Mercurial > hg > Aquinas


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            <h2 id="FS.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS: ACTS PECULIAR TO MAN (QQ[6]-21)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS_Q6">Q. 6. OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q7">Q. 7. OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q8">Q. 8. OF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q9">Q. 9. OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q10">Q. 10. OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q11">Q. 11. OF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q12">Q. 12. OF INTENTION (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q13">Q. 13. OF CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL WITH REGARD TO THE MEANS (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q14">Q. 14. OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q15">Q. 15. OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q16">Q. 16. OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q17">Q. 17. OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (NINE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q18">Q. 18. OF THE GOOD AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS, IN GENERAL (ELEVEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q19">Q. 19. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL (TEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q20">Q. 20. OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN AFFAIRS (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q21">Q. 21. OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/></div>
            <div id="FS_Q6" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q6-p0.1">Q. 6. OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q6-p2"> Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we must in due sequence consider human acts, in order
                  to know by what acts we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining it. But because operations
                  and acts are concerned with things singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of
                  things in detail. The study of Morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider first the general
                  principles; and secondly matters of detail.
               </p><p id="FS_Q6-p3"> In treating of the general principles, the points that offer themselves for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves;
                  (2) their principles. Now of human acts some are proper to man; others are common to man and animals. And since Happiness
                  is man's proper good, those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with Happiness than have those which are
                  common to man and the other animals. First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly,
                  those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are called Passions. The first of these points offers a twofold
                  consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What distinguishes human acts?
               </p><p id="FS_Q6-p4"> And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper
                  to man; we must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary.
               </p><p id="FS_Q6-p5"> First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general; secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being
                  elicited by the will, and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those acts which are voluntary, as being commanded
                  by the will, which issue from the will through the medium of the other powers.
               </p><p id="FS_Q6-p6"> And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first
                  consider the voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances of those acts which are found to be voluntary
                  or involuntary. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FS_Q6-p7"><a href="#FS_Q6_A1"> (1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q6-p8"><a href="#FS_Q6_A2"> (2) Whether in irrational animals?</a></p><p id="FS_Q6-p9"><a href="#FS_Q6_A3"> (3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action?</a></p><p id="FS_Q6-p10"><a href="#FS_Q6_A4"> (4) Whether violence can be done to the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q6-p11"><a href="#FS_Q6_A5"> (5) Whether violence causes involuntariness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q6-p12"><a href="#FS_Q6_A6"> (6) Whether fear causes involuntariness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q6-p13"><a href="#FS_Q6_A7"> (7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q6-p14"><a href="#FS_Q6_A8"> (8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 pr."><a name="33741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33741]
Iª-IIae q. 6 pr.</span></a> Quia igitur ad beatitudinem per
actus aliquos necesse est pervenire, oportet consequenter de
humanis actibus considerare, ut sciamus quibus actibus perveniatur
ad beatitudinem, vel impediatur beatitudinis via. Sed quia
operationes et actus circa singularia sunt, ideo omnis operativa
scientia in particulari consideratione perficitur. Moralis igitur
consideratio quia est humanorum actuum, primo quidem tradenda est
in universali secundo vero, in particulari. Circa universalem autem
considerationem humanorum actuum, primo quidem considerandum
occurrit de ipsis actibus humanis; secundo, de principiis eorum.
Humanorum autem actuum quidam sunt hominis proprii; quidam autem
sunt homini et aliis animalibus communes. Et quia beatitudo est
proprium hominis bonum, propinquius se habent ad beatitudinem actus
qui sunt proprie humani, quam actus qui sunt homini aliisque
animalibus communes. Primo ergo considerandum est de actibus qui
sunt proprii hominis; secundo, de actibus qui sunt homini aliisque
animalibus communes, qui dicuntur animae passiones. Circa primum
duo consideranda occurrunt, primo, de conditione humanorum actuum;
secundo, de distinctione eorum. Cum autem actus humani proprie
dicantur qui sunt voluntarii, eo quod voluntas est rationalis
appetitus, qui est proprius hominis; oportet considerare de actibus
inquantum sunt voluntarii. Primo ergo considerandum est de
voluntario et involuntario in communi; secundo, de actibus qui sunt
voluntarii quasi ab ipsa voluntate eliciti, ut immediate ipsius
voluntatis existentes; tertio, de actibus qui sunt voluntarii quasi
a voluntate imperati, qui sunt ipsius voluntatis mediantibus aliis
potentiis. Et quia actus voluntarii habent quasdam circumstantias,
secundum quas diiudicantur, primo considerandum est de voluntario
et involuntario; et consequenter de circumstantiis ipsorum actuum
in quibus voluntarium et involuntarium invenitur. Circa primum
quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum in humanis actibus inveniatur
voluntarium. Secundo, utrum inveniatur in animalibus brutis.
Tertio, utrum voluntarium esse possit absque omni actu. Quarto,
utrum violentia voluntati possit inferri. Quinto, utrum violentia
causet involuntarium. Sexto, utrum metus causet involuntarium.
Septimo, utrum concupiscentia involuntarium causet. Octavo, utrum
ignorantia.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q6_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A1-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 1. Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human acts. For that is voluntary "which has its principle within itself."
                     as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii.], Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare.
                     But the principle of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since man's appetite is moved to act, by the appetible
                     object which is outside him, and is as a "mover unmoved" (De Anima iii, 10).
                     Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33742] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod in humanis actibus non inveniatur
voluntarium. Voluntarium enim est cuius principium est in ipso; ut
patet per Gregorium Nyssenum, et Damascenum, et Aristotelem. Sed
principium humanorum actuum non est in ipso homine, sed est extra,
nam appetitus hominis movetur ad agendum ab appetibili quod est
extra quod est sicut movens non motum, ut dicitur in III de anima.
Ergo in humanis actibus non invenitur voluntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) proves that in animals no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion from
                     without. But all human acts are new, since none is eternal. Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from without:
                     and therefore there is nothing voluntary in them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33743] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
philosophus in VIII Physic. probat quod non invenitur in animalibus
aliquis motus novus, qui non praeveniatur ab alio motu exteriori.
Sed omnes actus hominis sunt novi, nullus enim actus hominis
aeternus est. Ergo principium omnium humanorum actuum est ab extra.
Non igitur in eis invenitur voluntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act of himself. But this is not true of man; for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q6_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.5" target="asv">Jn. 15:5</a>): "Without Me you can do nothing." Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33744] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
qui voluntarie agit, per se agere potest. Sed hoc homini non
convenit, dicitur enim Ioan. XV, <i>sine me nihil potestis
facere</i>. Ergo voluntarium in humanis actibus non invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation." Now such are human acts.
                     Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33745] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicit Damascenus, in II libro, quod <i>voluntarium est
actus qui est operatio rationalis</i>. Tales autem sunt actus
humani. Ergo in actibus humanis invenitur voluntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There must needs be something voluntary in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle
                     of some acts or movements is within the agent, or that which is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is
                     outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the stone: whereas when it is moved
                     downwards, the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by
                     an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. For since every agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end,
                     as stated above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A2" id="FS_Q6_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[2]</a>); those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of movement
                     for an end. Now in order for a thing to be done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so
                     acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of
                     the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if
                     a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of action or movement, nevertheless the principle
                     of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards
                     an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is imprinted on
                     it. Wherefore such like things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have a knowledge
                     of the end are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an
                     end. And consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit, that they act and that they act for an end, the
                     movements of such things are said to be voluntary: for the word "voluntary" implies that their movements and acts are from
                     their own inclination. Hence it is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene [*See
                     Objection 1], the voluntary is defined not only as having "a principle within" the agent, but also as implying "knowledge."
                     Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be
                     found.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 co."><a name="33746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33746] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod oportet in actibus humanis voluntarium esse. Ad cuius
evidentiam, considerandum est quod quorundam actuum seu motuum
principium est in agente, seu in eo quod movetur; quorundam autem
motuum vel actuum principium est extra. Cum enim lapis movetur
sursum, principium huius motionis est extra lapidem, sed cum
movetur deorsum, principium huius motionis est in ipso lapide.
Eorum autem quae a principio intrinseco moventur, quaedam movent
seipsa, quaedam autem non. Cum enim omne agens seu motum agat seu
moveatur propter finem, ut supra habitum est; illa perfecte
moventur a principio intrinseco, in quibus est aliquod intrinsecum
principium non solum ut moveantur, sed ut moveantur in finem. Ad
hoc autem quod fiat aliquid propter finem, requiritur cognitio
finis aliqualis. Quodcumque igitur sic agit vel movetur a principio
intrinseco, quod habet aliquam notitiam finis, habet in seipso
principium sui actus non solum ut agat, sed etiam ut agat propter
finem. Quod autem nullam notitiam finis habet, etsi in eo sit
principium actionis vel motus; non tamen eius quod est agere vel
moveri propter finem est principium in ipso, sed in alio, a quo ei
imprimitur principium suae motionis in finem. Unde huiusmodi non
dicuntur movere seipsa, sed ab aliis moveri. Quae vero habent
notitiam finis dicuntur seipsa movere, quia in eis est principium
non solum ut agant, sed etiam ut agant propter finem. Et ideo, cum
utrumque sit ab intrinseco principio, scilicet quod agunt, et quod
propter finem agunt, horum motus et actus dicuntur voluntarii, hoc
enim importat nomen voluntarii, quod motus et actus sit a propria
inclinatione. Et inde est quod voluntarium dicitur esse, secundum
definitionem Aristotelis et Gregorii Nysseni et Damasceni, non
solum cuius principium est intra, sed cum additione scientiae.
Unde, cum homo maxime cognoscat finem sui operis et moveat seipsum,
in eius actibus maxime voluntarium invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every principle is a first principle. Therefore, although it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be
                     within the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused
                     or moved by an extrinsic principle: because it is not essential to the voluntary act that its intrinsic principle be a first
                     principle. Yet again it must be observed that a principle of movement may happen to
                     be first in a genus, but not first simply: thus in the genus of things subject to alteration, the first principle of alteration
                     is a heavenly body, which is nevertheless, is not the first mover simply, but is moved locally by a higher mover. And so the
                     intrinsic principle of the voluntary act, i.e. the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first principle in the genus of
                     appetitive movement, although it is moved by an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33747] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod non omne principium est principium primum. Licet ergo
de ratione voluntarii sit quod principium eius sit intra, non tamen
est contra rationem voluntarii quod principium intrinsecum causetur
vel moveatur ab exteriori principio, quia non est de ratione
voluntarii quod principium intrinsecum sit principium primum. Sed
tamen sciendum quod contingit aliquod principium motus esse primum
in genere, quod tamen non est primum simpliciter sicut in genere
alterabilium primum alterans est corpus caeleste, quod tamen non
est primum movens simpliciter, sed movetur motu locali a superiori
movente. Sic igitur principium intrinsecum voluntarii actus, quod
est vis cognoscitiva et appetitiva, est primum principium in genere
appetitivi motus, quamvis moveatur ab aliquo exteriori secundum
alias species motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a motion from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far as by means
                     of an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted with something sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite.
                     Thus a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and coming towards him, begins to be moved towards the stag. Secondly, in so far
                     as some extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animal's body, as
                     in the case of cold or heat; and through the body being affected by the motion of an outward body, the sensitive appetite
                     which is the power of a bodily organ, is also moved indirectly; thus it happens that through some alteration in the body the
                     appetite is roused to the desire of something. But this is not contrary to the nature of voluntariness, as stated above (ad
                     1), for such movements caused by an extrinsic principle are of another genus of movement.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33748] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod motus animalis novus praevenitur quidem ab aliquo
exteriori motu quantum ad duo. Uno modo, inquantum per motum
exteriorem praesentatur sensui animalis aliquod sensibile, quod
apprehensum movet appetitum, sicut leo videns cervum per eius motum
appropinquantem, incipit moveri ad ipsum. Alio modo, inquantum per
exteriorem motum incipit aliqualiter immutari naturali immutatione
corpus animalis, puta per frigus vel calorem; corpore autem
immutato per motum exterioris corporis, immutatur etiam per
accidens appetitus sensitivus, qui est virtus organi corporei;
sicut cum ex aliqua alteratione corporis commovetur appetitus ad
concupiscentiam alicuius rei. Sed hoc non est contra rationem
voluntarii, ut dictum est huiusmodi enim motiones ab exteriori
principio sunt alterius generis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by
                     moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And
                     just as it is not incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from God as the First Mover, inasmuch as nature is
                     an instrument of God moving it: so it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary
                     act, that it proceed from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless both natural and voluntary movements have
                     this in common, that it is essential that they should proceed from a principle within the agent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33749] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Deus movet hominem ad agendum non solum sicut
proponens sensui appetibile, vel sicut immutans corpus, sed etiam
sicut movens ipsam voluntatem, quia omnis motus tam voluntatis quam
naturae, ab eo procedit sicut a primo movente. Et sicut non est
contra rationem naturae quod motus naturae sit a Deo sicut a primo
movente, inquantum natura est quoddam instrumentum Dei moventis;
ita non est contra rationem actus voluntarii quod sit a Deo,
inquantum voluntas a Deo movetur. Est tamen communiter de ratione
naturalis et voluntarii motus, quod sint a principio
intrinseco.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q6_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A2-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 2. Whether there is anything voluntary in irrational animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in irrational animals. For a thing is called "voluntary" from "voluntas" [will].
                     Now since the will is in the reason (De Anima iii, 9), it cannot be in irrational animals. Therefore neither is there anything
                     voluntary in them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33750] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntarium non sit in brutis
animalibus. Voluntarium enim a voluntate dicitur. Voluntas autem,
cum sit in ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima, non potest esse in
brutis animalibus. Ergo neque voluntarium in eis invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according as human acts are voluntary, man is said to be master of his actions. But irrational animals are not masters
                     of their actions; for "they act not; rather are they acted upon," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 27). Therefore there
                     is no such thing as a voluntary act in irrational animals.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33751] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum hoc quod actus humani sunt voluntarii, homo dicitur esse
dominus suorum actuum. Sed bruta animalia non habent dominium sui
actus, <i>non enim agunt, sed magis aguntur</i>, ut Damascenus
dicit. Ergo in brutis animalibus non est voluntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 24) that "voluntary acts lead to praise and blame." But neither praise nor blame is
                     due to the acts of irrational minds. Therefore such acts are not voluntary.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33752] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Damascenus dicit quod <i>actus voluntarios sequitur laus et
vituperium</i>. Sed actibus brutorum animalium non debetur neque
laus neque vituperium. Ergo in eis non est voluntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "both children and irrational animals participate in the voluntary." The same is
                     said by Damascene (De Fide Orth. 24) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxii.].
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33753] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicit philosophus, in III Ethic., quod <i>pueri et bruta
animalia communicant voluntario</i>. Et idem dicunt Damascenus et
Gregorius Nyssenus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q6_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q6_A1" id="FS_Q6_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, together with some knowledge of the end. Now
                     knowledge of the end is twofold; perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the
                     thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And
                     such knowledge belongs to none but the
                     rational nature. But imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the
                     aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals, through
                     their senses and their natural estimative power.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q6_A2-p7"> Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man
                     can, from deliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end. But imperfect knowledge of
                     the end leads to the imperfect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does not deliberate, and is moved
                     to the end at once. Wherefore the voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature: whereas the
                     imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even irrational animals.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 co."><a name="33754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33754] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad rationem voluntarii requiritur
quod principium actus sit intra, cum aliqua cognitione finis. Est
autem duplex cognitio finis, perfecta scilicet, et imperfecta.
Perfecta quidem finis cognitio est quando non solum apprehenditur
res quae est finis sed etiam cognoscitur ratio finis, et proportio
eius quod ordinatur in finem ad ipsum. Et talis cognitio finis
competit soli rationali naturae. Imperfecta autem cognitio finis
est quae in sola finis apprehensione consistit, sine hoc quod
cognoscatur ratio finis, et proportio actus ad finem. Et talis
cognitio finis invenitur in brutis animalibus, per sensum et
aestimationem naturalem. Perfectam igitur cognitionem finis
sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam, prout scilicet,
apprehenso fine, aliquis potest, deliberans de fine et de his quae
sunt ad finem, moveri in finem vel non moveri. Imperfectam autem
cognitionem finis sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem
imperfectam, prout scilicet apprehendens finem non deliberat, sed
subito movetur in ipsum. Unde soli rationali naturae competit
voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam, sed secundum rationem
imperfectam, competit etiam brutis animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will is the name of the rational appetite; and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word "voluntary"
                     is derived from "voluntas" [will], and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will, by way
                     of likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to
                     an end, through some kind of knowledge.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33755] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod voluntas nominat rationalem appetitum, et ideo non
potest esse in his quae ratione carent. Voluntarium autem
denominative dicitur a voluntate, et potest trahi ad ea in quibus
est aliqua participatio voluntatis, secundum aliquam convenientiam
ad voluntatem. Et hoc modo voluntarium attribuitur animalibus
brutis, inquantum scilicet per cognitionem aliquam moventur in
finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that man is master of his actions, is due to his being able to deliberate about them: for since the deliberating
                     reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, the will can be inclined to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness
                     is in irrational animals, as stated above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33756] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ex hoc contingit quod homo est dominus sui actus,
quod habet deliberationem de suis actibus, ex hoc enim quod ratio
deliberans se habet ad opposita, voluntas in utrumque potest. Sed
secundum hoc voluntarium non est in brutis animalibus, ut dictum
est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Praise and blame are the result of the voluntary act, wherein is the perfect voluntary; such as is not to be found in irrational
                     animals.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33757] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod laus et vituperium consequuntur actum voluntarium
secundum perfectam voluntarii rationem; qualis non invenitur in
brutis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q6_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A3-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 3. Whether there can be voluntariness without any act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing
                     can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of the will. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without
                     act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33758] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntarium non possit esse sine actu.
Voluntarium enim dicitur quod est a voluntate. Sed nihil potest
esse a voluntate nisi per aliquem actum, ad minus ipsius
voluntatis. Ergo voluntarium non potest esse sine actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to wish.
                     But not to wish implies involuntariness, which is contrary to voluntariness. Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when
                     the act of the will ceases.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33759] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut per actum voluntatis dicitur aliquis velle, ita cessante actu
voluntatis dicitur non velle. Sed non velle involuntarium causat,
quod opponitur voluntario. Ergo voluntarium non potest esse, actu
voluntatis cessante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q6_A1" id="FS_Q6_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). But knowledge involves an act. Therefore voluntariness cannot be without some act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33760] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
de ratione voluntarii est cognitio, ut dictum est. Sed cognitio est
per aliquem actum. Ergo voluntarium non potest esse absque aliquo
actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The word "voluntary" is applied to that of which we are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act,
                     to will and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33761] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
illud cuius domini sumus, dicitur esse voluntarium. Sed nos domini
sumus eius quod est agere et non agere, velle et non velle. Ergo
sicut agere et velle est voluntarium, ita et non agere et non
velle.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q6_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one thing proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly; in which sense
                     something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts; for instance, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which
                     sense something proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus the sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman,
                     from his having ceased to steer. But we must take note that the cause of what follows
                     from want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but only then when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman
                     were unable to steer the ship or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship would not be set down
                     to him, although it might be due to his absence from the helm.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q6_A3-p7"> Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing
                     and not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an
                     act; sometimes without outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills not to act; and sometimes without
                     even an interior act, as when one does not will to act.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 co."><a name="33762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33762] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod voluntarium dicitur quod est a voluntate. Ab aliquo
autem dicitur esse aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, directe, quod
scilicet procedit ab aliquo inquantum est agens, sicut calefactio a
calore. Alio modo, indirecte, ex hoc ipso quod non agit, sicut
submersio navis dicitur esse a gubernatore, inquantum desistit a
gubernando. Sed sciendum quod non semper id quod sequitur ad
defectum actionis, reducitur sicut in causam in agens, ex eo quod
non agit, sed solum tunc cum potest et debet agere. Si enim
gubernator non posset navem dirigere, vel non esset ei commissa
gubernatio navis, non imputaretur ei navis submersio, quae per
absentiam gubernatoris contingeret. Quia igitur voluntas, volendo
et agendo, potest impedire hoc quod est non velle et non agere, et
aliquando debet; hoc quod est non velle et non agere, imputatur ei,
quasi ab ipsa existens. Et sic voluntarium potest esse absque actu,
quandoque quidem absque actu exteriori, cum actu interiori, sicut
cum vult non agere; aliquando autem et absque actu interiori, sicut
cum non vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We apply the word "voluntary" not only to that which proceeds from the will directly, as from its action; but also to that
                     which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33763] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod voluntarium dicitur non solum quod procedit a
voluntate directe, sicut ab agente; sed etiam quod est ab ea
indirecte, sicut a non agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Not to wish" is said in two senses. First, as though it were one word, and the infinitive of "I-do-not-wish." Consequently
                     just as when I say "I do not wish to read," the sense is, "I wish not to read"; so "not to wish to read" is the same as "to
                     wish not to read," and in this sense "not to wish" implies involuntariness. Secondly it is taken as a sentence: and then no
                     act of the will is affirmed. And in this sense "not to wish" does not imply
                     involuntariness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33764] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod non velle dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, prout sumitur
in vi unius dictionis, secundum quod est infinitivum huius verbi
nolo. Unde sicut cum dico nolo legere, sensus est, volo non legere;
ita hoc quod est non velle legere, significat velle non legere. Et
sic non velle causat involuntarium. Alio modo sumitur in vi
orationis. Et tunc non affirmatur actus voluntatis. Et huiusmodi
non velle non causat involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in
                     one's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to
                     act, is voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33765] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod eo modo requiritur ad voluntarium actus cognitionis,
sicut et actus voluntatis; ut scilicet sit in potestate alicuius
considerare et velle et agere. Et tunc sicut non velle et non
agere, cum tempus fuerit, est voluntarium, ita etiam non
considerare.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q6_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A4-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 4. Whether violence can be done to the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But
                     there is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will. Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33766] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntati possit violentia inferri.
Unumquodque enim potest cogi a potentiori. Sed aliquid est humana
voluntate potentius, scilicet Deus. Ergo saltem ab eo cogi
potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active principle, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive
                     force: for it is a "mover moved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is sometimes moved by its active principle, it seems
                     that sometimes it is compelled.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33767] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
omne passivum cogitur a suo activo, quando immutatur ab eo. Sed
voluntas est vis passiva, est enim movens motum, ut dicitur in III
de anima. Cum ergo aliquando moveatur a suo activo, videtur quod
aliquando cogatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature;
                     as is clear of the will's movement to sin, which is contrary to nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore
                     the movement of the will can be compelled.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33768] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
motus violentus est qui est contra naturam. Sed motus voluntatis
aliquando est contra naturam; ut patet de motu voluntatis ad
peccandum, qui est contra naturam, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo motus
voluntatis potest esse coactus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that what is done by the will is not done of necessity. Now, whatever is done under compulsion
                     is done of necessity: consequently what is done by the will, cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to
                     act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33769] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, quod si aliquid fit
voluntate, non fit ex necessitate. Omne autem coactum fit ex
necessitate. Ergo quod fit ex voluntate, non potest esse coactum.
Ergo voluntas non potest cogi ad agendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q6_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, "to wish"; the other is an
                     act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power, such as "to walk" and "to speak," which
                     are commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q6_A4-p7"> As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior
                     members from executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be done to the will.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q6_A4-p8"> The reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from the interior principle
                     of knowledge: just as the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an interior principle without knowledge. Now
                     what is compelled or violent is from an exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to the nature of the will's own act,
                     that it should be subject to compulsion and violence: just as it is also contrary to the nature of a natural
                     inclination or movement. For a stone may have an upward movement from violence, but that this violent movement be from its
                     natural inclination is impossible. In like manner a man may be dragged by force: but it is contrary to the very notion of
                     violence, that he be dragged of his own will.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 co."><a name="33770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33770] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod duplex est actus voluntatis, unus quidem qui est eius
immediate, velut ab ipsa elicitus, scilicet velle; alius autem est
actus voluntatis a voluntate imperatus, et mediante alia potentia
exercitus, ut ambulare et loqui, qui a voluntate imperantur
mediante potentia motiva. Quantum igitur ad actus a voluntate
imperatos, voluntas violentiam pati potest, inquantum per
violentiam exteriora membra impediri possunt ne imperium voluntatis
exequantur. Sed quantum ad ipsum proprium actum voluntatis, non
potest ei violentia inferri. Et huius ratio est quia actus
voluntatis nihil est aliud quam inclinatio quaedam procedens ab
interiori principio cognoscente, sicut appetitus naturalis est
quaedam inclinatio ab interiori principio et sine cognitione. Quod
autem est coactum vel violentum, est ab exteriori principio. Unde
contra rationem ipsius actus voluntatis est quod sit coactus vel
violentus, sicut etiam est contra rationem naturalis inclinationis
vel motus. Potest enim lapis per violentiam sursum ferri, sed quod
iste motus violentus sit ex eius naturali inclinatione, esse non
potest. Similiter etiam potest homo per violentiam trahi, sed quod
hoc sit ex eius voluntate, repugnat rationi violentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God Who is more powerful than the human will, can move the will of man, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q6_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.21.1" target="asv"> Prov. 21:1</a>: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it." But if this were by compulsion,
                     it would no longer be by an act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33771] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Deus, qui est potentior quam voluntas humana, potest
voluntatem humanam movere; secundum illud Prov. XXI, <i>cor regis
in manu Dei est, et quocumque voluerit, vertet illud</i>. Sed si
hoc esset per violentiam, iam non esset cum actu voluntatis nec
ipsa voluntas moveretur, sed aliquid contra voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not always a violent movement, when a passive subject is moved by its active principle; but only when this is done
                     against the interior inclination of the passive subject. Otherwise every alteration and generation of simply bodies would
                     be unnatural and violent: whereas they are natural by reason of the natural interior aptitude of the matter or subject to
                     such a disposition. In like manner when the will is moved, according to its own
                     inclination, by the appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33772] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod non semper est motus violentus, quando passivum
immutatur a suo activo, sed quando hoc fit contra interiorem
inclinationem passivi. Alioquin omnes alterationes et generationes
simplicium corporum essent innaturales et violentae. Sunt autem
naturales, propter naturalem aptitudinem interiorem materiae vel
subiecti ad talem dispositionem. Et similiter quando voluntas
movetur ab appetibili secundum propriam inclinationem, non est
motus violentus, sed voluntarius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That to which the will tends by sinning, although in reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, nevertheless
                     is apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable
                     sensation or some vicious habit.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33773] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod id in quod voluntas tendit peccando, etsi sit malum
et contra rationalem naturam secundum rei veritatem, apprehenditur
tamen ut bonum et conveniens naturae, inquantum est conveniens
homini secundum aliquam passionem sensus, vel secundum aliquem
habitum corruptum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q6_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A5-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 5. Whether violence causes involuntariness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that violence does not cause involuntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness in respect
                     of the will. But violence cannot be done to the will, as shown above
                     <a href="#FS_Q6_A4" id="FS_Q6_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Therefore violence cannot cause involuntariness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33774] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod violentia non causet involuntarium.
Voluntarium enim et involuntarium secundum voluntatem dicuntur. Sed
voluntati violentia inferri non potest, ut ostensum est. Ergo
violentia involuntarium causare non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is done involuntarily is done with grief, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic.
                     iii, 5) say. But sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being grieved thereby. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33775] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
id quod est involuntarium, est cum tristitia, ut Damascenus et
philosophus dicunt. Sed aliquando patitur aliquis violentiam, nec
tamen inde tristatur. Ergo violentia non causat involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is from the will cannot be involuntary. But some violent actions proceed from the will: for instance, when
                     a man with a heavy body goes upwards; or when a man contorts his limbs in a way contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore
                     violence does not cause involuntariness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33776] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
id quod est a voluntate, non potest esse involuntarium. Sed aliqua
violenta sunt a voluntate, sicut cum aliquis cum corpore gravi
sursum ascendit; et sicut cum aliquis inflectit membra contra
naturalem eorum flexibilitatem. Ergo violentia non causat
involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) say that "things done under compulsion are involuntary."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33777] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod philosophus et Damascenus dicunt, quod <i>aliquid est
involuntarium per violentiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this in
                     common, that both are from an intrinsic principle; whereas violence is from an extrinsic principle. And for this reason, just
                     as in things devoid of knowledge, violence effects something against nature: so in things endowed with knowledge, it effects
                     something against the will. Now that which is against nature is said to be "unnatural";
                     and in like manner that which is against the will is said to be "involuntary." Therefore violence causes involuntariness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 co."><a name="33778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33778] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod violentia directe opponitur voluntario, sicut etiam
et naturali. Commune est enim voluntario et naturali quod utrumque
sit a principio intrinseco, violentum autem est a principio
extrinseco. Et propter hoc, sicut in rebus quae cognitione carent,
violentia aliquid facit contra naturam; ita in rebus cognoscentibus
facit aliquid esse contra voluntatem. Quod autem est contra
naturam, dicitur esse innaturale, et similiter quod est contra
voluntatem, dicitur esse involuntarium. Unde violentia
involuntarium causat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Now it has been said
                     <a href="#FS_Q6_A4" id="FS_Q6_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a> that not only the act, which proceeds immediately from the will, is called voluntary, but also the act commanded by the will.
                     Consequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as stated above

                     <a href="#FS_Q6_A4" id="FS_Q6_A5-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>: wherefore violence cannot make that act involuntary. But as to the commanded
                     act, the will can suffer violence: and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33779] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod involuntarium voluntario opponitur. Dictum est autem
supra quod voluntarium dicitur non solum actus qui est immediate
ipsius voluntatis, sed etiam actus a voluntate imperatus. Quantum
igitur ad actum qui est immediate ipsius voluntatis, ut supra
dictum est, violentia voluntati inferri non potest, unde talem
actum violentia involuntarium facere non potest. Sed quantum ad
actum imperatum, voluntas potest pati violentiam. Et quantum ad
hunc actum, violentia involuntarium facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As that is said to be natural, which is according to the inclination of nature; so that is said to be voluntary, which is
                     according to the inclination of the will. Now a thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, because it is from nature
                     as from an active principle: thus it is natural for fire to produce heat. Secondly, according to a passive principle; because,
                     to wit, there is in nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic
                     principle: thus the movement of the heavens is said to be natural, by reason of the natural aptitude in a heavenly body to
                     receive such movement; although the cause of that movement is a voluntary agent. In like manner an act is said to be voluntary
                     in two ways. First, in regard to action, for instance, when one wishes to be passive to another. Hence when action is brought
                     to bear on something, by an extrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer that action remains in the passive subject,
                     there is not violence simply: for although the patient does nothing by way of action, he does something by being willing to
                     suffer. Consequently this cannot be called involuntary.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33780] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut naturale dicitur quod est secundum
inclinationem naturae, ita voluntarium dicitur quod est secundum
inclinationem voluntatis. Dicitur autem aliquid naturale
dupliciter. Uno modo, quia est a natura sicut a principio activo,
sicut calefacere est naturale igni. Alio modo, secundum principium
passivum, quia scilicet est in natura inclinatio ad recipiendum
actionem a principio extrinseco, sicut motus caeli dicitur esse
naturalis, propter aptitudinem naturalem caelestis corporis ad
talem motum, licet movens sit voluntarium. Et similiter voluntarium
potest aliquid dici dupliciter, uno modo, secundum actionem, puta
cum aliquis vult aliquid agere; alio modo, secundum passionem,
scilicet cum aliquis vult pati ab alio. Unde cum actio infertur ab
aliquo exteriori, manente in eo qui patitur voluntate patiendi, non
est simpliciter violentum, quia licet ille qui patitur non conferat
agendo, confert tamen volendo pati. Unde non potest dici
involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4) the movement of an animal, whereby at times an animal is moved against the natural
                     inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, is nevertheless somewhat natural to the animal, to which
                     it is natural to be moved according to its appetite. Accordingly this is violent, not simply but in a certain respect. The
                     same remark applies in the case of one who contorts his limbs in a way that is contrary
                     to their natural disposition. For this is violent in a certain respect, i.e. as to that particular limb; but not simply, i.e.
                     as to the man himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33781] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in VIII Physic., motus
animalis quo interdum movetur animal contra naturalem inclinationem
corporis, etsi non sit naturalis corpori, est tamen quodammodo
naturalis animali, cui naturale est quod secundum appetitum
moveatur. Et ideo hoc non est violentum simpliciter, sed secundum
quid. Et similiter est dicendum cum aliquis inflectit membra contra
naturalem dispositionem. Hoc enim est violentum secundum quid,
scilicet quantum ad membrum particulare non tamen simpliciter,
quantum ad ipsum hominem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q6_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A6-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 6. Whether fear causes involuntariness simply?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply. For just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at
                     the time, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will. But violence causes involuntariness simply. Therefore
                     fear too causes involuntariness simply.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33782] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod metus causet involuntarium
simpliciter. Sicut enim violentia est respectu eius quod
contrariatur praesentialiter voluntati, ita metus est respectu mali
futuri quod repugnat voluntati. Sed violentia causat involuntarium
simpliciter. Ergo et metus involuntarium simpliciter causat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is such of itself, remains such, whatever be added to it: thus what is hot of itself, as long as it remains,
                     is still hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is done through fear, is involuntary in itself. Therefore, even with
                     the addition of fear, it is involuntary.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33783] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quod est secundum se tale, quolibet addito remanet tale, sicut quod
secundum se est calidum, cuicumque coniungatur, nihilominus est
calidum, ipso manente. Sed illud quod per metum agitur, secundum se
est involuntarium. Ergo etiam adveniente metu est
involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is such in a certain respect; whereas what is such, without any condition,
                     is such simply: thus what is necessary, subject to a condition, is necessary in some respect: but what is necessary absolutely,
                     is necessary simply. But that which is done through fear, is absolutely involuntary; and is not voluntary, save under a condition,
                     namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided. Therefore that which is
                     done through fear, is involuntary simply.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33784] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quod sub conditione est tale, secundum quid est tale; quod autem
absque conditione est tale, simpliciter est tale, sicut quod est
necessarium ex conditione, est necessarium secundum quid; quod
autem est necessarium absolute, est necessarium simpliciter. Sed id
quod per metum agitur, est involuntarium absolute, non est autem
voluntarium nisi sub conditione, scilicet ut vitetur malum quod
timetur. Ergo id quod per metum agitur, est simpliciter
involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things as are done through
                     fear are "voluntary rather than involuntary."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33785] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, et etiam philosophus quod
huiusmodi quae per metum aguntur, sunt magis voluntaria quam
involuntaria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q6_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such
                     things are done through fear "are of a mixed character," being partly voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is
                     done through fear, considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in this particular case, in order, namely,
                     to avoid the evil feared.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q6_A6-p7"> But if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply,
                     but involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply, according as it is in act; but according as it is
                     only in apprehension, it is not simply, but in a certain respect. Now that which is done through fear, is in act in so far
                     as it is done. For, since acts are concerned with singulars; and the singular, as such, is here and now; that which
                     is done is in act, in so far as it is here and now and under other individuating circumstances. And that which is done through
                     fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and now, that is to say, in so far as, under the circumstances, it hinders a greater
                     evil which was feared; thus the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear of the
                     danger: wherefore it is clear that it is voluntary simply. And hence it is that what is done out of fear is essentially
                     voluntary, because its principle is within. But if we consider what is done through fear, as outside this particular case,
                     and inasmuch as it is repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration of the mind. And consequently what is done through
                     fear is involuntary, considered in that respect, that is to say, outside the actual circumstances of the case.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 co."><a name="33786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33786] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., et idem dicit
Gregorius Nyssenus in libro suo de homine, huiusmodi quae per metum
aguntur, <i>mixta sunt ex voluntario et involuntario</i>. Id enim
quod per metum agitur, in se consideratum, non est voluntarium, sed
fit voluntarium in casu, scilicet ad vitandum malum quod timetur.
Sed si quis recte consideret, magis sunt huiusmodi voluntaria quam
involuntaria, sunt enim voluntaria simpliciter, involuntaria autem
secundum quid. Unumquodque enim simpliciter esse dicitur secundum
quod est in actu, secundum autem quod est in sola apprehensione,
non est simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Hoc autem quod per metum
agitur, secundum hoc est in actu, secundum quod fit, cum enim actus
in singularibus sint, singulare autem, inquantum huiusmodi, est hic
et nunc; secundum hoc id quod fit est in actu, secundum quod est
hic et nunc et sub aliis conditionibus individualibus. Sic autem
hoc quod fit per metum, est voluntarium, inquantum scilicet est hic
et nunc, prout scilicet in hoc casu est impedimentum maioris mali
quod timebatur, sicut proiectio mercium in mare fit voluntarium
tempore tempestatis, propter timorem periculi. Unde manifestum est
quod simpliciter voluntarium est. Unde et competit ei ratio
voluntarii, quia principium eius est intra. Sed quod accipiatur id
quod per metum fit, ut extra hunc casum existens, prout repugnat
voluntati, hoc non est nisi secundum considerationem tantum. Et
ideo est involuntarium secundum quid, idest prout consideratur
extra hunc casum existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things done through fear and compulsion differ not only according to present and future time, but also in this, that the
                     will does not consent, but is moved entirely counter to that which is done through compulsion: whereas what is done through
                     fear, becomes voluntary, because the will is moved towards it, albeit not for its own sake, but on account of something else,
                     that is, in order to avoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions of a
                     voluntary act are satisfied, if it be done on account of something else voluntary: since the voluntary is not only what we
                     wish, for its own sake, as an end, but also what we wish for the sake of something else, as an end. It is clear therefore
                     that in what is done from compulsion, the will does nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done through fear, the will does
                     something. Accordingly, as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] says, in order to exclude things done through fear,
                     a
                     violent action is defined as not only one, "the principal whereof is from without," but with the addition, "in which he that
                     suffers violence concurs not at all"; because the will of him that is in fear, does concur somewhat in that which he does
                     through fear.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33787] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ea quae aguntur per metum et per vim, non solum
differunt secundum praesens et futurum, sed etiam secundum hoc,
quod in eo quod agitur per vim, voluntas non consentit, sed omnino
est contra motum voluntatis, sed id quod per metum agitur, fit
voluntarium, ideo quia motus voluntatis fertur in id, licet non
propter seipsum, sed propter aliud, scilicet ad repellendum malum
quod timetur. Sufficit enim ad rationem voluntarii quod sit propter
aliud voluntarium, voluntarium enim est non solum quod propter
seipsum volumus ut finem, sed etiam quod propter aliud volumus ut
propter finem. Patet ergo quod in eo quod per vim agitur, voluntas
interior nihil agit, sed in eo quod per metum agitur, voluntas
aliquid agit. Et ideo, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, ad excludendum
ea quae per metum aguntur, in definitione violenti non solum
dicitur quod violentum est cuius principium est extra, sed additur,
nihil conferente vim passo, quia ad id quod agitur per metum,
voluntas timentis aliquid confert.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things that are such absolutely, remain such, whatever be added to them; for instance, a cold thing, or a white thing: but
                     things that are such relatively, vary according as they are compared with different things. For what is big in comparison
                     with one thing, is small in comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it
                     were absolutely; but also for the sake of something else, as it were relatively.
                     Accordingly, nothing prevents a thing which was not voluntary in comparison with one thing, from becoming voluntary when compared
                     with another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33788] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ea quae absolute dicuntur, quolibet addito remanent
talia, sicut calidum et album, sed ea quae relative dicuntur,
variantur secundum comparationem ad diversa; quod enim est magnum
comparatum huic, est parvum comparatum alteri. Voluntarium autem
dicitur aliquid non solum propter seipsum, quasi absolute, sed
etiam propter aliud, quasi relative. Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquid
quod non esset voluntarium alteri comparatum fieri voluntarium per
comparationem ad aliud.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which is done through fear, is voluntary without any condition, that is to say, according as it is actually done: but
                     it is involuntary, under a certain condition, that is to say, if such a fear were not threatening. Consequently, this argument
                     proves rather the opposite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33789] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod illud quod per metum agitur, absque conditione est
voluntarium, idest secundum quod actu agitur, sed involuntarium est
sub conditione, idest si talis metus non immineret. Unde secundum
illam rationem magis potest concludi oppositum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q6_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A7-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 7. Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscence causes involuntariness. For just as fear is a passion, so is concupiscence. But fear causes
                     involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so too.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33790] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia causet involuntarium.
Sicut enim metus est quaedam passio, ita et concupiscentia. Sed
metus causat quodammodo involuntarium. Ergo etiam
concupiscentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the timid man through fear acts counter to that which he proposed, so does the incontinent, through concupiscence.
                     But fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so also.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33791] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut per timorem timidus agit contra id quod proponebat, ita
incontinens propter concupiscentiam. Sed timor aliquo modo causat
involuntarium. Ergo et concupiscentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge is necessary for voluntariness. But concupiscence impairs knowledge; for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
                     vi, 5) that "delight," or the lust of pleasure, "destroys the judgment of prudence." Therefore concupiscence causes involuntariness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33792] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
ad voluntarium requiritur cognitio. Sed concupiscentia corrumpit
cognitionem, dicit enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod delectatio,
sive concupiscentia delectationis, corrumpit aestimationem
prudentiae. Ergo concupiscentia causat involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24): "The involuntary act deserves mercy or indulgence, and is done with regret." But neither
                     of these can be said of that which is done out of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence does not cause involuntariness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33793] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Damascenus dicit, <i>involuntarium est misericordia vel
indulgentia dignum, et cum tristitia agitur</i>. Sed neutrum horum
competit ei quod per concupiscentiam agitur. Ergo concupiscentia
non causat involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on the contrary makes something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to
                     be voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence.
                     Therefore the effect of concupiscence is to make something to be voluntary rather than involuntary.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 co."><a name="33794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33794] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod concupiscentia non causat involuntarium, sed magis
facit aliquid voluntarium. Dicitur enim aliquid voluntarium ex eo
quod voluntas in id fertur. Per concupiscentiam autem voluntas
inclinatur ad volendum id quod concupiscitur. Et ideo
concupiscentia magis facit ad hoc quod aliquid sit voluntarium,
quam quod sit involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear regards evil, but concupiscence regards good. Now evil of itself is counter to the will, whereas good harmonizes with
                     the will. Therefore fear has a greater tendency than concupiscence to cause involuntariness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33795] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod timor est de malo, concupiscentia autem respicit
bonum. Malum autem secundum se contrariatur voluntati, sed bonum
est voluntati consonum. Unde magis se habet timor ad causandum
involuntarium quam concupiscentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He who acts from fear retains the repugnance of the will to that which he does, considered in itself. But he that acts from
                     concupiscence, e.g. an incontinent man, does not retain his former will whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence;
                     for his will is changed so that he desires that which previously he repudiated. Accordingly, that which is done out of fear
                     is involuntary, to a certain extent, but that which is done from concupiscence
                     is nowise involuntary. For the man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but not counter
                     to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33796] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod in eo qui per metum aliquid agit, manet repugnantia
voluntatis ad id quod agitur, secundum quod in se consideratur. Sed
in eo qui agit aliquid per concupiscentiam, sicut est incontinens,
non manet prior voluntas, qua repudiabat illud quod concupiscitur,
sed mutatur ad volendum id quod prius repudiabat. Et ideo quod per
metum agitur, quodammodo est involuntarium, sed quod per
concupiscentiam agitur, nullo modo. Nam incontinens concupiscentiae
agit contra id quod prius proponebat, non autem contra id quod nunc
vult, sed timidus agit contra id quod etiam nunc secundum se
vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether, as happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would
                     follow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet properly speaking it would not result in the act being involuntary,
                     because in things bereft of reason, there is neither voluntary nor involuntary. But sometimes in those actions which are done
                     from concupiscence, knowledge is not completely destroyed, because the
                     power of knowing is not taken away entirely, but only the actual consideration in some particular possible act. Nevertheless,
                     this itself is voluntary, according as by voluntary we mean that which is in the power of the will, for example "not to act"
                     or "not to will," and in like manner "not to consider"; for the will can resist the passion, as we shall state later on (
                     <a href="#FS_Q10_A3" id="FS_Q6_A7-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[10], A[3]</a>;
                     <a href="unknown.html#FS_Q77_A7" id="FS_Q6_A7-p9.2" shape="rect"> Q[77], A[7]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33797] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, si concupiscentia totaliter cognitionem auferret,
sicut contingit in illis qui propter concupiscentiam fiunt amentes,
sequeretur quod concupiscentia voluntarium tolleret. Nec tamen
proprie esset ibi involuntarium, quia in his quae usum rationis non
habent, neque voluntarium est neque involuntarium. Sed quandoque in
his quae per concupiscentiam aguntur, non totaliter tollitur
cognitio, quia non tollitur potestas cognoscendi; sed solum
consideratio actualis in particulari agibili. Et tamen hoc ipsum
est voluntarium, secundum quod voluntarium dicitur quod est in
potestate voluntatis, ut non agere et non velle, similiter autem et
non considerare, potest enim voluntas passioni resistere, ut infra
dicetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q6_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q6_A8-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 8. Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance does not cause involuntariness. For "the involuntary act deserves pardon," as Damascene says
                     (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But sometimes that which is done through ignorance does not deserve pardon, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q6_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.38" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:38</a>: "If any man know not, he shall not be known." Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="33798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33798] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non causet involuntarium.
Involuntarium enim veniam meretur, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed
interdum quod per ignorantiam agitur, veniam non meretur; secundum
illud I ad Cor. XIV, <i>si quis ignorat, ignorabitur</i>. Ergo
ignorantia non causat involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin implies ignorance; according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q6_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv"> Prov. 14: 22</a>: "They err, that work evil." If, therefore, ignorance causes involuntariness, it would follow that every sin is involuntary:
                     which is opposed to the saying of Augustine, that "every sin is voluntary" (De Vera Relig. xiv).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="33799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33799] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
omne peccatum est cum ignorantia; secundum illud Prov. XIV,
<i>errant qui operantur malum</i>. Si igitur ignorantia
involuntarium causet, sequeretur quod omne peccatum esset
involuntarium. Quod est contra Augustinum dicentem quod omne
peccatum est voluntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "involuntariness is not without sadness," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But some things are done out
                     of ignorance, but without sadness: for instance, a man may kill a foe, whom he wishes to kill, thinking at the time that he
                     is killing a stag. Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="33800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33800] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
involuntarium cum tristitia est, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed quaedam
ignoranter aguntur, et sine tristitia, puta si aliquis occidit
hostem quem quaerit occidere, putans occidere cervum. Ergo
ignorantia non causat involuntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that "what is done through ignorance is involuntary."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 8 s. c."><a name="33801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33801] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Damascenus et philosophus dicunt, quod <i>involuntarium
quoddam est per ignorantiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> If ignorance causes involuntariness, it is in so far as it deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of voluntariness,
                     as was declared above
                     <a href="#FS_Q6_A1" id="FS_Q6_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But it is not every ignorance that deprives one of this knowledge. Accordingly, we must take note that ignorance has a threefold
                     relationship to the act of the will: in one way, "concomitantly"; in another, "consequently"; in a third way, "antecedently."
                     "Concomitantly,"
                     when there is ignorance of what is done; but, so that even if it were known, it would be done. For then, ignorance does not
                     induce one to wish this to be done, but it just happens that a thing is at the same time done, and not known: thus in the
                     example given (OBJ 3) a man did indeed wish to kill his foe, but killed him in ignorance, thinking to kill a stag. And ignorance
                     of this kind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1), does not cause involuntariness, since it is not the cause of
                     anything that is repugnant to the will: but it causes "non-voluntariness," since that which is unknown cannot be actually
                     willed. Ignorance is "consequent" to the act of the will, in so far as ignorance itself is voluntary: and this happens in
                     two ways, in accordance with the two aforesaid modes of voluntary
                     <a href="#FS_Q6_A3" id="FS_Q6_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. First, because the act of the will is brought to bear on the ignorance: as when a man wishes not to know, that he may have
                     an excuse for sin, or that he may
                     not be withheld from sin; according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q6_A8-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Job.21.14" target="asv"> Job 21:14</a>: "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways." And this is called "affected ignorance." Secondly, ignorance is said to be voluntary,
                     when it regards that which one can and ought to know: for in this sense "not to act" and "not to will" are said to be voluntary,
                     as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q6_A3" id="FS_Q6_A8-p6.4" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. And ignorance of this kind happens, either when one does not actually consider what one can and ought to consider; this
                     is
                     called "ignorance of evil choice," and arises from some passion or habit: or when one does not take the trouble to acquire
                     the knowledge which one ought to have; in which sense, ignorance of the general principles of law, which one to know, is voluntary,
                     as being due to negligence. Accordingly, if in either of these ways, ignorance is voluntary, it cannot cause involuntariness
                     simply. Nevertheless it causes involuntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it precedes the movement of the will
                     towards the act, which movement would not be, if there were knowledge. Ignorance is "antecedent" to the act of the will, when
                     it is not voluntary, and yet is the cause of man's willing what he would not will otherwise. Thus a man may be ignorant of
                     some circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, the result being that he does that which he would not do, if
                     he knew of that circumstance; for instance, a man, after taking proper precaution, may not know that someone is coming along
                     the road, so that he shoots an arrow and slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes involuntariness simply.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 8 co."><a name="33802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33802] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod ignorantia habet causare involuntarium ea ratione qua
privat cognitionem, quae praeexigitur ad voluntarium, ut supra
dictum est. Non tamen quaelibet ignorantia huiusmodi cognitionem
privat. Et ideo sciendum quod ignorantia tripliciter se habet ad
actum voluntatis, uno modo, concomitanter; alio modo, consequenter;
tertio modo, antecedenter. Concomitanter quidem, quando ignorantia
est de eo quod agitur, tamen, etiam si sciretur, nihilominus
ageretur. Tunc enim ignorantia non inducit ad volendum ut hoc fiat,
sed accidit simul esse aliquid factum et ignoratum, sicut, in
exemplo posito, cum aliquis vellet quidem occidere hostem, sed
ignorans occidit eum, putans occidere cervum. Et talis ignorantia
non facit involuntarium, ut philosophus dicit, quia non causat
aliquid quod sit repugnans voluntati, sed facit non voluntarium,
quia non potest esse actu volitum quod ignoratum est. Consequenter
autem se habet ignorantia ad voluntatem, inquantum ipsa ignorantia
est voluntaria. Et hoc contingit dupliciter, secundum duos modos
voluntarii supra positos. Uno modo, quia actus voluntatis fertur in
ignorantiam, sicut cum aliquis ignorare vult ut excusationem
peccati habeat, vel ut non retrahatur a peccando, secundum illud
Iob XXI, <i>scientiam viarum tuarum nolumus</i>. Et haec dicitur
ignorantia affectata. Alio modo dicitur ignorantia voluntaria eius
quod quis potest scire et debet, sic enim non agere et non velle
voluntarium dicitur, ut supra dictum est. Hoc igitur modo dicitur
ignorantia, sive cum aliquis actu non considerat quod considerare
potest et debet, quae est ignorantia malae electionis, vel ex
passione vel ex habitu proveniens, sive cum aliquis notitiam quam
debet habere, non curat acquirere; et secundum hunc modum,
ignorantia universalium iuris, quae quis scire tenetur, voluntaria
dicitur, quasi per negligentiam proveniens. Cum autem ipsa
ignorantia sit voluntaria aliquo istorum modorum, non potest
causare simpliciter involuntarium. Causat tamen secundum quid
involuntarium, inquantum praecedit motum voluntatis ad aliquid
agendum, qui non esset scientia praesente. Antecedenter autem se
habet ad voluntatem ignorantia, quando non est voluntaria, et tamen
est causa volendi quod alias homo non vellet. Sicut cum homo
ignorat aliquam circumstantiam actus quam non tenebatur scire, et
ex hoc aliquid agit, quod non faceret si sciret, puta cum aliquis,
diligentia adhibita, nesciens aliquem transire per viam, proiicit
sagittam, qua interficit transeuntem. Et talis ignorantia causat
involuntarium simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q6_A8-p7"> From this may be gathered the solution of the objections. For the first objection deals with ignorance of what a man is bound
                     to know. The second, with ignorance of choice, which is voluntary to a certain extent, as stated above. The third, with that
                     ignorance which is concomitant with the act of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 6 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="33803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33803] Iª-IIae q. 6 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc
patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam prima ratio procedebat de
ignorantia eorum quae quis tenetur scire. Secunda autem, de
ignorantia electionis, quae quodammodo est voluntaria, ut dictum
est. Tertia vero, de ignorantia quae concomitanter se habet ad
voluntatem.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q7" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q7-p0.1">Q. 7. OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q7-p2"> We must now consider the circumstances of human acts: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q7-p3"><a href="#FS_Q7_A1"> (1) What is a circumstance?</a></p><p id="FS_Q7-p4"><a href="#FS_Q7_A2"> (2) Whether a theologian should take note of the circumstances of human acts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q7-p5"><a href="#FS_Q7_A3"> (3) How many circumstances are there?</a></p><p id="FS_Q7-p6"><a href="#FS_Q7_A4"> (4) Which are the most important of them?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 pr."><a name="33804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33804]
Iª-IIae q. 7 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
circumstantiis humanorum actuum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
Primo, quid sit circumstantia. Secundo, utrum circumstantiae sint
circa humanos actus attendendae a theologo. Tertio, quot sunt
circumstantiae. Quarto, quae sunt in eis principaliores.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q7_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q7_A1-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 1. Whether a circumstance is an accident of a human act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of a human act. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhetor. i) that a circumstance
                     is that from "which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument." But oratorical arguments are derived principally
                     from things pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as the definition, the genus, the species, and the like, from which
                     also Tully declares that an orator should draw his arguments. Therefore a circumstance is
                     not an accident of a human act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33805] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantia non sit accidens actus
humani. Dicit enim Tullius, in rhetoricis, quod <i>circumstantia
est per quam argumentationi auctoritatem et firmamentum adiungit
oratio</i>. Sed oratio dat firmamentum argumentationi praecipue ab
his quae sunt de substantia rei, ut definitio, genus, species, et
alia huiusmodi; a quibus etiam Tullius oratorem argumentari docet.
Ergo circumstantia non est accidens humani actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "to be in" is proper to an accident. But that which surrounds [circumstat] is rather out than in. Therefore the
                     circumstances are not accidents of human acts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33806] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
accidentis proprium est inesse. Quod autem circumstat, non inest,
sed magis est extra. Ergo circumstantiae non sunt accidentia
humanorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an accident has no accident. But human acts themselves are accidents. Therefore the circumstances are not accidents
                     of acts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33807] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
accidentis non est accidens. Sed ipsi humani actus sunt quaedam
accidentia. Non ergo circumstantiae sunt accidentia actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The particular conditions of any singular thing are called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
                     1) calls the circumstances particular things [*{ta kath' ekasta}], i.e. the particular conditions of each act. Therefore the
                     circumstances are individual accidents of human acts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33808] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
particulares conditiones cuiuslibet rei singularis dicuntur
accidentia individuantia ipsam. Sed philosophus, in III Ethic.,
circumstantias nominat particularia, idest particulares singulorum
actuum conditiones. Ergo circumstantiae sunt accidentia
individualia humanorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q7_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words are the signs of what we understand," it must needs be that in
                     naming things we follow the process of intellectual knowledge. Now our intellectual knowledge proceeds from the better known
                     to the less known. Accordingly with us, names of more obvious things are transferred so as to signify things less obvious:
                     and hence it is that, as stated in Metaph. x, 4, "the notion of distance has been
                     transferred from things that are apart locally, to all kinds of opposition": and in like manner words that signify local movement
                     are employed to designate all other movements, because bodies which are circumscribed by place, are best known to us. And
                     hence it is that the word "circumstance" has passed from located things to human acts.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q7_A1-p7"> Now in things located, that is said to surround something, which is outside it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly,
                     whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances.
                     Now what is outside a thing's substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident. Wherefore the circumstances
                     of human acts should be called their accidents.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 co."><a name="33809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33809] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, quia nomina, secundum philosophum, sunt signa
intellectuum, necesse est quod secundum processum intellectivae
cognitionis, sit etiam nominationis processus. Procedit autem
nostra cognitio intellectualis a notioribus ad minus nota. Et ideo
apud nos a notioribus nomina transferuntur ad significandum res
minus notas. Et inde est quod, sicut dicitur in X Metaphys., <i>ab
his quae sunt secundum locum, processit nomen distantiae ad omnia
contraria</i>, et similiter nominibus pertinentibus ad motum
localem, utimur ad significandum alios motus, eo quod corpora, quae
loco circumscribuntur, sunt maxime nobis nota. Et inde est quod
nomen circumstantiae ab his quae in loco sunt, derivatur ad actus
humanos. Dicitur autem in localibus aliquid circumstare, quod est
quidem extrinsecum a re, tamen attingit ipsam, vel appropinquat ei
secundum locum. Et ideo quaecumque conditiones sunt extra
substantiam actus, et tamen attingunt aliquo modo actum humanum,
circumstantiae dicuntur. Quod autem est extra substantiam rei ad
rem ipsam pertinens, accidens eius dicitur. Unde circumstantiae
actuum humanorum accidentia eorum dicenda sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The orator gives strength to his argument, in the first place, from the substance of the act; and secondly, from the circumstances
                     of the act. Thus a man becomes indictable, first, through being guilty of murder; secondly, through having done it fraudulently,
                     or from motives of greed or at a holy time or place, and so forth. And so in the passage quoted, it is said pointedly that
                     the orator "adds strength to his argument," as though this were
                     something secondary.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33810] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod oratio quidem dat firmamentum argumentationi, primo
ex substantia actus, secundario vero, ex his quae circumstant
actum. Sicut primo accusabilis redditur aliquis ex hoc quod
homicidium fecit, secundario vero, ex hoc quod dolo fecit, vel
propter lucrum, vel in tempore aut loco sacro, aut aliquid aliud
huiusmodi. Et ideo signanter dicit quod per circumstantiam oratio
argumentationi firmamentum adiungit, quasi secundario.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is said to be an accident of something in two ways. First, from being in that thing: thus, whiteness is said to be
                     an accident of Socrates. Secondly, because it is together with that thing in the same subject: thus, whiteness is an accident
                     of the art of music, inasmuch as they meet in the same subject, so as to touch one another, as it were. And in this sense
                     circumstances are said to be the accidents of human acts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33811] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod aliquid dicitur accidens alicuius dupliciter. Uno
modo, quia inest ei, sicut album dicitur accidens Socratis. Alio
modo quia est simul cum eo in eodem subiecto, sicut dicitur quod
album accidit musico, inquantum conveniunt, et quodammodo se
contingunt, in uno subiecto. Et per hunc modum dicuntur
circumstantiae accidentia actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q7_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (ad 2), an accident is said to be the accident of an accident, from the fact that they meet in the same subject.
                     But this happens in two ways. First, in so far as two accidents are both related to the same subject, without any relation
                     to one another; as whiteness and the art of music in Socrates. Secondly, when such accidents are related to one another; as
                     when the subject receives one accident by means of the other; for instance, a
                     body receives color by means of its surface. And thus also is one accident said to be in another; for we speak of color as
                     being in the surface.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q7_A1-p11"> Accordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both these ways. For some circumstances that have a relation to acts, belong
                     to the agent otherwise than through the act; as place and condition of person; whereas others belong to the agent by reason
                     of the act, as the manner in which the act is done.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33812] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, accidens dicitur accidenti
accidere propter convenientiam in subiecto. Sed hoc contingit
dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod duo accidentia comparantur ad
unum subiectum absque aliquo ordine, sicut album et musicum ad
Socratem. Alio modo, cum aliquo ordine, puta quia subiectum recipit
unum accidens alio mediante, sicut corpus recipit colorem mediante
superficie. Et sic unum accidens dicitur etiam alteri inesse,
dicimus enim colorem esse in superficie. Utroque autem modo
circumstantiae se habent ad actus. Nam aliquae circumstantiae
ordinatae ad actum, pertinent ad agentem non mediante actu, puta
locus et conditio personae, aliquae vero mediante ipso actu, sicut
modus agendi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q7_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q7_A2-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 2. Whether theologians should take note of the circumstances of human acts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that theologians should not take note of the circumstances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider
                     human acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil. But it seems that circumstances cannot give quality
                     to human acts; for a thing is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which is outside it; but by that which is in it.
                     Therefore theologians should not take note of the circumstances of acts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33813] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantiae humanorum actuum non
sint considerandae a theologo. Non enim considerantur a theologo
actus humani, nisi secundum quod sunt aliquales, idest boni vel
mali. Sed circumstantiae non videntur posse facere actus aliquales,
quia nihil qualificatur, formaliter loquendo, ab eo quod est extra
ipsum, sed ab eo quod in ipso est. Ergo circumstantiae actuum non
sunt a theologo considerandae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts. But one thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents; hence the Philosopher
                     says (Metaph. vi, 2) that "no art or science considers accidental being, except only the art of sophistry." Therefore the
                     theologian has not to consider circumstances.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33814] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
circumstantiae sunt accidentia actuum. Sed uni infinita accidunt,
et ideo, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys., <i>nulla ars vel scientia est
circa ens per accidens, nisi sola sophistica</i>. Ergo theologos
non habet considerare circumstantias humanorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the consideration of circumstances belongs to the orator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is
                     not a theologian's business to consider circumstances.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33815] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
circumstantiarum consideratio pertinet ad rhetorem. Rhetorica autem
non est pars theologiae. Ergo consideratio circumstantiarum non
pertinet ad theologum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory of
                     Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]. But involuntariness excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theologian.
                     Therefore circumstances also should be considered by the theologian.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33816] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
ignorantia circumstantiarum causat involuntarium, ut Damascenus et
Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt. Sed involuntarium excusat a culpa, cuius
consideratio pertinet ad theologum. Ergo et consideratio
circumstantiarum ad theologum pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Circumstances come under the consideration of the theologian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian considers
                     human acts, inasmuch as man is thereby directed to Happiness. Now, everything that is directed to an end should be proportionate
                     to that end. But acts are made proportionate to an end by means of a certain commensurateness, which results from the due
                     circumstances. Hence the theologian has to consider the circumstances. Secondly,
                     because the theologian considers human acts according as they are found to be good or evil, better or worse: and this diversity
                     depends on circumstances, as we shall see further on (
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A10" id="FS_Q7_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18], AA[10]</a>,11;
                     <a href="unknown.html#FS_Q73_A7" id="FS_Q7_A2-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[73], A[7]</a>). Thirdly, because the theologian considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is proper to human acts;
                     and for this it is requisite that they be voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary,
                     according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q6_A8" id="FS_Q7_A2-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[6], A[8]</a>). Therefore the theologian has to consider circumstances.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 co."><a name="33817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33817] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod circumstantiae pertinent ad considerationem theologi
triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia theologus considerat actus
humanos secundum quod per eos homo ad beatitudinem ordinatur. Omne
autem quod ordinatur ad finem, oportet esse proportionatum fini.
Actus autem proportionantur fini secundum commensurationem quandam,
quae fit per debitas circumstantias. Unde consideratio
circumstantiarum ad theologum pertinet. Secundo, quia theologus
considerat actus humanos secundum quod in eis invenitur bonum et
malum, et melius et peius, et hoc diversificatur secundum
circumstantias, ut infra patebit. Tertio, quia theologus considerat
actus humanos secundum quod sunt meritorii vel demeritorii, quod
convenit actibus humanis; ad quod requiritur quod sint voluntarii.
Actus autem humanus iudicatur voluntarius vel involuntarius,
secundum cognitionem vel ignorantiam circumstantiarum, ut dictum
est. Et ideo consideratio circumstantiarum pertinet ad
theologum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
                     i, 6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful." Now, in the genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only
                     according to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the
                     expressions "right" and "left," "equal" and "unequal," and such like. Accordingly,
                     since the goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their being called good or bad according
                     to their proportion to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33818] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod bonum ordinatum ad finem dicitur utile, quod importat
relationem quandam, unde philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod <i>in
ad aliquid bonum est utile</i>. In his autem quae ad aliquid
dicuntur, denominatur aliquid non solum ab eo quod inest, sed etiam
ab eo quod extrinsecus adiacet, ut patet in dextro et sinistro,
aequali et inaequali, et similibus. Et ideo, cum bonitas actuum sit
inquantum sunt utiles ad finem, nihil prohibet eos bonos vel malos
dici secundum proportionem ad aliqua quae exterius adiacent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such
                     like accidents are not what we call circumstances; because circumstances although, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q7_A1" id="FS_Q7_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it. Proper accidents,
                     however, come under the consideration of art.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33819] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod accidentia quae omnino per accidens se habent,
relinquuntur ab omni arte, propter eorum incertitudinem et
infinitatem. Sed talia accidentia non habent rationem
circumstantiae, quia, ut dictum est, sic circumstantiae sunt extra
actum, quod tamen actum aliquo modo contingunt, ordinatae ad ipsum.
