Aquinas: summa/bilingual/FS_ii.html comparison

comparison summa/bilingual/FS_ii.html @ 108:a576afa4a039

Through Q19

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date	Sun, 17 Apr 2016 17:19:25 +0000
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 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="34222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34222] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod, cum imperium sit actus rationis, ille actus
 imperatur, qui rationi subditur. Primus autem voluntatis actus non
 est ex rationis ordinatione, sed ex instinctu naturae, aut
 superioris causae, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non oportet quod in
-infinitum procedatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A7-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 7. Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p2">
+infinitum procedatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A6-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 6. Whether the act of the reason is commanded?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be commanded. For it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But
+it is the reason that commands, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q17_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the act of the reason is not commanded.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="34223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34223] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus rationis non possit esse
+imperatus. Inconveniens enim videtur quod aliquid imperet sibi
+ipsi. Sed ratio est quae imperat, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
+rationis actus non imperatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is essential is different from that which is by participation. But the power whose act is commanded by
+reason, is rational by participation, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the act of that power, which is essentially rational,
+is not commanded.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="34224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34224] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+id quod est per essentiam, diversum est ab eo quod est per
+participationem. Sed potentia cuius actus imperatur a ratione, est
+ratio per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo illius
+potentiae actus non imperatur, quae est ratio per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But to know and judge the truth, which is the act of reason, is not
+always in our power. Therefore the act of the reason cannot be commanded.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="34225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34225] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+ille actus imperatur, qui est in potestate nostra. Sed cognoscere
+et iudicare verum, quod est actus rationis, non est semper in
+potestate nostra. Non ergo actus rationis potest esse
+imperatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> That which we do of our free-will, can be done by our command. But the acts of the reason are accomplished through the free-will:
+for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "by his free-will man inquires, considers, judges, approves." Therefore the
+acts of the reason can be commanded.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 s. c."><a name="34226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34226] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+id quod libero arbitrio agimus, nostro imperio agi potest. Sed
+actus rationis exercentur per liberum arbitrium, dicit enim
+Damascenus quod <i>libero arbitrio homo exquirit, et scrutatur, et
+iudicat, et disponit</i>. Ergo actus rationis possunt esse
+imperati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Since the reason reacts on itself, just as it directs the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act. Consequently
+its act can be commanded.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 co."><a name="34227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34227] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, quia ratio supra seipsam reflectitur, sicut ordinat
+de actibus aliarum potentiarum, ita etiam potest ordinare de actu
+suo. Unde etiam actus suus potest esse imperatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p7"> But we must take note that the act of the reason may be considered in two ways. First, as to the exercise of the act. And
+considered thus, the act of the reason can always be commanded: as when one is told to be attentive, and to use one's reason.
+Secondly, as to the object; in respect of which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is the act whereby it apprehends
+the truth about something. This act is not in our power: because it happens in virtue of a natural or
+supernatural light. Consequently in this respect, the act of the reason is not in our power, and cannot be commanded. The
+other act of the reason is that whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, that which the reason apprehends
+is such that it naturally assents thereto, e.g. the first principles, it is not in our power to assent or dissent to the like:
+assent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking, is not subject to our command. But some things which are
+apprehended do not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to assent or dissent, or at least suspend
+its assent or dissent, on account of some cause or other; and in such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is subject
+to our command.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Sed attendendum
+est quod actus rationis potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo,
+quantum ad exercitium actus. Et sic actus rationis semper imperari
+potest, sicut cum indicitur alicui quod attendat, et ratione
+utatur. Alio modo, quantum ad obiectum, respectu cuius, duo actus
+rationis attenduntur. Primo quidem, ut veritatem circa aliquid
+apprehendat. Et hoc non est in potestate nostra, hoc enim contingit
+per virtutem alicuius luminis, vel naturalis vel supernaturalis. Et
+ideo quantum ad hoc, actus rationis non est in potestate nostra,
+nec imperari potest. Alius autem actus rationis est, dum his quae
+apprehendit assentit. Si igitur fuerint talia apprehensa, quibus
+naturaliter intellectus assentiat, sicut prima principia, assensus
+talium vel dissensus non est in potestate nostra, sed in ordine
