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            <h2 id="SS.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON GRATUITOUS GRACES (QQ[171]-182)</h2>
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               <h3 id="SS_Q171-p0.1">OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q171-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q171-p2"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q171-p3"> After treating individually of all the virtues and vices that pertain to men of all conditions and estates, we must now consider
                  those things which pertain especially to certain men. Now there is a triple difference between men as regards things connected
                  with the soul's habits and acts. First, in reference to the various gratuitous graces, according to 
                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:4</a>, 
                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">7</a>: "There are diversities of graces . . . and to one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the
                  word of knowledge," etc. Another difference arises from the diversities of life, namely the active and the contemplative life,
                  which correspond to diverse purposes of operation, wherefore it is stated (
                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171-p3.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:4</a>, 
                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171-p3.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">7</a>) that "there are diversities of operations." For the purpose of operation in Martha, who "was busy about much serving," which
                  pertains to the active life, differed from the purpose of operation in Mary, "who sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard
                  His word"
                  (
                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171-p3.5" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.39" target="asv">Lk. 10:39,40</a>), which pertains to the contemplative life. A third difference corresponds to the various duties and states of life, as expressed
                  in
                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171-p3.6" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.11" target="asv"> Eph. 4:11, </a> "And He gave some apostles; and some prophets; and other some evangelists; and other some pastors and doctors": and this
                  pertains to diversity of ministries, of which it is written (
                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171-p3.7" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:5</a>): "There are diversities of ministries."
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q171-p4"> With regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object to be considered, it must be observed that some of them pertain
                  to knowledge, some to speech, and some to operation. Now all things pertaining to knowledge may be comprised under "prophecy,"
                  since prophetic revelation extends not only to future events relating to man, but also to things relating to God, both as
                  to those which are to be believed by all and are matters of "faith," and as to yet higher mysteries, which
                  concern the perfect and belong to "wisdom." Again, prophetic revelation is about things pertaining to spiritual substances,
                  by whom we are urged to good or evil; this pertains to the "discernment of spirits." Moreover it extends to the direction
                  of human acts, and this pertains to "knowledge," as we shall explain further on (
                  <a id="SS_Q171-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q177.html">Q[177])</a>. Accordingly we must first of all consider prophecy, and rapture which is a degree of prophecy.
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q171-p5"> Prophecy admits of four heads of consideration: (1) its essence; (2) its cause; (3) the mode of prophetic knowledge; (4)
                  the division of prophecy.
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q171-p6"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q171-p7"> (1) Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q171-p8"> (2) Whether it is a habit?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q171-p9"> (3) Whether it is only about future contingencies?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q171-p10"> (4) Whether a prophet knows all possible matters of prophecy?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q171-p11"> (5) Whether a prophet distinguishes that which he perceives by the gift of God, from that which he perceives by his own spirit?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q171-p12"> (6) Whether anything false can be the matter of prophecy?</p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q171_A1-p0.1">Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.48.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 48:14</a>) that after death the body of Eliseus prophesied, and further on (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.49.18" target="asv">Ecclus. 49:18</a>) it is said of Joseph that "his bones were visited, and after death they prophesied." Now no knowledge remains in the body
                     or in the bones after death. Therefore prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:3</a>): "He that prophesieth, speaketh to men unto edification." Now speech is not knowledge itself, but its effect. Therefore
                     it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every cognitive perfection excludes folly and madness. Yet both of these are consistent with prophecy; for it is
                     written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.9.7" target="asv">Osee 9:7</a>): "Know ye, O Israel, that the prophet was foolish and mad [*Vulg.: 'the spiritual man was mad']." Therefore prophecy is
                     not a cognitive perfection.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as revelation regards the intellect, so inspiration regards, apparently, the affections, since it denotes a
                     kind of motion. Now prophecy is described as "inspiration" or "revelation," according to Cassiodorus [*Prolog. super Psalt.
                     i]. Therefore it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to the intellect more than to the affections.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.9.9" target="asv">1 Kings 9:9</a>): "For he that is now called a prophet, in time past was called a seer." Now sight pertains to knowledge. Therefore prophecy
                     pertains to knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Prophecy first and chiefly consists in knowledge, because, to wit, prophets know things that are far [procul] removed from
                     man's knowledge. Wherefore they may be said to take their name from {phanos}, "apparition," because things appear to them
                     from afar. Wherefore, as Isidore states (Etym. vii, 8), "in the Old Testament, they were called Seers, because they saw what
                     others saw not, and surveyed things hidden in mystery." Hence among heathen nations they
                     were known as "vates, on account of their power of mind [vi mentis]," [*The Latin 'vates' is from the Greek {phates}, and
                     may be rendered 'soothsayer'] (Etym. viii, 7).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p8"> Since, however, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>): "The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit," and further on (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:12</a>): "Seek to abound unto the edification of the Church," it follows that prophecy consists secondarily in speech, in so far
                     as the prophets declare for the instruction of others, the things they know through being taught of God, according to the
                     saying of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.21.10" target="asv"> Is. 21:10, </a> "That which
                     I have heard of the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, I have declared unto you." Accordingly, as Isidore says (Etym. viii,
                     7), "prophets" may be described as "proefatores [foretellers], because they tell from afar [porro fantur]," that is, speak
                     from a distance, "and foretell the truth about things to come."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p9"> Now those things above human ken which are revealed by God cannot be confirmed by human reason, which they surpass as regards
                     the operation of the Divine power, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.16.20" target="asv"> Mk. 16:20, </a> "They . . . preached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs that followed." Hence, thirdly,
                     prophecy is concerned with the working of miracles, as a kind of confirmation of the prophetic utterances. Wherefore it is
                     written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.34.10" target="asv">Dt.
                        34:10,11
                     </a>): "There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face, in all the signs and wonders."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These passages speak of prophecy in reference to the third point just mentioned, which regards the proof of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Apostle is speaking there of the prophetic utterances.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those prophets who are described as foolish and mad are not true but false prophets, of whom it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.3.16" target="asv">Jer. 3:16</a>): "Hearken not to the words of the prophets that prophesy to you, and deceive you; they speak a vision of their own heart,
                     and not out of the mouth of the Lord," and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.13.3" target="asv">Ezech. 13:3</a>): "Woe to the foolish prophets, that follow their own spirit, and see nothing."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is requisite to prophecy that the intention of the mind be raised to the perception of Divine things: wherefore it is
                     written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.2.1" target="asv">Ezech. 2:1</a>): "Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak to thee." This raising of the intention is brought about by the motion
                     of the Holy Ghost, wherefore the text goes on to say: "And the Spirit entered into me . . . and He set me upon my feet." After
                     the mind's intention has been raised to
                     heavenly things, it perceives the things of God; hence the text continues: "And I heard Him speaking to me." Accordingly inspiration
                     is requisite for prophecy, as regards the raising of the mind, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Job.32.8" target="asv"> Job 32:8, </a> "The inspiration of the Almighty giveth understanding": while revelation is necessary, as regards the very perception of
                     Divine things, whereby prophecy is completed; by its means the veil of darkness and ignorance is removed, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A1-p13.3" href="./asv.html#Job.12.22" target="asv"> Job
                        12:22, 
                     </a>"He discovereth great things out of darkness."
                  </p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q171_A2-p0.1">Whether prophecy is a habit?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prophecy is a habit. For according to Ethic. ii, 5, "there are three things in the soul, power, passion,
                     and habit." Now prophecy is not a power, for then it would be in all men, since the powers of the soul are common to them.
                     Again it is not a passion, since the passions belong to the appetitive faculty, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q171_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A2.html">FS, Q[22] , A[2]</a>); whereas prophecy pertains principally to knowledge, as stated in the
                     foregoing Article. Therefore prophecy is a habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every perfection of the soul, which is not always in act, is a habit. Now prophecy is a perfection of the soul;
                     and it is not always in act, else a prophet could not be described as asleep. Therefore seemingly prophecy is a habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces. Now grace is something in the soul, after the manner of a habit,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q171_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q110_A2.html">FS, Q[110], A[2]</a>). Therefore prophecy is a habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A habit is something "whereby we act when we will," as the Commentator [*Averroes or Ibn Roshd, 1120-1198] says (De Anima
                     iii). But a man cannot make use of prophecy when he will, as appears in the case of Eliseus (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 3:15</a>), "who on Josaphat inquiring of him concerning the future, and the spirit of prophecy failing him, caused a minstrel to be
                     brought to him, that the spirit of prophecy might come down upon him through the praise
                     of psalmody, and fill his mind with things to come," as Gregory observes (Hom. i super Ezech.). Therefore prophecy is not
                     a habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.13" target="asv">Eph. 5:13</a>), "all that is made manifest is light," because, to wit, just as the manifestation of the material sight takes place through
                     material light, so too the manifestation of intellectual sight takes place through intellectual light. Accordingly manifestation
                     must be proportionate to the light by means of which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate to its cause. Since
                     then prophecy pertains to a
                     knowledge that surpasses natural reason, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q171_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it follows that prophecy requires an intellectual light surpassing the light of natural reason. Hence the saying of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Mic.7.8" target="asv"> Micah 7:8</a>: "When I sit in darkness, the Lord is my light." Now light may be in a subject in two ways: first, by way of an abiding form,
                     as material light is in the sun, and in fire; secondly, by way of a passion, or passing impression, as light is in the air.
                     Now the
                     prophetic light is not in the prophet's intellect by way of an abiding form, else a prophet would always be able to prophesy,
                     which is clearly false. For Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "Sometimes the spirit of prophecy is lacking to the prophet,
                     nor is it always within the call of his mind, yet so that in its absence he knows that its presence is due to a gift." Hence
                     Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p6.4" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 4:27</a>): "Her soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it
                     from me, and hath not told me." The reason for this is that the intellectual light that is in a subject by way of an abiding
                     and complete form, perfects the intellect chiefly to the effect of knowing the principle of the things manifested by that
                     light; thus by the light of the active intellect the intellect knows chiefly the first principles of all things known naturally.
                     Now the principle of things pertaining to supernatural knowledge, which are manifested by prophecy, is God Himself, Whom
                     the prophets do not see in His essence, although He is seen by the blessed in heaven, in whom this light is by way of an abiding
                     and complete form, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p6.5" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv"> Ps. 35:10, </a> "In Thy light we shall see light."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p7"> It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the prophet's soul by way of a passion or transitory impression. This
                     is indicated 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.33.22" target="asv">Ex. 33:22</a>: "When my glory shall pass, I will set thee in a hole of the rock," etc., and 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 19:11</a>: "Go forth and stand upon the mount before the Lord; and behold the Lord passeth," etc. Hence it is that even as the air
                     is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so too the prophet's mind is always in need of a fresh
                     revelation; thus a disciple who has not yet acquired the principles of an art needs to have every detail explained to him.
                     Wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.1.4" target="asv">Is. 1:4</a>): "In the morning He wakeneth my ear, so that I may hear Him as a master." This is also indicated by the very manner in which
                     prophecies are uttered: thus it is stated that "the Lord spake to such and such a prophet," or that "the word of the Lord,"
                     or "the hand of the Lord was made upon him."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p8"> But a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident that, properly speaking, prophecy is not a habit.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This division of the Philosopher's does not comprise absolutely all that is in the soul, but only such as can be principles
                     of moral actions, which are done sometimes from passion, sometimes from habit, sometimes from mere power, as in the case of
                     those who perform an action from the judgment of their reason before having the habit of that action.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p10"> However, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, provided we understand passion to denote any kind of receiving, in which sense
                     the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is, in a way, to be passive." For just as, in natural knowledge,
                     the possible intellect is passive to the light of the active intellect, so too in prophetic knowledge the human intellect
                     is passive to the enlightening of the Divine light.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as in corporeal things, when a passion ceases, there remains a certain aptitude to a repetition of the passion---thus
                     wood once ignited is more easily ignited again, so too in the prophet's intellect, after the actual enlightenment has ceased,
                     there remains an aptitude to be enlightened anew---thus when the mind has once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily
                     recalled to its former devotion. Hence Augustine says (De orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9)
                     that our prayers need to be frequent, "lest devotion be extinguished as soon as it is kindled."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p12"> We might, however, reply that a person is called a prophet, even while his prophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual, on
                     account of his being deputed by God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.1.5" target="asv"> Jer. 1:5, </a> "And I made thee a prophet unto the nations."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A2-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every gift of grace raises man to something above human nature, and this may happen in two ways. First, as to the substance
                     of the act---for instance, the working of miracles, and the knowledge of the uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom---and
                     for such acts man is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Secondly, a thing is above human nature as to the mode but not
                     the substance of the act---for instance to love God and to know Him in the mirror
                     of His creatures---and for this a habitual gift of grace is bestowed.
                  </p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q171_A3-p0.1">Whether prophecy is only about future contingencies?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prophecy is only about future contingencies. For Cassiodorus says [*Prol. super Psalt. i] that "prophecy
                     is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things with unchangeable truth." Now issues pertain to future
                     contingencies. Therefore the prophetic revelation is about future contingencies alone.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 12</a>, the grace of prophecy is differentiated from wisdom and faith, which are about Divine things; and from the discernment of
                     spirits, which is about created spirits; and from knowledge, which is about human things. Now habits and acts are differentiated
                     by their objects, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q171_A3-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">FS, Q[54], A[2]</a>). Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy is not connected with any of the above. Therefore it
                     follows that it is about future contingencies alone.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, difference of object causes difference of species, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q171_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">FS, Q[54], A[2]</a>). Therefore, if one prophecy is about future contingencies, and another about other things, it would seem to follow that
                     these are different species of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that some prophecies are "about the future, for instance (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.7.14" target="asv">Is. 7:14</a>), 'Behold a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son'"; some are "about the past, as (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>), 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth'"; some are "about the present," as (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p5.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:24,25</a>), "If all prophesy, and there come in one that believeth not . . . the secrets of his heart are made
                     manifest." Therefore prophecy is not about future contingencies alone.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A manifestation made by means of a certain light can extend to all those things that are subject to that light: thus the
                     body's sight extends to all colors, and the soul's natural knowledge extends to whatever is subject to the light of the active
                     intellect. Now prophetic knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is possible to know all things both Divine and
                     human, both spiritual and corporeal; and consequently the prophetic revelation extends to
                     them all. Thus by the ministry of spirits a prophetic revelation concerning the perfections of God and the angels was made
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv"> Is. 6:1, </a> where it is written, "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated." Moreover his prophecy contains matters referring
                     to natural bodies, according to the words of 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.12" target="asv"> Is. 40:12, </a> "Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of His hand," etc. It also contains matters relating to human conduct, according
                     to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.58.1" target="asv">Is. 58:1</a>,
                     "Deal thy bread to the hungry," etc.; and besides this it contains things pertaining to future events, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Isa.47.9" target="asv"> Is. 47:9, </a> "Two things shall come upon thee suddenly in one day, barrenness and widowhood."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p7"> Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from our knowledge, it must be observed that the more remote things are from
                     our knowledge the more pertinent they are to prophecy. Of such things there are three degrees. One degree comprises things
                     remote from the knowledge, either sensitive or intellective, of some particular man, but not from the knowledge of all men;
                     thus a particular man knows by sense things present to him locally, which another man does not know by human
                     sense, since they are removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew prophetically what his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 5:26</a>), and in like manner the secret thoughts of one man are manifested prophetically to another, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.25" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:25</a>; and again in this way what one man knows by demonstration may be revealed to another prophetically.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p8"> The second degree comprises those things which surpass the knowledge of all men without exception, not that they are in themselves
                     unknowable, but on account of a defect in human knowledge; such as the mystery of the Trinity, which was revealed by the Seraphim
                     saying: "Holy, Holy, Holy," etc. (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">Is. 6:3</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p9"> The last degree comprises things remote from the knowledge of all men, through being in themselves unknowable; such are future
                     contingencies, the truth of which is indeterminate. And since that which is predicated universally and by its very nature,
                     takes precedence of that which is predicated in a limited and relative sense, it follows that revelation of future events
                     belongs most properly to prophecy, and from this prophecy apparently takes its name. Hence Gregory says (Hom. i
                     super Ezech.): "And since a prophet is so called because he foretells the future, his name loses its significance when he
                     speaks of the past or present."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prophecy is there defined according to its proper signification; and it is in this sense that it is differentiated from the
                     other gratuitous graces.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This is evident from what has just been said. We might also reply that all those things that are the matter of prophecy have
                     the common aspect of being unknowable to man except by Divine revelation; whereas those that are the matter of "wisdom," "knowledge,"
                     and the "interpretation of speeches," can be known by man through natural reason, but are manifested in a higher way through
                     the enlightening of the Divine light. As to "faith," although it is
                     about things invisible to man, it is not concerned with the knowledge of the things believed, but with a man's certitude of
                     assent to things known by others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The formal element in prophetic knowledge is the Divine light, which being one, gives unity of species to prophecy, although
                     the things prophetically manifested by the Divine light are diverse.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A3-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q171_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q171_A4-p0.1">Whether by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known prophetically?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known prophetically. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Amos.3.7" target="asv">Amos 3:7</a>): "The Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets." Now whatever is revealed prophetically
                     is something done by God. Therefore there is not one of them but what is revealed to the prophet.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "God's works are perfect" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>). Now prophecy is a "Divine revelation," as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q171_A4-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore it is perfect; and this would not be so unless all possible matters of prophecy were revealed prophetically, since
                     "the perfect is that which lacks nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible matters of prophecy are revealed to the prophet.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine light which causes prophecy is more powerful than the right of natural reason which is the cause of human
                     science. Now a man who has acquired a science knows whatever pertains to that science; thus a grammarian knows all matters
                     of grammar. Therefore it would seem that a prophet knows all matters of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that "sometimes the spirit of prophecy indicates the present to the prophet's mind and
                     nowise the future; and sometimes it points not to the present but to the future." Therefore the prophet does not know all
                     matters of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Things which differ from one another need not exist simultaneously, save by reason of some one thing in which they are connected
                     and on which they depend: thus it has been stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q171_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], AA[1]</a>,2) that all the virtues must needs exist simultaneously on account of prudence and charity. Now all the things that are known
                     through some principle are connected in that principle and depend thereon. Hence he who knows a principle
                     perfectly, as regards all to which its virtue extends, knows at the same time all that can be known through that principle;
                     whereas if the common principle is unknown, or known only in a general way, it does not follow that one knows all those things
                     at the same time, but each of them has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently some of them may be known, and some
                     not.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p7"> Now the principle of those things that are prophetically manifested by the Divine light is the first truth, which the prophets
                     do not see in itself. Wherefore there is no need for their knowing all possible matters of prophecy; but each one knows some
                     of them according to the special revelation of this or that matter.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Lord reveals to the prophets all things that are necessary for the instruction of the faithful; yet not all to every
                     one, but some to one, and some to another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prophecy is by way of being something imperfect in the genus of Divine revelation: hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8</a>) that "prophecies shall be made void," and that "we prophesy in part," i.e. imperfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought
                     to its perfection in heaven; wherefore the same text continues (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A4-p9.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.113.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 113:10</a>): "When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away."
                     Consequently it does not follow that nothing is lacking to prophetic revelation, but that it lacks none of those things to
                     which prophecy is directed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who has a science knows the principles of that science, whence whatever is pertinent to that science depends; wherefore
                     to have the habit of a science perfectly, is to know whatever is pertinent to that science. But God Who is the principle of
                     prophetic knowledge is not known in Himself through prophecy; wherefore the comparison fails.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q171_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q171_A5-p0.1">Whether the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit.
                     For Augustine states (Confess. vi, 13) that his mother said "she could, through a certain feeling, which in words she could
                     not express, discern betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her own soul." Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as
                     stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q171_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore the prophet always distinguishes
                     what he says by the spirit of prophecy, from what he says by his own spirit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God commands nothing impossible, as Jerome [*Pelagius. Ep. xvi, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome] says.
                     Now the prophets were commanded (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.23.28" target="asv">Jer. 23:28</a>): "The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him speak My word with truth." Therefore
                     the prophet can distinguish what he has through the spirit of prophecy from what he sees otherwise.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the certitude resulting from a Divine light is greater than that which results from the light of natural reason.
                     Now he that has science, by the light of natural reason knows for certain that he has it. Therefore he that has prophecy by
                     a Divine light is much more certain that he has it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "It must be observed that sometimes the holy prophets, when consulted, utter certain
                     things by their own spirit, through being much accustomed to prophesying, and think they are speaking by the prophetic spirit."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The prophet's mind is instructed by God in two ways: in one way by an express revelation, in another way by a most mysterious
                     instinct to "which the human mind is subjected without knowing it," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17). Accordingly the
                     prophet has the greatest certitude about those things which he knows by an express revelation, and he has it for certain that
                     they are revealed to him by God; wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.26.15" target="asv">Jer.