Accidentia autem per se cadunt sub arte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The consideration of circumstances belongs to the moralist, the politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in so far as
                     with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue in human acts and passions. To the politician and to the
                     orator, in so far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of excuse or indictment. In different ways,
                     however: because where the orator persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian
                     this consideration belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him all the other arts are subservient: for he has to consider
                     virtuous and vicious acts, just as the moralist does; and with the orator and politician he considers acts according as they
                     are deserving of reward or punishment.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33820] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod consideratio circumstantiarum pertinet ad moralem, et
politicum, et ad rhetorem. Ad moralem quidem, prout secundum eas
invenitur vel praetermittitur medium virtutis in humanis actibus et
passionibus. Ad politicum autem et rhetorem, secundum quod ex
circumstantiis actus redduntur laudabiles vel vituperabiles,
excusabiles vel accusabiles. Diversimode tamen, nam quod rhetor
persuadet, politicus diiudicat. Ad theologum autem, cui omnes aliae
artes deserviunt, pertinent omnibus modis praedictis, nam ipse
habet considerationem de actibus virtuosis et vitiosis, cum morali;
et considerat actus secundum quod merentur poenam vel praemium, cum
rhetore et politico.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q7_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q7_A3-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 3. Whether the circumstances are properly set forth in the third book of Ethics?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the circumstances are not properly set forth in Ethic. iii, 1. For a circumstance of an act is described
                     as something outside the act. Now time and place answer to this description. Therefore there are only two circumstances, to
                     wit, "when" and "where."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33821] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter circumstantiae
numerentur in III Ethic. Circumstantia enim actus dicitur quod
exterius se habet ad actum. Huiusmodi autem sunt tempus et locus.
Ergo solae duae sunt circumstantiae, scilicet quando et ubi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing is well or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore
                     all the circumstances are included under one, which is the "mode of acting."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33822] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
ex circumstantiis accipitur quid bene vel male fiat. Sed hoc
pertinet ad modum actus. Ergo omnes circumstantiae concluduntur sub
una, quae est modus agendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an act. But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance.
                     Therefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act itself. Accordingly, neither "who," nor "why," nor "about
                     what," are circumstances: since "who" refers to the efficient cause, "why" to the final cause, and "about what" to the material
                     cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33823] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
circumstantiae non sunt de substantia actus. Sed ad substantiam
actus pertinere videntur causae ipsius actus. Ergo nulla
circumstantia debet sumi ex causa ipsius actus. Sic ergo neque
quis, neque propter quid, neque circa quid, sunt circumstantiae,
nam quis pertinet ad causam efficientem, propter quid ad finalem,
circa quid ad materialem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of the Philosopher in Ethic. iii, 1.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33824] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est auctoritas philosophi in III Ethicorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q7_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse:
                  </p><p id="FS_Q7_A3-p7"> "Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando---</p><p id="FS_Q7_A3-p8"> Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when."</p><p id="FS_Q7_A3-p9">For in acts we must take note of "who" did it, "by what aids" or "instruments" he did it, "what" he did, "where" he did it,
                     "why" he did it, "how" and "when" he did it. But Aristotle in Ethic. iii, 1 adds yet another, to wit, "about what," which
                     Tully includes in the circumstance "what."
                  </p><p id="FS_Q7_A3-p10"> The reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows. For a circumstance is described as something outside the substance
                     of the act, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways: first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly,
                     inasmuch as it touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the effect. It touches the act itself, either
                     by way of measure, as "time" and "place"; or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting." It touches
                     the effect when we consider "what" is done. It touches the cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance "why";
                     as to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance "about what"; as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance
                     "who"; and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstance "by what aids."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 co."><a name="33825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33825] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod Tullius, in sua rhetorica, assignat septem
circumstantias, quae hoc versu continentur, <i>quis, quid, ubi,
quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando</i>. Considerandum est enim
in actibus quis fecit, quibus auxiliis vel instrumentis fecerit,
quid fecerit, ubi fecerit, cur fecerit, quomodo fecerit, et quando
fecerit. Sed Aristoteles, in III Ethic., addit aliam, scilicet
circa quid, quae a Tullio comprehenditur sub quid. Et ratio huius
annumerationis sic accipi potest. Nam circumstantia dicitur quod,
extra substantiam actus existens, aliquo modo attingit ipsum.
Contingit autem hoc fieri tripliciter, uno modo, inquantum attingit
ipsum actum; alio modo, inquantum attingit causam actus; tertio
modo, inquantum attingit effectum. Ipsum autem actum attingit, vel
per modum mensurae, sicut tempus et locus; vel per modum qualitatis
actus, sicut modus agendi. Ex parte autem effectus, ut cum
consideratur quid aliquis fecerit. Ex parte vero causae actus,
quantum ad causam finalem, accipitur propter quid; ex parte autem
causae materialis, sive obiecti, accipitur circa quid; ex parte
vero causae agentis principalis, accipitur quis egerit; ex parte
vero causae agentis instrumentalis, accipitur quibus auxiliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Time and place surround [circumstant] the act by way of measure; but the others surround the act by touching it in any other
                     way, while they are extrinsic to the substance of the act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33826] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod tempus et locus circumstant actum per modum mensurae,
sed alia circumstant actum inquantum attingunt ipsum quocumque alio
modo, extra substantiam eius existentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This mode "well" or "ill" is not a circumstance, but results from all the circumstances. But the mode which refers to a quality
                     of the act is a special circumstance; for instance, that a man walk fast or slowly; that he strike hard or gently, and so
                     forth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33827] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod iste modus qui est bene vel male, non ponitur
circumstantia, sed consequens ad omnes circumstantias. Sed
specialis circumstantia ponitur modus qui pertinet ad qualitatem
actus, puta quod aliquis ambulet velociter vel tarde, et quod
aliquis percutit fortiter vel remisse, et sic de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A condition of the cause, on which the substance of the act depends, is not a circumstance; it must be an additional condition.
                     Thus, in regard to the object, it is not a circumstance of theft that the object is another's property, for this belongs to
                     the substance of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same applies to the other circumstances which are considered
                     in reference to the other causes. For the end that specifies the act is not a
                     circumstance, but some additional end. Thus, that a valiant man act "valiantly for the sake of" the good of the virtue or
                     fortitude, is not a circumstance; but if he act valiantly for the sake of the delivery of the state, or of Christendom, or
                     some such purpose. The same is to be said with regard to the circumstance "what"; for that a man by pouring water on someone
                     should happen to wash him, is not a circumstance of the washing; but that in doing so he give him a chill, or scald him; heal
                     him
                     or harm him, these are circumstances.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33828] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod illa conditio causae ex qua substantia actus
dependet, non dicitur circumstantia; sed aliqua conditio adiuncta.
Sicut in obiecto non dicitur circumstantia furti quod sit alienum,
hoc enim pertinet ad substantiam furti; sed quod sit magnum vel
parvum. Et similiter est de aliis circumstantiis quae accipiuntur
ex parte aliarum causarum. Non enim finis qui dat speciem actus,
est circumstantia; sed aliquis finis adiunctus. Sicut quod fortis
fortiter agat propter bonum fortitudinis, non est circumstantia;
sed si fortiter agat propter liberationem civitatis, vel populi
Christiani, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Similiter etiam ex parte eius
quod est quid, nam quod aliquis perfundens aliquem aqua, abluat
ipsum, non est circumstantia ablutionis; sed quod abluendo
infrigidet vel calefaciat, et sanet vel noceat, hoc est
circumstantia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q7_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q7_A4-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 4. Whether the most important circumstances are "why" and "in what the act consists"?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that these are not the most important circumstances, namely, "why" and those "in which the act is, [*hen ois
                     e praxis]" as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. For those in which the act is seem to be place and time: and these do not seem to be
                     the most important of the circumstances, since, of them all, they are the most extrinsic to the act. Therefore those things
                     in which the act is are not the most important circumstances.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33829] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint principales circumstantiae
propter quid, et ea in quibus est operatio, ut dicitur in III
Ethic. Ea enim in quibus est operatio, videntur esse locus et
tempus, quae non videntur esse principalia inter circumstantias,
cum sint maxime extrinseca ab actu. Ea ergo in quibus est operatio
non sunt principalissimae circumstantiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. Therefore it is not the most important circumstance.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33830] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
finis est extrinsecus rei. Non ergo videtur esse principalissima
circumstantiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which holds the foremost place in regard to each thing, is its cause and its form. But the cause of an act
                     is the person that does it; while the form of an act is the manner in which it is done. Therefore these two circumstances
                     seem to be of the greatest importance.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33831] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
principalissimum in unoquoque est causa eius et forma ipsius. Sed
causa ipsius actus est persona agens; forma autem actus est modus
ipsius. Ergo istae duae circumstantiae videntur esse
principalissimae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.] says that "the most important circumstances" are "why it is done" and "what
                     is done."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33832] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod <i>principalissimae
circumstantiae sunt cuius gratia agitur, et quid est quod
agitur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q7_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a>), acts are properly called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Now, the motive and object of the will is the end. Therefore
                     that circumstance is the most important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, viz. the circumstance "why":
                     and the second in importance, is that which touches the very substance of the act, viz. the circumstance "what he did." As
                     to the other circumstances, they are
                     more or less important, according as they more or less approach to these.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 co."><a name="33833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33833] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod actus proprie dicuntur humani, sicut supra dictum
est, prout sunt voluntarii. Voluntatis autem motivum et obiectum
est finis. Et ideo principalissima est omnium circumstantiarum illa
quae attingit actum ex parte finis, scilicet cuius gratia,
secundaria vero, quae attingit ipsam substantiam actus, idest quid
fecit. Aliae vero circumstantiae sunt magis vel minus principales,
secundum quod magis vel minus ad has appropinquant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By those things "in which the act is" the Philosopher does not mean time and place, but those circumstances that are affixed
                     to the act itself. Wherefore Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi], as though he were explaining the dictum of the
                     Philosopher, instead of the latter's term---"in which the act is"---said, "what is done."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33834] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod per ea in quibus est operatio, philosophus non
intelligit tempus et locum, sed ea quae adiunguntur ipsi actui.
Unde Gregorius Nyssenus, quasi exponens dictum philosophi, loco
eius quod philosophus dixit, in quibus est operatio, dicit quid
agitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the end is not part of the substance of the act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves
                     the agent to act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33835] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod finis, etsi non sit de substantia actus, est tamen
causa actus principalissima, inquantum movet ad agendum. Unde et
maxime actus moralis speciem habet ex fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q7_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The person that does the act is the cause of that act, inasmuch as he is moved thereto by the end; and it is chiefly in this
                     respect that he is directed to the act; while other conditions of the person have not such an important relation to the act.
                     As to the mode, it is not the substantial form of the act, for in an act the substantial form depends on the object and term
                     or end; but it is, as it were, a certain accidental quality of the act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 7 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33836] Iª-IIae q. 7 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod persona agens causa est actus secundum quod movetur a
fine; et secundum hoc principaliter ordinatur ad actum. Aliae vero
conditiones personae non ita principaliter ordinantur ad actum.
Modus etiam non est substantialis forma actus, hoc enim attenditur
in actu secundum obiectum et terminum vel finem, sed est quasi
quaedam qualitas accidentalis.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q8" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q8-p0.1">Q. 8. OF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q8-p2"> We must now consider the different acts of the will; and in the first place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately,
                  as being elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded by the will.
               </p><p id="FS_Q8-p3"> Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end; we must therefore consider: (1) those acts of the will whereby
                  it is moved to the end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means. And since it seems that there are three acts of the
                  will in reference to the end; viz. "volition," "enjoyment," and "intention"; we must consider: (1) volition; (2) enjoyment;
                  (3) intention. Concerning the first, three things must be considered: (1) Of what things is the will? (2) By
                  what is the will moved? (3) How is it moved?
               </p><p id="FS_Q8-p4"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q8-p5"><a href="#FS_Q8_A1"> (1) Whether the will is of good only?</a></p><p id="FS_Q8-p6"><a href="#FS_Q8_A2"> (2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means?</a></p><p id="FS_Q8-p7"><a href="#FS_Q8_A3"> (3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end and to the means, by the same movement?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 pr."><a name="33837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33837]
Iª-IIae q. 8 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de ipsis
actibus voluntariis in speciali. Et primo, de actibus qui sunt
immediate ipsius voluntatis velut ab ipsa voluntate eliciti;
secundo de actibus imperatis a voluntate. Voluntas autem movetur et
in finem, et in ea quae sunt ad finem. Primo igitur considerandum
est de actibus voluntatis quibus movetur in finem; et deinde de
actibus eius quibus movetur in ea quae sunt ad finem. Actus autem
voluntatis in finem videntur esse tres, scilicet velle, frui et
intendere. Primo ergo considerabimus de voluntate; secundo, de
fruitione; tertio, de intentione. Circa primum consideranda sunt
tria, primo quidem, quorum voluntas sit; secundo, a quo moveatur;
tertio, quomodo moveatur. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo,
utrum voluntas sit tantum boni. Secundum, utrum sit tantum finis,
an etiam eorum quae sunt ad finem. Tertio, si est aliquo modo eorum
quae sunt ad finem, utrum uno motu moveatur in finem et in ea quae
sunt ad finem.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q8_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q8_A1-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 1. Whether the will is of good only?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not of good only. For the same power regards opposites; for instance, sight regards white
                     and black. But good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is not only of good, but also of evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33838] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non tantum sit boni. Eadem
enim est potentia oppositorum, sicut visus albi et nigri. Sed bonum
et malum sunt opposita. Ergo voluntas non solum est boni, sed etiam
mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite purposes, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2). But the will
                     is a rational power, since it is "in the reason," as is stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore the will can be directed to opposites;
                     and consequently its volition is not confined to good, but extends to evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33839] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
potentiae rationales se habent ad opposita prosequenda, secundum
philosophum. Sed voluntas est potentia rationalis, est enim in
ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo voluntas se habet ad
opposita. Non ergo tantum ad volendum bonum, sed etiam ad volendum
malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, good and being are convertible. But volition is directed not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For sometimes
                     we wish "not to walk," or "not to speak"; and again at times we wish for future things, which are not actual beings. Therefore
                     the will is not of good only.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33840] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
bonum et ens convertuntur. Sed voluntas non solum est entium, sed
etiam non entium, volumus enim quandoque non ambulare et non loqui.
Volumus etiam interdum quaedam futura, quae non sunt entia in actu.
Ergo voluntas non tantum est boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the scope of the will," and that "all things desire good."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33841] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>malum est
praeter voluntatem, et quod omnia bonum appetunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q8_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is
                     nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards that thing. Now every inclination is to something
                     like and suitable to the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good, it
                     must needs be that every inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the
                     Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1) that "the good is that which all desire."
                  </p><p id="FS_Q8_A1-p7"> But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form, the natural appetite results from a form existing
                     in the nature of things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or rational appetite, which we call the will,
                     follows from an apprehended form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a thing; so the animal
                     or voluntary appetite tends to a good which is apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will tend to
                     anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher
                     says (Phys. ii, 3) that "the end is a good, or an apparent good."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 co."><a name="33842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33842] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod voluntas est appetitus quidam rationalis. Omnis autem
appetitus non est nisi boni. Cuius ratio est quia appetitus nihil
aliud est quam inclinatio appetentis in aliquid. Nihil autem
inclinatur nisi in aliquid simile et conveniens. Cum igitur omnis
res, inquantum est ens et substantia, sit quoddam bonum, necesse
est ut omnis inclinatio sit in bonum. Et inde est quod philosophus
dicit, in I Ethic., quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Sed
considerandum est quod, cum omnis inclinatio consequatur aliquam
formam, appetitus naturalis consequitur formam in natura
existentem, appetitus autem sensitivus, vel etiam intellectivus seu
rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas, sequitur formam apprehensam.
Sicut igitur id in quod tendit appetitus naturalis, est bonum
existens in re; ita id in quod tendit appetitus animalis vel
voluntarius, est bonum apprehensum. Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in
aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed
quod apprehendatur in ratione boni. Et propter hoc philosophus
dicit, in II Physic., quod <i>finis est bonum, vel apparens
bonum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same power regards opposites, but it is not referred to them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is referred both
                     to good and evil: but to good by desiring it: to evil, by shunning it. Wherefore the actual desire of good is called "volition"
                     [*In Latin, 'voluntas'. To avoid confusion with "voluntas" (the will) St. Thomas adds a word of explanation, which in the
                     translation may appear superfluous], meaning thereby the act of the will; for it is
                     in this sense that we are now speaking of the will. On the other hand, the shunning of evil is better described as "nolition":
                     wherefore, just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33843] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod eadem potentia est oppositorum, sed non eodem modo se
habet ad utrumque. Voluntas igitur se habet et ad bonum et ad
malum, sed ad bonum, appetendo ipsum; ad malum vero, fugiendo
illud. Ipse ergo actualis appetitus boni vocatur voluntas, secundum
quod nominat actum voluntatis, sic enim nunc loquimur de voluntate.
Fuga autem mali magis dicitur noluntas. Unde sicut voluntas est
boni, ita noluntas est mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A rational power is not to be directed to all opposite purposes, but to those which are contained under its proper object;
                     for no power seeks other than its proper object. Now, the object of the will is good. Wherefore the will can be directed to
                     such opposite purposes as are contained under good, such as to be moved or to be at rest, to speak or to be silent, and such
                     like: for the will can be directed to either under the aspect of good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33844] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod potentia rationalis non se habet ad quaelibet
opposita prosequenda, sed ad ea quae sub suo obiecto convenienti
continentur, nam nulla potentia prosequitur nisi suum conveniens
obiectum. Obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum. Unde ad illa
opposita prosequenda se habet voluntas, quae sub bono
comprehenduntur, sicut moveri et quiescere, loqui et tacere, et
alia huiusmodi, in utrumque enim horum fertur voluntas sub ratione
boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a being in the reason, wherefore negations and privations are said
                     to be "beings of reason." In this way, too, future things, in so far as they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, in
                     so far as such like are beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good; and it is thus that the will is directed to
                     them. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "to lack evil is considered as a
                     good."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33845] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod illud quod non est ens in rerum natura, accipitur ut
ens in ratione, unde negationes et privationes dicuntur entia
rationis. Per quem etiam modum futura, prout apprehenduntur, sunt
entia. Inquantum igitur sunt huiusmodi entia, apprehenduntur sub
ratione boni, et sic voluntas in ea tendit. Unde philosophus dicit,
in V Ethic., quod <i>carere malo habet rationem boni</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q8_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q8_A2-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 2. Whether volition is of the end only, or also of the means?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of the end only. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "volition
                     is of the end, while choice is of the means."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33846] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non sit eorum quae sunt ad
finem, sed tantum finis. Dicit enim philosophus, in III Ethic.,
quod <i>voluntas est finis, electio autem eorum quae sunt ad
finem.</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "For objects differing in genus there are corresponding different powers of the soul" (Ethic. vi, 1). Now, the end
                     and the means are in different genera of good: because the end, which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in
                     the genus "quality," or "action," or "passion"; whereas the good which is useful, and is directed to and end, is in the genus
                     "relation" (Ethic. i, 6). Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33847] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
ad ea quae sunt diversa genere, diversae potentiae animae
ordinantur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed finis et ea quae sunt ad
finem sunt in diverso genere boni, nam finis, qui est bonum
honestum vel delectabile, est in genere qualitatis, vel actionis
aut passionis; bonum autem quod dicitur utile, quod est ad finem,
est in ad aliquid, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo, si voluntas est
finis, non erit eorum quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since they are perfections thereof. But in those habits which are called practical
                     arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art; thus the use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the (art
                     of the) helmsman; whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs to the art of the shipwright. Therefore,
                     since volition is of the end, it is not of the means.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33848] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
habitus proportionantur potentis, cum sint earum perfectiones. Sed
in habitibus qui dicuntur artes operativae, ad aliud pertinet
finis, et ad aliud quod est ad finem, sicut ad gubernatorem
pertinet usus navis, qui est finis eius; ad navifactivam vero
constructio navis, quae est propter finem. Ergo, cum voluntas sit
finis, non erit eorum quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> In natural things, it is by the same power that a thing passes through the middle space, and arrives at the terminus. But
                     the means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives at the end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end,
                     it is also of the means.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33849] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est, quia in rebus naturalibus per eandem potentiam aliquid
pertransit media, et pertingit ad terminum. Sed ea quae sunt ad
finem, sunt quaedam media per quae pervenitur ad finem sicut ad
terminum. Ergo, si voluntas est finis, ipsa etiam est eorum quae
sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q8_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power of the will, sometimes its act [*See note: above A[1], Reply OBJ[1]].
                     Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means. For every power extends
                     to those things in which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any way whatever: thus the sight extends
                     to all things whatsoever that are in any way colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the
                     object of the power of the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q8_A2-p7"> If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every
                     act denominated from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to understand" designates the simple act of the
                     understanding. Now the simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object of that power. But that which
                     is good and willed in itself is the end. Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the
                     other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to
                     them, only in so far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the end. Thus, to understand, is properly
                     directed to things that are known in themselves, i.e. first principles: but we do not speak of understanding with regard to
                     things known through first principles, except in so far as we see the principles in those things. For in morals the end is
                     what principles are in speculative science (Ethic. viii, 8).
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 co."><a name="33850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33850] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod voluntas quandoque dicitur ipsa potentia qua volumus;
quandoque autem ipse voluntatis actus. Si ergo loquamur de
voluntate secundum quod nominat potentiam, sic se extendit et ad
finem, et ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Ad ea enim se extendit
unaquaeque potentia, in quibus inveniri potest quocumque modo ratio
sui obiecti, sicut visus se extendit ad omnia quaecumque
participant quocumque modo colorem. Ratio autem boni, quod est
obiectum potentiae voluntatis, invenitur non solum in fine, sed
etiam in his quae sunt ad finem. Si autem loquamur de voluntate
secundum quod nominat proprie actum, sic, proprie loquendo, est
finis tantum. Omnis enim actus denominatus a potentia, nominat
simplicem actum illius potentiae, sicut intelligere nominat
simplicem actum intellectus. Simplex autem actus potentiae est in
id quod est secundum se obiectum potentiae. Id autem quod est
propter se bonum et volitum, est finis. Unde voluntas proprie est
ipsius finis. Ea vero quae sunt ad finem, non sunt bona vel volita
propter seipsa, sed ex ordine ad finem. Unde voluntas in ea non
fertur, nisi quatenus fertur in finem, unde hoc ipsum quod in eis
vult, est finis. Sicut et intelligere proprie est eorum quae
secundum se cognoscuntur, scilicet principiorum, eorum autem quae
cognoscuntur per principia, non dicitur esse intelligentia, nisi
inquantum in eis ipsa principia considerantur, <i>sic enim se habet
finis in appetibilibus, sicut se habet principium in
intelligibilibus</i>, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of the will in reference to the simple act of the will; not in reference to the power of the
                     will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33851] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de voluntate, secundum quod
proprie nominat simplicem actum voluntatis, non autem secundum quod
nominat potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are different powers for objects that differ in genus and are on an equality; for instance, sound and color are different
                     genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and sight. But the useful and the righteous are not on an equality, but
                     are as that which is of itself, and that which is in relation to another. Now such like objects are always referred to the
                     same power; for instance, the power of sight perceives both color and light by
                     which color is seen.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33852] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ad ea quae sunt diversa genere ex aequo se habentia,
ordinantur diversae potentiae, sicut sonus et color sunt diversa
genera sensibilium, ad quae ordinantur auditus et visus. Sed utile
et honestum non ex aequo se habent, sed sicut quod est secundum se
et secundum alterum. Huiusmodi autem semper referuntur ad eandem
potentiam, sicut per potentiam visivam sentitur et color, et lux,
per quam color videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not everything that diversifies habits, diversifies the powers: since habits are certain determinations of powers to certain
                     special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers both the end and the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed
                     consider the end, as that which it effects; and the means, as that which it commands. On the other hand, the ship-building
                     art considers the means as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the
                     end, as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every practical art there is an end proper to it and means
                     that belong properly to that art.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33853] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non quidquid diversificat habitum, diversificat
potentiam, habitus enim sunt quaedam determinationes potentiarum ad
aliquos speciales actus. Et tamen quaelibet ars operativa
considerat et finem et id quod est ad finem. Nam ars gubernativa
considerat quidem finem, ut quem operatur, id autem quod est ad
finem, ut quod imperat. E contra vero navifactiva considerat id
quod est ad finem, ut quod operatur, id vero quod est finis, ut ad
quod ordinat id quod operatur. Et iterum in unaquaque arte
operativa est aliquis finis proprius, et aliquid quod est ad finem,
quod proprie ad illam artem pertinet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q8_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q8_A3-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 3. Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to the end and to the means. Because according to the Philosopher (Topic.
                     iii, 2) "where one thing is on account of another there is only one." But the will does not will the means save on account
                     of the end. Therefore it is moved to both by the same act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33854] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod eodem actu voluntas feratur in finem,
et in id quod est ad finem. Quia secundum philosophum, <i>ubi est
unum propter alterum, ibi est unum tantum</i>. Sed voluntas non
vult id quod est ad finem, nisi propter finem. Ergo eodem actu
movetur in utrumque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end is the reason for willing the means, just as light is the reason of seeing colors. But light and colors
                     are seen by the same act. Therefore it is the same movement of the will, whereby it wills the end and the means.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33855] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
finis est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, sicut lumen est
ratio visionis colorum. Sed eodem actu videtur lumen et color. Ergo
idem est motus voluntatis quo vult finem, et ea quae sunt ad
finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is one and the same natural movement which tends through the middle space to the terminus. But the means are
                     in comparison to the end, as the middle space is to the terminus. Therefore it is the same movement of the will whereby it
                     is directed to the end and to the means.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33856] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
idem numero motus naturalis est qui per media tendit ad ultimum.
Sed ea quae sunt ad finem, comparantur ad finem sicut media ad
ultimum. Ergo idem motus voluntatis est quo voluntas fertur in
finem, et in ea quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Acts are diversified according to their objects. But the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a useful
                     good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33857] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
actus diversificantur secundum obiecta. Sed diversae species boni
sunt finis, et id quod est ad finem, quod dicitur utile. Ergo non
eodem actu voluntas fertur in utrumque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the will can
                     be moved to the end, without being moved to the means; whereas it cannot be moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved
                     to the end. Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end absolutely and in itself; secondly, as
                     the reason for willing the means. Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the
                     same movement, to the end, as the reason for willing the means; and to the means themselves. But it is another act whereby
                     the will is moved to the end absolutely. And sometimes this act precedes the other in time; for example when a man first wills
                     to have health, and afterwards deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him. The same
                     happens in regard to the intellect: for at first a man understands the principles in themselves; but afterwards he understands
                     them in the conclusions, inasmuch as he assents to the conclusions on account of the principles.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 co."><a name="33858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33858] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, cum finis sit secundum se volitus, id autem quod est
ad finem, inquantum huiusmodi, non sit volitum nisi propter finem;
manifestum est quod voluntas potest ferri in finem sine hoc quod
feratur in ea quae sunt ad finem; sed in ea quae sunt ad finem,
inquantum huiusmodi, non potest ferri, nisi feratur in ipsum finem.
Sic ergo voluntas in ipsum finem dupliciter fertur, uno modo,
absolute secundum se; alio modo, sicut in rationem volendi ea quae
sunt ad finem. Manifestum est ergo quod unus et idem motus
voluntatis est quo fertur in finem, secundum quod est ratio volendi
ea quae sunt ad finem, et in ipsa quae sunt ad finem. Sed alius
actus est quod fertur in ipsum finem absolute. Et quandoque
praecedit tempore, sicut cum aliquis primo vult sanitatem, et
postea, deliberans quomodo possit sanari, vult conducere medicum ut
sanetur. Sicut etiam et circa intellectum accidit, nam primo
aliquis intelligit ipsa principia secundum se; postmodum autem
intelligit ea in ipsis conclusionibus, secundum quod assentit
conclusionibus propter principia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument holds in respect of the will being moved to the end as the reason for willing the means.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33859] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum quod voluntas fertur in
finem, ut est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whenever color is seen, by the same act the light is seen; but the light can be seen without the color being seen. In like
                     manner whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills the end; but not the conversely.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33860] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod quandocumque videtur color, eodem actu videtur lumen,
potest tamen videri lumen sine hoc quod videatur color. Et
similiter quandocumque quis vult ea quae sunt ad finem, vult eodem
actu finem, non tamen e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the execution of a work, the means are as the middle space, and the end, as the terminus. Wherefore just as natural movement
                     sometimes stops in the middle and does not reach the terminus; so sometimes one is busy with the means, without gaining the
                     end. But in willing it is the reverse: the will through (willing) the end comes to will the means; just as the intellect arrives
                     at the conclusions through the principles which are called "means." Hence
                     it is that sometimes the intellect understands a mean, and does not proceed thence to the conclusion. And in like manner the
                     will sometimes wills the end, and yet does not proceed to will the means.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33861] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod in executione operis, ea quae sunt ad finem se habent
ut media, et finis ut terminus. Unde sicut motus naturalis interdum
sistit in medio, et non pertingit ad terminum; ita quandoque
operatur aliquis id quod est ad finem, et tamen non consequitur
finem. Sed in volendo est e converso, nam voluntas per finem
devenit ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem; sicut et intellectus
devenit in conclusiones per principia, quae media dicuntur. Unde
intellectus aliquando intelligit medium, et ex eo non procedit ad
conclusionem. Et similiter voluntas aliquando vult finem, et tamen
non procedit ad volendum id quod est ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q8_A3-p10"> The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what has been said above (A[2], ad 2). For the useful and
                     the righteous are not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for its own sake and that which is for
                     the sake of something else: wherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the other; but not conversely.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 8 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="33862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33862] Iª-IIae q. 8 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad illud vero
quod in contrarium obiicitur, patet solutio per ea quae supra dicta
sunt. Nam utile et honestum non sunt species boni ex aequo divisae,
sed se habent sicut propter se et propter alterum. Unde actus
voluntatis in unum potest ferri sine hoc quod feratur in alterum,
sed non e converso.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q9" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q9-p0.1">Q. 9. OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q9-p2"> We must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q9-p3"><a href="#FS_Q9_A1"> (1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?</a></p><p id="FS_Q9-p4"><a href="#FS_Q9_A2"> (2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite?</a></p><p id="FS_Q9-p5"><a href="#FS_Q9_A3"> (3) Whether the will moves itself?</a></p><p id="FS_Q9-p6"><a href="#FS_Q9_A4"> (4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?</a></p><p id="FS_Q9-p7"><a href="#FS_Q9_A5"> (5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?</a></p><p id="FS_Q9-p8"><a href="#FS_Q9_A6"> (6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 pr."><a name="33863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33863]
Iª-IIae q. 9 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de motivo
voluntatis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum voluntas
moveatur ab intellectu. Secundo, utrum moveatur ab appetitu
sensitivo. Tertio, utrum voluntas moveat seipsam. Quarto, utrum
moveatur ab aliquo exteriori principio. Quinto, utrum moveatur a
corpore caelesti. Sexto, utrum voluntas moveatur a solo Deo, sicut
ab exteriori principio.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q9_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q9_A1-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 1. Whether the will is moved by the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect. For Augustine says on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q9_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.20" target="asv"> Ps. 118:20</a>: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows sluggishly or not at
                     all: we know what is good, but deeds delight us not." But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect: because
                     movement of the movable results from motion of the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the
                     will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33864] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur ab intellectu.
Dicit enim Augustinus, super illud Psalmi, <i>concupivit anima mea
desiderare iustificationes tuas, praevolat intellectus, sequitur
tardus aut nullus affectus, scimus bonum, nec delectat agere</i>.
Hoc autem non esset, si voluntas ab intellectu moveretur, quia
motus mobilis sequitur motionem moventis. Ergo intellectus non
movet voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object to the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination
                     in representing the appetible will to the sensitive appetite. But the imagination, does not remove the sensitive appetite:
                     indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at all (De Anima
                     ii, 3). Therefore neither does the intellect move the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33865] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
intellectus se habet ad voluntatem ut demonstrans appetibile, sicut
imaginatio demonstrat appetibile appetitui sensitivo. Sed
imaginatio demonstrans appetibile non movet appetitum sensitivum,
immo quandoque ita nos habemus ad ea quae imaginamur, sicut ad ea
quae in pictura nobis ostenduntur, ex quibus non movemur, ut
dicitur in libro de anima. Ergo neque etiam intellectus movet
voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise
                     the intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33866] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
idem respectu eiusdem non est movens et motum. Sed voluntas movet
intellectum, intelligimus enim quando volumus. Ergo intellectus non
movet voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that "the appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover moved."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33867] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>appetibile
intellectum est movens non motum, voluntas autem est movens
motum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q9_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in potentiality
                     needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality
                     to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action.
                     Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes
                     it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act,
                     and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes
                     not acting: while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q9_A1-p7"> The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A2" id="FS_Q9_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[2]</a>), the principle of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the art which is concerned with the end, by its command
                     moves the art which is concerned with the means; just as the "art of sailing commands the art of shipbuilding" (Phys. ii,
                     2). Now good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will.
                     Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers
                     when we will. For the end and perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the will as some particular
                     good: and always the art or power to which the universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong
                     the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good---i.e. the order
                     of the whole army---by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q9_A1-p8"> On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things
                     actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal "being" and "truth," which is the object
                     of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 co."><a name="33868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33868] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod intantum aliquid indiget moveri ab aliquo, inquantum
est in potentia ad plura, oportet enim ut id quod est in potentia,
reducatur in actum per aliquid quod est actu; et hoc est movere.
Dupliciter autem aliqua vis animae invenitur esse in potentia ad
diversa, uno modo, quantum ad agere et non agere; alio modo,
quantum ad agere hoc vel illud. Sicut visus quandoque videt actu,
et quandoque non videt; et quandoque videt album, et quandoque
videt nigrum. Indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo, scilicet
quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus; et quantum ad determinationem
actus. Quorum primum est ex parte subiecti, quod quandoque
invenitur agens, quandoque non agens, aliud autem est ex parte
obiecti, secundum quod specificatur actus. Motio autem ipsius
subiecti est ex agente aliquo. Et cum omne agens agat propter
finem, ut supra ostensum est, principium huius motionis est ex
fine. Et inde est quod ars ad quam pertinet finis, movet suo
imperio artem ad quam pertinet id quod est ad finem, sicut
gubernatoria ars imperat navifactivae, ut in II Physic. dicitur.
Bonum autem in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est obiectum
voluntatis. Et ideo ex hac parte voluntas movet alias potentias
animae ad suos actus, utimur enim aliis potentiis cum volumus. Nam
fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum comprehenduntur
sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona, semper
autem ars vel potentia ad quam pertinet finis universalis, movet ad
agendum artem vel potentiam ad quam pertinet finis particularis sub
illo universali comprehensus; sicut dux exercitus, qui intendit
bonum commune, scilicet ordinem totius exercitus, movet suo imperio
aliquem ex tribunis, qui intendit ordinem unius aciei. Sed obiectum
movet, determinando actum, ad modum principii formalis, a quo in
rebus naturalibus actio specificatur, sicut calefactio a calore.
Primum autem principium formale est ens et verum universale, quod
est obiectum intellectus. Et ideo isto modo motionis intellectus
movet voluntatem, sicut praesentans ei obiectum suum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect does not move, but that it does not move of necessity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33869] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate non habetur quod intellectus non
moveat, sed quod non moveat ex necessitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appetite; so
                     neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative
                     intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33870] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut imaginatio formae sine aestimatione
convenientis vel nocivi, non movet appetitum sensitivum; ita nec
apprehensio veri sine ratione boni et appetibilis. Unde intellectus
speculativus non movet, sed intellectus practicus, ut dicitur in
III de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect,
                     is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from
                     the object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the
                     universal true. It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in
                     the same respect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33871] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitium
actus, quia et ipsum verum, quod est perfectio intellectus,
continetur sub universali bono ut quoddam bonum particulare. Sed
quantum ad determinationem actus, quae est ex parte obiecti,
intellectus movet voluntatem, quia et ipsum bonum apprehenditur
secundum quandam specialem rationem comprehensam sub universali
ratione veri. Et sic patet quod non est idem movens et motum
secundum idem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q9_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q9_A2-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 2. Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the sensitive appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to
                     be passive," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is
                     the intellectual appetite; just as sense is less excellent than intellect. Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move
                     the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33872] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas ab appetitu sensitivo moveri
non possit. <i>Movens enim et agens est praestantius patiente</i>,
ut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt. Sed appetitus
sensitivus est inferior voluntate, quae est appetitus
intellectivus; sicut sensus est inferior intellectu. Ergo appetitus
sensitivus non movet voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no particular power can produce a universal effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it
                     follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause the movement of the will, which movement is universal,
                     as following the universal apprehension of the intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33873] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
nulla virtus particularis potest facere effectum universalem. Sed
appetitus sensitivus est virtus particularis, consequitur enim
particularem sensus apprehensionem. Ergo non potest causare motum
voluntatis, qui est universalis, velut consequens apprehensionem
universalem intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as is proved in Phys. viii, 5, the mover is not moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal
                     motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive
                     appetite does not move the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33874] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
ut probatur in VIII Physic., movens non movetur ab eo quod movet,
ut sit motio reciproca. Sed voluntas movet appetitum sensitivum,
inquantum appetitus sensitivus obedit rationi. Ergo appetitus
sensitivus non movet voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q9_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.14" target="asv">James 1:14</a>): "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured." But man would not be drawn away by his concupiscence,
                     unless his will were moved by the sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the sensitive appetite moves
                     the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33875] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Iac. I, <i>unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia
sua abstractus et illectus</i>. Non autem abstraheretur quis a
concupiscentia, nisi voluntas eius moveretur ab appetitu sensitivo,
in quo est concupiscentia. Ergo appetitus sensitivus movet
voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q9_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q9_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, that which is apprehended as good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appear to be good and
                     fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed.
                     For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it
                     is variously disposed, takes to a thing
                     in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as a man is,
                     such does the end seem to him."
                  </p><p id="FS_Q9_A2-p7"> Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore
                     according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected:
                     thus that seems good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. And in this way, the sensitive appetite
                     moves the will, on the part of the object.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 co."><a name="33876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33876] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, id quod apprehenditur sub
ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem per modum obiecti.
Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus
contingit, scilicet ex conditione eius quod proponitur, et eius cui
proponitur. Conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur, unde ex
utroque extremorum dependet. Et inde est quod gustus diversimode
dispositus, non eodem modo accipit aliquid ut conveniens et ut non
conveniens. Unde, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., <i>qualis
unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei</i>. Manifestum est autem
quod secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi, immutatur homo ad
aliquam dispositionem. Unde secundum quod homo est in passione
aliqua, videtur sibi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur extra
passionem existenti, sicut irato videtur bonum, quod non videtur
quieto. Et per hunc modum, ex parte obiecti, appetitus sensitivus
movet voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders that which is better simply and in itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly the
                     will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in
                     so far as he is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33877] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est simpliciter et secundum se
praestantius, quoad aliquid esse debilius. Voluntas igitur
simpliciter praestantior est quam appetitus sensitivus, sed quoad
istum in quo passio dominatur, inquantum subiacet passioni,
praeeminet appetitus sensitivus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Men's acts and choices are in reference to singulars. Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a particular
                     power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33878] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod actus et electiones hominum sunt circa singularia.
Unde ex hoc ipso quod appetitus sensitivus est virtus particularis,
habet magnam virtutem ad hoc quod per ipsum sic disponatur homo, ut
ei aliquid videatur sic vel aliter, circa singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and concupiscible
                     powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic sovereignty,"
                     as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible
                     can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the
                     will from being moved by them at times.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33879] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I Polit., ratio, in qua
est voluntas, movet suo imperio irascibilem et concupiscibilem, non
quidem despotico principatu, sicut movetur servus a domino; sed
principatu regali seu politico, sicut liberi homines reguntur a
gubernante, qui tamen possunt contra movere. Unde et irascibilis et
concupiscibilis possunt in contrarium movere ad voluntatem. Et sic
nihil prohibet voluntatem aliquando ab eis moveri.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q9_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q9_A3-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 3. Whether the will moves itself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will does not move itself. For every mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in potentiality;
                     since "movement is the act of that which is in potentiality, as such" [*Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1]. Now the same is not in potentiality
                     and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33880] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveat seipsam. Omne enim
movens, inquantum huiusmodi, est in actu, quod autem movetur, est
in potentia, nam motus est actus existentis in potentia, inquantum
huiusmodi. Sed non est idem in potentia et in actu respectu
eiusdem. Ergo nihil movet seipsum. Neque ergo voluntas seipsam
movere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present. But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved
                     itself, it would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33881] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
mobile movetur ad praesentiam moventis. Sed voluntas semper sibi
est praesens. Si ergo ipsa seipsam moveret, semper moveretur. Quod
patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q9_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. If, therefore, the will move itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which
                     seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33882] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
voluntas movetur ab intellectu, ut dictum est. Si igitur voluntas
movet seipsam, sequitur quod idem simul moveatur a duobus motoribus
immediate, quod videtur inconveniens. Non ergo voluntas movet
seipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the
                     power to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33883] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quia voluntas domina est sui actus, et in ipsa est velle et non
velle. Quod non esset, si non haberet in potestate movere seipsam
ad volendum. Ergo ipsa movet seipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q9_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's object. Now, as stated above (Q[8],
                     A[2]), the end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things intelligible. But it is evident that the intellect,
                     through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and
                     thus it moves itself. And, in like
                     manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 co."><a name="33884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33884] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad voluntatem pertinet
movere alias potentias ex ratione finis, qui est voluntatis
obiectum. Sed sicut dictum est, hoc modo se habet finis in
appetibilibus, sicut principium in intelligibilibus. Manifestum est
autem quod intellectus per hoc quod cognoscit principium, reducit
seipsum de potentia in actum, quantum ad cognitionem conclusionum,
et hoc modo movet seipsum. Et similiter voluntas per hoc quod vult
finem, movet seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not in respect of the same that the will moves itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in potentiality
                     in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect
                     of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33885] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod voluntas non secundum idem movet et movetur. Unde nec
secundum idem est in actu et in potentia. Sed inquantum actu vult
finem, reducit se de potentia in actum respectu eorum quae sunt ad
finem, ut scilicet actu ea velit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not always
                     in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself. Accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33886] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod potentia voluntatis semper actu est sibi praesens,
sed actus voluntatis, quo vult finem aliquem, non semper est in
ipsa voluntate. Per hunc autem movet seipsam. Unde non sequitur
quod semper seipsam moveat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object: whereas
                     it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33887] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non eodem modo voluntas movetur ab intellectu, et a
seipsa. Sed ab intellectu quidem movetur secundum rationem obiecti,
a seipsa vero, quantum ad exercitium actus, secundum rationem
finis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q9_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q9_A4-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 4. Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved by anything exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is essential
                     to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement
                     of the will is not from anything exterior.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33888] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur ab aliquo
exteriori. Motus enim voluntatis est voluntarius. Sed de ratione
voluntarii est quod sit a principio intrinseco, sicut et de ratione
naturalis. Non ergo motus voluntatis est ab aliquo extrinseco.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q6_A4" id="FS_Q9_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But the violent act is one "the principle of which is outside the agent" [*Aristotle, Ethic. iii, 1]. Therefore the will
                     cannot be moved by anything exterior.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33889] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
voluntas violentiam pati non potest, ut supra ostensum est. Sed
violentum est cuius principium est extra. Ergo voluntas non potest
ab aliquo exteriori moveri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover, needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently.
                     Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33890] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quod sufficienter movetur ab uno motore, non indiget moveri ab
alio. Sed voluntas sufficienter movet seipsam. Non ergo movetur ab
aliquo exteriori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The will is moved by the object, as stated above (A[1] ). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to
                     the sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33891] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
voluntas movetur ab obiecto, ut dictum est. Sed obiectum voluntatis
potest esse aliqua exterior res sensui proposita. Ergo voluntas
potest ab aliquo exteriori moveri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q9_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it
                     is moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be moved by some exterior principle.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q9_A4-p7"> For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by
                     a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it did not will it. Therefore it must,
                     of necessity, be moved by something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A3" id="FS_Q9_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the means. Now it cannot do this
                     without the aid of counsel: for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through
                     this reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did not always
                     actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if
                     the will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous
                     volition. But this process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to
                     its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian
                     Ethics (vii, 14).
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 co."><a name="33892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33892] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, secundum quod voluntas movetur ab obiecto,
manifestum est quod moveri potest ab aliquo exteriori. Sed eo modo
quo movetur quantum ad exercitium actus, adhuc necesse est ponere
voluntatem ab aliquo principio exteriori moveri. Omne enim quod
quandoque est agens in actu et quandoque in potentia, indiget
moveri ab aliquo movente. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas
incipit velle aliquid, cum hoc prius non vellet. Necesse est ergo
quod ab aliquo moveatur ad volendum. Et quidem, sicut dictum est,
ipsa movet seipsam, inquantum per hoc quod vult finem, reducit
seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem. Hoc autem non potest
facere nisi consilio mediante, cum enim aliquis vult sanari,
incipit cogitare quomodo hoc consequi possit, et per talem
cogitationem pervenit ad hoc quod potest sanari per medicum, et hoc
vult. Sed quia non semper sanitatem actu voluit, necesse est quod
inciperet velle sanari, aliquo movente. Et si quidem ipsa moveret
seipsam ad volendum, oportuisset quod mediante consilio hoc ageret,
ex aliqua voluntate praesupposita. Hoc autem non est procedere in
infinitum. Unde necesse est ponere quod in primum motum voluntatis
voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis, ut
Aristoteles concludit in quodam capitulo Ethicae Eudemicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward principle
                     be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless
                     its first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the natural movement is from without, that, to wit,
                     which moves nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33893] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod de ratione voluntarii est quod principium eius sit
intra, sed non oportet quod hoc principium intrinsecum sit primum
principium non motum ab alio. Unde motus voluntarius etsi habeat
principium proximum intrinsecum, tamen principium primum est ab
extra. Sicut et primum principium motus naturalis est ab extra,
quod scilicet movet naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> For an act to be violent it is not enough that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add "without the concurrence of him
                     that suffers violence." This does not happen when the will is moved by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills,
                     though moved by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to the movement of the will: which in the
                     present case is impossible; since then the will would will and not will the same
                     thing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33894] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod hoc non sufficit ad rationem violenti, quod
principium sit extra, sed oportet addere quod nil conferat vim
patiens. Quod non contingit, dum voluntas ab exteriori movetur, nam
ipsa est quae vult, ab alio tamen mota. Esset autem motus iste
violentus, si esset contrarius motui voluntatis. Quod in proposito
esse non potest, quia sic idem vellet et non vellet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but it cannot
                     move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it needs to be moved by another as first mover.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33895] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod voluntas quantum ad aliquid sufficienter se movet, et
in suo ordine, scilicet sicut agens proximum, sed non potest
seipsam movere quantum ad omnia, ut ostensum est. Unde indiget
moveri ab alio sicut a primo movente.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q9_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q9_A5-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 5. Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to
                     their cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved in Phys. viii, 9. But human movements are various
                     and multiform, since they begin to be, whereas previously they were not. Therefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to
                     the movement of the heavens, which is uniform according to its nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33896] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas humana a corpore caelesti
moveatur. Omnes enim motus varii et multiformes reducuntur, sicut
in causam, in motum uniformem, qui est motus caeli ut probatur VIII
Physic. Sed motus humani sunt varii et multiformes, incipientes
postquam prius non fuerant. Ergo reducuntur in motum caeli sicut in
causam, qui est uniformis secundum naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "the lower bodies are moved by the higher." But the movements of the human
                     body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will
                     too were moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33897] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum Augustinum, in III de Trin., <i>corpora inferiora moventur
per corpora superiora</i>. Sed motus humani corporis, qui causantur
a voluntate, non possent reduci in motum caeli sicut in causam,
nisi etiam voluntas a caelo moveretur. Ergo caelum movet voluntatem
humanam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the
                     will. But this would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move man's will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly
                     body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33898] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
per observationem caelestium corporum astrologi quaedam vera
praenuntiant de humanis actibus futuris, qui sunt a voluntate. Quod
non esset, si corpora caelestia voluntatem hominis movere non
possent. Movetur ergo voluntas humana a caelesti corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts." But they would be, if the
                     will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly
                     bodies.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33899] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod <i>corpora caelestia
non sunt causae nostrorum actuum</i>. Essent autem, si voluntas,
quae est humanorum actuum principium, a corporibus caelestibus
moveretur. Non ergo movetur voluntas a corporibus caelestibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q9_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is to
                     say, in so far as exterior bodies, which move the will, through being offered to the senses, and also the organs themselves
                     of the sensitive powers, are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q9_A5-p7"> But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the human will, in the same way as some exterior agent
                     moves the will, as to the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the "will," as stated in De Anima iii, 9, "is in
                     the reason." Now the reason is a power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows that the will is a power
                     absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but
                     rather the reverse: because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more formal and more universal than any corporeal
                     things whatever. Therefore it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect or will. For this reason
                     Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that "such is the
                     will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods bring on" [*Odyssey xviii. 135] (referring to Jupiter, by whom
                     they understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally,
                     by the heavenly bodies, i.e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts they are.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q9_A5-p8"> But since it has been stated
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A2" id="FS_Q9_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that the intellectual appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the movements of the heavenly bodies have
                     an indirect bearing on the will; in so far as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 co."><a name="33900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33900] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod eo modo quo voluntas movetur ab exteriori obiecto,
manifestum est quod voluntas potest moveri a corporibus
caelestibus, inquantum scilicet corpora exteriora, quae sensui
proposita movent voluntatem, et etiam ipsa organa potentiarum
sensitivarum, subiacent motibus caelestium corporum. Sed eo modo
quo voluntas movetur, quantum ad exercitium actus, ab aliquo
exteriori agente, adhuc quidam posuerunt corpora caelestia directe
imprimere in voluntatem humanam. Sed hoc est impossibile. Voluntas
enim, ut dicitur in III de anima, est in ratione. Ratio autem est
potentia animae non alligata organo corporali. Unde relinquitur
quod voluntas sit potentia omnino immaterialis et incorporea.
Manifestum est autem quod nullum corpus agere potest in rem
incorpoream, sed potius e converso, eo quod res incorporeae et
immateriales sunt formalioris et universalioris virtutis quam
quaecumque res corporales. Unde impossibile est quod corpus
caeleste imprimat directe in intellectum aut voluntatem. Et propter
hoc Aristoteles, in libro de anima, opinionem dicentium quod talis
est voluntas in hominibus, <i>qualem in diem ducit pater deorum
virorumque</i> (scilicet Iupiter, per quem totum caelum
intelligunt), attribuit eis qui ponebant intellectum non differre a
sensu. Omnes enim vires sensitivae, cum sint actus organorum
corporalium, per accidens moveri possunt a caelestibus corporibus,
motis scilicet corporibus quorum sunt actus. Sed quia dictum est
quod appetitus intellectivus quodammodo movetur ab appetitu
sensitivo, indirecte redundat motus caelestium corporum in
voluntatem, inquantum scilicet per passiones appetitus sensitivi
voluntatem moveri contingit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multiform movements of the human will are reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect and will.
                     This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement
                     of the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its cause.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33901] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod multiformes motus voluntatis humanae reducuntur in
aliquam causam uniformem, quae tamen est intellectu et voluntate
superior. Quod non potest dici de aliquo corpore, sed de aliqua
superiori substantia immateriali. Unde non oportet quod motus
voluntatis in motum caeli reducatur sicut in causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the disposition
                     suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the influence of heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive appetite
                     is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again, in so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement
                     of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or
                     not to will something; for instance, when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to make the fire. But this movement of the
                     will is on the part of the object offered from without: not on the part of an inward instigation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33902] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod motus corporales humani reducuntur in motum caelestis
corporis sicut in causam, inquantum ipsa dispositio organorum
congrua ad motum, est aliqualiter ex impressione caelestium
corporum; et inquantum etiam appetitus sensitivus commovetur ex
impressione caelestium corporum; et ulterius inquantum corpora
exteriora moventur secundum motum caelestium corporum, ex quorum
occursu voluntas incipit aliquid velle vel non velle, sicut
adveniente frigore incipit aliquis velle facere ignem. Sed ista
motio voluntatis est ex parte obiecti exterius praesentati, non ex
parte interioris instinctus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q9_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (Cf.
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A6" id="FS_Q9_A5-p11.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], AA[6]</a>,7) the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to anger
                     or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural complexion.
                     But the majority of men are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the majority of cases predictions
                     about
                     human acts, gathered from the observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says (Centiloquium v),
                     "the wise man governs the stars"; which is a though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will, which is free
                     and nowise subject to the movement of the heavens, to such like effects of the heavenly bodies.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q9_A5-p12"> Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): "We must confess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due
                     to some most hidden inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And since this is done in order to
                     deceive man, it must be the work of the lying spirits."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33903] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, appetitus sensitivus est actus
organi corporalis. Unde nihil prohibet ex impressione corporum
caelestium aliquos esse habiles ad irascendum vel concupiscendum,
vel aliquam huiusmodi passionem, sicut et ex complexione naturali.
Plures autem hominum sequuntur passiones, quibus soli sapientes
resistunt. Et ideo ut in pluribus verificantur ea quae
praenuntiantur de actibus hominum secundum considerationem
caelestium corporum. Sed tamen, ut Ptolomaeus dicit in Centiloquio,
<i>sapiens dominatur astris</i>, scilicet quia, resistens
passionibus, impedit per voluntatem liberam, et nequaquam motui
caelesti subiectam, huiusmodi corporum caelestium effectus. Vel, ut
Augustinus dicit II super Gen. ad Litt., <i>fatendum est, quando ab
astrologis vera dicuntur, instinctu quodam occultissimo dici, quem
nescientes humanae mentes patiuntur. Quod cum ad decipiendum
homines fit, spirituum seductorum operatio est</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q9_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q9_A6-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 6. Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved
                     by its superior: thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But there is something which is higher than the will
                     of man and below God, namely, the angel. Therefore man's will can be moved by an angel also, as exterior principle.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33904] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non a solo Deo moveatur sicut
ab exteriori principio. Inferius enim natum est moveri a suo
superiori, sicut corpora inferiora a corporibus caelestibus. Sed
voluntas hominis habet aliquid superius post Deum; scilicet
Angelum. Ergo voluntas hominis potest moveri, sicut ab exteriori
principio, etiam ab Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the act of the will follows the act of the intellect. But man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but
                     also by the angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). For the same reason, therefore, the will also is
                     moved by an angel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33905] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
actus voluntatis sequitur actum intellectus. Sed intellectus
hominis reducitur in suum actum non solum a Deo, sed etiam ab
Angelo per illuminationes, ut Dionysius dicit. Ergo eadem ratione
et voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God is not the cause of other than good things, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q9_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.31" target="asv"> Gn. 1:31</a>: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." If, therefore man's will were moved by God alone, it
                     would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby "we sin and whereby we do right," as Augustine says (Retract.
                     i, 9).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33906] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Deus non est causa nisi bonorum; secundum illud Gen. I, <i>vidit
Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona</i>. Si ergo a solo
Deo voluntas hominis moveretur, nunquam moveretur ad malum, cum
tamen voluntas sit qua peccatur et recte vivitur, ut Augustinus
dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q9_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.13" target="asv">Phil. 2:13</a>): "It is God Who worketh in us" [Vulg.'you'] "both to will and to accomplish."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33907] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. II, <i>Deus est qui operatur
in nobis velle et perficere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q9_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The movement of the will is from within, as also is the movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to
                     move a natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet that alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing's
                     nature, can cause a natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man, who is not the cause of the stone's
                     nature, but this movement is not natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the
                     stone is caused by no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in Phys. vii, 4, that the generator moves locally
                     heavy and light things. Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause; but that
                     his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q9_A6-p7"> Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power
                     of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated in the
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q90_A2" id="FS_Q9_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[90], A[2]</a>. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else can be the
                     cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good: while every other good is good by
                     participation, and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence neither can
                     primary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 co."><a name="33908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33908] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod motus voluntatis est ab intrinseco, sicut et motus
naturalis. Quamvis autem rem naturalem possit aliquid movere quod
non est causa naturae rei motae, tamen motum naturalem causare non
potest nisi quod est aliqualiter causa naturae. Movetur enim lapis
sursum ab homine, qui naturam lapidis non causat, sed hic motus non
est lapidi naturalis, naturalis autem motus eius non causatur nisi
ab eo quod causat naturam. Unde dicitur in VIII Physic. quod
generans movet secundum locum gravia et levia. Sic ergo hominem,
voluntatem habentem, contingit moveri ab aliquo qui non est causa
eius, sed quod motus voluntarius eius sit ab aliquo principio
extrinseco quod non est causa voluntatis, est impossibile.
Voluntatis autem causa nihil aliud esse potest quam Deus. Et hoc
patet dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex hoc quod voluntas est potentia
animae rationalis, quae a solo Deo causatur per creationem, ut in
primo dictum est. Secundo vero ex hoc patet, quod voluntas habet
ordinem ad universale bonum. Unde nihil aliud potest esse
voluntatis causa, nisi ipse Deus, qui est universale bonum. Omne
autem aliud bonum per participationem dicitur, et est quoddam
particulare bonum, particularis autem causa non dat inclinationem
universalem. Unde nec materia prima, quae est in potentia ad omnes
formas, potest causari ab aliquo particulari agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An angel is not above man in such a way as to be the cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural
                     forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33909] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
dicendum quod Angelus non sic est supra hominem, quod sit causa
voluntatis eius; sicut corpora caelestia sunt causa formarum
naturalium, ad quas consequuntur naturales motus corporum
naturalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man's intellect is moved by an angel, on the part of the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to man's
                     knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a creature from without, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A4" id="FS_Q9_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33910] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod intellectus hominis movetur ab Angelo ex parte
obiecti, quod sibi proponitur virtute angelici luminis ad
cognoscendum. Et sic etiam voluntas ab exteriori creatura potest
moveri, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q9_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal
                     motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent
                     good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case
                     of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on (
                     <a href="FS_vii.html#FS_Q109_A2" id="FS_Q9_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[109], A[2]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 9 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33911] Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis
motor, ad universale obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum. Et sine
hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle. Sed homo per
rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere
bonum vel apparens bonum. Sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet
aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum, sicut in
his quos movet per gratiam, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q10" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q10-p0.1">Q. 10. OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q10-p2"> We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q10-p3"><a href="#FS_Q10_A1"> (1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?</a></p><p id="FS_Q10-p4"><a href="#FS_Q10_A2"> (2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object?</a></p><p id="FS_Q10-p5"><a href="#FS_Q10_A3"> (3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite?</a></p><p id="FS_Q10-p6"><a href="#FS_Q10_A4"> (4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 pr."><a name="33912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33912]
Iª-IIae q. 10 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de modo
quo voluntas movetur. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum
voluntas ad aliquid naturaliter moveatur. Secundo, utrum de
necessitate moveatur a suo obiecto. Tertio, utrum de necessitate
moveatur ab appetitu inferiori. Quarto, utrum de necessitate
moveatur ab exteriori motivo quod est Deus.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q10_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q10_A1-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 1. Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved to anything naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary agent,
                     as stated at the beginning of Phys. ii, 1. Therefore the will is not moved to anything naturally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33913] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur ad aliquid
naturaliter. Agens enim naturale dividitur contra agens
voluntarium, ut patet in principio II Physic. Non ergo voluntas ad
aliquid naturaliter movetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as "being hot" is in fire. But no movement is always in the will. Therefore
                     no movement is natural to the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33914] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
id quod est naturale, inest alicui semper; sicut igni esse calidum.
Sed nullus motus inest voluntati semper. Ergo nullus motus est
naturalis voluntati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the will is referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing
                     naturally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33915] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
natura est determinata ad unum. Sed voluntas se habet ad opposita.
Ergo voluntas nihil naturaliter vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The movement of the will follows the movement of the intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally. Therefore
                     the will, too, wills some things naturally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33916] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod motus voluntatis sequitur actum intellectus. Sed
intellectus aliqua intelligit naturaliter. Ergo et voluntas aliqua
vult naturaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q10_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a manifold sense.
                     For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In this sense nature is either matter or the material
                     form, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense,
                     that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of its substance. And this
                     is that which of itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which they are, are
                     reduced to something which belongs of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in this sense,
                     it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the
                     intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements
                     must be something naturally willed.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q10_A1-p7"> Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does each power to its object; and again it is the last
                     end, which stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of demonstrations to things intelligible:
                     and, speaking generally, it is all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature. For it is not only things
                     pertaining to the will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire
                     man. Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other
                     powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live and other like things which regard
                     the natural well-being; all of which are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 co."><a name="33917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33917] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut Boetius dicit in libro de duabus naturis, et
philosophus in V Metaphys., natura dicitur multipliciter. Quandoque
enim dicitur principium intrinsecum in rebus mobilibus. Et talis
natura est vel materia, vel forma materialis, ut patet ex II
Physic. Alio modo dicitur natura quaelibet substantia, vel etiam
quodlibet ens. Et secundum hoc, illud dicitur esse naturale rei,
quod convenit ei secundum suam substantiam. Et hoc est quod per se
inest rei. In omnibus autem, ea quae non per se insunt, reducuntur
in aliquid quod per se inest, sicut in principium. Et ideo necesse
est quod, hoc modo accipiendo naturam, semper principium in his
quae conveniunt rei, sit naturale. Et hoc manifeste apparet in
intellectu, nam principia intellectualis cognitionis sunt
naturaliter nota. Similiter etiam principium motuum voluntariorum
oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum. Hoc autem est bonum in
communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet
potentia in suum obiectum, et etiam ipse finis ultimus, qui hoc
modo se habet in appetibilibus, sicut prima principia
demonstrationum in intelligibilibus, et universaliter omnia illa
quae conveniunt volenti secundum suam naturam. Non enim per
voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam
voluntatis; sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias, et
ad totum hominem. Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum obiectum
voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt aliis potentiis, ut
cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere et
alia huiusmodi, quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia
comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quadam particularia
bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will is distinguished from nature as one kind of cause from another; for some things happen naturally and some are done
                     voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides
                     the manner proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But since the will is founded on some nature, it is necessary
                     that the movement proper to nature be shared by the will, to some extent: just as
                     what belongs to a previous cause is shared by a subsequent cause. Because in every thing, being itself, which is from nature,
                     precedes volition, which is from the will. And hence it is that the will wills something naturally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33918] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod voluntas dividitur contra naturam, sicut una
causa contra aliam, quaedam enim fiunt naturaliter, et quaedam
fiunt voluntarie. Est autem alius modus causandi proprius
voluntati, quae est domina sui actus, praeter modum qui convenit
naturae, quae est determinata ad unum. Sed quia voluntas in aliqua
natura fundatur, necesse est quod motus proprius naturae, quantum
ad aliquid, participetur in voluntate, sicut quod est prioris
causae, participatur a posteriori. Est enim prius in unaquaque re
ipsum esse, quod est per naturam, quam velle, quod est per
voluntatem. Et inde est quod voluntas naturaliter aliquid vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the case of natural things, that which is natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as heat is
                     in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality:
                     because form is act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is "the act of that which is in potentiality" (Aristotle,
                     Phys. iii, 1). Wherefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in
                     regard to natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always move upwards, but only when it is outside its own
                     place. [*The Aristotelian theory was that fire's proper place is the fiery heaven, i.e. the Empyrean.] And in like manner
                     it is not necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills something), should always be in
                     the act of volition; but only when it is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is pure act, is always
                     in
                     the act of volition.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33919] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod in rebus naturalibus id quod est naturale quasi
consequens formam tantum, semper actu inest, sicut calidum igni.
Quod autem est naturale sicut consequens materiam, non semper actu
inest, sed quandoque secundum potentiam tantum. Nam forma est
actus, materia vero potentia. Motus autem est actus existentis in
potentia. Et ideo illa quae pertinent ad motum, vel quae
consequuntur motum, in rebus naturalibus, non semper insunt, sicut
ignis non semper movetur sursum, sed quando est extra locum suum.