+naturae, et ideo, proprie loquendo, nec imperio subiacet. Sunt
+autem quaedam apprehensa, quae non adeo convincunt intellectum,
+quin possit assentire vel dissentire, vel saltem assensum vel
+dissensum suspendere, propter aliquam causam, et in talibus
+assensus ipse vel dissensus in potestate nostra est, et sub imperio
+cadit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason commands itself, just as the will moves itself, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q9_A3" id="FS_Q17_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[3]</a>), that is to say, in so far as each power reacts on its own acts, and from one thing tends to another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="34228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34228] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ratio hoc modo imperat sibi ipsi, sicut et
+voluntas movet seipsam, ut supra dictum est, inquantum scilicet
+utraque potentia reflectitur supra suum actum, et ex uno in aliud
+tendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> On account of the diversity of objects subject to the act of the reason, nothing prevents the reason from participating in
+itself: thus the knowledge of principles is participated in the knowledge of the conclusions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="34229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34229] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, propter diversitatem obiectorum quae actui rationis
+subduntur, nihil prohibet rationem seipsam participare, sicut in
+cognitione conclusionum participatur cognitio principiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A6-p10"> The reply to the third object is evident from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="34230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34230] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+patet responsio ex dictis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q17_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q17_A7-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 7. Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q17_A7-p2">
 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is not commanded. For the Apostle says (
 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q17_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.15" target="asv">Rom. 7:15</a>): "For I do not that good which I will": and a gloss explains this by saying that man lusts, although he wills not to lust.
 But to lust is an act of the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command.
 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 17 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="34231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34231] Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
 sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus sensitivi appetitus non sit
 is evil. But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness, as stated above (ad 2).
 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="34410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34410] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
 dicendum quod sola malitia intentionis sufficit ad malitiam
 voluntatis, et ideo etiam quantum mala est intentio, tantum mala
 est voluntas. Sed non est eadem ratio de bonitate, ut dictum
-est.</p></div></div></div></div>
+est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A9-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 9. Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend on its conformity to the Divine will. Because it is impossible
+for man's will to be conformed to the Divine will; as appears from the word of
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.55.9" target="asv"> Isa. 55:9</a>: "As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are My ways exalted above your ways, and My thoughts above your thoughts."
+If therefore goodness of the will depended on its conformity to the Divine will, it would follow
+that it is impossible for man's will to be good. Which is inadmissible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="34411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34411] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonitas voluntatis humanae non
+dependeat ex conformitate voluntatis divinae. Impossibile est enim
+voluntatem hominis conformari voluntati divinae, ut patet per id
+quod dicitur Isaiae LV, <i>sicut exaltantur caeli a terra, ita
+exaltatae sunt viae meae a viis vestris, et cogitationes meae a
+cogitationibus vestris</i>. Si ergo ad bonitatem voluntatis
+requireretur conformitas ad divinam voluntatem, sequeretur quod
+impossibile esset hominis voluntatem esse bonam. Quod est
+inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as our wills arise from the Divine will, so does our knowledge flow from the Divine knowledge. But our knowledge
+does not require to be conformed to God's knowledge; since God knows many things that we know not. Therefore there is no need
+for our will to be conformed to the Divine will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="34412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34412] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut voluntas nostra derivatur a voluntate divina, ita scientia
+nostra derivatur a scientia divina. Sed non requiritur ad scientiam
+nostram quod sit conformis scientiae divinae, multa enim Deus scit
+quae nos ignoramus. Ergo non requiritur quod voluntas nostra sit
+conformis voluntati divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will is a principle of action. But our action cannot be conformed to God's. Therefore neither can our will be
+conformed to His.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="34413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34413] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+voluntas est actionis principium. Sed actio nostra non potest
+conformari actioni divinae. Ergo nec voluntas voluntati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.39" target="asv">Mat. 26:39</a>): "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt": which words He said, because "He wishes man to be upright and to tend to God," as Augustine
+expounds in the Enchiridion [*Enarr. in
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A9-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.32" target="asv">Ps. 32</a>, serm. i.]. But the rectitude of the will is its goodness. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to