                        26:15
                     </a>): "In truth the Lord sent me to you, to speak all these words in your hearing." Else, were he not certain about this, the
                     faith which relies on the utterances of the prophet would not be certain. A sign of the prophet's certitude may be gathered
                     from the fact that Abraham being admonished in a prophetic vision, prepared to sacrifice his only-begotten son, which he nowise
                     would have done had he not been most certain of the Divine revelation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p7"> On the other hand, his position with regard to the things he knows by instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish
                     fully whether his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of his own spirit. And those things which we know by Divine
                     instinct are not all manifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something imperfect in the genus of prophecy.
                     It is thus that we are to understand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, this should lead to error,
                     "they are very soon set aright by the Holy Ghost [*For instance, cf. 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.7.3" target="asv">2 Kings 7:3 </a>seqq.], and from Him they hear the truth, so that they reproach themselves for having said what was untrue," as Gregory adds
                     (Hom. i super Ezech.).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p8"> The arguments set down in the first place consider the revelation that is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore the answer
                     to all the objections is clear.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p9"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A5-p10"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q171_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q171_A6-p0.1">Whether things known or declared prophetically can be false?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that things known or declared prophetically can be false. For prophecy is about future contingencies, as stated
                     above (A[3] ). Now future contingencies may possibly not happen; else they would happen of necessity. Therefore the matter
                     of prophecy can be false.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias saying (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.1" target="asv">Is. 38:1</a>): "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt surely die, and shalt not live," and yet fifteen years were added to his life
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 20:6</a>). Again the Lord said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A6-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Jer.18.7" target="asv">Jer. 18:7,8</a>): "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that
                     nation against which I have spoken shall repent of
                     their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do them." This is instanced in the example of the Ninevites,
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A6-p3.4" href="./asv.html#John.3.10" target="asv"> Jn. 3:10</a>: "The Lord [Vulg.: 'God'] had mercy with regard to the evil which He had said that He would do to them, and He did it not."
                     Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever the antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely necessary,
                     because the consequent of a conditional proposition stands in the same relation to the antecedent, as the conclusion to the
                     premises in a syllogism, and a syllogism whose premises are necessary always leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved
                     in I Poster. 6. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be false, the following
                     conditional proposition must needs be true: "If a thing has been prophesied, it will be." Now the antecedent of this conditional
                     proposition is absolutely necessary, since it is about the past. Therefore the consequent is also necessary absolutely; yet
                     this is unfitting, for then prophecy would not be about contingencies. Therefore it is untrue that the matter of prophecy
                     cannot be false.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Cassiodorus says [*Prol. in Psalt. i] that "prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things
                     with invariable truth." Now the truth of prophecy would not be invariable, if its matter could be false. Therefore nothing
                     false can come under prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As may be gathered from what has been said (
                     <a id="SS_Q171_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3,5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressed under the form of teaching on the prophet's intellect, by Divine revelation.
                     Now the truth of knowledge is the same in disciple and teacher since the knowledge of the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge
                     of the teacher, even as in natural things the form of the thing generated is a likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome
                     speaks
                     in this sense when he says [*Comment. in Daniel ii, 10] that "prophecy is the seal of the Divine foreknowledge." Consequently
                     the same truth must needs be in prophetic knowledge and utterances, as in the Divine knowledge, under which nothing false
                     can possibly come, as stated in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q171_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A8.html">FP, Q[16], A[8]</a>. Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q171_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">FP, Q[14], A[13]</a> the certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the contingency of future singular events, because that knowledge
                     regards the future as present and already determinate to one thing. Wherefore prophecy also, which is an "impressed likeness"
                     or "seal of the Divine foreknowledge," does not by its unchangeable truth exclude the contingency of future things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in two ways. First, as they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, as it sees
                     them in their presentiality: secondly, as in their causes, inasmuch as it sees the order of causes in relation to their effects.
                     And though future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are determinate to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes,
                     they are not so determined but that they can happen otherwise. Again,
                     though this twofold knowledge is always united in the Divine intellect, it is not always united in the prophetic revelation,
                     because an imprint made by an active cause is not always on a par with the virtue of that cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic
                     revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in so far as the latter regards future contingencies in themselves:
                     and such things happen in the same way as foretold, for example this saying of 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.7.14" target="asv">Is. 7:14</a>: "Behold a virgin shall
                     conceive." Sometimes, however, the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge as knowing the
                     order of causes to effects; and then at times the event is otherwise than foretold. Yet the prophecy does not cover a falsehood,
                     for the meaning of the prophecy is that inferior causes, whether they be natural causes or human acts, are so disposed as
                     to lead to such a result. In this way we are to understand the saying of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A6-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.1" target="asv"> Is. 38:1</a>: "Thou shalt die, and
                     not live"; in other words, "The disposition of thy body has a tendency to death": and the saying of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q171_A6-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Jonah.3.4" target="asv"> Jonah 3:4, </a> "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be destroyed," that is to say, "Its merits demand that it should be destroyed." God is
                     said "to repent," metaphorically, inasmuch as He bears Himself after the manner of one who repents, by "changing His sentence,
                     although He changes not His counsel" [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q171_A6-p8.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A7.html">FP, Q[19], A[7]</a>, ad 2].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the same truth of prophecy is the same as the truth of Divine foreknowledge, as stated above, the conditional proposition:
                     "If this was prophesied, it will be," is true in the same way as the proposition: "If this was foreknown, it will be": for
                     in both cases it is impossible for the antecedent not to be. Hence the consequent is necessary, considered, not as something
                     future in our regard, but as being present to the Divine foreknowledge, as
                     stated in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q171_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">FP, Q[14], A[13]</a>, ad 2.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q171_A6-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS.iv.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q172" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q172-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q172-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q172-p2"> We must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q172-p3"> (1) Whether prophecy is natural?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q172-p4"> (2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q172-p5"> (3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q172-p6"> (4) Whether a good life is requisite?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q172-p7"> (5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q172-p8"> (6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is true?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q172_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q172_A1-p0.1">Whether prophecy can be natural?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prophecy can be natural. For Gregory says (Dial. iv, 26) that "sometimes the mere strength of the soul
                     is sufficiently cunning to foresee certain things": and Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13) that the human soul, according
                     as it is withdrawn from the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q172_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q86_A4.html">FP, Q[86], A[4]</a>, ad 2]. Now this pertains to prophecy. Therefore the soul can acquire prophecy naturally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the human soul's knowledge is more alert while one wakes than while one sleeps. Now some, during sleep, naturally
                     foresee the future, as the Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divinat. per Somn. ii, which is annexed to the work
                     quoted]). Much more therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man, by his nature, is more perfect than dumb animals. Yet some dumb animals have foreknowledge of future things
                     that concern them. Thus ants foreknow the coming rains, which is evident from their gathering grain into their nest before
                     the rain commences; and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm, as may be gathered from their movements in avoiding places
                     exposed to storm. Much more therefore can men foreknow the future that concerns themselves,
                     and of such things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes from nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.29.18" target="asv">Prov. 29:18</a>): "When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad"; wherefore it is evident that prophecy is necessary for
                     the stability of the human race. Now "nature does not fail in necessaries" [*Aristotle, de Anima iii, 9]. Therefore it seems
                     that prophecy is from nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.21" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:21</a>): "For prophecy came not by the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost." Therefore
                     prophecy comes not from nature, but through the gift of the Holy Ghost.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[171], A[6], ad 2) prophetic foreknowledge may regard future things in two ways: in one way, as they are
                     in themselves; in another way, as they are in their causes. Now, to foreknow future things, as they are in themselves, is
                     proper to the Divine intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as stated in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q172_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">FP, Q[14], A[13]</a>. Wherefore such like foreknowledge of the future cannot come from nature, but from
                     Divine revelation alone. On the other hand, future things can be foreknown in their causes with a natural knowledge even by
                     man: thus a physician foreknows future health or death in certain causes, through previous experimental knowledge of the order
                     of those causes to such effects. Such like knowledge of the future may be understood to be in a man by nature in two ways.
                     In one way that the soul, from that which it holds, is able to foreknow the future, and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
                     xii, 13): "Some have deemed the human soul to contain a certain power of divination." This seems to be in accord with the
                     opinion of Plato [*Phaed. xxvii; Civit. vi], who held that our souls have knowledge of all things by participating in the
                     ideas; but that this knowledge is obscured in them by union with the body; yet in some more, in others less, according to
                     a difference in bodily purity. According to this it might be said that men, whose souls are not much obscured through union
                     with the
                     body, are able to foreknow such like future things by their own knowledge. Against this opinion Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
                     xii, 13): "How is it that the soul cannot always have this power of divination, since it always wishes to have it?"
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p8"> Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the soul acquires knowledge from sensibles, as
                     stated in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q172_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html">FP, Q[84], A[6]</a>, it is better to have recourse to another explanation, and to hold that men have no such foreknowledge of the future, but
                     that they can acquire it by means of experience, wherein they are helped by their natural disposition, which depends on the
                     perfection of a man's imaginative power, and the clarity of
                     his understanding.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p9"> Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future differs in two ways from the former, which comes through Divine revelation.
                     First, because the former can be about any events whatever, and this infallibly; whereas the latter foreknowledge, which can
                     be had naturally, is about certain effects, to which human experience may extend. Secondly, because the former prophecy is
                     "according to the unchangeable truth" [*
                     <a id="SS_Q172_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A3.html">Q[171], A[3]</a>, OBJ[1]], while the latter
                     is not, and can cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and not the latter, properly belongs to prophecy, because,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q172_A1-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A3.html">Q[171], A[3]</a>), prophetic knowledge is of things which naturally surpass human knowledge. Consequently we must say that prophecy strictly
                     so called cannot be from nature, but only from Divine revelation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the soul is withdrawn from corporeal things, it becomes more adapted to receive the influence of spiritual substances
                     [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q172_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q88_A4.html">FP, Q[88], A[4]</a>, ad 2], and also is more inclined to receive the subtle motions which take place in the human imagination through the impression
                     of natural causes, whereas it is hindered from receiving them while occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says (Dial.
                     iv, 26) that "the soul, at the
                     approach of death, foresees certain future things, by reason of the subtlety of its nature," inasmuch as it is receptive even
                     of slight impressions. Or again, it knows future things by a revelation of the angels; but not by its own power, because according
                     to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13), "if this were so, it would be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed," which
                     is clearly false.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p11">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Knowledge of the future by means of dreams, comes either from the revelation of spiritual substances, or from a corporeal
                     cause, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q172_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q95_A6.html">Q[95], A[6]</a>), when we were treating of divination. Now both these causes are more applicable to a person while asleep than while awake,
                     because, while awake, the soul is occupied with external sensibles, so that it is less receptive of the subtle impressions
                     either of spiritual substances, or
                     even of natural causes; although as regards the perfection of judgment, the reason is more alert in waking than in sleeping.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even dumb animals have no foreknowledge of future events, except as these are foreknown in their causes, whereby their imagination
                     is moved more than man's, because man's imagination, especially in waking, is more disposed according to reason than according
                     to the impression of natural causes. Yet reason effects much more amply in man, that which the impression of natural causes
                     effects in dumb animals; and Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy
                     assists man still more.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The prophetic light extends even to the direction of human acts; and in this way prophecy is requisite for the government
                     of a people, especially in relation to Divine worship; since for this nature is not sufficient, and grace is necessary.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A1-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q172_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q172_A2-p0.1">Whether prophetic revelation comes through the angels?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prophetic revelation does not come through the angels. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.27" target="asv">Wis. 7:27</a>) that Divine wisdom "conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God, and the prophets." Now wisdom makes
                     the friends of God immediately. Therefore it also makes the prophets immediately, and not through the medium of the angels.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces. But the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to
                     
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:4, </a> "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit." Therefore the prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Cassiodorus [*Prol. in Psalt. i] says that prophecy is a "Divine revelation": whereas if it were conveyed by the
                     angels, it would be called an angelic revelation. Therefore prophecy is not bestowed by means of the angels.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "Our glorious fathers received Divine visions by means of the heavenly powers"; and he is
                     speaking there of prophetic visions. Therefore prophetic revelation is conveyed by means of the angels.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>), "Things that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of God.']." Now the Divine ordering, according
                     to Dionysius [*Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v], is such that the lowest things are directed by middle things. Now the angels
                     hold a middle position between God and men, in that they have a greater share in the perfection of the Divine goodness than
                     men have. Wherefore the Divine
                     enlightenments and revelations are conveyed from God to men by the angels. Now prophetic knowledge is bestowed by Divine enlightenment
                     and revelation. Therefore it is evident that it is conveyed by the angels.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity which makes man a friend of God, is a perfection of the will, in which God alone can form an impression; whereas
                     prophecy is a perfection of the intellect, in which an angel also can form an impression, as stated in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q172_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>, wherefore the comparison fails between the two.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The gratuitous graces are ascribed to the Holy Ghost as their first principle: yet He works grace of this kind in men by
                     means of the angels.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The work of the instrument is ascribed to the principal agent by whose power the instrument acts. And since a minister is
                     like an instrument, prophetic revelation, which is conveyed by the ministry of the angels, is said to be Divine.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q172_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q172_A3-p0.1">Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy. For prophecy is received by the prophet according to
                     the disposition of the recipient, since a gloss of Jerome on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Amos.1.2" target="asv"> Amos 1:2, </a> "The Lord will roar from Sion," says: "Anyone who wishes to make a comparison naturally turns to those things of which he
                     has experience, and among which his life is spent. For example, sailors compare their enemies to the winds, and their losses
                     to a
                     shipwreck. In like manner Amos, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to that which is inspired by the lion's roar."
                     Now that which is received by a thing according to the mode of the recipient requires a natural disposition. Therefore prophecy
                     requires a natural disposition.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the considerations of prophecy are more lofty than those of acquired science. Now natural indisposition hinders
                     the considerations of acquired science, since many are prevented by natural indisposition from succeeding to grasp the speculations
                     of science. Much more therefore is a natural disposition requisite for the contemplation of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, natural indisposition is a much greater obstacle than an accidental impediment. Now the considerations of prophecy
                     are hindered by an accidental occurrence. For Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [*The quotation is from Origen, Hom.
                     vi in Num.] that "at the time of the marriage act, the presence of the Holy Ghost will not be vouchsafed, even though it be
                     a prophet that fulfils the duty of procreation." Much more therefore does a natural
                     indisposition hinder prophecy; and thus it would seem that a good natural disposition is requisite for prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev.): "He," namely the Holy Ghost, "fills the boy harpist and makes him a
                     Psalmist; He fills the herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes him a prophet." Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition,
                     but depends on the will alone of the Holy Ghost, of Whom it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:2</a>): "All these things, one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q172_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q172_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, prophecy in its true and exact sense comes from Divine inspiration; while that which comes from a natural cause is not called
                     prophecy except in a relative sense. Now we must observe that as God Who is the universal efficient cause requires neither
                     previous matter nor previous disposition of matter in His corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant to bring into
                     being matter and disposition and
                     form, so neither does He require a previous disposition in His spiritual effects, but is able to produce both the spiritual
                     effect and at the same time the fitting disposition as requisite according to the order of nature. More than this, He is able
                     at the same time, by creation, to produce the subject, so as to dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the prophetic grace,
                     at the very instant of its creation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It matters not to prophecy by what comparisons the thing prophesied is expressed; and so the Divine operation makes no change
                     in a prophet in this respect. Yet if there be anything in him incompatible with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The considerations of science proceed from a natural cause, and nature cannot work without a previous disposition in matter.
                     This cannot be said of God Who is the cause of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A natural indisposition, if not removed, might be an obstacle to prophetic revelation, for instance if a man were altogether
                     deprived of the natural senses. In the same way a man might be hindered from the act of prophesying by some very strong passion,
                     whether of anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by any other passion. But such a natural indisposition as this is
                     removed by the Divine power, which is the cause of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q172_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q172_A4-p0.1">Whether a good life is requisite for prophecy?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a good life is requisite for prophecy. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.27" target="asv">Wis. 7:27</a>) that the wisdom of God "through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God, and prophets."
                     Now there can be no holiness without a good life and sanctifying grace. Therefore prophecy cannot be without a good life and
                     sanctifying grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, secrets are not revealed save to a friend, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.15" target="asv"> Jn. 15:15, </a> "But I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you." Now God
                     reveals His secrets to the prophets (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Amos.3.7" target="asv">Amos 3:7</a>). Therefore it would seem that the prophets are the friends of God; which is impossible without charity. Therefore seemingly
                     prophecy cannot be without charity; and charity is
                     impossible without sanctifying grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.15" target="asv">Mat. 7:15</a>): "Beware of false prophets, who come to you in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly they are ravening wolves." Now all who
                     are without grace are likened inwardly to a ravening wolf, and consequently all such are false prophets. Therefore no man
                     is a true prophet except he be good by grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*Cf. De Divinat. per Somn. i, which is annexed to the work quoted]) that
                     "if interpretation of dreams is from God, it is unfitting for it to be bestowed on any but the best." Now it is evident that
                     the gift of prophecy is from God. Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed only to the best men.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> To those who had said, "Lord, have we not prophesied in Thy name?" this reply is made: "I never knew you" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.22" target="asv">Mat. 7:22,23</a>). Now "the Lord knoweth who are His" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.19" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:19</a>). Therefore prophecy can be in those who are not God's by grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A good life may be considered from two points of view. First, with regard to its inward root, which is sanctifying grace.
                     Secondly, with regard to the inward passions of the soul and the outward actions. Now sanctifying grace is given chiefly in
                     order that man's soul may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18): "A man is not transferred
                     from the left side to the right, unless he receive the Holy Ghost, by Whom he is made a
                     lover of God and of his neighbor." Hence whatever can be without charity can be without sanctifying grace, and consequently
                     without goodness of life. Now prophecy can be without charity; and this is clear on two counts. First, on account of their
                     respective acts: for prophecy pertains to the intellect, whose act precedes the act of the will, which power is perfected
                     by charity. For this reason the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13</a>) reckons prophecy with other things pertinent to the intellect, that can be had
                     without charity. Secondly, on account of their respective ends. For prophecy like other gratuitous graces is given for the
                     good of the Church, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7, </a> "The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"; and is not directly intended to unite man's affections
                     to God, which is the purpose of charity. Therefore prophecy can be without a good life, as regards the first root of this
                     goodness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p8"> If, however, we consider a good life, with regard to the passions of the soul, and external actions, from this point of view
                     an evil life is an obstacle to prophecy. For prophecy requires the mind to be raised very high in order to contemplate spiritual
                     things, and this is hindered by strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of external things. Hence we read of the sons
                     of the prophets (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 4:38</a>) that they "dwelt together with [Vulg.: 'before']"
                     Eliseus, leading a solitary life, as it were, lest worldly employment should be a hindrance to the gift of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes the gift of prophecy is given to a man both for the good of others, and in order to enlighten his own mind; and
                     such are those whom Divine wisdom, "conveying itself" by sanctifying grace to their minds, "maketh the friends of God, and
                     prophets." Others, however, receive the gift of prophecy merely for the good of others. Hence Jerome commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.22" target="asv"> Mat. 7:22, </a> says: "Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the
                     casting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but either to the invoking the name of Christ,
                     or to the condemnation of those who invoke, and for the good of those who see and hear."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gregory [*Hom. xxvii in Ev.] expounding this passage [*
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.15" target="asv">Jn. 15:15</a>] says: "Since we love the lofty things of heaven as soon as we hear them, we know them as soon as we love them, for to love
                     is to know. Accordingly He had made all things known to them, because having renounced earthly desires they were kindled by
                     the torches of perfect love." In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed to prophets.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not all wicked men are ravening wolves, but only those whose purpose is to injure others. For Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf.
                     in Matth., Hom. xix, among the works of St. John Chrysostom, and falsely ascribed to him] that "Catholic teachers, though
                     they be sinners, are called slaves of the flesh, but never ravening wolves, because they do not purpose the destruction of
                     Christians." And since prophecy is directed to the good of others, it is manifest
                     that such are false prophets, because they are not sent for this purpose by God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> God's gifts are not always bestowed on those who are simply the best, but sometimes are vouchsafed to those who are best
                     as regards the receiving of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants the gift of prophecy to those whom He judges best to
                     give it to.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A4-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q172_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q172_A5-p0.1">Whether any prophecy comes from the demons?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no prophecy comes from the demons. For prophecy is "a Divine revelation," according to Cassiodorus [*Prol.
                     in Psalt. i]. But that which is done by a demon is not Divine. Therefore no prophecy can be from a demon.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some kind of enlightenment is requisite for prophetic knowledge, as stated above (Q[171], AA[2],3). Now the demons
                     do not enlighten the human intellect, as stated above in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q172_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q119_A3.html">FP, Q[119], A[3]</a>. Therefore no prophecy can come from the demons.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a sign is worthless if it betokens contraries. Now prophecy is a sign in confirmation of faith; wherefore a gloss
                     on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.6" target="asv">Rom. 12:6</a>, "Either prophecy to be used according to the rule of faith," says: "Observe that in reckoning the graces, he begins with
                     prophecy, which is the first proof of the reasonableness of our faith; since believers, after receiving the Spirit, prophesied."