Et similiter non oportet quod voluntas, quae de potentia in actum
reducitur dum aliquid vult, semper actu velit, sed solum quando est
in aliqua dispositione determinata. Voluntas autem Dei, quae est
actus purus, semper est in actu volendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To every nature there is one thing corresponding, proportionate, however, to that nature. For to nature considered as a genus,
                     there corresponds something one generically; and to nature as species there corresponds something one specifically; and to
                     the individualized nature there corresponds some one individual. Since, therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the
                     intellect, some one general thing corresponds to it, naturally which is the good;
                     just as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the true, or being, or "what a thing is." And
                     under good in general are included many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33920] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod naturae semper respondet unum, proportionatum tamen
naturae. Naturae enim in genere, respondet aliquid unum in genere;
et naturae in specie acceptae, respondet unum in specie; naturae
autem individuatae respondet aliquid unum individuale. Cum igitur
voluntas sit quaedam vis immaterialis sicut et intellectus,
respondet sibi naturaliter aliquod unum commune, scilicet bonum,
sicut etiam intellectui aliquod unum commune, scilicet verum, vel
ens, vel quod quid est. Sub bono autem communi multa particularia
bona continentur, ad quorum nullum voluntas determinatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q10_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q10_A2-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 2. Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover
                     to movable, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. But a mover, if it be sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the
                     will can be moved of necessity by its object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33921] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas de necessitate moveatur a suo
obiecto. Obiectum enim voluntatis comparatur ad ipsam sicut motivum
ad mobile, ut patet in III de anima. Sed motivum, si sit
sufficiens, ex necessitate movet mobile. Ergo voluntas ex
necessitate potest moveri a suo obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is the intellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object,
                     as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity, by its object: therefore the will also, by its object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33922] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut voluntas est vis immaterialis, ita et intellectus, et utraque
potentia ad obiectum universale ordinatur, ut dictum est. Sed
intellectus ex necessitate movetur a suo obiecto. Ergo et voluntas
a suo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or something ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end necessarily:
                     because it is like the principle in speculative matters, to which principle one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason
                     for willing the means; and so it seems that we will the means also necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by
                     its object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33923] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
omne quod quis vult, aut est finis, aut aliquid ordinatum ad finem.
Sed finem aliquis ex necessitate vult, ut videtur, quia est sicut
principium in speculativis, cui ex necessitate assentimus. Finis
autem est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, et sic videtur quod
etiam ea quae sunt ad finem, ex necessitate velimus. Voluntas ergo
ex necessitate movetur a suo obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational power,
                     since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not
                     moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33924] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod potentiae rationales, secundum philosophum, sunt ad
opposita. Sed voluntas est potentia rationalis, est enim in
ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo voluntas se habet ad
opposita. Non ergo ex necessitate movetur ad alterum
oppositorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived
                     from the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man's
                     power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved
                     by one object necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by its object,
                     we must consider under what aspect the object moves the power. For the visible moves the sight, under the aspect of color
                     actually visible. Wherefore if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily: unless one turns one's eyes
                     away; which belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all respects colored
                     actually, but only so in some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for
                     it
                     might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored, and thus it would not see it. Now just as the actually
                     colored is the object of sight, so is good the object of the will. Wherefore if the will be offered an object which is good
                     universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot
                     will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will
                     not
                     tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect
                     and lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it: and this is Happiness. Whereas any other particular
                     goods, in so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this point of view, they can be
                     set aside or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 co."><a name="33925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33925] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod voluntas movetur dupliciter, uno modo, quantum ad
exercitium actus; alio modo, quantum ad specificationem actus, quae
est ex obiecto. Primo ergo modo, voluntas a nullo obiecto ex
necessitate movetur, potest enim aliquis de quocumque obiecto non
cogitare, et per consequens neque actu velle illud. Sed quantum ad
secundum motionis modum, voluntas ab aliquo obiecto ex necessitate
movetur, ab aliquo autem non. In motu enim cuiuslibet potentiae a
suo obiecto, consideranda est ratio per quam obiectum movet
potentiam. Visibile enim movet visum sub ratione coloris actu
visibilis. Unde si color proponatur visui, ex necessitate movet
visum, nisi aliquis visum avertat, quod pertinet ad exercitium
actus. Si autem proponeretur aliquid visui quod non omnibus modis
esset color in actu, sed secundum aliquid esset tale, secundum
autem aliquid non tale, non ex necessitate visus tale obiectum
videret, posset enim intendere in ipsum ex ea parte qua non est
coloratum in actu, et sic ipsum non videret. Sicut autem coloratum
in actu est obiectum visus, ita bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Unde
si proponatur aliquod obiectum voluntati quod sit universaliter
bonum et secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in
illud tendet, si aliquid velit, non enim poterit velle oppositum.
Si autem proponatur sibi aliquod obiectum quod non secundum
quamlibet considerationem sit bonum, non ex necessitate voluntas
feretur in illud. Et quia defectus cuiuscumque boni habet rationem
non boni, ideo illud solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil
deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas non potest non velle, quod
est beatitudo. Alia autem quaelibet particularia bona, inquantum
deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona, et secundum
hanc considerationem, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate,
quae potest in idem ferri secundum diversas considerationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sufficient mover of a power is none but that object that in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that power.
                     If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not move of necessity, as stated above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33926] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod sufficiens motivum alicuius potentiae non est
nisi obiectum quod totaliter habet rationem motivi. Si autem in
aliquo deficiat, non ex necessitate movebit, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an object which is such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by that which
                     may be either true or false---viz. by that which is contingent: as we have said of the good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33927] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod intellectus ex necessitate movetur a tali obiecto
quod est semper et ex necessitate verum, non autem ab eo quod
potest esse verum et falsum, scilicet a contingenti, sicut et de
bono dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that end,
                     and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and "to live," and the like. But other things without which
                     the end can be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end: just as he who assents to the principle, does
                     not necessarily assent to the conclusions, without which the principles can still be
                     true.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33928] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod finis ultimus ex necessitate movet voluntatem, quia
est bonum perfectum. Et similiter illa quae ordinantur ad hunc
finem, sine quibus finis haberi non potest, sicut esse et vivere et
huiusmodi. Alia vero, sine quibus finis haberi potest, non ex
necessitate vult qui vult finem, sicut conclusiones sine quibus
principia possunt esse vera, non ex necessitate credit qui credit
principia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q10_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q10_A3-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 3. Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q10_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv">Rom. 7:19</a>): "The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": and this is said by reason of concupiscence,
                     which is a passion. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33929] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas ex necessitate moveatur a
passione appetitus inferioris. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VII,
<i>non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; sed quod odi malum, illud
facio</i>, quod dicitur propter concupiscentiam, quae est passio
quaedam. Ergo voluntas ex necessitate movetur a passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, "according as a man is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in man's power
                     to cast aside a passion once. Therefore it is not in man's power not to will that to which the passion inclines him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33930] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut dicitur in III Ethic., <i>qualis unusquisque est, talis finis
videtur ei</i>. Sed non est in potestate voluntatis quod statim
passionem abiiciat. Ergo non est in potestate voluntatis quod non
velit illud ad quod passio se inclinat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular effect, except by means of a particular cause: wherefore the universal
                     reason does not move save by means of a particular estimation, as stated in De Anima iii, 11. But as the universal reason
                     is to the particular estimation, so is the will to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the will is not moved to will something
                     particular, except through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the sensitive appetite
                     happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a passion, the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33931] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
causa universalis non applicatur ad effectum particularem nisi
mediante causa particulari, unde et ratio universalis non movet
nisi mediante aestimatione particulari, ut dicitur in III de anima.
Sed sicut se habet ratio universalis ad aestimationem particularem,
ita se habet voluntas ad appetitum sensitivum. Ergo ad aliquod
particulare volendum non movetur voluntas nisi mediante appetitu
sensitivo. Ergo si appetitus sensitivus sit per aliquam passionem
ad aliquid dispositus, voluntas non poterit in contrarium
moveri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b>
                     It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q10_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.7" target="asv">Gn. 4:7</a>):
                     "Thy lust [Vulg. 'The lust thereof'] shall be
                     under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over
                     it." Therefore man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33932] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Gen. IV, <i>subter te erit appetitus tuus, et tu
dominaberis illius</i>. Non ergo voluntas hominis ex necessitate
movetur ab appetitu inferiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q10_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A2" id="FS_Q10_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[2]</a>), the passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit,
                     man through being disposed in such and such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not
                     judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason
                     is wholly bound, so that he has not
                     the use of reason: as happens in those who through a violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious or insane, just
                     as they may from some other bodily disorder; since such like passions do not take place without some change in the body. And
                     of such the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow, of necessity, the impulse of their passions: for in
                     them there is neither movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q10_A3-p7"> Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain
                     extent, its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains
                     free, and not subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto
                     the passion inclines it. Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man, and the passion
                     alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of the will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 co."><a name="33933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33933] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, passio appetitus sensitivi
movet voluntatem ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab obiecto,
inquantum scilicet homo aliqualiter dispositus per passionem,
iudicat aliquid esse conveniens et bonum quod extra passionem
existens non iudicaret. Huiusmodi autem immutatio hominis per
passionem duobus modis contingit. Uno modo, sic quod totaliter
ratio ligatur, ita quod homo usum rationis non habet, sicut
contingit in his qui propter vehementem iram vel concupiscentiam
furiosi vel amentes fiunt, sicut et propter aliquam aliam
perturbationem corporalem; huiusmodi enim passiones non sine
corporali transmutatione accidunt. Et de talibus eadem est ratio
sicut et de animalibus brutis, quae ex necessitate sequuntur
impetum passionis, in his enim non est aliquis rationis motus, et
per consequens nec voluntatis. Aliquando autem ratio non totaliter
absorbetur a passione, sed remanet quantum ad aliquid iudicium
rationis liberum. Et secundum hoc remanet aliquid de motu
voluntatis. Inquantum ergo ratio manet libera et passioni non
subiecta, intantum voluntatis motus qui manet, non ex necessitate
tendit ad hoc ad quod passio inclinat. Et sic aut motus voluntatis
non est in homine, sed sola passio dominatur, aut, si motus
voluntatis sit, non ex necessitate sequitur passionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the will cannot prevent the movement of concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: "The evil which I
                     will not, that I do---i.e. I desire"; yet it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence.
                     And thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33934] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod, etsi voluntas non possit facere quin motus
concupiscentiae insurgat, de quo apostolus dicit Rom. VII, <i>quod
odi malum, illud facio</i>, idest concupisco; tamen potest voluntas
non velle concupiscere, aut concupiscentiae non consentire. Et sic
non ex necessitate sequitur concupiscentiae motum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since there is in man a twofold nature, intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in respect of
                     his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly subject to this reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason
                     is entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this
                     reason remains free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion
                     entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is
                     variously disposed according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise according to his reason, than
                     it does according to a passion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33935] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum in homine duae sint naturae, intellectualis
scilicet et sensitiva, quandoque quidem est homo aliqualis
uniformiter secundum totam animam, quia scilicet vel pars sensitiva
totaliter subiicitur rationi, sicut contingit in virtuosis; vel e
converso ratio totaliter absorbetur a passione sicut accidit in
amentibus. Sed aliquando, etsi ratio obnubiletur a passione,
remanet tamen aliquid rationis liberum. Et secundum hoc potest
aliquis vel totaliter passionem repellere; vel saltem se tenere ne
passionem sequatur. In tali enim dispositione, quia homo secundum
diversas partes animae diversimode disponitur, aliud ei videtur
secundum rationem, et aliud secundum passionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense. Wherefore
                     he can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things
                     without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in those cases wherein reason resists passion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33936] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod voluntas non solum movetur a bono universali
apprehenso per rationem, sed etiam a bono apprehenso per sensum. Et
ideo potest moveri ad aliquod particulare bonum absque passione
appetitus sensitivi. Multa enim volumus et operamur absque
passione, per solam electionem, ut maxime patet in his in quibus
ratio renititur passioni.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q10_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q10_A4-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 4. Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by God. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But
                     God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q10_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.19" target="asv">Rom. 9:19</a>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore God moves the will of necessity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33937] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas ex necessitate moveatur a
Deo. Omne enim agens cui resisti non potest, ex necessitate movet.
Sed Deo, cum sit infinitae virtutis, resisti non potest, unde
dicitur Rom. IX, <i>voluntati eius quis resistit?</i> Ergo Deus ex
necessitate movet voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it wills naturally, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). But "whatever God does
                     in a thing is natural to it," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3). Therefore the will wills of necessity everything
                     to which God moves it.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33938] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
voluntas ex necessitate movetur in illa quae naturaliter vult, ut
dictum est. <i>Sed hoc est unicuique rei naturale, quod Deus in ea
operatur</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum. Ergo
voluntas ex necessitate vult omne illud ad quod a Deo movetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from
                     the supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it: because in that case God's operation would be ineffectual.
                     Therefore it is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it. Therefore it wills it of necessity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33939] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
possibile est quo posito non sequitur impossibile. Sequitur autem
impossibile, si ponatur quod voluntas non velit hoc ad quod Deus
eam movet, quia secundum hoc, operatio Dei esset inefficax. Non
ergo est possibile voluntatem non velle hoc ad quod Deus eam movet.
Ergo necesse est eam hoc velle.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q10_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>): "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore He does not of necessity move
                     man's will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33940] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Eccli. XV, <i>Deus ab initio constituit hominem,
et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui</i>. Non ergo ex necessitate
movet voluntatem eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things."
                     Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions; so that from necessary causes through the Divine motion,
                     effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active
                     principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things,
                     God so moves it, that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary,
                     except in those things to which it is moved naturally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 co."><a name="33941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33941] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>ad
providentiam divinam non pertinet naturam rerum corrumpere, sed
servare</i>. Unde omnia movet secundum eorum conditionem, ita quod
ex causis necessariis per motionem divinam consequuntur effectus ex
necessitate; ex causis autem contingentibus sequuntur effectus
contingenter. Quia igitur voluntas est activum principium non
determinatum ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa, sic
Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed
remanet motus eius contingens et non necessarius, nisi in his ad
quae naturaliter movetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Divine will extends not only to the doing of something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a way
                     which is fitting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will
                     to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33942] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod voluntas divina non solum se extendit ut aliquid
fiat per rem quam movet, sed ut etiam eo modo fiat quo congruit
naturae ipsius. Et ideo magis repugnaret divinae motioni, si
voluntas ex necessitate moveretur, quod suae naturae non competit;
quam si moveretur libere, prout competit suae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That is natural to a thing, which God so works in it that it may be natural to it: for thus is something becoming to a thing,
                     according as God wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not wish that whatever He works in things should be natural to them,
                     for instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to be natural to each thing---that it be subject to the
                     Divine power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33943] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod naturale est unicuique quod Deus operatur in ipso ut
sit ei naturale, sic enim unicuique convenit aliquid, secundum quod
Deus vult quod ei conveniat. Non autem vult quod quidquid operatur
in rebus, sit eis naturale, puta quod mortui resurgant. Sed hoc
vult unicuique esse naturale, quod potestati divinae subdatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q10_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto. But it is
                     not impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that the will is moved by God necessarily.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 10 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33944] Iª-IIae q. 10 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, si Deus movet voluntatem ad aliquid, incompossibile
est huic positioni quod voluntas ad illud non moveatur. Non tamen
est impossibile simpliciter. Unde non sequitur quod voluntas a Deo
ex necessitate moveatur.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q11" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q11-p0.1">Q. 11. OF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q11-p2"> We must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q11-p3"><a href="#FS_Q11_A1"> (1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q11-p4"><a href="#FS_Q11_A2"> (2) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?</a></p><p id="FS_Q11-p5"><a href="#FS_Q11_A3"> (3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q11-p6"><a href="#FS_Q11_A4"> (4) Whether it is only of the end possessed?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 pr."><a name="33945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33945]
Iª-IIae q. 11 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
fruitione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum frui sit
actus appetitivae potentiae. Secundo, utrum soli rationali
creaturae conveniat, an etiam animalibus brutis. Tertio, utrum
fruitio sit tantum ultimi finis. Quarto, utrum sit solum finis
habiti.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q11_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q11_A1-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 1. Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to enjoy belongs not only to the appetitive power. For to enjoy seems nothing else than to receive the
                     fruit. But it is the intellect, in whose act Happiness consists, as shown above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A4" id="FS_Q11_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>), that receives the fruit of human life, which is Happiness. Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power, but
                     of the intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33946] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod frui non sit solum appetitivae
potentiae. Frui enim nihil aliud esse videtur quam fructum capere.
Sed fructum humanae vitae, qui est beatitudo, capit intellectus, in
cuius actu beatitudo consistit, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo frui
non est appetitivae potentiae, sed intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, each power has its proper end, which is its perfection: thus the end of sight is to know the visible; of the hearing,
                     to perceive sounds; and so forth. But the end of a thing is its fruit. Therefore to enjoy belongs to each power, and not only
                     to the appetite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33947] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quaelibet potentia habet proprium finem, qui est eius perfectio,
sicut visus finis est cognoscere visibile, auditus percipere sonos,
et sic de aliis. Sed finis rei est fructus eius. Ergo frui est
potentiae cuiuslibet, et non solum appetitivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, enjoyment implies a certain delight. But sensible delight belongs to sense, which delights in its object: and for
                     the same reason, intellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore enjoyment belongs to the apprehensive, and not to
                     the appetitive power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33948] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
fruitio delectationem quandam importat. Sed delectatio sensibilis
pertinet ad sensum, qui delectatur in suo obiecto, et eadem
ratione, delectatio intellectualis ad intellectum. Ergo fruitio
pertinet ad apprehensivam potentiam, et non ad appetitivam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4; and De Trin. x, 10,11): "To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own
                     sake." But love belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore also to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33949] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, I de Doctr. Christ., et in X de Trin.,
<i>frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter seipsam</i>. Sed
amor pertinet ad appetitivam potentiam. Ergo et frui est actus
appetitivae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> "Fruitio" [enjoyment] and "fructus" [fruit] seem to refer to the same, one being derived from the other; which from which,
                     matters not for our purpose; though it seems probable that the one which is more clearly known, was first named. Now those
                     things are most manifest to us which appeal most to the senses: wherefore it seems that the word "fruition" is derived from
                     sensible fruits. But sensible fruit is that which we expect the tree to produce in the last
                     place, and in which a certain sweetness is to be perceived. Hence fruition seems to have relation to love, or to the delight
                     which one has in realizing the longed-for term, which is the end. Now the end and the good is the object of the appetitive
                     power. Wherefore it is evident that fruition is the act of the appetitive power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 co."><a name="33950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33950] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod fruitio et fructus ad idem pertinere videntur, et
unum ex altero derivari. Quid autem a quo, nihil ad propositum
refert; nisi quod hoc probabile videtur, quod id quod magis est
manifestum, prius etiam fuerit nominatum. Sunt autem nobis primo
manifesta quae sunt sensibilia magis. Unde a sensibilibus fructibus
nomen fruitionis derivatum videtur. Fructus autem sensibilis est id
quod ultimum ex arbore expectatur, et cum quadam suavitate
percipitur. Unde fruitio pertinere videtur ad amorem vel
delectationem quam aliquis habet de ultimo expectato, quod est
finis. Finis autem et bonum est obiectum appetitivae potentiae.
Unde manifestum est quod fruitio est actus appetitivae
potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging, under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly the vision
                     of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is the object of the will. And as such is the fruition
                     thereof: so that the intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but the will as the motive power, moving (the powers)
                     towards the end and enjoying the end attained.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33951] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum et idem, secundum diversas
rationes, ad diversas potentias pertinere. Ipsa igitur visio Dei,
inquantum est visio, est actus intellectus, inquantum autem est
bonum et finis, est voluntatis obiectum. Et hoc modo est eius
fruitio. Et sic hunc finem intellectus consequitur tanquam potentia
agens, voluntas autem tanquam potentia movens ad finem, et fruens
fine iam adepto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The perfection and end of every other power is contained in the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is contained
                     in the common, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q11_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Hence the perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive
                     power moves the other powers to their ends; and itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33952] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod perfectio et finis cuiuslibet alterius potentiae,
continetur sub obiecto appetitivae, sicut proprium sub communi, ut
dictum est supra. Unde perfectio et finis cuiuslibet potentiae,
inquantum est quoddam bonum, pertinet ad appetitivam. Propter quod
appetitiva potentia movet alias ad suos fines; et ipsa consequitur
finem, quando quaelibet aliarum pertingit ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In delight there are two things: perception of what is becoming; and this belongs to the apprehensive power; and complacency
                     in that which is offered as becoming: and this belongs to the appetitive power, in which power delight is formally completed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33953] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod in delectatione duo sunt, scilicet perceptio
convenientis, quae pertinet ad apprehensivam potentiam; et
complacentia eius quod offertur ut conveniens. Et hoc pertinet ad
appetitivam potentiam, in qua ratio delectationis completur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q11_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q11_A2-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 2. Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to enjoy belongs to men alone. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) that "it is given to us men
                     to enjoy and to use." Therefore other animals cannot enjoy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33954] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod frui solummodo sit hominum. Dicit enim
Augustinus, in I de Doct. Christ., quod <i>nos homines sumus qui
fruimur et utimur</i>. Non ergo alia animalia frui possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But irrational animals cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for them
                     to enjoy.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33955] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
frui est ultimi finis. Sed ad ultimum finem non possunt pertingere
bruta animalia. Ergo eorum non est frui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite beneath the sensitive.
                     If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite, it seems that for the same reason it can belong to the natural
                     appetite. But this is evidently false, since the latter cannot delight in anything. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot
                     enjoy: and accordingly enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33956] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut appetitus sensitivus est sub intellectivo, ita appetitus
naturalis est sub sensitivo. Si igitur frui pertinet ad appetitum
sensitivum, videtur quod pari ratione possit ad naturalem
pertinere. Quod patet esse falsum, quia eius non est delectari.
Ergo appetitus sensitivi non est frui. Et ita non convenit brutis
animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "It is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily pleasure."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33957] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest.,
<i>frui quidem cibo et qualibet corporali voluptate, non absurde
existimantur et bestiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q11_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As was stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q11_A1" id="FS_Q11_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> to enjoy is not the act of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that commands the achievement; for
                     it has been said to belong to the appetitive power. Now things void of reason have indeed a power of achieving an end by way
                     of execution, as that by which a heavy body has a downward tendency, whereas a light body has an upward tendency. Yet the
                     power of command in respect of the end
                     is not in them, but in some higher nature, which moves all nature by its command, just as in things endowed with knowledge,
                     the appetite moves the other powers to their acts. Wherefore it is clear that things void of knowledge, although they attain
                     an end, have no enjoyment of the end: this is only for those that are endowed with knowledge.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q11_A2-p7"> Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that
                     known which is the end and the good, but also the universal formality of the end and the good; and such knowledge belongs
                     to the rational nature alone. On the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the good are known in the
                     particular. Such knowledge is in irrational animals: whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are
                     moved according to a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend. Consequently, enjoyment belongs to the rational nature,
                     in a perfect degree; to irrational animals, imperfectly; to other creatures, not at all.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 co."><a name="33958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33958] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis habetur, frui non est actus
potentiae pervenientis ad finem sicut exequentis, sed potentiae
imperantis executionem, dictum est enim quod est appetitivae
potentiae. In rebus autem cognitione carentibus invenitur quidem
potentia pertingens ad finem per modum exequentis, sicut qua grave
tendit deorsum et leve sursum. Sed potentia ad quam pertineat finis
per modum imperantis, non invenitur in eis; sed in aliqua superiori
natura, quae sic movet totam naturam per imperium, sicut in
habentibus cognitionem appetitus movet alias potentias ad suos
actus. Unde manifestum est quod in his quae cognitione carent,
quamvis pertingant ad finem, non invenitur fruitio finis; sed solum
in his quae cognitionem habent. Sed cognitio finis est duplex,
perfecta, et imperfecta. Perfecta quidem, qua non solum cognoscitur
id quod est finis et bonum, sed universalis ratio finis et boni, et
talis cognitio est solius rationalis naturae. Imperfecta autem
cognitio est qua cognoscitur particulariter finis et bonum, et
talis cognitio est in brutis animalibus. Quorum etiam virtutes
appetitivae non sunt imperantes libere; sed secundum naturalem
instinctum ad ea quae apprehenduntur, moventur. Unde rationali
naturae convenit fruitio secundum rationem perfectam, brutis autem
animalibus secundum rationem imperfectam, aliis autem creaturis
nullo modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33959] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de fruitione perfecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enjoyment need not be of the last end simply; but of that which each one chooses for his last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33960] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod non oportet quod fruitio sit ultimi finis
simpliciter, sed eius quod habetur ab unoquoque pro ultimo
fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge; not so the natural appetite, especially in things void of knowledge.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33961] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus consequitur aliquam cognitionem,
non autem appetitus naturalis, praecipue prout est in his quae
cognitione carent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine is speaking there of imperfect enjoyment. This is clear from his way of speaking: for he says that "it is not so
                     absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy," that is, as it would be, if one were to say that they "use."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="33962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33962] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de fruitione imperfecta.
Quod ex ipso modo loquendi apparet, dicit enim quod frui non adeo
absurde existimantur et bestiae, scilicet sicut uti absurdissime
dicerentur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q11_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q11_A3-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 3. Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q11_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phlm.1.20" target="asv">Philem. 20</a>): "Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in the Lord." But it is evident that Paul had not placed his last end in a man. Therefore
                     to enjoy is not only of the last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33963] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod fruitio non sit tantum ultimi finis.
Dicit enim apostolus, ad Philem., <i>ita, frater, ego te fruar in
domino</i>. Sed manifestum est quod Paulus non posuerat ultimum
suum finem in homine. Ergo frui non tantum est ultimi finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what we enjoy is the fruit. But the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q11_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22</a>): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," and other like things, which are not in the nature of the last end. Therefore
                     enjoyment is not only of the last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33964] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
fructus est quo aliquis fruitur. Sed apostolus dicit, ad Galat. V,
fructus spiritus est caritas, gaudium, pax, et cetera huiusmodi;
quae non habent rationem ultimi finis. Non ergo fruitio est tantum
ultimi finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the acts of the will reflect on one another; for I will to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act of the
                     will: since "it is the will with which we enjoy," as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10). Therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment.
                     But the last end of man is not enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. Therefore enjoyment is not only of the
                     last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33965] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
actus voluntatis supra seipsos reflectuntur, volo enim me velle, et
amo me amare. Sed frui est actus voluntatis, voluntas enim est per
quam fruimur, ut Augustinus dicit X de Trin. Ergo aliquis fruitur
sua fruitione. Sed fruitio non est ultimus finis hominis, sed solum
bonum increatum, quod est Deus. Non ergo fruitio est solum ultimi
finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "A man does not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else." But the last
                     end alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else. Therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33966] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., <i>non fruitur si quis id
quod in facultatem voluntatis assumit, propter aliud appetit</i>.
Sed solum ultimus finis est qui non propter aliud appetitur. Ergo
solius ultimi finis est fruitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q11_A1" id="FS_Q11_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> the notion of fruit implies two things: first that it should come last; second, that it should calm the appetite with a certain
                     sweetness and delight. Now a thing is last either simply or relatively; simply, if it be referred to nothing else; relatively,
                     if it is the last in a particular series. Therefore that which is last simply, and in which one delights as in the last end,
                     is properly called fruit; and this
                     it is that one is properly said to enjoy. But that which is delightful not in itself, but is desired, only as referred to
                     something else, e.g. a bitter potion for the sake of health, can nowise be called fruit. And that which has something delightful
                     about it, to which a number of preceding things are referred, may indeed by called fruit in a certain manner; but we cannot
                     be said to enjoy it properly or as though it answered perfectly to the notion of fruit. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. x,
                     10) that "we enjoy what we know, when the delighted will is at rest therein." But its rest is not absolute save in the possession
                     of the last end: for as long as something is looked for, the movement of the will remains in suspense, although it has reached
                     something. Thus in local movement, although any point between the two terms is a beginning and an end, yet it is not considered
                     as an actual end, except when the movement stops there.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 co."><a name="33967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33967] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad rationem fructus duo pertinent,
scilicet quod sit ultimum; et quod appetitum quietet quadam
dulcedine vel delectatione. Ultimum autem est simpliciter, et
secundum quid, simpliciter quidem, quod ad aliud non refertur; sed
secundum quid, quod est aliquorum ultimum. Quod ergo est
simpliciter ultimum, in quo aliquid delectatur sicut in ultimo
fine, hoc proprie dicitur fructus, et eo proprie dicitur aliquis
frui. Quod autem in seipso non est delectabile, sed tantum
appetitur in ordine ad aliud, sicut potio amara ad sanitatem; nullo
modo fructus dici potest. Quod autem in se habet quandam
delectationem, ad quam quaedam praecedentia referuntur, potest
quidem aliquo modo dici fructus, sed non proprie, et secundum
completam rationem fructus, eo dicimur frui. Unde Augustinus, in X
de Trin., dicit quod <i>fruimur cognitis in quibus voluntas
delectata conquiescit</i>. Non autem quiescit simpliciter nisi in
ultimo, quia quandiu aliquid expectatur, motus voluntatis remanet
in suspenso, licet iam ad aliquid pervenerit. Sicut in motu locali,
licet illud quod est medium in magnitudine, sit principium et
finis; non tamen accipitur ut finis in actu, nisi quando in eo
quiescitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 33), "if he had said, 'May I enjoy thee,' without adding 'in the Lord,' he would
                     seem to have set the end of his love in him. But since he added that he set his end in the Lord, he implied his desire to
                     enjoy Him": as if we were to say that he expressed his enjoyment of his brother not as a term but as a means.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33968] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in I de Doctr. Christ.,
<i>si dixisset te fruar, et non addidisset in domino, videretur
finem dilectionis in eo posuisse. Sed quia illud addidit, in domino
se posuisse finem, atque eo se frui significavit</i>. Ut sic fratre
se frui dixerit non tanquam termino, sed tanquam medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fruit bears one relation to the tree that bore it, and another to man that enjoys it. To the tree indeed that bore it, it
                     is compared as effect to cause; to the one enjoying it, as the final object of his longing and the consummation of his delight.
                     Accordingly these fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called because they are certain effects of the Holy Ghost in us,
                     wherefore they are called "fruits of the spirit": but not as though we are to enjoy
                     them as our last end. Or we may say with Ambrose that they are called fruits because "we should desire them for their own
                     sake": not indeed as though they were not ordained to the last end; but because they are such that we ought to find pleasure
                     in them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33969] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod fructus aliter comparatur ad arborem producentem, et
aliter ad hominem fruentem. Ad arborem quidem producentem
comparatur ut effectus ad causam, ad fruentem autem, sicut ultimum
expectatum et delectans. Dicuntur igitur ea quae enumerat ibi
apostolus, fructus, quia sunt effectus quidam spiritus sancti in
nobis, unde et fructus spiritus dicuntur, non autem ita quod eis
fruamur tanquam ultimo fine. Vel aliter dicendum quod dicuntur
fructus, secundum Ambrosium, quia propter se petenda sunt, non
quidem ita quod ad beatitudinem non referantur; sed quia in seipsis
habent unde nobis placere debeant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q11_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>;
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q11_A3-p9.2" shape="rect"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), we speak of an end in a twofold sense: first, as being the thing itself; secondly, as the attainment thereof. These are
                     not, of course, two ends, but one end, considered in itself, and in its relation to something else. Accordingly God is the
                     last end, as that which is ultimately sought for: while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this last end. And so, just
                     as God is not one end, and the enjoyment of God, another: so it is the same enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and whereby we
                     enjoy our enjoyment of God. And the same applies to created happiness which consists in enjoyment.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33970] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est finis dicitur dupliciter, uno
modo, ipsa res; alio modo, adeptio rei. Quae quidem non sunt duo
fines, sed unus finis, in se consideratus, et alteri applicatus.
Deus igitur est ultimus finis sicut res quae ultimo quaeritur,
fruitio autem sicut adeptio huius ultimi finis. Sicut igitur non
est alius finis Deus, et fruitio Dei; ita eadem ratio fruitionis
est qua fruimur Deo, et qua fruimur divina fruitione. Et eadem
ratio est de beatitudine creata, quae in fruitione consistit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q11_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q11_A4-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 4. Whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that enjoyment is only of the end possessed. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that "to enjoy is to use joyfully,
                     with the joy, not of hope, but of possession." But so long as a thing is not had, there is joy, not of possession, but of
                     hope. Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33971] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod fruitio non sit nisi finis habiti.
Dicit enim Augustinus, X de Trin., quod <i>frui est cum gaudio uti,
non adhuc spei, sed iam rei</i>. Sed quandiu non habetur, non est
gaudium rei, sed spei. Ergo fruitio non est nisi finis habiti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q11_A3" id="FS_Q11_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, enjoyment is not properly otherwise than of the last end: because this alone gives rest to the appetite. But the appetite
                     has no rest save in the possession of the end. Therefore enjoyment, properly speaking, is only of the end possessed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33972] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut dictum est, fruitio non est proprie nisi ultimi finis, quia
solus ultimus finis quietat appetitum. Sed appetitus non quietatur
nisi in fine iam habito. Ergo fruitio, proprie loquendo, non est
nisi finis habiti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit. But one does not lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end.
                     Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33973] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
frui est capere fructum. Sed non capitur fructus, nisi quando iam
finis habetur. Ergo fruitio non est nisi finis habiti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this is possible,
                     even in regard to a thing which is not in our possession. Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not
                     possessed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33974] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
<i>frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter seipsam</i>, ut
Augustinus dicit. Sed hoc potest fieri etiam de re non habita. Ergo
frui potest esse etiam finis non habiti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to the last end, according as the will has something by way of last end.
                     Now an end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly, when it is possessed not only in intention but
                     also in reality; imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment, therefore, is of the end already
                     possessed: but imperfect enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in
                     intention.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 co."><a name="33975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33975] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod frui importat comparationem quandam voluntatis ad
ultimum finem, secundum quod voluntas habet aliquid pro ultimo
fine. Habetur autem finis dupliciter, uno modo, perfecte; et alio
modo, imperfecte. Perfecte quidem, quando habetur non solum in
intentione, sed etiam in re, imperfecte autem, quando habetur in
intentione tantum. Est ergo perfecta fruitio finis iam habiti
realiter. Sed imperfecta est etiam finis non habiti realiter, sed
in intentione tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33976] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de fruitione perfecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest. First on the part of the object; by reason of its not being the last
                     end, but ordained to something else: secondly on the part of the one who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in
                     possession of it. Now it is the object that specifies an act: but on the agent depends the manner of acting, so that the act
                     be perfect or imperfect, as compared with the actual circumstances of the agent.
                     Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is not enjoyment properly speaking, as falling short of the nature of enjoyment.
                     But enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect
                     way in which it is possessed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33977] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod quies voluntatis dupliciter impeditur, uno modo, ex
parte obiecti, quia scilicet non est ultimus finis, sed ad aliud
ordinatur; alio modo, ex parte appetentis finem qui nondum
adipiscitur finem. Obiectum autem est quod dat speciem actui, sed
ab agente dependet modus agendi, ut sit perfectus vel imperfectus,
secundum conditionem agentis. Et ideo eius quod non est ultimus
finis, fruitio est impropria, quasi deficiens a specie fruitionis.
Finis autem ultimi non habiti, est fruitio propria quidem, sed
imperfecta, propter imperfectum modum habendi ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q11_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One is said to lay hold of or to have an end, not only in reality, but also in intention, as stated above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 11 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33978] Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod finem accipere vel habere dicitur aliquis, non solum
secundum rem, sed etiam secundum intentionem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q12" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q12-p0.1">Q. 12. OF INTENTION (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q12-p2"> We must now consider Intention: concerning which there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q12-p3"><a href="#FS_Q12_A1"> (1) Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q12-p4"><a href="#FS_Q12_A2"> (2) Whether it is only of the last end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q12-p5"><a href="#FS_Q12_A3"> (3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time?</a></p><p id="FS_Q12-p6"><a href="#FS_Q12_A4"> (4) Whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the means?</a></p><p id="FS_Q12-p7"><a href="#FS_Q12_A5"> (5) Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 pr."><a name="33979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33979]
Iª-IIae q. 12 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
intentione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum intentio
sit actus intellectus, vel voluntatis secundo, utrum sit tantum
finis ultimi. Tertio, utrum aliquis possit simul duo intendere.
Quarto, utrum intentio finis sit idem actus cum voluntate eius quod
est ad finem. Quinto, utrum intentio conveniat brutis
animalibus.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q12_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q12_A1-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 1. Whether intention is an act of the intellect or of the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that intention is an act of the intellect, and not of the will. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q12_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.22" target="asv">Mat. 6:22</a>): "If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome": where, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13)
                     the eye signifies intention. But since the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive power. Therefore intention
                     is not an act of the appetitive but of the apprehensive power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33980] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod intentio sit actus intellectus, et non
voluntatis. Dicitur enim Matth. VI, <i>si oculus tuus fuerit
simplex, totum corpus tuum lucidum erit</i>, ubi per oculum
significatur intentio, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de Serm. Dom.
in Mont. Sed oculus, cum sit instrumentum visus, significat
apprehensivam potentiam. Ergo intentio non est actus appetitivae
potentiae, sed apprehensivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) that Our Lord spoke of intention as a light, when He said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q12_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.23" target="asv">Mat. 6:23</a>): "If the light that is in thee be darkness," etc. But light pertains to knowledge. Therefore intention does too.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33981] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
ibidem Augustinus dicit quod intentio lumen vocatur a domino, ubi
dicit, si lumen quod in te est, tenebrae sunt, et cetera. Sed lumen
ad cognitionem pertinet. Ergo et intentio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, intention implies a kind of ordaining to an end. But to ordain is an act of reason. Therefore intention belongs
                     not to the will but to the reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33982] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
intentio designat ordinationem quandam in finem. Sed ordinare est
rationis. Ergo intentio non pertinet ad voluntatem, sed ad
rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, an act of the will is either of the end or of the means. But the act of the will in respect of the end is called
                     volition, or enjoyment; with regard to the means, it is choice, from which intention is distinct. Therefore it is not an act
                     of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="33983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33983] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
actus voluntatis non est nisi vel finis, vel eorum quae sunt ad
finem. Sed actus voluntatis respectu finis, vocatur voluntas seu
fruitio, respectu autem eorum quae sunt ad finem, est electio, a
quibus differt intentio. Ergo intentio non est actus
voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9) that "the intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the images retained
                     in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's inner thought." Therefore intention is an act of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33984] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, in XI de Trin., quod <i>voluntatis
intentio copulat corpus visum visui, et similiter speciem in
memoria existentem ad aciem animi interius cogitantis</i>. Est
igitur intentio actus voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Intention, as the very word denotes, signifies, "to tend to something." Now both the action of the mover and the movement
                     of thing moved, tend to something. But that the movement of the thing moved tends to anything, is due to the action of the
                     mover. Consequently intention belongs first and principally to that which moves to the end: hence we say that an architect
                     or anyone who is in authority, by his command moves others to that which he intends. Now the
                     will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as shown above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q12_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Wherefore it is evident that intention, properly speaking, is an act of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 co."><a name="33985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33985] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod intentio, sicut ipsum nomen sonat, significat in
aliquid tendere. In aliquid autem tendit et actio moventis, et
motus mobilis. Sed hoc quod motus mobilis in aliquid tendit, ab
actione moventis procedit. Unde intentio primo et principaliter
pertinet ad id quod movet ad finem, unde dicimus architectorem, et
omnem praecipientem, movere suo imperio alios ad id quod ipse
intendit. Voluntas autem movet omnes alias vires animae ad finem,
ut supra habitum est. Unde manifestum est quod intentio proprie est
actus voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The eye designates intention figuratively, not because intention has reference to knowledge, but because it presupposes knowledge,
                     which proposes to the will the end to which the latter moves; thus we foresee with the eye whither we should tend with our
                     bodies.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33986] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod intentio nominatur oculus metaphorice, non quia
ad cognitionem pertineat; sed quia cognitionem praesupponit, per
quam proponitur voluntati finis ad quem movet; sicut oculo
praevidemus quo tendere corporaliter debeamus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Intention is called a light because it is manifest to him who intends. Wherefore works are called darkness because a man
                     knows what he intends, but knows not what the result may be, as Augustine expounds (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33987] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod intentio dicitur lumen, quia manifesta est
intendenti. Unde et opera dicuntur tenebrae, quia homo scit quid
intendit, sed nescit quid ex opere sequatur, sicut Augustinus
ibidem exponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will does not ordain, but tends to something according to the order of reason. Consequently this word "intention" indicates
                     an act of the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason orders something to the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33988] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod voluntas quidem non ordinat, sed tamen in aliquid
tendit secundum ordinem rationis. Unde hoc nomen intentio nominat
actum voluntatis, praesupposita ordinatione rationis ordinantis
aliquid in finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Intention is an act of the will in regard to the end. Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First, absolutely;
                     and thus we have "volition," whereby we will absolutely to have health, and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its
                     place of rest; and thus "enjoyment" regards the end. Thirdly, it considers the end as the term towards which something is
                     ordained; and thus "intention" regards the end. For when we speak of intending
                     to have health, we mean not only that we have it, but that we will have it by means of something else.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="33989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33989] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod intentio est actus voluntatis respectu finis. Sed
voluntas respicit finem tripliciter. Uno modo, absolute, et sic
dicitur voluntas, prout absolute volumus vel sanitatem, vel si quid
aliud est huiusmodi. Alio modo consideratur finis secundum quod in
eo quiescitur, et hoc modo fruitio respicit finem. Tertio modo
consideratur finis secundum quod est terminus alicuius quod in
ipsum ordinatur, et sic intentio respicit finem. Non enim solum ex
hoc intendere dicimur sanitatem, quia volumus eam, sed quia volumus
ad eam per aliquid aliud pervenire.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q12_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q12_A2-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 2. Whether intention is only of the last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that intention is only of the last end. For it is said in the book of Prosper's Sentences (Sent. 100): "The
                     intention of the heart is a cry to God." But God is the last end of the human heart. Therefore intention is always regards
                     the last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33990] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod intentio sit tantum ultimi finis.
Dicitur enim in libro sententiarum prosperi, <i>clamor ad Deum est
intentio cordis</i>. Sed Deus est ultimus finis humani cordis. Ergo
intentio semper respicit ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intention regards the end as the terminus, as stated above (A[1], ad 4). But a terminus is something last. Therefore
                     intention always regards the last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33991] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
intentio respicit finem secundum quod est terminus, ut dictum est.
Sed terminus habet rationem ultimi. Ergo intentio semper respicit
ultimum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as intention regards the end, so does enjoyment. But enjoyment is always of the last end. Therefore intention
                     is too.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33992] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut intentio respicit finem, ita et fruitio. Sed fruitio semper
est ultimi finis. Ergo et intentio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> There is but one last end of human wills, viz. Happiness, as stated above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A7" id="FS_Q12_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[7]</a>). If, therefore, intentions were only of the last end, men would not have different intentions: which is evidently false.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33993] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
ultimus finis humanarum voluntatum est unus, scilicet beatitudo, ut
supra dictum est. Si igitur intentio esset tantum ultimi finis, non
essent diversae hominum intentiones. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 4), intention regards the end as a terminus of the movement of the will. Now a terminus of movement
                     may be taken in two ways. First, the very last terminus, when the movement comes to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole
                     movement. Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of one part of the movement, and the end or terminus of the
                     other. Thus in the movement from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a
                     terminus, but not the last. And intention can be both. Consequently though intention is always of the end, it need not be
                     always of the last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 co."><a name="33994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33994] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, intentio respicit finem secundum
quod est terminus motus voluntatis. In motu autem potest accipi
terminus dupliciter, uno modo, ipse terminus ultimus, in quo
quiescitur, qui est terminus totius motus; alio modo, aliquod
medium, quod est principium unius partis motus, et finis vel
terminus alterius. Sicut in motu quo itur de a in c per b, c est
terminus ultimus, b autem est terminus, sed non ultimus. Et
utriusque potest esse intentio. Unde etsi semper sit finis, non
tamen oportet quod semper sit ultimi finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intention of the heart is called a cry to God, not that God is always the object of intention, but because He sees our
                     intention. Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention to God, which intention has the force of a cry.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33995] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod intentio cordis dicitur clamor ad Deum, non quod
Deus sit obiectum intentionis semper, sed quia est intentionis
cognitor. Vel quia, cum oramus, intentionem nostram ad Deum
dirigimus, quae quidem intentio vim clamoris habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A terminus is something last, not always in respect of the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33996] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod terminus habet rationem ultimi; sed non semper ultimi
respectu totius, sed quandoque respectu alicuius partis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Enjoyment implies rest in the end; and this belongs to the last end alone. But intention implies movement towards an end,
                     not rest. Wherefore the comparison proves nothing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33997] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod fruitio importat quietem in fine, quod pertinet solum
ad ultimum finem. Sed intentio importat motum in finem, non autem
quietem. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q12_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q12_A3-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 3. Whether one can intend two things at the same time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one cannot intend several things at the same time. For Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 14,16,17)
                     that man's intention cannot be directed at the same time to God and to bodily benefits. Therefore, for the same reason, neither
                     to any other two things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33998] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possit aliquis simul plura
intendere. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte,
quod non potest homo simul intendere Deum et commodum corporale.
Ergo pari ratione, neque aliqua alia duo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intention designates a movement of the will towards a terminus. Now there cannot be several termini in the same
                     direction of one movement. Therefore the will cannot intend several things at the same time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33999] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
intentio nominat motum voluntatis ad terminum. Sed unius motus non
possunt esse plures termini ex una parte. Ergo voluntas non potest
simul multa intendere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, intention presupposes an act of reason or of the intellect. But "it is not possible to understand several things
                     at the same time," according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 10). Therefore neither is it possible to intend several things
                     at the same time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34000] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
intentio praesupponit actum rationis sive intellectus. Sed non
contingit simul plura intelligere, secundum philosophum. Ergo etiam
neque contingit simul plura intendere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Art imitates nature. Now nature intends two purposes by means of one instrument: thus "the tongue is for the purpose of taste
                     and speech" (De Anima ii, 8). Therefore, for the same reason, art or reason can at the same time direct one thing to two ends:
                     so that one can intend several ends at the same time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34001] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
ars imitatur naturam. Sed natura ex uno instrumento intendit duas
utilitates, <i>sicut lingua ordinatur et ad gustum et ad
locutionem</i>, ut dicitur in II de anima. Ergo, pari ratione ars
vel ratio potest simul aliquid unum ad duos fines ordinare. Et ita
potest aliquis simul plura intendere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q12_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The expression "two things" may be taken in two ways: they may be ordained to one another or not so ordained. And if they
                     be ordained to one another, it is evident, from what has been said, that a man can intend several things at the same time.
                     For intention is not only of the last end, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q12_A2" id="FS_Q12_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, but also of an intermediary end. Now a man intends at the same time, both the proximate and the last end; as the mixing
                     of a
                     medicine and the giving of health.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q12_A3-p7"> But if we take two things that are not ordained to one another, thus also a man can intend several things at the same time.
                     This is evident from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because it is the better of the two. Now one of the
                     reasons for which one thing is better than another is that it is available for more purposes: wherefore one thing can be chosen
                     in preference to another, because of the greater number of purposes for which it is available: so that
                     evidently a man can intend several things at the same time.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 co."><a name="34002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34002] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod aliqua duo possunt accipi dupliciter, vel ordinata ad
invicem, vel ad invicem non ordinata. Et si quidem ad invicem
fuerint ordinata, manifestum est ex praemissis quod homo potest
simul multa intendere. Est enim intentio non solum finis ultimi, ut
dictum est, sed etiam finis medii. Simul autem intendit aliquis et
finem proximum, et ultimum; sicut confectionem medicinae, et
sanitatem. Si autem accipiantur duo ad invicem non ordinata, sic
etiam simul homo potest plura intendere. Quod patet ex hoc, quod
homo unum alteri praeeligit, quia melius est altero, inter alias
autem conditiones quibus aliquid est melius altero, una est quod ad
plura valet, unde potest aliquid praeeligi alteri, ex hoc quod ad
plura valet. Et sic manifeste homo simul plura intendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine means to say that man cannot at the same time direct his attention to God and to bodily benefits, as to two last
                     ends: since, as stated above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A5" id="FS_Q12_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[5]</a>), one man cannot have several last ends.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34003] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod Augustinus intelligit hominem non posse simul
Deum et commodum temporale intendere, sicut ultimos fines, quia, ut
supra ostensum est, non possunt esse plures fines ultimi unius
hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There can be several termini ordained to one another, of the same movement and in the same direction; but not unless they
                     be ordained to one another. At the same time it must be observed that what is not one in reality may be taken as one by the
                     reason. Now intention is a movement of the will to something already ordained by the reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 3).
                     Wherefore where we have many things in reality, we may take them as one term of
                     intention, in so far as the reason takes them as one: either because two things concur in the integrity of one whole, as a
                     proper measure of heat and cold conduce to health; or because two things are included in one which may be intended. For instance,
                     the acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth, as in something common to both; wherefore nothing hinders the man
                     who intends to acquire wealth, from intending both the others.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34004] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod unius motus possunt ex una parte esse plures termini,
si unus ad alium ordinetur, sed duo termini ad invicem non
ordinati, ex una parte, unius motus esse non possunt. Sed tamen
considerandum est quod id quod non est unum secundum rem, potest
accipi ut unum secundum rationem. Intentio autem est motus
voluntatis in aliquid praeordinatum in ratione, sicut dictum est.
Et ideo ea quae sunt plura secundum rem, possunt accipi ut unus
terminus intentionis, prout sunt unum secundum rationem, vel quia
aliqua duo concurrunt ad integrandum aliquid unum, sicut ad
sanitatem concurrunt calor et frigus commensurata; vel quia aliqua
duo sub uno communi continentur, quod potest esse intentum. Puta
acquisitio vini et vestis continetur sub lucro, sicut sub quodam
communi, unde nihil prohibet quin ille qui intendit lucrum, simul
haec duo intendat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A10" id="FS_Q12_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[12], A[10]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A2" id="FS_Q12_A3-p10.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[58], A[2]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q85_A4" id="FS_Q12_A3-p10.3" shape="rect">FP, Q[85], A[4]</a> it is possible to understand several things at the same time, in so far as, in some way, they are one.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34005] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, contingit simul plura
intelligere, inquantum sunt aliquo modo unum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q12_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q12_A4-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 4. Whether intention of the end is the same act as the volition of the means?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intention of the end and the volition of the means are not one and the same movement. For Augustine
                     says (De Trin. xi, 6) that "the will to see the window, has for its end the seeing of the window; and is another act from
                     the will to see, through the window, the passersby." But that I should will to see the passersby, through the window, belongs
                     to intention; whereas that I will to see the window, belongs to the volition of the means.
                     Therefore intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34006] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit unus et idem motus intentio
finis, et voluntas eius quod est ad finem. Dicit enim Augustinus,
in XI de Trin., quod <i>voluntas videndi fenestram, finem habet
fenestrae visionem; et altera est voluntas per fenestram videndi
transeuntes</i>. Sed hoc pertinet ad intentionem, quod velim videre
transeuntes per fenestram, hoc autem ad voluntatem eius quod est ad
finem, quod velim videre fenestram. Ergo alius est motus voluntatis
intentio finis, et alius voluntas eius quod est ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, acts are distinct according to their objects. But the end and the means are distinct objects. Therefore the intention
                     of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34007] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
actus distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed finis, et id quod est ad
finem, sunt diversa obiecta. Ergo alius motus voluntatis est
intentio finis, et voluntas eius quod est ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the willing of the means is called choice. But choice and intention are not the same. Therefore intention of the
                     end and the willing of the means are not the same movement of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34008] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
voluntas eius quod est ad finem, dicitur electio. Sed non est idem
electio et intentio. Ergo non est idem motus intentio finis, cum
voluntate eius quod est ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The means in relation to the end, are as the mid-space to the terminus. Now it is all the same movement that passes through
                     the mid-space to the terminus, in natural things. Therefore in things pertaining to the will, the intention of the end is
                     the same movement as the willing of the means.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34009] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
id quod est ad finem, se habet ad finem ut medium ad terminum. Sed
idem motus est qui per medium transit ad terminum, in rebus
naturalibus. Ergo et in rebus voluntariis idem motus est intentio
finis, et voluntas eius quod est ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The movement of the will to the end and to the means can be considered in two ways. First, according as the will is moved
                     to each of the aforesaid absolutely and in itself. And thus there are really two movements of the will to them. Secondly,
                     it may be considered accordingly as the will is moved to the means for the sake of the end: and thus the movement of the will
                     to the end and its movement to the means are one and the same thing. For when I say: "I wish
                     to take medicine for the sake of health," I signify no more than one movement of my will. And this is because the end is the
                     reason for willing the means. Now the object, and that by reason of which it is an object, come under the same act; thus it
                     is the same act of sight that perceives color and light, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q8_A3" id="FS_Q12_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[8], A[3]</a>, ad 2). And the same applies to the intellect; for if it consider principle and conclusion absolutely, it considers each
                     by a distinct act;
                     but when it assents to the conclusion on account of the principles, there is but one act of the intellect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 co."><a name="34010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34010] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod motus voluntatis in finem et in id quod est ad finem,
potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod voluntas in
utrumque fertur absolute et secundum se. Et sic sunt simpliciter
duo motus voluntatis in utrumque. Alio modo potest considerari
secundum quod voluntas fertur in id quod est ad finem, propter
finem. Et sic unus et idem subiecto motus voluntatis est tendens ad
finem, et in id quod est ad finem. Cum enim dico, volo medicinam
propter sanitatem, non designo nisi unum motum voluntatis. Cuius
ratio est quia finis ratio est volendi ea quae sunt ad finem. Idem
autem actus cadit super obiectum, et super rationem obiecti, sicut
eadem visio est coloris et luminis, ut supra dictum est. Et est
simile de intellectu, quia si absolute principium et conclusionem
consideret, diversa est consideratio utriusque; in hoc autem quod
conclusioni propter principia assentit, est unus actus intellectus
tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of seeing the window and of seeing, through the window, the passersby, according as the will is moved
                     to either absolutely.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34011] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de visione fenestrae, et
visione transeuntium per fenestram, secundum quod voluntas in
utrumque absolute fertur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end, considered as a thing, and the means to that end, are distinct objects of the will. But in so far as the end is
                     the formal object in willing the means, they are one and the same object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34012] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod finis, inquantum est res quaedam, est aliud
voluntatis obiectum quam id quod est ad finem. Sed inquantum est
ratio volendi id quod est ad finem, est unum et idem obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A movement which is one as to the subject, may differ, according to our way of looking at it, as to its beginning and end,
                     as in the case of ascent and descent (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly, in so far as the movement of the will is to the means, as
                     ordained to the end, it is called "choice": but the movement of the will to the end as acquired by the means, it is called
                     "intention." A sign of this is that we can have intention of the end without having
                     determined the means which are the object of choice.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34013] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod motus qui est unus subiecto, potest ratione differre
secundum principium et finem, ut ascensio et descensio, sicut
dicitur in III Physic. Sic igitur inquantum motus voluntatis fertur
in id quod est ad finem, prout ordinatur ad finem, est electio.
Motus autem voluntatis qui fertur in finem, secundum quod
acquiritur per ea quae sunt ad finem, vocatur intentio. Cuius
signum est quod intentio finis esse potest, etiam nondum
determinatis his quae sunt ad finem, quorum est electio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q12_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q12_A5-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 5. Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that irrational animals intend the end. For in things void of reason nature stands further apart from the rational
                     nature, than does the sensitive nature in irrational animals. But nature intends the end even in things void of reason, as
                     is proved in Phys. ii, 8. Much more, therefore, do irrational animals intend the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34014] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod bruta animalia intendant finem. Natura
enim in his quae cognitione carent, magis distat a rationali
natura, quam natura sensitiva, quae est in animalibus brutis. Sed
natura intendit finem etiam in his quae cognitione carent, ut
probatur in II Physic. Ergo multo magis bruta animalia intendunt
finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as intention is of the end, so is enjoyment. But enjoyment is in irrational animals, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q11_A2" id="FS_Q12_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[11], A[2]</a>). Therefore intention is too.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34015] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut intentio est finis, ita et fruitio. Sed fruitio convenit
brutis animalibus, ut dictum est. Ergo et intentio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to intend an end belongs to one who acts for an end; since to intend is nothing else than to tend to something.
                     But irrational animals act for an end; for an animal is moved either to seek food, or to do something of the kind. Therefore
                     irrational animals intend an end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34016] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
eius est intendere finem, cuius est agere propter finem, cum
intendere nihil sit nisi in aliud tendere. Sed bruta animalia agunt
propter finem, movetur enim animal vel ad cibum quaerendum, vel ad
aliquid huiusmodi. Ergo bruta animalia intendunt finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Intention of an end implies ordaining something to an end: which belongs to reason. Since therefore irrational animals are
                     void of reason, it seems that they do not intend an end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34017] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
intentio finis importat ordinationem alicuius in finem quod est
rationis. Cum igitur bruta animalia non habeant rationem, videtur
quod non intendant finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q12_A1" id="FS_Q12_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, to intend is to tend to something; and this belongs to the mover and to the moved. According, therefore, as that which is
                     moved to an end by another is said to intend the end, thus nature is said to intend an end, as being moved to its end by God,
                     as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in this way, irrational animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved to something
                     by natural instinct. The other way of
                     intending an end belongs to the mover; according as he ordains the movement of something, either his own or another's, to
                     an end. This belongs to reason alone. Wherefore irrational animals do not intend an end in this way, which is to intend properly
                     and principally, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q12_A1" id="FS_Q12_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 co."><a name="34018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34018] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, intendere est in aliud
tendere; quod quidem est et moventis, et moti. Secundum quidem
igitur quod dicitur intendere finem id quod movetur ad finem ab
alio, sic natura dicitur intendere finem, quasi mota ad suum finem
a Deo, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Et hoc modo etiam bruta animalia
intendunt finem, inquantum moventur instinctu naturali ad aliquid.
Alio modo intendere finem est moventis, prout scilicet ordinat
motum alicuius, vel sui vel alterius, in finem. Quod est rationis
tantum. Unde per hunc modum bruta non intendunt finem, quod est
proprie et principaliter intendere, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes intention in the sense of being moved to an end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34019] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum quod intendere est
eius quod movetur ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34020] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod fruitio non importat ordinationem alicuius in
aliquid, sicut intentio; sed absolutam quietem in fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q12_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as though they thought that they can gain the end by this movement; this belongs
                     to one that intends; but through desiring the end by natural instinct, they are moved to an end, moved, as it were, by another,
                     like other things that are moved naturally.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 12 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34021] Iª-IIae q. 12 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod bruta animalia moventur ad finem, non quasi
considerantia quod per motum suum possunt consequi finem, quod est
proprie intendentis, sed concupiscentia finem naturali instinctu,
moventur ad finem quasi ab alio mota, sicut et cetera quae moventur
naturaliter.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q13" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q13-p0.1">Q. 13. OF CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL WITH REGARD TO THE MEANS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q13-p2"> We must now consider the acts of the will with regard to the means. There are three of them: to choose, to consent, and to
                  use. And choice is preceded by counsel. First of all, then, we must consider choice: secondly, counsel; thirdly, consent;
                  fourthly, use.
               </p><p id="FS_Q13-p3"> Concerning choice there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q13-p4"><a href="#FS_Q13_A1"> (1) Of what power is it the act; of the will or of the reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q13-p5"><a href="#FS_Q13_A2"> (2) Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?</a></p><p id="FS_Q13-p6"><a href="#FS_Q13_A3"> (3) Whether choice is only the means, or sometimes also of the end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q13-p7"><a href="#FS_Q13_A4"> (4) Whether choice is only of things that we do ourselves?</a></p><p id="FS_Q13-p8"><a href="#FS_Q13_A5"> (5) Whether choice is only of possible things?</a></p><p id="FS_Q13-p9"><a href="#FS_Q13_A6"> (6) Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 pr."><a name="34022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34022]
Iª-IIae q. 13 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
actibus voluntatis qui sunt in comparatione ad ea quae sunt ad
finem. Et sunt tres, eligere, consentire, et uti. Electionem autem
praecedit consilium. Primo ergo considerandum est de electione;
secundo, de consilio; tertio, de consensu; quarto, de usu. Circa
electionem quaeruntur sex. Primo, cuius potentiae sit actus, utrum
voluntatis vel rationis. Secundo, utrum electio conveniat brutis
animalibus. Tertio, utrum electio sit solum eorum quae sunt ad
finem, vel etiam quandoque finis. Quarto, utrum electio sit tantum
eorum quae per nos aguntur. Quinto, utrum electio sit solum
possibilium. Sexto, utrum homo ex necessitate eligat, vel
libere.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q13_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q13_A1-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 1. Whether choice is an act of will or of reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that choice is an act, not of will but of reason. For choice implies comparison, whereby one is given preference
                     to another. But to compare is an act of reason. Therefore choice is an act of reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34023] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod electio non sit actus voluntatis, sed
rationis. Electio enim collationem quandam importat, qua unum
alteri praefertur. Sed conferre est rationis. Ergo electio est
rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is for the same faculty to form a syllogism, and to draw the conclusion. But, in practical matters, it is the
                     reason that forms syllogisms. Since therefore choice is a kind of conclusion in practical matters, as stated in Ethic. vii,
                     3, it seems that it is an act of reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34024] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
eiusdem est syllogizare et concludere. Sed syllogizare in
operabilibus est rationis. Cum igitur electio sit quasi conclusio
in operabilibus, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., videtur quod sit actus
rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, ignorance does not belong to the will but to the cognitive power. Now there is an "ignorance of choice," as is stated
                     in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore it seems that choice does not belong to the will but to the reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34025] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
ignorantia non pertinet ad voluntatem, sed ad vim cognitivam. Est
autem quaedam ignorantia electionis, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo
videtur quod electio non pertineat ad voluntatem, sed ad
rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is "the desire of things in our power." But desire is an act of will. Therefore
                     choice is too.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34026] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>electio est
desiderium eorum quae sunt in nobis</i>. Desiderium autem est actus
voluntatis. Ergo et electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q13_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The word choice implies something belonging to the reason or intellect, and something belonging to the will: for the Philosopher
                     says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice is either "intellect influenced by appetite or appetite influenced by intellect." Now whenever
                     two things concur to make one, one of them is formal in regard to the other. Hence Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
                     xxxiii.] says that choice "is neither desire only, nor counsel only, but a
                     combination of the two. For just as we say that an animal is composed of soul and body, and that it is neither a mere body,
                     nor a mere soul, but both; so is it with choice."
                  </p><p id="FS_Q13_A1-p7"> Now we must observe, as regards the acts of the soul, that an act belonging essentially to some power or habit, receives
                     a form or species from a higher power or habit, according as an inferior is ordained by a superior: for if a man were to perform
                     an act of fortitude for the love of God, that act is materially an act of fortitude, but formally, an act of charity. Now
                     it is evident that, in a sense, reason precedes the will and ordains its act: in so far as the will tends to
                     its object, according to the order of reason, since the apprehensive power presents the object to the appetite. Accordingly,
                     that act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good, through being ordained to the end by the reason,
                     is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason. Now in such like matters the substance of the act is
                     as the matter in comparison to the order imposed by the higher power. Wherefore choice is substantially not an act of the
                     reason
                     but of the will: for choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen. Consequently
                     it is evidently an act of the appetitive power.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 co."><a name="34027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34027] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod in nomine electionis importatur aliquid pertinens ad
rationem sive intellectum, et aliquid pertinens ad voluntatem,
dicit enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod <i>electio est
appetitivus intellectus, vel appetitus intellectivus</i>.
Quandocumque autem duo concurrunt ad aliquid unum constituendum,
unum eorum est ut formale respectu alterius. Unde Gregorius
Nyssenus dicit quod <i>electio neque est appetitus secundum
seipsam, neque consilium solum, sed ex his aliquid compositum.
Sicut enim dicimus animal ex anima et corpore compositum esse,
neque vero corpus esse secundum seipsum, neque animam solam, sed
utrumque; ita et electionem</i>. Est autem considerandum in actibus
animae, quod actus qui est essentialiter unius potentiae vel
habitus, recipit formam et speciem a superiori potentia vel habitu,
secundum quod ordinatur inferius a superiori, si enim aliquis actum
fortitudinis exerceat propter Dei amorem, actus quidem ille
materialiter est fortitudinis, formaliter vero caritatis.