+the Divine will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 9 s. c."><a name="34414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34414] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Matth. XXVI, <i>non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu
+vis</i>, quod dicit quia rectum vult esse hominem, et ad Deum
+dirigi, ut Augustinus exponit in Enchirid. Rectitudo autem
+voluntatis est bonitas eius. Ergo bonitas voluntatis dependet ex
+conformitate ad voluntatem divinam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q19_A7" id="FS_Q19_A9-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>, the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end. Now the last end of the human will is the Sovereign Good,
+namely, God, as stated above (Q[1], A[8]; Q[3], A[1]). Therefore the goodness of the human will requires it to be ordained
+to the Sovereign Good, that is, to God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 9 co."><a name="34415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34415] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonitas voluntatis dependet ex
+intentione finis. Finis autem ultimus voluntatis humanae est summum
+bonum, quod est Deus, ut supra dictum est. Requiritur ergo ad
+bonitatem humanae voluntatis, quod ordinetur ad summum bonum, quod
+est Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p7"> Now this Good is primarily and essentially compared to the Divine will, as its proper object. Again, that which is first
+in any genus is the measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus. Moreover, everything attains to rectitude and goodness,
+in so far as it is in accord with its proper measure. Therefore, in order that man's will be good it needs to be conformed
+to the Divine will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Hoc autem bonum primo quidem et per se comparatur ad
+voluntatem divinam ut obiectum proprium eius. Illud autem quod est
+primum in quolibet genere, est mensura et ratio omnium quae sunt
+illius generis. Unumquodque autem rectum et bonum est, inquantum
+attingit ad propriam mensuram. Ergo ad hoc quod voluntas hominis
+sit bona, requiritur quod conformetur voluntati divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The human will cannot be conformed to the will of God so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like manner human
+knowledge is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it knows truth: and human action is conformed to the Divine,
+in so far as it is becoming to the agent: and this by way of imitation, not by way of equality.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="34416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34416] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod voluntas hominis non potest conformari voluntati
+divinae per aequiparantiam, sed per imitationem. Et similiter
+conformatur scientia hominis scientiae divinae, inquantum cognoscit
+verum. Et actio hominis actioni divinae, inquantum est agenti
+conveniens. Et hoc per imitationem, non autem per
+aequiparantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A9-p9"> From the above may be gathered the replies to the Second and Third Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="34417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34417] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet
+solutio ad secundum, et ad tertium argumentum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q19_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q19_A10-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 10. Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing
+willed?
+</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A10-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human will need not always be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we cannot
+will what we know not: since the apprehended good is the object of the will. But in many things we know not what God wills.
+Therefore the human will cannot be conformed to the Divine will as to the thing willed.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="34418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34418] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas hominis non debeat semper
+conformari divinae voluntati in volito. Non enim possumus velle
+quod ignoramus, bonum enim apprehensum est obiectum voluntatis. Sed
+quid Deus velit, ignoramus in plurimis. Ergo non potest humana
+voluntas divinae voluntati conformari in volito.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A10-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills to damn the man whom He foresees about to die in mortal sin. If therefore man were bound to conform his
+will to the Divine will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow that a man is bound to will his own damnation.
+Which is inadmissible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="34419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34419] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Deus vult damnare aliquem, quem praescit in mortali peccato
+moriturum. Si ergo homo teneretur conformare voluntatem suam
+divinae voluntati in volito, sequeretur quod homo teneretur velle
+suam damnationem. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A10-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one is bound to will what is against filial piety. But if man were to will what God wills, this would sometimes
+be contrary to filial piety: for instance, when God wills the death of a father: if his son were to will it also, it would
+be against filial piety. Therefore man is not bound to conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="34420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34420] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+nullus tenetur velle aliquid quod est contra pietatem. Sed si homo
+vellet illud quod Deus vult, hoc esset quandoque contra pietatem,
+puta, cum Deus vult mori patrem alicuius, si filius hoc idem
+vellet, contra pietatem esset. Ergo non tenetur homo conformare
+voluntatem suam voluntati divinae in volito.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> (1) On
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32.1" target="asv"> Ps. 32:1, </a> "Praise becometh the upright," a gloss says: "That man has an upright heart, who wills what God wills." But everyone is bound
+to have an upright heart. Therefore everyone is bound to will what God wills.