                     Therefore prophecy cannot be bestowed by the demons.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 18:19</a>): "Gather unto me all Israel unto mount Carmel, and the prophets of Baal four hundred and fifty, and the prophets of the
                     grove four hundred, who eat at Jezebel's table." Now these were worshippers of demons. Therefore it would seem that there
                     is also a prophecy from the demons.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q172_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A1.html">Q[171], A[1]</a>), prophecy denotes knowledge far removed from human knowledge. Now it is evident that an intellect of a higher order can
                     know some things that are far removed from the knowledge of an inferior intellect. Again, above the human intellect there
                     is not only the Divine intellect, but also the intellects of good and bad angels according to the order of nature. Hence the
                     demons, even by their natural
                     knowledge, know certain things remote from men's knowledge, which they can reveal to men: although those things which God
                     alone knows are remote simply and most of all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p7"> Accordingly prophecy, properly and simply, is conveyed by Divine revelations alone; yet the revelation which is made by the
                     demons may be called prophecy in a restricted sense. Wherefore those men to whom something is revealed by the demons are styled
                     in the Scriptures as prophets, not simply, but with an addition, for instance as "false prophets," or "prophets of idols."
                     Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): "When the evil spirit lays hold of a man for such purposes as
                     these," namely visions, "he makes him either devilish, or possessed, or a false prophet."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Cassiodorus is here defining prophecy in its proper and simple acceptation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The demons reveal what they know to men, not by enlightening the intellect, but by an imaginary vision, or even by audible
                     speech; and in this way this prophecy differs from true prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The prophecy of the demons can be distinguished from Divine prophecy by certain, and even outward, signs. Hence Chrysostom
                     says [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "some prophesy by the spirit of the
                     devil, such as diviners, but they may be discerned by the fact that the devil sometimes utters what is false, the Holy Ghost
                     never." Wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A5-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.21" target="asv">Dt. 18:21,22</a>): "If in silent thought thou answer:
                     How shall I know the word that the Lord hath spoken? Thou shalt have this sign: Whatsoever that same prophet foretelleth in
                     the name of the Lord, and it come not to pass, that thing the Lord hath not spoken."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A5-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q172_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q172_A6-p0.1">Whether the prophets of the demons ever foretell the truth?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the prophets of the demons never foretell the truth. For Ambrose [*Hilary the Deacon (Ambrosiaster) on
                     
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:3</a>] says that "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from the Holy Ghost." Now the prophets of the demons do not speak from
                     the Holy Ghost, because "there is no concord between Christ and Belial [*'What concord hath Christ with Belial?']" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.15" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:15</a>). Therefore it would seem that they
                     never foretell the truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as true prophets are inspired by the Spirit of truth, so the prophets of the demons are inspired by the spirit
                     of untruth, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 22:22, </a> "I will go forth, and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets." Now the prophets inspired by the Holy Ghost never
                     speak false, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q172_A6-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q111_A6.html">Q[111], A[6]</a>). Therefore the prophets of the demons never speak truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said of the devil (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.44" target="asv">Jn. 8:44</a>) that "when he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for the devil is a liar, and the father thereof," i.e. of lying. Now
                     by inspiring his prophets, the devil speaks only of his own, for he is not appointed God's minister to declare the truth,
                     since "light hath no fellowship with darkness [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath light with darkness?']" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:14</a>). Therefore the
                     prophets of the demons never foretell the truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.22.14" target="asv"> Num. 22:14, </a> says that "Balaam was a diviner, for he sometimes foreknew the future by help of the demons and the magic art." Now he foretold
                     many true things, for instance that which is to be found in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Num.24.17" target="asv"> Num. 24:17</a>: "A star shall rise out of Jacob, and a scepter shall spring up from Israel." Therefore even the prophets of the demons foretell
                     the truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the good is in relation to things, so is the true in relation to knowledge. Now in things it is impossible to find one
                     that is wholly devoid of good. Wherefore it is also impossible for any knowledge to be wholly false, without some mixture
                     of truth. Hence Bede says [*Comment. in Luc. xvii, 12; Cf. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, 40] that "no teaching is so false that
                     it never mingles truth with falsehood." Hence the teaching of the demons, with which they
                     instruct their prophets, contains some truths whereby it is rendered acceptable. For the intellect is led astray to falsehood
                     by the semblance of truth, even as the will is seduced to evil by the semblance of goodness. Wherefore Chrysostom says [*Opus
                     Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: "The devil is allowed sometimes to speak true things,
                     in order that his unwonted truthfulness may gain credit for his lie."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The prophets of the demons do not always speak from the demons' revelation, but sometimes by Divine inspiration. This was
                     evidently the case with Balaam, of whom we read that the Lord spoke to him (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q172_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Num.22.12" target="asv">Num. 22:12</a>), though he was a prophet of the demons, because God makes use even of the wicked for the profit of the good. Hence He foretells
                     certain truths even by the demons' prophets, both that the truth may be rendered more credible,
                     since even its foes bear witness to it, and also in order that men, by believing such men, may be more easily led on to truth.
                     Wherefore also the Sibyls foretold many true things about Christ.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p8"> Yet even when the demons' prophets are instructed by the demons, they foretell the truth, sometimes by virtue of their own
                     nature, the author of which is the Holy Ghost, and sometimes by revelation of the good spirits, as Augustine declares (Gen.
                     ad lit. xii, 19): so that even then this truth which the demons proclaim is from the Holy Ghost.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A true prophet is always inspired by the Spirit of truth, in Whom there is no falsehood, wherefore He never says what is
                     not true; whereas a false prophet is not always instructed by the spirit of untruth, but sometimes even by the Spirit of truth.
                     Even the very spirit of untruth sometimes declares true things, sometimes false, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those things are called the demons' own, which they have of themselves, namely lies and sins; while they have, not of themselves
                     but of God, those things which belong to them by nature: and it is by virtue of their own nature that they sometimes foretell
                     the truth, as stated above (ad 1). Moreover God makes use of them to make known the truth which is to be accomplished through
                     them, by revealing Divine mysteries to them through the angels, as already
                     stated (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19; 
                     <a id="SS_Q172_A6-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q109_A4.html">FP, Q[109], A[4]</a>, ad 1).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q172_A6-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q171_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q173" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q173-p0.1">OF THE MANNER IN WHICH PROPHETIC KNOWLEDGE IS CONVEYED (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q173-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q173-p2"> We must now consider the manner in which prophetic knowledge is conveyed, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q173-p3"> (1) Whether the prophets see God's very essence?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q173-p4"> (2) Whether the prophetic revelation is effected by the infusion of certain species, or by the infusion of Divine light alone?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q173-p5"> (3) Whether prophetic revelation is always accompanied by abstraction from the sense?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q173-p6"> (4) Whether prophecy is always accompanied by knowledge of the things prophesied?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q173_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q173_A1-p0.1">Whether the prophets see the very essence of God?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the prophets see the very essence of God, for a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.1" target="asv"> Is. 38:1, </a> "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die and not live," says: "Prophets can read in the book of God's foreknowledge
                     in which all things are written." Now God's foreknowledge is His very essence. Therefore prophets see God's very essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 7) that "in that eternal truth from which all temporal things are made, we see with
                     the mind's eye the type both of our being and of our actions." Now, of all men, prophets have the highest knowledge of Divine
                     things. Therefore they, especially, see the Divine essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, future contingencies are foreknown by the prophets "with unchangeable truth." Now future contingencies exist thus
                     in God alone. Therefore the prophets see God Himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The vision of the Divine essence is not made void in heaven; whereas "prophecy is made void" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8</a>). Therefore prophecy is not conveyed by a vision of the Divine essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Prophecy denotes Divine knowledge as existing afar off. Wherefore it is said of the prophets (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.13" target="asv">Heb. 11:13</a>) that "they were beholding . . . afar off." But those who are in heaven and in the state of bliss see, not as from afar off,
                     but rather, as it were, from near at hand, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.139.14" target="asv"> Ps. 139:14, </a> "The upright shall dwell with Thy countenance." Hence it is evident that prophetic knowledge differs from the perfect
                     knowledge, which we shall have in heaven, so that it is distinguished therefrom as the imperfect from the perfect, and when
                     the latter comes the former is made void, as appears from the words of the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p7"> Some, however, wishing to discriminate between prophetic knowledge and the knowledge of the blessed, have maintained that
                     the prophets see the very essence of God (which they call the "mirror of eternity") [*Cf. De Veritate, xii, 6; Sent. II, D,
                     XI, part 2, art. 2, ad 4], not, however, in the way in which it is the object of the blessed, but as containing the types
                     [*Cf. FP, Q[15]] of future events. But this is altogether impossible. For God is the object of bliss in His very
                     essence, according to the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not these," i.e.
                     creatures. Now it is not possible to see the types of creatures in the very essence of God without seeing It, both because
                     the Divine essence is Itself the type of all things that are made---the ideal type adding nothing to the Divine essence save
                     only a relationship to the creature---and because knowledge of a thing in itself---and such is the knowledge of God as the
                     object
                     of heavenly bliss---precedes knowledge of that thing in its relation to something else---and such is the knowledge of God
                     as containing the types of things. Consequently it is impossible for prophets to see God as containing the types of creatures,
                     and yet not as the object of bliss. Therefore we must conclude that the prophetic vision is not the vision of the very essence
                     of God, and that the prophets do not see in the Divine essence Itself the things they do see, but that they see them in
                     certain images, according as they are enlightened by the Divine light.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p8"> Wherefore Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), in speaking of prophetic visions, says that "the wise theologian calls that vision
                     divine which is effected by images of things lacking a bodily form through the seer being rapt in divine things." And these
                     images illumined by the Divine light have more of the nature of a mirror than the Divine essence: since in a mirror images
                     are formed from other things, and this cannot be said of God. Yet the prophet's mind thus enlightened may be called
                     a mirror, in so far as a likeness of the truth of the Divine foreknowledge is formed therein, for which reason it is called
                     the "mirror of eternity," as representing God's foreknowledge, for God in His eternity sees all things as present before Him,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q173_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q172_A1.html">Q[172], A[1]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The prophets are said to read the book of God's foreknowledge, inasmuch as the truth is reflected from God's foreknowledge
                     on the prophet's mind.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is said to see in the First Truth the type of his existence, in so far as the image of the First Truth shines forth on
                     man's mind, so that he is able to know himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the very fact that future contingencies are in God according to unalterable truth, it follows that God can impress a
                     like knowledge on the prophet's mind without the prophet seeing God in His essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q173_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q173_A2-p0.1">Whether, in prophetic revelation, new species of things are impressed on the prophet's mind, or merely a new light?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in prophetic revelation no new species of things are impressed on the prophet's mind, but only a new light.
                     For a gloss of Jerome on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Amos.1.2" target="asv"> Amos 1:2 </a>says that "prophets draw comparisons from things with which they are conversant." But if prophetic vision were effected by
                     means of species newly impressed, the prophet's previous experience of things would be inoperative. Therefore no new species
                     are impressed on the prophet's
                     soul, but only the prophetic light.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), "it is not imaginative but intellective vision that makes the prophet";
                     wherefore it is declared (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.1" target="asv">Dan. 10:1</a>) that "there is need of understanding in a vision." Now intellective vision, as stated in the same book (Gen. ad lit. xii,
                     6) is not effected by means of images, but by the very truth of things. Therefore it would seem that prophetic revelation
                     is not effected by impressing
                     species on the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the gift of prophecy the Holy Ghost endows man with something that surpasses the faculty of nature. Now man can
                     by his natural faculties form all kinds of species of things. Therefore it would seem that in prophetic revelation no new
                     species of things are impressed, but merely an intellectual light.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.12.10" target="asv">Osee 12:10</a>): "I have multiplied" their "visions, and I have used similitudes, by the ministry of the prophets." Now multiplicity of
                     visions results, not from a diversity of intellectual light, which is common to every prophetic vision, but from a diversity
                     of species, whence similitudes also result. Therefore it seems that in prophetic revelation new species of things are impressed,
                     and not merely an intellectual
                     light.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), "prophetic knowledge pertains most of all to the intellect." Now two things have
                     to be considered in connection with the knowledge possessed by the human mind, namely the acceptance or representation of
                     things, and the judgment of the things represented. Now things are represented to the human mind under the form of species:
                     and according to the order of nature, they must be represented first to the senses, secondly
                     to the imagination, thirdly to the passive intellect, and these are changed by the species derived from the phantasms, which
                     change results from the enlightening action of the active intellect. Now in the imagination there are the forms of sensible
                     things not only as received from the senses, but also transformed in various ways, either on account of some bodily transformation
                     (as in the case of people who are asleep or out of their senses), or through the coordination of the phantasms, at the
                     command of reason, for the purpose of understanding something. For just as the various arrangements of the letters of the
                     alphabet convey various ideas to the understanding, so the various coordinations of the phantasms produce various intelligible
                     species of the intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p7"> As to the judgment formed by the human mind, it depends on the power of the intellectual light.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p8"> Now the gift of prophecy confers on the human mind something which surpasses the natural faculty in both these respects,
                     namely as to the judgment which depends on the inflow of intellectual light, and as to the acceptance or representation of
                     things, which is effected by means of certain species. Human teaching may be likened to prophetic revelation in the second
                     of these respects, but not in the first. For a man represents certain things to his disciple by signs of speech, but
                     he cannot enlighten him inwardly as God does.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p9"> But it is the first of these two that holds the chief place in prophecy, since judgment is the complement of knowledge. Wherefore
                     if certain things are divinely represented to any man by means of imaginary likenesses, as happened to Pharaoh (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.41.1" target="asv">Gn. 41:1-7</a>) and to Nabuchodonosor (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.4.1" target="asv">Dan. 4:1-2</a>), or even by bodily likenesses, as happened to Balthasar (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Dan.5.5" target="asv">Dan. 5:5</a>), such a man is not to be considered a prophet, unless his mind
                     be enlightened for the purpose of judgment; and such an apparition is something imperfect in the genus of prophecy. Wherefore
                     some [*Rabbi Moyses, Doct. Perplex. II, xxxvi] have called this "prophetic ecstasy," and such is divination by dreams. And
                     yet a man will be a prophet, if his intellect be enlightened merely for the purpose of judging of things seen in imagination
                     by others, as in the case of Joseph who interpreted Pharaoh's dream. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9),
                     "especially is he a prophet who excels in both respects, so," to wit, "as to see in spirit likenesses significant of things
                     corporeal, and understand them by the quickness of his intellect."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p10"> Now sensible forms are divinely presented to the prophet's mind, sometimes externally by means of the senses---thus Daniel
                     saw the writing on the wall (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.5.25" target="asv">Dan. 5:25</a>)---sometimes by means of imaginary forms, either of exclusively Divine origin and not received through the senses (for instance,
                     if images of colors were imprinted on the imagination of one blind from birth), or divinely coordinated from those derived
                     from the senses---thus Jeremiah saw the "boiling
                     caldron . . . from the face of the north" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.1.13" target="asv">Jer. 1:13</a>)---or by the direct impression of intelligible species on the mind, as in the case of those who receive infused scientific
                     knowledge or wisdom, such as Solomon or the apostles.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p11"> But intellectual light is divinely imprinted on the human mind---sometimes for the purpose of judging of things seen by others,
                     as in the case of Joseph, quoted above, and of the apostles whose understanding our Lord opened "that they might understand
                     the scriptures" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.45" target="asv">Lk. 24:45</a>); and to this pertains the "interpretation of speeches"---sometimes for the purpose of judging according to Divine truth,
                     of the things which a man apprehends in the ordinary course
                     of nature---sometimes for the purpose of discerning truthfully and efficaciously what is to be done, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A2-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.63.14" target="asv"> Is. 63:14, </a> "The Spirit of the Lord was their leader."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p12"> Hence it is evident that prophetic revelation is conveyed sometimes by the mere infusion of light, sometimes by imprinting
                     species anew, or by a new coordination of species.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above, sometimes in prophetic revelation imaginary species previously derived from the senses are divinely coordinated
                     so as to accord with the truth to be revealed, and then previous experience is operative in the production of the images,
                     but not when they are impressed on the mind wholly from without.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Intellectual vision is not effected by means of bodily and individual images, but by an intelligible image. Hence Augustine
                     says (De Trin. ix, 11) that "the soul possesses a certain likeness of the species known to it." Sometimes this intelligible
                     image is, in prophetic revelation, imprinted immediately by God, sometimes it results from pictures in the imagination, by
                     the aid of the prophetic light, since a deeper truth is gathered from these pictures
                     in the imagination by means of the enlightenment of the higher light.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is true that man is able by his natural powers to form all kinds of pictures in the imagination, by simply considering
                     these pictures, but not so that they be directed to the representation of intelligible truths that surpass his intellect,
                     since for this purpose he needs the assistance of a supernatural light.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p16"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A2-p17"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q173_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q173_A3-p0.1">Whether the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Num.12.6" target="asv">Num. 12:6</a>): "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." Now
                     a gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter, "a vision that takes place by dreams and apparitions consists of things which
                     seem to be said or done." But when things seem to be said or done, which
                     are neither said nor done, there is abstraction from the senses. Therefore prophecy is always accompanied by abstraction from
                     the senses.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when one power is very intent on its own operation, other powers are drawn away from theirs; thus men who are very
                     intent on hearing something fail to see what takes place before them. Now in the prophetic vision the intellect is very much
                     uplifted, and intent on its act. Therefore it seems that the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the
                     senses.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing cannot, at the same time, tend in opposite directions. Now in the prophetic vision the mind tends
                     to the acceptance of things from above, and consequently it cannot at the same time tend to sensible objects. Therefore it
                     would seem necessary for prophetic revelation to be always accompanied by abstraction from the senses.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.32" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:32</a>): "The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets." Now this were impossible if the prophet were not in possession
                     of his faculties, but abstracted from his senses. Therefore it would seem that prophetic vision is not accompanied by abstraction
                     from the senses.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the foregoing Article, the prophetic revelation takes place in four ways: namely, by the infusion of an intelligible
                     light, by the infusion of intelligible species, by impression or coordination of pictures in the imagination, and by the outward
                     presentation of sensible images. Now it is evident that there is no abstraction from the senses, when something is presented
                     to the prophet's mind by means of sensible species---whether these be divinely
                     formed for this special purpose, as the bush shown to Moses (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.2" target="asv">Ex. 3:2</a>), and the writing shown to Daniel (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.5" target="asv">Dan. 5</a>:)---or whether they be produced by other causes; yet so that they are ordained by Divine providence to be prophetically significant
                     of something, as, for instance, the Church was signified by the ark of Noah.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p7"> Again, abstraction from the external senses is not rendered necessary when the prophet's mind is enlightened by an intellectual
                     light, or impressed with intelligible species, since in us the perfect judgment of the intellect is effected by its turning
                     to sensible objects, which are the first principles of our knowledge, as stated in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q173_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html">FP, Q[84], A[6]</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p8"> When, however, prophetic revelation is conveyed by images in the imagination, abstraction from the senses is necessary lest
                     the things thus seen in imagination be taken for objects of external sensation. Yet this abstraction from the senses is sometimes
                     complete, so that a man perceives nothing with his senses; and sometimes it is incomplete, so that he perceives something
                     with his senses, yet does not fully discern the things he perceives outwardly from those he sees in
                     imagination. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "Those images of bodies which are formed in the soul are seen just
                     as bodily things themselves are seen by the body, so that we see with our eyes one who is present, and at the same time we
                     see with the soul one who is absent, as though we saw him with our eyes."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p9"> Yet this abstraction from the senses takes place in the prophets without subverting the order of nature, as is the case with
                     those who are possessed or out of their senses; but is due to some well-ordered cause. This cause may be natural---for instance,
                     sleep---or spiritual---for instance, the intenseness of the prophets' contemplation; thus we read of Peter (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.9" target="asv">Acts 10:9</a>) that while he was praying in the supper-room [*Vulg.: 'the house-top' or 'upper-chamber']
                     "he fell into an ecstasy"---or he may be carried away by the Divine power, according to the saying of Ezechiel 1:3: "The hand
                     of the Lord was upon him."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted refers to prophets in whom imaginary pictures were formed or coordinated, either while asleep, which is
                     denoted by the word "dream," or while awake, which is signified by the word "vision."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the mind is intent, in its act, upon distant things which are far removed from the senses, the intensity of its application
                     leads to abstraction from the senses; but when it is intent, in its act, upon the coordination of or judgment concerning objects
                     of sense, there is no need for abstraction from the senses.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movement of the prophetic mind results not from its own power, but from a power acting on it from above. Hence there
                     is no abstraction from the senses when the prophet's mind is led to judge or coordinate matters relating to objects of sense,
                     but only when the mind is raised to the contemplation of certain more lofty things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The spirit of the prophets is said to be subject to the prophets as regards the prophetic utterances to which the Apostle
                     refers in the words quoted; because, to wit, the prophets in declaring what they have seen speak their own mind, and are not
                     thrown off their mental balance, like persons who are possessed, as Priscilla and Montanus maintained. But as regards the
                     prophetic revelation itself, it would be more correct to say that the prophets are
                     subject to the. spirit of prophecy, i.e. to the prophetic gift.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A3-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q173_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q173_A4-p0.1">Whether prophets always know the things which they prophesy?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the prophets always know the things which they prophesy. For, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9),
                     "those to whom signs were shown in spirit by means of the likenesses of bodily things, had not the gift of prophecy, unless
                     the mind was brought into action, so that those signs were also understood by them." Now what is understood cannot be unknown.