Manifestum est autem quod ratio quodammodo voluntatem praecedit, et
ordinat actum eius, inquantum scilicet voluntas in suum obiectum
tendit secundum ordinem rationis, eo quod vis apprehensiva
appetitivae suum obiectum repraesentat. Sic igitur ille actus quo
voluntas tendit in aliquid quod proponitur ut bonum, ex eo quod per
rationem est ordinatum ad finem, materialiter quidem est
voluntatis, formaliter autem rationis. In huiusmodi autem
substantia actus materialiter se habet ad ordinem qui imponitur a
superiori potentia. Et ideo electio substantialiter non est actus
rationis, sed voluntatis, perficitur enim electio in motu quodam
animae ad bonum quod eligitur. Unde manifeste actus est appetitivae
potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Choice implies a previous comparison; not that it consists in the comparison itself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34028] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod electio importat collationem quandam
praecedentem, non quod essentialiter sit ipsa collatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is quite true that it is for the reason to draw the conclusion of a practical syllogism; and it is called "a decision"
                     or "judgment," to be followed by "choice." And for this reason the conclusion seems to belong to the act of choice, as to
                     that which results from it.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34029] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod conclusio etiam syllogismi qui fit in operabilibus,
ad rationem pertinet; et dicitur sententia vel iudicium, quam
sequitur electio. Et ob hoc ipsa conclusio pertinere videtur ad
electionem, tanquam ad consequens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In speaking "of ignorance of choice," we do not mean that choice is a sort of knowledge, but that there is ignorance of what
                     ought to be chosen.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34030] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ignorantia dicitur esse electionis, non quod ipsa
electio sit scientia, sed quia ignoratur quid sit eligendum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q13_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q13_A2-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 2. Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that irrational animals are able to choose. For choice "is the desire of certain things on account of an end,"
                     as stated in Ethic. iii, 2,3. But irrational animals desire something on account of an end: since they act for an end, and
                     from desire. Therefore choice is in irrational animals.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34031] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod electio brutis animalibus conveniat.
Electio enim est appetitus aliquorum propter finem, ut dicitur in
III Ethic. Sed bruta animalia appetunt aliquid propter finem, agunt
enim propter finem, et ex appetitu. Ergo in brutis animalibus est
electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the very word "electio" [choice] seems to signify the taking of something in preference to others. But irrational
                     animals take something in preference to others: thus we can easily see for ourselves that a sheep will eat one grass and refuse
                     another. Therefore choice is in irrational animals.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34032] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
ipsum nomen electionis significare videtur quod aliquid prae aliis
accipiatur. Sed bruta animalia accipiunt aliquid prae aliis, sicut
manifeste apparet quod ovis unam herbam comedit, et aliam refutat.
Ergo in brutis animalibus est electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Ethic. vi, 12, "it is from prudence that a man makes a good choice of means." But prudence is found
                     in irrational animals: hence it is said in the beginning of Metaph. i, 1 that "those animals which, like bees, cannot hear
                     sounds, are prudent by instinct." We see this plainly, in wonderful cases of sagacity manifested in the works of various animals,
                     such as bees, spiders, and dogs. For a hound in following a stag, on coming to a
                     crossroad, tries by scent whether the stag has passed by the first or the second road: and if he find that the stag has not
                     passed there, being thus assured, takes to the third road without trying the scent; as though he were reasoning by way of
                     exclusion, arguing that the stag must have passed by this way, since he did not pass by the others, and there is no other
                     road. Therefore it seems that irrational animals are able to choose.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34033] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
ut dicitur in VI Ethic., <i>ad prudentiam pertinet quod aliquis
bene eligat ea quae sunt ad finem</i>. Sed prudentia convenit
brutis animalibus, unde dicitur in principio Metaphys., quod
<i>prudentia sunt sine disciplina quaecumque sonos audire non
potentia sunt, ut apes</i>. Et hoc etiam sensui manifestum videtur,
apparent enim mirabiles sagacitates in operibus animalium, ut apum
et aranearum et canum. Canis enim insequens cervum, si ad trivium
venerit, odoratu quidem explorat an cervus per primam vel secundam
viam transiverit, quod si invenerit non transisse, iam securus per
tertiam viam incedit non explorando, quasi utens syllogismo
divisivo, quo concludi posset cervum per illam viam incedere, ex
quo non incedit per alias duas, cum non sint plures. Ergo videtur
quod electio brutis animalibus conveniat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.] says that "children and irrational animals act willingly but not from
                     choice." Therefore choice is not in irrational animals.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34034] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod <i>pueri et irrationalia
voluntarie quidem faciunt, non tamen eligentia</i>. Ergo in brutis
animalibus non est electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference to another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that
                     can be chosen. Consequently in those things which are altogether determinate to one there is no place for choice. Now the
                     difference between the sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A2" id="FS_Q13_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[2]</a>, ad 3), the sensitive appetite is determinate to one particular thing, according to the order of
                     nature; whereas the will, although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according to the order of nature, is
                     nevertheless indeterminate in respect of particular goods. Consequently choice belongs properly to the will, and not to the
                     sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals have. Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 co."><a name="34035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34035] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, cum electio sit praeacceptio unius respectu
alterius, necesse est quod electio sit respectu plurium quae eligi
possunt. Et ideo in his quae sunt penitus determinata ad unum,
electio locum non habet. Est autem differentia inter appetitum
sensitivum et voluntatem, quia, ut ex praedictis patet, appetitus
sensitivus est determinatus ad unum aliquid particulare secundum
ordinem naturae; voluntas autem est quidem, secundum naturae
ordinem, determinata ad unum commune, quod est bonum, sed
indeterminate se habet respectu particularium bonorum. Et ideo
proprie voluntatis est eligere, non autem appetitus sensitivi, qui
solus est in brutis animalibus. Et propter hoc brutis animalibus
electio non convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every desire of one thing on account of an end is called choice: there must be a certain discrimination of one thing
                     from another. And this cannot be except when the appetite can be moved to several things.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34036] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod non omnis appetitus alicuius propter finem,
vocatur electio, sed cum quadam discretione unius ab altero. Quae
locum habere non potest, nisi ubi appetitus potest ferri ad
plura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An irrational animal takes one thing in preference to another, because its appetite is naturally determinate to that thing.
                     Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by its imagination, is offered something to which its appetite is
                     naturally inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any choice. Just as fire is moved upwards and not downwards,
                     without its making any choice.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34037] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod brutum animal accipit unum prae alio, quia appetitus
eius est naturaliter determinatus ad ipsum. Unde statim quando per
sensum vel per imaginationem repraesentatur sibi aliquid ad quod
naturaliter inclinatur eius appetitus, absque electione in illud
solum movetur. Sicut etiam absque electione ignis movetur sursum,
et non deorsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Phys. iii, 3 "movement is the act of the movable, caused by a mover." Wherefore the power of the mover appears
                     in the movement of that which it moves. Accordingly, in all things moved by reason, the order of reason which moves them is
                     evident, although the things themselves are without reason: for an arrow through the motion of the archer goes straight towards
                     the target, as though it were endowed with reason to direct its course. The
                     same may be seen in the movements of clocks and all engines put together by the art of man. Now as artificial things are in
                     comparison to human art, so are all natural things in comparison to the Divine art. And accordingly order is to be seen in
                     things moved by nature, just as in things moved by reason, as is stated in Phys. ii. And thus it is that in the works of irrational
                     animals we notice certain marks of sagacity, in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about their actions in
                     a most orderly manner through being ordained by the Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals are called prudent
                     or sagacious; and not because they reason or exercise any choice about things. This is clear from the fact that all that share
                     in one nature, invariably act in the same way.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34038] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in III Physic., <i>motus est actus
mobilis a movente</i>. Et ideo virtus moventis apparet in motu
mobilis. Et propter hoc in omnibus quae moventur a ratione, apparet
ordo rationis moventis, licet ipsa rationem non habeant, sic enim
sagitta directe tendit ad signum ex motione sagittantis, ac si ipsa
rationem haberet dirigentem. Et idem apparet in motibus
horologiorum, et omnium ingeniorum humanorum, quae arte fiunt.
Sicut autem comparantur artificialia ad artem humanam, ita
comparantur omnia naturalia ad artem divinam. Et ideo ordo apparet
in his quae moventur secundum naturam, sicut et in his quae
moventur per rationem, ut dicitur in II Physic. Et ex hoc contingit
quod in operibus brutorum animalium apparent quaedam sagacitates,
inquantum habent inclinationem naturalem ad quosdam ordinatissimos
processus, utpote a summa arte ordinatos. Et propter hoc etiam
quaedam animalia dicuntur prudentia vel sagacia, non quod in eis
sit aliqua ratio vel electio. Quod ex hoc apparet, quod omnia quae
sunt unius naturae, similiter operantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q13_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q13_A3-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 3. Whether choice is only of the means, or sometimes also of the end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that choice is not only of the means. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "virtue makes us choose
                     aright; but it is not the part of virtue, but of some other power to direct aright those things which are to be done for its
                     sake." But that for the sake of which something is done is the end. Therefore choice is of the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34039] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod electio non sit tantum eorum quae sunt
ad finem. Dicit enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod <i>electionem
rectam facit virtus, quaecumque autem illius gratia nata sunt
fieri, non sunt virtutis, sed alterius potentiae</i>. Illud autem
cuius gratia fit aliquid, est finis. Ergo electio est finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, choice implies preference of one thing to another. But just as there can be preference of means, so can there be
                     preference of ends. Therefore choice can be of ends, just as it can be of means.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34040] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
electio importat praeacceptionem unius respectu alterius. Sed sicut
eorum quae sunt ad finem unum potest praeaccipi alteri, ita etiam
et diversorum finium. Ergo electio potest esse finis, sicut et
eorum quae sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A3-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "volition is of the end, but choice of the means."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34041] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>voluntas est
finis, electio autem eorum quae sunt ad finem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q13_A3-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As already stated (A[1], ad 2), choice results from the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a practical
                     syllogism. Hence that which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism, is the matter of choice. Now in practical things the
                     end stands in the position of a principle, not of a conclusion, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9). Wherefore the end,
                     as such, is not a matter of choice.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q13_A3-p6"> But just as in speculative knowledge nothing hinders the principle of one demonstration or of one science, from being the
                     conclusion of another demonstration or science; while the first indemonstrable principle cannot be the conclusion of any demonstration
                     or science; so too that which is the end in one operation, may be ordained to something as an end. And in this way it is a
                     matter of choice. Thus in the work of a physician health is the end: wherefore it is not a matter of
                     choice for a physician, but a matter of principle. Now the health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul, consequently
                     with one who has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may be a matter of choice; for the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q13_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:10</a>): "For when I am weak, then am I powerful." But the last end is nowise a matter of choice.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 3 co."><a name="34042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34042] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, electio consequitur sententiam
vel iudicium, quod est sicut conclusio syllogismi operativi. Unde
illud cadit sub electione, quod se habet ut conclusio in syllogismo
operabilium. Finis autem in operabilibus se habet ut principium, et
non ut conclusio, ut philosophus dicit in II Physic. Unde finis,
inquantum est huiusmodi, non cadit sub electione. Sed sicut in
speculativis nihil prohibet id quod est unius demonstrationis vel
scientiae principium, esse conclusionem alterius demonstrationis
vel scientiae; primum tamen principium indemonstrabile non potest
esse conclusio alicuius demonstrationis vel scientiae; ita etiam
contingit id quod est in una operatione ut finis, ordinari ad
aliquid ut ad finem. Et hoc modo sub electione cadit. Sicut in
operatione medici, sanitas se habet ut finis, unde hoc non cadit
sub electione medici, sed hoc supponit tanquam principium. Sed
sanitas corporis ordinatur ad bonum animae, unde apud eum qui habet
curam de animae salute, potest sub electione cadere esse sanum vel
esse infirmum; nam apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. XII, <i>cum enim
infirmor, tunc potens sum</i>. Sed ultimus finis nullo modo sub
electione cadit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The proper ends of virtues are ordained to Happiness as to their last end. And thus it is that they can be a matter of choice.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34043] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod fines proprii virtutum ordinantur ad
beatitudinem sicut ad ultimum finem. Et hoc modo potest esse eorum
electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A5" id="FS_Q13_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[5]</a>), there is but one last end. Accordingly wherever there are several ends, they can be the subject of choice, in so far as
                     they are ordained to a further end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34044] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, ultimus finis est unus
tantum. Unde ubicumque occurrunt plures fines, inter eos potest
esse electio, secundum quod ordinantur ad ulteriorem finem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q13_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q13_A4-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 4. Whether choice is of those things only that are done by us?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that choice is not only in respect of human acts. For choice regards the means. Now, not only acts, but also
                     the organs, are means (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore choice is not only concerned with human acts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34045] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod electio non sit solum respectu
humanorum actuum. Electio enim est eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sed ea
quae sunt ad finem non solum sunt actus, sed etiam organa, ut
dicitur in II Physic. Ergo electiones non sunt tantum humanorum
actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, action is distinct from contemplation. But choice has a place even in contemplation; in so far as one opinion is
                     preferred to another. Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34046] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
actio a contemplatione distinguitur. Sed electio etiam in
contemplatione locum habet; prout scilicet una opinio alteri
praeeligitur. Ergo electio non est solum humanorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, men are chosen for certain posts, whether secular or ecclesiastical, by those who exercise no action in their regard.
                     Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34047] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
eliguntur homines ad aliqua officia, vel saecularia vel
ecclesiastica, ab his qui nihil erga eos agunt. Ergo electio non
solum est humanorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "no man chooses save what he can do himself."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34048] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>nullus eligit
nisi ea quae existimat fieri per ipsum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as intention regards the end, so does choice regard the means. Now the end is either an action or a thing. And when
                     the end is a thing, some human action must intervene; either in so far as man produces the thing which is the end, as the
                     physician produces health (wherefore the production of health is said to be the end of the physician); or in so far as man,
                     in some fashion, uses or enjoys the thing which is the end; thus for the miser, money or the
                     possession of money is the end. The same is to be said of the means. For the means must needs be either an action; or a thing,
                     with some action intervening whereby man either makes the thing which is the means, or puts it to some use. And thus it is
                     that choice is always in regard to human acts.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 co."><a name="34049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34049] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut intentio est finis, ita electio est eorum quae
sunt ad finem. Finis autem vel est actio, vel res aliqua. Et cum
res aliqua fuerit finis, necesse est quod aliqua humana actio
interveniat, vel inquantum homo facit rem illam quae est finis,
sicut medicus facit sanitatem, quae est finis eius (unde et facere
sanitatem dicitur finis medici); vel inquantum homo aliquo modo
utitur vel fruitur re quae est finis, sicut avaro est finis
pecunia, vel possessio pecuniae. Et eodem modo dicendum est de eo
quod est ad finem. Quia necesse est ut id quod est ad finem, vel
sit actio; vel res aliqua, interveniente aliqua actione, per quam
facit id quod est ad finem, vel utitur eo. Et per hunc modum
electio semper est humanorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The organs are ordained to the end, inasmuch as man makes use of them for the sake of the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34050] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod organa ordinantur ad finem, inquantum homo
utitur eis propter finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In contemplation itself there is the act of the intellect assenting to this or that opinion. It is exterior action that is
                     put in contradistinction to contemplation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34051] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod in ipsa contemplatione est aliquis actus intellectus
assentientis huic opinioni vel illi. Actio vero exterior est quae
contra contemplationem dividitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a man chooses someone for a bishopric or some high position in the state, he chooses to name that man to that post.
                     Else, if he had no right to act in the appointment of the bishop or official, he would have no right to choose. Likewise,
                     whenever we speak of one thing being chosen in preference to another, it is in conjunction with some action of the chooser.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34052] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod homo qui eligit episcopum vel principem civitatis,
eligit nominare ipsum in talem dignitatem. Alioquin, si nulla esset
eius actio ad constitutionem episcopi vel principis, non competeret
ei electio. Et similiter dicendum est quod quandocumque dicitur
aliqua res praeeligi alteri, adiungitur ibi aliqua operatio
eligentis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q13_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q13_A5-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 5. Whether choice is only of possible things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that choice in not only of possible things. For choice is an act of the will, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q13_A1" id="FS_Q13_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now there is "a willing of impossibilities" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore there is also a choice of impossibilities.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34053] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod electio non sit solum possibilium.
Electio enim est actus voluntatis, ut dictum est. Sed voluntas est
impossibilium, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo et electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, choice is of things done by us, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q13_A4" id="FS_Q13_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Therefore it matters not, as far as the act of choosing is concerned, whether one choose that which is impossible in itself,
                     or that which is impossible to the chooser. Now it often happens that we are unable to accomplish what we choose: so that
                     this proves to be impossible to us. Therefore choice is of the impossible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34054] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
electio est eorum quae per nos aguntur, sicut dictum est. Nihil
ergo refert, quantum ad electionem, utrum eligatur id quod est
impossibile simpliciter, vel id quod est impossibile eligenti. Sed
frequenter ea quae eligimus, perficere non possumus, et sic sunt
impossibilia nobis. Ergo electio est impossibilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to try to do a thing is to choose to do it. But the Blessed Benedict says (Regula lxviii) that if the superior command
                     what is impossible, it should be attempted. Therefore choice can be of the impossible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34055] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
nihil homo tentat agere nisi eligendo. Sed beatus Benedictus dicit
quod, si praelatus aliquid impossibile praeceperit, tentandum est.
Ergo electio potest esse impossibilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "there is no choice of impossibilities."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34056] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>electio non est
impossibilium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q13_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q13_A4" id="FS_Q13_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, our choice is always concerned with our actions. Now whatever is done by us, is possible to us. Therefore we must needs
                     say that choice is only of possible things.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q13_A5-p7"> Moreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that it conduces to an end. But what is impossible cannot conduce to an end.
                     A sign of this is that when men in taking counsel together come to something that is impossible to them, they depart, as being
                     unable to proceed with the business.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q13_A5-p8"> Again, this is evident if we examine the previous process of the reason. For the means, which are the object of choice, are
                     to the end, as the conclusion is to the principle. Now it is clear that an impossible conclusion does not follow from a possible
                     principle. Wherefore an end cannot be possible, unless the means be possible. Now no one is moved to the impossible. Consequently
                     no one would tend to the end, save for the fact that the means appear to be possible. Therefore the
                     impossible is not the object of choice.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 co."><a name="34057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34057] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, electiones nostrae referuntur
semper ad nostras actiones. Ea autem quae per nos aguntur, sunt
nobis possibilia. Unde necesse est dicere quod electio non sit nisi
possibilium. Similiter etiam ratio eligendi aliquid est ex hoc quod
ducit ad finem. Per id autem quod est impossibile, non potest
aliquis consequi finem. Cuius signum est quia, cum in consiliando
perveniunt homines ad id quod est eis impossibile, discedunt, quasi
non valentes ulterius procedere. Apparet etiam hoc manifeste ex
processu rationis praecedente. Sic enim se habet id quod est ad
finem, de quo electio est, ad finem, sicut conclusio ad principium.
Manifestum est autem quod conclusio impossibilis non sequitur ex
principio possibili. Unde non potest esse quod finis sit
possibilis, nisi id quod est ad finem fuerit possibile. Ad id autem
quod est impossibile, nullus movetur. Unde nullus tenderet in
finem, nisi per hoc quod apparet id quod est ad finem esse
possibile. Unde id quod est impossibile sub electione non
cadit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will stands between the intellect and the external action: for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and the
                     will causes the external action. Hence the principle of the movement in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends
                     something under the universal notion of good: but the term or perfection of the will's act is to be observed in its relation
                     to the action whereby a man tends to the attainment of a thing; for the
                     movement of the will is from the soul to the thing. Consequently the perfect act of the will is in respect of something that
                     is good for one to do. Now this cannot be something impossible. Wherefore the complete act of the will is only in respect
                     of what is possible and good for him that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in respect of the impossible; and by
                     some is called "velleity," because, to wit, one would will [vellet] such a thing, were it possible. But choice is an act of
                     the
                     will, fixed on something to be done by the chooser. And therefore it is by no means of anything but what is possible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34058] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod voluntas media est inter intellectum et
exteriorem operationem, nam intellectus proponit voluntati suum
obiectum, et ipsa voluntas causat exteriorem actionem. Sic igitur
principium motus voluntatis consideratur ex parte intellectus, qui
apprehendit aliquid ut bonum in universali, sed terminatio, seu
perfectio actus voluntatis attenditur secundum ordinem ad
operationem, per quam aliquis tendit ad consecutionem rei; nam
motus voluntatis est ab anima ad rem. Et ideo perfectio actus
voluntatis attenditur secundum hoc quod est aliquid bonum alicui ad
agendum. Hoc autem est possibile. Et ideo voluntas completa non est
nisi de possibili, quod est bonum volenti. Sed voluntas incompleta
est de impossibili, quae secundum quosdam velleitas dicitur, quia
scilicet aliquis vellet illud, si esset possibile. Electio autem
nominat actum voluntatis iam determinatum ad id quod est huic
agendum. Et ideo nullo modo est nisi possibilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the object of the will is the apprehended good, we must judge of the object of the will according as it is apprehended.
                     And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something which is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good; so is choice
                     sometimes made of something apprehended as possible to the chooser, and yet impossible to him.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34059] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, cum obiectum voluntatis sit bonum apprehensum, hoc
modo iudicandum est de obiecto voluntatis, secundum quod cadit sub
apprehensione. Et ideo sicut quandoque voluntas est alicuius quod
apprehenditur ut bonum, et tamen non est vere bonum; ita quandoque
est electio eius quod apprehenditur ut possibile eligenti, quod
tamen non est ei possibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason for this is that the subject should not rely on his own judgment to decide whether a certain thing is possible;
                     but in each case should stand by his superior's judgment.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34060] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod hoc ideo dicitur, quia an aliquid sit possibile,
subditus non debet suo iudicio definire; sed in unoquoque, iudicio
superioris stare.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q13_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q13_A6-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 6. Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man chooses of necessity. For the end stands in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of
                     that which follows from the principles, as declared in Ethic. vii, 8. But conclusions follow of necessity from their principles.
                     Therefore man is moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the choice (of the means).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34061] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo ex necessitate eligat. Sic enim
se habet finis ad eligibilia, ut principia ad ea quae ex principiis
consequuntur, ut patet in VII Ethic. Sed ex principiis ex
necessitate deducuntur conclusiones. Ergo ex fine de necessitate
movetur aliquis ad eligendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), choice follows the reason's judgment of what is to be done. But reason judges of necessity
                     about some things: on account of the necessity of the premises. Therefore it seems that choice also follows of necessity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34062] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut dictum est, electio consequitur iudicium rationis de agendis.
Sed ratio ex necessitate iudicat de aliquibus, propter necessitatem
praemissarum. Ergo videtur quod etiam electio ex necessitate
sequatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is not moved to one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as Plato
                     says (Cf. De Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either side with two portions of food equally appetizing and at an equal distance,
                     he is not moved towards one more than to the other; and he finds the reason of this in the immobility of the earth in the
                     middle of the world. Now, if that which is equally (eligible) with something else cannot
                     be chosen, much less can that be chosen which appears as less (eligible). Therefore if two or more things are available, of
                     which one appears to be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of the others. Therefore that which appears to hold
                     the first place is chosen of necessity. But every act of choosing is in regard to something that seems in some way better.
                     Therefore every choice is made necessarily.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34063] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
si aliqua duo sunt penitus aequalia, non magis movetur homo ad unum
quam ad aliud, sicut famelicus, si habet cibum aequaliter
appetibilem in diversis partibus, et secundum aequalem distantiam,
non magis movetur ad unum quam ad alterum, ut Plato dixit,
assignans rationem quietis terrae in medio, sicut dicitur in II de
caelo. Sed multo minus potest eligi quod accipitur ut minus, quam
quod accipitur ut aequale. Ergo si proponantur duo vel plura, inter
quae unum maius appareat, impossibile est aliquod aliorum eligere.
Ergo ex necessitate eligitur illud quod eminentius apparet. Sed
omnis electio est de omni eo quod videtur aliquo modo melius. Ergo
omnis electio est ex necessitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Choice is an act of a rational power; which according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) stands in relation to opposites.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34064] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod electio est actus potentiae rationalis; quae se habet ad
opposita, secundum philosophum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Man does not choose of necessity. And this is because that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity. Now the reason
                     why it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be gathered from a twofold power in man. For man can will and not will,
                     act and not act; again, he can will this or that, and do this or that. The reason of this is seated in the very power of the
                     reason. For the will can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good. Now the
                     reason can apprehend as good, not only this, viz. "to will" or "to act," but also this, viz. "not to will" or "not to act."
                     Again, in all particular goods, the reason can consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of some good, which has the aspect
                     of evil: and in this respect, it can apprehend any single one of such goods as to be chosen or to be avoided. The perfect
                     good alone, which is Happiness, cannot be apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as lacking in any way. Consequently man
                     wills Happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to be happy, or to be unhappy. Now since choice is not of the end, but of
                     the means, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q13_A3" id="FS_Q13_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>; it is not of the perfect good, which is Happiness, but of other particular goods. Therefore man chooses not of necessity,
                     but freely.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 co."><a name="34065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34065] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod homo non ex necessitate eligit. Et hoc ideo, quia
quod possibile est non esse, non necesse est esse. Quod autem
possibile sit non eligere vel eligere, huius ratio ex duplici
hominis potestate accipi potest. Potest enim homo velle et non
velle, agere et non agere, potest etiam velle hoc aut illud, et
agere hoc aut illud. Cuius ratio ex ipsa virtute rationis
accipitur. Quidquid enim ratio potest apprehendere ut bonum, in hoc
voluntas tendere potest. Potest autem ratio apprehendere ut bonum
non solum hoc quod est velle aut agere; sed hoc etiam quod est non
velle et non agere. Et rursum in omnibus particularibus bonis
potest considerare rationem boni alicuius, et defectum alicuius
boni, quod habet rationem mali, et secundum hoc, potest unumquodque
huiusmodi bonorum apprehendere ut eligibile, vel fugibile. Solum
autem perfectum bonum, quod est beatitudo, non potest ratio
apprehendere sub ratione mali, aut alicuius defectus. Et ideo ex
necessitate beatitudinem homo vult, nec potest velle non esse
beatus, aut miser. Electio autem, cum non sit de fine, sed de his
quae sunt ad finem, ut iam dictum est; non est perfecti boni, quod
est beatitudo, sed aliorum particularium bonorum. Et ideo homo non
ex necessitate, sed libere eligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The conclusion does not always of necessity follow from the principles, but only when the principles cannot be true if the
                     conclusion is not true. In like manner, the end does not always necessitate in man the choosing of the means, because the
                     means are not always such that the end cannot be gained without them; or, if they be such, they are not always considered
                     in that light.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34066] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod non semper ex principiis ex necessitate procedit
conclusio, sed tunc solum quando principia non possunt esse vera si
conclusio non sit vera. Et similiter non oportet quod semper ex
fine insit homini necessitas ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem,
quia non omne quod est ad finem, tale est ut sine eo finis haberi
non possit; aut, si tale sit, non semper sub tali ratione
consideratur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason's decision or judgment of what is to be done is about things that are contingent and possible to us. In such matters
                     the conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles that are absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally;
                     as, for instance, "If he runs, he is in motion."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34067] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod sententia sive iudicium rationis de rebus agendis est
circa contingentia, quae a nobis fieri possunt, in quibus
conclusiones non ex necessitate sequuntur ex principiis necessariis
absoluta necessitate, sed necessariis solum ex conditione, ut, si
currit, movetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q13_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular point
                     of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards that one rather than towards the other.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 13 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34068] Iª-IIae q. 13 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod nihil prohibet, si aliqua duo aequalia proponantur
secundum unam considerationem, quin circa alterum consideretur
aliqua conditio per quam emineat, et magis flectatur voluntas in
ipsum quam in aliud.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q14" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q14-p0.1">Q. 14. OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q14-p2"> We must now consider counsel; concerning which there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q14-p3"><a href="#FS_Q14_A1"> (1) Whether counsel is an inquiry?</a></p><p id="FS_Q14-p4"><a href="#FS_Q14_A2"> (2) Whether counsel is of the end or of the means?</a></p><p id="FS_Q14-p5"><a href="#FS_Q14_A3"> (3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do?</a></p><p id="FS_Q14-p6"><a href="#FS_Q14_A4"> (4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do?</a></p><p id="FS_Q14-p7"><a href="#FS_Q14_A5"> (5) Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?</a></p><p id="FS_Q14-p8"><a href="#FS_Q14_A6"> (6) Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 pr."><a name="34069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34069]
Iª-IIae q. 14 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
consilio. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum consilium sit
inquisitio. Secundo, utrum consilium sit de fine, vel solum de his
quae sunt ad finem. Tertio, utrum consilium sit solum de his quae a
nobis aguntur. Quarto, utrum consilium sit de omnibus quae a nobis
aguntur. Quinto, utrum consilium procedat ordine resolutorio.
Sexto, utrum consilium procedat in infinitum.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q14_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q14_A1-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 1. Whether counsel is an inquiry?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that counsel is not an inquiry. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is "an act of the appetite."
                     But inquiry is not an act of the appetite. Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34070] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod consilium non sit inquisitio. Dicit
enim Damascenus quod <i>consilium est appetitus</i>. Sed ad
appetitum non pertinet inquirere. Ergo consilium non est
inquisitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect: for which reason it is not found in God, Whose knowledge is not discursive,
                     as we have shown in the
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A7" id="FS_Q14_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[14], A[7]</a>. But counsel is ascribed to God: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q14_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>) that "He worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Therefore counsel is not inquiry.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34071] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
inquirere intellectus discurrentis est; et sic Deo non convenit,
cuius cognitio non est discursiva, ut in primo habitum est. Sed
consilium Deo attribuitur, dicitur enim ad Ephes. I, quod
<i>operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae</i>. Ergo
consilium non est inquisitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. But counsel is given in matters that are certainly good; thus the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q14_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.25" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:25</a>): "Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel." Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34072] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
inquisitio est de rebus dubiis. Sed consilium datur de his quae
sunt certa bona; secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. VII, <i>de
virginibus autem praeceptum domini non habeo, consilium autem
do</i>. Ergo consilium non est inquisitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says: "Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a counsel."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34073] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, <i>omne quidem consilium
quaestio est; non autem omnis quaestio consilium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Choice, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q13_A1" id="FS_Q14_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[1]</a>, ad 2; A[3]), follows the judgment of the reason about what is to be done. Now there is much uncertainty in things that have
                     to be done; because actions are concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of their vicissitude, are uncertain.
                     Now in things doubtful and uncertain the reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous inquiry: wherefore the reason
                     must of necessity institute
                     an inquiry before deciding on the objects of choice; and this inquiry is called counsel. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
                     iii, 2) that choice is the "desire of what has been already counselled."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 co."><a name="34074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34074] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod electio, sicut dictum est, consequitur iudicium
rationis de rebus agendis. In rebus autem agendis multa incertitudo
invenitur, quia actiones sunt circa singularia contingentia, quae
propter sui variabilitatem incerta sunt. In rebus autem dubiis et
incertis ratio non profert iudicium absque inquisitione
praecedente. Et ideo necessaria est inquisitio rationis ante
iudicium de eligendis, et haec inquisitio consilium vocatur.
Propter quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>electio est
appetitus praeconsiliati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the acts of two powers are ordained to one another, in each of them there is something belonging to the other power:
                     consequently each act can be denominated from either power. Now it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction
                     as to the means, and the act of the will tending to these means according to the reason's direction, are ordained to one another.
                     Consequently there is to be found something of the reason, viz. order, in that
                     act of the will, which is choice: and in counsel, which is an act of reason, something of the will---both as matter (since
                     counsel is of what man wills to do)---and as motive (because it is from willing the end, that man is moved to take counsel
                     in regard to the means). And therefore, just as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice "is intellect influenced by
                     appetite," thus pointing out that both concur in the act of choosing; so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel
                     is
                     "appetite based on inquiry," so as to show that counsel belongs, in a way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose
                     impulsion the inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes the inquiry.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34075] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod, quando actus duarum potentiarum ad invicem
ordinantur, in utroque est aliquid quod est alterius potentiae, et
ideo uterque actus ab utraque potentia denominari potest.
Manifestum est autem quod actus rationis dirigentis in his quae
sunt ad finem, et actus voluntatis secundum regimen rationis in ea
tendentis, ad se invicem ordinantur. Unde et in actu voluntatis,
quae est electio, apparet aliquid rationis, scilicet ordo, et in
consilio, quod est actus rationis, apparet aliquid voluntatis sicut
materia, quia consilium est de his quae homo vult facere; et etiam
sicut motivum, quia ex hoc quod homo vult finem, movetur ad
consiliandum de his quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo sicut philosophus
dicit, in VI Ethic., quod electio est intellectus appetitivus, ut
ad electionem utrumque concurrere ostendat; ita Damascenus dicit
quod consilium est appetitus inquisitivus, ut consilium aliquo modo
pertinere ostendat et ad voluntatem, circa quam et ex qua fit
inquisitio, et ad rationem inquirentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The things that we say of God must be understood without any of the defects which are to be found in us: thus in us science
                     is of conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to effects: but science when said of God means sure knowledge of all effects
                     in the First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like manner we ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of His knowledge
                     or judgment, which certainty in us arises from the inquiry of counsel.
                     But such inquiry has no place in God; wherefore in this respect it is not ascribed to God: in which sense Damascene says (De
                     Fide Orth. ii, 22): "God takes not counsel: those only take counsel who lack knowledge."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34076] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ea quae dicuntur de Deo, accipienda sunt absque omni
defectu qui invenitur in nobis, sicut in nobis scientia est
conclusionum per discursum a causis in effectus; sed scientia dicta
de Deo, significat certitudinem de omnibus effectibus in prima
causa, absque omni discursu. Et similiter consilium attribuitur Deo
quantum ad certitudinem sententiae vel iudicii, quae in nobis
provenit ex inquisitione consilii. Sed huiusmodi inquisitio in Deo
locum non habet, et ideo consilium secundum hoc Deo non
attribuitur. Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit quod <i>Deus non
consiliatur, ignorantis enim est consiliari</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It may happen that things which are most certainly good in the opinion of wise and spiritual men are not certainly good in
                     the opinion of many, or at least of carnal-minded men. Consequently in such things counsel may be given.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34077] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliqua esse certissima bona secundum
sententiam sapientum et spiritualium virorum, quae tamen non sunt
certa bona secundum sententiam plurium, vel carnalium hominum. Et
ideo de talibus consilia dantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q14_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q14_A2-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 2. Whether counsel is of the end, or only of the means?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that counsel is not only of the means but also of the end. For whatever is doubtful, can be the subject of
                     inquiry. Now in things to be done by man there happens sometimes a doubt as to the end and not only as to the means. Since
                     therefore inquiry as to what is to be done is counsel, it seems that counsel can be of the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34078] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod consilium non solum sit de his quae
sunt ad finem, sed etiam de fine. Quaecumque enim dubitationem
habent, de his potest inquiri. Sed circa operabilia humana
contingit esse dubitationem de fine, et non solum de his quae sunt
ad finem. Cum igitur inquisitio circa operabilia sit consilium,
videtur quod consilium possit esse de fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the matter of counsel is human actions. But some human actions are ends, as stated in Ethic. i, 1. Therefore counsel
                     can be of the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34079] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
materia consilii sunt operationes humanae. Sed quaedam operationes
humanae sunt fines, ut dicitur in I Ethic. ergo consilium potest
esse de fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A2-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says that "counsel is not of the end, but of the means."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34080] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod <i>non de fine, sed de his
quae sunt ad finem, est consilium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A2-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The end is the principle in practical matters: because the reason of the means is to be found in the end. Now the principle
                     cannot be called in question, but must be presupposed in every inquiry. Since therefore counsel is an inquiry, it is not of
                     the end, but only of the means. Nevertheless it may happen that what is the end in regard to some things, is ordained to something
                     else; just as also what is the principle of one demonstration, is the conclusion of
                     another: and consequently that which is looked upon as the end in one inquiry, may be looked upon as the means in another;
                     and thus it will become an object of counsel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 2 co."><a name="34081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34081] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod finis in operabilibus habet rationem principii, eo
quod rationes eorum quae sunt ad finem, ex fine sumuntur.
Principium autem non cadit sub quaestione, sed principia oportet
supponere in omni inquisitione. Unde cum consilium sit quaestio, de
fine non est consilium, sed solum de his quae sunt ad finem. Tamen
contingit id quod est finis respectu quorundam, ordinari ad alium
finem, sicut etiam id quod est principium unius demonstrationis,
est conclusio alterius. Et ideo id quod accipitur ut finis in una
inquisitione, potest accipi ut ad finem in alia inquisitione. Et
sic de eo erit consilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A2-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is looked upon as an end, is already fixed: consequently as long as there is any doubt about it, it is not looked
                     upon as an end. Wherefore if counsel is taken about it, it will be counsel not about the end, but about the means.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34082] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod id quod accipitur ut finis, est iam
determinatum. Unde quandiu habetur ut dubium, non habetur ut finis.
Et ideo si de eo consilium habetur, non erit consilium de fine, sed
de eo quod est ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Counsel is about operations, in so far as they are ordained to some end. Consequently if any human act be an end, it will
                     not, as such, be the matter of counsel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34083] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod de operationibus est consilium, inquantum ordinantur
ad aliquem finem. Unde si aliqua operatio humana sit finis, de ea,
inquantum huiusmodi, non est consilium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q14_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q14_A3-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 3. Whether counsel is only of things that we do?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that counsel is not only of things that we do. For counsel implies some kind of conference. But it is possible
                     for many to confer about things that are not subject to movement, and are not the result of our actions, such as the nature
                     of various things. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34084] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod consilium non sit solum de his quae
aguntur a nobis. Consilium enim collationem quandam importat. Sed
collatio inter multos potest fieri etiam de rebus immobilibus, quae
non fiunt a nobis, puta de naturis rerum. Ergo consilium non solum
est de his quae aguntur a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, men sometimes seek counsel about things that are laid down by law; hence we speak of counsel at law. And yet those
                     who seek counsel thus, have nothing to do in making the laws. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34085] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
homines interdum consilium quaerunt de his quae sunt lege statuta,
unde et iurisconsulti dicuntur. Et tamen eorum qui quaerunt
huiusmodi consilium, non est leges facere. Ergo consilium non solum
est de his quae a nobis aguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some are said to take consultation about future events; which, however, are not in our power. Therefore counsel
                     is not only of things that we do.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34086] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
dicuntur etiam quidam consultationes facere de futuris eventibus;
qui tamen non sunt in potestate nostra. Ergo consilium non solum
est de his quae a nobis fiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if counsel were only of things that we do, no would take counsel about what another does. But this is clearly untrue.
                     Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="34087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34087] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
si consilium esset solum de his quae a nobis fiunt, nullus
consiliaretur de his quae sunt per alium agenda. Sed hoc patet esse
falsum. Ergo consilium non solum est de his quae a nobis fiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says: "We take counsel of things that are within our competency and that
                     we are able to do."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34088] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, <i>consiliamur de his quae sunt
in nobis, et per nos fieri possunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Counsel properly implies a conference held between several; the very word [consilium] denotes this, for it means a sitting
                     together [considium], from the fact that many sit together in order to confer with one another. Now we must take note that
                     in contingent particular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it is necessary to take several conditions or
                     circumstances into consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are
                     considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary
                     and universal things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more absolute and simple, so that one man by himself may
                     be sufficient to consider these things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is concerned, properly speaking, with contingent
                     singulars. Now the knowledge of the truth in such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the
                     knowledge of things universal and necessary; but it is desired as being useful towards action, because actions bear on things
                     singular and contingent. Consequently, properly speaking, counsel is about things done by us.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 co."><a name="34089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34089] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod consilium proprie importat collationem inter plures
habitam. Quod et ipsum nomen designat, dicitur enim consilium quasi
Considium, eo quod multi consident ad simul conferendum. Est autem
considerandum quod in particularibus contingentibus, ad hoc quod
aliquid certum cognoscatur, plures conditiones seu circumstantias
considerare oportet, quas ab uno non facile est considerari, sed a
pluribus certius percipiuntur, dum quod unus considerat, alii non
occurrit, in necessariis autem et universalibus est absolutior et
simplicior consideratio, ita quod magis ad huiusmodi
considerationem unus per se sufficere potest. Et ideo inquisitio
consilii proprie pertinet ad contingentia singularia. Cognitio
autem veritatis in talibus non habet aliquid magnum, ut per se sit
appetibilis, sicut cognitio universalium et necessariorum, sed
appetitur secundum quod est utilis ad operationem, quia actiones
sunt circa contingentia singularia. Et ideo dicendum est quod
proprie consilium est circa ea quae aguntur a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Counsel implies conference, not of any kind, but about what is to be done, for the reason given above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34090] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod consilium importat collationem non quamcumque,
sed collationem de rebus agendis, ratione iam dicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although that which is laid down by the law is not due to the action of him who seeks counsel, nevertheless it directs him
                     in his action: since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing something.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34091] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod id quod est lege positum, quamvis non sit ex
operatione quaerentis consilium, tamen est directivum eius ad
operandum, quia ista est una ratio aliquid operandi, mandatum
legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we speak
                     of consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to do or omit something, through the knowledge of future events.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34092] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod consilium non solum est de his quae aguntur, sed de
his quae ordinantur ad operationes. Et propter hoc consultatio
dicitur fieri de futuris eventibus, inquantum homo per futuros
eventus cognitos dirigitur ad aliquid faciendum vel vitandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> We seek counsel about the actions of others, in so far as they are, in some way, one with us; either by union of affection---thus
                     a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend, as though it concerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument,
                     for the principal agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause, since one acts through the other; thus the master takes
                     counsel about what he would do through his servant.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="34093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34093] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod de aliorum factis consilium quaerimus, inquantum sunt
quodammodo unum nobiscum, vel per unionem affectus, sicut amicus
sollicitus est de his quae ad amicum spectant, sicut de suis; vel
per modum instrumenti, nam agens principale et instrumentale sunt
quasi una causa, cum unum agat per alterum; et sic dominus
consiliatur de his quae sunt agenda per servum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q14_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q14_A4-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 4. Whether counsel is about all things that we do?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that counsel is about all things that we have to do. For choice is the "desire of what is counselled" as stated
                     above
                     <a href="#FS_Q14_A1" id="FS_Q14_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But choice is about all things that we do. Therefore counsel is too.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34094] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod consilium sit de omnibus quae sunt per
nos agenda. Electio enim est appetitus praeconsiliati, ut dictum
est. Sed electio est de omnibus quae per nos aguntur. Ergo et
consilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, counsel implies the reason's inquiry. But, whenever we do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue
                     of the reason's inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about everything that we do.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34095] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
consilium importat inquisitionem rationis. Sed in omnibus quae non
per impetum passionis agimus, procedimus ex inquisitione rationis.
Ergo de omnibus quae aguntur a nobis, est consilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "if it appears that something can be done by more means than one, we take
                     counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be
                     done by this." But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore counsel takes place in all things that
                     we do.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34096] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>si per plura aliquid
fieri potest, consilio inquiritur per quod facillime et optime
fiat; si autem per unum, qualiter per illud fiat</i>. Sed omne quod
fit, fit per unum vel per multa. Ergo de omnibus quae fiunt a
nobis, est consilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says that "counsel has no place in things that are done according to science
                     or art."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34097] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod <i>de his quae secundum
disciplinam vel artem sunt operibus, non est consilium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q14_A1" id="FS_Q14_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument,
                     "is a reason that attests something that admitted of doubt" [*Cicero, Topic. ad Trebat.]. Now, that something in relation
                     to human acts admits of no doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because certain determinate ends are gained by certain
                     determinate
                     means: as happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of action; thus a writer does not take counsel how
                     to form his letters, for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the fact that it little matters whether it is done this
                     or that way; this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed at; and reason looks
                     upon small things as mere nothings. Consequently there are two things of which we do not take counsel, although they conduce
                     to
                     the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3): namely, minute things, and those which have a fixed way of being done, as
                     in works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture such as medicine, commerce, and the like,
                     as Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxiv.].
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 co."><a name="34098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34098] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod consilium est inquisitio quaedam, ut dictum est. De
illis autem inquirere solemus, quae in dubium veniunt, unde et
ratio inquisitiva, quae dicitur argumentum, est rei dubiae faciens
fidem. Quod autem aliquid in operabilibus humanis non sit
dubitabile, ex duobus contingit. Uno modo, quia per determinatas
vias proceditur ad determinatos fines, sicut contingit in artibus
quae habent certas vias operandi; sicut scriptor non consiliatur
quomodo debeat trahere litteras, hoc enim determinatum est per
artem. Alio modo, quia non multum refert utrum sic vel sic fiat, et
ista sunt minima, quae parum adiuvant vel impediunt respectu finis
consequendi; quod autem parum est, quasi nihil accipit ratio. Et
ideo de duobus non consiliamur, quamvis ordinentur ad finem, ut
philosophus dicit, scilicet de rebus parvis; et de his quae sunt
determinata qualiter fieri debent, sicut est in operibus artium,
praeter quasdam coniecturales, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, ut puta
medicinalis, negotiativa, et huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its judgment or decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is evident without
                     inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34099] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod electio praesupponit consilium ratione iudicii
vel sententiae. Unde quando iudicium vel sententia manifesta est
absque inquisitione, non requiritur consilii inquisitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In matters that are evident, the reason makes no inquiry, but judges at once. Consequently there is no need of counsel in
                     all that is done by reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34100] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ratio in rebus manifestis non inquirit, sed statim
iudicat. Et ideo non oportet in omnibus quae ratione aguntur, esse
inquisitionem consilii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a thing can be accomplished by one means, but in different ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be accomplished
                     by several means: hence the need of counsel. But when not only the means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then
                     there is no need of counsel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34101] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod quando aliquid per unum potest fieri, sed diversis
modis, potest dubitationem habere, sicut et quando fit per plura,
et ideo opus est consilio. Sed quando determinatur non solum res,
sed modus, tunc non est opus consilio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q14_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q14_A5-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 5. Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of analysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But the process
                     of our actions is not one of analysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz. from the simple to the composite. Therefore counsel
                     does not always proceed by way of analysis.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34102] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod consilium non procedat modo
resolutorio. Consilium enim est de his quae a nobis aguntur. Sed
operationes nostrae non procedunt modo resolutorio, sed magis modo
compositivo, scilicet de simplicibus ad composita. Ergo consilium
non semper procedit modo resolutorio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But reason proceeds from things that precede to things that follow, according
                     to the more appropriate order. Since then, the past precedes the present, and the present precedes the future, it seems that
                     in taking counsel one should proceed from the past and present to the future: which is not an analytical process. Therefore
                     the process of counsel is not one of analysis.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34103] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
consilium est inquisitio rationis. Sed ratio a prioribus incipit,
et ad posteriora devenit, secundum convenientiorem ordinem cum
igitur praeterita sint priora praesentibus, et praesentia priora
futuris, in consiliando videtur esse procedendum a praesentibus et
praeteritis in futura. Quod non pertinet ad ordinem resolutorium.
Ergo in consiliis non servatur ordo resolutorius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, counsel is only of such things as are possible to us, according to Ethic. iii, 3. But the question as to whether
                     a certain thing is possible to us, depends on what we are able or unable to do, in order to gain such and such an end. Therefore
                     the inquiry of counsel should begin from things present.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34104] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
consilium non est nisi de his quae sunt nobis possibilia, ut
dicitur in III Ethic. Sed an sit nobis aliquid possibile,
perpenditur ex eo quod possumus facere, vel non possumus facere, ut
perveniamus in illud. Ergo in inquisitione consilii a praesentibus
incipere oportet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "he who takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34105] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>ille qui
consiliatur, videtur quaerere et resolvere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In every inquiry one must begin from some principle. And if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the process
                     is not analytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause to effect is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more
                     simple than effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the order of being, the process is one of analysis,
                     as when our judgment deals with effects, which by analysis we trace to their simple
                     causes. Now the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into
                     execution. Hence the inquiry of counsel must needs be one of analysis, beginning that is to say, from that which is intended
                     in the future, and continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 co."><a name="34106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34106] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod in omni inquisitione oportet incipere ab aliquo
principio. Quod quidem si, sicut est prius in cognitione, ita etiam
sit prius in esse, non est processus resolutorius, sed magis
compositivus, procedere enim a causis in effectus, est processus
compositivus, nam causae sunt simpliciores effectibus. Si autem id
quod est prius in cognitione, sit posterius in esse, est processus
resolutorius, utpote cum de effectibus manifestis iudicamus,
resolvendo in causas simplices. Principium autem in inquisitione
consilii est finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, posterior
tamen in esse. Et secundum hoc, oportet quod inquisitio consilii
sit resolutiva, incipiendo scilicet ab eo quod in futuro
intenditur, quousque perveniatur ad id quod statim agendum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take their reason from the end; and consequently the order of reasoning about
                     actions is contrary to the order of actions.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34107] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod consilium est quidem de operationibus. Sed ratio
operationum accipitur ex fine, et ideo ordo ratiocinandi de
operationibus, est contrarius ordini operandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason begins with that which is first according to reason; but not always with that which is first in point of time.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34108] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ratio incipit ab eo quod est prius secundum rationem,
non autem semper ab eo quod est prius tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We should not want to know whether something to be done for an end be possible, if it were not suitable for gaining that
                     end. Hence we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the end, before considering whether it be possible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34109] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod de eo quod est agendum propter finem, non quaereremus
scire an sit possibile, si non esset congruum fini. Et ideo prius
oportet inquirere an conveniat ad ducendum in finem, quam
consideretur an sit possibile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q14_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q14_A6-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 6. Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite. For counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which
                     action is concerned. But singulars are infinite. Therefore the process of counsel is indefinite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34110] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod inquisitio consilii procedat in
infinitum. Consilium enim est inquisitio de particularibus, in
quibus est operatio. Sed singularia sunt infinita. Ergo inquisitio
consilii est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only what is to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But every human
                     action can be hindered, and an obstacle can be removed by some human reason. Therefore the inquiry about removing obstacles
                     can go on indefinitely.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34111] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sub inquisitione consilii cadit considerare non solum quid agendum
sit, sed etiam quomodo impedimenta tollantur. Sed quaelibet humana
actio potest impediri, et impedimentum tolli potest per aliquam
rationem humanam. Ergo in infinitum remanet quaerere de
impedimentis tollendis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the inquiry of demonstrative science does not go on indefinitely, because one can come to principles that are self-evident,
                     which are absolutely certain. But such like certainty is not to be had in contingent singulars, which are variable and uncertain.
                     Therefore the inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34112] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
inquisitio scientiae demonstrativae non procedit in infinitum, quia
est devenire in aliqua principia per se nota, quae omnimodam
certitudinem habent. Sed talis certitudo non potest inveniri in
singularibus contingentibus, quae sunt variabilia et incerta. Ergo
inquisitio consilii procedit in infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "No one is moved to that which he cannot possibly reach" (De Coelo i, 7). But it is impossible to pass through the infinite.
                     If therefore the inquiry of counsel is infinite, no one would begin to take counsel. Which is clearly untrue.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34113] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> <i>Sed
contra, nullus movetur ad id ad quod impossibile est quod
perveniat</i>, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed infinitum impossibile
est transire. Si igitur inquisitio consilii sit infinita, nullus
consiliari inciperet. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on both sides, on that of its principle and on that of its term. For a twofold
                     principle is available in the inquiry of counsel. One is proper to it, and belongs to the very genus of things pertaining
                     to operation: this is the end which is not the matter of counsel, but is taken for granted as its principle, as stated above

                     <a href="#FS_Q14_A2" id="FS_Q14_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. The other principle is taken from another genus, so to speak;
                     thus in demonstrative sciences one science postulates certain things from another, without inquiring into them. Now these
                     principles which are taken for granted in the inquiry of counsel are any facts received through the senses---for instance,
                     that this is bread or iron: and also any general statements known either through speculative or through practical science;
                     for instance, that adultery is forbidden by God, or that man cannot live without suitable nourishment. Of such things counsel
                     makes
                     no inquiry. But the term of inquiry is that which we are able to do at once. For just as the end is considered in the light
                     of a principle, so the means are considered in the light of a conclusion. Wherefore that which presents itself as to be done
                     first, holds the position of an ultimate conclusion whereat the inquiry comes to an end. Nothing however prevents counsel
                     from being infinite potentially, for as much as an infinite number of things may present themselves to be inquired into by
                     means
                     of counsel.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 co."><a name="34114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34114] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod inquisitio consilii est finita in actu ex duplici
parte, scilicet ex parte principii, et ex parte termini. Accipitur
enim in inquisitione consilii duplex principium. Unum proprium, ex
ipso genere operabilium, et hoc est finis, de quo non est
consilium, sed supponitur in consilio ut principium, ut dictum est.
Aliud quasi ex alio genere assumptum sicut et in scientiis
demonstrativis una scientia supponit aliqua ab alia, de quibus non
inquirit. Huiusmodi autem principia quae in inquisitione consilii
supponuntur, sunt quaecumque sunt per sensum accepta, utpote quod
hoc sit panis vel ferrum; et quaecumque sunt per aliquam scientiam
speculativam vel practicam in universali cognita, sicut quod
moechari est a Deo prohibitum, et quod homo non potest vivere nisi
nutriatur nutrimento convenienti. Et de istis non inquirit
consiliator. Terminus autem inquisitionis est id quod statim est in
potestate nostra ut faciamus. Sicut enim finis habet rationem
principii, ita id quod agitur propter finem, habet rationem
conclusionis. Unde id quod primo agendum occurrit, habet rationem
ultimae conclusionis, ad quam inquisitio terminatur. Nihil autem
prohibet consilium potentia infinitum esse, secundum quod in
infinitum possunt aliqua occurrere consilio inquirenda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only potentially.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34115] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod singularia non sunt infinita actu, sed in
potentia tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although human action can be hindered, the hindrance is not always at hand. Consequently it is not always necessary to take
                     counsel about removing the obstacle.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34116] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, licet humana actio possit impediri, non tamen semper
habet impedimentum paratum. Et ideo non semper oportet consiliari
de impedimento tollendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q14_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In contingent singulars, something may be taken for certain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being, and as far as it
                     concerns the work to be done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a necessary statement; but that he is sitting, as long
                     as he continues to sit, is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 14 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34117] Iª-IIae q. 14 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod in singularibus contingentibus potest aliquid accipi
certum, etsi non simpliciter, tamen ut nunc, prout assumitur in
operatione. Socratem enim sedere non est necessarium, sed eum
sedere, dum sedet, est necessarium. Et hoc per certitudinem accipi
potest.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q15" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q15-p0.1">Q. 15. OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q15-p2"> We must now consider consent; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q15-p3"><a href="#FS_Q15_A1"> (1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q15-p4"><a href="#FS_Q15_A2"> (2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?</a></p><p id="FS_Q15-p5"><a href="#FS_Q15_A3"> (3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means?</a></p><p id="FS_Q15-p6"><a href="#FS_Q15_A4"> (4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul only?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 pr."><a name="34118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34118]
Iª-IIae q. 15 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
consensu. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum consensus
sit actus appetitivae, vel apprehensivae virtutis. Secundo, utrum
conveniat brutis animalibus. Tertio, utrum sit de fine, vel de his
quae sunt ad finem. Quarto, utrum consensus in actum pertineat
solum ad superiorem animae partem.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q15_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q15_A1-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 1. Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent belongs only to the apprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) ascribes consent
                     to the higher reason. But the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent belongs to an apprehensive power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34119] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod consentire pertineat solum ad partem
animae apprehensivam. Augustinus enim, XII de Trin., consensum
attribuit superiori rationi. Sed ratio nominat apprehensivam
virtutem. Ergo consentire pertinet ad apprehensivam virtutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, consent is "co-sense." But sense is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34120] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
consentire est simul sentire. Sed sentire est apprehensivae
potentiae. Ergo et consentire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as assent is an application of the intellect to something, so is consent. But assent belongs to the intellect,
                     which is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent also belongs to an apprehensive power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34121] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut assentire dicit applicationem intellectus ad aliquid, ita et
consentire. Sed assentire pertinet ad intellectum, qui est vis
apprehensiva. Ergo et consentire ad vim apprehensivam pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "if a man judge without affection for that of which he judges, there is no sentence,"
                     i.e. consent. But affection belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore consent does also.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34122] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod <i>si aliquis iudicet,
et non diligat, non est sententia</i>, idest consensus. Sed
diligere ad appetitivam virtutem pertinet. Ergo et consensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Consent implies application of sense to something. Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for the
                     imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things, even in the absence of the things of which they bear the likeness;
                     while the intellect apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend indifferently, whether the singulars be present or
                     absent. And since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing
                     itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so far as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude,
                     the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, in so far as it takes
                     complacency in it. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q15_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.1" target="asv">Wis. 1:1</a>): "Think of [Sentite] the Lord in goodness." And on these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 co."><a name="34123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34123] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod consentire importat applicationem sensus ad aliquid.
Est autem proprium sensus quod cognoscitivus est rerum praesentium,
vis enim imaginativa est apprehensiva similitudinum corporalium,
etiam rebus absentibus quarum sunt similitudines; intellectus autem
apprehensivus est universalium rationum, quas potest apprehendere
indifferenter et praesentibus et absentibus singularibus. Et quia
actus appetitivae virtutis est quaedam inclinatio ad rem ipsam,
secundum quandam similitudinem ipsa applicatio appetitivae virtutis
ad rem, secundum quod ei inhaeret, accipit nomen sensus, quasi
experientiam quandam sumens de re cui inhaeret, inquantum complacet
sibi in ea. Unde et Sap. I, dicitur, <i>sentite de domino in
bonitate</i>. Et secundum hoc, consentire est actus appetitivae
virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in De Anima iii, 9, "the will is in the reason." Hence, when Augustine ascribes consent to the reason, he takes
                     reason as including the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34124] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in III de anima, voluntas in
ratione est. Unde cum Augustinus attribuit consensum rationi,
accipit rationem secundum quod in ea includitur voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive faculty; but by way of similitude, in so far as it implies seeking
                     acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power, as stated above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34125] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum, quod sentire proprie dictum ad apprehensivam potentiam
pertinet, sed secundum similitudinem cuiusdam experientiae,
pertinet ad appetitivam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Assentire" [to assent] is, to speak, "ad aliud sentire" [to feel towards something]; and thus it implies a certain distance
                     from that to which assent is given. But "consentire" [to consent] is "to feel with," and this implies a certain union to the
                     object of consent. Hence the will, to which it belongs to tend to the thing itself, is more properly said to consent: whereas
                     the intellect, whose act does not consist in a movement towards the thing, but
                     rather the reverse, as we have stated in the
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q16_A1" id="FS_Q15_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[16], A[1]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q15_A1-p9.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[27], A[4]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q59_A2" id="FS_Q15_A1-p9.3" shape="rect">FP, Q[59], A[2]</a>, is more properly said to assent: although one word is wont to be used for the other [*In Latin rather than in English.].
                     We may also say that the intellect assents, in so far as it is moved by the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34126] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod assentire est quasi ad aliud sentire, et sic importat
quandam distantiam ad id cui assentitur. Sed consentire est simul
sentire, et sic importat quandam coniunctionem ad id cui
consentitur. Et ideo voluntas, cuius est tendere ad ipsam rem,
magis proprie dicitur consentire, intellectus autem, cuius operatio
non est secundum motum ad rem, sed potius e converso, ut in primo
dictum est, magis proprie dicitur assentire, quamvis unum pro alio
poni soleat. Potest etiam dici quod intellectus assentit, inquantum
a voluntate movetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q15_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q15_A2-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 2. Whether consent is to be found in irrational animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent is to be found in irrational animals. For consent implies a determination of the appetite to one
                     thing. But the appetite of irrational animals is determinate to one thing. Therefore consent is to be found in irrational
                     animals.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34127] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod consensus conveniat brutis animalibus.
Consensus enim importat determinationem appetitus ad unum. Sed
appetitus brutorum animalium sunt determinati ad unum. Ergo
consensus in brutis animalibus invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if you remove what is first, you remove what follows. But consent precedes the accomplished act. If therefore there
                     were no consent in irrational animals, there would be no act accomplished; which is clearly false.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34128] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
remoto priori, removetur posterius. Sed consensus praecedit operis
executionem. Si ergo in brutis non esset consensus, non esset in
eis operis executio. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, men are sometimes said to consent to do something, through some passion; desire, for instance, or anger. But irrational
                     animals act through passion. Therefore they consent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34129] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
homines interdum consentire dicuntur in aliquid agendum ex aliqua
passione, puta concupiscentia vel ira. Sed bruta animalia ex
passione agunt. Ergo in eis est consensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "after judging, man approves and embraces the judgment of his counselling, and
                     this is called the sentence," i.e. consent. But counsel is not in irrational animals. Therefore neither is consent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34130] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Damascenus dicit quod <i>post iudicium, homo disponit et
amat quod ex consilio iudicatum est, quod vocatur sententia</i>,
idest consensus. Sed consilium non est in brutis animalibus. Ergo
nec consensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational animals. The reason of this is that consent implies an application of the
                     appetitive movement to something as to be done. Now to apply the appetitive movement to the doing of something, belongs to
                     the subject in whose power it is to move the appetite: thus to touch a stone is an action suitable to a stick, but to apply
                     the stick so that it touch the stone, belongs to one who has the power of moving the stick.
                     But irrational animals have not the command of the appetitive movement; for this is in them through natural instinct. Hence
                     in the irrational animal, there is indeed the movement of the appetite, but it does not apply that movement to some particular
                     thing. And hence it is that the irrational animal is not properly said to consent: this is proper to the rational nature,
                     which has the command of the appetitive movement, and is able to apply or not to apply it to this or that thing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 co."><a name="34131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34131] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod consensus, proprie loquendo, non est in brutis
animalibus. Cuius ratio est quia consensus importat applicationem
appetitivi motus ad aliquid agendum. Eius autem est applicare
appetitivum motum ad aliquid agendum, in cuius potestate est
appetitivus motus, sicut tangere lapidem convenit quidem baculo,
sed applicare baculum ad tactum lapidis, est eius qui habet in
potestate movere baculum. Bruta autem animalia non habent in sui
potestate appetitivum motum, sed talis motus in eis est ex
instinctu naturae. Unde brutum animal appetit quidem, sed non
applicat appetitivum motum ad aliquid. Et propter hoc non proprie
dicitur consentire, sed solum rationalis natura, quae habet in
potestate sua appetitivum motum, et potest ipsum applicare vel non
applicare ad hoc vel ad illud.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In irrational animals the determination of the appetite to a particular thing is merely passive: whereas consent implies
                     a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely passive.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34132] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod in brutis animalibus invenitur determinatio
appetitus ad aliquid passive tantum. Consensus vero importat
determinationem appetitus non solum passivam, sed magis
activam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the first be removed, then what follows is removed, provided that, properly speaking, it follow from that only. But if
                     something can follow from several things, it is not removed by the fact that one of them is removed; thus if hardening is
                     the effect of heat and of cold (since bricks are hardened by the fire, and frozen water is hardened by the cold), then by
                     removing heat it does not follow that there is no hardening. Now the accomplishment of an
                     act follows not only from consent, but also from the impulse of the appetite, such as is found in irrational animals.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34133] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, remoto priori, removetur posterius quod proprie ex
eo tantum sequitur. Si autem aliquid ex pluribus sequi possit, non
propter hoc posterius removetur, uno priorum remoto, sicut si
induratio possit fieri et a calido et frigido (nam lateres
indurantur ab igne, et aqua congelata induratur ex frigore), non
oportet quod, remoto calore, removeatur induratio. Executio autem
operis non solum sequitur ex consensu, sed etiam ex impetuoso
appetitu, qualis est in brutis animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The man who acts through passion is able not to follow the passion: whereas irrational animals have not that power. Hence
                     the comparison fails.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34134] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod homines qui ex passione agunt, possunt passionem non
sequi. Non autem bruta animalia. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q15_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q15_A3-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 3. Whether consent is directed to the end or to the means?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent is directed to the end. Because that on account of which a thing is such is still more such. But
                     it is on account of the end that we consent to the means. Therefore, still more do we consent to the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34135] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod consensus sit de fine. Quia propter
quod unumquodque, illud magis. Sed his quae sunt ad finem
consentimus propter finem. Ergo fini consentimus magis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the act of the intemperate man is his end, just as the act of the virtuous man is his end. But the intemperate man
                     consents to his own act. Therefore consent can be directed to the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34136] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
actio intemperati est finis eius, sicut et actio virtuosi est finis
eius. Sed intemperatus consentit in proprium actum. Ergo consensus
potest esse de fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, desire of the means is choice, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q13_A1" id="FS_Q15_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[1]</a>). If therefore consent were only directed to the means it would nowise differ from choice. And this is proved to be false
                     by the authority of Damascene who says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "after the approval" which he calls "the sentence," "comes
                     the choice." Therefore consent is not only directed to the means.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34137] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, est electio, ut supra dictum
est. Si igitur consensus esset solum de his quae sunt ad finem, in
nullo ab electione differre videretur. Quod patet esse falsum per
Damascenum, qui dicit quod post dispositionem, quam vocaverat
sententiam, fit electio. Non ergo consensus est solum de his quae
sunt ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that the "sentence," i.e. the consent, takes place "when a man approves and embraces
                     the judgment of his counsel." But counsel is only about the means. Therefore the same applies to consent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34138] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Damascenus ibidem dicit, quod <i>sententia, sive
consensus, est quando homo disponit et amat quod ex consilio
iudicatum est</i>. Sed consilium non est nisi de his quae sunt ad
finem. Ergo nec consensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to something that is already in the power of him who causes the application.