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p6"> (2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, as does every act. If therefore man is bound to conform his will to
+the Divine will, it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p7"> (3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing different things. But whoever has a will in opposition to the Divine
+will, has an evil will. Therefore whoever does not conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed, has an evil
+will.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 s. c. 1"><a name="34421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34421] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed
+contra est quia super illud Psalmi XXXII, <i>rectos decet
+collaudatio</i>, dicit Glossa, <i>rectum cor habet qui vult quod
+Deus vult</i>. Sed quilibet tenetur habere rectum cor. Ergo
+quilibet tenetur velle quod Deus vult.</p><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 s. c. 2"><a name="34422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34422] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 s. c. 2</span></a>
+Praeterea, forma voluntatis est ex obiecto sicut et cuiuslibet
+actus. Si ergo tenetur homo conformare voluntatem suam voluntati
+divinae, sequitur quod teneatur conformare in volito.</p><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 s. c. 3"><a name="34423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34423] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 s. c. 3</span></a>
+Praeterea, repugnantia voluntatum consistit in hoc, quod homines
+diversa volunt. Sed quicumque habet voluntatem repugnantem divinae
+voluntati, habet malam voluntatem. Ergo quicumque non conformat
+voluntatem suam voluntati divinae in volito, habet malam
+voluntatem.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p8">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from what has been said above (
+<a href="#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q19_A10-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[3]</a>,5), the will tends to its object, according as it is proposed by the reason. Now a thing may be considered in various ways
+by the reason, so as to appear good from one point of view, and not good from another point of view. And therefore if a man's
+will wills a thing to be, according as it appears to be good, his will is good: and the will of another man, who wills that
+thing not to
+be, according as it appears evil, is also good. Thus a judge has a good will, in willing a thief to be put to death, because
+this is just: while the will of another---e.g. the thief's wife or son, who wishes him not to be put to death, inasmuch as
+killing is a natural evil, is also good.
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p9"> Now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or intellect; the more universal the aspect of the apprehended
+good, the more universal the good to which the will tends. This is evident in the example given above: because the judge has
+care of the common good, which is justice, and therefore he wishes the thief's death, which has the aspect of good in relation
+to the common estate; whereas the thief's wife has to consider the private, the good of the family, and from
+this point of view she wishes her husband, the thief, not to be put to death. Now the good of the whole universe is that which
+is apprehended by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of all things: hence whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect
+of the common good; this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the whole universe. On the other hand, the apprehension
+of a creature, according to its nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to that nature. Now a thing may happen to
+be
+good under a particular aspect, and yet not good under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as stated above. And therefore it
+comes to pass that a certain will is good from willing something considered under a particular aspect, which thing God wills
+not, under a universal aspect, and vice versa. And hence too it is, that various wills of various men can be good in respect
+of opposite things, for as much as, under various aspects, they wish a particular thing to be or not to be.
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p10"> But a man's will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he refer it to the common good as an end: since even the
+natural appetite of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is the end that supplies the formal reason,
+as it were, of willing whatever is directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man will some particular good with a
+right will, he must will that particular good materially, and the Divine and universal good, formally.
+Therefore the human will is bound to be conformed to the Divine will, as to that which is willed formally, for it is bound
+to will the Divine and universal good; but not as to that which is willed materially, for the reason given above.
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p11"> At the same time in both these respects, the human will is conformed to the Divine, in a certain degree. Because inasmuch
+as it is conformed to the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed, it is conformed thereto in the point of the
+last end. While, inasmuch as it is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed materially, it is conformed to that
+will considered as efficient cause; since the proper inclination consequent to nature, or to the particular
+apprehension of some particular thing, comes to a thing from God as its efficient cause. Hence it is customary to say that
+a man's will, in this respect, is conformed to the Divine will, because it wills what God wishes him to will.