                     Therefore the prophet is not ignorant of what he prophesies.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the light of prophecy surpasses the light of natural reason. Now one who possesses a science by his natural light,
                     is not ignorant of his scientific acquirements. Therefore he who utters things by the prophetic light cannot ignore them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prophecy is directed for man's enlightenment; wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.19" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:19</a>): "We have the more firm prophetical word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place."
                     Now nothing can enlighten others unless it be lightsome in itself. Therefore it would seem that the prophet is first enlightened
                     so as to know what he declares to others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.11.51" target="asv">Jn. 11:51</a>): "And this he" (Caiphas) "spoke, not of himself, but being the High Priest of that year, he prophesied that Jesus should
                     die for the nation," etc. Now Caiphas knew this not. Therefore not every prophet knows what he prophesies.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In prophetic revelation the prophet's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, as an instrument that is deficient in regard to the
                     principal agent. Now the prophet's mind is moved not only to apprehend something, but also to speak or to do something; sometimes
                     indeed to all these three together, sometimes to two, sometimes to one only, and in each case there may be a defect in the
                     prophet's knowledge. For when the prophet's mind is moved to think or apprehend a
                     thing, sometimes he is led merely to apprehend that thing, and sometimes he is further led to know that it is divinely revealed
                     to him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p7"> Again, sometimes the prophet's mind is moved to speak something, so that he understands what the Holy Ghost means by the
                     words he utters; like David who said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.23.2" target="asv">2 Kings 23:2</a>): "The Spirit of the Lord hath spoken by me"; while, on the other hand, sometimes the person whose mind is moved to utter
                     certain words knows not what the Holy Ghost means by them, as was the case with Caiphas (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.11.51" target="asv">Jn. 11:51</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p8"> Again, when the Holy Ghost moves a man's mind to do something, sometimes the latter understands the meaning of it, like Jeremias
                     who hid his loin-cloth in the Euphrates (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q173_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.13.1" target="asv">Jer. 13:1-11</a>); while sometimes he does not understand it---thus the soldiers, who divided Christ's garments, understood not the meaning
                     of what they did.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p9"> Accordingly, when a man knows that he is being moved by the Holy Ghost to think something, or signify something by word or
                     deed, this belongs properly to prophecy; whereas when he is moved, without his knowing it, this is not perfect prophecy, but
                     a prophetic instinct. Nevertheless it must be observed that since the prophet's mind is a defective instrument, as stated
                     above, even true prophets know not all that the Holy Ghost means by the things they see, or speak, or even
                     do.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p10"> And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections, since the arguments given at the beginning refer to true prophets whose
                     minds are perfectly enlightened from above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q173_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q172_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q174" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q173_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q174-p0.1">OF THE DIVISION OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q174-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q174-p2"> We must now consider the division of prophecy, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q174-p3"> (1) The division of prophecy into its species;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q174-p4"> (2) Whether the more excellent prophecy is that which is without imaginative vision?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q174-p5"> (3) The various degrees of prophecy;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q174-p6"> (4) Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q174-p7"> (5) Whether a comprehensor can be a prophet?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q174-p8"> (6) Whether prophecy advanced in perfection as time went on?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q174_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q174_A1-p0.1">Whether prophecy is fittingly divided into the prophecy of divine predestination, of foreknowledge, and of denunciation?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prophecy is unfittingly divided according to a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.23" target="asv"> Mat. 1:23, </a> "Behold a virgin shall be with child," where it is stated that "one kind of prophecy proceeds from the Divine predestination,
                     and must in all respects be accomplished so that its fulfillment is independent of our will, for instance the one in question.
                     Another prophecy proceeds from God's foreknowledge: and into this our will enters. And another prophecy
                     is called denunciation, which is significative of God's disapproval." For that which results from every prophecy should not
                     be reckoned a part of prophecy. Now all prophecy is according to the Divine foreknowledge, since the prophets "read in the
                     book of foreknowledge," as a gloss says on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.1" target="asv"> Is. 38:1.</a> Therefore it would seem that prophecy according to foreknowledge should not be reckoned a species of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as something is foretold in denunciation, so is something foretold in promise, and both of these are subject
                     to alteration. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.18.7" target="asv">Jer. 18:7,8</a>): "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it. If that
                     nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent"---and this pertains to the prophecy of
                     denunciation, and afterwards
                     the text continues in reference to the prophecy of promise (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.18.9" target="asv">Jer. 18:9,10</a>): "I will suddenly speak of a nation and of a kingdom, to build up and plant it. If it shall do evil in My sight . . . I
                     will repent of the good that I have spoken to do unto it." Therefore as there is reckoned to be a prophecy of denunciation,
                     so should there be a prophecy of promise.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. vii, 8): "There are seven kinds of prophecy. The first is an ecstasy, which is the transport
                     of the mind: thus Peter saw a vessel descending from heaven with all manner of beasts therein. The second kind is a vision,
                     as we read in Isaias, who says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>): 'I saw the Lord sitting,' etc. The third kind is a dream: thus Jacob in a dream, saw a ladder. The fourth kind is from
                     the midst of a cloud: thus God spake to Moses. The fifth
                     kind is a voice from heaven, as that which called to Abraham saying (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.11" target="asv">Gn. 22:11</a>): 'Lay not thy hand upon the boy.' The sixth kind is taking up a parable, as in the example of Balaam (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A1-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Num.23.7" target="asv">Num. 23:7</a>; 24:15). The seventh kind is the fullness of the Holy Ghost, as in the case of nearly all the prophets." Further, he mentions
                     three kinds of vision; "one by the eyes of the body, another by the soul's imagination, a third by the eyes of the mind."
                     Now these are not
                     included in the aforesaid division. Therefore it is insufficient.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Jerome to whom the gloss above quoted is ascribed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The species of moral habits and acts are distinguished according to their objects. Now the object of prophecy is something
                     known by God and surpassing the faculty of man. Wherefore, according to the difference of such things, prophecy is divided
                     into various species, as assigned above. Now it has been stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q174_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q71_A6.html">Q[71], A[6]</a>, ad 2) that the future is contained in the Divine knowledge in two ways. First, as in its cause: and thus we
                     have the prophecy of "denunciation," which is not always fulfilled. but it foretells the relation of cause to effect, which
                     is sometimes hindered by some other occurrence supervening. Secondly, God foreknows certain things in themselves---either
                     as to be accomplished by Himself, and of such things is the prophecy of "predestination," since, according to Damascene (De
                     Fide Orth. ii, 30), "God predestines things which are not in our power"---or as to be accomplished through man's free-will,
                     and
                     of such is the prophecy of "foreknowledge." This may regard either good or evil, which does not apply to the prophecy of predestination,
                     since the latter regards good alone. And since predestination is comprised under foreknowledge, the gloss in the beginning
                     of the Psalter assigns only two species to prophecy, namely of "foreknowledge," and of "denunciation."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Foreknowledge, properly speaking, denotes precognition of future events in themselves, and in this sense it is reckoned a
                     species of prophecy. But in so far as it is used in connection with future events, whether as in themselves, or as in their
                     causes, it is common to every species of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The prophecy of promise is included in the prophecy of denunciation, because the aspect of truth is the same in both. But
                     it is denominated in preference from denunciation, because God is more inclined to remit punishment than to withdraw promised
                     blessings.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Isidore divides prophecy according to the manner of prophesying. Now we may distinguish the manner of prophesying---either
                     according to man's cognitive powers, which are sense, imagination, and intellect, and then we have the three kinds of vision
                     mentioned both by him and by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7)---or according to the different ways in which the prophetic
                     current is received. Thus as regards the enlightening of the intellect there is the
                     "fullness of the Holy Ghost" which he mentions in the seventh place. As to the imprinting of pictures on the imagination he
                     mentions three, namely "dreams," to which he gives the third place; "vision," which occurs to the prophet while awake and
                     regards any kind of ordinary object, and this he puts in the second place; and "ecstasy," which results from the mind being
                     uplifted to certain lofty things, and to this he assigns the first place. As regards sensible signs he reckons three kinds
                     of
                     prophecy, because a sensible sign is---either a corporeal thing offered externally to the sight, such as "a cloud," which
                     he mentions in the fourth place---or a "voice" sounding from without and conveyed to man's hearing---this he puts in the fifth
                     place---or a voice proceeding from a man, conveying something under a similitude, and this pertains to the "parable" to which
                     he assigns the sixth place.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q174_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q174_A2-p0.1">Whether the prophecy which is accompanied by intellective and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is accompanied
                     by intellective vision alone?
                  </h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the prophecy which has intellective and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is accompanied
                     by intellective vision alone. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9): "He is less a prophet, who sees in spirit nothing
                     but the signs representative of things, by means of the images of things corporeal: he is more a prophet, who is merely endowed
                     with the understanding of these signs; but most of all is he a prophet, who excels in
                     both ways," and this refers to the prophet who has intellective together with imaginative vision. Therefore this kind of prophecy
                     is more excellent.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater a thing's power is, the greater the distance to which it extends. Now the prophetic light pertains chiefly
                     to the mind, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q174_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q173_A2.html">Q[173], A[2]</a>). Therefore apparently the prophecy that extends to the imagination is greater than that which is confined to the intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Jerome (Prol. in Lib. Reg.) distinguishes the "prophets" from the "sacred writers." Now all those whom he calls
                     prophets (such as Isaias, Jeremias, and the like) had intellective together with imaginative vision: but not those whom he
                     calls sacred writers, as writing by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost (such as Job, David, Solomon, and the like). Therefore
                     it would seem more proper to call prophets those who had intellective together with imaginative
                     vision, than those who had intellective vision alone.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is impossible for the Divine ray to shine on us, except as screened round
                     about by the many-colored sacred veils." Now the prophetic revelation is conveyed by the infusion of the divine ray. Therefore
                     it seems that it cannot be without the veils of phantasms.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter that "the most excellent manner of prophecy is when a man prophesies by the
                     mere inspiration of the Holy Ghost, apart from any outward assistance of deed, word, vision, or dream."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The excellence of the means is measured chiefly by the end. Now the end of prophecy is the manifestation of a truth that
                     surpasses the faculty of man. Wherefore the more effective this manifestation is, the more excellent the prophecy. But it
                     is evident that the manifestation of divine truth by means of the bare contemplation of the truth itself, is more effective
                     than that which is conveyed under the similitude of corporeal things, for it approaches nearer
                     to the heavenly vision whereby the truth is seen in God's essence. Hence it follows that the prophecy whereby a supernatural
                     truth is seen by intellectual vision, is more excellent than that in which a supernatural truth is manifested by means of
                     the similitudes of corporeal things in the vision of the imagination.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p8"> Moreover the prophet's mind is shown thereby to be more lofty: even as in human teaching the hearer, who is able to grasp
                     the bare intelligible truth the master propounds, is shown to have a better understanding than one who needs to be taken by
                     the hand and helped by means of examples taken from objects of sense. Hence it is said in commendation of David's prophecy
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.23.3" target="asv">2 Kings 23:3</a>): "The strong one of Israel spoke to me," and further on (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.23.4" target="asv">2 Kings
                        23:4
                     </a>): "As the light of the morning, when the sun riseth, shineth in the morning without clouds."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a particular supernatural truth has to be revealed by means of corporeal images, he that has both, namely the intellectual
                     light and the imaginary vision, is more a prophet than he that has only one, because his prophecy is more perfect; and it
                     is in this sense that Augustine speaks as quoted above. Nevertheless the prophecy in which the bare intelligible truth is
                     revealed is greater than all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same judgment does not apply to things that are sought for their own sake, as to things sought for the sake of something
                     else. For in things sought for their own sake, the agent's power is the more effective according as it extends to more numerous
                     and more remote objects; even so a physician is thought more of, if he is able to heal more people, and those who are further
                     removed from health. on the other hand, in things sought only for the sake
                     of something else, that agent would seem to have greater power, who is able to achieve his purpose with fewer means and those
                     nearest to hand: thus more praise is awarded the physician who is able to heal a sick person by means of fewer and more gentle
                     remedies. Now, in the prophetic knowledge, imaginary vision is required, not for its own sake, but on account of the manifestation
                     of the intelligible truth. Wherefore prophecy is all the more excellent according as it needs it less.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that a particular predicate is applicable to one thing and less properly to another, does not prevent this latter
                     from being simply better than the former: thus the knowledge of the blessed is more excellent than the knowledge of the wayfarer,
                     although faith is more properly predicated of the latter knowledge, because faith implies an imperfection of knowledge. In
                     like manner prophecy implies a certain obscurity, and remoteness from the
                     intelligible truth; wherefore the name of prophet is more properly applied to those who see by imaginary vision. And yet the
                     more excellent prophecy is that which is conveyed by intellectual vision, provided the same truth be revealed in either case.
                     If, however, the intellectual light be divinely infused in a person, not that he may know some supernatural things, but that
                     he may be able to judge, with the certitude of divine truth, of things that can be known by human reason, such intellectual
                     prophecy is beneath that which is conveyed by an imaginary vision leading to a supernatural truth. It was this kind of prophecy
                     that all those had who are included in the ranks of the prophets, who moreover were called prophets for the special reason
                     that they exercised the prophetic calling officially. Hence they spoke as God's representatives, saying to the people: "Thus
                     saith the Lord": but not so the authors of the "sacred writings," several of whom treated more frequently of things that
                     can be known by human reason, not in God's name, but in their own, yet with the assistance of the Divine light withal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the present life the enlightenment by the divine ray is not altogether without any veil of phantasms, because according
                     to his present state of life it is unnatural to man not to understand without a phantasm. Sometimes, however, it is sufficient
                     to have phantasms abstracted in the usual way from the senses without any imaginary vision divinely vouchsafed, and thus prophetic
                     vision is said to be without imaginary vision.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A2-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q174_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q174_A3-p0.1">Whether the degrees of prophecy can be distinguished according to the imaginary vision?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the degrees of prophecy cannot be distinguished according to the imaginary vision. For the degrees of
                     a thing bear relation to something that is on its own account, not on account of something else. Now, in prophecy, intellectual
                     vision is sought on its own account, and imaginary vision on account of something else, as stated above (A[2], ad 2). Therefore
                     it would seem that the degrees of prophecy are distinguished not according to
                     imaginary, but only according to intellectual, vision.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, seemingly for one prophet there is one degree of prophecy. Now one prophet receives revelation through various imaginary
                     visions. Therefore a difference of imaginary visions does not entail a difference of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to a gloss [*Cassiodorus, super Prolog. Hieron. in Psalt.], prophecy consists of words, deeds, dreams,
                     and visions. Therefore the degrees of prophecy should not be distinguished according to imaginary vision, to which vision
                     and dreams pertain, rather than according to words and deeds.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The medium differentiates the degrees of knowledge: thus science based on direct [*"Propter quid"] proofs is more excellent
                     than science based on indirect [*"Quia"] premises or than opinion, because it comes through a more excellent medium. Now imaginary
                     vision is a kind of medium in prophetic knowledge. Therefore the degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according to
                     imaginary vision.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q174_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q173_A2.html">Q[173], A[2]</a>), the prophecy wherein, by the intelligible light, a supernatural truth is revealed through an imaginary vision, holds the
                     mean between the prophecy wherein a supernatural truth is revealed without imaginary vision, and that wherein through the
                     intelligible light and without an imaginary vision, man is directed to know or do things pertaining to human conduct. Now
                     knowledge is more proper to prophecy
                     than is action; wherefore the lowest degree of prophecy is when a man, by an inward instinct, is moved to perform some outward
                     action. Thus it is related of Samson (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Judg.15.14" target="asv">Judges 15:14</a>) that "the Spirit of the Lord came strongly upon him, and as the flax [*'Lina.' St. Thomas apparently read 'ligna' ('wood')]
                     is wont to be consumed at the approach of fire, so the bands with which he was bound were broken and loosed." The second degree
                     of prophecy is when a man is enlightened by an
                     inward light so as to know certain things, which, however, do not go beyond the bounds of natural knowledge: thus it is related
                     of Solomon (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 4:32,33</a>) that "he spoke . . . parables . . . and he treated about trees from the cedar that is in Libanus unto the hyssop that cometh
                     out of the wall, and he discoursed of beasts and of fowls, and of creeping things and of fishes": and all of this came from
                     divine inspiration, for it was stated previously (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings
                        4:29
                     </a>): "God gave to Solomon wisdom and understanding exceeding much."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p7"> Nevertheless these two degrees are beneath prophecy properly so called, because they do not attain to supernatural truth.