                     Now the order of action is this: First there is the apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel
                     about the means; then the desire of the means. Now the appetite tends to the last end naturally: wherefore the application
                     of the appetitive movement to the apprehended end has not the nature of consent, but
                     of simple volition. But as to those things which come under consideration after the last end, in so far as they are directed
                     to the end, they come under counsel: and so counsel can be applied to them, in so far as the appetitive movement is applied
                     to the judgment resulting from counsel. But the appetitive movement to the end is not applied to counsel: rather is counsel
                     applied to it, because counsel presupposes the desire of the end. On the other hand, the desire of the means presupposes the
                     decision of counsel. And therefore the application of the appetitive movement to counsel's decision is consent, properly speaking.
                     Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent, properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 co."><a name="34139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34139] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod consensus nominat applicationem appetitivi motus ad
aliquid praeexistens in potestate applicantis in ordine autem
agibilium, primo quidem oportet sumere apprehensionem finis; deinde
appetitum finis; deinde consilium de his quae sunt ad finem; deinde
appetitum eorum quae sunt ad finem. Appetitus autem in ultimum
finem tendit naturaliter, unde et applicatio motus appetitivi in
finem apprehensum, non habet rationem consensus, sed simplicis
voluntatis. De his autem quae sunt post ultimum finem, inquantum
sunt ad finem, sub consilio cadunt, et sic potest esse de eis
consensus, inquantum motus appetitivus applicatur ad id quod ex
consilio iudicatum est. Motus vero appetitivus in finem, non
applicatur consilio, sed magis consilium ipsi, quia consilium
praesupponit appetitum finis. Sed appetitus eorum quae sunt ad
finem, praesupponit determinationem consilii. Et ideo applicatio
appetitivi motus ad determinationem consilii, proprie est
consensus. Unde, cum consilium non sit nisi de his quae sunt ad
finem, consensus, proprie loquendo, non est nisi de his quae sunt
ad finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the principles is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not science,
                     but something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent to the means on account of the end, in respect of which our
                     act is not consent but something greater, namely, volition.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34140] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod, sicut conclusiones scimus per principia, horum
tamen non est scientia, sed quod maius est, scilicet intellectus;
ita consentimus his quae sunt ad finem propter finem, cuius tamen
non est consensus, sed quod maius est, scilicet voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Delight in his act, rather than the act itself, is the end of the intemperate man, and for sake of this delight he consents
                     to that act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34141] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod intemperatus habet pro fine delectationem operis,
propter quam consentit in opus, magis quam ipsam operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Choice includes something that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to something to which something else is preferred:
                     and therefore after consent there still remains a choice. For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been
                     found conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval, consent has been given to each: but after approving
                     of many, we have given our preference to one by choosing it. But if only one
                     meets with approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in our way of looking at them; so that we
                     call it consent, according as we approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer it to those that do not meet
                     with our approval.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34142] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod electio addit supra consensum quandam relationem
respectu eius cui aliquid praeeligitur, et ideo post consensum,
adhuc remanet electio. Potest enim contingere quod per consilium
inveniantur plura ducentia ad finem, quorum dum quodlibet placet,
in quodlibet eorum consentitur, sed ex multis quae placent,
praeaccipimus unum eligendo. Sed si inveniatur unum solum quod
placeat, non differunt re consensus et electio, sed ratione tantum,
ut consensus dicatur secundum quod placet ad agendum; electio
autem, secundum quod praefertur his quae non placent.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q15_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q15_A4-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 4. Whether consent to the act belongs only to the higher part of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent to the act does not always belong to the higher reason. For "delight follows action, and perfects
                     it, just as beauty perfects youth" [*oion tois akmaiois he hora}--as youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime] (Ethic. x,
                     4). But consent to delight belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore consent to the act
                     does not belong only to the higher reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34143] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod consensus ad agendum non semper
pertineat ad superiorem rationem. <i>Delectatio enim consequitur
operationem, et perficit eam, sicut decor iuventutem</i>, sicut
dicitur in X Ethic. Sed consensus in delectationem pertinet ad
inferiorem rationem, ut dicit Augustinus in XII de Trin. Ergo
consensus in actum non pertinet ad solam superiorem rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an act to which we consent is said to be voluntary. But it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts. Therefore
                     the higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34144] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
actio in quam consentimus, dicitur esse voluntaria. Sed multarum
potentiarum est producere actiones voluntarias. Ergo non sola
superior ratio consentit in actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal," as Augustine
                     says (De Trin. xii, 7). But man often consents to an act not for eternal, but for temporal reasons, or even on account of
                     some passion of the soul. Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher reason alone.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34145] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
superior ratio intendit aeternis inspiciendis ac consulendis, ut
Augustinus dicit in XII de Trin. Sed multoties homo consentit in
actum non propter rationes aeternas, sed propter aliquas rationes
temporales, vel etiam propter aliquas animae passiones. Non ergo
consentire in actum pertinet ad solam superiorem rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "It is impossible for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless that mental faculty
                     which has the sovereign power of urging his members to, or restraining them from, act, yield to the evil deed and become its
                     slave."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34146] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., <i>non potest peccatum
efficaciter perpetrandum mente decerni, nisi illa mentis intentio
penes quam summa potestas est membra in opus movendi vel ab opere
cohibendi, malae actioni cedat et serviat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The final decision belongs to him who holds the highest place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the others; for as long
                     as judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced, the final decision has not been given. Now it is evident that it belongs
                     to the higher reason to judge of all: since it is by the reason that we judge of sensible things; and of things pertaining
                     to human principles we judge according to Divine principles, which is the function of
                     the higher reason. Wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or not, according to Divine principles, no judgment
                     of the reason can be considered in the light of a final decision. Now the final decision of what is to be done is consent
                     to the act. Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher reason; but in that sense in which the reason includes the
                     will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 co."><a name="34147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34147] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod finalis sententia semper pertinet ad eum qui superior
est, ad quem pertinet de aliis iudicare, quandiu enim iudicandum
restat quod proponitur, nondum datur finalis sententia. Manifestum
est autem quod superior ratio est quae habet de omnibus iudicare,
quia de sensibilibus per rationem iudicamus; de his vero quae ad
rationes humanas pertinent, iudicamus secundum rationes divinas,
quae pertinent ad rationem superiorem. Et ideo quandiu incertum est
an secundum rationes divinas resistatur vel non, nullum iudicium
rationis habet rationem finalis sententiae. Finalis autem sententia
de agendis est consensus in actum. Et ideo consensus in actum
pertinet ad rationem superiorem, secundum tamen quod in ratione
voluntas includitur, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consent to delight in the work done belongs to the higher reason, as also does consent to the work; but consent to delight
                     in thought belongs to the lower reason, just as to the lower reason it belongs to think. Nevertheless the higher reason exercises
                     judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an action; and in like manner on the delight that results.
                     But in so far as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further
                     act, it belongs to the lower reason. For that which is ordained to something else, belongs to a lower art or power than does
                     the end to which it is ordained: hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the master or principal art.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34148] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod consensus in delectationem operis pertinet ad
superiorem rationem, sicut et consensus in opus, sed consensus in
delectationem cogitationis, pertinet ad rationem inferiorem, sicut
ad ipsam pertinet cogitare. Et tamen de hoc ipso quod est cogitare
vel non cogitare, inquantum consideratur ut actio quaedam, habet
iudicium superior ratio, et similiter de delectatione consequente.
Sed inquantum accipitur ut ad actionem aliam ordinatum, sic
pertinet ad inferiorem rationem. Quod enim ad aliud ordinatur, ad
inferiorem artem vel potentiam pertinet quam finis ad quem
ordinatur, unde ars quae est de fine, architectonica, seu
principalis, vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since actions are called voluntary from the fact that we consent to them, it does not follow that consent is an act of each
                     power, but of the will which is in the reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), and from which the voluntary act is named.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34149] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, quia actiones dicuntur voluntariae ex hoc quod eis
consentimus, non oportet quod consensus sit cuiuslibet potentiae,
sed voluntatis, a qua dicitur voluntarium; quae est in ratione,
sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q15_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The higher reason is said to consent not only because it always moves to act, according to the eternal reasons; but also
                     because it fails to dissent according to those same reasons.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 15 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34150] Iª-IIae q. 15 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ratio superior dicitur consentire, non solum quia
secundum rationes aeternas semper moveat ad agendum; sed etiam quia
secundum rationes aeternas non dissentit.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q16" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q16-p0.1">Q. 16. OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q16-p2"> We must now consider use; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q16-p3"><a href="#FS_Q16_A1"> (1) Whether use is an act of the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q16-p4"><a href="#FS_Q16_A2"> (2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?</a></p><p id="FS_Q16-p5"><a href="#FS_Q16_A3"> (3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also?</a></p><p id="FS_Q16-p6"><a href="#FS_Q16_A4"> (4) Of the relation of use to choice.</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 pr."><a name="34151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34151]
Iª-IIae q. 16 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de usu.
Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum uti sit actus
voluntatis. Secundo, utrum conveniat brutis animalibus. Tertio,
utrum sit tantum eorum quae sunt ad finem, vel etiam finis. Quarto,
de ordine usus ad electionem.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q16_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q16_A1-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 1. Whether use is an act of the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that use is not an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4) that "to use is to refer that
                     which is the object of use to the obtaining of something else." But "to refer" something to another is an act of the reason
                     to which it belongs to compare and to direct. Therefore use is an act of the reason and not of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34152] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod uti non sit actus voluntatis. Dicit
enim Augustinus, in I de Doctr. Christ., quod <i>uti est id quod in
usum venerit, ad aliud obtinendum referre</i>. Sed referre aliquid
ad aliud est rationis, cuius est conferre et ordinare. Ergo uti est
actus rationis. Non ergo voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that man "goes forward to the operation, and this is called impulse; then
                     he makes use (of the powers) and this is called use." But operation belongs to the executive power; and the act of the will
                     does not follow the act of the executive power, on the contrary execution comes last. Therefore use is not an act of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34153] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Damascenus dicit quod <i>homo impetum facit ad operationem, et
dicitur impetus, deinde utitur, et dicitur usus</i>. Sed operatio
pertinet ad potentiam executivam. Actus autem voluntatis non
sequitur actum executivae potentiae, sed executio est ultimum. Ergo
usus non est actus voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "All things that were made were made for man's use, because reason with which man
                     is endowed uses all things by its judgment of them." But judgment of things created by God belongs to the speculative reason;
                     which seems to be altogether distinct from the will, which is the principle of human acts. Therefore use is not an act of
                     the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34154] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>omnia quae
facta sunt, in usum hominis facta sunt, quia omnibus utitur
iudicando ratio quae hominibus data est</i>. Sed iudicare de rebus
a Deo creatis pertinet ad rationem speculativam; quae omnino
separata videtur a voluntate, quae est principium humanorum actuum.
Ergo uti non est actus voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "To use is to apply to something to purpose of the will."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34155] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., <i>uti est assumere
aliquid in facultatem voluntatis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The use of a thing implies the application of that thing to an operation: hence the operation to which we apply a thing is
                     called its use; thus the use of a horse is to ride, and the use of a stick is to strike. Now we apply to an operation not
                     only the interior principles of action, viz. the powers of the soul or the members of the body; as the intellect, to understand;
                     and the eye, to see; but also external things, as a stick, to strike. But it is evident
                     that we do not apply external things to an operation save through the interior principles which are either the powers of the
                     soul, or the habits of those powers, or the organs which are parts of the body. Now it has been shown above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q16_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>) that it is the will which moves the soul's powers to their acts, and this is to apply them to operation. Hence it is evident
                     that first and principally use belongs to the will as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to
                     the other powers as executing the operation, which powers are compared to the will which applies them to act, as the instruments
                     are compared to the principal agent. Now action is properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as
                     building is ascribed to the builder, not to his tools. Hence it is evident that use is, properly speaking, an act of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 co."><a name="34156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34156] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod usus rei alicuius importat applicationem rei illius
ad aliquam operationem, unde et operatio ad quam applicamus rem
aliquam, dicitur usus eius; sicut equitare est usus equi, et
percutere est usus baculi. Ad operationem autem applicamus et
principia interiora agendi, scilicet ipsas potentias animae vel
membra corporis, ut intellectum ad intelligendum, et oculum ad
videndum; et etiam res exteriores, sicut baculum ad percutiendum.
Sed manifestum est quod res exteriores non applicamus ad aliquam
operationem nisi per principia intrinseca, quae sunt potentiae
animae, aut habitus potentiarum, aut organa, quae sunt corporis
membra. Ostensum est autem supra quod voluntas est quae movet
potentias animae ad suos actus; et hoc est applicare eas ad
operationem. Unde manifestum est quod uti primo et principaliter
est voluntatis, tanquam primi moventis; rationis autem tanquam
dirigentis; sed aliarum potentiarum tanquam exequentium, quae
comparantur ad voluntatem, a qua applicantur ad agendum, sicut
instrumenta ad principale agens. Actio autem proprie non
attribuitur instrumento, sed principali agenti, sicut aedificatio
aedificatori, non autem instrumentis. Unde manifestum est quod uti
proprie est actus voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason does indeed refer one thing to another; but the will tends to that which is referred by the reason to something else.
                     And in this sense to use is to refer one thing to another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34157] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod ratio quidem in aliud refert, sed voluntas
tendit in id quod est in aliud relatum per rationem. Et secundum
hoc dicitur quod uti est referre aliquid in alterum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Damascene is speaking of use in so far as it belongs to the executive powers.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34158] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Damascenus loquitur de usu, secundum quod pertinet ad
executivas potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even the speculative reason is applied by the will to the act of understanding or judging. Consequently the speculative reason
                     is said to use, in so far as it is moved by the will, in the same way as the other powers.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34159] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod etiam ipsa ratio speculativa applicatur ad opus
intelligendi vel iudicandi, a voluntate. Et ideo intellectus
speculativus uti dicitur tanquam a voluntate motus, sicut aliae
executivae potentiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q16_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q16_A2-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 2. Whether use is to be found in irrational animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that use is to be found in irrational animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as Augustine
                     says (De Trin. x, 10): "We use things by referring them to something else which we are to enjoy." But enjoyment is to be found
                     in irrational animals, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q11_A2" id="FS_Q16_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[11], A[2]</a>). Much more, therefore, is it possible for them to use.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34160] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod uti conveniat brutis animalibus. Frui
enim est nobilius quam uti, quia, ut Augustinus dicit in X de
Trin., <i>utimur eis quae ad aliud referimus, quo fruendum est</i>.
Sed frui convenit brutis animalibus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
multo magis convenit eis uti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to apply the members to action is to use them. But irrational animals apply their members to action; for instance,
                     their feet, to walk; their horns, to strike. Therefore it is possible for irrational animals to use.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34161] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
applicare membra ad agendum est uti membris. Sed bruta animalia
applicant membra ad aliquid agendum; sicut pedes ad ambulandum,
cornua ad percutiendum. Ergo brutis animalibus convenit uti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A2-p4">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "None but a rational animal can make use of a thing."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34162] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>uti
aliqua re non potest nisi animal quod rationis est
particeps</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A2-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q16_A1" id="FS_Q16_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, to use is to apply an active principle to action: thus to consent is to apply the appetitive movement to the desire of something,
                     as stated above (Q[15], AA[1],2,3). Now he alone who has the disposal of a thing, can apply it to something else; and this
                     belongs to him alone who knows how to refer it to something else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore none but a
                     rational animal consents and uses.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 2 co."><a name="34163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34163] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, uti est applicare aliquod
principium actionis ad actionem, sicut consentire est applicare
motum appetitivum ad aliquid appetendum, ut dictum est. Applicare
autem aliquid ad alterum non est nisi eius quod habet arbitrium
super illud, quod non est nisi eius qui scit referre aliquid in
alterum, quod ad rationem pertinet. Et ideo solum animal rationale
et consentit, et utitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A2-p6">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the appetite to the appetible: whereas to use implies a movement of the appetite
                     to something as directed to something else. If therefore we compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment
                     is better than use; because that which is appetible absolutely is better than that which is appetible only as directed to
                     something else. But if we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that
                     precedes them, greater excellence is required on the part of use: because to direct one thing to another is an act of reason;
                     whereas to apprehend something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34164] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod frui importat absolutum motum appetitus in
appetibile, sed uti importat motum appetitus ad aliquid in ordine
ad alterum. Si ergo comparentur uti et frui quantum ad obiecta, sic
frui est nobilius quam uti, quia id quod est absolute appetibile,
est melius quam id quod est appetibile solum in ordine ad aliud.
Sed si comparentur quantum ad vim apprehensivam praecedentem, maior
nobilitas requiritur ex parte usus, quia ordinare aliquid in
alterum est rationis; absolute autem aliquid apprehendere potest
etiam sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Animals by means of their members do something from natural instinct; not through knowing the relation of their members to
                     these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply their members to action, nor do they use them.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34165] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod animalia per sua membra aliquid agunt instinctu
naturae, non per hoc quod cognoscant ordinem membrorum ad illas
operationes. Unde non dicuntur proprie applicare membra ad agendum,
nec uti membris.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q16_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q16_A3-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 3. Whether use regards also the last end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that use can regard also the last end. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "Whoever enjoys, uses." But man
                     enjoys the last end. Therefore he uses the last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34166] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod usus possit esse etiam ultimi finis.
Dicit enim Augustinus, in X de Trin., <i>omnis qui fruitur,
utitur</i>. Sed ultimo fine fruitur aliquis. Ergo ultimo fine
aliquis utitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "to use is to apply something to the purpose of the will" (De Trin. x, 11). But the last end, more than anything
                     else, is the object of the will's application. Therefore it can be the object of use.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34167] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a>
<i>Praeterea, uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem
voluntatis</i>, ut ibidem dicitur. Sed nihil magis assumitur a
voluntate quam ultimus finis. Ergo usus potest esse ultimi
finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "Eternity is in the Father, Likeness in the Image," i.e. in the Son, "Use in the
                     Gift," i.e. in the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost, since He is God, is the last end. Therefore the last end can be the object
                     of use.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34168] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Hilarius dicit, in II de Trin., quod aeternitas est in patre,
species in imagine, idest in filio, usus in munere, idest in
spiritu sancto. Sed spiritus sanctus, cum sit Deus, est ultimus
finis. Ergo ultimo fine contingit uti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "No one rightly uses God, but one enjoys Him." But God alone is the last end. Therefore
                     we cannot use the last end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34169] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>Deo
nullus recte utitur, sed fruitur</i>. Sed solus Deus est ultimus
finis. Ergo ultimo fine non est utendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q16_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Use, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q16_A1" id="FS_Q16_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, implies the application of one thing to another. Now that which is applied to another is regarded in the light of means
                     to an end; and consequently use always regards the means. For this reason things that are adapted to a certain end are said
                     to be "useful"; in fact their very usefulness is sometimes called use.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q16_A3-p7"> It must, however, be observed that the last end may be taken in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in respect of an individual.
                     For since the end, as stated above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A8" id="FS_Q16_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[8]</a>;
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q16_A3-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), signifies sometimes the thing itself, and sometimes the attainment or possession of that thing (thus the miser's end is
                     either money or the possession of it); it is evident that, simply speaking, the last end is the thing itself; for the
                     possession of money is good only inasmuch as there is some good in money. But in regard to the individual, the obtaining of
                     money is the last end; for the miser would not seek for money, save that he might have it. Therefore, simply and properly
                     speaking, a man enjoys money, because he places his last end therein; but in so far as he seeks to possess it, he is said
                     to use it.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 co."><a name="34170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34170] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod uti, sicut dictum est, importat applicationem
alicuius ad aliquid. Quod autem applicatur ad aliud, se habet in
ratione eius quod est ad finem. Et ideo uti semper est eius quod
est ad finem. Propter quod et ea quae sunt ad finem accommoda,
utilia dicuntur; et ipsa utilitas interdum usus nominatur. Sed
considerandum est quod ultimus finis dicitur dupliciter, uno modo,
simpliciter; et alio modo, quoad aliquem. Cum enim finis, ut supra
dictum est, dicatur quandoque quidem res, quandoque autem adeptio
rei vel possessio eius, sicut avaro finis est vel pecunia vel
possessio pecuniae; manifestum est quod, simpliciter loquendo,
ultimus finis est ipsa res, non enim possessio pecuniae est bona,
nisi propter bonum pecuniae. Sed quoad hunc, adeptio pecuniae est
finis ultimus, non enim quaereret pecuniam avarus, nisi ut haberet
eam. Ergo, simpliciter loquendo et proprie, pecunia homo aliquis
fruitur, quia in ea ultimum finem constituit, sed inquantum refert
eam ad possessionem, dicitur uti ea.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of use in general, in so far as it implies the relation of an end to the enjoyment which a man seeks
                     in that end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34171] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de usu communiter, secundum
quod importat ordinem finis ad ipsam finis fruitionem, quam aliquis
quaerit de fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end is applied to the purpose of the will, that the will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in the end, which
                     is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use of the end. But the means are applied to the will's purpose, not only
                     in being used as means, but as ordained to something else in which the will finds rest.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34172] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod finis assumitur in facultatem voluntatis, ut voluntas
in illo quiescat. Unde ipsa requies in fine, quae fruitio est,
dicitur hoc modo usus finis. Sed id quod est ad finem, assumitur in
facultatem voluntatis non solum in ordine ad usum eius quod est ad
finem, sed in ordine ad aliam rem, in qua voluntas quiescit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The words of Hilary refer to use as applicable to rest in the last end; just as, speaking in a general sense, one may be
                     said to use the end for the purpose of attaining it, as stated above. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10) that "this love,
                     delight, felicity, or happiness, is called use by him."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34173] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod usus accipitur in verbis Hilarii pro quiete in ultimo
fine, eo modo quo aliquis, communiter loquendo, dicitur uti fine ad
obtinendum ipsum, sicut dictum est. Unde Augustinus, in VI de
Trin., dicit quod <i>illa dilectio, delectatio, felicitas vel
beatitudo usus ab eo appellatur</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q16_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q16_A4-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 4. Whether use precedes choice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that use precedes choice. For nothing follows after choice, except execution. But use, since it belongs to
                     the will, precedes execution. Therefore it precedes choice also.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34174] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod usus praecedat electionem. Post
electionem enim nihil sequitur nisi executio. Sed usus, cum
pertineat ad voluntatem, praecedit executionem. Ergo praecedit
etiam electionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the absolute precedes the relative. Therefore the less relative precedes the more relative. But choice implies two
                     relations: one, of the thing chosen, in relation to the end; the other, of the thing chosen, in respect of that to which it
                     is preferred; whereas use implies relation to the end only. Therefore use precedes choice.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34175] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
absolutum est ante relatum. Ergo minus relatum est ante magis
relatum. Sed electio importat duas relationes, unam eius quod
eligitur ad finem, aliam vero ad id cui praeeligitur, usus autem
importat solam relationem ad finem. Ergo usus est prior
electione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will uses the other powers in so far as it removes them. But the will moves itself, too, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A3" id="FS_Q16_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[3]</a>). Therefore it uses itself, by applying itself to act. But it does this when it consents. Therefore there is use in consent.
                     But consent precedes choice as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q15_A3" id="FS_Q16_A4-p4.2" shape="rect">Q[15], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Therefore use does also.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34176] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
voluntas utitur aliis potentiis inquantum movet eas. Sed voluntas
movet etiam seipsam ut dictum est. Ergo etiam utitur seipsa,
applicando se ad agendum. Sed hoc facit cum consentit. Ergo in ipso
consensu est usus. Sed consensus praecedit electionem ut dictum
est. Ergo et usus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "the will after choosing has an impulse to the operation, and afterwards it uses
                     (the powers)." Therefore use follows choice.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34177] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>voluntas post electionem impetum
facit ad operationem, et postea utitur</i>. Ergo usus sequitur
electionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q16_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The will has a twofold relation to the thing willed. One, according as the thing willed is, in a way, in the willing subject,
                     by a kind of proportion or order to the thing willed. Wherefore those things that are naturally proportionate to a certain
                     end, are said to desire that end naturally. Yet to have an end thus is to have it imperfectly. Now every imperfect thing tends
                     to perfection. And therefore both the natural and the voluntary appetite tend to have
                     the end in reality; and this is to have it perfectly. This is the second relation of the will to the thing willed.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q16_A4-p7"> Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the means. And the last act that belongs to the first relation of the
                     will to the means, is choice; for there the will becomes fully proportionate, by willing the means fully. Use, on the other
                     hand, belongs to the second relation of the will, in respect of which it tends to the realization of the thing willed. Wherefore
                     it is evident that use follows choice; provided that by use we mean the will's use of the executive power in
                     moving it. But since the will, in a way, moves the reason also, and uses it, we may take the use of the means, as consisting
                     in the consideration of the reason, whereby it refers the means to the end. In this sense use precedes choice.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 co."><a name="34178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34178] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod voluntas duplicem habitudinem habet ad volitum. Unam
quidem, secundum quod volitum est quodammodo in volente, per
quandam proportionem vel ordinem ad volitum. Unde et res quae
naturaliter sunt proportionatae ad aliquem finem, dicuntur appetere
illum naturaliter. Sed sic habere finem, est imperfecte habere
ipsum. Omne autem imperfectum tendit in perfectionem. Et ideo tam
appetitus naturalis, quam voluntarius, tendit ut habeat ipsum finem
realiter, quod est perfecte habere ipsum. Et haec est secunda
habitudo voluntatis ad volitum. Volitum autem non solum est finis,
sed id quod est ad finem. Ultimum autem quod pertinet ad primam
habitudinem voluntatis, respectu eius quod est ad finem, est
electio, ibi enim completur proportio voluntatis, ut complete velit
id quod est ad finem. Sed usus iam pertinet ad secundam habitudinem
voluntatis, qua tendit ad consequendum rem volitam. Unde manifestum
est quod usus sequitur electionem, si tamen accipiatur usus,
secundum quod voluntas utitur executiva potentia movendo ipsam. Sed
quia voluntas etiam quodammodo rationem movet, et utitur ea, potest
intelligi usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod est in
consideratione rationis referentis ipsum in finem. Et hoc modo usus
praecedit electionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The motion of the will to the execution of the work, precedes execution, but follows choice. And so, since use belongs to
                     that very motion of the will, it stands between choice and execution.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34179] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod ipsam executionem operis praecedit motio qua
voluntas movet ad exequendum, sequitur autem electionem. Et sic,
cum usus pertineat ad praedictam motionem voluntatis, medium est
inter electionem et executionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is essentially relative is after the absolute; but the thing to which relation is referred need not come after. Indeed,
                     the more a cause precedes, the more numerous the effects to which it has relation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34180] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod id quod est per essentiam suam relatum, posterius est
absoluto, sed id cui attribuuntur relationes, non oportet quod sit
posterius. Immo quanto causa est prior, tanto habet relationem ad
plures effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q16_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Choice precedes use, if they be referred to the same object. But nothing hinders the use of one thing preceding the choice
                     of another. And since the acts of the will react on one another, in each act of the will we can find both consent and choice
                     and use; so that we may say that the will consents to choose, and consents to consent, and uses itself in consenting and choosing.
                     And such acts as are ordained to that which precedes, precede also.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 16 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34181] Iª-IIae q. 16 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod electio praecedit usum, si referantur ad idem. Nihil
autem prohibet quod usus unius praecedat electionem alterius. Et
quia actus voluntatis reflectuntur supra seipsos, in quolibet actu
voluntatis potest accipi et consensus, et electio, et usus, ut si
dicatur quod voluntas consentit se eligere, et consentit se
consentire, et utitur se ad consentiendum et eligendum. Et semper
isti actus ordinati ad id quod est prius, sunt priores.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q17" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q17-p0.1">Q. 17. OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (NINE ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q17-p2"> We must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head there are nine points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q17-p3"><a href="#FS_Q17_A1"> (1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p4"><a href="#FS_Q17_A2"> (2) Whether command belongs to irrational animals?</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p5"><a href="#FS_Q17_A3"> (3) Of the order between command and use</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p6"><a href="#FS_Q17_A4"> (4) Whether command and the commanded act are one act or distinct?</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p7"><a href="#FS_Q17_A5"> (5) Whether the act of the will is commanded?</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p8"><a href="#FS_Q17_A6"> (6) Whether the act of the reason is commanded?</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p9"><a href="#FS_Q17_A7"> (7) Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p10"><a href="#FS_Q17_A8"> (8) Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?</a></p><p id="FS_Q17-p11"><a href="#FS_Q17_A9"> (9) Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 pr."><a name="34182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34182]
Iª-IIae q. 17 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
actibus imperatis a voluntate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur novem.
Primo, utrum imperare sit actus voluntatis, vel rationis. Secundo,
utrum imperare pertineat ad bruta animalia. Tertio, de ordine
imperii ad usum. Quarto, utrum imperium et actus imperatus sint
unus actus, vel diversi. Quinto, utrum actus voluntatis imperetur.
Sexto, utrum actus rationis. Septimo, utrum actus appetitus
sensitivi. Octavo, utrum actus animae vegetabilis. Nono, utrum
actus exteriorum membrorum.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q17_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A1-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 1. Whether command is an act of the reason or of the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that command is not an act of the reason but of the will. For command is a kind of motion; because Avicenna
                     says that there are four ways of moving, "by perfecting, by disposing, by commanding, and by counselling." But it belongs
                     to the will to move all the other powers of the soul, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q17_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore command is an act of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34183] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod imperare non sit actus rationis, sed
voluntatis. Imperare enim est movere quoddam, dicit enim Avicenna
quod quadruplex est movens, scilicet perficiens, disponens,
imperans et consilians. Sed ad voluntatem pertinet movere omnes
alias vires animae, ut dictum est supra. Ergo imperare est actus
voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as to be commanded belongs to that which is subject, so, seemingly, to command belongs to that which is most
                     free. But the root of liberty is especially in the will. Therefore to command belongs to the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34184] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut imperari pertinet ad id quod est subiectum, ita imperare
pertinere videtur ad id quod est maxime liberum. Sed radix
libertatis est maxime in voluntate. Ergo voluntatis est
imperare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, command is followed at once by act. But the act of the reason is not followed at once by act: for he who judges
                     that a thing should be done, does not do it at once. Therefore command is not an act of the reason, but of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34185] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
ad imperium statim sequitur actus. Sed ad actum rationis non statim
sequitur actus, non enim qui iudicat aliquid esse faciendum, statim
illud operatur. Ergo imperare non est actus rationis, sed
voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] and the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) say that "the appetite obeys reason."
                     Therefore command is an act of the reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34186] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, et etiam philosophus quod
appetitivum obedit rationi. Ergo rationis est imperare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q17_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Command is an act of the reason presupposing, however, an act of the will. In proof of this, we must take note that, since
                     the acts of the reason and of the will can be brought to bear on one another, in so far as the reason reasons about willing,
                     and the will wills to reason, the result is that the act of the reason precedes the act of the will, and conversely. And since
                     the power of the preceding act continues in the act that follows, it happens sometimes
                     that there is an act of the will in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the reason, as we have stated in
                     reference to use and choice; and conversely, that there is an act of the reason in so far as it retains in itself something
                     of an act of the will.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q17_A1-p7"> Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the commander orders the one commanded to do something, by way
                     of intimation or declaration; and to order thus by intimating or declaring is an act of the reason. Now the reason can intimate
                     or declare something in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as
                     when one person says to another: "This is what you should do." Sometimes, however, the reason intimates
                     something to a man by moving him thereto; and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as when it is
                     said to someone: "Do this." Now the first mover, among the powers of the soul, to the doing of an act is the will, as stated
                     above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q17_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Since therefore the second mover does not move, save in virtue of the first mover, it follows that the very fact that the
                     reason moves by commanding, is due to the power of the will. Consequently it follows
                     that command is an act of the reason, presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which the reason, by its command, moves
                     (the power) to the execution of the act.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 co."><a name="34187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34187] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod imperare est actus rationis, praesupposito tamen actu
voluntatis. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, quia actus
voluntatis et rationis supra se invicem possunt ferri, prout
scilicet ratio ratiocinatur de volendo, et voluntas vult
ratiocinari; contingit actum voluntatis praeveniri ab actu
rationis, et e converso. Et quia virtus prioris actus remanet in
actu sequenti, contingit quandoque quod est aliquis actus
voluntatis, secundum quod manet virtute in ipso aliquid de actu
rationis, ut dictum est de usu et de electione; et e converso
aliquis est actus rationis, secundum quod virtute manet in ipso
aliquid de actu voluntatis. Imperare autem est quidem essentialiter
actus rationis, imperans enim ordinat eum cui imperat, ad aliquid
agendum, intimando vel denuntiando; sic autem ordinare per modum
cuiusdam intimationis, est rationis. Sed ratio potest aliquid
intimare vel denuntiare dupliciter. Uno modo, absolute, quae quidem
intimatio exprimitur per verbum indicativi modi; sicut si aliquis
alicui dicat, hoc est tibi faciendum. Aliquando autem ratio intimat
aliquid alicui, movendo ipsum ad hoc, et talis intimatio exprimitur
per verbum imperativi modi; puta cum alicui dicitur, fac hoc.
Primum autem movens in viribus animae ad exercitium actus, est
voluntas, ut supra dictum est. Cum ergo secundum movens non moveat
nisi in virtute primi moventis, sequitur quod hoc ipsum quod ratio
movet imperando, sit ei ex virtute voluntatis. Unde relinquitur
quod imperare sit actus rationis, praesupposito actu voluntatis, in
cuius virtute ratio movet per imperium ad exercitium actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To command is to move, not anyhow, but by intimating and declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34188] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod imperare non est movere quocumque modo, sed cum
quadam intimatione denuntiativa ad alterum. Quod est rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The root of liberty is the will as the subject thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend freely towards
                     various objects, precisely because the reason can have various perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define the free-will
                     as being "a free judgment arising from reason," implying that reason is the root of liberty.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34189] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subiectum, sed
sicut causa, est ratio. Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad
diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones boni.
Et ideo philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium quod est liberum de
ratione iudicium, quasi ratio sit causa libertatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that command is an act of reason not absolutely, but with a kind of motion as stated above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34190] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod imperium non sit actus
rationis absolute, sed cum quadam motione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A2-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 2. Whether command belongs to irrational animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that command belongs to irrational animals. Because, according to Avicenna, "the power that commands movement
                     is the appetite; and the power that executes movement is in the muscles and nerves." But both powers are in irrational animals.
                     Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34191] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod imperare conveniat brutis animalibus.
Quia secundum Avicennam, <i>virtus imperans motum est appetitiva,
et virtus exequens motum est in musculis et in nervis</i>. Sed
utraque virtus est in brutis animalibus. Ergo imperium invenitur in
brutis animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the condition of a slave is that of one who receives commands. But the body is compared to the soul as a slave to
                     his master, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Therefore the body is commanded by the soul, even in irrational animals,
                     since they are composed of soul and body.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34192] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
de ratione servi est quod ei imperetur. Sed corpus comparatur ad
animam sicut servus ad dominum, sicut dicit philosophus in I Polit.
Ergo corpori imperatur ab anima, etiam in brutis, quae sunt
composita ex anima et corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by commanding, man has an impulse towards an action. But impulse to action is to be found in irrational animals,
                     as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22). Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34193] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
per imperium homo facit impetum ad opus. Sed impetus in opus
invenitur in brutis animalibus, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo in brutis
animalibus invenitur imperium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Command is an act of reason, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q17_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But in irrational animals there is no reason. Neither, therefore, is there command.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34194] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
imperium est actus rationis, ut dictum est. Sed in brutis non est
ratio. Ergo neque imperium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> To command is nothing else than to direct someone to do something, by a certain motion of intimation. Now to direct is the
                     proper act of reason. Wherefore it is impossible that irrational animals should command in any way, since they are devoid
                     of reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 co."><a name="34195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34195] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod imperare nihil aliud est quam ordinare aliquem ad
aliquid agendum, cum quadam intimativa motione. Ordinare autem est
proprius actus rationis. Unde impossibile est quod in brutis
animalibus, in quibus non est ratio, sit aliquo modo imperium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The appetitive power is said to command movement, in so far as it moves the commanding reason. But this is only in man. In
                     irrational animals the appetitive power is not, properly speaking, a commanding faculty, unless command be taken loosely for
                     motion.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34196] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod vis appetitiva dicitur imperare motum, inquantum
movet rationem imperantem. Sed hoc est solum in hominibus. In
brutis autem animalibus virtus appetitiva non est proprie
imperativa, nisi imperativum sumatur large pro motivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The body of the irrational animal is competent to obey; but its soul is not competent to command, because it is not competent
                     to direct. Consequently there is no ratio there of commander and commanded; but only of mover and moved.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34197] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod in brutis animalibus corpus quidem habet unde
obediat, sed anima non habet unde imperet, quia non habet unde
ordinet. Et ideo non est ibi ratio imperantis et imperati; sed
solum moventis et moti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Impulse to action is in irrational animals otherwise than in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the directing
                     reason; wherefore his impulse is one of command. On the other hand, the impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural
                     instinct; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the unfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue or to
                     avoid. Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and they themselves do not
                     direct themselves to act. Consequently in them is impulse but not command.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34198] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod aliter invenitur impetus ad opus in brutis
animalibus, et aliter in hominibus. Homines enim faciunt impetum ad
opus per ordinationem rationis, unde habet in eis impetus rationem
imperii. In brutis autem fit impetus ad opus per instinctum
naturae, quia scilicet appetitus eorum statim apprehenso
convenienti vel inconvenienti, naturaliter movetur ad prosecutionem
vel fugam. Unde ordinantur ab alio ad agendum, non autem ipsa
seipsa ordinant ad actionem. Et ideo in eis est impetus, sed non
imperium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A3-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 3. Whether use precedes command?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that use precedes command. For command is an act of the reason presupposing an act of the will, as stated above

                     <a href="#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q17_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But, as we have already shown (Q[16], A[1]), use is an act of the will. Therefore use precedes command.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34199] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod usus praecedat imperium. Imperium enim
est actus rationis praesupponens actum voluntatis, ut supra dictum
est. Sed usus est actus voluntatis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo usus
praecedit imperium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, command is one of those things that are ordained to the end. But use is of those things that are ordained to the
                     end. Therefore it seems that use precedes command.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34200] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
imperium est aliquid eorum quae ad finem ordinantur. Eorum autem
quae sunt ad finem, est usus. Ergo videtur quod usus sit prius quam
imperium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every act of a power moved by the will is called use; because the will uses the other powers, as stated above (Q[16],
                     A[1]). But command is an act of the reason as moved by the will, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q17_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore command is a kind of use. Now the common precedes the proper. Therefore use precedes command.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34201] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
omnis actus potentiae motae a voluntate, usus dicitur, quia
voluntas utitur aliis potentiis, ut supra dictum est. Sed imperium
est actus rationis prout mota est a voluntate, sicut dictum est.
Ergo imperium est quidam usus. Commune autem est prius proprio.
Ergo usus est prius quam imperium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that impulse to action precedes use. But impulse to operation is given by command.
                     Therefore command precedes use.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34202] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Damascenus dicit, quod impetus ad operationem praecedit
usum. Sed impetus ad operationem fit per imperium. Ergo imperium
praecedit usum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is in the reason referring this to the end, precedes choice, as
                     stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q16_A4" id="FS_Q17_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[16], A[4]</a>). Wherefore still more does it precede command. On the other hand, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as
                     it is subject to the executive power, follows command; because use in the user is united to the act of the thing used; for
                     one does not use a stick before doing
                     something with the stick. But command is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the command is given: for it
                     naturally precedes its fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by priority of time. Consequently it is evident that command precedes
                     use.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 co."><a name="34203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34203] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod est in
ratione referente ipsum in finem, praecedit electionem, ut supra
dictum est. Unde multo magis praecedit imperium. Sed usus eius quod
est ad finem, secundum quod subditur potentiae executivae, sequitur
imperium, eo quod usus utentis coniunctus est cum actu eius quo
quis utitur; non enim utitur aliquis baculo, antequam aliquo modo
per baculum operetur. Imperium autem non est simul cum actu eius
cui imperatur, sed naturaliter prius est imperium quam imperio
obediatur, et aliquando etiam est prius tempore. Unde manifestum
est quod imperium est prius quam usus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every act of the will precedes this act of the reason which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz. choice;
                     and an act of the will follows, viz. use. Because after counsel's decision, which is reason's judgment, the will chooses;
                     and after choice, the reason commands that power which has to do what was chosen; and then, last of all, someone's will begins
                     to use, by executing the command of reason; sometimes it is another's will, when one
                     commands another; sometimes the will of the one that commands, when he commands himself to do something.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34204] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod non omnis actus voluntatis praecedit hunc actum
rationis qui est imperium, sed aliquis praecedit, scilicet electio;
et aliquis sequitur, scilicet usus. Quia post determinationem
consilii, quae est iudicium rationis, voluntas eligit; et post
electionem, ratio imperat ei per quod agendum est quod eligitur; et
tunc demum voluntas alicuius incipit uti, exequendo imperium
rationis; quandoque quidem voluntas alterius, cum aliquis imperat
alteri; quandoque autem voluntas ipsius imperantis, cum aliquis
imperat sibi ipsi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as act ranks before power, so does the object rank before the act. Now the object of use is that which is directed to
                     the end. Consequently, from the fact that command precedes, rather than that it follows use.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34205] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut actus sunt praevii potentiis, ita obiecta
actibus. Obiectum autem usus est id quod est ad finem. Ex hoc ergo
quod ipsum imperium est ad finem, magis potest concludi quod
imperium sit prius usu, quam quod sit posterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the act of the will in using the reason for the purpose of command, precedes the command; so also we may say that
                     this act whereby the will uses the reason, is preceded by a command of reason; since the acts of these powers react on one
                     another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34206] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut actus voluntatis utentis ratione ad
imperandum, praecedit ipsum imperium; ita etiam potest dici quod et
istum usum voluntatis praecedit aliquod imperium rationis, eo quod
actus harum potentiarum supra seipsos invicem reflectuntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A4-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 4. Whether command and the commanded act are one act, or distinct?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the commanded act is not one with the command itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves
                     distinct. But the commanded act belongs to one power, and the command to another; since one is the power that commands, and
                     the other is the power that receives the command. Therefore the commanded act is not one with the command.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34207] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus imperatus non sit unus actus cum
ipso imperio. Diversarum enim potentiarum diversi sunt actus. Sed
alterius potentiae est actus imperatus, et alterius ipsum imperium,
quia alia est potentia quae imperat, et alia cui imperatur. Ergo
non est idem actus imperatus cum imperio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever things can be separate from one another, are distinct: for nothing is severed from itself. But sometimes
                     the commanded act is separate from the command: for sometimes the command is given, and the commanded act follows not. Therefore
                     command is a distinct act from the act commanded.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34208] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
quaecumque possunt ab invicem separari, sunt diversa, nihil enim
separatur a seipso. Sed aliquando actus imperatus separatur ab
imperio, praecedit enim quandoque imperium, et non sequitur actus
imperatus. Ergo alius actus est imperium ab actu imperato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things are related to one another as precedent and consequent, are distinct. But command naturally precedes
                     the commanded act. Therefore they are distinct.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34209] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quaecumque se habent secundum prius et posterius, sunt diversa. Sed
imperium naturaliter praecedit actum imperatum. Ergo sunt
diversa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "where one thing is by reason of another, there is but one." But there is no commanded
                     act unless by reason of the command. Therefore they are one.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34210] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod philosophus dicit, quod <i>ubi est unum propter alterum,
ibi est unum tantum</i>. Sed actus imperatus non est nisi propter
imperium. Ergo sunt unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q17_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing prevents certain things being distinct in one respect, and one in another respect. Indeed, every multitude is one
                     in some respect, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xiii). But a difference is to be observed in this, that some are simply many,
                     and one in a particular aspect: while with others it is the reverse. Now "one" is predicated in the same way as "being." And
                     substance is being simply, whereas accident or being "of reason" is a being only in a
                     certain respect. Wherefore those things that are one in substance are one simply, though many in a certain respect. Thus,
                     in the genus substance, the whole composed of its integral or essential parts, is one simply: because the whole is being and
                     substance simply, and the parts are being and substances in the whole. But those things which are distinct in substance, and
                     one according to an accident, are distinct simply, and one in a certain respect: thus many men are one people, and many stones
                     are one heap; which is unity of composition or order. In like manner also many individuals that are one in genus or species
                     are many simply, and one in a certain respect: since to be one in genus or species is to be one according to the consideration
                     of the reason.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q17_A4-p7"> Now just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is composed of matter and form (e.g. man, who is one natural being, though
                     he has many parts, is composed of soul and body); so, in human acts, the act of a lower power is in the position of matter
                     in regard to the act of a higher power, in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power moving it: for thus
                     also the act of the first mover is as the form in regard to the act of its instrument. Hence it is evident
                     that command and the commanded act are one human act, just as a whole is one, yet in its parts, many.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 co."><a name="34211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34211] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliqua esse secundum quid multa, et
secundum quid unum. Quinimmo omnia multa sunt secundum aliquid
unum, ut Dionysius dicit, ult. cap. de Div. Nom. Est tamen
differentia attendenda in hoc, quod quaedam sunt simpliciter multa,
et secundum quid unum, quaedam vero e converso. Unum autem hoc modo
dicitur sicut et ens. Ens autem simpliciter est substantia, sed ens
secundum quid est accidens, vel etiam ens rationis. Et ideo
quaecumque sunt unum secundum substantiam, sunt unum simpliciter,
et multa secundum quid. Sicut totum in genere substantiae,
compositum ex suis partibus vel integralibus vel essentialibus, est
unum simpliciter, nam totum est ens et substantia simpliciter,
partes vero sunt entia et substantiae in toto. Quae vero sunt
diversa secundum substantiam, et unum secundum accidens, sunt
diversa simpliciter, et unum secundum quid, sicut multi homines
sunt unus populus, et multi lapides sunt unus acervus; quae est
unitas compositionis, aut ordinis. Similiter etiam multa individua,
quae sunt unum genere vel specie, sunt simpliciter multa, et
secundum quid unum, nam esse unum genere vel specie, est esse unum
secundum rationem. Sicut autem in genere rerum naturalium, aliquod
totum componitur ex materia et forma, ut homo ex anima et corpore,
qui est unum ens naturale, licet habeat multitudinem partium; ita
etiam in actibus humanis, actus inferioris potentiae materialiter
se habet ad actum superioris, inquantum inferior potentia agit in
virtute superioris moventis ipsam, sic enim et actus moventis primi
formaliter se habet ad actum instrumenti. Unde patet quod imperium
et actus imperatus sunt unus actus humanus, sicut quoddam totum est
unum, sed est secundum partes multa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the distinct powers are not ordained to one another, their acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the mover of
                     the other, then their acts are, in a way, one: since "the act of the mover and the act of the thing moved are one act" (Phys.
                     iii, 3).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34212] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod, si essent potentiae diversae ad invicem non
ordinatae, actus earum essent simpliciter diversi. Sed quando una
potentia est movens alteram, tunc actus earum sunt quodammodo unus,
nam idem est actus moventis et moti, ut dicitur in III Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that command and the commanded act can be separated from one another shows that they are different parts. Because
                     the parts of a man can be separated from one another, and yet they form one whole.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34213] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ex hoc quod imperium et actus imperatus possunt ab
invicem separari, habetur quod sunt multa partibus. Nam partes
hominis possunt ab invicem separari, quae tamen sunt unum toto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In those things that are many in parts, but one as a whole, nothing hinders one part from preceding another. Thus the soul,
                     in a way, precedes the body; and the heart, the other members.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34214] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod nihil prohibet in his quae sunt multa partibus et
unum toto, unum esse prius alio. Sicut anima quodammodo est prius
corpore, et cor est prius aliis membris.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A5-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 5. Whether the act of the will is commanded?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of the will is not commanded. For Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands the mind
                     to will, and yet it does not." But to will is the act of the will. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34215] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus voluntatis non sit imperatus.
Dicit enim Augustinus, in VIII Confess., <i>imperat animus ut velit
animus, nec tamen facit</i>. Velle autem est actus voluntatis. Ergo
actus voluntatis non imperatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to receive a command belongs to one who can understand the command. But the will cannot understand the command;
                     for the will differs from the intellect, to which it belongs to understand. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34216] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
ei convenit imperari, cui convenit imperium intelligere. Sed
voluntatis non est intelligere imperium, differt enim voluntas ab
intellectu, cuius est intelligere. Ergo actus voluntatis non
imperatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for the same reason all are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are
                     commanded, we must needs proceed to infinity; because the act of the will precedes the act of reason commanding, as stated
                     above
                     <a href="#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q17_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; for if that act of the will be also commanded, this command will be precedes by another act of the reason, and so on to
                     infinity. But to proceed to infinity is not possible.
                     Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34217] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
si aliquis actus voluntatis imperatur, pari ratione omnes
imperantur. Sed si omnes actus voluntatis imperantur, necesse est
in infinitum procedere, quia actus voluntatis praecedit actum
imperantis rationis, ut dictum est; qui voluntatis actus si iterum
imperatur, illud iterum imperium praecedet alius rationis actus, et
sic in infinitum. Hoc autem est inconveniens, quod procedatur in
infinitum. Non ergo actus voluntatis imperatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is in our power, is subject to our command. But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our power; since all our
                     acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are voluntary. Therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34218] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
omne quod est in potestate nostra, subiacet imperio nostro. Sed
actus voluntatis sunt maxime in potestate nostra, nam omnes actus
nostri intantum dicuntur in potestate nostra esse, inquantum
voluntarii sunt. Ergo actus voluntatis imperantur a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q17_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, command is nothing else than the act of the reason directing, with a certain motion, something to act. Now it is evident
                     that the reason can direct the act of the will: for just as it can judge it to be good to will something, so it can direct
                     by commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an act of the will can be commanded.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 co."><a name="34219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34219] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, imperium nihil aliud est quam
actus rationis ordinantis, cum quadam motione, aliquid ad agendum.
Manifestum est autem quod ratio potest ordinare de actu voluntatis,
sicut enim potest iudicare quod bonum sit aliquid velle, ita potest
ordinare imperando quod homo velit. Ex quo patet quod actus
voluntatis potest esse imperatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the mind commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills: but that sometimes
                     it commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it commands imperfectly. Now imperfect command arises from the fact that
                     the reason is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command: wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to
                     command perfectly.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34220] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, animus, quando
perfecte imperat sibi ut velit, tunc iam vult, sed quod aliquando
imperet et non velit, hoc contingit ex hoc quod non perfecte
imperat. Imperfectum autem imperium contingit ex hoc, quod ratio ex
diversis partibus movetur ad imperandum vel non imperandum, unde
fluctuat inter duo, et non perfecte imperat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as each of the members of the body works not for itself alone but for the whole body; thus it is for the whole body
                     that the eye sees; so is it with the powers of the soul. For the intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all
                     the powers; and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too. Wherefore man, in so far as he is endowed
                     with intellect and will, commands the act of the will for himself.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34221] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut in membris corporalibus quodlibet membrum
operatur non sibi soli, sed toti corpori, ut oculus videt toti
corpori; ita etiam est in potentiis animae. Nam intellectus
intelligit non solum sibi, sed omnibus potentiis; et voluntas vult
non solum sibi, sed omnibus potentiis. Et ideo homo imperat sibi
ipsi actum voluntatis, inquantum est intelligens et volens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since command is an act of reason, that act is commanded which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will is not
                     due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of nature, or of a higher cause, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A4" id="FS_Q17_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[4]</a>). Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34222] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, cum imperium sit actus rationis, ille actus
imperatur, qui rationi subditur. Primus autem voluntatis actus non
est ex rationis ordinatione, sed ex instinctu naturae, aut
superioris causae, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non oportet quod in
infinitum procedatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A6-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 6. Whether the act of the reason is commanded?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be commanded. For it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But
                     it is the reason that commands, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q17_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the act of the reason is not commanded.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34223] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus rationis non possit esse
imperatus. Inconveniens enim videtur quod aliquid imperet sibi
ipsi. Sed ratio est quae imperat, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
rationis actus non imperatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is essential is different from that which is by participation. But the power whose act is commanded by
                     reason, is rational by participation, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the act of that power, which is essentially rational,
                     is not commanded.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34224] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
id quod est per essentiam, diversum est ab eo quod est per
participationem. Sed potentia cuius actus imperatur a ratione, est
ratio per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo illius
potentiae actus non imperatur, quae est ratio per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But to know and judge the truth, which is the act of reason, is not
                     always in our power. Therefore the act of the reason cannot be commanded.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34225] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
ille actus imperatur, qui est in potestate nostra. Sed cognoscere
et iudicare verum, quod est actus rationis, non est semper in
potestate nostra. Non ergo actus rationis potest esse
imperatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> That which we do of our free-will, can be done by our command. But the acts of the reason are accomplished through the free-will:
                     for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "by his free-will man inquires, considers, judges, approves." Therefore the
                     acts of the reason can be commanded.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34226] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
id quod libero arbitrio agimus, nostro imperio agi potest. Sed
actus rationis exercentur per liberum arbitrium, dicit enim
Damascenus quod <i>libero arbitrio homo exquirit, et scrutatur, et
iudicat, et disponit</i>. Ergo actus rationis possunt esse
imperati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since the reason reacts on itself, just as it directs the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act. Consequently
                     its act can be commanded.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 co."><a name="34227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34227] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, quia ratio supra seipsam reflectitur, sicut ordinat
de actibus aliarum potentiarum, ita etiam potest ordinare de actu
suo. Unde etiam actus suus potest esse imperatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p7"> But we must take note that the act of the reason may be considered in two ways. First, as to the exercise of the act. And
                     considered thus, the act of the reason can always be commanded: as when one is told to be attentive, and to use one's reason.
                     Secondly, as to the object; in respect of which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is the act whereby it apprehends
                     the truth about something. This act is not in our power: because it happens in virtue of a natural or
                     supernatural light. Consequently in this respect, the act of the reason is not in our power, and cannot be commanded. The
                     other act of the reason is that whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, that which the reason apprehends
                     is such that it naturally assents thereto, e.g. the first principles, it is not in our power to assent or dissent to the like:
                     assent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking, is not subject to our command. But some things which are
                     apprehended do not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to assent or dissent, or at least suspend
                     its assent or dissent, on account of some cause or other; and in such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is subject
                     to our command.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Sed attendendum
est quod actus rationis potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo,
quantum ad exercitium actus. Et sic actus rationis semper imperari
potest, sicut cum indicitur alicui quod attendat, et ratione
utatur. Alio modo, quantum ad obiectum, respectu cuius, duo actus
rationis attenduntur. Primo quidem, ut veritatem circa aliquid
apprehendat. Et hoc non est in potestate nostra, hoc enim contingit
per virtutem alicuius luminis, vel naturalis vel supernaturalis. Et
ideo quantum ad hoc, actus rationis non est in potestate nostra,
nec imperari potest. Alius autem actus rationis est, dum his quae
apprehendit assentit. Si igitur fuerint talia apprehensa, quibus
naturaliter intellectus assentiat, sicut prima principia, assensus
talium vel dissensus non est in potestate nostra, sed in ordine
naturae, et ideo, proprie loquendo, nec imperio subiacet. Sunt
autem quaedam apprehensa, quae non adeo convincunt intellectum,
quin possit assentire vel dissentire, vel saltem assensum vel
dissensum suspendere, propter aliquam causam, et in talibus
assensus ipse vel dissensus in potestate nostra est, et sub imperio
cadit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason commands itself, just as the will moves itself, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A3" id="FS_Q17_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[3]</a>), that is to say, in so far as each power reacts on its own acts, and from one thing tends to another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34228] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod ratio hoc modo imperat sibi ipsi, sicut et
voluntas movet seipsam, ut supra dictum est, inquantum scilicet
utraque potentia reflectitur supra suum actum, et ex uno in aliud
tendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> On account of the diversity of objects subject to the act of the reason, nothing prevents the reason from participating in
                     itself: thus the knowledge of principles is participated in the knowledge of the conclusions.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34229] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, propter diversitatem obiectorum quae actui rationis
subduntur, nihil prohibet rationem seipsam participare, sicut in
cognitione conclusionum participatur cognitio principiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p10"> The reply to the third object is evident from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34230] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
patet responsio ex dictis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A7-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 7. Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is not commanded. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q17_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.15" target="asv">Rom. 7:15</a>): "For I do not that good which I will": and a gloss explains this by saying that man lusts, although he wills not to lust.
                     But to lust is an act of the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="34231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34231] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus sensitivi appetitus non sit
imperatus. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VII, <i>non enim quod volo
bonum, hoc ago</i>, et Glossa exponit quod homo vult non
concupiscere, et tamen concupiscit. Sed concupiscere est actus
appetitus sensitivi. Ergo actus appetitus sensitivi non subditur
imperio nostro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, corporeal matter obeys God alone, to the effect of formal transmutation, as was shown in the
                     <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q65_A4" id="FS_Q17_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[65], A[4]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q91_A2" id="FS_Q17_A7-p3.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[91], A[2]</a>;
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FS_Q17_A7-p3.3" shape="rect">FP, Q[110], A[2]</a>. But the act of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a formal transmutation of the body, consisting in heat or cold.
                     Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to man's command.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="34232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34232] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
materia corporalis soli Deo obedit, quantum ad transmutationem
formalem, ut in primo habitum est. Sed actus appetitus sensitivi
habet quandam formalem transmutationem corporis, scilicet calorem
vel frigus. Ergo actus appetitus sensitivi non subditur imperio
humano.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the proper motive principle of the sensitive appetite is something apprehended by sense or imagination. But it is
                     not always in our power to apprehend something by sense or imagination. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not
                     subject to our command.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="34233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34233] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
proprium motivum appetitus sensitivi est apprehensum secundum
sensum vel imaginationem. Sed non est in potestate nostra semper
quod aliquid apprehendamus sensu vel imaginatione. Ergo actus
appetitus sensitivi non subiacet imperio nostro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] says: "That which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the irascible,"
                     which belong to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 s. c."><a name="34234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34234] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod <i>obediens rationi
dividitur in duo, in desiderativum et irascitivum</i>, quae
pertinent ad appetitum sensitivum. Ergo actus appetitus sensitivi
subiacet imperio rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q17_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> An act is subject to our command, in so far as it is in our power, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q17_A5" id="FS_Q17_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Consequently in order to understand in what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason,
                     we must consider in what manner it is in our power. Now it must be observed that the sensitive appetite differs from the intellective
                     appetite, which is called the will, in the fact that the sensitive appetite is a power of
                     a corporeal organ, whereas the will is not. Again, every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ, depends not only on a
                     power of the soul, but also on the disposition of that corporeal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the power of sight,
                     and on the condition of the eye, which condition is a help or a hindrance to that act. Consequently the act of the sensitive
                     appetite depends not only on the appetitive power, but also on the disposition of the body.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q17_A7-p7"> Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act, follows apprehension. And the apprehension of the imagination,
                     being a particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason, which is universal; just as a particular active
                     power is regulated by a universal active power. Consequently in this respect the act of the sensitive appetite is subject
                     to the command of reason. On the other hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of
                     reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to
                     the command of reason.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q17_A7-p8"> Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension
                     of the imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command of reason: although reason could have prevented
                     it, had it foreseen. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason governs the irascible and concupiscible not
                     by a "despotic supremacy," which is that of a master over his slave; but by a "politic and royal
                     supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject to command.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 co."><a name="34235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34235] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod secundum hoc aliquis actus imperio nostro subiacet,
prout est in potestate nostra, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo ad
intelligendum qualiter actus appetitus sensitivi subdatur imperio
rationis, oportet considerare qualiter sit in potestate nostra. Est
autem sciendum quod appetitus sensitivus in hoc differt ab appetitu
intellectivo, qui dicitur voluntas, quod appetitus sensitivus est
virtus organi corporalis, non autem voluntas. Omnis autem actus
virtutis utentis organo corporali, dependet non solum ex potentia
animae, sed etiam ex corporalis organi dispositione, sicut visio ex
potentia visiva, et qualitate oculi, per quam iuvatur vel
impeditur. Unde et actus appetitus sensitivi non solum dependet ex
vi appetitiva, sed etiam ex dispositione corporis. Illud autem quod
est ex parte potentiae animae, sequitur apprehensionem. Apprehensio
autem imaginationis, cum sit particularis, regulatur ab
apprehensione rationis, quae est universalis, sicut virtus activa
particularis a virtute activa universali. Et ideo ex ista parte,
actus appetitus sensitivi subiacet imperio rationis. Qualitas autem
et dispositio corporis non subiacet imperio rationis. Et ideo ex
hac parte, impeditur quin motus sensitivi appetitus totaliter
subdatur imperio rationis. Contingit etiam quandoque quod motus
appetitus sensitivi subito concitatur ad apprehensionem
imaginationis vel sensus. Et tunc ille motus est praeter imperium
rationis, quamvis potuisset impediri a ratione, si praevidisset.
Unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod ratio praeest irascibili
et concupiscibili non principatu despotico, qui est domini ad
servum; sed principatu politico aut regali, qui est ad liberos, qui
non totaliter subduntur imperio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That man lusts, although he wills not to lust, is due to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is hindered
                     from perfect compliance with the command of reason. Hence the Apostle adds (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q17_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.15" target="asv">Rom. 7:15</a>): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind." This may also happen through a sudden movement
                     of concupiscence, as stated above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="34236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34236] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod hoc quod homo vult non concupiscere, et tamen
concupiscit, contingit ex dispositione corporis, per quam impeditur
appetitus sensitivus ne totaliter sequatur imperium rationis. Unde
et apostolus ibidem subdit, <i>video aliam legem in membris meis,
repugnantem legi mentis meae</i>. Hoc etiam contingit propter
subitum motum concupiscentiae, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The condition of the body stands in a twofold relation to the act of the sensitive appetite. First, as preceding it: thus
                     a man may be disposed in one way or another, in respect of his body, to this or that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it:
                     thus a man becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is not subject to the command of reason: since it
                     is due either to nature, or to some previous movement, which cannot cease at once.
                     But the condition that is consequent, follows the command of reason: since it results from the local movement of the heart,
                     which has various movements according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="34237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34237] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod qualitas corporalis dupliciter se habet ad actum
appetitus sensitivi. Uno modo, ut praecedens, prout aliquis est
aliqualiter dispositus secundum corpus, ad hanc vel illam
passionem. Alio modo, ut consequens, sicut cum ex ira aliquis
incalescit. Qualitas igitur praecedens non subiacet imperio
rationis, quia vel est ex natura, vel ex aliqua praecedenti
motione, quae non statim quiescere potest. Sed qualitas consequens
sequitur imperium rationis, quia sequitur motum localem cordis,
quod diversimode movetur secundum diversos actus sensitivi
appetitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the external sensible is necessary for the apprehension of the senses, it is not in our power to apprehend anything
                     by the senses, unless the sensible be present; which presence of the sensible is not always in our power. For it is then that
                     man can use his senses if he will so to do; unless there be some obstacle on the part of the organ. On the other hand, the
                     apprehension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of reason, in proportion
                     to the strength or weakness of the imaginative power. For that man is unable to imagine the things that reason considers,
                     is either because they cannot be imagined, such as incorporeal things; or because of the weakness of the imaginative power,
                     due to some organic indisposition.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="34238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34238] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, quia ad apprehensionem sensus requiritur sensibile
exterius, non est in potestate nostra apprehendere aliquid sensu,
nisi sensibili praesente; cuius praesentia non semper est in
potestate nostra. Tunc enim homo potest uti sensu cum voluerit,
nisi sit impedimentum ex parte organi. Apprehensio autem
imaginationis subiacet ordinationi rationis, secundum modum
virtutis vel debilitatis imaginativae potentiae. Quod enim homo non
possit imaginari quae ratio considerat, contingit vel ex hoc quod
non sunt imaginabilia, sicut incorporalia; vel propter debilitatem
virtutis imaginativae, quae est ex aliqua indispositione
organi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A8-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 8. Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the acts of the vegetal soul are subject to the command of reason. For the sensitive powers are of higher
                     rank than the vegetal powers. But the powers of the sensitive soul are subject to the command of reason. Much more, therefore,
                     are the powers of the vegetal soul.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="34239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34239] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus vegetabilis animae imperio
rationis subdantur. Vires enim sensitivae nobiliores sunt viribus
animae vegetabilis. Sed vires animae sensitivae subduntur imperio
rationis. Ergo multo magis vires animae vegetabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man is called a "little world" [*Aristotle, Phys. viii. 2], because the soul is in the body, as God is in the world.