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p12"> There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal cause, consisting in man's willing something from charity,
+as God wills it. And this conformity is also reduced to the formal conformity, that is in respect of the last end, which is
+the proper object of charity.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 co."><a name="34424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34424] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, voluntas fertur in suum
+obiectum secundum quod a ratione proponitur. Contingit autem
+aliquid a ratione considerari diversimode, ita quod sub una ratione
+est bonum, et secundum aliam rationem non bonum. Et ideo voluntas
+alicuius, si velit illud esse, secundum quod habet rationem boni,
+est bona, et voluntas alterius, si velit illud idem non esse,
+secundum quod habet rationem mali, erit voluntas etiam bona. Sicut
+iudex habet bonam voluntatem, dum vult occisionem latronis, quia
+iusta est, voluntas autem alterius, puta uxoris vel filii, qui non
+vult occidi ipsum, inquantum est secundum naturam mala occisio, est
+etiam bona.</p><p>Cum autem voluntas sequatur apprehensionem rationis vel
+intellectus, secundum quod ratio boni apprehensi fuerit communior,
+secundum hoc et voluntas fertur in bonum communius. Sicut patet in
+exemplo proposito, nam iudex habet curam boni communis, quod est
+iustitia, et ideo vult occisionem latronis, quae habet rationem
+boni secundum relationem ad statum communem; uxor autem latronis
+considerare habet bonum privatum familiae, et secundum hoc vult
+maritum latronem non occidi. Bonum autem totius universi est id
+quod est apprehensum a Deo, qui est universi factor et gubernator,
+unde quidquid vult, vult sub ratione boni communis, quod est sua
+bonitas, quae est bonum totius universi. Apprehensio autem
+creaturae, secundum suam naturam, est alicuius boni particularis
+proportionati suae naturae. Contingit autem aliquid esse bonum
+secundum rationem particularem, quod non est bonum secundum
+rationem universalem, aut e converso, ut dictum est. Et ideo
+contingit quod aliqua voluntas est bona volens aliquid secundum
+rationem particularem consideratum, quod tamen Deus non vult
+secundum rationem universalem, et e converso. Et inde est etiam
+quod possunt diversae voluntates diversorum hominum circa opposita
+esse bonae, prout sub diversis rationibus particularibus volunt hoc
+esse vel non esse.</p><p>Non est autem recta voluntas alicuius hominis
+volentis aliquod bonum particulare, nisi referat illud in bonum
+commune sicut in finem, cum etiam naturalis appetitus cuiuslibet
+partis ordinetur in bonum commune totius. Ex fine autem sumitur
+quasi formalis ratio volendi illud quod ad finem ordinatur. Unde ad
+hoc quod aliquis recta voluntate velit aliquod particulare bonum,
+oportet quod illud particulare bonum sit volitum materialiter,
+bonum autem commune divinum sit volitum formaliter. Voluntas igitur
+humana tenetur conformari divinae voluntati in volito formaliter,
+tenetur enim velle bonum divinum et commune, sed non materialiter,
+ratione iam dicta.</p><p>Sed tamen quantum ad utrumque, aliquo modo
+voluntas humana conformatur voluntati divinae. Quia secundum quod
+conformatur voluntati divinae in communi ratione voliti,
+conformatur ei in fine ultimo. Secundum autem quod non conformatur
+ei in volito materialiter, conformatur ei secundum rationem causae
+efficientis, quia hanc propriam inclinationem consequentem naturam,
+vel apprehensionem particularem huius rei, habet res a Deo sicut a
+causa effectiva. Unde consuevit dici quod conformatur, quantum ad
+hoc, voluntas hominis voluntati divinae, quia vult hoc quod Deus
+vult eum velle.</p><p> Est et alius modus conformitatis secundum rationem
+causae formalis, ut scilicet homo velit aliquid ex caritate, sicut
+Deus vult. Et ista etiam conformitas reducitur ad conformitatem
+formalem quae attenditur ex ordine ad ultimum finem, quod est
+proprium obiectum caritatis.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We can know in a general way what God wills. For we know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the aspect of good. Consequently
+whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a will conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing willed.