                     The prophecy wherein supernatural truth is manifested through imaginary vision is differentiated first according to the difference
                     between dreams which occur during sleep, and vision which occurs while one is awake. The latter belongs to a higher degree
                     of prophecy, since the prophetic light that draws the soul away to supernatural things while it is awake
                     and occupied with sensible things would seem to be stronger than that which finds a man's soul asleep and withdrawn from objects
                     of sense. Secondly the degrees of this prophecy are differentiated according to the expressiveness of the imaginary signs
                     whereby the intelligible truth is conveyed. And since words are the most expressive signs of intelligible truth, it would
                     seem to be a higher degree of prophecy when the prophet, whether awake or asleep, hears words expressive of an intelligible
                     truth, than when he sees things significative of truth, for instance "the seven full ears of corn" signified "seven years
                     of plenty" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.41.22" target="asv">Gn. 41:22</a>, 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.41.26" target="asv">26</a>). In such like signs prophecy would seem to be the more excellent, according as the signs are more expressive, for instance
                     when Jeremias saw the burning of the city under the figure of a boiling cauldron (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A3-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Jer.1.13" target="asv">Jer. 1:13</a>). Thirdly, it is evidently a still higher degree of prophecy when a prophet not only sees
                     signs of words or deeds, but also, either awake or asleep, sees someone speaking or showing something to him, since this proves
                     the prophet's mind to have approached nearer to the cause of the revelation. Fourthly, the height of a degree of prophecy
                     may be measured according to the appearance of the person seen: for it is a higher degree of prophecy, if he who speaks or
                     shows something to the waking or sleeping prophet be seen by him under the form of an angel, than if he be seen by him under
                     the form of man: and higher still is it, if he be seen by the prophet whether asleep or awake, under the appearance of God,
                     according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A3-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>, "I saw the Lord sitting."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p8"> But above all these degrees there is a third kind of prophecy, wherein an intelligible and supernatural truth is shown without
                     any imaginary vision. However, this goes beyond the bounds of prophecy properly so called, as stated above (A[2], ad 3); and
                     consequently the degrees of prophecy are properly distinguished according to imaginary vision.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We are unable to know how to distinguish the intellectual light, except by means of imaginary or sensible signs. Hence the
                     difference in the intellectual light is gathered from the difference in the things presented to the imagination.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q174_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A2.html">Q[171], A[2]</a>), prophecy is by way, not of an abiding habit, but of a transitory passion; wherefore there is nothing inconsistent if one
                     and the same prophet, at different times, receive various degrees of prophetic revelation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The words and deeds mentioned there do not pertain to the prophetic revelation, but to the announcement, which is made according
                     to the disposition of those to whom that which is revealed to the prophet is announced; and this is done sometimes by words,
                     sometimes by deeds. Now this announcement, and the working of miracles, are something consequent upon prophecy, as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="SS_Q174_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A1.html">Q[171], A[1]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A3-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q174_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q174_A4-p0.1">Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Moses was not the greatest of the prophets. For a gloss at the beginning of the Psalter says that "David
                     is called the prophet by way of excellence." Therefore Moses was not the greatest of all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, greater miracles were wrought by Josue, who made the sun and moon to stand still (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Josh.10.12" target="asv">Josh. 10:12-14</a>), and by Isaias, who made the sun to turn back (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.8" target="asv">Is. 38:8</a>), than by Moses, who divided the Red Sea (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.14.21" target="asv">Ex. 14:21</a>). In like manner greater miracles were wrought by Elias, of whom it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p3.4" href="./asv.html#Sir.48.4" target="asv">Ecclus. 48:4,5</a>): "Who can glory like to thee? Who raisedst up a dead man from below." Therefore Moses was not the greatest of
                     the prophets.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>) that "there hath not risen, among them that are born of women, a greater than John the Baptist." Therefore Moses was not
                     greater than all the prophets.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.34.10" target="asv">Dt. 34:10</a>): "There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Although in some respect one or other of the prophets was greater than Moses, yet Moses was simply the greatest of all. For,
                     as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q174_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q174_A3.html">(A[3];</a> Q[171], A[1]), in prophecy we may consider not only the knowledge, whether by intellectual or by imaginary vision, but also
                     the announcement and the confirmation by miracles. Accordingly Moses was greater than the other prophets. First, as regards
                     the intellectual vision, since he saw
                     God's very essence, even as Paul in his rapture did, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27). Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Num.12.8" target="asv">Num. 12:8</a>) that he saw God "plainly and not by riddles." Secondly, as regards the imaginary vision, which he had at his call, as it
                     were, for not only did he hear words, but also saw one speaking to him under the form of God, and this not only while asleep,
                     but even when he was awake. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.33.11" target="asv">Ex. 33:11</a>) that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to
                     face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend." Thirdly, as regards the working of miracles which he wrought on a whole nation
                     of unbelievers. Wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.34.10" target="asv">Dt. 34:10,11</a>): "There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face: in all the signs and wonders,
                     which He sent by him, to do in the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to all his servants, and to his whole land."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The prophecy of David approaches near to the vision of Moses, as regards the intellectual vision, because both received a
                     revelation of intelligible and supernatural truth, without any imaginary vision. Yet the vision of Moses was more excellent
                     as regards the knowledge of the Godhead; while David more fully knew and expressed the mysteries of Christ's incarnation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These signs of the prophets mentioned were greater as to the substance of the thing done; yet the miracles of Moses were
                     greater as regards the way in which they were done, since they were wrought on a whole people.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> John belongs to the New Testament, whose ministers take precedence even of Moses, since they are spectators of a fuller revelation,
                     as stated in 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3" target="asv">2 Cor. 3</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q174_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q174_A5-p0.1">Whether there is a degree of prophecy in the blessed?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is a degree of prophecy in the blessed. For, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q174_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q174_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, Moses saw the Divine essence, and yet he is called a prophet. Therefore in like manner the blessed can be called prophets.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prophecy is a "divine revelation." Now divine revelations are made even to the blessed angels. Therefore even blessed
                     angels can be prophets.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Christ was a comprehensor from the moment of His conception; and yet He calls Himself a prophet (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.57" target="asv">Mat. 13:57</a>), when He says: "A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country." Therefore even comprehensors and the blessed can
                     be called prophets.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written of Samuel (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.46.23" target="asv">Ecclus. 46:23</a>): "He lifted up his voice from the earth in prophecy to blot out the wickedness of the nation." Therefore other saints can
                     likewise be called prophets after they have died.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The prophetic word is compared (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.19" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:19</a>) to a "light that shineth in a dark place." Now there is no darkness in the blessed. Therefore they cannot be called prophets.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Prophecy denotes vision of some supernatural truth as being far remote from us. This happens in two ways. First, on the part
                     of the knowledge itself, because, to wit, the supernatural truth is not known in itself, but in some of its effects; and this
                     truth will be more remote if it be known by means of images of corporeal things, than if it be known in its intelligible effects;
                     and such most of all is the prophetic vision, which is conveyed by images and
                     likenesses of corporeal things. Secondly, vision is remote on the part of the seer, because, to wit, he has not yet attained
                     completely to his ultimate perfection, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6, </a> "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p8"> Now in neither of these ways are the blessed remote; wherefore they cannot be called prophets.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This vision of Moses was interrupted after the manner of a passion, and was not permanent like the beatific vision, wherefore
                     he was as yet a seer from afar. For this reason his vision did not entirely lose the character of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The divine revelation is made to the angels, not as being far distant, but as already wholly united to God; wherefore their
                     revelation has not the character of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ was at the same time comprehensor and wayfarer [*Cf. TP, QQ[9], seqq.]. Consequently the notion of prophecy is not
                     applicable to Him as a comprehensor, but only as a wayfarer.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Samuel had not yet attained to the state of blessedness. Wherefore although by God's will the soul itself of Samuel foretold
                     to Saul the issue of the war as revealed to him by God, this pertains to the nature of prophecy. It is not the same with the
                     saints who are now in heaven. Nor does it make any difference that this is stated to have been brought about by the demons'
                     art, because although the demons are unable to evoke the soul of a saint, or to
                     force it to do any particular thing, this can be done by the power of God, so that when the demon is consulted, God Himself
                     declares the truth by His messenger: even as He gave a true answer by Elias to the King's messengers who were sent to consult
                     the god of Accaron (4 Kings 1).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p13"> It might also be replied [*The Book of Ecclesiasticus was not as yet declared by the Church to be Canonical Scripture; Cf.
                     
                     <a id="SS_Q174_A5-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A8.html">FP, Q[89], A[8]</a>, ad 2] that it was not the soul of Samuel, but a demon impersonating him; and that the wise man calls him Samuel, and describes
                     his prediction as prophetic, in accordance with the thoughts of Saul and the bystanders who were of this opinion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A5-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q174_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q174_A6-p0.1">Whether the degrees of prophecy change as time goes on?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the degrees of prophecy change as time goes on. For prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine things,
                     as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q174_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q174_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Now according to Gregory (Hom. in Ezech.), "knowledge of God went on increasing as time went on." Therefore degrees of prophecy
                     should be distinguished according to the process of time.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prophetic revelation is conveyed by God speaking to man; while the prophets declared both in words and in writing
                     the things revealed to them. Now it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.3.1" target="asv">1 Kings 3:1</a>) that before the time of Samuel "the word of the Lord was precious," i.e. rare; and yet afterwards it was delivered to many.
                     In like manner the books of the prophets do not appear to have been written before the time of Isaias, to whom it was said
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.8.1" target="asv">Is. 8:1</a>): "Take thee a great book and write in it with a man's pen," after which many prophets wrote their prophecies. Therefore
                     it would seem that in course of time the degree of prophecy made progress.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our Lord said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.13" target="asv">Mat. 11:13</a>): "The prophets and the law prophesied until John"; and afterwards the gift of prophecy was in Christ's disciples in a much
                     more excellent manner than in the prophets of old, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.5" target="asv"> Eph. 3:5, </a> "In other generations" the mystery of Christ "was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles
                     and prophets in the Spirit." Therefore it would seem that in course
                     of time the degree of prophecy advanced.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q174_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q174_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, Moses was the greatest of the prophets, and yet he preceded the other prophets. Therefore prophecy did not advance in degree
                     as time went on.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q174_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine truth, by the contemplation of which we are not only instructed in faith,
                     but also guided in our actions, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.42.3" target="asv">Ps. 42:3</a>, "Send forth Thy light and Thy truth: they have conducted me." Now our faith consists chiefly in two things: first, in the
                     true knowledge of God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv"> Heb. 11:6, </a> "He that cometh to God must believe that He
                     is"; secondly, in the mystery of Christ's incarnation, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.4" href="./asv.html#John.14.1" target="asv">Jn. 14:1</a>, "You believe in God, believe also in Me." Accordingly, if we speak of prophecy as directed to the Godhead as its end, it
                     progressed according to three divisions of time, namely before the law, under the law, and under grace. For before the law,
                     Abraham and the other patriarchs were prophetically taught things pertinent to faith in the Godhead. Hence they are called
                     prophets, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.5" href="./asv.html#Ps.104.15" target="asv"> Ps. 104:15,
                        
                     </a>"Do no evil to My prophets," which words are said especially on behalf of Abraham and Isaac. Under the Law prophetic revelation
                     of things pertinent to faith in the Godhead was made in a yet more excellent way than hitherto, because then not only certain
                     special persons or families but the whole people had to be instructed in these matters. Hence the Lord said to Moses (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.6" href="./asv.html#Exod.6.2" target="asv">Ex. 6:2,3</a>): "I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, by the name of God
                     almighty, and My name Adonai I did not show to them"; because previously the patriarchs had been taught to believe in a general
                     way in God, one and Almighty, while Moses was more fully instructed in the simplicity of the Divine essence, when it was said
                     to him (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.7" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.14" target="asv">Ex. 3:14</a>): "I am Who am"; and this name is signified by Jews in the word "Adonai" on account of their veneration for that unspeakable
                     name. Afterwards in the time of grace the mystery of the Trinity was revealed by
                     the Son of God Himself, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p6.8" href="./asv.html#Matt.28.19" target="asv"> Mat. 28:19</a>: "Going . . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p7"> In each state, however, the most excellent revelation was that which was given first. Now the first revelation, before the
                     Law, was given to Abraham, for it was at that time that men began to stray from faith in one God by turning aside to idolatry,
                     whereas hitherto no such revelation was necessary while all persevered in the worship of one God. A less excellent revelation
                     was made to Isaac, being founded on that which was made to Abraham. Wherefore it was said to him
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.26.24" target="asv">Gn. 26:24</a>): "I am the God of Abraham thy father," and in like manner to Jacob (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.28.13" target="asv">Gn. 28:13</a>): "I am the God of Abraham thy father, and the God of Isaac." Again in the state of the Law the first revelation which was
                     given to Moses was more excellent, and on this revelation all the other revelations to the prophets were founded. And so,
                     too, in the time of grace the entire faith of the Church is founded on the revelation vouchsafed to the apostles,
                     concerning the faith in one God and three Persons, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.18" target="asv">Mat. 16:18</a>, "On this rock," i.e. of thy confession, "I will build My Church."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p8"> As to the faith in Christ's incarnation, it is evident that the nearer men were to Christ, whether before or after Him, the
                     more fully, for the most part, were they instructed on this point, and after Him more fully than before, as the Apostle declares
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.5" target="asv">Eph. 3:5</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p9"> As regards the guidance of human acts, the prophetic revelation varied not according to the course of time, but according
                     as circumstances required, because as it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q174_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.29.18" target="asv">Prov. 29:18</a>), "When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad." Wherefore at all times men were divinely instructed about
                     what they were to do, according as it was expedient for the spiritual welfare of the elect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of Gregory is to be referred to the time before Christ's incarnation, as regards the knowledge of this mystery.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 27), "just as in the early days of the Assyrian kingdom promises were made most explicitly
                     to Abraham, so at the outset of the western Babylon," which is Rome, "and under its sway Christ was to come, in Whom were
                     to be fulfilled the promises made through the prophetic oracles testifying in word and writing to that great event to come,"
                     the promises, namely, which were made to Abraham. "For while prophets were
                     scarcely ever lacking to the people of Israel from the time that they began to have kings, it was exclusively for their benefit,
                     not for that of the nations. But when those prophetic writings were being set up with greater publicity, which at some future
                     time were to benefit the nations, it was fitting to begin when this city," Rome to wit, "was being built, which was to govern
                     the nations."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p12"> The reason why it behooved that nation to have a number of prophets especially at the time of the kings, was that then it
                     was not over-ridden by other nations, but had its own king; wherefore it behooved the people, as enjoying liberty, to have
                     prophets to teach them what to do.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The prophets who foretold the coming of Christ could not continue further than John, who with his finger pointed to Christ
                     actually present. Nevertheless as Jerome says on this passage, "This does not mean that there were no more prophets after
                     John. For we read in the Acts of the apostles that Agabus and the four maidens, daughters of Philip, prophesied." John, too,
                     wrote a prophetic book about the end of the Church; and at all times there have not
                     been lacking persons having the spirit of prophecy, not indeed for the declaration of any new doctrine of faith, but for the
                     direction of human acts. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 26) that "the emperor Theodosius sent to John who dwelt in the
                     Egyptian desert, and whom he knew by his ever-increasing fame to be endowed with the prophetic spirit: and from him he received
                     a message assuring him of victory."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q174_A6-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A5.html"></a>
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            <div id="SS_Q175" class="div3">
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               <h3 id="SS_Q175-p0.1">OF RAPTURE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q175-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q175-p2"> We must now consider rapture. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q175-p3"> (1) Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q175-p4"> (2) Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive or to the appetitive power?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q175-p5"> (3) Whether Paul when in rapture saw the essence of God?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q175-p6"> (4) Whether he was withdrawn from his senses?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q175-p7"> (5) Whether, when in that state, his soul was wholly separated from his body?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q175-p8"> (6) What did he know, and what did he not know about this matter?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q175_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q175_A1-p0.1">Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul of man is not carried away to things divine. For some define rapture as "an uplifting by the
                     power of a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to that which is above nature" [*Reference unknown; Cf. De
                     Veritate xiii, 1]. Now it is in accordance with man's nature that he be uplifted to things divine; for Augustine says at the
                     beginning of his Confessions: "Thou madest us, Lord, for Thyself, and our heart is restless,
                     till it rest in Thee." Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii) that "God's justice is seen in this that He treats all things according to their
                     mode and dignity." But it is not in accordance with man's mode and worth that he be raised above what he is according to nature.
                     Therefore it would seem that man's soul is not carried away to things divine.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, rapture denotes violence of some kind. But God rules us not by violence or force, as Damascene says [*De Fide Orth.
                     ii, 30]. Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.2" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:2</a>): "I know a man in Christ . . . rapt even to the third heaven." On which words a gloss says: "Rapt, that is to say, uplifted
                     contrary to nature."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Rapture denotes violence of a kind as stated above (OBJ[3]); and "the violent is that which has its principle without, and
                     in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all" (Ethic. iii, 1). Now everything concurs in that to which it tends in
                     accordance with its proper inclination, whether voluntary or natural. Wherefore he who is carried away by some external agent,
                     must be carried to something different from that to which his inclination tends. This
                     difference arises in two ways: in one way from the end of the inclination---for instance a stone, which is naturally inclined
                     to be borne downwards, may be thrown upwards; in another way from the manner of tending---for instance a stone may be thrown
                     downwards with greater velocity than consistent with its natural movement.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p7"> Accordingly man's soul also is said to be carried away, in a twofold manner, to that which is contrary to its nature: in
                     one way, as regards the term of transport---as when it is carried away to punishment, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.49.22" target="asv"> Ps. 49:22, </a> "Lest He snatch you away, and there be none to deliver you"; in another way, as regards the manner connatural to man, which
                     is that he should understand the truth through sensible things. Hence when he is withdrawn from the
                     apprehension of sensibles, he is said to be carried away, even though he be uplifted to things whereunto he is directed naturally:
                     provided this be not done intentionally, as when a man betakes himself to sleep which is in accordance with nature, wherefore
                     sleep cannot be called rapture, properly speaking.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p8"> This withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise from a threefold cause. First, from a bodily cause, as happens to those
                     who suffer abstraction from the senses through weakness: secondly, by the power of the demons, as in those who are possessed:
                     thirdly, by the power of God. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture, whereby a man is uplifted by the spirit of
                     God to things supernatural, and withdrawn from his senses, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.8.3" target="asv"> Ezech. 8:3,
                        
                     </a>"The spirit lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the vision of God into Jerusalem."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p9"> It must be observed, however, that sometimes a person is said to be carried away, not only through being withdrawn from his
                     senses, but also through being withdrawn from the things to which he was attending, as when a person's mind wanders contrary
                     to his purpose. But this is to use the expression in a less proper signification.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is natural to man to tend to divine things through the apprehension of things sensible, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv"> Rom. 1:20, </a> "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." But the mode, whereby
                     a man is uplifted to divine things and withdrawn from his senses, is not natural to man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs to man's mode and dignity that he be uplifted to divine things, from the very fact that he is made to God's image.
                     And since a divine good infinitely surpasses the faculty of man in order to attain that good, he needs the divine assistance
                     which is bestowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it is not contrary to nature, but above the faculty of nature that
                     man's mind be thus uplifted in rapture by God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The saying of Damascene refers to those things which a man does by himself. But as to those things which are beyond the scope
                     of the free-will, man needs to be uplifted by a stronger operation, which in a certain respect may be called force if we consider
                     the mode of operation, but not if we consider its term to which man is directed both by nature and by his intention.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A1-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175.html"></a>
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               </div>
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                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q175_A2-p0.1">Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive rather than to the appetitive power?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that rapture pertains to the appetitive rather than to the cognitive power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
                     "The Divine love causes ecstasy." Now love pertains to the appetitive power. Therefore so does ecstasy or rapture.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3) that "he who fed the swine debased himself by a dissipated mind and an unclean life;
                     whereas Peter, when the angel delivered him and carried him into ecstasy, was not beside himself, but above himself." Now
                     the prodigal son sank into the depths by his appetite. Therefore in those also who are carried up into the heights it is the
                     appetite that is affected.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.30.1" target="asv"> Ps. 30:1, </a> "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped, let me never be confounded," says in explaining the title [*Unto the end, a psalm for David,
                     in an ecstasy]: "{Ekstasis} in Greek signifies in Latin 'excessus mentis,' an aberration of the mind. This happens in two
                     ways, either through dread of earthly things or through the mind being rapt in heavenly things and forgetful of this lower
                     world." Now dread of earthly things
                     pertains to the appetite. Therefore rapture of the mind in heavenly things, being placed in opposition to this dread, also
                     pertains to the appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.115.2" target="asv"> Ps. 115:2, </a> "I said in my excess: Every man is a liar," says: "We speak of ecstasy, not when the mind wanders through fear, but when
                     it is carried aloft on the wings of revelation." Now revelation pertains to the intellective power. Therefore ecstasy or rapture
                     does also.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We can speak of rapture in two ways. First, with regard to the term of rapture, and thus, properly speaking, rapture cannot
                     pertain to the appetitive, but only to the cognitive power. For it was stated 
                     <a id="SS_Q175_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q175_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that rapture is outside the inclination of the person who is rapt; whereas the movement of the appetitive power is an inclination
                     to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speaking, in desiring something, a man is not rapt, but
                     is moved by himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p7"> Secondly, rapture may be considered with regard to its cause, and thus it may have a cause on the part of the appetitive
                     power. For from the very fact that the appetite is strongly affected towards something, it may happen, owing to the violence
                     of his affection, that a man is carried away from everything else. Moreover, it has an effect on the appetitive power, when
                     for instance a man delights in the things to which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that he was rapt, not only
                     "to the third heaven"---which pertains to the contemplation of the intellect---but also into "paradise," which pertains to
                     the appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Rapture adds something to ecstasy. For ecstasy means simply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one's proper order
                     [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q175_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q28_A3.html">FS, Q[28], A[3]</a>]; while rapture denotes a certain violence in addition. Accordingly ecstasy may pertain to the appetitive power, as when
                     a man's appetite tends to something outside him, and in this sense Dionysius says that "the Divine love causes ecstasy," inasmuch
                     as it makes man's appetite tend
                     to the object loved. Hence he says afterwards that "even God Himself, the cause of all things, through the overflow of His
                     loving goodness, goes outside Himself in His providence for all beings." But even if this were said expressly of rapture,
                     it would merely signify that love is the cause of rapture.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is a twofold appetite in man; to wit, the intellective appetite which is called the will, and the sensitive appetite
                     known as the sensuality. Now it is proper to man that his lower appetite be subject to the higher appetite, and that the higher
                     move the lower. Hence man may become outside himself as regards the appetite, in two ways. In one way, when a man's intellective
                     appetite tends wholly to divine things, and takes no account of those
                     things whereto the sensitive appetite inclines him; thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul being in ecstasy through
                     the vehemence of Divine love" exclaimed: "I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p10"> In another way, when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the lower appetite, and takes no account of his higher appetite.
                     It is thus that "he who fed the swine debased himself"; and this latter kind of going out of oneself, or being beside oneself,
                     is more akin than the former to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite is more proper to man. Hence when through
                     the violence of his lower appetite a man is withdrawn from the movement of his higher appetite, it is
                     more a case of being withdrawn from that which is proper to him. Yet, because there is no violence therein, since the will
                     is able to resist the passion, it falls short of the true nature of rapture, unless perchance the passion be so strong that
                     it takes away entirely the use of reason, as happens to those who are mad with anger or love.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p11"> It must be observed. however, that both these excesses affecting the appetite may cause an excess in the cognitive power,
                     either because the mind is carried away to certain intelligible objects, through being drawn away from objects of sense, or
                     because it is caught up into some imaginary vision or fanciful apparition.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as love is a movement of the appetite with regard to good, so fear is a movement of the appetite with regard to evil.