                     But God is in the world in such a way, that everything in the world obeys His command. Therefore all that is in man, even
                     the powers of the vegetal soul, obey the command of reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="34240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34240] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
homo dicitur minor mundus, quia sic est anima in corpore, sicut
Deus in mundo. Sed Deus sic est in mundo, quod omnia quae sunt in
mundo, obediunt eius imperio. Ergo et omnia quae sunt in homine,
obediunt imperio rationis, etiam vires vegetabilis animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, praise and blame are awarded only to such acts as are subject to the command of reason. But in the acts of the nutritive
                     and generative power, there is room for praise and blame, virtue and vice: as in the case of gluttony and lust, and their
                     contrary virtues. Therefore the acts of these powers are subject to the command of reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="34241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34241] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
laus et vituperium non contingit nisi in actibus qui subduntur
imperio rationis. Sed in actibus nutritivae et generativae
potentiae, contingit esse laudem et vituperium, et virtutem et
vitium, sicut patet in gula et luxuria, et virtutibus oppositis.
Ergo actus harum potentiarum subduntur imperio rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] sats that "the nutritive and generative power is one over which the reason
                     has no control."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 s. c."><a name="34242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34242] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod <i>id quod non persuadetur
a ratione, est nutritivum et generativum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some acts proceed from the natural appetite, others from the animal, or from the intellectual appetite: for every agent desires
                     an end in some way. Now the natural appetite does not follow from some apprehension, as to the animal and the intellectual
                     appetite. But the reason commands by way of apprehensive power. Wherefore those acts that proceed from the intellective or
                     the animal appetite, can be commanded by reason: but not those acts that proceed from
                     the natural appetite. And such are the acts of the vegetal soul; wherefore Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii)
                     says "that generation and nutrition belong to what are called natural powers." Consequently the acts of the vegetal soul are
                     not subject to the command of reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 co."><a name="34243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34243] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod actuum quidam procedunt ex appetitu naturali, quidam
autem ex appetitu animali vel intellectuali, omne enim agens aliquo
modo appetit finem. Appetitus autem naturalis non consequitur
aliquam apprehensionem, sicut sequitur appetitus animalis et
intellectualis. Ratio autem imperat per modum apprehensivae
virtutis. Et ideo actus illi qui procedunt ab appetitu intellectivo
vel animali, possunt a ratione imperari, non autem actus illi qui
procedunt ex appetitu naturali. Huiusmodi autem sunt actus
vegetabilis animae, unde Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod vocatur
naturale quod generativum et nutritivum. Et propter hoc, actus
vegetabilis animae non subduntur imperio rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it is, and the more is it subject to the command of reason. Hence the very
                     fact that the acts of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, shows that they rank lowest.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="34244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34244] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod, quanto aliquis actus est immaterialior, tanto
est nobilior, et magis subditus imperio rationis. Unde ex hoc ipso
quod vires animae vegetabilis non obediunt rationi, apparet has
vires infimas esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The comparison holds in a certain respect: because, to wit, as God moves the world, so the soul moves the body. But it does
                     not hold in every respect: for the soul did not create the body out of nothing, as God created the world; for which reason
                     the world is wholly subject to His command.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="34245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34245] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod similitudo attenditur quantum ad aliquid, quia
scilicet, sicut Deus movet mundum, ita anima movet corpus. Non
autem quantum ad omnia, non enim anima creavit corpus ex nihilo,
sicut Deus mundum; propter quod totaliter subditur eius
imperio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtue and vice, praise and blame do not affect the acts themselves of the nutritive and generative power, i.e. digestion,
                     and formation of the human body; but they affect the acts of the sensitive part, that are ordained to the acts of generation
                     and nutrition; for example the desire for pleasure in the act of taking food or in the act of generation, and the right or
                     wrong use thereof.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="34246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34246] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod virtus et vitium, laus et vituperium, non debentur
ipsis actibus nutritivae vel generativae potentiae, qui sunt
digestio et formatio corporis humani; sed actibus sensitivae partis
ordinatis ad actus generativae vel nutritivae; puta in
concupiscendo delectationem cibi et venereorum, et utendo, secundum
quod oportet, vel non secundum quod oportet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A9-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 9. Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the members of the body do not obey reason as to their acts. For it is evident that the members of the
                     body are more distant from the reason, than the powers of the vegetal soul. But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey
                     reason, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q17_A8" id="FS_Q17_A9-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>. Therefore much less do the members of the body obey.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="34247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34247] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod membra corporis non obediant rationi
quantum ad actus suos. Constat enim quod membra corporis magis
distant a ratione quam vires animae vegetabilis. Sed vires animae
vegetabilis non obediunt rationi, ut dictum est. Ergo multo minus
membra corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the heart is the principle of animal movement. But the movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason:
                     for Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] says that "the pulse is not controlled by reason." Therefore the movement
                     of the bodily members is not subject to the command of reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="34248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34248] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
cor est principium motus animalis. Sed motus cordis non subditur
imperio rationis, dicit enim Gregorius Nyssenus quod <i>pulsativum
non est persuasibile ratione</i>. Ergo motus membrorum corporalium
non subiacet imperio rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A9-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16) that "the movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not
                     desired; sometimes when sought it fails, and whereas the heart is warm with desire, the body remains cold." Therefore the
                     movements of the members are not obedient to reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="34249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34249] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>motus membrorum
genitalium aliquando importunus est, nullo poscente, aliquando
autem destituit inhiantem, et cum in animo concupiscentia ferveat,
friget in corpore</i>. Ergo motus membrorum non obediunt
rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A9-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely
                     can one discern obedience from command."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 s. c."><a name="34250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34250] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII Confess., <i>imperat animus ut
moveatur manus, et tanta est facilitas, ut vix a servitio
discernatur imperium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A9-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The members of the body are organs of the soul's powers. Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in respect
                     of obedience to reason, so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof. Since then the sensitive powers are subject
                     to the command of reason, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all movements of members, that are moved by the sensitive
                     powers, are subject to the command of reason; whereas those movements of members,
                     that arise from the natural powers, are not subject to the command of reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 co."><a name="34251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34251] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod membra corporis sunt organa quaedam potentiarum
animae. Unde eo modo quo potentiae animae se habent ad hoc quod
obediant rationi, hoc modo se habent etiam corporis membra. Quia
igitur vires sensitivae subduntur imperio rationis, non autem vires
naturales; ideo omnes motus membrorum quae moventur a potentiis
sensitivis, subduntur imperio rationis; motus autem membrorum qui
consequuntur vires naturales, non subduntur imperio rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A9-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The members do not move themselves, but are moved through the powers of the soul; of which powers, some are in closer contact
                     with the reason than are the powers of the vegetal soul.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="34252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34252] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod membra non movent seipsa, sed moventur per
potentias animae; quarum quaedam sunt rationi viciniores quam vires
animae vegetabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A9-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which is according to nature stands first, whence all other things are derived:
                     thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition
                     of the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to
                     nature. Now the principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the
                     heart. Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature, and not according to the will: for like a proper accident,
                     it results from life, which follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the movement of heavy and light things results from
                     their substantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their generator, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii,
                     4). Wherefore this movement is called "vital." For which reason Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says
                     that, just as the movement of generation and nutrition does not obey reason, so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement.
                     By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="34253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34253] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod in his quae ad intellectum et voluntatem pertinent,
primum invenitur id quod est secundum naturam, ex quo alia
derivantur, ut a cognitione principiorum naturaliter notorum,
cognitio conclusionum; et a voluntate finis naturaliter desiderati,
derivatur electio eorum quae sunt ad finem. Ita etiam in
corporalibus motibus principium est secundum naturam. Principium
autem corporalis motus est a motu cordis. Unde motus cordis est
secundum naturam, et non secundum voluntatem, consequitur enim
sicut per se accidens vitam, quae est ex unione animae et corporis.
Sicut motus gravium et levium consequitur formam substantialem
ipsorum, unde et a generante moveri dicuntur, secundum philosophum
in VIII Physic. Et propter hoc motus iste vitalis dicitur. Unde
Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod sicut generativum et nutritivum non
obedit rationi, ita nec pulsativum, quod est vitale. Pulsativum
autem appellat motum cordis, qui manifestatur per venas
pulsatiles.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q17_A9-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 17,20) it is in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey reason:
                     in this sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion against God, by the insubmission of that member whereby original
                     sin is transmitted to posterity.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q17_A9-p10"> But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the sin of our first parent was that his nature was left to itself,
                     through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man, we must consider the natural cause of this
                     particular member's insubmission to reason. This is stated by Aristotle (De Causis Mot. Animal.) who says that "the movements
                     of the heart and of the organs of generation are involuntary," and that the reason of this is as follows. These
                     members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension; in so far as the intellect and imagination represent such things
                     as arouse the passions of the soul, of which passions these movements are a consequence. But they are not moved at the command
                     of the reason or intellect, because these movements are conditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold, which change
                     is not subject to the command of reason. This is the case with these two organs in particular, because each is as it were
                     a separate animal being, in so far as it is a principle of life; and the principle is virtually the whole. For the heart is
                     the principle of the senses; and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue, which is virtually the entire animal.
                     Consequently they have their proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be natural, as stated above (Reply
                     OBJ 2).
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="34254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34254] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in XIV de Civ. Dei, hoc quod
motus genitalium membrorum rationi non obedit, est ex poena
peccati, ut scilicet anima suae inobedientiae ad Deum in illo
praecipue membro poenam inobedientiae patiatur, per quod peccatum
originale ad posteros traducitur. Sed quia per peccatum primi
parentis, ut infra dicetur, natura est sibi relicta, subtracto
supernaturali dono quod homini divinitus erat collatum; ideo
consideranda est ratio naturalis quare motus huiusmodi membrorum
specialiter rationi non obedit. Cuius causam assignat Aristoteles
in libro de causis motus animalium, dicens involuntarios esse motus
cordis et membri pudendi, quia scilicet ex aliqua apprehensione
huiusmodi membra commoventur, inquantum scilicet intellectus et
phantasia repraesentant aliqua ex quibus consequuntur passiones
animae, ad quas consequitur motus horum membrorum. Non tamen
moventur secundum iussum rationis aut intellectus, quia scilicet ad
motum horum membrorum requiritur aliqua alteratio naturalis,
scilicet caliditatis et frigiditatis, quae quidem alteratio non
subiacet imperio rationis. Specialiter autem hoc accidit in his
duobus membris, quia utrumque istorum membrorum est quasi quoddam
animal separatum, inquantum est principium vitae, principium autem
est virtute totum. Cor enim principium est sensuum, et ex membro
genitali virtus exit seminalis, quae est virtute totum animal. Et
ideo habent proprios motus naturaliter, quia principia oportet esse
naturalia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q18" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q18-p0.1">Q. 18. OF THE GOOD AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS, IN GENERAL (ELEVEN ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q18-p2"> We must now consider the good and evil of human acts. First, how a human act is good or evil; secondly, what results from
                  the good or evil of a human act, as merit or demerit, sin and guilt.
               </p><p id="FS_Q18-p3"> Under the first head there will be a threefold consideration: the first will be of the good and evil of human acts, in general;
                  the second, of the good and evil of internal acts; the third, of the good and evil of external acts.
               </p><p id="FS_Q18-p4"> Concerning the first there are eleven points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q18-p5"><a href="#FS_Q18_A1"> (1) Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p6"><a href="#FS_Q18_A2"> (2) Whether the good or evil of a human action is derived from its object?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p7"><a href="#FS_Q18_A3"> (3) Whether it is derived from a circumstance?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p8"><a href="#FS_Q18_A4"> (4) Whether it is derived from the end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p9"><a href="#FS_Q18_A5"> (5) Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p10"><a href="#FS_Q18_A6"> (6) Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p11"><a href="#FS_Q18_A7"> (7) Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus,
                  or conversely?
               </a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p12"><a href="#FS_Q18_A8"> (8) Whether any action is indifferent in its species?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p13"><a href="#FS_Q18_A9"> (9) Whether an individual action can be indifferent?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p14"><a href="#FS_Q18_A10"> (10) Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q18-p15"><a href="#FS_Q18_A11"> (11) Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places the moral action in the species of good or evil?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 pr."><a name="34255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34255]
Iª-IIae q. 18 pr.</span></a> Post hoc considerandum est de
bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum. Et primo, quomodo actio
humana sit bona vel mala; secundo, de his quae consequuntur ad
bonitatem vel malitiam humanorum actuum, puta meritum vel
demeritum, peccatum et culpa. Circa primum occurrit triplex
consideratio, prima est de bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum in
generali; secunda, de bonitate et malitia interiorum actuum;
tertia, de bonitate et malitia exteriorum actuum. Circa primum
quaeruntur undecim. Primo, utrum omnis actio sit bona, vel aliqua
sit mala. Secundo, utrum actio hominis habeat quod sit bona vel
mala, ex obiecto. Tertio, utrum hoc habeat ex circumstantia.
Quarto, utrum hoc habeat ex fine. Quinto, utrum aliqua actio
hominis sit bona vel mala in sua specie. Sexto, utrum actus habeat
speciem boni vel mali ex fine. Septimo, utrum species quae est ex
fine, contineatur sub specie quae est ex obiecto, sicut sub genere,
aut e converso. Octavo, utrum sit aliquis actus indifferens
secundum suam speciem. Nono, utrum aliquis actus sit indifferens
secundum individuum. Decimo, utrum aliqua circumstantia constituat
actum moralem in specie boni vel mali. Undecimo, utrum omnis
circumstantia augens bonitatem vel malitiam, constituat actum
moralem in specie boni vel mali.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q18_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A1-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 1. Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every human action is good, and that none is evil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil acts not,
                     save in virtue of the good. But no evil is done in virtue of the good. Therefore no action is evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34256] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis actio hominis sit bona, et nulla
sit mala. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod malum
non agit nisi virtute boni. Sed virtute boni non fit malum. Ergo
nulla actio est mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Now a thing is evil, not according as it is in act, but according
                     as its potentiality is void of act; whereas in so far as its potentiality is perfected by act, it is good, as stated in Metaph.
                     ix, 9. Therefore nothing acts in so far as it is evil, but only according as it is good. Therefore every action is good, and
                     none is evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34257] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu. Non est autem aliquid malum
secundum quod est actu, sed secundum quod potentia privatur actu,
inquantum autem potentia perficitur per actum, est bonum, ut
dicitur in IX Metaphys. Nihil ergo agit inquantum est malum, sed
solum inquantum est bonum. Omnis ergo actio est bona, et nulla
mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil cannot be a cause, save accidentally, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But every action has some effect
                     which is proper to it. Therefore no action is evil, but every action is good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34258] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
malum non potest esse causa nisi per accidens, ut patet per
Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed omnis actionis est aliquis per
se effectus. Nulla ergo actio est mala, sed omnis actio est
bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q18_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.20" target="asv">Jn. 3:20</a>): "Every one that doth evil, hateth the light." Therefore some actions of man are evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34259] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. III, <i>omnis qui male agit, odit
lucem</i>. Est ergo aliqua actio hominis mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act that
                     it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has being: since good and being are convertible, as was stated
                     in the
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q5_A1" id="FS_Q18_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[5], AA[1]</a>,3. But God alone has the whole plenitude of His Being in a certain unity: whereas every other thing has its proper fulness
                     of being in a certain multiplicity.
                     Wherefore it happens with some things, that they have being in some respect, and yet they are lacking in the fulness of being
                     due to them. Thus the fulness of human being requires a compound of soul and body, having all the powers and instruments of
                     knowledge and movement: wherefore if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due to the fulness of
                     his being. So that as much as he has of being, so much has he of goodness: while so far as he is lacking in goodness, and
                     is
                     said to be evil: thus a blind man is possessed of goodness inasmuch as he lives; and of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight.
                     That, however, which has nothing of being or goodness, could not be said to be either evil or good. But since this same fulness
                     of being is of the very essence of good, if a thing be lacking in its due fulness of being, it is not said to be good simply,
                     but in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is a being; although it can be called a being simply, and a non-being in a certain
                     respect, as was stated in the
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q5_A1" id="FS_Q18_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[5], A[1]</a>, ad 1. We must therefore say that every action has goodness, in so far as it has being; whereas it is lacking in goodness,
                     in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its fulness of being; and thus it is said to be evil: for instance
                     if it lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due place, or something of the kind.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 co."><a name="34260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34260] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod de bono et malo in actionibus oportet loqui sicut de
bono et malo in rebus, eo quod unaquaeque res talem actionem
producit, qualis est ipsa. In rebus autem unumquodque tantum habet
de bono, quantum habet de esse, bonum enim et ens convertuntur, ut
in primo dictum est. Solus autem Deus habet totam plenitudinem sui
esse secundum aliquid unum et simplex, unaquaeque vero res alia
habet plenitudinem essendi sibi convenientem secundum diversa. Unde
in aliquibus contingit quod quantum ad aliquid habent esse, et
tamen eis aliquid deficit ad plenitudinem essendi eis debitam.
Sicut ad plenitudinem esse humani requiritur quod sit quoddam
compositum ex anima et corpore, habens omnes potentias et
instrumenta cognitionis et motus, unde si aliquid horum deficiat
alicui homini deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine sui esse. Quantum
igitur habet de esse, tantum habet de bonitate, inquantum vero
aliquid ei deficit de plenitudine essendi, intantum deficit a
bonitate, et dicitur malum, sicut homo caecus habet de bonitate
quod vivit, et malum est ei quod caret visu. Si vero nihil haberet
de entitate vel bonitate, neque malum neque bonum dici posset. Sed
quia de ratione boni est ipsa plenitudo essendi, si quidem alicui
aliquid defuerit de debita essendi plenitudine, non dicetur
simpliciter bonum, sed secundum quid, inquantum est ens, poterit
tamen dici simpliciter ens et secundum quid non ens, ut in primo
dictum est. Sic igitur dicendum est quod omnis actio, inquantum
habet aliquid de esse, intantum habet de bonitate, inquantum vero
deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine essendi quae debetur actioni
humanae, intantum deficit a bonitate, et sic dicitur mala, puta si
deficiat ei vel determinata quantitas secundum rationem, vel
debitus locus, vel aliquid huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For it there were nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor possibility
                     of action. On the other hand if good were not deficient, there would be no evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient
                     good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34261] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod malum agit in virtute boni deficientis. Si enim
nihil esset ibi de bono, neque esset ens, neque agere posset. Si
autem non esset deficiens, non esset malum. Unde et actio causata
est quoddam bonum deficiens, quod secundum quid est bonum,
simpliciter autem malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient in
                     act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch
                     as he is deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he walks.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34262] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse secundum quid in actu,
unde agere possit; et secundum aliud privari actu, unde causet
deficientem actionem. Sicut homo caecus actu habet virtutem
gressivam, per quam ambulare potest, sed inquantum caret visu, qui
dirigit in ambulando, patitur defectum in ambulando, dum ambulat
cespitando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An evil action can have a proper effect, according to the goodness and being that it has. Thus adultery is the cause of human
                     generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34263] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod actio mala potest habere aliquem effectum per se,
secundum id quod habet de bonitate et entitate. Sicut adulterium
est causa generationis humanae, inquantum habet commixtionem maris
et feminae, non autem inquantum caret ordine rationis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A2-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 2. Whether the good or evil of a man's action is derived from its object?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the good or evil of an action is not derived from its object. For the object of any action is a thing.
                     But "evil is not in things, but in the sinner's use of them," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12). Therefore the
                     good or evil of a human action is not derived from their object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34264] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod actio non habeat bonitatem vel
malitiam ex obiecto. Obiectum enim actionis est res. In rebus autem
non est malum, sed in usu peccantium, ut Augustinus dicit in libro
III de Doct. Christ. Ergo actio humana non habet bonitatem vel
malitiam ex obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object is compared to the action as its matter. But the goodness of a thing is not from its matter, but rather
                     from the form, which is an act. Therefore good and evil in actions is not derived from their object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34265] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
obiectum comparatur ad actionem ut materia. Bonitas autem rei non
est ex materia, sed magis ex forma, quae est actus. Ergo bonum et
malum non est in actibus ex obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the object of an active power is compared to the action as effect to cause. But the goodness of a cause does not
                     depend on its effect; rather is it the reverse. Therefore good or evil in actions is not derived from their object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34266] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
obiectum potentiae activae comparatur ad actionem sicut effectus ad
causam. Sed bonitas causae non dependet ex effectu, sed magis e
converso. Ergo actio humana non habet bonitatem vel malitiam ex
obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q18_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.9.10" target="asv">Osee 9:10</a>): "They became abominable as those things which they loved." Now man becomes abominable to God on account of the malice of
                     his action. Therefore the malice of his action is according to the evil objects that man loves. And the same applies to the
                     goodness of his action.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34267] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Osee IX, <i>facti sunt abominabiles, sicut ea quae
dilexerunt</i>. Fit autem homo Deo abominabilis propter malitiam
suae operationis. Ergo malitia operationis est secundum obiecta
mala quae homo diligit. Et eadem ratio est de bonitate
actionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A1" id="FS_Q18_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> the good or evil of an action, as of other things, depends on its fulness of being or its lack of that fulness. Now the first
                     thing that belongs to the fulness of being seems to be that which gives a thing its species. And just as a natural thing has
                     its species from its form, so an action has its species from its object, as movement from its term. And therefore just as
                     the primary goodness of a natural thing
                     is derived from its form, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from its suitable
                     object: hence some call such an action "good in its genus"; for instance, "to make use of what is one's own." And just as,
                     in natural things, the primary evil is when a generated thing does not realize its specific form (for instance, if instead
                     of a man, something else be generated); so the primary evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, for instance,
                     "to
                     take what belongs to another." And this action is said to be "evil in its genus," genus here standing for species, just as
                     we apply the term "mankind" to the whole human species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 co."><a name="34268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34268] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum et malum actionis, sicut et
ceterarum rerum, attenditur ex plenitudine essendi vel defectu
ipsius. Primum autem quod ad plenitudinem essendi pertinere
videtur, est id quod dat rei speciem. Sicut autem res naturalis
habet speciem ex sua forma, ita actio habet speciem ex obiecto;
sicut et motus ex termino. Et ideo sicut prima bonitas rei
naturalis attenditur ex sua forma, quae dat speciem ei, ita et
prima bonitas actus moralis attenditur ex obiecto convenienti; unde
et a quibusdam vocatur bonum ex genere; puta, uti re sua. Et sicut
in rebus naturalibus primum malum est, si res generata non
consequitur formam specificam, puta si non generetur homo, sed
aliquid loco hominis; ita primum malum in actionibus moralibus est
quod est ex obiecto, sicut accipere aliena. Et dicitur malum ex
genere, genere pro specie accepto, eo modo loquendi quo dicimus
humanum genus totam humanam speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although external things are good in themselves, nevertheless they have not always a due proportion to this or that action.
                     And so, inasmuch as they are considered as objects of such actions, they have not the quality of goodness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34269] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod, licet res exteriores sint in seipsis bonae,
tamen non semper habent debitam proportionem ad hanc vel illam
actionem. Et ideo inquantum considerantur ut obiecta talium
actionum, non habent rationem boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object is not the matter "of which" (a thing is made), but the matter "about which" (something is done); and stands in
                     relation to the act as its form, as it were, through giving it its species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34270] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod obiectum non est materia ex qua, sed materia circa
quam, et habet quodammodo rationem formae, inquantum dat
speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of the human action is not always the object of an active power. For the appetitive power is, in a way, passive;
                     in so far as it is moved by the appetible object; and yet it is a principle of human actions. Nor again have the objects of
                     the active powers always the nature of an effect, but only when they are already transformed: thus food when transformed is
                     the effect of the nutritive power; whereas food before being transformed stands in
                     relation to the nutritive power as the matter about which it exercises its operation. Now since the object is in some way
                     the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and consequently that it gives it its form and
                     species, since movement derives its species from its term. Moreover, although the goodness of an action is not caused by the
                     goodness of its effect, yet an action is said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good effect. Consequently the
                     very
                     proportion of an action to its effect is the measure of its goodness.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34271] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non semper obiectum actionis humanae est obiectum
activae potentiae. Nam appetitiva potentia est quodammodo passiva,
inquantum movetur ab appetibili, et tamen est principium humanorum
actuum. Neque etiam potentiarum activarum obiecta semper habent
rationem effectus, sed quando iam sunt transmutata, sicut alimentum
transmutatum est effectus nutritivae potentiae, sed alimentum
nondum transmutatum comparatur ad potentiam nutritivam sicut
materia circa quam operatur. Ex hoc autem quod obiectum est aliquo
modo effectus potentiae activae, sequitur quod sit terminus
actionis eius, et per consequens quod det ei formam et speciem,
motus enim habet speciem a terminis. Et quamvis etiam bonitas
actionis non causetur ex bonitate effectus, tamen ex hoc dicitur
actio bona, quod bonum effectum inducere potest. Et ita ipsa
proportio actionis ad effectum, est ratio bonitatis ipsius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A3-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 3. Whether man's action is good or evil from a circumstance?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an action is not good or evil from a circumstance. For circumstances stand around [circumstant] an action,
                     as being outside it, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q7_A1" id="FS_Q18_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). But "good and evil are in things themselves," as is stated in Metaph. vi, 4. Therefore an action does not derive goodness
                     or malice from a circumstance.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34272] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod actio non sit bona vel mala ex
circumstantia. Circumstantiae enim circumstant actum sicut extra
ipsum existentes, ut dictum est. Sed bonum et malum sunt in ipsis
rebus, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys. Ergo actio non habet bonitatem
vel malitiam ex circumstantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the goodness or malice of an action is considered principally in the doctrine of morals. But since circumstances
                     are accidents of actions, it seems that they are outside the scope of art: because "no art takes notice of what is accidental"
                     (Metaph. vi, 2). Therefore the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a circumstance.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34273] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
bonitas vel malitia actus maxime consideratur in doctrina morum.
Sed circumstantiae, cum sint quaedam accidentia actuum, videntur
esse praeter considerationem artis, quia nulla ars considerat id
quod est per accidens, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys. Ergo bonitas vel
malitia actionis non est ex circumstantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which belongs to a thing, in respect of its substance, is not ascribed to it in respect of an accident. But
                     good and evil belong to an action in respect of its substance; because an action can be good or evil in its genus as stated
                     above
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q18_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore an action is not good or bad from a circumstance.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34274] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
id quod convenit alicui secundum suam substantiam, non attribuitur
ei per aliquod accidens. Sed bonum et malum convenit actioni
secundum suam substantiam, quia actio ex suo genere potest esse
bona vel mala, ut dictum est. Ergo non convenit actioni ex
circumstantia quod sit bona vel mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that a virtuous man acts as he should, and when he should, and so on in respect of the
                     other circumstances. Therefore, on the other hand, the vicious man, in the matter of each vice, acts when he should not, or
                     where he should not, and so on with the other circumstances. Therefore human actions are good or evil according to circumstances.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34275] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod philosophus dicit, in libro Ethic., quod <i>virtuosus
operatur secundum quod oportet, et quando oportet, et secundum
alias circumstantias</i>. Ergo ex contrario vitiosus, secundum
unumquodque vitium, operatur quando non oportet, ubi non oportet,
et sic de aliis circumstantiis. Ergo actiones humanae secundum
circumstantias sunt bonae vel malae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere substantial
                     form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives much from supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and
                     the like; and if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the result. So it is with action. For the plenitude
                     of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain additions
                     which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such are its due circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting that
                     is requisite as a due circumstance the action will be evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 co."><a name="34276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34276] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod in rebus naturalibus non invenitur tota plenitudo
perfectionis quae debetur rei, ex forma substantiali, quae dat
speciem; sed multum superadditur ex supervenientibus accidentibus,
sicut in homine ex figura, ex colore, et huiusmodi; quorum si
aliquod desit ad decentem habitudinem, consequitur malum. Ita etiam
est in actione. Nam plenitudo bonitatis eius non tota consistit in
sua specie, sed aliquid additur ex his quae adveniunt tanquam
accidentia quaedam. Et huiusmodi sunt circumstantiae debitae. Unde
si aliquid desit quod requiratur ad debitas circumstantias, erit
actio mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they are not part of its essence; but they are in an action as accidents
                     thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are outside the essence.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34277] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod circumstantiae sunt extra actionem, inquantum
non sunt de essentia actionis, sunt tamen in ipsa actione velut
quaedam accidentia eius. Sicut et accidentia quae sunt in
substantiis naturalibus, sunt extra essentias earum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every accident is not accidentally in its subject; for some are proper accidents; and of these every art takes notice. And
                     thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered in the doctrine of morals.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34278] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod non omnia accidentia per accidens se habent ad sua
subiecta, sed quaedam sunt per se accidentia; quae in unaquaque
arte considerantur. Et per hunc modum considerantur circumstantiae
actuum in doctrina morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since good and being are convertible; according as being is predicated of substance and of accident, so is good predicated
                     of a thing both in respect of its essential being, and in respect of its accidental being; and this, both in natural things
                     and in moral actions.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34279] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, cum bonum convertatur cum ente, sicut ens dicitur
secundum substantiam et secundum accidens, ita et bonum attribuitur
alicui et secundum esse suum essentiale, et secundum esse
accidentale, tam in rebus naturalibus, quam in actionibus
moralibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A4-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 4. Whether a human action is good or evil from its end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the good and evil in human actions are not from the end. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "nothing
                     acts with a view to evil." If therefore an action were good or evil from its end, no action would be evil. Which is clearly
                     false.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34280] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum et malum in actibus humanis non
sint ex fine. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod
<i>nihil respiciens ad malum operatur</i>. Si igitur ex fine
derivaretur operatio bona vel mala, nulla actio esset mala. Quod
patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the goodness of an action is something in the action. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore an action is
                     not said to be good or bad according to its end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34281] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
bonitas actus est aliquid in ipso existens. Finis autem est causa
extrinseca. Non ergo secundum finem dicitur actio bona vel
mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a good action may happen to be ordained to an evil end, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely,
                     an evil action may happen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft committed in order to give something to the poor. Therefore
                     an action is not good or evil from its end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34282] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
contingit aliquam bonam operationem ad malum finem ordinari, sicut
cum aliquis dat eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam, et e converso
aliquam malam operationem ordinari ad bonum finem, sicut cum quis
furatur ut det pauperi. Non ergo est ex fine actio bona vel
mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Differ. Topic. ii) that "if the end is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing also
                     is evil."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34283] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Boetius dicit, in Topic., quod <i>cuius finis bonus est,
ipsum quoque bonum est, et cuius finis malus est, ipsum quoque
malum est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q18_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The disposition of things as to goodness is the same as their disposition as to being. Now in some things the being does
                     not depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their being absolutely. But there are things the being of which
                     depends on something else, and hence in their regard we must consider their being in its relation to the cause on which it
                     depends. Now just as the being of a thing depends on the agent, and the form, so the goodness
                     of a thing depends on its end. Hence in the Divine Persons, Whose goodness does not depend on another, the measure of goodness
                     is not taken from the end. Whereas human actions, and other things, the goodness of which depends on something else, have
                     a measure of goodness from the end on which they depend, besides that goodness which is in them absolutely.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q18_A4-p7"> Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action. First, that which, as an action, it derives from its
                     genus; because as much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A1" id="FS_Q18_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Secondly, it has goodness according to its species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has goodness
                     from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to
                     which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 co."><a name="34284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34284] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod eadem est dispositio rerum in bonitate, et in esse.
Sunt enim quaedam quorum esse ex alio non dependet, et in his
sufficit considerare ipsum eorum esse absolute. Quaedam vero sunt
quorum esse dependet ab alio, unde oportet quod consideretur per
considerationem ad causam a qua dependet. Sicut autem esse rei
dependet ab agente et forma, ita bonitas rei dependet a fine. Unde
in personis divinis, quae non habent bonitatem dependentem ab alio,
non consideratur aliqua ratio bonitatis ex fine. Actiones autem
humanae, et alia quorum bonitas dependet ab alio, habent rationem
bonitatis ex fine a quo dependent, praeter bonitatem absolutam quae
in eis existit. Sic igitur in actione humana bonitas quadruplex
considerari potest. Una quidem secundum genus, prout scilicet est
actio, quia quantum habet de actione et entitate, tantum habet de
bonitate, ut dictum est. Alia vero secundum speciem, quae accipitur
secundum obiectum conveniens. Tertia secundum circumstantias, quasi
secundum accidentia quaedam. Quarta autem secundum finem, quasi
secundum habitudinem ad causam bonitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good in view of which one acts is not always a true good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good.
                     And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34285] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod bonum ad quod aliquis respiciens operatur, non
semper est verum bonum; sed quandoque verum bonum, et quandoque
apparens. Et secundum hoc, ex fine sequitur actio mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the end is an extrinsic cause, nevertheless due proportion to the end, and relation to the end, are inherent to
                     the action.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34286] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, quamvis finis sit causa extrinseca, tamen debita
proportio ad finem et relatio in ipsum, inhaeret actioni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the way mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus
                     it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa.
                     However, an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since "evil results from any single defect, but
                     good from the complete cause," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34287] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod nihil prohibet actioni habenti unam praedictarum
bonitatum, deesse aliam. Et secundum hoc, contingit actionem quae
est bona secundum speciem suam vel secundum circumstantias,
ordinari ad finem malum, et e converso. Non tamen est actio bona
simpliciter, nisi omnes bonitates concurrant, quia <i>quilibet
singularis defectus causat malum, bonum autem causatur ex integra
causa</i>, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A5-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 5. Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good and evil in moral actions do not make a difference of species. For the existence of good and evil
                     in actions is in conformity with their existence in things, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A1" id="FS_Q18_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But good and evil do not make a specific difference in things; for a good man is specifically the same as a bad man. Therefore
                     neither do they make a specific difference in actions.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34288] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus morales non differant specie
secundum bonum et malum. Bonum enim et malum in actibus invenitur
conformiter rebus, ut dictum est. Sed in rebus bonum et malum non
diversificant speciem, idem enim specie est homo bonus et malus.
Ergo neque etiam bonum et malum in actibus diversificant
speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since evil is a privation, it is a non-being. But non-being cannot be a difference, according to the Philosopher
                     (Metaph. iii, 3). Since therefore the difference constitutes the species, it seems that an action is not constituted in a
                     species through being evil. Consequently good and evil do not diversify the species of human actions.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34289] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
malum, cum sit privatio, est quoddam non ens. Sed non ens non
potest esse differentia, secundum philosophum, in III Metaphys. Cum
ergo differentia constituat speciem, videtur quod aliquis actus, ex
hoc quod est malus, non constituatur in aliqua specie. Et ita bonum
et malum non diversificant speciem humanorum actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, acts that differ in species produce different effects. But the same specific effect results from a good and from
                     an evil action: thus a man is born of adulterous or of lawful wedlock. Therefore good and evil actions do not differ in species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34290] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
diversorum actuum secundum speciem, diversi sunt effectus. Sed idem
specie effectus potest consequi ex actu bono et malo, sicut homo
generatur ex adulterio, et ex matrimoniali concubitu. Ergo actus
bonus et malus non differunt specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, actions are sometimes said to be good or bad from a circumstance, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A3" id="FS_Q18_A5-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But since a circumstance is an accident, it does not give an action its species. Therefore human actions do not differ in
                     species on account of their goodness or malice.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="34291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34291] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
bonum et malum dicitur in actibus quandoque secundum
circumstantiam, ut dictum est. Sed circumstantia, cum sit accidens,
non dat speciem actui. Ergo actus humani non differunt specie
propter bonitatem et malitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic ii. 1) "like habits produce like actions." But a good and a bad habit differ in species,
                     as liberality and prodigality. Therefore also good and bad actions differ in species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34292] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
secundum philosophum, in II Ethic., <i>similes habitus similes
actus reddunt</i>. Sed habitus bonus et malus differunt specie, ut
liberalitas et prodigalitas. Ergo et actus bonus et malus differunt
specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q18_A5-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Every action derives its species from its object, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q18_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Hence it follows that a difference of object causes a difference of species in actions. Now, it must be observed that a
                     difference of objects causes a difference of species in actions, according as the latter are referred to one active principle,
                     which does not cause a difference in actions, according as they are referred to another active principle. Because
                     nothing accidental constitutes a species, but only that which is essential; and a difference of object may be essential in
                     reference to one active principle, and accidental in reference to another. Thus to know color and to know sound, differ essentially
                     in reference to sense, but not in reference to the intellect.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q18_A5-p8"> Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated in reference to the reason; because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv),
                     "the good of man is to be in accordance with reason," and evil is "to be against reason." For that is good for a thing which
                     suits it in regard to its form; and evil, that which is against the order of its form. It is therefore evident that the difference
                     of good and evil considered in reference to the object is an essential difference in relation to reason;
                     that is to say, according as the object is suitable or unsuitable to reason. Now certain actions are called human or moral,
                     inasmuch as they proceed from the reason. Consequently it is evident that good and evil diversify the species in human actions;
                     since essential differences cause a difference of species.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 co."><a name="34293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34293] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod omnis actus speciem habet ex suo obiecto, sicut supra
dictum est. Unde oportet quod aliqua differentia obiecti faciat
diversitatem speciei in actibus. Est autem considerandum quod
aliqua differentia obiecti facit differentiam speciei in actibus,
secundum quod referuntur ad unum principium activum, quod non facit
differentiam in actibus, secundum quod referuntur ad aliud
principium activum. Quia nihil quod est per accidens, constituit
speciem, sed solum quod est per se, potest autem aliqua differentia
obiecti esse per se in comparatione ad unum activum principium, et
per accidens in comparatione ad aliud; sicut cognoscere colorem et
sonum, per se differunt per comparationem ad sensum, non autem per
comparationem ad intellectum. In actibus autem humanis bonum et
malum dicitur per comparationem ad rationem, quia, ut Dionysius
dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., bonum hominis est secundum rationem
esse, malum autem quod est praeter rationem. Unicuique enim rei est
bonum quod convenit ei secundum suam formam; et malum quod est ei
praeter ordinem suae formae. Patet ergo quod differentia boni et
mali circa obiectum considerata, comparatur per se ad rationem,
scilicet secundum quod obiectum est ei conveniens vel non
conveniens. Dicuntur autem aliqui actus humani, vel morales,
secundum quod sunt a ratione. Unde manifestum est quod bonum et
malum diversificant speciem in actibus moralibus, differentiae enim
per se diversificant speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even in natural things, good and evil, inasmuch as something is according to nature, and something against nature, diversify
                     the natural species; for a dead body and a living body are not of the same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is
                     in accord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against reason, diversify the moral species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34294] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod etiam in rebus naturalibus bonum et malum, quod
est secundum naturam et contra naturam, diversificant speciem
naturae, corpus enim mortuum et corpus vivum non sunt eiusdem
speciei. Et similiter bonum, inquantum est secundum rationem, et
malum, inquantum est praeter rationem, diversificant speciem
moris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil implies privation, not absolute, but affecting some potentiality. For an action is said to be evil in its species, not
                     because it has no object at all; but because it has an object in disaccord with reason, for instance, to appropriate another's
                     property. Wherefore in so far as the object is something positive, it can constitute the species of an evil act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34295] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod malum importat privationem non absolutam, sed
consequentem talem potentiam. Dicitur enim malus actus secundum
suam speciem, non ex eo quod nullum habeat obiectum; sed quia habet
obiectum non conveniens rationi, sicut tollere aliena. Unde
inquantum obiectum est aliquid positive, potest constituere speciem
mali actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The conjugal act and adultery, as compared to reason, differ specifically and have effects specifically different; because
                     the other deserves praise and reward, the other, blame and punishment. But as compared to the generative power, they do not
                     differ in species; and thus they have one specific effect.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34296] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod actus coniugalis et adulterium, secundum quod
comparantur ad rationem, differunt specie, et habent effectus
specie differentes, quia unum eorum meretur laudem et praemium,
aliud vituperium et poenam. Sed secundum quod comparantur ad
potentiam generativam, non differunt specie. Et sic habent unum
effectum secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can specify
                     a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstance transforms an action from good to evil; for a circumstance would
                     not make an action evil, except through being repugnant to reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="34297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34297] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod circumstantia quandoque sumitur ut differentia
essentialis obiecti, secundum quod ad rationem comparatur, et tunc
potest dare speciem actui morali. Et hoc oportet esse, quandocumque
circumstantia transmutat actum de bonitate in malitiam, non enim
circumstantia faceret actum malum, nisi per hoc quod rationi
repugnat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A6-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 6. Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive their
                     species from the object. But the end is altogether apart from the object. Therefore the good and evil which are from the end
                     do not diversify the species of an action.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34298] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum et malum quod est ex fine, non
diversificent speciem in actibus. Actus enim habent speciem ex
obiecto. Sed finis est praeter rationem obiecti. Ergo bonum et
malum quod est ex fine, non diversificant speciem actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is accidental does not constitute the species, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q18_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. But it is accidental to an action to be ordained to some particular end; for instance, to give alms from vainglory. Therefore
                     actions are not diversified as to species, according to the good and evil which are from the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34299] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
id quod est per accidens, non constituit speciem, ut dictum est.
Sed accidit alicui actui quod ordinetur ad aliquem finem; sicut
quod aliquis det eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam. Ergo secundum
bonum et malum quod est ex fine, non diversificantur actus secundum
speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, acts that differ in species, can be ordained to the same end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of various virtues
                     and vices can be ordained. Therefore the good and evil which are taken from the end, do not diversify the species of action.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34300] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
diversi actus secundum speciem, ad unum finem ordinari possunt,
sicut ad finem inanis gloriae ordinari possunt actus diversarum
virtutum, et diversorum vitiorum. Non ergo bonum et malum quod
accipitur secundum finem, diversificat speciem actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It has been shown above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q18_A6-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>) that human actions derive their species from the end. Therefore good and evil in respect of the end diversify the species
                     of actions.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34301] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod supra ostensum est, quod actus humani habent speciem a
fine. Ergo bonum et malum quod accipitur secundum finem,
diversificat speciem actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q18_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary, as stated above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q18_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a>). Now, in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior action of the will, and the external action: and
                     each of these actions has its object. The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will: while the object of
                     the external action, is that on which the action is brought to bear. Therefore just as the
                     external action takes its species from the object on which it bears; so the interior act of the will takes its species from
                     the end, as from its own proper object.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q18_A6-p7"> Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that which is on the part of the external action: because
                     the will uses the limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any measure of morality, save in so far as they are
                     voluntary. Consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end, but materially with regard
                     to the object of the external action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who steals that he may
                     commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief."
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 co."><a name="34302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34302] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod aliqui actus dicuntur humani, inquantum sunt
voluntarii, sicut supra dictum est. In actu autem voluntario
invenitur duplex actus, scilicet actus interior voluntatis, et
actus exterior, et uterque horum actuum habet suum obiectum. Finis
autem proprie est obiectum interioris actus voluntarii, id autem
circa quod est actio exterior, est obiectum eius. Sicut igitur
actus exterior accipit speciem ab obiecto circa quod est; ita actus
interior voluntatis accipit speciem a fine, sicut a proprio
obiecto. Ita autem quod est ex parte voluntatis, se habet ut
formale ad id quod est ex parte exterioris actus, quia voluntas
utitur membris ad agendum, sicut instrumentis; neque actus
exteriores habent rationem moralitatis, nisi inquantum sunt
voluntarii. Et ideo actus humani species formaliter consideratur
secundum finem, materialiter autem secundum obiectum exterioris
actus. Unde philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod <i>ille qui
furatur ut committat adulterium, est, per se loquendo, magis
adulter quam fur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The end also has the character of an object, as stated above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34303] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod etiam finis habet rationem obiecti, ut dictum
est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is accidental to the external action to be ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the interior
                     act of the will, which act is compared to the external act, as form to matter.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34304] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ordinari ad talem finem, etsi accidat exteriori
actui, non tamen accidit actui interiori voluntatis, qui comparatur
ad exteriorem sicut formale ad materiale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When many actions, differing in species, are ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the part
                     of the external actions; but unity of species on the part of the internal action.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34305] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod quando multi actus specie differentes ordinantur ad
unum finem, est quidem diversitas speciei ex parte exteriorum
actuum; sed unitas speciei ex parte actus interioris.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A7-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 7. Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the species of goodness derived from the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the
                     object, as a species is contained under its genus; for instance, when a man commits a theft in order to give alms. For an
                     action takes its species from its object, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q18_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,6). But it is impossible for a thing to be contained under another species, if this species be not contained under the proper
                     species of that thing; because the same thing cannot be contained in different species that are not subordinate to one another.
                     Therefore the species which is taken from the end, is contained under the species which is taken from the object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="34306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34306] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod species bonitatis quae est ex fine,
contineatur sub specie bonitatis quae est ex obiecto, sicut species
sub genere, puta cum aliquis vult furari ut det eleemosynam. Actus
enim habet speciem ex obiecto, ut dictum est. Sed impossibile est
quod aliquid contineatur in aliqua alia specie, quae sub propria
specie non continetur, quia idem non potest esse in diversis
speciebus non subalternis. Ergo species quae est ex fine,
continetur sub specie quae est ex obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the last difference always constitutes the most specific species. But the difference derived from the end seems
                     to come after the difference derived from the object: because the end is something last. Therefore the species derived from
                     the end, is contained under the species derived from the object, as its most specific species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="34307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34307] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
semper ultima differentia constituit speciem specialissimam. Sed
differentia quae est ex fine, videtur esse posterior quam
differentia quae est ex obiecto, quia finis habet rationem ultimi.
Ergo species quae est ex fine, continetur sub specie quae est ex
obiecto, sicut species specialissima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more formal a difference is compared to genus, as form to matter. But the species derived from the end, is more
                     formal than that which is derived from the object, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q18_A7-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. Therefore the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as the most specific
                     species is contained under the subaltern genus.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="34308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34308] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
quanto aliqua differentia est magis formalis, tanto magis est
specialis, quia differentia comparatur ad genus ut forma ad
materiam. Sed species quae est ex fine, est formalior ea quae est
ex obiecto, ut dictum est. Ergo species quae est ex fine,
continetur sub specie quae est ex obiecto, sicut species
specialissima sub genere subalterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Each genus has its determinate differences. But an action of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained
                     to an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to an infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the
                     species derived from the end is not contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 s. c."><a name="34309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34309] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
cuiuslibet generis sunt determinatae differentiae. Sed actus
eiusdem speciei ex parte obiecti, potest ad infinitos fines
ordinari, puta furtum ad infinita bona vel mala. Ergo species quae
est ex fine, non continetur sub specie quae est ex obiecto, sicut
sub genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q18_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The object of the external act can stand in a twofold relation to the end of the will: first, as being of itself ordained
                     thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to victory; secondly, as being ordained thereto accidentally; thus to take
                     what belongs to another is ordained accidentally to the giving of alms. Now the differences that divide a genus, and constitute
                     the species of that genus, must, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12), divide that
                     genus essentially: and if they divide it accidentally, the division is incorrect: as, if one were to say: "Animals are divided
                     into rational and irrational; and the irrational into animals with wings, and animals without wings"; for "winged" and "wingless"
                     are not essential determinations of the irrational being. But the following division would be correct: "Some animals have
                     feet, some have no feet: and of those that have feet, some have two feet, some four, some many": because the latter
                     division is an essential determination of the former. Accordingly when the object is not of itself ordained to the end, the
                     specific difference derived from the object is not an essential determination of the species derived from the end, nor is
                     the reverse the case. Wherefore one of these species is not under the other; but then the moral action is contained under
                     two species that are disparate, as it were. Consequently we say that he that commits theft for the sake of adultery, is guilty
                     of a
                     twofold malice in one action. On the other hand, if the object be of itself ordained to the end, one of these differences
                     is an essential determination of the other. Wherefore one of these species will be contained under the other.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q18_A7-p7"> It remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the other. In order to make this clear, we must first of
                     all observe that the more particular the form is from which a difference is taken, the more specific is the difference. Secondly,
                     that the more universal an agent is, the more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that the more remote an end is, the
                     more universal the agent to which it corresponds; thus victory, which is the last end of the army, is the end
                     intended by the commander in chief; while the right ordering of this or that regiment is the end intended by one of the lower
                     officers. From all this it follows that the specific difference derived from the end, is more general; and that the difference
                     derived from an object which of itself is ordained to that end, is a specific difference in relation to the former. For the
                     will, the proper object of which is the end, is the universal mover in respect of all the powers of the soul, the proper
                     objects of which are the objects of their particular acts.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 co."><a name="34310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34310] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod obiectum exterioris actus dupliciter potest se habere
ad finem voluntatis, uno modo, sicut per se ordinatum ad ipsum,
sicut bene pugnare per se ordinatur ad victoriam; alio modo, per
accidens, sicut accipere rem alienam per accidens ordinatur ad
dandum eleemosynam. Oportet autem, ut philosophus dicit in VII
Metaphys., quod differentiae dividentes aliquod genus, et
constituentes speciem illius generis, per se dividant illud. Si
autem per accidens, non recte procedit divisio, puta si quis dicat,
animalium aliud rationale, aliud irrationale; et animalium
irrationalium aliud alatum, aliud non alatum, alatum enim et non
alatum non sunt per se determinativa eius quod est irrationale.
Oportet autem sic dividere, animalium aliud habens pedes, aliud non
habens pedes; et habentium pedes, aliud habet duos, aliud quatuor,
aliud multos, haec enim per se determinant priorem differentiam.
Sic igitur quando obiectum non est per se ordinatum ad finem,
differentia specifica quae est ex obiecto, non est per se
determinativa eius quae est ex fine, nec e converso. Unde una
istarum specierum non est sub alia, sed tunc actus moralis est sub
duabus speciebus quasi disparatis. Unde dicimus quod ille qui
furatur ut moechetur, committit duas malitias in uno actu. Si vero
obiectum per se ordinetur ad finem, una dictarum differentiarum est
per se determinativa alterius. Unde una istarum specierum
continebitur sub altera. Considerandum autem restat quae sub qua.
Ad cuius evidentiam, primo considerandum est quod quanto aliqua
differentia sumitur a forma magis particulari, tanto magis est
specifica. Secundo, quod quanto agens est magis universale, tanto
ex eo est forma magis universalis. Tertio, quod quanto aliquis
finis est posterior, tanto respondet agenti universaliori, sicut
victoria, quae est ultimus finis exercitus, est finis intentus a
summo duce; ordinatio autem huius aciei vel illius, est finis
intentus ab aliquo inferiorum ducum. Et ex istis sequitur quod
differentia specifica quae est ex fine, est magis generalis; et
differentia quae est ex obiecto per se ad talem finem ordinato, est
specifica respectu eius. Voluntas enim, cuius proprium obiectum est
finis, est universale motivum respectu omnium potentiarum animae,
quarum propria obiecta sunt obiecta particularium actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One and the same thing, considered in its substance, cannot be in two species, one of which is not subordinate to the other.
                     But in respect of those things which are superadded to the substance, one thing can be contained under different species.
                     Thus one and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under one species, i.e. a white thing: and, as to its perfume,
                     under the species of sweet-smelling things. In like manner an action which, as to its
                     substance, is in one natural species, considered in respect to the moral conditions that are added to it, can belong to two
                     species, as stated above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q18_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>, ad 3).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="34311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34311] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod secundum substantiam suam non potest aliquid
esse in duabus speciebus, quarum una sub altera non ordinetur. Sed
secundum ea quae rei adveniunt, potest aliquid sub diversis
speciebus contineri. Sicut hoc pomum, secundum colorem, continetur
sub hac specie, scilicet albi, et secundum odorem, sub specie bene
redolentis. Et similiter actus qui secundum substantiam suam est in
una specie naturae, secundum conditiones morales supervenientes, ad
duas species referri potest, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end is last in execution; but first in the intention of the reason, in regard to which moral actions receive their species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="34312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34312] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod finis est postremum in executione; sed est primum in
intentione rationis, secundum quam accipiuntur moralium actuum
species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Difference is compared to genus as form to matter, inasmuch as it actualizes the genus. On the other hand, the genus is considered
                     as more formal than the species, inasmuch as it is something more absolute and less contracted. Wherefore also the parts of
                     a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is stated in Phys. ii, 3. And in this sense the genus is the formal
                     cause of the species; and so much the more formal, as it is more
                     universal.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="34313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34313] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod differentia comparatur ad genus ut forma ad materiam,
inquantum facit esse genus in actu. Sed etiam genus consideratur ut
formalius specie, secundum quod est absolutius, et minus
contractum. Unde et partes definitionis reducuntur ad genus causae
formalis, ut dicitur in libro Physic. Et secundum hoc, genus est
causa formalis speciei, et tanto erit formalius, quanto
communius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A8-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 8. Whether any action is indifferent in its species?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no action is indifferent in its species. For evil is the privation of good, according to Augustine (Enchiridion
                     xi). But privation and habit are immediate contraries, according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Therefore there is not
                     such thing as an action that is indifferent in its species, as though it were between good and evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="34314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34314] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliquis actus indifferens
secundum suam speciem. Malum enim est privatio boni, secundum
Augustinum. Sed privatio et habitus sunt opposita immediata,
secundum philosophum. Ergo non est aliquis actus qui secundum
speciem suam sit indifferens, quasi medium existens inter bonum et
malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human actions derive their species from their end or object, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q18_A8-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[6];</a> Q[1], A[3]). But every end and every object is either good or bad. Therefore every human action is good or evil according
                     to its species. None, therefore, is indifferent in its species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="34315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34315] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
actus humani habent speciem a fine vel obiecto, ut dictum est. Sed
omne obiectum, et omnis finis habet rationem boni vel mali. Ergo
omnis actus humanus secundum suam speciem est bonus vel malus.
Nullus ergo est indifferens secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A1" id="FS_Q18_A8-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, an action is said to be good, when it has its due complement of goodness; and evil, when it lacks that complement. But every
                     action must needs either have the entire plenitude of its goodness, or lack it in some respect. Therefore every action must
                     needs be either good or bad in its species, and none is indifferent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="34316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34316] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut dictum est, actus dicitur bonus, qui habet debitam
perfectionem bonitatis; malus, cui aliquid de hoc deficit. Sed
necesse est quod omnis actus vel habeat totam plenitudinem suae
bonitatis, vel aliquid ei deficiat. Ergo necesse est quod omnis
actus secundum speciem suam sit bonus vel malus, et nullus
indifferens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18) that "there are certain deeds of a middle kind, which can be done with a good
                     or evil mind, of which it is rash to form a judgment." Therefore some actions are indifferent according to their species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 s. c."><a name="34317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34317] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in Mont., quod
<i>sunt quaedam facta media, quae possunt bono vel malo animo
fieri, de quibus est temerarium iudicare</i>. Sunt ergo aliqui
actus secundum speciem suam indifferentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q18_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,5), every action takes its species from its object; while human action, which is called moral, takes its species from the
                     object, in relation to the principle of human actions, which is the reason. Wherefore if the object of an action includes
                     something in accord with the order of reason, it will be a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms
                     to a person in want. On the other hand, if it
                     includes something repugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act according to its species; for instance, to steal,
                     which is to appropriate what belongs to another. But it may happen that the object of an action does not include something
                     pertaining to the order of reason; for instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and the like:
                     and such actions are indifferent according to their species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 co."><a name="34318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34318] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, actus omnis habet speciem ab
obiecto; et actus humanus, qui dicitur moralis, habet speciem ab
obiecto relato ad principium actuum humanorum, quod est ratio. Unde
si obiectum actus includat aliquid quod conveniat ordini rationis,
erit actus bonus secundum suam speciem, sicut dare eleemosynam
indigenti. Si autem includat aliquid quod repugnet ordini rationis,
erit malus actus secundum speciem, sicut furari, quod est tollere
aliena. Contingit autem quod obiectum actus non includit aliquid
pertinens ad ordinem rationis, sicut levare festucam de terra, ire
ad campum, et huiusmodi, et tales actus secundum speciem suam sunt
indifferentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Privation is twofold. One is privation "as a result" [privatum esse], and this leaves nothing, but takes all away: thus blindness
                     takes away sight altogether; darkness, light; and death, life. Between this privation and the contrary habit, there can be
                     no medium in respect of the proper subject. The other is privation "in process" [privari]: thus sickness is privation of health;
                     not that it takes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road
                     to the entire loss of health, occasioned by death. And since this sort of privation leaves something, it is not always the
                     immediate contrary of the opposite habit. In this way evil is a privation of good, as Simplicius says in his commentary on
                     the Categories: because it does not take away all good, but leaves some. Consequently there can be something between good
                     and evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="34319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34319] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod duplex est privatio. Quaedam quae consistit in
privatum esse, et haec nihil relinquit, sed totum aufert; ut
caecitas totaliter aufert visum, et tenebrae lucem, et mors vitam.
Et inter hanc privationem et habitum oppositum, non potest esse
aliquod medium circa proprium susceptibile. Est autem alia privatio
quae consistit in privari, sicut aegritudo est privatio sanitatis,
non quod tota sanitas sit sublata, sed quod est quasi quaedam via
ad totalem ablationem sanitatis, quae fit per mortem. Et ideo talis
privatio, cum aliquid relinquat, non semper est immediata cum
opposito habitu. Et hoc modo malum est privatio boni, ut Simplicius
dicit in commento super librum Praedic., quia non totum bonum
aufert, sed aliquid relinquit. Unde potest esse aliquod medium
inter bonum et malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every object or end has some goodness or malice, at least natural to it: but this does not imply moral goodness or malice,
                     which is considered in relation to the reason, as stated above. And it is of this that we are here treating.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="34320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34320] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod omne obiectum vel finis habet aliquam bonitatem vel
malitiam, saltem naturalem, non tamen semper importat bonitatem vel
malitiam moralem, quae consideratur per comparationem ad rationem,
ut dictum est. Et de hac nunc agitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not everything belonging to an action belongs also to its species. Wherefore although an action's specific nature may not
                     contain all that belongs to the full complement of its goodness, it is not therefore an action specifically bad; nor is it
                     specifically good. Thus a man in regard to his species is neither virtuous nor wicked.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="34321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34321] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non quidquid habet actus, pertinet ad speciem eius.
Unde etsi in ratione suae speciei non contineatur quidquid pertinet
ad plenitudinem bonitatis ipsius, non propter hoc est ex specie sua
malus, nec etiam bonus, sicut homo secundum suam speciem neque
virtuosus, neque vitiosus est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A9-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 9. Whether an individual action can be indifferent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an individual action can be indifferent. For there is no species that does not, cannot, contain an individual.
                     But an action can be indifferent in its species, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A8" id="FS_Q18_A9-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>. Therefore an individual action can be indifferent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="34322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34322] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis actus secundum individuum sit
indifferens. Nulla enim species est quae sub se non contineat vel
continere possit aliquod individuum. Sed aliquis actus est
indifferens secundum suam speciem, ut dictum est. Ergo aliquis
actus individualis potest esse indifferens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, individual actions cause like habits, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a habit can be indifferent: for the Philosopher
                     says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even temper and prodigal disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that
                     they are not good, since they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in respect of a habit. Therefore some individual
                     actions are indifferent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="34323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34323] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
ex individualibus actibus causantur habitus conformes ipsis, ut
dicitur in II Ethic. Sed aliquis habitus est indifferens. Dicit
enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., de quibusdam, sicut de placidis et
prodigis, quod non sunt mali, et tamen constat quod non sunt boni,
cum recedant a virtute, et sic sunt indifferentes secundum habitum.
Ergo aliqui actus individuales sunt indifferentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A9-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral evil belongs to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain
                     a specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end. Therefore an individual action may happen to be indifferent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="34324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34324] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
bonum morale pertinet ad virtutem, malum autem morale pertinet ad
vitium. Sed contingit quandoque quod homo actum qui ex specie sua
est indifferens, non ordinat ad aliquem finem vel vitii vel
virtutis. Ergo contingit aliquem actum individualem esse
indifferentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A9-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.): "An idle word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive
                     of just necessity or pious utility." But an idle word is an evil, because "men . . . shall render an account of it in the
                     day of judgment" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q18_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.36" target="asv">Mat. 12:36</a>): while if it does not lack the motive of just necessity or pious utility, it is good. Therefore every word is either good
                     or bad. For the same reason every other
                     action is either good or bad. Therefore no individual action is indifferent.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 s. c."><a name="34325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34325] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Gregorius dicit in quadam homilia, <i>otiosum verbum est
quod utilitate rectitudinis, aut ratione iustae necessitatis aut
piae utilitatis, caret</i>. Sed verbum otiosum est malum, quia de
eo reddent homines rationem in die iudicii, ut dicitur Matth. XII.
Si autem non caret ratione iustae necessitatis aut piae utilitatis,
est bonum. Ergo omne verbum aut est bonum aut malum. Pari ergo
ratione, et quilibet alius actus vel est bonus vel malus. Nullus
ergo individualis actus est indifferens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q18_A9-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. And
                     the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A3" id="FS_Q18_A9-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it takes its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its
                     accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason of his individual accidents, which does not belong
                     to him by reason of his species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad,
                     at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds
                     from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character
                     of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must
                     needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason,
                     if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q18_A9-p7"> If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his
                     beard, or moves his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human; since this depends on the reason.
                     Hence it will be indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 co."><a name="34326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34326] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod contingit quandoque aliquem actum esse indifferentem
secundum speciem, qui tamen est bonus vel malus in individuo
consideratus. Et hoc ideo, quia actus moralis, sicut dictum est,
non solum habet bonitatem ex obiecto, a quo habet speciem; sed
etiam ex circumstantiis, quae sunt quasi quaedam accidentia; sicut
aliquid convenit individuo hominis secundum accidentia
individualia, quod non convenit homini secundum rationem speciei.
Et oportet quod quilibet individualis actus habeat aliquam
circumstantiam per quam trahatur ad bonum vel malum, ad minus ex
parte intentionis finis. Cum enim rationis sit ordinare, actus a
ratione deliberativa procedens, si non sit ad debitum finem
ordinatus, ex hoc ipso repugnat rationi, et habet rationem mali. Si
vero ordinetur ad debitum finem, convenit cum ordine rationis, unde
habet rationem boni. Necesse est autem quod vel ordinetur, vel non
ordinetur ad debitum finem. Unde necesse est omnem actum hominis a
deliberativa ratione procedentem, in individuo consideratum, bonum
esse vel malum. Si autem non procedit a ratione deliberativa, sed
ex quadam imaginatione, sicut cum aliquis fricat barbam, vel movet
manum aut pedem; talis actus non est, proprie loquendo, moralis vel
humanus; cum hoc habeat actus a ratione. Et sic erit indifferens,
quasi extra genus moralium actuum existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A9-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> For an action to be indifferent in its species can be understood in several ways. First in such a way that its species demands
                     that it remain indifferent; and the objection proceeds along this line. But no action can be specifically indifferent thus:
                     since no object of human action is such that it cannot be directed to good or evil, either through its end or through a circumstance.
                     Secondly, specific indifference of an action may be due to the fact
                     that as far as its species is concerned, it is neither good nor bad. Wherefore it can be made good or bad by something else.