+But we know not what God wills in particular: and in this respect we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p14"> But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in
+that particular matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in all things not only formally, but also materially.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="34425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34425] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod volitum divinum, secundum rationem communem,
+quale sit, scire possumus. Scimus enim quod Deus quidquid vult,
+vult sub ratione boni. Et ideo quicumque vult aliquid sub quacumque
+ratione boni, habet voluntatem conformem voluntati divinae, quantum
+ad rationem voliti. Sed in particulari nescimus quid Deus velit. Et
+quantum ad hoc, non tenemur conformare voluntatem nostram divinae
+voluntati. In statu tamen gloriae, omnes videbunt in singulis quae
+volent, ordinem eorum ad id quod Deus circa hoc vult. Et ideo non
+solum formaliter, sed materialiter in omnibus suam voluntatem Deo
+conformabunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q19_A10-p15">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not will the damnation of a man, considered precisely as damnation, nor a man's death, considered precisely as death,
+because, "He wills all men to be saved" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A10-p15.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>); but He wills such things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore in regard to such things it suffices for man to will the
+upholding of God's justice and of the natural order.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="34426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34426] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod Deus non vult damnationem alicuius sub ratione
+damnationis, nec mortem alicuius inquantum est mors, <i>quia ipse
+vult omnes homines salvos fieri</i>, sed vult ista sub ratione
+iustitiae. Unde sufficit circa talia quod homo velit iustitiam Dei,
+et ordinem naturae servari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p16"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b>
+	Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.</p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p17"> To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said that a man who conforms his will to God's, in the aspect
+of reason of the thing willed, wills what God wills, more than the man, who conforms his will to God's, in the point of the
+very thing willed; because the will tends more to the end, than to that which is on account of the end.
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p18"> To the second, it must be replied that the species and form of an act are taken from the object considered formally, rather
+than from the object considered materially.
+</p><p id="FS_Q19_A10-p19"> To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills when several people desire different things, but not under
+the same aspect: but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same aspect, one man wills a thing which another
+wills not. But there is no question of this here.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="34427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34427] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet
+solutio ad tertium.</p><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 ad 4"><a name="34428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34428] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad primum
+vero quod in contrarium obiiciebatur, dicendum quod magis vult quod
+Deus vult, qui conformat voluntatem suam voluntati divinae quantum
+ad rationem voliti, quam qui conformat quantum ad ipsam rem
+volitam, quia voluntas principalius fertur in finem, quam in id
+quod est ad finem.</p><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 ad 5"><a name="34429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34429] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 ad 5</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod species et forma actus magis attenditur secundum
+rationem obiecti, quam secundum id quod est materiale in
+obiecto.</p><p title="I-II q. 19 a. 10 ad 6"><a name="34430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34430] Iª-IIae q. 19 a. 10 ad 6</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod non est repugnantia voluntatum, quando aliqui diversa
+volunt non secundum eandem rationem. Sed si sub una ratione esset
+aliquid ab uno volitum, quod alius nollet, hoc induceret
+repugnantiam voluntatum. Quod tamen non est in proposito.</p></div></div></div></div></div>
 <div id="FS_Q20" class="div3">
 <h3 id="FS_Q20-p0.1">Q. 20. OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN AFFAIRS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
 <p id="FS_Q20-p2"> We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q20-p3"><a href="#FS_Q20_A1"> (1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or in the external action?</a></p><p id="FS_Q20-p4"><a href="#FS_Q20_A2"> (2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the goodness of the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q20-p5"><a href="#FS_Q20_A3"> (3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as those of the external action?</a></p><p id="FS_Q20-p6"><a href="#FS_Q20_A4"> (4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q20-p7"><a href="#FS_Q20_A5"> (5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its goodness or malice?</a></p><p id="FS_Q20-p8"><a href="#FS_Q20_A6"> (6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?</a></p>
 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 20 pr."><a name="34431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[34431]

Mercurial > hg > Aquinas

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