                     Wherefore either of them may equally cause an aberration of mind; and all the more since fear arises from love, as Augustine
                     says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A2-p14"></p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q175_A3-p0.1">Whether Paul, when in rapture, saw the essence of God?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, did not see the essence of God. For just as we read of Paul that he was rapt to
                     the third heaven, so we read of Peter (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.10" target="asv">Acts 10:10</a>) that "there came upon him an ecstasy of mind." Now Peter, in his ecstasy, saw not God's essence but an imaginary vision.
                     Therefore it would seem that neither did Paul see the essence of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the vision of God is beatific. But Paul, in his rapture, was not beatified; else he would never have returned to
                     the unhappiness of this life, but his body would have been glorified by the overflow from his soul, as will happen to the
                     saints after the resurrection, and this clearly was not the case. Therefore Paul when in rapture saw not the essence of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10-12</a>, faith and hope are incompatible with the vision of the Divine essence. But Paul when in this state had faith and hope. Therefore
                     he saw not the essence of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7), "pictures of bodies are seen in the imaginary vision." Now Paul is
                     stated (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.2" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:2</a>, 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.4" target="asv">4</a>) to have seen certain pictures in his rapture, for instance of the "third heaven" and of "paradise." Therefore he would seem
                     to have been rapt to an imaginary vision rather than to the vision of the Divine essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Ep. CXLVII, 13; ad Paulin., de videndo Deum) concludes that "possibly God's very substance was seen by some while
                     yet in this life: for instance by Moses, and by Paul who in rapture heard unspeakable words, which it is not granted unto
                     man to utter."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that Paul, when in rapture, saw "not the very essence of God, but a certain reflection of His clarity." But
                     Augustine clearly comes to an opposite decision, not only in his book (De videndo Deum), but also in Gen. ad lit. xii, 28
                     (quoted in a gloss on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.2" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:2</a>). Indeed the words themselves of the Apostle indicate this. For he says that "he heard secret words, which it is not granted
                     unto man to utter": and such would
                     seem to be words pertaining to the vision of the blessed, which transcends the state of the wayfarer, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.64.4" target="asv">Is. 64:4</a>, "Eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that love [Vulg.: 'wait for'] Thee" [*
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p7.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>]. Therefore it is more becoming to hold that he saw God in His essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man's mind is rapt by God to the contemplation of divine truth in three ways. First, so that he contemplates it through certain
                     imaginary pictures, and such was the ecstasy that came upon Peter. Secondly, so that he contemplates the divine truth through
                     its intelligible effects; such was the ecstasy of David, who said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.115.11" target="asv">Ps. 115:11</a>): "I said in my excess: Every man is a liar." Thirdly, so that he contemplates it in its essence. Such was the rapture of
                     Paul, as also of Moses [*Cf. Q[174], A[4]]; and not without reason, since as Moses was the first Teacher of the Jews, so was
                     Paul the first "Teacher of the gentiles" [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q175_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q68_A4.html">FP, Q[68], A[4]</a>].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Divine essence cannot be seen by a created intellect save through the light of glory, of which it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>): "In Thy light we shall see light." But this light can be shared in two ways. First by way of an abiding form, and thus
                     it beatifies the saints in heaven. Secondly, by way of a transitory passion, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q175_A3-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A2.html">Q[171] , A[2]</a>) of the light of prophecy; and in this way that light
                     was in Paul when he was in rapture. Hence this vision did not beatify him simply, so as to overflow into his body, but only
                     in a restricted sense. Consequently this rapture pertains somewhat to prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since, in his rapture, Paul was beatified not as to the habit, but only as to the act of the blessed, it follows that he
                     had not the act of faith at the same time, although he had the habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In one way by the third heaven we may understand something corporeal, and thus the third heaven denotes the empyrean [*
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.7" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:7</a>; Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q175_A3-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html">FP, Q[12], A[11]</a>, ad 2], which is described as the "third," in relation to the aerial and starry heavens, or better still, in relation to
                     the aqueous and crystalline heavens. Moreover Paul is stated to be rapt to the "third heaven," not as though his rapture consisted
                     in
                     the vision of something corporeal, but because this place is appointed for the contemplation of the blessed. Hence the gloss
                     on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p11.3" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12" target="asv">2 Cor. 12</a> says that the "third heaven is a spiritual heaven, where the angels and the holy souls enjoy the contemplation of God: and
                     when Paul says that he was rapt to this heaven he means that God showed him the life wherein He is to be seen forevermore."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p12"> In another way the third heaven may signify a supra-mundane vision. Such a vision may be called the third heaven in three
                     ways. First, according to the order of the cognitive powers. In this way the first heaven would indicate a supramundane bodily
                     vision, conveyed through the senses; thus was seen the hand of one writing on the wall (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.5.5" target="asv">Dan. 5:5</a>); the second heaven would be an imaginary vision such as Isaias saw, and John in the Apocalypse; and the third
                     heaven would denote an intellectual vision according to Augustine's explanation (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26,28,34). Secondly, the
                     third heaven may be taken according to the order of things knowable, the first heaven being "the knowledge of heavenly bodies,
                     the second the knowledge of heavenly spirits, the third the knowledge of God Himself." Thirdly, the third heaven may denote
                     the contemplation of God according to the degrees of knowledge whereby God is seen. The first of these degrees belongs to
                     the angels of the lowest hierarchy [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q175_A3-p12.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q108_A1.html">FP, Q[108], A[1]</a>], the second to the angels of the middle hierarchy, the third to the angels of the highest hierarchy, according to the gloss
                     on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A3-p12.3" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12" target="asv">2 Cor. 12</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p13"> And since the vision of God cannot be without delight, he says that he was not only "rapt to the third heaven" by reason
                     of his contemplation, but also into "Paradise" by reason of the consequent delight.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A3-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q175_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q175_A4-p0.1">Whether Paul, when in rapture, was withdrawn from his senses?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, was not withdrawn from his senses. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28): "Why
                     should we not believe that when so great an apostle, the teacher of the gentiles, was rapt to this most sublime vision, God
                     was willing to vouchsafe him a glimpse of that eternal life which is to take the place of the present life?" Now in that future
                     life after the resurrection the saints will see the Divine essence without being
                     withdrawn from the senses of the body. Therefore neither did such a withdrawal take place in Paul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Christ was truly a wayfarer, and also enjoyed an uninterrupted vision of the Divine essence, without, however, being
                     withdrawn from His senses. Therefore there was no need for Paul to be withdrawn from his senses in order for him to see the
                     essence of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, after seeing God in His essence, Paul remembered what he had seen in that vision; hence he said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:4</a>): "He heard secret words, which it is not granted to man to utter." Now the memory belongs to the sensitive faculty according
                     to the Philosopher (De Mem. et Remin. i). Therefore it seems that Paul, while seeing the essence of God, was not withdrawn
                     from his senses.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27): "Unless a man in some way depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his
                     body or by turning away and withdrawing from his carnal senses, so that he truly knows not as the Apostle said, whether he
                     be in the body or out of the body, he is not rapt and caught up into that vision.*" [*The text of St. Augustine reads: "when
                     he is rapt," etc.]
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Divine essence cannot be seen by man through any cognitive power other than the intellect. Now the human intellect does
                     not turn to intelligible objects except by means of the phantasms [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q175_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a>] which it takes from the senses through the intelligible species; and it is in considering these phantasms that the intellect
                     judges of and coordinates sensible objects. Hence in any operation that requires abstraction of the
                     intellect from phantasms, there must be also withdrawal of the intellect from the senses. Now in the state of the wayfarer
                     it is necessary for man's intellect, if it see God's essence, to be withdrawn from phantasms. For God's essence cannot be
                     seen by means of a phantasm, nor indeed by any created intelligible species [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q175_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">FP, Q[12], A[2]</a>], since God's essence infinitely transcends not only all bodies, which are represented by phantasms, but also all intelligible
                     creatures. Now when man's intellect is uplifted to the sublime vision of God's essence, it is necessary that his mind's whole
                     attention should be summoned to that purpose in such a way that he understand naught else by phantasms, and be absorbed entirely
                     in God. Therefore it is impossible for man while a wayfarer to see God in His essence without being withdrawn from his senses.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[3], OBJ[2]), after the resurrection, in the blessed who see God in His essence, there will be an overflow
                     from the intellect to the lower powers and even to the body. Hence it is in keeping with the rule itself of the divine vision
                     that the soul will turn towards phantasms and sensible objects. But there is no such overflow in those who are raptured, as
                     stated (A[3], OBJ[2], ad 2), and consequently the comparison fails.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect of Christ's soul was glorified by the habit of the light of glory, whereby He saw the Divine essence much more
                     fully than an angel or a man. He was, however, a wayfarer on account of the passibility of His body, in respect of which He
                     was "made a little lower than the angels" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.9" target="asv">Heb. 2:9</a>), by dispensation, and not on account of any defect on the part of His intellect. Hence there is no comparison between Him
                     and other
                     wayfarers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Paul, after seeing God in His essence, remembered what he had known in that vision, by means of certain intelligible species
                     that remained in his intellect by way of habit; even as in the absence of the sensible object, certain impressions remain
                     in the soul which it recollects when it turns to the phantasms. And so this was the knowledge that he was unable wholly to
                     think over or express in words.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q175_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q175_A5-p0.1">Whether, while in this state, Paul's soul was wholly separated from his body?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that, while in this state, Paul's soul was wholly separated from his body. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6,7</a>): "While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by faith, and not by sight" [*'Per speciem,' i.e. by
                     an intelligible species]. Now, while in that state, Paul was not absent from the Lord, for he saw Him by a species, as stated
                     above 
                     <a id="SS_Q175_A5-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q175_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore he was not in the
                     body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a power of the soul cannot be uplifted above the soul's essence wherein it is rooted. Now in this rapture the intellect,
                     which is a power of the soul, was withdrawn from its bodily surroundings through being uplifted to divine contemplation. Much
                     more therefore was the essence of the soul separated from the body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the forces of the vegetative soul are more material than those of the sensitive soul. Now in order for him to be
                     rapt to the vision of God, it was necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces of the sensitive soul, as stated above
                     
                     <a id="SS_Q175_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q175_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Much more, therefore, was it necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces of the vegetative soul. Now when these forces
                     cease to operate, the soul is no longer in any way united to
                     the body. Therefore it would seem that in Paul's rapture it was necessary for the soul to be wholly separated from the body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Ep. CXLVII, 13, ad Paulin.; de videndo Deum): "It is not incredible that this sublime revelation" (namely,
                     that they should see God in His essence) "was vouchsafed certain saints, without their departing this life so completely as
                     to leave nothing but a corpse for burial." Therefore it was not necessary for Paul's soul, when in rapture, to be wholly separated
                     from his body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], OBJ[1]), in the rapture of which we are speaking now, man is uplifted by God's power, "from that which
                     is according to nature to that which is above nature." Wherefore two things have to be considered: first, what pertains to
                     man according to nature; secondly, what has to be done by God in man above his nature. Now, since the soul is united to the
                     body as its natural form, it belongs to the soul to have a natural disposition to
                     understand by turning to phantasms; and this is not withdrawn by the divine power from the soul in rapture, since its state
                     undergoes no change, as stated above (A[3], ad 2,3). Yet, this state remaining, actual conversion to phantasms and sensible
                     objects is withdrawn from the soul, lest it be hindered from being uplifted to that which transcends all phantasms, as stated
                     above 
                     <a id="SS_Q175_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q175_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Therefore it was not necessary that his soul in rapture should be so separated from
                     the body as to cease to be united thereto as its form; and yet it was necessary for his intellect to be withdrawn from phantasms
                     and the perception of sensible objects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this rapture Paul was absent from the Lord as regards his state, since he was still in the state of a wayfarer, but not
                     as regards the act by which he saw God by a species, as stated above (A[3], ad 2,3).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A faculty of the soul is not uplifted by the natural power above the mode becoming the essence of the soul; but it can be
                     uplifted by the divine power to something higher, even as a body by the violence of a stronger power is lifted up above the
                     place befitting it according to its specific nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The forces of the vegetative soul do not operate through the soul being intent thereon, as do the sensitive forces, but by
                     way of nature. Hence in the case of rapture there is no need for withdrawal from them, as from the sensitive powers, whose
                     operations would lessen the intentness of the soul on intellective knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q175_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q175_A6-p0.1">Did Paul know whether his soul were separated from his body?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Paul was not ignorant whether his soul were separated from his body. For he says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.2" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:2</a>): "I know a man in Christ rapt even to the third heaven." Now man denotes something composed of soul and body; and rapture
                     differs from death. Seemingly therefore he knew that his soul was not separated from his body by death, which is the more
                     probable seeing that this is the common opinion of the Doctors.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it appears from the same words of the Apostle that he knew whither he was rapt, since it was "to the third heaven."
                     Now this shows that he knew whether he was in the body or not, for if he knew the third heaven to be something corporeal,
                     he must have known that his soul was not separated from his body, since a corporeal thing cannot be an object of sight save
                     through the body. Therefore it would seem that he was not ignorant whether his soul were
                     separated from his body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28) that "when in rapture, he saw God with the same vision as the saints see Him
                     in heaven." Now from the very fact that the saints see God, they know whether their soul is separated from their body. Therefore
                     Paul too knew this.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.3" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:3</a>): "Whether in the body, or out of the body, I know not, God knoweth."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The true answer to this question must be gathered from the Apostle's very words, whereby he says he knew something, namely
                     that he was "rapt even to the third heaven," and that something he knew not, namely "whether" he were "in the body or out
                     of the body." This may be understood in two ways. First, the words "whether in the body or out of the body" may refer not
                     to the very being of the man who was rapt (as though he knew not whether his soul were in his
                     body or not), but to the mode of rapture, so that he ignored whether his body besides his soul, or, on the other hand, his
                     soul alone, were rapt to the third heaven. Thus Ezechiel is stated (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q175_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.8.3" target="asv">Ezech. 8:3</a>) to have been "brought in the vision of God into Jerusalem." This was the explanation of a certain Jew according to Jerome
                     (Prolog. super Daniel.), where he says that "lastly our Apostle" (thus said the Jew) "durst not assert that he was rapt in
                     his body, but said: 'Whether
                     in the body or out of the body, I know not.'"