                     Thus man, as far as his species is concerned, is neither white nor black; nor is it a condition of his species that he should
                     not be black or white; but blackness or whiteness is superadded to man by other principles than those of his species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="34327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34327] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod aliquem actum esse indifferentem secundum suam
speciem, potest esse multipliciter. Uno modo, sic quod ex sua
specie debeatur ei quod sit indifferens. Et sic procedit ratio. Sed
tamen isto modo nullus actus ex sua specie est indifferens, non
enim est aliquod obiectum humani actus, quod non possit ordinari
vel ad bonum vel ad malum, per finem vel circumstantiam. Alio modo
potest dici indifferens ex sua specie, quia non habet ex sua specie
quod sit bonus vel malus. Unde per aliquid aliud potest fieri bonus
vel malus. Sicut homo non habet ex sua specie quod sit albus vel
niger, nec tamen habet ex sua specie quod non sit albus aut niger,
potest enim albedo vel nigredo supervenire homini aliunde quam a
principiis speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A9-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher states that a man is evil, properly speaking, if he be hurtful to others. And accordingly, because he hurts
                     none save himself. And the same applies to all others who are not hurtful to other men. But we say here that evil, in general,
                     is all that is repugnant to right reason. And in this sense every individual action is either good or bad, as stated above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="34328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34328] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod philosophus dicit illum esse malum proprie, qui est
aliis hominibus nocivus. Et secundum hoc, dicit prodigum non esse
malum, quia nulli alteri nocet nisi sibi ipsi. Et similiter de
omnibus aliis qui non sunt proximis nocivi. Nos autem hic dicimus
malum communiter omne quod est rationi rectae repugnans. Et
secundum hoc, omnis individualis actus est bonus vel malus, ut
dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A9-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason, it belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil of some vice.
                     Thus, if a man's action is directed to the support or repose of his body, it is also directed to the good of virtue, provided
                     he direct his body itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly applies to other actions.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="34329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34329] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod omnis finis a ratione deliberativa intentus, pertinet
ad bonum alicuius virtutis, vel ad malum alicuius vitii. Nam hoc
ipsum quod aliquis agit ordinate ad sustentationem vel quietem sui
corporis, ad bonum virtutis ordinatur in eo qui corpus suum ordinat
ad bonum virtutis. Et idem patet in aliis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A10-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 10. Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral action in the species of good or evil. For the species of an action
                     is taken from its object. But circumstances differ from the object. Therefore circumstances do not give an action its species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="34330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34330] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantia non possit constituere
aliquam speciem boni vel mali actus. Species enim actus est ex
obiecto. Sed circumstantiae differunt ab obiecto. Ergo
circumstantiae non dant speciem actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, circumstances are as accidents in relation to the moral action, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q7_A1" id="FS_Q18_A10-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). But an accident does not constitute the species. Therefore a circumstance does not constitute a species of good or evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="34331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34331] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
circumstantiae comparantur ad actum moralem sicut accidentia eius,
ut dictum est. Sed accidens non constituit speciem. Ergo
circumstantia non constituit aliquam speciem boni vel mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one thing is not in several species. But one action has several circumstances. Therefore a circumstance does not
                     place a moral action in a species of good or evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="34332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34332] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
unius rei non sunt plures species. Unius autem actus sunt plures
circumstantiae. Ergo circumstantia non constituit actum moralem in
aliqua specie boni vel mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a holy
                     place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral action to be specifically good or bad.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 s. c."><a name="34333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34333] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
locus est circumstantia quaedam. Sed locus constituit actum moralem
in quadam specie mali, furari enim aliquid de loco sacro est
sacrilegium. Ergo circumstantia constituit actum moralem in aliqua
specie boni vel mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as the species of natural things are constituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are constituted
                     by forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident from what was said above
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q18_A10-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. But since nature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some ultimate
                     form, giving a specific difference, after which no further specific difference is possible. Hence it
                     is that in natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference constituting the species.
                     But the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And consequently
                     that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by
                     the directing reason, as the principal condition of the object that determines the action's species. Thus to appropriate
                     another's property is specified by reason of the property being "another's," and in this respect it is placed in the species
                     of theft; and if we consider that action also in its bearing on place or time, then this will be an additional circumstance.
                     But since the reason can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that the condition as to place, in relation
                     to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason forbids damage to be done to a holy
                     place. Consequently to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to the order of reason. And thus place, which
                     was first of all considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the principal condition of the object, and as itself
                     repugnant to reason. And in this way, whenever a circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it
                     must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 co."><a name="34334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34334] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut species rerum naturalium constituuntur ex
naturalibus formis, ita species moralium actuum constituuntur ex
formis prout sunt a ratione conceptae, sicut ex supradictis patet.
Quia vero natura determinata est ad unum, nec potest esse processus
naturae in infinitum, necesse est pervenire ad aliquam ultimam
formam, ex qua sumatur differentia specifica, post quam alia
differentia specifica esse non possit. Et inde est quod in rebus
naturalibus, id quod est accidens alicui rei, non potest accipi ut
differentia constituens speciem. Sed processus rationis non est
determinatus ad aliquid unum, sed quolibet dato, potest ulterius
procedere. Et ideo quod in uno actu accipitur ut circumstantia
superaddita obiecto quod determinat speciem actus, potest iterum
accipi a ratione ordinante ut principalis conditio obiecti
determinantis speciem actus. Sicut tollere alienum habet speciem ex
ratione alieni, ex hoc enim constituitur in specie furti, et si
consideretur super hoc ratio loci vel temporis, se habebit in
ratione circumstantiae. Sed quia ratio etiam de loco vel de
tempore, et aliis huiusmodi, ordinare potest; contingit conditionem
loci circa obiectum accipi ut contrariam ordini rationis; puta quod
ratio ordinat non esse iniuriam faciendam loco sacro. Unde tollere
aliquid alienum de loco sacro addit specialem repugnantiam ad
ordinem rationis. Et ideo locus, qui prius considerabatur ut
circumstantia, nunc consideratur ut principalis conditio obiecti
rationi repugnans. Et per hunc modum, quandocumque aliqua
circumstantia respicit specialem ordinem rationis vel pro vel
contra, oportet quod circumstantia det speciem actui morali vel
bono vel malo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an action, is considered as a condition of the object, as stated above, and as
                     being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="34335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34335] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod circumstantia secundum quod dat speciem actui,
consideratur ut quaedam conditio obiecti, sicut dictum est, et
quasi quaedam specifica differentia eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but when
                     it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does specify the action.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="34336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34336] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod circumstantia manens in ratione circumstantiae, cum
habeat rationem accidentis, non dat speciem, sed inquantum mutatur
in principalem conditionem obiecti, secundum hoc dat speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A10-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not every circumstance that places the moral action in the species of good or evil; since not every circumstance implies
                     accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently, although one action may have many circumstances, it does not follow that it
                     is in many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should not be in several, even disparate, moral species,
                     as said above (A[7], ad 1;
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q18_A10-p9.1" shape="rect"> Q[1], A[3]</a>, ad 3).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="34337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34337] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non omnis circumstantia constituit actum moralem in
aliqua specie boni vel mali, cum non quaelibet circumstantia
importet aliquam consonantiam vel dissonantiam ad rationem. Unde
non oportet, licet sint multae circumstantiae unius actus, quod
unus actus sit in pluribus speciebus. Licet etiam non sit
inconveniens quod unus actus moralis sit in pluribus speciebus
moris etiam disparatis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q18_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q18_A11-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 11. Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places a moral action in a species of good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every circumstance relating to good or evil, specifies an action. For good and evil are specific differences
                     of moral actions. Therefore that which causes a difference in the goodness or malice of a moral action, causes a specific
                     difference, which is the same as to make it differ in species. Now that which makes an action better or worse, makes it differ
                     in goodness and malice. Therefore it causes it to differ in species. Therefore every
                     circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="34338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34338] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis circumstantia
pertinens ad bonitatem vel malitiam, det speciem actui. Bonum enim
et malum sunt differentiae specificae moralium actuum. Quod ergo
facit differentiam in bonitate vel malitia moralis actus, facit
differre secundum differentiam specificam, quod est differre
secundum speciem. Sed id quod addit in bonitate vel malitia actus,
facit differre secundum bonitatem et malitiam. Ergo facit differre
secundum speciem. Ergo omnis circumstantia addens in bonitate vel
malitia actus, constituit speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an additional circumstance either has in itself the character of goodness or malice, or it has not. If not, it cannot
                     make the action better or worse; because what is not good, cannot make a greater good; and what is not evil, cannot make a
                     greater evil. But if it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this very reason it has a certain species of good
                     or evil. Therefore every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a
                     new species of good or evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="34339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34339] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
aut circumstantia adveniens habet in se aliquam rationem bonitatis
vel malitiae, aut non. Si non, non potest addere in bonitate vel
malitia actus, quia quod non est bonum, non potest facere maius
bonum; et quod non est malum, non potest facere maius malum. Si
autem habet in se rationem bonitatis vel malitiae, ex hoc ipso
habet quandam speciem boni vel mali. Ergo omnis circumstantia
augens bonitatem vel malitiam, constituit novam speciem boni vel
mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is caused by each single defect." Now every circumstance that increases
                     malice, has a special defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds a new species of sin. And for the same reason, every
                     circumstance that increases goodness, seems to add a new species of goodness: just as every unity added to a number makes
                     a new species of number; since the good consists in "number, weight, and measure" (
                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q18_A11-p4.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[5], A[5]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="34340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34340] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>malum causatur ex
singularibus defectibus</i>. Quaelibet autem circumstantia
aggravans malitiam, habet specialem defectum. Ergo quaelibet
circumstantia addit novam speciem peccati. Et eadem ratione,
quaelibet augens bonitatem, videtur addere novam speciem boni,
sicut quaelibet unitas addita numero, facit novam speciem numeri;
bonum enim consistit in numero, pondere et mensura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> More and less do not change a species. But more and less is a circumstance of additional goodness or malice. Therefore not
                     every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, places it in a species of good or evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 s. c."><a name="34341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34341] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Sed magis et minus est
circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia. Ergo non omnis
circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia, constituit actum
moralem in specie boni vel mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A10" id="FS_Q18_A11-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[10])</a>, a circumstance gives the species of good or evil to a moral action, in so far as it regards a special order of reason. Now
                     it happens sometimes that a circumstance does not regard a special order of reason in respect of good or evil, except on the
                     supposition of another previous circumstance, from which the moral action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to take
                     something in a large or small quantity,
                     does not regard the order of reason in respect of good or evil, except a certain other condition be presupposed, from which
                     the action takes its malice or goodness; for instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which makes the action to be discordant
                     with reason. Wherefore to take what belongs to another in a large or small quantity, does not change the species of the sin.
                     Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin. The same applies to other evil or good actions. Consequently not
                     every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, changes its species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 co."><a name="34342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34342] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, circumstantia dat speciem boni vel
mali actui morali, inquantum respicit specialem ordinem rationis.
Contingit autem quandoque quod circumstantia non respicit ordinem
rationis in bono vel malo, nisi praesupposita alia circumstantia, a
qua actus moralis habet speciem boni vel mali. Sicut tollere
aliquid in magna quantitate vel parva, non respicit ordinem
rationis in bono vel malo, nisi praesupposita aliqua alia
conditione, per quam actus habeat malitiam vel bonitatem, puta hoc
quod est esse alienum, quod repugnat rationi. Unde tollere alienum
in magna vel parva quantitate, non diversificat speciem peccati.
Tamen potest aggravare vel diminuere peccatum. Et similiter est in
aliis malis vel bonis. Unde non omnis circumstantia addens in
bonitate vel malitia, variat speciem moralis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In things which can be more or less intense, the difference of more or less does not change the species: thus by differing
                     in whiteness through being more or less white a thing is not changed in regard to its species of color. In like manner that
                     which makes an action to be more or less good or evil, does not make the action differ in species.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="34343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34343] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod in his quae intenduntur et remittuntur,
differentia intensionis et remissionis non diversificat speciem,
sicut quod differt in albedine secundum magis et minus, non differt
secundum speciem coloris. Et similiter quod facit diversitatem in
bono vel malo secundum intensionem et remissionem, non facit
differentiam moralis actus secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance that aggravates a sin, or adds to the goodness of an action, sometimes has no goodness or malice in itself,
                     but in regard to some other condition of the action, as stated above. Consequently it does not add a new species, but adds
                     to the goodness or malice derived from this other condition of the action.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="34344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34344] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod circumstantia aggravans peccatum, vel augens
bonitatem actus, quandoque non habet bonitatem vel malitiam
secundum se, sed per ordinem ad aliam conditionem actus, ut dictum
est. Et ideo non dat novam speciem, sed auget bonitatem vel
malitiam quae est ex alia conditione actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q18_A11-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A circumstance does not always involve a distinct defect of its own; sometimes it causes a defect in reference to something
                     else. In like manner a circumstance does not always add further perfection, except in reference to something else. And, for
                     as much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or malice, it does not always change the species of good or evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 18 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="34345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34345] Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non quaelibet circumstantia inducit singularem
defectum secundum seipsam, sed solum secundum ordinem ad aliquid
aliud. Et similiter non semper addit novam perfectionem, nisi per
comparationem ad aliquid aliud. Et pro tanto, licet augeat
bonitatem vel malitiam, non semper variat speciem boni vel
mali.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q19" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q19-p0.1">Q. 19. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL (TEN ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q19-p2"> We must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will; under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q19-p3"><a href="#FS_Q19_A1"> (1) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the subject?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p4"><a href="#FS_Q19_A2"> (2) Whether it depends on the object alone?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p5"><a href="#FS_Q19_A3"> (3) Whether it depends on reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p6"><a href="#FS_Q19_A4"> (4) Whether it depends on the eternal law?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p7"><a href="#FS_Q19_A5"> (5) Whether erring reason binds?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p8"><a href="#FS_Q19_A6"> (6) Whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against the law of God?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p9"><a href="#FS_Q19_A7"> (7) Whether the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depends on the intention of the end?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p10"><a href="#FS_Q19_A8"> (8) Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p11"><a href="#FS_Q19_A9"> (9) Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine Will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q19-p12"><a href="#FS_Q19_A10"> (10) Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine Will, as regards the
                  thing willed?
               </a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 pr."><a name="34346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34346]
Iª-IIae q. 19 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
bonitate actus interioris voluntatis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur
decem. Primo, utrum bonitas voluntatis dependeat ex obiecto.
Secundo, utrum ex solo obiecto dependeat. Tertio, utrum dependeat
ex ratione. Quarto, utrum dependeat ex lege aeterna. Quinto, utrum
ratio errans obliget. Sexto, utrum voluntas contra legem Dei
sequens rationem errantem, sit mala. Septimo, utrum bonitas
voluntatis in his quae sunt ad finem, dependeat ex intentione
finis. Octavo, utrum quantitas bonitatis vel malitiae in voluntate,
sequatur quantitatem boni vel mali in intentione. Nono, utrum
bonitas voluntatis dependeat ex conformitate ad voluntatem divinam.
Decimo, utrum necesse sit voluntatem humanam conformari divinae
voluntati in volito, ad hoc quod sit bona.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q19_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A1-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 1. Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the object. For the will cannot be directed otherwise than
                     to what is good: since "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). If therefore the goodness
                     of the will depended on the object, it would follow that every act of the will is good, and none bad.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34347] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis non dependeat ex
obiecto. Voluntas enim non potest esse nisi boni, quia malum est
praeter voluntatem, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Si
igitur bonitas voluntatis iudicaretur ex obiecto, sequeretur quod
omnis voluntas esset bona, et nulla esset mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is first of all in the end: wherefore the goodness of the end, as such, does not depend on any other. But,
                     according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), "goodness of action is the end, but goodness of making is never the end": because
                     the latter is always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. Therefore the goodness of the act of the will does not depend
                     on any object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34348] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
bonum per prius invenitur in fine, unde bonitas finis, inquantum
huiusmodi, non dependet ab aliquo alio. Sed secundum philosophum,
in VI Ethic., <i>bona actio est finis, licet factio nunquam sit
finis</i>, ordinatur enim semper, sicut ad finem, ad aliquid
factum. Ergo bonitas actus voluntatis non dependet ex aliquo
obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a thing to be. But the object of the will is good, by reason of the goodness
                     of nature. Therefore it cannot give moral goodness to the will. Therefore the moral goodness of the will does not depend on
                     the object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34349] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
unumquodque quale est, tale alterum facit. Sed obiectum voluntatis
est bonum bonitate naturae. Non ergo potest praestare voluntati
bonitatem moralem. Moralis ergo bonitas voluntatis non dependet ex
obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is that habit "from which men wish for just things": and accordingly, virtue
                     is a habit from which men wish for good things. But a good will is one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore the goodness
                     of the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34350] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod iustitia est secundum
quam aliqui volunt iusta, et eadem ratione, virtus est secundum
quam aliqui volunt bona. Sed bona voluntas est quae est secundum
virtutem. Ergo bonitas voluntatis est ex hoc quod aliquis vult
bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Good and evil are essential differences of the act of the will. Because good and evil of themselves regard the will; just
                     as truth and falsehood regard reason; the act of which is divided essentially by the difference of truth and falsehood, for
                     as much as an opinion is said to be true or false. Consequently good and evil will are acts differing in species. Now the
                     specific difference in acts is according to objects, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q19_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a>). Therefore good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly from the objects.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 co."><a name="34351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34351] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod bonum et malum sunt per se differentiae actus
voluntatis. Nam bonum et malum per se ad voluntatem pertinent;
sicut verum et falsum ad rationem, cuius actus per se distinguitur
differentia veri et falsi, prout dicimus opinionem esse veram vel
falsam. Unde voluntas bona et mala sunt actus differentes secundum
speciem. Differentia autem speciei in actibus est secundum obiecta,
ut dictum est. Et ideo bonum et malum in actibus voluntatis proprie
attenditur secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will is not always directed to what is truly good, but sometimes to the apparent good; which has indeed some measure
                     of good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence it is that the act of the will is not always good,
                     but sometimes evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34352] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod voluntas non semper est veri boni, sed quandoque
est apparentis boni, quod quidem habet aliquam rationem boni, non
tamen simpliciter convenientis ad appetendum. Et propter hoc actus
voluntatis non est bonus semper, sed aliquando malus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although an action can, in a certain way, be man's last end; nevertheless such action is not an act of the will, as stated
                     above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q19_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a>, ad 2).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34353] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, quamvis aliquis actus possit esse ultimus finis
hominis secundum aliquem modum, non tamen talis actus est actus
voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is presented to the will as its object by the reason: and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters the moral
                     order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will: because the reason is the principle of human and moral acts, as stated
                     above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q19_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34354] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod bonum per rationem repraesentatur voluntati ut
obiectum; et inquantum cadit sub ordine rationis, pertinet ad genus
moris, et causat bonitatem moralem in actu voluntatis. Ratio enim
principium est humanorum et moralium actuum, ut supra dictum
est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A2-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 2. Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relationship to
                     the will than to any other power. But the acts of the other powers derive goodness not only from the object but also from
                     the end, as we have shown above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q19_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[18] , A[4]</a>). Therefore the act also of the will derives goodness not only from the object but also from the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34355] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis non dependeat solum
ex obiecto. Finis enim affinior est voluntati quam alteri
potentiae. Sed actus aliarum potentiarum recipiunt bonitatem non
solum ex obiecto, sed etiam ex fine, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo
etiam actus voluntatis recipit bonitatem non solum ex obiecto, sed
etiam ex fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the goodness of an action is derived not only from the object but also from the circumstances, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A3" id="FS_Q19_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[3]</a>). But according to the diversity of circumstances there may be diversity of goodness and malice in the act of the will: for
                     instance, if a man will, when he ought, where he ought, as much as he ought, and how he ought, or if he will as he ought not.
                     Therefore the goodness of the will depends not only on
                     the object, but also on the circumstances.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34356] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
bonitas actus non solum est ex obiecto, sed etiam ex
circumstantiis, ut supra dictum est. Sed secundum diversitatem
circumstantiarum contingit esse diversitatem bonitatis et malitiae
in actu voluntatis, puta quod aliquis velit quando debet et ubi
debet, et quantum debet, et quomodo debet, vel prout non debet.
Ergo bonitas voluntatis non solum dependet ex obiecto, sed etiam ex
circumstantiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q6_A8" id="FS_Q19_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[8]</a>). But it would not be so, unless the goodness or malice of the will depended on the circumstances. Therefore the goodness
                     and malice of the will depend on the circumstances, and not only on the object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34357] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
ignorantia circumstantiarum excusat malitiam voluntatis, ut supra
habitum est. Sed hoc non esset, nisi bonitas et malitia voluntatis
a circumstantiis dependeret. Ergo bonitas et malitia voluntatis
dependet ex circumstantiis, et non a solo obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> An action does not take its species from the circumstances as such, as stated above (Q[18], A[10], ad 2). But good and evil
                     are specific differences of the act of the will, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q19_A1" id="FS_Q19_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend, not on the circumstances, but on the object alone.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34358] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
ex circumstantiis, inquantum huiusmodi, actus non habet speciem, ut
supra dictum est. Sed bonum et malum sunt specificae differentiae
actus voluntatis, ut dictum est. Ergo bonitas et malitia voluntatis
non dependet ex circumstantiis, sed ex solo obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In every genus, the more a thing is first, the more simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it consists: thus
                     primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be observed that the first things in every genus, are, in some way, simple and consist
                     of one principle. Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human actions is taken from the act of the will. Consequently
                     the goodness and malice of the act of the will depend on some one thing; while the
                     goodness and malice of other acts may depend on several things.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A2-p7"> Now that one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not something accidental to that genus, but something essential
                     thereto: because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as to its principle. Therefore the goodness of
                     the will's act depends on that one thing alone, which of itself causes goodness in the act; and that one thing is the object,
                     and not the circumstances, which are accidents, as it were, of the act.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 co."><a name="34359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34359] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod in quolibet genere, quanto aliquid est prius, tanto
est simplicius et in paucioribus consistens, sicut prima corpora
sunt simplicia. Et ideo invenimus quod ea quae sunt prima in
quolibet genere, sunt aliquo modo simplicia, et in uno consistunt.
Principium autem bonitatis et malitiae humanorum actuum est ex actu
voluntatis. Et ideo bonitas et malitia voluntatis secundum aliquid
unum attenditur, aliorum vero actuum bonitas et malitia potest
secundum diversa attendi. Illud autem unum quod est principium in
quolibet genere, non est per accidens, sed per se, quia omne quod
est per accidens, reducitur ad id quod est per se, sicut ad
principium. Et ideo bonitas voluntatis ex solo uno illo dependet,
quod per se facit bonitatem in actu, scilicet ex obiecto, et non ex
circumstantiis, quae sunt quaedam accidentia actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the goodness derived
                     from the object, does not differ from that which is derived from the end, as they differ in the acts of the other powers;
                     except perhaps accidentally, in so far as one end depends on another, and one act of the will on another.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34360] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod finis est obiectum voluntatis, non autem aliarum
virium. Unde quantum ad actum voluntatis, non differt bonitas quae
est ex obiecto, a bonitate quae est ex fine, sicut in actibus
aliarum virium, nisi forte per accidens, prout finis dependet ex
fine, et voluntas ex voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good, no circumstances can make that act bad. Consequently when it is said
                     that a man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought not, this can be understood in two ways. First, so that this
                     circumstance is referred to the thing willed. And thus the act of the will is not fixed on something good: since to will to
                     do something when it ought not to be done, is not to will something good. Secondly, so
                     that the circumstance is referred to the act of willing. And thus, it is impossible to will something good when one ought
                     not to, because one ought always to will what is good: except, perhaps, accidentally, in so far as a man by willing some particular
                     good, is prevented from willing at the same time another good which he ought to will at that time. And then evil results,
                     not from his willing that particular good, but from his not willing the other. The same applies to the other
                     circumstances.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34361] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, supposito quod voluntas sit boni, nulla
circumstantia potest eam facere malam. Quod ergo dicitur quod
aliquis vult aliquod bonum quando non debet vel ubi non debet,
potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ita quod ista circumstantia
referatur ad volitum. Et sic voluntas non est boni, quia velle
facere aliquid quando non debet fieri, non est velle bonum. Alio
modo, ita quod referatur ad actum volendi. Et sic impossibile est
quod aliquis velit bonum quando non debet, quia semper homo debet
velle bonum, nisi forte per accidens, inquantum aliquis, volendo
hoc bonum, impeditur ne tunc velit aliquod bonum debitum. Et tunc
non incidit malum ex eo quod aliquis vult illud bonum; sed ex eo
quod non vult aliud bonum. Et similiter dicendum est de aliis
circumstantiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will, in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed: that is to
                     say, in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act which he wills.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34362] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod circumstantiarum ignorantia excusat malitiam
voluntatis, secundum quod circumstantiae se tenent ex parte voliti,
inquantum scilicet ignorat circumstantias actus quem vult.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A3-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 3. Whether the goodness of the will depends on reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on reason. For what comes first does not depend on what follows.
                     But the good belongs to the will before it belongs to reason, as is clear from what has been said above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q19_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34363] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis non dependeat a
ratione. Prius enim non dependet a posteriori. Sed bonum per prius
pertinet ad voluntatem quam ad rationem, ut ex supradictis patet.
Ergo bonum voluntatis non dependet a ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that the goodness of the practical intellect is "a truth that is in conformity
                     with right desire." But right desire is a good will. Therefore the goodness of the practical reason depends on the goodness
                     of the will, rather than conversely.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34364] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod bonitas intellectus practici
est verum conforme appetitui recto. Appetitus autem rectus est
voluntas bona. Ergo bonitas rationis practicae magis dependet a
bonitate voluntatis, quam e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the mover does not depend on that which is moved, but vice versa. But the will moves the reason and the other powers,
                     as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q19_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34365] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
movens non dependet ab eo quod movetur, sed e converso. Voluntas
autem movet rationem et alias vires, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
bonitas voluntatis non dependet a ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. x): "It is an unruly will that persists in its desires in opposition to reason." But the goodness of
                     the will consists in not being unruly. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its being subject to reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34366] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Hilarius dicit, in X de Trin., <i>immoderata est omnis
susceptarum voluntatum pertinacia, ubi non rationi voluntas
subiicitur</i>. Sed bonitas voluntatis consistit in hoc quod non
sit immoderata. Ergo bonitas voluntatis dependet ex hoc quod sit
subiecta rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q19_A1" id="FS_Q19_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2), the goodness of the will depends properly on the object. Now the will's object is proposed to it by reason. Because the
                     good understood is the proportionate object of the will; while sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate not to the will
                     but to the sensitive appetite: since the will can tend to the universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas the sensitive
                     appetite tends only to the particular
                     good, apprehended by the sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason, in the same way as it depends
                     on the object.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 co."><a name="34367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34367] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonitas voluntatis proprie ex
obiecto dependet. Obiectum autem voluntatis proponitur ei per
rationem. Nam bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis
proportionatum ei; bonum autem sensibile, vel imaginarium, non est
proportionatum voluntati, sed appetitui sensitivo, quia voluntas
potest tendere in bonum universale, quod ratio apprehendit;
appetitus autem sensitivus non tendit nisi in bonum particulare,
quod apprehendit vis sensitiva. Et ideo bonitas voluntatis dependet
a ratione, eo modo quo dependet ab obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good considered as such, i.e. as appetible, pertains to the will before pertaining to the reason. But considered as true
                     it pertains to the reason, before, under the aspect of goodness, pertaining to the will: because the will cannot desire a
                     good that is not previously apprehended by reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34368] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod bonum sub ratione boni, idest appetibilis, per
prius pertinet ad voluntatem quam ad rationem. Sed tamen per prius
pertinet ad rationem sub ratione veri, quam ad voluntatem sub
ratione appetibilis, quia appetitus voluntatis non potest esse de
bono, nisi prius a ratione apprehendatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher speaks here of the practical intellect, in so far as it counsels and reasons about the means: for in this
                     respect it is perfected by prudence. Now in regard to the means, the rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with
                     the desire of a due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes on the part of reason a right apprehension
                     of the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34369] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de intellectu practico,
secundum quod est consiliativus et ratiocinativus eorum quae sunt
ad finem, sic enim perficitur per prudentiam. In his autem quae
sunt ad finem, rectitudo rationis consistit in conformitate ad
appetitum finis debiti. Sed tamen et ipse appetitus finis debiti
praesupponit rectam apprehensionem de fine, quae est per
rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will moves the reason in one way: the reason moves the will in another, viz. on the part of the object, as stated above
                     (
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q19_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34370] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod voluntas quodam modo movet rationem; et ratio alio
modo movet voluntatem, ex parte scilicet obiecti, ut supra dictum
est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A4-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 4. Whether the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend on the eternal law. Because to one thing there is one rule
                     and one measure. But the rule of the human will, on which its goodness depends, is right reason. Therefore the goodness of
                     the will does not depend on the eternal law.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34371] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis humanae non
dependeat a lege aeterna. Unius enim una est regula et mensura. Sed
regula humanae voluntatis, ex qua eius bonitas dependet, est ratio
recta. Ergo non dependet bonitas voluntatis a lege aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "a measure is homogeneous with the thing measured" (Metaph. x, 1). But the eternal law is not homogeneous with the
                     human will. Therefore the eternal law cannot be the measure on which the goodness of the human will depends.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34372] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
mensura est homogenea mensurato, ut dicitur X Metaphys. Sed lex
aeterna non est homogenea voluntati humanae. Ergo lex aeterna non
potest esse mensura voluntatis humanae, ut ab ea bonitas eius
dependeat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a measure should be most certain. But the eternal law is unknown to us. Therefore it cannot be the measure on which
                     the goodness of our will depends.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34373] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
mensura debet esse certissima. Sed lex aeterna est nobis ignota.
Ergo non potest esse nostrae voluntatis mensura, ut ab ea bonitas
voluntatis nostrae dependeat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that "sin is a deed, word or desire against the eternal law." But malice of the will
                     is the root of sin. Therefore, since malice is contrary to goodness, the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34374] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, XXII libro contra Faustum, quod
<i>peccatum est factum, dictum vel concupitum aliquid contra
aeternam legem</i>. Sed malitia voluntatis est radix peccati. Ergo,
cum malitia bonitati opponatur, bonitas voluntatis dependet a lege
aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one another, the effect depends more on the first than on the second cause:
                     since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first. Now it is from the eternal law, which is the Divine Reason, that
                     human reason is the rule of the human will, from which the human derives its goodness. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.6" target="asv">Ps. 4:6,7</a>): "Many say: Who showeth us good things? The light of Thy countenance, O Lord,
                     is signed upon us": as though to say: "The light of our reason is able to show us good things, and guide our will, in so far
                     as it is the light (i.e. derived from) Thy countenance." It is therefore evident that the goodness of the human will depends
                     on the eternal law much more than on human reason: and when human reason fails we must have recourse to the Eternal Reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 co."><a name="34375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34375] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod in omnibus causis ordinatis, effectus plus dependet a
causa prima quam a causa secunda, quia causa secunda non agit nisi
in virtute primae causae. Quod autem ratio humana sit regula
voluntatis humanae, ex qua eius bonitas mensuretur, habet ex lege
aeterna, quae est ratio divina. Unde in Psalmo IV, dicitur,
<i>multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona? Signatum est super nos
lumen vultus tui, domine</i>, quasi diceret, lumen rationis quod in
nobis est, intantum potest nobis ostendere bona, et nostram
voluntatem regulare, inquantum est lumen vultus tui, idest a vultu
tuo derivatum. Unde manifestum est quod multo magis dependet
bonitas voluntatis humanae a lege aeterna, quam a ratione humana,
et ubi deficit humana ratio, oportet ad rationem aeternam
recurrere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To one thing there are not several proximate measures; but there can be several measures if one is subordinate to the other.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34376] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod unius rei non sunt plures mensurae proximae,
possunt tamen esse plures mensurae, quarum una sub alia
ordinetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A proximate measure is homogeneous with the thing measured; a remote measure is not.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34377] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod mensura proxima est homogenea mensurato, non autem
mensura remota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the Divine Mind: nevertheless, it becomes known to us somewhat,
                     either by natural reason which is derived therefrom as its proper image; or by some sort of additional revelation.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34378] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, licet lex aeterna sit nobis ignota secundum quod est
in mente divina; innotescit tamen nobis aliqualiter vel per
rationem naturalem, quae ab ea derivatur ut propria eius imago; vel
per aliqualem revelationem superadditam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A5-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 5. Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not evil when it is at variance with erring reason. Because the reason is the rule of the
                     human will, in so far as it is derived from the eternal law, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q19_A4" id="FS_Q19_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. But erring reason is not derived from the eternal law. Therefore erring reason is not the rule of the human will. Therefore
                     the will is not evil, if it be at variance with erring reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34379] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas discordans a ratione errante,
non sit mala. Ratio enim est regula voluntatis humanae, inquantum
derivatur a lege aeterna, ut dictum est. Sed ratio errans non
derivatur a lege aeterna. Ergo ratio errans non est regula
voluntatis humanae. Non est ergo voluntas mala, si discordat a
ratione errante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine, the command of a lower authority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher
                     authority: for instance, if a provincial governor command something that is forbidden by the emperor. But erring reason sometimes
                     proposes what is against the command of a higher power, namely, God Whose power is supreme. Therefore the decision of an erring
                     reason does not bind. Consequently the will is not evil if it be at variance with
                     erring reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34380] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
secundum Augustinum, inferioris potestatis praeceptum non obligat,
si contrarietur praecepto potestatis superioris, sicut si proconsul
iubeat aliquid quod imperator prohibet. Sed ratio errans quandoque
proponit aliquid quod est contra praeceptum superioris, scilicet
Dei, cuius est summa potestas. Ergo dictamen rationis errantis non
obligat. Non est ergo voluntas mala, si discordet a ratione
errante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every evil will is reducible to some species of malice. But the will that is at variance with erring reason is not
                     reducible to some species of malice. For instance, if a man's reason err in telling him to commit fornication, his will in
                     not willing to do so, cannot be reduced to any species of malice. Therefore the will is not evil when it is at variance with
                     erring reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34381] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
omnis voluntas mala reducitur ad aliquam speciem malitiae. Sed
voluntas discordans a ratione errante, non potest reduci ad aliquam
speciem malitiae, puta, si ratio errans errat in hoc, quod dicat
esse fornicandum, voluntas eius qui fornicari non vult, ad nullam
malitiam reduci potest. Ergo voluntas discordans a ratione errante,
non est mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> As stated in the
                     <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A13" id="FS_Q19_A5-p5.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[13]</a>, conscience is nothing else than the application of knowledge to some action. Now knowledge is in the reason. Therefore when
                     the will is at variance with erring reason, it is against conscience. But every such will is evil; for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv">Rom. 14:23</a>): "All that is not of faith"---i.e. all that is against conscience---"is sin." Therefore the will is evil when it is at
                     variance with erring reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34382] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
sicut in primo dictum est, conscientia nihil aliud est quam
applicatio scientiae ad aliquem actum. Scientia autem in ratione
est. Voluntas ergo discordans a ratione errante, est contra
conscientiam. Sed omnis talis voluntas est mala, dicitur enim Rom.
XIV, <i>omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est</i>, idest omne
quod est contra conscientiam. Ergo voluntas discordans a ratione
errante, est mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason (for it is an application of knowledge to action, as was stated in the

                     <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A13" id="FS_Q19_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[19], A[13]</a>), to inquire whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason, is the same as to inquire "whether an erring
                     conscience binds." On this matter, some distinguished three kinds of actions: for some are good generically; some are indifferent;
                     some are evil generically. And they say
                     that if reason or conscience tell us to do something which is good generically, there is no error: and in like manner if it
                     tell us not to do something which is evil generically; since it is the same reason that prescribes what is good and forbids
                     what is evil. On the other hand if a man's reason or conscience tells him that he is bound by precept to do what is evil in
                     itself; or that what is good in itself, is forbidden, then his reason or conscience errs. In like manner if a man's reason
                     or
                     conscience tell him, that what is indifferent in itself, for instance to raise a straw from the ground, is forbidden or commanded,
                     his reason or conscience errs. They say, therefore, that reason or conscience when erring in matters of indifference, either
                     by commanding or by forbidding them, binds: so that the will which is at variance with that erring reason is evil and sinful.
                     But they say that when reason or conscience errs in commanding what is evil in itself, or in forbidding what is good
                     in itself and necessary for salvation, it does not bind; wherefore in such cases the will which is at variance with erring
                     reason or conscience is not evil.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A5-p7"> But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference, the will that is at variance with erring reason or conscience,
                     is evil in some way on account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the will depends; not indeed on account of
                     the object according as it is in its own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by reason as something evil
                     to do or to avoid. And since the object of the will is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above

                     <a href="#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q19_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And this
                     is the case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good or evil in themselves. For not only indifferent
                     matters can received the character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which is good, can receive the character
                     of evil, or that which is evil, can receive the character of goodness, on account of the
                     reason apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from fornication is good: yet the will does not tend to this good
                     except in so far as it is proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose it as an evil, the will tends to
                     it as to something evil. Consequently the will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that which is evil in itself, but
                     that which is evil accidentally, through being apprehended as such by the reason. In like manner, to believe in Christ is
                     good
                     in itself, and necessary for salvation: but the will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason.
                     Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as something evil, the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it were
                     evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the apprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
                     vii, 9) that "properly speaking the incontinent man is one who does not follow right reason; but accidentally, he is also
                     one who does not follow false reason." We must therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at variance with reason,
                     whether right or erring, is always evil.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 co."><a name="34383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34383] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, cum conscientia sit quodammodo dictamen rationis
(est enim quaedam applicatio scientiae ad actum, ut in primo dictum
est), idem est quaerere utrum voluntas discordans a ratione errante
sit mala, quod quaerere utrum conscientia errans obliget. Circa
quod, aliqui distinxerunt tria genera actuum, quidam enim sunt boni
ex genere; quidam sunt indifferentes; quidam sunt mali ex genere.
Dicunt ergo quod, si ratio vel conscientia dicat aliquid esse
faciendum quod sit bonum ex suo genere, non est ibi error.
Similiter, si dicat aliquid non esse faciendum quod est malum ex
suo genere, eadem enim ratione praecipiuntur bona, qua prohibentur
mala. Sed si ratio vel conscientia dicat alicui quod illa quae sunt
secundum se mala, homo teneatur facere ex praecepto; vel quod illa
quae sunt secundum se bona, sint prohibita; erit ratio vel
conscientia errans. Et similiter si ratio vel conscientia dicat
alicui quod id quod est secundum se indifferens, ut levare festucam
de terra, sit prohibitum vel praeceptum, erit ratio vel conscientia
errans. Dicunt ergo quod ratio vel conscientia errans circa
indifferentia, sive praecipiendo sive prohibendo, obligat, ita quod
voluntas discordans a tali ratione errante, erit mala et peccatum.
Sed ratio vel conscientia errans praecipiendo ea quae sunt per se
mala, vel prohibendo ea quae sunt per se bona et necessaria ad
salutem, non obligat, unde in talibus voluntas discordans a ratione
vel conscientia errante, non est mala. Sed hoc irrationabiliter
dicitur. In indifferentibus enim, voluntas discordans a ratione vel
conscientia errante, est mala aliquo modo propter obiectum, a quo
bonitas vel malitia voluntatis dependet, non autem propter obiectum
secundum sui naturam; sed secundum quod per accidens a ratione
apprehenditur ut malum ad faciendum vel ad vitandum. Et quia
obiectum voluntatis est id quod proponitur a ratione, ut dictum
est, ex quo aliquid proponitur a ratione ut malum, voluntas, dum in
illud fertur, accipit rationem mali. Hoc autem contingit non solum
in indifferentibus, sed etiam in per se bonis vel malis. Non solum
enim id quod est indifferens, potest accipere rationem boni vel
mali per accidens; sed etiam id quod est bonum, potest accipere
rationem mali, vel illud quod est malum, rationem boni, propter
apprehensionem rationis. Puta, abstinere a fornicatione bonum
quoddam est, tamen in hoc bonum non fertur voluntas, nisi secundum
quod a ratione proponitur. Si ergo proponatur ut malum a ratione
errante, feretur in hoc sub ratione mali. Unde voluntas erit mala,
quia vult malum, non quidem id quod est malum per se, sed id quod
est malum per accidens, propter apprehensionem rationis. Et
similiter credere in Christum est per se bonum, et necessarium ad
salutem, sed voluntas non fertur in hoc, nisi secundum quod a
ratione proponitur. Unde si a ratione proponatur ut malum, voluntas
feretur in hoc ut malum, non quia sit malum secundum se, sed quia
est malum per accidens ex apprehensione rationis. Et ideo
philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod, per se loquendo,
<i>incontinens est qui non sequitur rationem rectam, per accidens
autem, qui non sequitur etiam rationem falsam</i>. Unde dicendum
est simpliciter quod omnis voluntas discordans a ratione, sive
recta sive errante, semper est mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the judgment of an erring reason is not derived from God, yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment as being
                     true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is all truth.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34384] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod iudicium rationis errantis licet non derivetur a
Deo, tamen ratio errans iudicium suum proponit ut verum, et per
consequens ut a Deo derivatum, a quo est omnis veritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Augustine holds good when it is known that the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the command
                     of the higher authority. But if a man were to believe the command of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in scorning
                     the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of the emperor. In like manner if a man were to know that human reason
                     was dictating something contrary to God's commandment, he would not be
                     bound to abide by reason: but then reason would not be entirely erroneous. But when erring reason proposes something as being
                     commanded by God, then to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn the commandment of God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34385] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod verbum Augustini habet locum, quando cognoscitur quod
inferior potestas praecipit aliquid contra praeceptum superioris
potestatis. Sed si aliquis crederet quod praeceptum proconsulis
esset praeceptum imperatoris, contemnendo praeceptum proconsulis,
contemneret praeceptum imperatoris. Et similiter si aliquis homo
cognosceret quod ratio humana dictaret aliquid contra praeceptum
Dei, non teneretur rationem sequi, sed tunc ratio non totaliter
esset errans. Sed quando ratio errans proponit aliquid ut
praeceptum Dei, tunc idem est contemnere dictamen rationis, et Dei
praeceptum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whenever reason apprehends something as evil, it apprehends it under some species of evil; for instance, as being something
                     contrary to a divine precept, or as giving scandal, or for some such like reason. And then that evil is reduced to that species
                     of malice.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34386] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod ratio, quando apprehendit aliquid ut malum, semper
apprehendit illud sub aliqua ratione mali, puta quia contrariatur
divino praecepto, vel quia est scandalum, vel propter aliquid
huiusmodi. Et tunc ad talem speciem malitiae reducitur talis mala
voluntas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A6-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 6. Whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is good when it abides by erring reason. For just as the will, when at variance with the reason,
                     tends to that which reason judges to be evil; so, when in accord with reason, it tends to what reason judges to be good. But
                     the will is evil when it is at variance with reason, even when erring. Therefore even when it abides by erring reason, the
                     will is good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34387] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas concordans rationi erranti,
sit bona. Sicut enim voluntas discordans a ratione tendit in id
quod ratio iudicat malum; ita voluntas concordans rationi, tendit
in id quod ratio iudicat bonum. Sed voluntas discordans a ratione,
etiam errante, est mala. Ergo voluntas concordans rationi, etiam
erranti, est bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is always good, when it abides by the commandment of God and the eternal law. But the eternal law and God's
                     commandment are proposed to us by the apprehension of the reason, even when it errs. Therefore the will is good, even when
                     it abides by erring reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34388] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
voluntas concordans praecepto Dei et legi aeternae, semper est
bona. Sed lex aeterna et praeceptum Dei proponitur nobis per
apprehensionem rationis, etiam errantis. Ergo voluntas concordans
etiam rationi erranti, est bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also when it abides
                     by erring reason, it seems that the will is always evil when in conjunction with erring reason: so that in such a case a man
                     would be in a dilemma, and, of necessity, would sin: which is unreasonable. Therefore the will is good when it abides by erring
                     reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34389] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
voluntas discordans a ratione errante, est mala. Si ergo voluntas
concordans rationi erranti sit etiam mala, videtur quod omnis
voluntas habentis rationem errantem, sit mala. Et sic talis homo
erit perplexus, et ex necessitate peccabit, quod est inconveniens.
Ergo voluntas concordans rationi erranti, est bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The will of those who slew the apostles was evil. And yet it was in accord with the erring reason, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.16.2" target="asv"> Jn. 16:2</a>: "The hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a service to God." Therefore the will can be evil,
                     when it abides by erring reason.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34390] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
voluntas occidentium apostolos erat mala. Sed tamen concordabat
rationi erranti ipsorum, secundum illud Ioan. XVI, <i>venit hora,
ut omnis qui interficit vos, arbitretur obsequium se praestare
Deo</i>. Ergo voluntas concordans rationi erranti, potest esse
mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience binds"; so this question is the same
                     as inquiring "whether an erring conscience excuses." Now this question depends on what has been said above about ignorance.
                     For it was said (Q[6], A[8]) that ignorance sometimes causes an act to be involuntary, and sometimes not. And since moral
                     good and evil consist in action in so far as it is voluntary, as was stated above

                     <a href="#FS_Q19_A2" id="FS_Q19_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>; it is evident that when ignorance causes an act to be involuntary, it takes away the character of moral good and evil; but
                     not, when it does not cause the act to be involuntary. Again, it has been stated above (Q[6], A[8]) that when ignorance is
                     in any way willed, either directly or indirectly, it does not cause the act to be involuntary. And I call that ignorance "directly"
                     voluntary, to which the act of the will tends: and that, "indirectly" voluntary, which
                     is due to negligence, by reason of a man not wishing to know what he ought to know, as stated above (Q[6], A[8]).
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A6-p7"> If then reason or conscience err with an error that is involuntary, either directly, or through negligence, so that one errs
                     about what one ought to know; then such an error of reason or conscience does not excuse the will, that abides by that erring
                     reason or conscience, from being evil. But if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance, and without any negligence,
                     so that it cause the act to be involuntary, then that error of reason or conscience excuses the will,
                     that abides by that erring reason, from being evil. For instance, if erring reason tell a man that he should go to another
                     man's wife, the will that abides by that erring reason is evil; since this error arises from ignorance of the Divine Law,
                     which he is bound to know. But if a man's reason, errs in mistaking another for his wife, and if he wish to give her her right
                     when she asks for it, his will is excused from being evil: because this error arises from ignorance of a circumstance, which
                     ignorance excuses, and causes the act to be involuntary.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 co."><a name="34391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34391] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut praemissa quaestio eadem est cum quaestione
qua quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea liget; ita ista quaestio
eadem est cum illa qua quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea excuset.
Haec autem quaestio dependet ab eo quod supra de ignorantia dictum
est. Dictum est enim supra quod ignorantia quandoque causat
involuntarium, quandoque autem non. Et quia bonum et malum morale
consistit in actu inquantum est voluntarius, ut ex praemissis
patet; manifestum est quod illa ignorantia quae causat
involuntarium, tollit rationem boni et mali moralis; non autem illa
quae involuntarium non causat. Dictum est etiam supra quod
ignorantia quae est aliquo modo volita, sive directe sive
indirecte, non causat involuntarium. Et dico ignorantiam directe
voluntariam, in quam actus voluntatis fertur, indirecte autem,
propter negligentiam, ex eo quod aliquis non vult illud scire quod
scire tenetur, ut supra dictum est. Si igitur ratio vel conscientia
erret errore voluntario, vel directe, vel propter negligentiam,
quia est error circa id quod quis scire tenetur; tunc talis error
rationis vel conscientiae non excusat quin voluntas concordans
rationi vel conscientiae sic erranti, sit mala. Si autem sit error
qui causet involuntarium, proveniens ex ignorantia alicuius
circumstantiae absque omni negligentia; tunc talis error rationis
vel conscientiae excusat, ut voluntas concordans rationi erranti
non sit mala. Puta, si ratio errans dicat quod homo teneatur ad
uxorem alterius accedere, voluntas concordans huic rationi erranti
est mala, eo quod error iste provenit ex ignorantia legis Dei, quam
scire tenetur. Si autem ratio erret in hoc, quod credat aliquam
mulierem submissam, esse suam uxorem, et, ea petente debitum, velit
eam cognoscere; excusatur voluntas eius, ut non sit mala, quia
error iste ex ignorantia circumstantiae provenit, quae excusat, et
involuntarium causat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from the entire cause, evil from each particular defect." Consequently in
                     order that the thing to which the will tends be called evil, it suffices, either that it be evil in itself, or that it be
                     apprehended as evil. But in order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34392] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit in IV cap. de Div. Nom.,
<i>bonum causatur ex integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus
defectibus</i>. Et ideo ad hoc quod dicatur malum id in quod fertur
voluntas, sufficit sive quod secundum suam naturam sit malum, sive
quod apprehendatur ut malum. Sed ad hoc quod sit bonum, requiritur
quod utroque modo sit bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The eternal law cannot err, but human reason can. Consequently the will that abides by human reason, is not always right,
                     nor is it always in accord with the eternal law.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34393] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod lex aeterna errare non potest, sed ratio humana
potest errare. Et ideo voluntas concordans rationi humanae non
semper est recta, nec semper est concordans legis aeternae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in syllogistic arguments, granted one absurdity, others must needs follow; so in moral matters, given one absurdity,
                     others must follow too. Thus suppose a man to seek vainglory, he will sin, whether he does his duty for vainglory or whether
                     he omit to do it. Nor is he in a dilemma about the matter: because he can put aside his evil intention. In like manner, suppose
                     a man's reason or conscience to err through inexcusable ignorance, then evil
                     must needs result in the will. Nor is this man in a dilemma: because he can lay aside his error, since his ignorance is vincible
                     and voluntary.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34394] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut in syllogisticis, uno inconvenienti dato,
necesse est alia sequi; ita in moralibus, uno inconvenienti posito,
ex necessitate alia sequuntur. Sicut, supposito quod aliquis
quaerat inanem gloriam, sive propter inanem gloriam faciat quod
facere tenetur, sive dimittat, peccabit. Nec tamen est perplexus,
quia potest intentionem malam dimittere. Et similiter, supposito
errore rationis vel conscientiae qui procedit ex ignorantia non
excusante, necesse est quod sequatur malum in voluntate. Nec tamen
est homo perplexus, quia potest ab errore recedere, cum ignorantia
sit vincibilis et voluntaria.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A7-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 7. Whether the goodness of the will, as regards the means, depends on the intention of the end?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end. For it has been stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q19_A2" id="FS_Q19_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that the goodness of the will depends on the object alone. But as regards the means, the object of the will is one thing,
                     and the end intended is another. Therefore in such matters the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the
                     end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="34395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34395] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis non dependeat ex
intentione finis. Dictum est enim supra quod bonitas voluntatis
dependet ex solo obiecto. Sed in his quae sunt ad finem, aliud est
obiectum voluntatis, et aliud finis intentus. Ergo in talibus
bonitas voluntatis non dependet ab intentione finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to wish to keep God's commandment, belongs to a good will. But this can be referred to an evil end, for instance,
                     to vainglory or covetousness, by willing to obey God for the sake of temporal gain. Therefore the goodness of the will does
                     not depend on the intention of the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="34396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34396] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
velle servare mandatum Dei, pertinet ad voluntatem bonam. Sed hoc
potest referri ad malum finem, scilicet ad finem inanis gloriae,
vel cupiditatis, dum aliquis vult obedire Deo propter temporalia
consequenda. Ergo bonitas voluntatis non dependet ab intentione
finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as good and evil diversify the will, so do they diversify the end. But malice of the will does not depend on
                     the malice of the end intended; since a man who wills to steal in order to give alms, has an evil will, although he intends
                     a good end. Therefore neither does the goodness of the will depend on the goodness of the end intended.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="34397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34397] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
bonum et malum, sicut diversificant voluntatem, ita diversificant
finem. Sed malitia voluntatis non dependet a malitia finis intenti,
qui enim vult furari ut det eleemosynam, voluntatem malam habet,
licet intendat finem bonum. Ergo etiam bonitas voluntatis non
dependet a bonitate finis intenti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ix, 3) that God rewards the intention. But God rewards a thing because it is good. Therefore the
                     goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 s. c."><a name="34398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34398] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, IX Confess., quod intentio remuneratur a
Deo. Sed ex eo aliquid remuneratur a Deo, quia est bonum. Ergo
bonitas voluntatis ex intentione finis dependet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the act of the will; first, as preceding it, secondly as following [*Leonine
                     edn.: 'accompanying'] it. The intention precedes the act of the will causally, when we will something because we intend a
                     certain end. And then the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of the thing willed: for instance,
                     when a man wills to fast for God's sake; because the act of fasting is specifically good
                     from the very fact that it is done for God's sake. Wherefore, since the goodness of the will depends on the goodness of the
                     thing willed, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q19_A1" id="FS_Q19_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2), it must, of necessity, depend on the intention of the end.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A7-p7"> On the other hand, intention follows the act of the will, when it is added to a preceding act of the will; for instance,
                     a man may will to do something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the goodness of the previous act of the will
                     does not depend on the subsequent intention, except in so far as that act is repeated with the subsequent intention.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 co."><a name="34399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34399] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod intentio dupliciter se potest habere ad voluntatem,
uno modo, ut praecedens; alio modo, ut concomitans. Praecedit
quidem causaliter intentio voluntatem, quando aliquid volumus
propter intentionem alicuius finis. Et tunc ordo ad finem
consideratur ut ratio quaedam bonitatis ipsius voliti, puta cum
aliquis vult ieiunare propter Deum, habet enim ieiunium rationem
boni ex hoc ipso quod fit propter Deum. Unde, cum bonitas
voluntatis dependeat a bonitate voliti, ut supra dictum est,
necesse est quod dependeat ex intentione finis. Consequitur autem
intentio voluntatem, quando accedit voluntati praeexistenti, puta
si aliquis velit aliquid facere, et postea referat illud in Deum.
Et tunc primae voluntatis bonitas non dependet ex intentione
sequenti, nisi quatenus reiteratur actus voluntatis cum sequenti
intentione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the intention is the cause of the act of willing, the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of
                     the object, as stated above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="34400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34400] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod, quando intentio est causa volendi, ordo ad
finem accipitur ut quaedam ratio bonitatis in obiecto, ut dictum
est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The act of the will cannot be said to be good, if an evil intention is the cause of willing. For when a man wills to give
                     an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in itself, under a species of evil; and therefore, as willed
                     by him, it is evil. Wherefore his will is evil. If, however, the intention is subsequent to the act of the will, then the
                     latter may be good: and the intention does not spoil that act of the will which
                     preceded, but that which is repeated.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="34401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34401] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod voluntas non potest dici bona, si sit intentio mala
causa volendi. Qui enim vult dare eleemosynam propter inanem
gloriam consequendam, vult id quod de se est bonum, sub ratione
mali, et ideo, prout est volitum ab ipso, est malum. Unde voluntas
eius est mala. Sed si intentio sit consequens, tunc voluntas potuit
esse bona, et per intentionem sequentem non depravatur ille actus
voluntatis qui praecessit, sed actus voluntatis qui iteratur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As we have already stated (A[6], ad 1), "evil results from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire cause."
                     Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even under the species of good; or to the good under the species of
                     evil, it will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, it must tend to the good under the species of
                     good; in other words, it must will the good for the sake of the good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="34402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34402] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, malum contingit ex
singularibus defectibus, bonum vero ex tota et integra causa. Unde
sive voluntas sit eius quod est secundum se malum, etiam sub
ratione boni; sive sit boni sub ratione mali; semper voluntas erit
mala. Sed ad hoc quod sit voluntas bona, requiritur quod sit boni
sub ratione boni; idest quod velit bonum, et propter bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A8-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 8. Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will depends on the degree of good in the intention. Because on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.35" target="asv"> Mat. 12:35, </a> "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good," a gloss says: "A man does as much good
                     as he intends." But the intention gives goodness not only to the external action, but also to the act of the will, as stated
                     above
                     <a href="#FS_Q19_A7" id="FS_Q19_A8-p2.2" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. Therefore the goodness of a
                     man's will is according to the goodness of his intention.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="34403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34403] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod quantitas bonitatis in voluntate,
dependeat ex quantitate bonitatis in intentione. Quia super illud
Matth. XII, <i>bonus homo de thesauro bono cordis sui profert
bona</i>, dicit Glossa, tantum boni quis facit, quantum intendit.
Sed intentio non solum dat bonitatem actui exteriori, sed etiam
voluntati, ut dictum est. Ergo tantum aliquis habet bonam
voluntatem, quantum intendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the effect. But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will.
                     Therefore a man's will is good, according as his intention is good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="34404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34404] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
augmentata causa, augmentatur effectus. Sed intentionis bonitas est
causa bonae voluntatis. Ergo quantum quis intendit de bono, tantum
voluntas est bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to his intention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous
                     intention, he would be guilty of murder. Therefore, for the same reason, in good actions, the will is good in proportion to
                     the good intended.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="34405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34405] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
in malis quantum aliquis intendit, tantum peccat, si enim aliquis
proiiciens lapidem, intenderet facere homicidium, reus esset
homicidii. Ergo, pari ratione, in bonis tantum est bona voluntas,
quantum aliquis bonum intendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The intention can be good, while the will is evil. Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the will
                     less good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 s. c."><a name="34406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34406] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
potest esse intentio bona, et voluntas mala. Ergo, pari ratione,
potest esse intentio magis bona, et voluntas minus bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In regard to both the act, and the intention of the end, we may consider a twofold quantity: one, on the part of the object,
                     by reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater; the other, taken from the intensity of the act, according as a
                     man wills or acts intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A8-p7"> If then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of view of the object, it is evident that the quantity in
                     the act does not depend on the quantity in the intention. With regard to the external act this may happen in two ways. First,
                     through the object that is ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that end; for instance, if a man were to
                     give ten pounds, he could not realize his intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds.
                     Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in regard to the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to
                     remove: for instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters obstacles, which prevent him from going. On the other hand,
                     with regard to the interior act of the will, this happens in only one way: because the interior acts of the will are in our
                     power, whereas the external actions are not. But the will can will an object that is not proportionate to the intended end:
                     and thus the will that tends to that object considered absolutely, is not so good as the intention. Yet because the intention
                     also belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit, as it is the reason thereof; it comes to pass that the quantity
                     of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act of the will; that is to say, in so far as the will wills some great good
                     for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a good, is not proportionate to that good.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A8-p8"> But if we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act, according to their respective intensity, then the intensity
                     of the intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the will: since the intention stands in relation to
                     them as a kind of form, as is clear from what has been said above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q12_A4" id="FS_Q19_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[4]</a>;
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q19_A8-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], A[6]</a>). And yet considered materially, while the intention is intense, the interior or exterior
                     act may be not so intense, materially speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much intensity to take medicine
                     as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal principle, upon
                     the intense volition of medicine.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A8-p9"> We must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or exterior act, may be referred to the intention as its object:
                     as when a man intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And yet it does not follow that he wills or acts intensely;
                     because the quantity of goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend on the quantity of the good intended, as
                     is shown above. And hence it is that a man does not merit as much as he intends to merit: because the
                     quantity of merit is measured by the intensity of the act, as we shall show later on (
                     <a href="#FS_Q20_A4" id="FS_Q19_A8-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[20] , A[4]</a>;
                     <a href="FS_vii.html#FS_Q114_A4" id="FS_Q19_A8-p9.2" shape="rect"> Q[114], A[4]</a>).
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 co."><a name="34407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34407] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod circa actum et intentionem finis, duplex quantitas
potest considerari, una ex parte obiecti, quia vult maius bonum,
vel agit; alia ex intensione actus, quia intense vult vel agit,
quod est maius ex parte agentis. Si igitur loquamur de quantitate
utriusque quantum ad obiectum, manifestum est quod quantitas actus
non sequitur quantitatem intentionis. Quod quidem ex parte actus
exterioris, contingere potest dupliciter. Uno modo, quia obiectum
quod ordinatur ad finem intentum, non est proportionatum fini illi,
sicut si quis daret decem libras, non posset consequi suam
intentionem, si intenderet emere rem valentem centum libras. Alio
modo, propter impedimenta quae supervenire possunt circa exteriorem
actum, quae non est in potestate nostra removere, puta, aliquis
intendit ire usque Romam, et occurrunt ei impedimenta, quod non
potest hoc facere. Sed ex parte interioris actus voluntatis, non
est nisi uno modo, quia interiores actus voluntatis sunt in
potestate nostra, non autem exteriores actus. Sed voluntas potest
velle aliquod obiectum non proportionatum fini intento, et sic
voluntas quae fertur in illud obiectum absolute consideratum, non
est tantum bona, quantum est intentio. Sed quia etiam ipsa intentio
quodammodo pertinet ad actum voluntatis, inquantum scilicet est
ratio eius; propter hoc redundat quantitas bonae intentionis in
voluntatem, inquantum scilicet voluntas vult aliquod bonum magnum
ut finem, licet illud per quod vult consequi tantum bonum, non sit
dignum illo bono. Si vero consideretur quantitas intentionis et
actus secundum intensionem utriusque, sic intensio intentionis
redundat in actum interiorem et exteriorem voluntatis, quia ipsa
intentio quodammodo se habet formaliter ad utrumque, ut ex supra
dictis patet. Licet materialiter, intentione existente intensa,
possit esse actus interior vel exterior non ita intensus,
materialiter loquendo, puta cum aliquis non ita intense vult
medicinam sumere, sicut vult sanitatem. Tamen hoc ipsum quod est
intense intendere sanitatem, redundat formaliter in hoc quod est
intense velle medicinam. Sed tamen hoc est considerandum, quod
intensio actus interioris vel exterioris potest referri ad
intentionem ut obiectum, puta cum aliquis intendit intense velle,
vel aliquid intense operari. Et tamen non propter hoc intense vult
vel operatur, quia quantitatem boni intenti non sequitur bonitas
actus interioris vel exterioris, ut dictum est. Et inde est quod
non quantum aliquis intendit mereri, meretur, quia quantitas meriti
consistit in intensione actus, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of God, Who considers principally the intention of the end. Wherefore another
                     gloss says on the same passage that "the treasure of the heart is the intention, according to which God judges our works."
                     For the goodness of the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon the goodness of the will, which makes even
                     the external act to be meritorious in God's sight.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="34408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34408] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur quantum ad reputationem
Dei, qui praecipue considerat intentionem finis. Unde alia Glossa
dicit ibidem quod <i>thesaurus cordis intentio est, ex qua Deus
iudicat opera</i>. Bonitas enim intentionis, ut dictum est,
redundat quodammodo in bonitatem voluntatis, quae facit etiam
exteriorem actum meritorium apud Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A8-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The goodness of the intention is not the whole cause of a good will. Hence the argument does not prove.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="34409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34409] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod bonitas intentionis non est tota causa bonae
voluntatis. Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A8-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The mere malice of the intention suffices to make the will evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention
                     is evil. But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness, as stated above (ad 2).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="34410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34410] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod sola malitia intentionis sufficit ad malitiam
voluntatis, et ideo etiam quantum mala est intentio, tantum mala
est voluntas. Sed non est eadem ratio de bonitate, ut dictum
est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A9-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 9. Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend on its conformity to the Divine will. Because it is impossible
                     for man's will to be conformed to the Divine will; as appears from the word of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.55.9" target="asv"> Isa. 55:9</a>: "As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are My ways exalted above your ways, and My thoughts above your thoughts."