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p7"> Augustine, however, disapproves of this explanation (Gen. ad lit. xii, 3 seqq.) for this reason that the Apostle states that
                     he knew he was rapt even to the third heaven. Wherefore he knew it to be really the third heaven to which he was rapt, and
                     not an imaginary likeness of the third heaven: otherwise if he gave the name of third heaven to an imaginary third heaven,
                     in the same way he might state that he was rapt in the body, meaning, by body, an image of his body, such as
                     appears in one's dreams. Now if he knew it to be really the third heaven, it follows that either he knew it to be something
                     spiritual and incorporeal, and then his body could not be rapt thither; or he knew it to be something corporeal, and then
                     his soul could not be rapt thither without his body, unless it were separated from his body. Consequently we must explain
                     the matter otherwise, by saying that the Apostle knew himself to be rapt both in soul and body, but that he ignored how his
                     soul
                     stood in relation to his body, to wit, whether it were accompanied by his body or not.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p8"> Here we find a diversity of opinions. For some say that the Apostle knew his soul to be united to his body as its form, but
                     ignored whether it were abstracted from its senses, or again whether it were abstracted from the operations of the vegetative
                     soul. But he could not but know that it was abstracted from the senses, seeing that he knew himself to be rapt; and as to
                     his being abstracted from the operation of the vegetative soul, this was not of such importance as to require
                     him to be so careful in mentioning it. It follows, then, that the Apostle ignored whether his soul were united to his body
                     as its form, or separated from it by death. Some, however, granting this say that the Apostle did not consider the matter
                     while he was in rapture, because he was wholly intent upon God, but that afterwards he questioned the point, when taking cognizance
                     of what he had seen. But this also is contrary to the Apostle's words, for he there distinguishes between the past and
                     what happened subsequently, since he states that at the present time he knows that he was rapt "fourteen years ago," and that
                     at the present time he knows not "whether he was in the body or out of the body."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p9"> Consequently we must assert that both before and after he ignored whether his soul were separated from his body. Wherefore
                     Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 5), after discussing the question at length, concludes: "Perhaps then we must infer that he ignored
                     whether, when he was rapt to the third heaven, his soul was in his body (in the same way as the soul is in the body, when
                     we speak of a living body either of a waking or of a sleeping man, or of one that is withdrawn from his
                     bodily senses during ecstasy), or whether his soul went out of his body altogether, so that his body lay dead."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes by the figure of synecdoche a part of man, especially the soul which is the principal part, denotes a man. or again
                     we might take this to mean that he whom he states to have been rapt was a man not at the time of his rapture, but fourteen
                     years afterwards: for he says "I know a man," not "I know a rapt man." Again nothing hinders death brought about by God being
                     called rapture; and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 3): "If the Apostle
                     doubted the matter, who of us will dare to be certain about it?" Wherefore those who have something to say on this subject
                     speak with more conjecture than certainty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Apostle knew that either the heaven in question was something incorporeal, or that he saw something incorporeal in that
                     heaven; yet this could be done by his intellect, even without his soul being separated from his body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Paul's vision, while he was in rapture, was like the vision of the blessed in one respect, namely as to the thing seen; and,
                     unlike, in another respect, namely as to the mode of seeing, because he saw not so perfectly as do the saints in heaven. Hence
                     Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 36): "Although, when the Apostle was rapt from his carnal senses to the third heaven, he
                     lacked that full and perfect knowledge of things which is in the angels, in that
                     he knew not whether he was in the body, or out of the body, this will surely not be lacking after reunion with the body in
                     the resurrection of the dead, when this corruptible will put on incorruption."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q175_A6-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q174_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q176" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q175_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q176_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q176-p0.1">OF THE GRACE OF TONGUES (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q176-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q176-p2"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q176-p3"> We must now consider those gratuitous graces that pertain to speech, and (1) the grace of tongues; (2) the grace of the word
                  of wisdom and knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q176-p4"> (1) Whether by the grace of tongues a man acquires the knowledge of all languages?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q176-p5"> (2) Of the comparison between this gift and the grace of prophecy.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q176_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q176_A1-p0.1">Whether those who received the gift of tongues spoke in every language?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who received the gift of tongues did not speak in every language. For that which is granted to certain
                     persons by the divine power is the best of its kind: thus our Lord turned the water into good wine, as stated in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.2.10" target="asv"> Jn. 2:10.</a> Now those who had the gift of tongues spoke better in their own language; since a gloss on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1" target="asv">Heb. 1</a>, says that "it is not surprising that the epistle to the Hebrews is more graceful in style than the
                     other epistles, since it is natural for a man to have more command over his own than over a strange language. For the Apostle
                     wrote the other epistles in a foreign, namely the Greek, idiom; whereas he wrote this in the Hebrew tongue." Therefore the
                     apostles did not receive the knowledge of all languages by a gratuitous grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nature does not employ many means where one is sufficient; and much less does God Whose work is more orderly than
                     nature's. Now God could make His disciples to be understood by all, while speaking one tongue: hence a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.6" target="asv"> Acts 2:6, </a> "Every man heard them speak in his own tongue," says that "they spoke in every tongue, or speaking in their own, namely the
                     Hebrew language, were understood by all, as though they spoke the language
                     proper to each." Therefore it would seem that they had not the knowledge to speak in all languages.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all graces flow from Christ to His body, which is the Church, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.16" target="asv"> Jn. 1:16, </a> "Of His fullness we all have received." Now we do not read that Christ spoke more than one language, nor does each one of
                     the faithful now speak save in one tongue. Therefore it would seem that Christ's disciples did not receive the grace to the
                     extent of speaking in all languages.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.4" target="asv">Acts 2:4</a>) that "they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak with divers tongues, according as the Holy Ghost
                     gave them to speak"; on which passage a gloss of Gregory [*Hom. xxx in Ev.] says that "the Holy Ghost appeared over the disciples
                     under the form of fiery tongues, and gave them the knowledge of all tongues."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Christ's first disciples were chosen by Him in order that they might disperse throughout the whole world, and preach His
                     faith everywhere, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.28.19" target="asv"> Mat. 28:19, </a> "Going . . . teach ye all nations." Now it was not fitting that they who were being sent to teach others should need to be
                     taught by others, either as to how they should speak to other people, or as to how they were to understand those who spoke
                     to them; and all the more seeing
                     that those who were being sent were of one nation, that of Judea, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.6" target="asv"> Is. 27:6, </a> "When they shall rush out from Jacob [*Vulg.: 'When they shall rush in unto Jacob,' etc.] . . . they shall fill the face
                     of the world with seed." Moreover those who were being sent were poor and powerless; nor at the outset could they have easily
                     found someone to interpret their words faithfully to others, or to explain what others said to them, especially as they were
                     sent to
                     unbelievers. Consequently it was necessary, in this respect, that God should provide them with the gift of tongues; in order
                     that, as the diversity of tongues was brought upon the nations when they fell away to idolatry, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.11" target="asv">Gn. 11</a>, so when the nations were to be recalled to the worship of one God a remedy to this diversity might be applied by the gift
                     of tongues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>), "the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"; and consequently both Paul and the other apostles
                     were divinely instructed in the languages of all nations sufficiently for the requirements of the teaching of the faith. But
                     as regards the grace and elegance of style which human art adds to a language, the Apostle was instructed in his own, but
                     not in a foreign tongue. Even so
                     they were sufficiently instructed in wisdom and scientific knowledge, as required for teaching the faith, but not as to all
                     things known by acquired science, for instance the conclusions of arithmetic and geometry.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although either was possible, namely that, while speaking in one tongue they should be understood by all, or that they should
                     speak in all tongues, it was more fitting that they should speak in all tongues, because this pertained to the perfection
                     of their knowledge, whereby they were able not only to speak, but also to understand what was said by others. Whereas if their
                     one language were intelligible to all, this would either have been due to the
                     knowledge of those who understood their speech, or it would have amounted to an illusion, since a man's words would have had
                     a different sound in another's ears, from that with which they were uttered. Hence a gloss says on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.6" target="asv"> Acts 2:6 </a>that "it was a greater miracle that they should speak all kinds of tongues"; and Paul says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:18</a>): "I thank my God I speak with all your tongues."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ in His own person purposed preaching to only one nation, namely the Jews. Consequently, although without any doubt
                     He possessed most perfectly the knowledge of all languages, there was no need for Him to speak in every tongue. And therefore,
                     as Augustine says (Tract. xxxii in Joan.), "whereas even now the Holy Ghost is received, yet no one speaks in the tongues
                     of all nations, because the Church herself already speaks the languages of all
                     nations: since whoever is not in the Church, receives not the Holy Ghost."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q176_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q176_A2-p0.1">Whether the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy. For, seemingly, better things are proper
                     to better persons, according to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 1). Now the gift of tongues is proper to the New Testament, hence
                     we sing in the sequence of Pentecost [*The sequence: 'Sancti Spiritus adsit nobis gratia' ascribed to King Robert of France,
                     the reputed author of the 'Veni Sancte Spiritus.' Cf. Migne, Patr. Lat. tom. CXLI]:
                     "On this day Thou gavest Christ's apostles an unwonted gift, a marvel to all time": whereas prophecy is more pertinent to
                     the Old Testament, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.1" target="asv"> Heb. 1:1, </a> "God Who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets." Therefore it would seem
                     that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that whereby we are directed to God is seemingly more excellent than that whereby we are directed to men. Now, by
                     the gift of tongues, man is directed to God, whereas by prophecy he is directed to man; for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:2,3</a>): "He that speaketh in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God . . . but he that prophesieth, speaketh unto men unto
                     edification." Therefore it would seem that the gift of tongues is more
                     excellent than the gift of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gift of tongues abides like a habit in the person who has it, and "he can use it when he will"; wherefore it
                     is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:18</a>): "I thank my God I speak with all your tongues." But it is not so with the gift of prophecy, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q176_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q171_A2.html">Q[171], A[2]</a>). Therefore the gift of tongues would seem to be more excellent than the gift of prophecy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the "interpretation of speeches" would seem to be contained under prophecy, because the Scriptures are expounded
                     by the same Spirit from Whom they originated. Now the interpretation of speeches is placed after "divers kinds of tongues"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:10</a>). Therefore it seems that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy, particularly as regards a part
                     of the latter.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:5</a>): "Greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The gift of prophecy surpasses the gift of tongues, in three ways. First, because the gift of tongues regards the utterance
                     of certain words, which signify an intelligible truth, and this again is signified by the phantasms which appear in an imaginary
                     vision; wherefore Augustine compares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 8) the gift of tongues to an imaginary vision. On the other hand,
                     it has been stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q176_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q173_A2.html">Q[173], A[2]</a>) that the gift of
                     prophecy consists in the mind itself being enlightened so as to know an intelligible truth. Wherefore, as the prophetic enlightenment
                     is more excellent than the imaginary vision, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q176_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q174_A2.html">Q[174], A[2]</a>), so also is prophecy more excellent than the gift of tongues considered in itself. Secondly, because the gift of prophecy
                     regards the knowledge of things, which is more excellent than the knowledge of words, to which the gift of tongues pertains.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p8"> Thirdly, because the gift of prophecy is more profitable. The Apostle proves this in three ways (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14" target="asv">1 Cor. 14</a>); first, because prophecy is more profitable to the edification of the Church, for which purpose he that speaketh in tongues
                     profiteth nothing, unless interpretation follow (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:4,5</a>). Secondly, as regards the speaker himself, for if he be enabled to speak in divers tongues without understanding them, which
                     pertains to the gift of prophecy, his
                     own mind would not be edified (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p8.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:7-14</a>). Thirdly, as to unbelievers for whose especial benefit the gift of tongues seems to have been given; since perchance they
                     might think those who speak in tongues to be mad (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p8.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.23" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:23</a>), for instance the Jews deemed the apostles drunk when the latter spoke in various tongues (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p8.5" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.13" target="asv">Acts 2:13</a>): whereas by prophecies the unbeliever is convinced, because the secrets of his heart are made
                     manifest (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p8.6" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.25" target="asv">Acts 2:25</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q176_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q174_A3.html">Q[174], A[3]</a>, ad 1), it belongs to the excellence of prophecy that a man is not only enlightened by an intelligible light, but also that
                     he should perceive an imaginary vision: and so again it belongs to the perfection of the Holy Ghost's operation, not only
                     to fill the mind with the prophetic light, and the imagination with the imaginary vision, as happened in the Old Testament,
                     but also to endow the tongue
                     with external erudition, in the utterance of various signs of speech. All this is done in the New Testament, according to
                     
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.26" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:26, </a> "Every one of you hath a psalm, hath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation," i.e. a prophetic revelation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the gift of prophecy man is directed to God in his mind, which is more excellent than being directed to Him in his tongue.
                     "He that speaketh in a tongue "is said to speak "not unto men," i.e. to men's understanding or profit, but unto God's understanding
                     and praise. On the other hand, by prophecy a man is directed both to God and to man; wherefore it is the more perfect gift.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prophetic revelation extends to the knowledge of all things supernatural; wherefore from its very perfection it results that
                     in this imperfect state of life it cannot be had perfectly by way of habit, but only imperfectly by way of passion. on the
                     other hand, the gift of tongues is confined to a certain particular knowledge, namely of human words; wherefore it is not
                     inconsistent with the imperfection of this life, that it should be had perfectly and
                     by way of habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The interpretation of speeches is reducible to the gift of prophecy, inasmuch as the mind is enlightened so as to understand
                     and explain any obscurities of speech arising either from a difficulty in the things signified, or from the words uttered
                     being unknown, or from the figures of speech employed, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.5.16" target="asv"> Dan. 5:16, </a> "I have heard of thee, that thou canst interpret obscure things, and resolve difficult things." Hence the
                     interpretation of speeches is more excellent than the gift of tongues, as appears from the saying of the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q176_A2-p12.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:5</a>), "Greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues; unless perhaps he interpret." Yet the interpretation
                     of speeches is placed after the gift of tongues, because the interpretation of speeches extends even to the interpretation
                     of divers kinds of tongues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q176_A2-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q176_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177.html"></a>
               </div>
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               <a href="summa.SS_Q176_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q177" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q176_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q177_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q177-p0.1">OF THE GRATUITOUS GRACE CONSISTING IN WORDS (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q177-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q177-p2"> We must now consider the gratuitous grace that attaches to words; of which the Apostle says (
                  <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:8</a>): "To one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge." Under this head there are
                  two points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q177-p3"> (1) Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q177-p4"> (2) To whom is the grace becoming?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q177_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q177_A1-p0.1">Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a gratuitous grace does not attach to words. For grace is given for that which surpasses the faculty of
                     nature. But natural reason has devised the art of rhetoric whereby a man is able to speak so as to teach, please, and persuade,
                     as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 12). Now this belongs to the grace of words. Therefore it would seem that the grace
                     of words is not a gratuitous grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all grace pertains to the kingdom of God. But the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.20" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:20</a>): "The kingdom of God is not in speech, but in power." Therefore there is no gratuitous grace connected with words.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no grace is given through merit, since "if by grace, it is not now of works" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.6" target="asv">Rom. 11:6</a>). But the word is sometimes given to a man on his merits. For Gregory says (Moral. xi, 15) in explanation of 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.43" target="asv">Ps. 118:43</a>, "Take not Thou the word of truth utterly out of my mouth" that "the word of truth is that which Almighty God gives to them
                     that do it, and takes away from them that do it not." Therefore it would seem that the gift of the word
                     is not a gratuitous grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it behooves man to declare in words things pertaining to the virtue of faith, no less than those pertaining to the
                     gift of wisdom or of knowledge. Therefore if the word of wisdom and the word of knowledge are reckoned gratuitous graces,
                     the word of faith should likewise be placed among the gratuitous graces.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.6.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 6:5</a>): "A gracious tongue in a good man shall abound [Vulg.: 'aboundeth']." Now man's goodness is by grace. Therefore graciousness
                     in words is also by grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The gratuitous graces are given for the profit of others, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q177_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q111_A1.html">FS, Q[111], AA[1]</a>,4). Now the knowledge a man receives from God cannot be turned to another's profit, except by means of speech. And since
                     the Holy Ghost does not fail in anything that pertains to the profit of the Church, He provides also the members of the Church
                     with speech; to the effect that a man not only speaks so as to be understood by different
                     people, which pertains to the gift of tongues, but also speaks with effect, and this pertains to the grace "of the word."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p8"> This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct the intellect, and this is the case when a man speaks so as "to teach."
                     Secondly, in order to move the affections, so that a man willingly hearkens to the word of God. This is the case when a man
                     speaks so as "to please" his hearers, not indeed with a view to his own favor, but in order to draw them to listen to God's
                     word. Thirdly, in order that men may love that which is signified by the word, and desire to fulfill it,
                     and this is the case when a man so speaks as "to sway" his hearers. In order to effect this the Holy Ghost makes use of the
                     human tongue as of an instrument; but He it is Who perfects the work within. Hence Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost
                     (Hom. xxx in Ev.): "Unless the Holy Ghost fill the hearts of the hearers, in vain does the voice of the teacher resound in
                     the ears of the body."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as by a miracle God sometimes works in a more excellent way those things which nature also can work, so too the Holy
                     Ghost effects more excellently by the grace of words that which art can effect in a less efficient manner.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Apostle is speaking there of the word that relies on human eloquence without the power of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore he
                     says just before (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.19" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:19</a>): "I . . . will know, not the speech of them that are puffed up, but the power": and of himself he had already said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:4</a>): "My speech and my preaching was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the spirit and power."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above, the grace of the word is given to a man for the profit of others. Hence it is withdrawn sometimes through
                     the fault of the hearer, and sometimes through the fault of the speaker. The good works of either of them do not merit this
                     grace directly, but only remove the obstacles thereto. For sanctifying grace also is withdrawn on account of a person's fault,
                     and yet he does not merit it by his good works, which, however, remove the
                     obstacles to grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above, the grace of the word is directed to the profit of others. Now if a man communicates his faith to others
                     this is by the word of knowledge or of wisdom. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "to know how faith may profit the
                     godly and be defended against the ungodly, is apparently what the Apostle means by knowledge." Hence it was not necessary
                     for him to mention the word of faith, but it was sufficient for him to mention the
                     word of knowledge and of wisdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A1-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q177_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q178.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q177_A2-p0.1">Whether the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming to women?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming even to women. For teaching is pertinent to
                     this grace, as stated in the foregoing Article. Now it is becoming to a woman to teach; for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.4.3" target="asv">Prov. 4:3,4</a>): "I was an only son in the sight of my mother, and she taught me [*Vulg.: 'I was my father's son, tender, and as an only
                     son in the sight of my mother. And he taught me.']." Therefore this grace is
                     becoming to women.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the grace of prophecy is greater than the grace of the word, even as the contemplation of truth is greater than
                     its utterance. But prophecy is granted to women, as we read of Deborah (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Judg.4.4" target="asv">Judges 4:4</a>), and of Holda the prophetess, the wife of Sellum (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 22:14</a>), and of the four daughters of Philip (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Acts.21.9" target="asv">Acts 21:9</a>). Moreover the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p3.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:5</a>): "Every woman praying or prophesying,"
                     etc. Much more therefore would it seem that the grace of the word is becoming to a woman.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.4.10" target="asv">1 Pet. 4:10</a>): "As every man hath received grace ministering the same one to another." Now some women receive the grace of wisdom and
                     knowledge, which they cannot minister to others except by the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the word is becoming
                     to women.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.34" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:34</a>): "Let women keep silence in the churches," and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.12" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:12</a>): "I suffer not a woman to teach." Now this pertains especially to the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the word
                     is not becoming to women.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Speech may be employed in two ways: in one way privately, to one or a few, in familiar conversation, and in this respect
                     the grace of the word may be becoming to women; in another way, publicly, addressing oneself to the whole church, and this
                     is not permitted to women. First and chiefly, on account of the condition attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should
                     be subject to man, as appears from 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.16" target="asv">Gn. 3:16</a>. Now teaching and persuading publicly in the
                     church belong not to subjects but to the prelates (although men who are subjects may do these things if they be so commissioned,
                     because their subjection is not a result of their natural sex, as it is with women, but of some thing supervening by accident).
                     Secondly, lest men's minds be enticed to lust, for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.9.11" target="asv">Ecclus. 9:11</a>): "Her conversation burneth as fire." Thirdly, because as a rule women are not perfected in wisdom, so as to be fit to be
                     intrusted with
                     public teaching.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted speaks of private teaching whereby a father instructs his son.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The grace of prophecy consists in God enlightening the mind, on the part of which there is no difference of sex among men,
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q177_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.10" target="asv"> Col. 3:10,11, </a> "Putting on the new" man, "him who is renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of Him that created him, where there
                     is neither male nor female [*Vulg.: 'Neither Gentile nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian nor Scythian, bond
                     nor free.' Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q177_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q93_A6.html">FP, Q[93], A[6]</a>, ad 2 footnote]." Now the grace of the word pertains to the instruction of men among whom the difference of sex is found.
                     Hence the comparison fails.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The recipients of a divinely conferred grace administer it in different ways according to their various conditions. Hence
                     women, if they have the grace of wisdom or of knowledge, can administer it by teaching privately but not publicly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q177_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q177_A1.html"></a>
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            <div id="SS_Q178" class="div3">
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               <h3 id="SS_Q178-p0.1">OF THE GRACE OF MIRACLES (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q178-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q178-p2"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q178-p3"> We must next consider the grace of miracles, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q178-p4"> (1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q178-p5"> (2) To whom is it becoming?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q178_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q178.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q178_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q178_A1-p0.1">Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no gratuitous grace is directed to the working of miracles. For every grace puts something in the one
                     to whom it is given (Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q178_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">FS, Q[90], A[1]</a>). Now the working of miracles puts nothing in the soul of the man who receives it since miracles are wrought at the touch
                     even of a dead body. Thus we read (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 13:21</a>) that "some . . . cast the body into the sepulchre of Eliseus. And when it had touched
                     the bones of Eliseus, the man came to life, and stood upon his feet." Therefore the working of miracles does not belong to
                     a gratuitous grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:4, </a> "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit." Now the working of miracles is effected even by the unclean spirit,
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.24" target="asv"> Mat. 24:24, </a> "There shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders." Therefore it would seem that
                     the working of miracles does not belong to a gratuitous grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, miracles are divided into "signs," "wonders" or "portents," and "virtues." [*Cf. 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9, </a> where the Douay version renders 'virtus' by 'power.' The use of the word 'virtue' in the sense of a miracle is now obsolete,
                     and the generic term 'miracle' is elsewhere used in its stead: Cf. 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:10</a>, 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p4.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.28" target="asv">28</a>;
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p4.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.4" target="asv"> Heb. 2:4</a>;
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p4.5" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.22" target="asv"> Acts 2:22</a>]. Therefore it is unreasonable to reckon the
                     "working of miracles" a gratuitous grace, any more than the "working of signs" and "wonders."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the miraculous restoring to health is done by the power of God. Therefore the grace of healing should not be distinguished
                     from the working of miracles.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the working of miracles results from faith---either of the worker, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2, </a> "If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains," or of other persons for whose sake miracles are wrought,
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.58" target="asv"> Mat. 13:58, </a> "And He wrought not many miracles there, because of their unbelief." Therefore, if faith be reckoned a gratuitous grace,
                     it is superfluous to reckon in addition the working of
                     signs as another gratuitous grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:9,10</a>) says that among other gratuitous graces, "to another" is given "the grace of healing . . . to another, the working of miracles."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q178_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q177_A1.html">Q[177], A[1]</a>), the Holy Ghost provides sufficiently for the Church in matters profitable unto salvation, to which purpose the gratuitous
                     graces are directed. Now just as the knowledge which a man receives from God needs to be brought to the knowledge of others
                     through the gift of tongues and the grace of the word, so too the word uttered needs to be confirmed in order that it be rendered
                     credible. This is done by
                     the working of miracles, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.16.20" target="asv"> Mk. 16:20, </a> "And confirming the word with signs that followed": and reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive at the intelligible
                     truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore just as man led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some knowledge of
                     God through His natural effects, so is he brought to a certain degree of supernatural knowledge of the objects of faith by
                     certain supernatural effects which are called miracles.
                     Therefore the working of miracles belongs to a gratuitous grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as prophecy extends to whatever can be known supernaturally, so the working of miracles extends to all things that can
                     be done supernaturally; the cause whereof is the divine omnipotence which cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it
                     is impossible for the principle of working miracles to be a quality abiding as a habit in the soul. On the other hand, just
                     as the prophet's mind is moved by divine inspiration to know something
                     supernaturally, so too is it possible for the mind of the miracle worker to be moved to do something resulting in the miraculous
                     effect which God causes by His power. Sometimes this takes place after prayer, as when Peter raised to life the dead Tabitha
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.9.40" target="asv">Acts 9:40</a>): sometimes without any previous prayer being expressed, as when Peter by upbraiding the lying Ananias and Saphira delivered
                     them to death (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.4" target="asv">Acts 5:4</a>, 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.9" target="asv">9</a>). Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 30) that "the saints work
                     miracles, sometimes by authority, sometimes by prayer." In either case, however, God is the principal worker, for He uses
                     instrumentally either man's inward movement, or his speech, or some outward action, or again the bodily contact of even a
                     dead body. Thus when Josue had said as though authoritatively (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p9.4" href="./asv.html#Josh.10.12" target="asv">Josh. 10:12</a>): "Move not, O sun, toward Gabaon," it is said afterwards (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p9.5" href="./asv.html#Josh.10.14" target="asv">Josh. 10:14</a>): "There was not before or after so long a day, the Lord obeying
                     the voice of a man."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our Lord is speaking there of the miracles to be wrought at the time of Antichrist, of which the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9</a>) that the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." To
                     quote the words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 19), "it is a matter of debate whether they are called signs and lying wonders,
                     because he will deceive the senses of mortals by imaginary
                     visions, in that he will seem to do what he does not, or because, though they be real wonders, they will seduce into falsehood
                     them that believe." They are said to be real, because the things themselves will be real, just as Pharaoh's magicians made
                     real frogs and real serpents; but they will not be real miracles, because they will be done by the power of natural causes,
                     as stated in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q178_A1-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q114_A4.html">FP, Q[114], A[4]</a>; whereas the working of miracles which is ascribed to a
                     gratuitous grace, is done by God's power for man's profit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two things may be considered in miracles. One is that which is done: this is something surpassing the faculty of nature,
                     and in this respect miracles are called "virtues." The other thing is the purpose for which miracles are wrought, namely the
                     manifestation of something supernatural, and in this respect they are commonly called "signs": but on account of some excellence
                     they receive the name of "wonder" or "prodigy," as showing something from afar
                     [procul].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The "grace of healing" is mentioned separately, because by its means a benefit, namely bodily health, is conferred on man
                     in addition to the common benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely the bringing of men to the knowledge of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The working of miracles is ascribed to faith for two reasons. First, because it is directed to the confirmation of faith,
                     secondly, because it proceeds from God's omnipotence on which faith relies. Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith,
                     the grace of the word is necessary that people may be instructed in the faith, so too is the grace of miracles necessary that
                     people may be confirmed in their faith.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A1-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q178.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q178_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
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                  <a href="summa.SS_Q178_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q179.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q178_A2-p0.1">Whether the wicked can work miracles?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles. For miracles are wrought through prayer, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
                     Now the prayer of a sinner is not granted, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.9.31" target="asv"> Jn. 9:31, </a> "We know that God doth not hear sinners," and
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.28.9" target="asv"> Prov. 28:9, </a> "He that turneth away his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination." Therefore it would seem that the
                     wicked cannot work miracles.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, miracles are ascribed to faith, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.17.19" target="asv"> Mat. 17:19, </a> "If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed you shall say to this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove."