                     If therefore goodness of the will depended on its conformity to the Divine will, it would follow
                     that it is impossible for man's will to be good. Which is inadmissible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="34411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34411] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis humanae non
dependeat ex conformitate voluntatis divinae. Impossibile est enim
voluntatem hominis conformari voluntati divinae, ut patet per id
quod dicitur Isaiae LV, <i>sicut exaltantur caeli a terra, ita
exaltatae sunt viae meae a viis vestris, et cogitationes meae a
cogitationibus vestris</i>. Si ergo ad bonitatem voluntatis
requireretur conformitas ad divinam voluntatem, sequeretur quod
impossibile esset hominis voluntatem esse bonam. Quod est
inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as our wills arise from the Divine will, so does our knowledge flow from the Divine knowledge. But our knowledge
                     does not require to be conformed to God's knowledge; since God knows many things that we know not. Therefore there is no need
                     for our will to be conformed to the Divine will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="34412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34412] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut voluntas nostra derivatur a voluntate divina, ita scientia
nostra derivatur a scientia divina. Sed non requiritur ad scientiam
nostram quod sit conformis scientiae divinae, multa enim Deus scit
quae nos ignoramus. Ergo non requiritur quod voluntas nostra sit
conformis voluntati divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will is a principle of action. But our action cannot be conformed to God's. Therefore neither can our will be
                     conformed to His.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="34413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34413] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
voluntas est actionis principium. Sed actio nostra non potest
conformari actioni divinae. Ergo nec voluntas voluntati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.39" target="asv">Mat. 26:39</a>): "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt": which words He said, because "He wishes man to be upright and to tend to God," as Augustine
                     expounds in the Enchiridion [*Enarr. in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A9-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.32" target="asv">Ps. 32</a>, serm. i.]. But the rectitude of the will is its goodness. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to
                     the Divine will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 9 s. c."><a name="34414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34414] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Matth. XXVI, <i>non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu
vis</i>, quod dicit quia rectum vult esse hominem, et ad Deum
dirigi, ut Augustinus exponit in Enchirid. Rectitudo autem
voluntatis est bonitas eius. Ergo bonitas voluntatis dependet ex
conformitate ad voluntatem divinam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q19_A7" id="FS_Q19_A9-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>, the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end. Now the last end of the human will is the Sovereign Good,
                     namely, God, as stated above (Q[1], A[8]; Q[3], A[1]). Therefore the goodness of the human will requires it to be ordained
                     to the Sovereign Good, that is, to God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 9 co."><a name="34415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34415] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonitas voluntatis dependet ex
intentione finis. Finis autem ultimus voluntatis humanae est summum
bonum, quod est Deus, ut supra dictum est. Requiritur ergo ad
bonitatem humanae voluntatis, quod ordinetur ad summum bonum, quod
est Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p7"> Now this Good is primarily and essentially compared to the Divine will, as its proper object. Again, that which is first
                     in any genus is the measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus. Moreover, everything attains to rectitude and goodness,
                     in so far as it is in accord with its proper measure. Therefore, in order that man's will be good it needs to be conformed
                     to the Divine will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Hoc autem bonum primo quidem et per se comparatur ad
voluntatem divinam ut obiectum proprium eius. Illud autem quod est
primum in quolibet genere, est mensura et ratio omnium quae sunt
illius generis. Unumquodque autem rectum et bonum est, inquantum
attingit ad propriam mensuram. Ergo ad hoc quod voluntas hominis
sit bona, requiritur quod conformetur voluntati divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The human will cannot be conformed to the will of God so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like manner human
                     knowledge is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it knows truth: and human action is conformed to the Divine,
                     in so far as it is becoming to the agent: and this by way of imitation, not by way of equality.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="34416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34416] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod voluntas hominis non potest conformari voluntati
divinae per aequiparantiam, sed per imitationem. Et similiter
conformatur scientia hominis scientiae divinae, inquantum cognoscit
verum. Et actio hominis actioni divinae, inquantum est agenti
conveniens. Et hoc per imitationem, non autem per
aequiparantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p9"> From the above may be gathered the replies to the Second and Third Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="34417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34417] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet
solutio ad secundum, et ad tertium argumentum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A10-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 10. Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing
                     willed?
                  </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A10-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human will need not always be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we cannot
                     will what we know not: since the apprehended good is the object of the will. But in many things we know not what God wills.
                     Therefore the human will cannot be conformed to the Divine will as to the thing willed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="34418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34418] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas hominis non debeat semper
conformari divinae voluntati in volito. Non enim possumus velle
quod ignoramus, bonum enim apprehensum est obiectum voluntatis. Sed
quid Deus velit, ignoramus in plurimis. Ergo non potest humana
voluntas divinae voluntati conformari in volito.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A10-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills to damn the man whom He foresees about to die in mortal sin. If therefore man were bound to conform his
                     will to the Divine will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow that a man is bound to will his own damnation.
                     Which is inadmissible.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="34419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34419] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Deus vult damnare aliquem, quem praescit in mortali peccato
moriturum. Si ergo homo teneretur conformare voluntatem suam
divinae voluntati in volito, sequeretur quod homo teneretur velle
suam damnationem. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A10-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one is bound to will what is against filial piety. But if man were to will what God wills, this would sometimes
                     be contrary to filial piety: for instance, when God wills the death of a father: if his son were to will it also, it would
                     be against filial piety. Therefore man is not bound to conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="34420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34420] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
nullus tenetur velle aliquid quod est contra pietatem. Sed si homo
vellet illud quod Deus vult, hoc esset quandoque contra pietatem,
puta, cum Deus vult mori patrem alicuius, si filius hoc idem
vellet, contra pietatem esset. Ergo non tenetur homo conformare
voluntatem suam voluntati divinae in volito.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> (1) On
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32.1" target="asv"> Ps. 32:1, </a> "Praise becometh the upright," a gloss says: "That man has an upright heart, who wills what God wills." But everyone is bound
                     to have an upright heart. Therefore everyone is bound to will what God wills.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p6"> (2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, as does every act. If therefore man is bound to conform his will to
                     the Divine will, it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p7"> (3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing different things. But whoever has a will in opposition to the Divine
                     will, has an evil will. Therefore whoever does not conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed, has an evil
                     will.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 s. c. 1"><a name="34421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34421] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed
contra est quia super illud Psalmi XXXII, <i>rectos decet
collaudatio</i>, dicit Glossa, <i>rectum cor habet qui vult quod
Deus vult</i>. Sed quilibet tenetur habere rectum cor. Ergo
quilibet tenetur velle quod Deus vult.</p><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 s. c. 2"><a name="34422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34422] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 s. c. 2</span></a>
Praeterea, forma voluntatis est ex obiecto sicut et cuiuslibet
actus. Si ergo tenetur homo conformare voluntatem suam voluntati
divinae, sequitur quod teneatur conformare in volito.</p><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 s. c. 3"><a name="34423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34423] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 s. c. 3</span></a>
Praeterea, repugnantia voluntatum consistit in hoc, quod homines
diversa volunt. Sed quicumque habet voluntatem repugnantem divinae
voluntati, habet malam voluntatem. Ergo quicumque non conformat
voluntatem suam voluntati divinae in volito, habet malam
voluntatem.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from what has been said above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q19_A10-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[3]</a>,5), the will tends to its object, according as it is proposed by the reason. Now a thing may be considered in various ways
                     by the reason, so as to appear good from one point of view, and not good from another point of view. And therefore if a man's
                     will wills a thing to be, according as it appears to be good, his will is good: and the will of another man, who wills that
                     thing not to
                     be, according as it appears evil, is also good. Thus a judge has a good will, in willing a thief to be put to death, because
                     this is just: while the will of another---e.g. the thief's wife or son, who wishes him not to be put to death, inasmuch as
                     killing is a natural evil, is also good.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p9"> Now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or intellect; the more universal the aspect of the apprehended
                     good, the more universal the good to which the will tends. This is evident in the example given above: because the judge has
                     care of the common good, which is justice, and therefore he wishes the thief's death, which has the aspect of good in relation
                     to the common estate; whereas the thief's wife has to consider the private, the good of the family, and from
                     this point of view she wishes her husband, the thief, not to be put to death. Now the good of the whole universe is that which
                     is apprehended by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of all things: hence whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect
                     of the common good; this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the whole universe. On the other hand, the apprehension
                     of a creature, according to its nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to that nature. Now a thing may happen to
                     be
                     good under a particular aspect, and yet not good under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as stated above. And therefore it
                     comes to pass that a certain will is good from willing something considered under a particular aspect, which thing God wills
                     not, under a universal aspect, and vice versa. And hence too it is, that various wills of various men can be good in respect
                     of opposite things, for as much as, under various aspects, they wish a particular thing to be or not to be.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p10"> But a man's will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he refer it to the common good as an end: since even the
                     natural appetite of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is the end that supplies the formal reason,
                     as it were, of willing whatever is directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man will some particular good with a
                     right will, he must will that particular good materially, and the Divine and universal good, formally.
                     Therefore the human will is bound to be conformed to the Divine will, as to that which is willed formally, for it is bound
                     to will the Divine and universal good; but not as to that which is willed materially, for the reason given above.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p11"> At the same time in both these respects, the human will is conformed to the Divine, in a certain degree. Because inasmuch
                     as it is conformed to the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed, it is conformed thereto in the point of the
                     last end. While, inasmuch as it is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed materially, it is conformed to that
                     will considered as efficient cause; since the proper inclination consequent to nature, or to the particular
                     apprehension of some particular thing, comes to a thing from God as its efficient cause. Hence it is customary to say that
                     a man's will, in this respect, is conformed to the Divine will, because it wills what God wishes him to will.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p12"> There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal cause, consisting in man's willing something from charity,
                     as God wills it. And this conformity is also reduced to the formal conformity, that is in respect of the last end, which is
                     the proper object of charity.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 co."><a name="34424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34424] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, voluntas fertur in suum
obiectum secundum quod a ratione proponitur. Contingit autem
aliquid a ratione considerari diversimode, ita quod sub una ratione
est bonum, et secundum aliam rationem non bonum. Et ideo voluntas
alicuius, si velit illud esse, secundum quod habet rationem boni,
est bona, et voluntas alterius, si velit illud idem non esse,
secundum quod habet rationem mali, erit voluntas etiam bona. Sicut
iudex habet bonam voluntatem, dum vult occisionem latronis, quia
iusta est, voluntas autem alterius, puta uxoris vel filii, qui non
vult occidi ipsum, inquantum est secundum naturam mala occisio, est
etiam bona.</p><p>Cum autem voluntas sequatur apprehensionem rationis vel
intellectus, secundum quod ratio boni apprehensi fuerit communior,
secundum hoc et voluntas fertur in bonum communius. Sicut patet in
exemplo proposito, nam iudex habet curam boni communis, quod est
iustitia, et ideo vult occisionem latronis, quae habet rationem
boni secundum relationem ad statum communem; uxor autem latronis
considerare habet bonum privatum familiae, et secundum hoc vult
maritum latronem non occidi. Bonum autem totius universi est id
quod est apprehensum a Deo, qui est universi factor et gubernator,
unde quidquid vult, vult sub ratione boni communis, quod est sua
bonitas, quae est bonum totius universi. Apprehensio autem
creaturae, secundum suam naturam, est alicuius boni particularis
proportionati suae naturae. Contingit autem aliquid esse bonum
secundum rationem particularem, quod non est bonum secundum
rationem universalem, aut e converso, ut dictum est. Et ideo
contingit quod aliqua voluntas est bona volens aliquid secundum
rationem particularem consideratum, quod tamen Deus non vult
secundum rationem universalem, et e converso. Et inde est etiam
quod possunt diversae voluntates diversorum hominum circa opposita
esse bonae, prout sub diversis rationibus particularibus volunt hoc
esse vel non esse.</p><p>Non est autem recta voluntas alicuius hominis
volentis aliquod bonum particulare, nisi referat illud in bonum
commune sicut in finem, cum etiam naturalis appetitus cuiuslibet
partis ordinetur in bonum commune totius. Ex fine autem sumitur
quasi formalis ratio volendi illud quod ad finem ordinatur. Unde ad
hoc quod aliquis recta voluntate velit aliquod particulare bonum,
oportet quod illud particulare bonum sit volitum materialiter,
bonum autem commune divinum sit volitum formaliter. Voluntas igitur
humana tenetur conformari divinae voluntati in volito formaliter,
tenetur enim velle bonum divinum et commune, sed non materialiter,
ratione iam dicta.</p><p>Sed tamen quantum ad utrumque, aliquo modo
voluntas humana conformatur voluntati divinae. Quia secundum quod
conformatur voluntati divinae in communi ratione voliti,
conformatur ei in fine ultimo. Secundum autem quod non conformatur
ei in volito materialiter, conformatur ei secundum rationem causae
efficientis, quia hanc propriam inclinationem consequentem naturam,
vel apprehensionem particularem huius rei, habet res a Deo sicut a
causa effectiva. Unde consuevit dici quod conformatur, quantum ad
hoc, voluntas hominis voluntati divinae, quia vult hoc quod Deus
vult eum velle.</p><p> Est et alius modus conformitatis secundum rationem
causae formalis, ut scilicet homo velit aliquid ex caritate, sicut
Deus vult. Et ista etiam conformitas reducitur ad conformitatem
formalem quae attenditur ex ordine ad ultimum finem, quod est
proprium obiectum caritatis.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We can know in a general way what God wills. For we know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the aspect of good. Consequently
                     whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a will conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing willed.
                     But we know not what God wills in particular: and in this respect we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p14"> But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in
                     that particular matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in all things not only formally, but also materially.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="34425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34425] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod volitum divinum, secundum rationem communem,
quale sit, scire possumus. Scimus enim quod Deus quidquid vult,
vult sub ratione boni. Et ideo quicumque vult aliquid sub quacumque
ratione boni, habet voluntatem conformem voluntati divinae, quantum
ad rationem voliti. Sed in particulari nescimus quid Deus velit. Et
quantum ad hoc, non tenemur conformare voluntatem nostram divinae
voluntati. In statu tamen gloriae, omnes videbunt in singulis quae
volent, ordinem eorum ad id quod Deus circa hoc vult. Et ideo non
solum formaliter, sed materialiter in omnibus suam voluntatem Deo
conformabunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A10-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not will the damnation of a man, considered precisely as damnation, nor a man's death, considered precisely as death,
                     because, "He wills all men to be saved" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A10-p15.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>); but He wills such things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore in regard to such things it suffices for man to will the
                     upholding of God's justice and of the natural order.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="34426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34426] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod Deus non vult damnationem alicuius sub ratione
damnationis, nec mortem alicuius inquantum est mors, <i>quia ipse
vult omnes homines salvos fieri</i>, sed vult ista sub ratione
iustitiae. Unde sufficit circa talia quod homo velit iustitiam Dei,
et ordinem naturae servari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p16"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b>
	Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.</p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p17"> To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said that a man who conforms his will to God's, in the aspect
                     of reason of the thing willed, wills what God wills, more than the man, who conforms his will to God's, in the point of the
                     very thing willed; because the will tends more to the end, than to that which is on account of the end.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p18"> To the second, it must be replied that the species and form of an act are taken from the object considered formally, rather
                     than from the object considered materially.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p19"> To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills when several people desire different things, but not under
                     the same aspect: but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same aspect, one man wills a thing which another
                     wills not. But there is no question of this here.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="34427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34427] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet
solutio ad tertium.</p><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 ad 4"><a name="34428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34428] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad primum
vero quod in contrarium obiiciebatur, dicendum quod magis vult quod
Deus vult, qui conformat voluntatem suam voluntati divinae quantum
ad rationem voliti, quam qui conformat quantum ad ipsam rem
volitam, quia voluntas principalius fertur in finem, quam in id
quod est ad finem.</p><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 ad 5"><a name="34429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34429] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 ad 5</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod species et forma actus magis attenditur secundum
rationem obiecti, quam secundum id quod est materiale in
obiecto.</p><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 ad 6"><a name="34430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34430] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 ad 6</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod non est repugnantia voluntatum, quando aliqui diversa
volunt non secundum eandem rationem. Sed si sub una ratione esset
aliquid ab uno volitum, quod alius nollet, hoc induceret
repugnantiam voluntatum. Quod tamen non est in proposito.</p></div></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q20" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q20-p0.1">Q. 20. OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN AFFAIRS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q20-p2"> We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q20-p3"><a href="#FS_Q20_A1"> (1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or in the external action?</a></p><p id="FS_Q20-p4"><a href="#FS_Q20_A2"> (2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the goodness of the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q20-p5"><a href="#FS_Q20_A3"> (3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as those of the external action?</a></p><p id="FS_Q20-p6"><a href="#FS_Q20_A4"> (4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q20-p7"><a href="#FS_Q20_A5"> (5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its goodness or malice?</a></p><p id="FS_Q20-p8"><a href="#FS_Q20_A6"> (6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 pr."><a name="34431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34431]
Iª-IIae q. 20 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
bonitate et malitia quantum ad exteriores actus. Et circa hoc
quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum bonitas et malitia per prius sit in
actu voluntatis, vel in actu exteriori secundo, utrum tota bonitas
vel malitia actus exterioris dependeat ex bonitate voluntatis.
Tertio, utrum sit eadem bonitas et malitia interioris et exterioris
actus. Quarto, utrum actus exterior aliquid addat de bonitate vel
malitia supra actum interiorem. Quinto, utrum eventus sequens
aliquid addat de bonitate vel malitia ad actum exteriorem. Sexto,
utrum idem actus exterior possit esse bonus et malus.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q20_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q20_A1-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 1. Whether goodness or malice is first in the action of the will, or in the external action?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good and evil are in the external action prior to being in the act of the will. For the will derives goodness
                     from its object, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q19_A1" id="FS_Q20_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[19], AA[1]</a>,2). But the external action is the object of the interior act of the will: for a man is said to will to commit a theft, or
                     to will to give an alms. Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34432] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum et malum per prius consistat in
actu exteriori quam in actu voluntatis. Voluntas enim habet
bonitatem ex obiecto, ut supra dictum est. Sed actus exterior est
obiectum interioris actus voluntatis, dicimur enim velle furtum,
vel velle dare eleemosynam. Ergo malum et bonum per prius est in
actu exteriori, quam in actu voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end: since what is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from
                     its relation to the end. Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an end, as stated above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q20_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a>, ad 2), the act of another power can be an end. Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to being in the act
                     of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34433] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
bonum per prius convenit fini, quia ea quae sunt ad finem, habent
rationem boni ex ordine ad finem. Actus autem voluntatis non potest
esse finis, ut supra dictum est, actus alicuius alterius potentiae
potest esse finis. Ergo per prius consistit bonum in actu potentiae
alterius, quam in actu voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation to the external action, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q20_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[6]</a>). But that which is formal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter. Therefore good and evil are in the external
                     action, prior to being in the act of the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34434] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
actus voluntatis formaliter se habet ad actum exteriorem, ut supra
dictum est. Sed id quod est formale, est posterius, nam forma
advenit materiae. Ergo per prius est bonum et malum in actu
exteriori quam in actu voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will that we sin, and that we behave aright." Therefore moral good and
                     evil are first in the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34435] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., quod <i>voluntas est
qua peccatur, et recte vivitur</i>. Ergo bonum et malum morale per
prius consistit in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> External actions may be said to be good or bad in two ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the circumstances connected
                     with them: thus the giving of alms, if the required conditions be observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said
                     to be good or evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of alms for vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the
                     end is the will's proper object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil, which the
                     external action derives from its relation to the end, is to be found first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes
                     to the external action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the external action has of itself, on account of its
                     being about due matter and its being attended by due circumstances, is not derived from the will, but rather from the reason.
                     Consequently, if we consider the goodness of the external action, in so far as it comes from reason's ordination and
                     apprehension, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will: but if we consider it in so far as it is in the execution
                     of the action done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its principle.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 co."><a name="34436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34436] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod aliqui actus exteriores possunt dici boni vel mali
dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum genus suum, et secundum
circumstantias in ipsis consideratas, sicut dare eleemosynam,
servatis debitis circumstantiis, dicitur esse bonum. Alio modo
dicitur aliquid esse bonum vel malum ex ordine ad finem, sicut dare
eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam, dicitur esse malum. Cum autem
finis sit proprium obiectum voluntatis, manifestum est quod ista
ratio boni vel mali quam habet actus exterior ex ordine ad finem,
per prius invenitur in actu voluntatis, et ex eo derivatur ad actum
exteriorem. Bonitas autem vel malitia quam habet actus exterior
secundum se, propter debitam materiam et debitas circumstantias,
non derivatur a voluntate, sed magis a ratione. Unde si
consideretur bonitas exterioris actus secundum quod est in
ordinatione et apprehensione rationis, prior est quam bonitas actus
voluntatis, sed si consideretur secundum quod est in executione
operis, sequitur bonitatem voluntatis, quae est principium
eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good apprehended
                     and ordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the good in the act of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the execution
                     of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34437] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod actus exterior est obiectum voluntatis,
inquantum proponitur voluntati a ratione ut quoddam bonum
apprehensum et ordinatum per rationem, et sic est prius quam bonum
actus voluntatis. Inquantum vero consistit in executione operis,
est effectus voluntatis, et sequitur voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end precedes in the order of intention, but follows in the order of execution.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34438] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod finis est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in
executione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A form as received into matter, is subsequent to matter in the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order
                     of nature: but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in every way. Now the will is compared to the exterior action,
                     as its efficient cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as existing in the active cause, is the form of the
                     exterior action.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34439] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod forma, secundum quod est recepta in materia, est
posterior in via generationis quam materia, licet sit prior natura,
sed secundum quod est in causa agente, est omnibus modis prior.
Voluntas autem comparatur ad actum exteriorem sicut causa
efficiens. Unde bonitas actus voluntatis est forma exterioris
actus, sicut in causa agente existens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q20_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q20_A2-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 2. Whether the whole goodness and malice of the external action depends on the goodness of the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the external action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q20_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv">Mat. 7:18</a>): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit." But, according to the gloss,
                     the tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it is impossible for the interior act of the will to be
                     good, and the external action evil, or vice versa.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34440] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod tota bonitas et malitia actus
exterioris dependeat ex voluntate. Dicitur enim Matth. VII, <i>non
potest arbor bona malos fructus facere, nec arbor mala facere
fructus bonos</i>. Per arborem autem intelligitur voluntas, et per
fructum opus, secundum Glossam. Ergo non potest esse quod voluntas
interior sit bona, et actus exterior sit malus; aut e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that there is no sin without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the will,
                     there will be none in the external action. And so the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the will.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34441] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., quod non nisi voluntate
peccatur. Si ergo non sit peccatum in voluntate, non erit peccatum
in exteriori actu. Et ita tota bonitas vel malitia exterioris actus
ex voluntate dependet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking now are differences of the moral act. Now differences make an essential
                     division in a genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12). Since therefore an act is moral from being voluntary,
                     it seems that goodness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34442] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
bonum et malum de quo nunc loquimur, sunt differentiae moralis
actus. Differentiae autem per se dividunt genus, secundum
philosophum, in VII Metaphys. Cum igitur actus sit moralis ex eo
quod est voluntarius, videtur quod bonum et malum accipitur in actu
solum ex parte voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that "there are some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34443] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, quod
<i>quaedam sunt quae nullo quasi bono fine, aut bona voluntate,
possunt bene fieri</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q20_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q20_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, we may consider a twofold goodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of due matter and circumstances; the
                     other in respect of the order to the end. And that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on the will:
                     while that which is in respect of due matter or circumstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends the goodness
                     of the will, in so far as the will
                     tends towards it.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q20_A2-p7"> Now it must be observed, as was noted above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q19_A6" id="FS_Q20_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[6]</a>, ad 1), that for a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices, whereas, for it to be good simply, it is not enough for
                     it to be good in one point only, it must be good in every respect. If therefore the will be good, both from its proper object
                     and from its end, if follows that the external action is good. But if the will be good from its intention of the end, this
                     is not enough to make the
                     external action good: and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of the end, or by reason of the act willed,
                     it follows that the external action is evil.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 co."><a name="34444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34444] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, in actu exteriori potest
considerari duplex bonitas vel malitia, una secundum debitam
materiam et circumstantias; alia secundum ordinem ad finem. Et illa
quidem quae est secundum ordinem ad finem, tota dependet ex
voluntate. Illa autem quae est ex debita materia vel
circumstantiis, dependet ex ratione, et ex hac dependet bonitas
voluntatis, secundum quod in ipsam fertur. Est autem considerandum
quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad hoc quod aliquid sit malum,
sufficit unus singularis defectus, ad hoc autem quod sit
simpliciter bonum, non sufficit unum singulare bonum, sed
requiritur integritas bonitatis. Si igitur voluntas sit bona et ex
obiecto proprio, et ex fine, consequens est actum exteriorem esse
bonum. Sed non sufficit ad hoc quod actus exterior sit bonus,
bonitas voluntatis quae est ex intentione finis, sed si voluntas
sit mala sive ex intentione finis, sive ex actu volito, consequens
est actum exteriorem esse malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the good tree be taken to signify the good will, it must be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act willed
                     and from the end intended.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34445] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod voluntas bona, prout significatur per arborem
bonam, est accipienda secundum quod habet bonitatem ex actu volito,
et ex fine intento.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end; but also when he wills an evil act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34446] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod non solum aliquis voluntate peccat, quando vult malum
finem; sed etiam quando vult malum actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed from
                     the will and the reason. Consequently the difference of good and evil is applicable to both the interior and external act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34447] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod voluntarium dicitur non solum actus interior
voluntatis, sed etiam actus exteriores, prout a voluntate procedunt
et ratione. Et ideo circa utrosque actus potest esse differentia
boni et mali.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q20_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q20_A3-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 3. Whether the goodness and malice of the external action are the same as those of the interior act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness and malice of the interior act of the will are not the same as those of the external action.
                     For the principle of the interior act is the interior apprehensive or appetitive power of the soul; whereas the principle
                     of the external action is the power that accomplishes the movement. Now where the principles of action are different, the
                     actions themselves are different. Moreover, it is the action which is the subject of goodness
                     or malice: and the same accident cannot be in different subjects. Therefore the goodness of the interior act cannot be the
                     same as that of the external action.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34448] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod non eadem sit bonitas vel malitia
actus interioris voluntatis, et exterioris actus. Actus enim
interioris principium est vis animae interior apprehensiva vel
appetitiva, actus autem exterioris principium est potentia exequens
motum. Ubi autem sunt diversa principia actionis, ibi sunt diversi
actus. Actus autem est subiectum bonitatis vel malitiae. Non potest
autem esse idem accidens in diversis subiectis. Ergo non potest
esse eadem bonitas interioris et exterioris actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "A virtue makes that, which has it, good, and renders its action good also" (Ethic. ii, 6). But the intellective
                     virtue in the commanding power is distinct from the moral virtue in the power commanded, as is declared in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore
                     the goodness of the interior act, which belongs to the commanding power, is distinct from the goodness of the external action,
                     which belongs to the power commanded.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34449] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a>
<i>Praeterea, virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius
bonum reddit</i>, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed alia est virtus
intellectualis in potentia imperante, et alia virtus moralis in
potentia imperata, ut patet ex I Ethic. Ergo alia est bonitas actus
interioris, qui est potentiae imperantis, et alia est bonitas actus
exterioris, qui est potentiae imperatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect; since nothing is its own cause. But the goodness of the interior act
                     is the cause of the goodness of the external action, or vice versa, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q20_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore it is not the same goodness in each.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34450] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
causa et effectus idem esse non possunt, nihil enim est causa sui
ipsius. Sed bonitas actus interioris est causa bonitatis actus
exterioris, aut e converso, ut dictum est. Ergo non potest esse
eadem bonitas utriusque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It was shown above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q20_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[6]</a>) that the act of the will is the form, as it were, of the external action. Now that which results from the material and formal
                     element is one thing. Therefore there is but one goodness of the internal and external act.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34451] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod supra ostensum est quod actus voluntatis se habet ut
formale ad actum exteriorem. Ex formali autem et materiali fit
unum. Ergo est una bonitas actus interioris et exterioris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q20_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[17], A[4]), the interior act of the will, and the external action, considered morally, are one act. Now
                     it happens sometimes that one and the same individual act has several aspects of goodness or malice, and sometimes that it
                     has but one. Hence we must say that sometimes the goodness or malice of the interior act is the same as that of the external
                     action, and sometimes not. For as we have already said (
                     <a href="#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q20_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2),
                     these two goodnesses or malices, of the internal and external acts, are ordained to one another. Now it may happen, in things
                     that are subordinate to something else, that a thing is good merely from being subordinate; thus a bitter draught is good
                     merely because it procures health. Wherefore there are not two goodnesses, one the goodness of health, and the other the goodness
                     of the draught; but one and the same. On the other hand it happens sometimes that that which is subordinate to something
                     else, has some aspect of goodness in itself, besides the fact of its being subordinate to some other good: thus a palatable
                     medicine can be considered in the light of a pleasurable good, besides being conducive to health.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q20_A3-p7"> We must therefore say that when the external action derives goodness or malice from its relation to the end only, then there
                     is but one and the same goodness of the act of the will which of itself regards the end, and of the external action, which
                     regards the end through the medium of the act of the will. But when the external action has goodness or malice of itself,
                     i.e. in regard to its matter and circumstances, then the goodness of the external action is distinct from the
                     goodness of the will in regarding the end; yet so that the goodness of the end passes into the external action, and the goodness
                     of the matter and circumstances passes into the act of the will, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q20_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2).
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 co."><a name="34452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34452] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus interior voluntatis et
actus exterior, prout considerantur in genere moris, sunt unus
actus. Contingit autem quandoque actum qui est unus subiecto,
habere plures rationes bonitatis vel malitiae; et quandoque unam
tantum. Sic ergo dicendum quod quandoque est eadem bonitas vel
malitia interioris et exterioris actus; quandoque alia et alia.
Sicut enim iam dictum est, praedictae duae bonitates vel malitiae,
scilicet interioris et exterioris actus, ad invicem ordinantur.
Contingit autem in his quae ad aliud ordinantur, quod aliquid est
bonum ex hoc solum quod ad aliud ordinatur, sicut potio amara ex
hoc solo est bona, quod est sanativa. Unde non est alia bonitas
sanitatis et potionis, sed una et eadem. Quandoque vero illud quod
ad aliud ordinatur, habet in se aliquam rationem boni, etiam
praeter ordinem ad aliud bonum, sicut medicina saporosa habet
rationem boni delectabilis, praeter hoc quod est sanativa. Sic ergo
dicendum quod, quando actus exterior est bonus vel malus solum ex
ordine ad finem, tunc est omnino eadem bonitas vel malitia actus
voluntatis, qui per se respicit finem, et actus exterioris, qui
respicit finem mediante actu voluntatis. Quando autem actus
exterior habet bonitatem vel malitiam secundum se, scilicet
secundum materiam vel circumstantias, tunc bonitas exterioris actus
est una, et bonitas voluntatis quae est ex fine, est alia, ita
tamen quod et bonitas finis ex voluntate redundat in actum
exteriorem, et bonitas materiae et circumstantiarum redundat in
actum voluntatis, sicut iam dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that the internal and external actions are different in the physical order: yet distinct as they are
                     in that respect, they combine to form one thing in the moral order, as stated above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q17_A4" id="FS_Q20_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[4]</a>).
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34453] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod actus interior et
exterior sunt diversi secundum genus naturae. Sed tamen ex eis sic
diversis constituitur unum in genere moris, ut supra dictum
est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated in Ethic. vi, 12, a moral virtue is ordained to the act of that virtue, which act is the end, as it were, of that
                     virtue; whereas prudence, which is in the reason, is ordained to things directed to the end. For this reason various virtues
                     are necessary. But right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has no other goodness than the goodness of that virtue,
                     in so far as the goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34454] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VI Ethic., virtutes morales
ordinantur ad ipsos actus virtutum, qui sunt quasi fines; prudentia
autem, quae est in ratione, ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Et propter
hoc requiruntur diversae virtutes. Sed ratio recta de ipso fine
virtutum non habet aliam bonitatem quam bonitatem virtutis,
secundum quod bonitas rationis participatur in qualibet
virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a thing is derived by one thing from another, as from a univocal efficient cause, then it is not the same in both: thus
                     when a hot thing heats, the heat of the heater is distinct from the heat of the thing heated, although it be the same specifically.
                     But when a thing is derived from one thing from another, according to analogy or proportion, then it is one and the same in
                     both: thus the healthiness which is in medicine or urine is derived from
                     the healthiness of the animal's body; nor is health as applied to urine and medicine, distinct from health as applied to the
                     body of an animal, of which health medicine is the cause, and urine the sign. It is in this way that the goodness of the external
                     action is derived from the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the order of one to the other.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34455] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod, quando aliquid ex uno derivatur in alterum sicut ex
causa agente univoca, tunc aliud est quod est in utroque, sicut cum
calidum calefacit, alius numero est calor calefacientis, et calor
calefacti, licet idem specie. Sed quando aliquid derivatur ab uno
in alterum secundum analogiam vel proportionem, tunc est tantum
unum numero, sicut a sano quod est in corpore animalis, derivatur
sanum ad medicinam et urinam; nec alia sanitas est medicinae et
urinae, quam sanitas animalis, quam medicina facit, et urina
significat. Et hoc modo a bonitate voluntatis derivatur bonitas
actus exterioris, et e converso, scilicet secundum ordinem unius ad
alterum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q20_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q20_A5-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 5. Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice. For the effect pre-exists virtually
                     in its cause. But the consequences result from the action as an effect from its cause. Therefore they pre-exist virtually
                     in actions. Now a thing is judged to be good or bad according to its virtue, since a virtue "makes that which has it to be
                     good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an
                     action.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="34464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34464] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod eventus sequens addat ad bonitatem vel
malitiam actus. Effectus enim virtute praeexistit in causa. Sed
eventus consequuntur actus sicut effectus causas. Ergo virtute
praeexistunt in actibus. Sed unumquodque secundum suam virtutem
iudicatur bonum vel malum, nam virtus est quae bonum facit
habentem, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo eventus addunt ad bonitatem
vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good actions of his hearers are consequences resulting from the words of a preacher. But such goods as these
                     redound to the merit of the preacher, as is evident from
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q20_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.4.1" target="asv"> Phil. 4:1</a>: "My dearly beloved brethren, my joy and my crown." Therefore the consequences of an action increase its goodness or malice.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="34465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34465] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
bona quae faciunt auditores, sunt effectus quidam consequentes ex
praedicatione doctoris. Sed huiusmodi bona redundant ad meritum
praedicatoris, ut patet per id quod dicitur Philipp. IV, <i>fratres
mei carissimi et desideratissimi, gaudium meum et corona mea</i>.
Ergo eventus sequens addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, punishment is not increased, unless the fault increases: wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q20_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv">Dt. 25:2</a>): "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." But the punishment is increased on account
                     of the consequences; for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q20_A5-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.29" target="asv">Ex. 21:29</a>): "But if the ox was wont to push with his horn yesterday and the day before, and they warned his master, and he did not
                     shut him up, and he shall
                     kill a man or a woman, then the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death." But he would not have been
                     put to death, if the ox, although he had not been shut up, had not killed a man. Therefore the consequences increase the goodness
                     or malice of an action.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="34466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34466] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
poena non additur nisi crescente culpa, unde dicitur Deut. XXV,
<i>pro mensura peccati, erit et plagarum modus</i>. Sed ex eventu
sequente additur ad poenam, dicitur enim Exod. XXI, <i>quod si bos
fuerit cornupeta ab heri et nudius tertius, et contestati sunt
dominum eius, nec recluserit eum, occideritque virum aut mulierem;
et bos lapidibus obruetur, et dominum eius occident</i>. Non autem
occideretur, si bos non occidisset hominem, etiam non reclusus.
Ergo eventus sequens addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if a man do something which may cause death, by striking, or by sentencing, and if death does not ensue, he does
                     not contract irregularity: but he would if death were to ensue. Therefore the consequence of an action increase its goodness
                     or malice.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="34467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34467] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
si aliquis ingerat causam mortis percutiendo vel sententiam dando,
et mors non sequatur, non contrahitur irregularitas. Contraheretur
autem si mors sequeretur. Ergo eventus sequens addit ad bonitatem
vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The consequences do not make an action that was evil, to be good; nor one that was good, to be evil. For instance, if a man
                     give an alms to a poor man who makes bad use of the alms by committing a sin, this does not undo the good done by the giver;
                     and, in like manner, if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him, the wrongdoer is not thereby excused. Therefore the consequences
                     of an action doe not increase its goodness or malice.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 s. c."><a name="34468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34468] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
eventus sequens non facit actum malum qui erat bonus, nec bonum qui
erat malus. Puta si aliquis det eleemosynam pauperi, qua ille
abutatur ad peccatum, nihil deperit ei qui eleemosynam fecit, et
similiter si aliquis patienter ferat iniuriam sibi factam, non
propter hoc excusatur ille qui fecit. Ergo eventus sequens non
addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q20_A5-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The consequences of an action are either foreseen or not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the goodness
                     or malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may follow from his action, and yet does not therefore desist therefrom,
                     this shows his will to be all the more inordinate.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q20_A5-p8"> But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction. Because if they follow from the nature of the action
                     and in the majority of cases, in this respect, the consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action: for it is
                     evident that an action is specifically better, if better results can follow from it; and specifically worse, if it is of a
                     nature to produce worse results. On the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, then they do
                     not increase the goodness or malice of the action: because we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it
                     by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 co."><a name="34469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34469] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod eventus sequens aut est praecogitatus, aut non. Si
est praecogitatus, manifestum est quod addit ad bonitatem vel
malitiam. Cum enim aliquis cogitans quod ex opere suo multa mala
possunt sequi, nec propter hoc dimittit, ex hoc apparet voluntas
eius esse magis inordinata. Si autem eventus sequens non sit
praecogitatus, tunc distinguendum est. Quia si per se sequitur ex
tali actu, et ut in pluribus, secundum hoc eventus sequens addit ad
bonitatem vel malitiam actus, manifestum est enim meliorem actum
esse ex suo genere, ex quo possunt plura bona sequi; et peiorem, ex
quo nata sunt plura mala sequi. Si vero per accidens, et ut in
paucioribus, tunc eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel ad
malitiam actus, non enim datur iudicium de re aliqua secundum illud
quod est per accidens, sed solum secundum illud quod est per
se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by accident.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="34470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34470] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod virtus causae existimatur secundum effectus per
se, non autem secundum effectus per accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good actions done by the hearers, result from the preacher's words, as an effect that flows from their very nature. Hence
                     they redound to the merit of the preacher: especially when such is his intention.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="34471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34471] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod bona quae auditores faciunt, consequuntur ex
praedicatione doctoris sicut effectus per se. Unde redundant ad
praemium praedicatoris, et praecipue quando sunt praeintenta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The consequences for which that man is ordered to be punished, both follow from the nature of the cause, and are supposed
                     to be foreseen. For this reason they are reckoned as punishable.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34472] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod eventus ille pro quo illi poena infligenda mandatur,
et per se sequitur ex tali causa, et iterum ponitur ut
praecogitatus. Et ideo imputatur ad poenam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q20_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This argument would prove if irregularity were the result of the fault. But it is not the result of the fault, but of the
                     fact, and of the obstacle to the reception of a sacrament.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="34473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34473] Iª-IIae q. 20 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si irregularitas sequeretur
culpam. Non autem sequitur culpam, sed factum, propter aliquem
defectum sacramenti.</p></div></div></div></div>
            <div id="FS_Q21" class="div3">
<h3 id="FS_Q21-p0.1">Q. 21. OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
<p id="FS_Q21-p2"> We have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason of their goodness and malice: and under this head there
                  are four points of inquiry:
               </p><p id="FS_Q21-p3"><a href="#FS_Q21_A1"> (1) Whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil?</a></p><p id="FS_Q21-p4"><a href="#FS_Q21_A2"> (2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame?</a></p><p id="FS_Q21-p5"><a href="#FS_Q21_A3"> (3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious?</a></p><p id="FS_Q21-p6"><a href="#FS_Q21_A4"> (4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God?</a></p>
</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 pr."><a name="34482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34482]
Iª-IIae q. 21 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his
quae consequuntur actus humanos ratione bonitatis vel malitiae. Et
circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum actus humanus, inquantum
est bonus vel malus, habeat rationem rectitudinis vel peccati.
Secundo, utrum habeat rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis. Tertio,
utrum habeat rationem meriti vel demeriti. Quarto, utrum habeat
rationem meriti vel demeriti apud Deum.</p></div></div></div>
<div id="FS_Q21_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q21_A1-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 1. Whether a human action is right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a human action is not right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil. For "monsters are the sins of nature"
                     (Phys. ii, 8). But monsters are not actions, but things engendered outside the order of nature. Now things that are produced
                     according to art and reason imitate those that are produced according to nature (Phys. ii, 8). Therefore an action is not
                     sinful by reason of its being inordinate and evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="34483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34483] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus humanus, inquantum est bonus vel
malus, non habeat rationem rectitudinis vel peccati. Peccata enim
sunt monstra in natura, ut dicitur in II Physic. Monstra autem non
sunt actus, sed sunt quaedam res generatae praeter ordinem naturae.
Ea autem quae sunt secundum artem et rationem, imitantur ea quae
sunt secundum naturam, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo actus ex hoc quod
est inordinatus et malus, non habet rationem peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin, as stated in Phys. ii, 8 occurs in nature and art, when the end intended by nature or art is not attained.
                     But the goodness or malice of a human action depends, before all, on the intention of the end, and on its achievement. Therefore
                     it seems that the malice of an action does not make it sinful.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="34484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34484] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
peccatum, ut dicitur in II Physic., accidit in natura et arte, cum
non pervenitur ad finem intentum a natura vel arte. Sed bonitas vel
malitia actus humani maxime consistit in intentione finis, et eius
prosecutione. Ergo videtur quod malitia actus non inducat rationem
peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the malice of an action makes it sinful, it follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this is false:
                     since punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil. Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="34485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34485] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
si malitia actus induceret rationem peccati, sequeretur quod
ubicumque esset malum, ibi esset peccatum. Hoc autem est falsum,
nam poena, licet habeat rationem mali, non tamen habet rationem
peccati. Non ergo ex hoc quod aliquis actus est malus, habet
rationem peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> As shown above (
                     <a href="#FS_Q19_A4" id="FS_Q21_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>), the goodness of a human action depends principally on the Eternal Law: and consequently its malice consists in its being
                     in disaccord with the Eternal Law. But this is the very nature of sin; for Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that "sin
                     is a word, deed, or desire, in opposition to the Eternal Law." Therefore a human action is sinful by reason of its being evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 s. c."><a name="34486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34486] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
bonitas actus humani, ut supra ostensum est, principaliter dependet
a lege aeterna, et per consequens malitia eius in hoc consistit,
quod discordat a lege aeterna. Sed hoc facit rationem peccati,
dicit enim Augustinus, XXII contra Faustum, quod <i>peccatum est
dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum aliquid contra legem
aeternam</i>. Ergo actus humanus ex hoc quod est malus, habet
rationem peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q21_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as also is good than right. For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is an
                     evil: whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain end, and lacking due order to that end. Now the due order
                     to an end is measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature, this rule is the natural force that inclines them
                     to that end. When therefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in accord with the
                     natural inclination to an end, then the action is said to be right: since the mean does not exceed its limits, viz. the action
                     does not swerve from the order of its active principle to the end. But when an action strays from this rectitude, it comes
                     under the notion of sin.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q21_A1-p7"> Now in those things that are done by the will, the proximate rule is the human reason, while the supreme rule is the Eternal
                     Law. When, therefore, a human action tends to the end, according to the order of reason and of the Eternal Law, then that
                     action is right: but when it turns aside from that rectitude, then it is said to be a sin. Now it is evident from what has
                     been said (
                     <a href="#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q21_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], AA[3]</a>,4) that every voluntary action that turns aside from the order
                     of reason and of the Eternal Law, is evil, and that every good action is in accord with reason and the Eternal Law. Hence
                     it follows that a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 co."><a name="34487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34487] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod malum in plus est quam peccatum, sicut et bonum in
plus est quam rectum. Quaelibet enim privatio boni in quocumque
constituit rationem mali, sed peccatum proprie consistit in actu
qui agitur propter finem aliquem, cum non habet debitum ordinem ad
finem illum. Debitus autem ordo ad finem secundum aliquam regulam
mensuratur. Quae quidem regula in his quae secundum naturam agunt,
est ipsa virtus naturae, quae inclinat in talem finem. Quando ergo
actus procedit a virtute naturali secundum naturalem inclinationem
in finem, tunc servatur rectitudo in actu, quia medium non exit ab
extremis, scilicet actus ab ordine activi principii ad finem.
Quando autem a rectitudine tali actus aliquis recedit, tunc incidit
ratio peccati. In his vero quae aguntur per voluntatem, regula
proxima est ratio humana; regula autem suprema est lex aeterna.
Quando ergo actus hominis procedit in finem secundum ordinem
rationis et legis aeternae, tunc actus est rectus, quando autem ab
hac rectitudine obliquatur, tunc dicitur esse peccatum. Manifestum
est autem ex praemissis quod omnis actus voluntarius est malus per
hoc quod recedit ab ordine rationis et legis aeternae, et omnis
actus bonus concordat rationi et legi aeternae. Unde sequitur quod
actus humanus ex hoc quod est bonus vel malus, habeat rationem
rectitudinis vel peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Monsters are called sins, inasmuch as they result from a sin in nature's action.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="34488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34488] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod monstra dicuntur esse peccata, inquantum
producta sunt ex peccato in actu naturae existente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end is twofold; the last end, and the proximate end. In the sin of nature, the action does indeed fail in respect of
                     the last end, which is the perfection of the thing generated; but it does not fail in respect of any proximate end whatever;
                     since when nature works it forms something. In like manner, the sin of the will always fails as regards the last end intended,
                     because no voluntary evil action can be ordained to happiness, which is the last
                     end: and yet it does not fail in respect of some proximate end: intended and achieved by the will. Wherefore also, since the
                     very intention of this end is ordained to the last end, this same intention may be right or sinful.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="34489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34489] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod duplex est finis, scilicet ultimus, et propinquus. In
peccato autem naturae, deficit quidem actus a fine ultimo, qui est
perfectio generati; non tamen deficit a quocumque fine proximo;
operatur enim natura aliquid formando. Similiter in peccato
voluntatis, semper est defectus ab ultimo fine intento, quia nullus
actus voluntarius malus est ordinabilis ad beatitudinem, quae est
ultimus finis, licet non deficiat ab aliquo fine proximo, quem
voluntas intendit et consequitur. Unde etiam cum ipsa intentio
huius finis ordinetur ad finem ultimum, in ipsa intentione
huiusmodi finis potest inveniri ratio rectitudinis et peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Each thing is ordained to its end by its action: and therefore sin, which consists in straying from the order to the end,
                     consists properly in an action. On the other hand, punishment regards the person of the sinner, as was stated in the
                     <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A5" id="FS_Q21_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>, ad 4; A[6], ad 3.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="34490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34490] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod unumquodque ordinatur ad finem per actum suum, et
ideo ratio peccati, quae consistit in deviatione ab ordine ad
finem, proprie consistit in actu. Sed poena respicit personam
peccantem, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q21_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q21_A2-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 2. Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a human action does not deserve praise or blame by reason of its being good or evil. For "sin happens
                     even in things done by nature" (Phys. ii, 8). And yet natural things are not deserving of praise or blame (Ethic. iii, 5).
                     Therefore a human action does not deserve blame, by reason of its being evil or sinful; and, consequently, neither does it
                     deserve praise, by reason of its being good.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="34491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34491] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus humanus, ex hoc quod est bonus
vel malus, non habeat rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis.
<i>Peccatum enim contingit etiam in his quae aguntur a natura</i>,
ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed tamen ea quae sunt naturalia, non sunt
laudabilia nec culpabilia, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo actus
humanus, ex hoc quod est malus vel peccatum, non habet rationem
culpae, et per consequens nec ex hoc quod est bonus, habet rationem
laudabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as sin occurs in moral actions, so does it happen in the productions of art: because as stated in Phys. ii,
                     8 "it is a sin in a grammarian to write badly, and in a doctor to give the wrong medicine." But the artist is not blamed for
                     making something bad: because the artist's work is such, that he can produce a good or a bad thing, just as he lists. Therefore
                     it seems that neither is there any reason for blaming a moral action, in the fact that it
                     is evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="34492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34492] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
sicut contingit peccatum in actibus moralibus, ita et in actibus
artis, quia, ut dicitur in II Physic., <i>peccat grammaticus non
recte scribens, et medicus non recte dans potionem</i>. Sed non
culpatur artifex ex hoc quod aliquod malum facit, quia ad
industriam artificis pertinet quod possit et bonum opus facere et
malum, cum voluerit. Ergo videtur quod etiam actus moralis, ex hoc
quod est malus, non habeat rationem culpabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is "weak and incapable." But weakness or inability either takes away or
                     diminishes guilt. Therefore a human action does not incur guilt from being evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="34493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34493] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod malum est infirmum
et impotens. Sed infirmitas vel impotentia vel tollit vel diminuit
rationem culpae. Non ergo actus humanus est culpabilis ex hoc quod
est malus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that "virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to virtue deserve
                     censure and blame." But good actions are virtuous; because "virtue makes that which has it, good, and makes its action good"
                     (Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil. Therefore a human action deserves praise or blame, through being
                     good or evil.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 s. c."><a name="34494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34494] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod philosophus dicit, quod <i>laudabilia sunt virtutum opera;
vituperabilia autem, vel culpabilia, opera contraria</i>. Sed actus
boni sunt actus virtutis, quia <i>virtus est quae bonum facit
habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit</i>, ut dicitur in II Ethic.,
unde actus oppositi sunt actus mali. Ergo actus humanus ex hoc quod
est bonus vel malus, habet rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is sin more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve praise
                     or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise or to blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the
                     malice or goodness of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when it is in his power, so that he has dominion over
                     it: because it is through his will that man has dominion over his actions, as was made
                     clear above (
                     <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q21_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], AA[1]</a>,2). Hence it follows that good or evil, in voluntary actions alone, renders them worthy of praise or blame: and in such like
                     actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 co."><a name="34495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34495] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut malum est in plus quam peccatum, ita peccatum
est in plus quam culpa. Ex hoc enim dicitur aliquis actus
culpabilis vel laudabilis, quod imputatur agenti, nihil enim est
aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel
bonitatem sui actus. Tunc autem actus imputatur agenti, quando est
in potestate ipsius, ita quod habeat dominium sui actus. Hoc autem
est in omnibus actibus voluntariis, quia per voluntatem homo
dominium sui actus habet, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde relinquitur
quod bonum vel malum in solis actibus voluntariis constituit
rationem laudis vel culpae; in quibus idem est malum, peccatum et
culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Natural actions are not in the power of the natural agent: since the action of nature is determinate. And, therefore, although
                     there be sin in natural actions, there is no blame.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="34496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34496] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod actus naturales non sunt in potestate naturalis
agentis, cum natura sit determinata ad unum. Et ideo, licet in
actibus naturalibus sit peccatum, non tamen est ibi culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason stands in different relations to the productions of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, reason is directed
                     to a particular end, which is something devised by reason: whereas in moral matters, it is directed to the general end of
                     all human life. Now a particular end is subordinate to the general end. Since therefore sin is a departure from the order
                     to the end, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q21_A1" id="FS_Q21_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, sin may occur in two ways,
                     in a production of art. First, by a departure from the particular end intended by the artist: and this sin will be proper
                     to the art; for instance, if an artist produce a bad thing, while intending to produce something good; or produce something
                     good, while intending to produce something bad. Secondly, by a departure from the general end of human life: and then he will
                     be said to sin, if he intend to produce a bad work, and does so in effect, so that another is taken in thereby. But this sin
                     is
                     not proper to the artist as such, but as man. Consequently for the former sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for
                     the latter he is blamed as a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where we take into consideration the order of reason
                     to the general end of human life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of reason to the general end of
                     human life. Wherefore man is blamed for such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
                     5)
                     that "in art, he who sins voluntarily is preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which prudence directs, "he
                     is the reverse."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="34497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34497] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod ratio aliter se habet in artificialibus et aliter in
moralibus. In artificialibus enim ratio ordinatur ad finem
particularem, quod est aliquid per rationem excogitatum. In
moralibus autem ordinatur ad finem communem totius humanae vitae.
Finis autem particularis ordinatur ad finem communem. Cum ergo
peccatum sit per deviationem ab ordine ad finem, ut dictum est, in
actu artis contingit dupliciter esse peccatum. Uno modo, per
deviationem a fine particulari intento ab artifice, et hoc peccatum
erit proprium arti; puta si artifex, intendens facere bonum opus,
faciat malum, vel intendens facere malum, faciat bonum. Alio modo,
per deviationem a fine communi humanae vitae, et hoc modo dicetur
peccare, si intendat facere malum opus, et faciat, per quod alius
decipiatur. Sed hoc peccatum non est proprium artificis inquantum
artifex, sed inquantum homo est. Unde ex primo peccato culpatur
artifex inquantum artifex, sed ex secundo culpatur homo inquantum
homo. Sed in moralibus, ubi attenditur ordo rationis ad finem
communem humanae vitae, semper peccatum et malum attenditur per
deviationem ab ordine rationis ad finem communem humanae vitae. Et
ideo culpatur ex tali peccato homo et inquantum est homo, et
inquantum est moralis. Unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod
<i>in arte volens peccans est eligibilior; circa prudentiam autem
minus, sicut et in virtutibus moralibus</i>, quarum prudentia est
directiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils, is subject to man's power: wherefore it neither takes away nor diminishes guilt.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="34498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34498] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod illa infirmitas quae est in malis voluntariis,
subiacet potestati hominis. Et ideo nec tollit nec diminuit
rationem culpae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q21_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q21_A3-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 3. Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious in so far as it is good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a human action is not meritorious or demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice. For we speak
                     of merit or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no place save in matters relating to another person. But good or
                     evil actions are not all related to another person, for some are related to the person of the agent. Therefore not every good
                     or evil human action is meritorious or demeritorious.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="34499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34499] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus humanus non habeat rationem
meriti et demeriti, propter suam bonitatem vel malitiam. Meritum
enim et demeritum dicitur per ordinem ad retributionem, quae locum
solum habet in his quae ad alterum sunt. Sed non omnes actus humani
boni vel mali sunt ad alterum, sed quidam sunt ad seipsum. Ergo non
omnis actus humanus bonus vel malus habet rationem meriti vel
demeriti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one deserves punishment or reward for doing as he chooses with that of which he is master: thus if a man destroys
                     what belongs to him, he is not punished, as if he had destroyed what belongs to another. But man is master of his own actions.
                     Therefore a man does not merit punishment or reward, through putting his action to a good or evil purpose.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="34500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34500] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
nullus meretur poenam vel praemium ex hoc quod disponit ut vult de
eo cuius est dominus, sicut si homo destruat rem suam, non punitur,
sicut si destrueret rem alterius. Sed homo est dominus suorum
actuum. Ergo ex hoc quod bene vel male disponit de suo actu, non
meretur poenam vel praemium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he does not on that account deserve to be benefited by another man: and
                     the same applies to evil. Now a good action is itself a kind of good and perfection of the agent: while an inordinate action
                     is his evil. Therefore a man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does a good or an evil deed.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="34501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34501] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
ex hoc quod aliquis sibi ipsi acquirit bonum, non meretur ut ei
bene fiat ab alio, et eadem ratio est de malis. Sed ipse actus
bonus est quoddam bonum et perfectio agentis, actus autem
inordinatus est quoddam malum ipsius. Non ergo ex hoc quod homo
facit malum actum vel bonum, meretur vel demeretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q21_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.10" target="asv">Is. 3:10,11</a>): "Say to the just man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to the wicked unto evil; for the reward
                     of his hands shall be given him."
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 s. c."><a name="34502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34502] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Isaiae III, <i>dicite iusto quoniam bene, quoniam
fructum adinventionum suarum comedet. Vae impio in malum,
retributio enim manuum eius fiet ei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q21_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution according to justice
                     is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done something to another's advantage or hurt. It must, moreover, be observed
                     that every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or
                     evil, done to the member of a society, redounds on the whole society: thus, who hurts
                     the hand, hurts the man. When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to another individual, there is a twofold measure of merit
                     or demerit in his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the individual to whom he has done good or harm;
                     secondly, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the whole of society. Now when a man ordains his action directly for
                     the good or evil of the whole society, retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by the whole society;
                     secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas when a man does that which conduces to his own benefit or disadvantage,
                     then again is retribution owed to him, in so far as this too affects the community, forasmuch as he is a part of society:
                     although retribution is not due to him, in so far as it conduces to the good or harm of an individual, who is identical with
                     the agent: unless, perchance, he owe retribution to himself, by a sort of resemblance, in so far as man is said to be just
                     to
                     himself.
                  </p><p id="FS_Q21_A3-p7"> It is therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves praise or blame, in so far as it is in the power of the will:
                     that it is right or sinful, according as it is ordained to the end; and that its merit or demerit depends on the recompense
                     for justice or injustice towards another.
                  </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 co."><a name="34503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34503] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod meritum et demeritum dicuntur in ordine ad
retributionem quae fit secundum iustitiam. Retributio autem
secundum iustitiam fit alicui ex eo quod agit in profectum vel
nocumentum alterius. Est autem considerandum quod unusquisque in
aliqua societate vivens, est aliquo modo pars et membrum totius
societatis. Quicumque ergo agit aliquid in bonum vel malum alicuius
in societate existentis, hoc redundat in totam societatem sicut qui
laedit manum, per consequens laedit hominem. Cum ergo aliquis agit
in bonum vel malum alterius singularis personae, cadit ibi
dupliciter ratio meriti vel demeriti. Uno modo, secundum quod
debetur ei retributio a singulari persona quam iuvat vel offendit.
Alio modo, secundum quod debetur ei retributio a toto collegio.
Quando vero aliquis ordinat actum suum directe in bonum vel malum
totius collegii, debetur ei retributio primo quidem et
principaliter a toto collegio, secundario vero, ab omnibus collegii
partibus. Cum vero aliquis agit quod in bonum proprium vel malum
vergit, etiam debetur ei retributio, inquantum etiam hoc vergit in
commune secundum quod ipse est pars collegii, licet non debeatur ei
retributio inquantum est bonum vel malum singularis personae, quae
est eadem agenti, nisi forte a seipso secundum quandam
similitudinem, prout est iustitia hominis ad seipsum. Sic igitur
patet quod actus bonus vel malus habet rationem laudabilis vel
culpabilis, secundum quod est in potestate voluntatis; rationem
vero rectitudinis et peccati, secundum ordinem ad finem; rationem
vero meriti et demeriti, secundum retributionem iustitiae ad
alterum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man's good or evil actions, although not ordained to the good or evil of another individual, are nevertheless ordained
                     to the good or evil of another, i.e. the community.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="34504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34504] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod quandoque actus hominis boni vel mali, etsi non
ordinantur ad bonum vel malum alterius singularis personae, tamen
ordinantur ad bonum vel ad malum alterius quod est ipsa
communitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is master of his actions; and yet, in so far as he belongs to another, i.e. the community, of which he forms part, he
                     merits or demerits, inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill: just as if he were to dispense well or ill other belongings
                     of his, in respect of which he is bound to serve the community.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="34505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34505] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod homo, qui habet dominium sui actus, ipse etiam,
inquantum est alterius, scilicet communitatis, cuius est pars
meretur aliquid vel demeretur, inquantum actus suos bene vel male
disponit, sicut etiam si alia sua, de quibus communitati servire
debet, bene vel male dispenset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This very good or evil, which a man does to himself by his action, redounds to the community, as stated above.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="34506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34506] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod hoc ipsum bonum vel malum quod aliquis sibi facit per
suum actum, redundat in communitatem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q21_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q21_A4-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 4. Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious before God, according as it is good or evil?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's actions, good or evil, are not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God. Because, as stated
                     above
                     <a href="#FS_Q21_A3" id="FS_Q21_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, merit and demerit imply relation to retribution for good or harm done to another. But a man's action, good or evil, does
                     no good or harm to God; for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q21_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Job.35.6" target="asv">Job 35:6,7</a>): "If thou sin, what shalt thou hurt Him? . . . And if thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him?"
                     Therefore a human action, good or evil, is not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="34507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34507] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus hominis bonus vel malus non
habeat rationem meriti vel demeriti per comparationem ad Deum.
Quia, ut dictum est, meritum et demeritum importat ordinem ad
recompensationem profectus vel damni ad alterum illati. Sed actus
hominis bonus vel malus non cedit in aliquem profectum vel damnum
ipsius Dei, dicitur enim Iob XXXV, <i>si peccaveris quid ei
nocebis? Porro si iuste egeris, quid donabis ei?</i> Ergo actus
hominis bonus vel malus non habet rationem meriti vel demeriti apud
Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an instrument acquires no merit or demerit in the sight of him that uses it; because the entire action of the instrument
                     belongs to the user. Now when man acts he is the instrument of the Divine power which is the principal cause of his action;
                     hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q21_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.10.15" target="asv">Is. 10:15</a>): "Shall the axe boast itself against him that cutteth with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it is drawn?"
                     where man while acting is
                     evidently compared to an instrument. Therefore man merits or demerits nothing in God's sight, by good or evil deeds.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="34508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34508] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
instrumentum nihil meretur vel demeretur apud eum qui utitur
instrumento, quia tota actio instrumenti est utentis ipso. Sed homo
in agendo est instrumentum divinae virtutis principaliter ipsum
moventis, unde dicitur Isaiae X, <i>numquid gloriabitur securis
contra eum qui secat in ea? Aut exaltabitur serra contra eum a quo
trahitur?</i> Ubi manifeste hominem agentem comparat instrumento.
Ergo homo, bene agendo vel male, nihil meretur vel demeretur apud
Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit through being ordained to someone else. But not all human actions are ordained
                     to God. Therefore not every good or evil action acquires merit or demerit in God's sight.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="34509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34509] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
actus humanus habet rationem meriti vel demeriti, inquantum
ordinatur ad alterum. Sed non omnes actus humani ordinantur ad
Deum. Ergo non omnes actus boni vel mali habent rationem meriti vel
demeriti apud Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q21_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.12.14" target="asv">Eccles. 12:14</a>): "All things that are done, God will bring into judgment . . . whether it be good or evil." Now judgment implies retribution,
                     in respect of which we speak of merit and demerit. Therefore every human action, both good and evil, acquires merit or demerit
                     in God's sight.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 s. c."><a name="34510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34510] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
est quod dicitur Eccle. ult., <i>cuncta quae fiunt adducet Deus in
iudicium, sive bonum sit sive malum</i>. Sed iudicium importat
retributionem, respectu cuius meritum et demeritum dicitur. Ergo
omnis actus hominis bonus vel malus habet rationem meriti vel
demeriti apud Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A human action, as stated above
                     <a href="#FS_Q21_A3" id="FS_Q21_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, acquires merit or demerit, through being ordained to someone else, either by reason of himself, or by reason of the community:
                     and in each way, our actions, good and evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of God. On the part of God Himself, inasmuch
                     as He is man's last end; and it is our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as stated above (Q[19], A[10]). Consequently,
                     whoever
                     does an evil deed, not referable to God, does not give God the honor due to Him as our last end. On the part of the whole
                     community of the universe, because in every community, he who governs the community, cares, first of all, for the common good;
                     wherefore it is his business to award retribution for such things as are done well or ill in the community. Now God is the
                     governor and ruler of the whole universe, as stated in the
                     <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A5" id="FS_Q21_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[103], A[5]</a>: and especially of
                     rational creatures. Consequently it is evident that human actions acquire merit or demerit in reference to Him: else it would
                     follow that human actions are no business of God's.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 co."><a name="34511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34511] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, actus alicuius hominis habet
rationem meriti vel demeriti, secundum quod ordinatur ad alterum,
vel ratione eius, vel ratione communitatis. Utroque autem modo
actus nostri boni vel mali habent rationem meriti vel demeriti apud
Deum. Ratione quidem ipsius, inquantum est ultimus hominis finis,
est autem debitum ut ad finem ultimum omnes actus referantur, ut
supra habitum est. Unde qui facit actum malum non referibilem in
Deum, non servat honorem Dei, qui ultimo fini debetur. Ex parte
vero totius communitatis universi, quia in qualibet communitate
ille qui regit communitatem, praecipue habet curam boni communis,
unde ad eum pertinet retribuere pro his quae bene vel male fiunt in
communitate. Est autem Deus gubernator et rector totius universi,
sicut in primo habitum est, et specialiter rationalium creaturarum.
Unde manifestum est quod actus humani habent rationem meriti vel
demeriti per comparationem ad ipsum, alioquin sequeretur quod Deus
non haberet curam de actibus humanis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God in Himself neither gains nor losses anything by the action of man: but man, for his part, takes something from God, or
                     offers something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the order instituted by God.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="34512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34512] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
ergo dicendum quod per actum hominis Deo secundum se nihil potest
accrescere vel deperire, sed tamen homo, quantum in se est, aliquid
subtrahit Deo, vel ei exhibet, cum servat vel non servat ordinem
quem Deus instituit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is so moved, as an instrument, by God, that, at the same time, he moves himself by his free-will, as was explained above
                     (
                     <a href="#FS_Q9_A6" id="FS_Q21_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[6]</a>, ad 3). Consequently, by his action, he acquires merit or demerit in God's sight.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="34513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34513] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
dicendum quod homo sic movetur a Deo ut instrumentum, quod tamen
non excluditur quin moveat seipsum per liberum arbitrium, ut ex
supradictis patet. Et ideo per suum actum meretur vel demeretur
apud Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q21_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to all that he is and has; and so it does not follow that every action
                     of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body politic. But all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred
                     to God: and therefore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires merit or demerit in the sight of God, as far as the
                     action itself is concerned.
                  </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 21 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="34514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34514] Iª-IIae q. 21 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
dicendum quod homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam secundum
se totum, et secundum omnia sua, et ideo non oportet quod quilibet
actus eius sit meritorius vel demeritorius per ordinem ad
communitatem politicam. Sed totum quod homo est, et quod potest et
habet, ordinandum est ad Deum, et ideo omnis actus hominis bonus
vel malus habet rationem meriti vel demeriti apud Deum, quantum est
ex ipsa ratione actus.</p></div></div></div></div>


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author	ht
date	Sun, 17 Apr 2016 17:19:25 +0000
parents	3858f013e8cb
children	8c90b527af0e