                     Now "faith without works is dead," according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.20" target="asv"> James 2:20, </a> so that, seemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore it would seem that the wicked, since they do not good
                     works, cannot work miracles.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, miracles are divine attestations, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.4" target="asv"> Heb. 2:4, </a> "God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and divers miracles": wherefore in the Church the canonization of certain
                     persons is based on the attestation of miracles. Now God cannot bear witness to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that
                     wicked men cannot work miracles.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the good are more closely united to God than the wicked. But the good do not all work miracles. Much less therefore
                     do the wicked.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2</a>): "If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." Now whosoever has not
                     charity is wicked, because "this gift alone of the Holy Ghost distinguishes the children of the kingdom from the children
                     of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18). Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can work miracles.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some miracles are not true but imaginary deeds, because they delude man by the appearance of that which is not; while others
                     are true deeds, yet they have not the character of a true miracle, because they are done by the power of some natural cause.
                     Both of these can be done by the demons, as stated above (A[1], ad 2).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p8"> True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of God, because God works them for man's benefit, and this in two ways:
                     in one way for the confirmation of truth declared, in another way in proof of a person's holiness, which God desires to propose
                     as an example of virtue. In the first way miracles can be wrought by any one who preaches the true faith and calls upon Christ's
                     name, as even the wicked do sometimes. In this way even the wicked can work miracles. Hence Jerome
                     commenting on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.22" target="asv">Mat. 7:22</a>, "Have not we prophesied in Thy name?" says: "Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons
                     are accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but to the invoking of Christ's name, that men may honor God,
                     by invoking Whom such great miracles are wrought."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p9"> In the second way miracles are not wrought except by the saints, since it is in proof of their holiness that miracles are
                     wrought during their lifetime or after death, either by themselves or by others. For we read (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.19.11" target="asv">Acts 19:11,12</a>) that "God wrought by the hand of Paul . . . miracles" and "even there were brought from his body to the sick, handkerchiefs
                     . . . and the diseases departed from them." In this way indeed there is nothing to prevent a sinner from
                     working miracles by invoking a saint; but the miracle is ascribed not to him, but to the one in proof of whose holiness such
                     things are done.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q178_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q83_A16.html">Q[83], A[16]</a>) when we were treating of prayer, the prayer of impetration relies not on merit but on God's mercy, which extends even to
                     the wicked, wherefore the prayers even of sinners are sometimes granted by God. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliv in Joan.)
                     that "the blind man spoke these words before he was anointed," that is, before he was perfectly enlightened; "since God does
                     hear sinners." When it is
                     said that the prayer of one who hears not the law is an abomination, this must be understood so far as the sinner's merit
                     is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for the spiritual welfare of the one who prays---as the publican was heard
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q178_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.14" target="asv">Lk. 18:14</a>)---or for the good of others and for God's glory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith without works is said to be dead, as regards the believer, who lives not, by faith, with the life of grace. But nothing
                     hinders a living thing from working through a dead instrument, as a man through a stick. It is thus that God works while employing
                     instrumentally the faith of a sinner.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose for which they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine
                     never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ's name which
                     they invoke, and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If they teach a true doctrine, sometimes they work
                     true miracles as confirming their teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness.
                     Hence Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79): "Magicians work miracles in one way, good Christians in another, wicked Christians
                     in another. Magicians by private compact with the demons, good Christians by their manifest righteousness, evil Christians
                     by the outward signs of righteousness."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79), "the reason why these are not granted to all holy men is lest by a most baneful
                     error the weak be deceived into thinking such deeds to imply greater gifts than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal
                     life is obtained."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p15"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q178_A2-p16"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q178_A1.html"></a>
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               <h3 id="SS_Q179-p0.1">OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q179-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q179-p2"> We must next consider active and contemplative life. This consideration will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into
                  active and contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the active life; (4) Of the comparison between the active
                  and the contemplative life.
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q179-p3"> Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q179-p4"> (1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q179-p5"> (2) Whether this is an adequate division?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q179_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q179.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q179_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q179_A1-p0.1">Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by
                     its essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "in living things to live is to be." Now the soul is the principle
                     of action and contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and contemplative,
                     or "speculative" and "practical," are differences of the intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while "to live" comes before "to understand,"
                     since "to live" comes first to living things through the vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore
                     life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the word "life" implies movement, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in
                     rest, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q179_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv"> Wis. 8:16</a>: "When I enter into my house, I shall repose myself with her." Therefore it would seem that life is unfittingly divided into
                     active and contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech.): "There is a twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the active
                     life and the contemplative."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking, those things are said to live whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which is
                     proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which is most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living
                     thing gives proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to which it is most inclined. Thus the life
                     of plants is said to consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation
                     and movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of
                     every man would seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on which he is most intent; thus especially does he wish "to
                     associate with his friends" (Ethic. ix, 12).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p7"> Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on
                     external actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Each thing's proper form that makes it actually "to be" is properly that thing's principle of operation. Hence "to live"
                     is, in living things, "to be," because living things through having "being" from their form, act in such and such a way.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Life in general is not divided into active and contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from having an
                     intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect and human life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from external movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of the
                     intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement; in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7)
                     that sensation and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as movement is defined "the act of a perfect thing." In
                     this way Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in
                     contemplation, namely, "straight," "circular," and "oblique" [*Cf.
                     <a id="SS_Q179_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A6.html"> Q[180], A[6]</a>].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q179.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q179_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q179_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q179_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q179_A2-p0.1">Whether life is adequately divided into active and contemplative?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that life is not adequately divided into active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that
                     there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of "pleasure," the "civil" which would seem to be the same as the active,
                     and the "contemplative" life. Therefore the division of life into active and contemplative would seem to be inadequate.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1,2,3,19) mentions three kinds of life, namely the life of "leisure" which pertains
                     to the contemplative, the "busy" life which pertains to the active, and a third "composed of both." Therefore it would seem
                     that life is inadequately divided into active and contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man's life is diversified according to the divers actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two
                     occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life should be divided into more kinds than the active and the
                     contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> These two lives are signified by the two wives of Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the two
                     hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37 [*Hom.
                     xiv in Ezech.]). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately
                     divided into active and contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 2), this division applies to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is
                     divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which
                     pertains to the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains to the practical or active intellect. Therefore
                     life too is adequately divided into active and contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the Philosopher
                     says (Ethic. Ethic. i, 5), it is the life "of a beast." Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into
                     active and contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore it is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale in white
                     and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise that which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture
                     one of the simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active element,
                     abounds.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the occupations of human actions, if directed to the requirements of the present life in accord with right reason, belong
                     to the active life which provides for the necessities of the present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the other
                     hand, they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life of pleasure, which is not comprised under the active
                     life. Those human occupations that are directed to the consideration of
                     truth belong to the contemplative life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q179_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q179_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q178_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q179_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q180" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q179_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q180-p0.1">OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q180-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q180-p2"> We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q180-p3"> (1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or also to the affections?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q180-p4"> (2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q180-p5"> (3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in several?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q180-p6"> (4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the contemplative life?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q180-p7"> (5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to the vision of God?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q180-p8"> (6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv);</p>
               <p id="SS_Q180-p9"> (7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q180-p10"> (8) Of the duration of contemplation.</p>
               <p id="SS_Q180-p11"></p>
               <div id="SS_Q180_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A1-p0.1">Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and pertains wholly to the intellect?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For
                     the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [*Ed Did. ia, 1]) that "the end of contemplation is truth." Now truth pertains wholly
                     to the intellect. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly regards the intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech.) that "Rachel, which is interpreted 'vision of the principle' [*Or
                     rather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from {rah} and {irzn}; Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.], signifies the contemplative
                     life." Now the vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the contemplative life belongs properly
                     to the intellect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it belongs to the contemplative life, "to rest from external action." Now
                     the affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing
                     to do with the appetitive power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God and our
                     neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator." Now desire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as
                     stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">FS, Q[25], A[2]</a>; 
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q26_A2.html">FS, Q[26], A[2]</a>). Therefore the contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or appetitive power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[179], A[1]) theirs is said to be the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth.
                     Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q12_A1.html">FS, Q[12], A[1]</a>), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence
                     of the action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of the exercise of that action it belongs
                     to the will, which moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A4.html">FP, Q[82], A[4]</a>; 
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">FS, Q[9], A[1]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p7"> Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of
                     the thing seen because, as it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.21" target="asv">Mat. 6:21</a>), "where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also," sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one acquires by observation.
                     Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative life to consist in the "love of God," inasmuch as through loving God we are aflame
                     to gaze on His beauty. And since
                     everyone delights when he obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life terminates in delight, which is seated
                     in the affective power, the result being that love also becomes more intense.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the very fact that truth is the end of contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable and delightful,
                     and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We are urged to the vision of the first principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.)
                     that "the contemplative life tramples on all cares and longs to see the face of its Creator."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The appetitive power moves not only the bodily members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to practice the
                     act of contemplation, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q180_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A2-p0.1">Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative
                     life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor with the whole mind." Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are
                     prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of God and of our neighbor, for "love . . . is the fulfilling
                     of the Law" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.10" target="asv">Rom. 13:10</a>). Therefore it would seem that the
                     moral virtues belong to the contemplative life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the contemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that
                     "the mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its Creator." Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness
                     of heart, which is a result of moral virtue [*Cf.
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q8_A7.html"> Q[8], A[7]</a>]. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.8" target="asv">Mat. 5:8</a>): "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God": and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.14" target="asv">Heb. 12:14</a>):
                     "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God." Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues
                     pertain to the contemplative life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life gives beauty to the soul," wherefore it is signified
                     by Rachel, of whom it is said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.29.17" target="asv">Gn. 29:17</a>) that she was "of a beautiful countenance." Now the beauty of the soul consists in the moral virtues, especially temperance,
                     as Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43,45,46). Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The moral virtues are directed to external actions. Now Gregory says (Moral. vi [*Hom. xiv in Ezech.; Cf. A[1], OBJ[3]])
                     that it belongs to the contemplative life "to rest from external action." Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the
                     contemplative life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong to
                     the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the Philosopher
                     states (Ethic. ii, 4), "knowledge," which pertains to the consideration of truth, "has little influence on the moral virtues":
                     wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to active but
                     not to contemplative happiness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p7"> On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein
                     the contemplative life essentially consists, is hindered both by the impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul's
                     intention from intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral virtues curb the impetuosity of
                     the passions, and quell the disturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong dispositively to the
                     contemplative life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the contemplative life has its motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this respect the love of God and our neighbor
                     is requisite to the contemplative life. Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of a thing, but dispose and perfect
                     it. Wherefore it does not follow that the moral virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the virtues that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of the
                     reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.32.17" target="asv"> Is. 32:17, </a> "The work of justice shall be peace": since he who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of quarrels and disturbances.
                     Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life by causing peace and
                     cleanness of heart.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Beauty, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A2.html">Q[145], A[2]</a>), consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is found radically in the reason; because both the
                     light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence since the contemplative
                     life consists in an act of the reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.2" target="asv">Wis.
                        8:2
                     </a>) of the contemplation of wisdom: "I became a lover of her beauty."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p11"> On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation, in so far as they participate in the order of reason;
                     and especially is it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially darken the light of reason. Hence
                     it is that the virtue of chastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal pleasures most of all weigh
                     the mind down to sensible objects, as Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q180_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A3-p0.1">Whether there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl.
                     i, 3,4] distinguishes between "contemplation," "meditation," and "cogitation." Yet all these apparently pertain to contemplation.
                     Therefore it would seem that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.18" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:18</a>): "But we . . . beholding [speculantes] the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same clarity [*Vulg.:
                     'into the same image from glory to glory.']." Now this belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore in addition to the three
                     aforesaid, vision [speculatio] belongs to the contemplative life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "the first and greatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty." Now according
                     to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear. Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite
                     for the contemplative life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "Prayer," "reading," and "meditation" [*Hugh of St. Victor, Alleg. in N.T. iii, 4] are said to belong to the contemplative
                     life. Again, "hearing" belongs to the contemplative life: since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is
                     signified) "sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.39" target="asv">Lk. 10:39</a>). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the contemplative life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Life signifies here the operation on which a man is chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the contemplative
                     life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative lives.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We are now speaking of the contemplative life as applicable to man. Now according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) between man
                     and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the truth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception
                     of a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly, then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it is
                     finally completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives
                     its unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this final act. Some of these pertain to the reception of principles,
                     from which it proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned with deducing from the principles, the truth, the
                     knowledge of which is sought; and the last and crowning act is the contemplation itself of the truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Richard of St. Victor "cogitation" would seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a person
                     intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance
                     of certain effects, but also the imaginations. and again the reason's discussion of the various signs or of anything that
                     conduces to the truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv,
                     7), cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect. "Meditation" would seem to be the process of reason from
                     certain principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and "consideration" has the same meaning, according to Bernard
                     (De Consid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), every operation of the intellect may be called
                     "consideration." But "contemplation" regards the simple act of gazing on the truth; wherefore Richard says again (De Grat.
                     Contempl. i, 4) that "contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze; meditation is the survey
                     of the mind while occupied in searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is prone to wander."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to a gloss [*Cf. De Trin. xv, 8] of Augustine on this passage, "beholding" [speculatio] denotes "seeing in a mirror
                     [speculo], not from a watch-tower [specula]." Now to see a thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its likeness
                     is reflected. Hence "beholding" would seem to be reducible to meditation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the apprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it results from
                     the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that contemplation terminates in the affections.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways. First, by means of things received from another. In this way, as regards
                     the things he receives from God, he needs "prayer," according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.7" target="asv"> Wis. 7:7, </a> "I called upon" God, "and the spirit of wisdom came upon me": while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs
                     "hearing," in so far as he receives from the spoken word, and "reading," in so far as he receives from the tradition
                     of Holy Writ. Secondly, he needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he requires "meditation."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A3-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q180_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A4-p0.1">Whether the contemplative life consists in the mere contemplation of God, or also in the consideration of any truth whatever?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of
                     any truth. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.138.14" target="asv">Ps. 138:14</a>): "Wonderful are Thy works, and my soul knoweth right well." Now the knowledge of God's works is effected by any contemplation
                     of the truth. Therefore it would seem that it pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate not only the divine truth,
                     but also any other.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "contemplation consists in admiration first of God's majesty, secondly of His
                     judgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His promises." Now of these four the first alone regards the divine truth,
                     and the other three pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of the
                     divine truth, but also in the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl. i, 6] distinguishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to
                     "the imagination alone," and consists in thinking of corporeal things. The second is in "the imagination guided by reason,"
                     and consists in considering the order and disposition of sensible objects. The third is in "the reason based on the imagination";
                     when, to wit, from the consideration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The
                     fourth is in "the reason and conducted by the reason," when the mind is intent on things invisible of which the imagination
                     has no cognizance. The fifth is "above the reason," but not contrary to reason, when by divine revelation we become cognizant
                     of things that cannot be comprehended by the human reason. The sixth is "above reason and contrary to reason"; when, to wit,
                     by the divine enlightening we know things that seem contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of the mystery of the
                     Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to pertain to the divine truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth regards
                     not only the divine truth, but also that which is considered in creatures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the contemplative life the contemplation of truth is sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is
                     a perfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life consists in the contemplation of any truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation we seek the principle which is God."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, a thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily, or dispositively. That which belongs
                     principally to the contemplative life is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this contemplation is the end of the
                     whole human life. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "the contemplation of God is promised us as being the goal of
                     all our actions and the everlasting
                     perfection of our joys." This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come, when we shall see God face to face, wherefore
                     it will make us perfectly happy: whereas now the contemplation of the divine truth is competent to us imperfectly, namely
                     "through a glass" and "in a dark manner" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate beatitude, which begins now and will be continued in the life to come; wherefore
                     the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places man's
                     ultimate happiness in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p8"> Since, however, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation of God Himself, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv"> Rom. 1:20, </a> "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," it follows that the contemplation
                     of the divine effects also belongs to the contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby to the knowledge of God. Hence
                     Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxix) that "in the study of creatures we must not exercise an
                     empty and futile curiosity, but should make them the stepping-stone to things unperishable and everlasting."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p9"> Accordingly it is clear from what has been said (
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2,3) that four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life; first, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts
                     exclusive of contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects; fourthly, the complement of all which is the contemplation
                     of the divine truth itself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> David sought the knowledge of God's works, so that he might be led by them to God; wherefore he says elsewhere (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.142.5" target="asv">Ps. 142:5,6</a>): "I meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By considering the divine judgments man is guided to the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the divine
                     benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God's mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to
                     be vouchsafed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by means of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step consists
                     in the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step consists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects;
                     the third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible things; the fourth is the absolute consideration
                     of the intelligible objects to which one has attained by means of sensibles; the
                     fifth is the contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable by means of sensibles, but which the reason
                     is able to grasp; the sixth step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the reason can neither discover nor grasp,
                     which pertain to the sublime contemplation of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately perfected.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is the divine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect in relation to
                     the divine truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A4-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q180_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A5-p0.1">Whether in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence. For,
                     as stated in 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.30" target="asv">Gn. 32:30</a>, Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face, and my soul has been saved." Now the vision of God's face is the vision of the
                     Divine essence. Therefore it would seem that in the present life one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in His
                     essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "contemplative men withdraw within themselves in order to explore spiritual things,
                     nor do they ever carry with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if these follow them they prudently drive them away:
                     but being desirous of seeing the incomprehensible light, they suppress all the images of their limited comprehension, and
                     through longing to reach what is above them, they overcome that which they are." Now man is
                     not hindered from seeing the Divine essence, which is the incomprehensible light, save by the necessity of turning to corporeal
                     phantasms. Therefore it would seem that the contemplation of the present life can extend to the vision of the incomprehensible
                     light in its essence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 35): "All creatures are small to the soul that sees its Creator: wherefore when the man
                     of God," the blessed Benedict, to wit, "saw a fiery globe in the tower and angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could
                     only see such things by the light of God." Now the blessed Benedict was still in this life. Therefore the contemplation of
                     the present life can extend to the vision of the essence of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "As long as we live in this mortal flesh, no one reaches such a height of contemplation
                     as to fix the eyes of his mind on the ray itself of incomprehensible light."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), "no one seeing God lives this mortal life wherein the bodily senses have their
                     play: and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his body, or by withdrawing from his
                     carnal senses, he is not caught up into that vision." This has been carefully discussed above (Q[175], AA[4],5), where we
                     spoke of rapture, and in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">FP, Q[12], A[2]</a>, where we treated of the
                     vision of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p7"> Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways. First, with regard to act, that is to say by actually
                     making use of the bodily senses, and thus contemplation in the present life can nowise attain to the vision of God's essence.
                     Secondly, one may be in this life potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say, when the soul is united to the mortal
                     body as its form, yet so as to make use neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the imagination, as
                     happens in rapture; and in this way the contemplation of the present life can attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
                     Consequently the highest degree of contemplation in the present life is that which Paul had in rapture, whereby he was in
                     a middle state between the present life and the life to come.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Ep. i ad Caium. Monach.), "if anyone seeing God, understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but something
                     belonging to God." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "By no means is God seen now in His glory; but the soul sees something
                     of lower degree, and is thereby refreshed so that afterwards it may attain to the glory of vision." Accordingly the words
                     of Jacob, "I saw God face to face" do not imply that he saw God's essence,
                     but that he saw some shape [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html">FP, Q[12], A[11]</a>, ad 1], imaginary of course, wherein God spoke to him. Or, "since we know a man by his face, by the face of God he signified
                     his knowledge of Him," according to a gloss of Gregory on the same passage.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the present state of life human contemplation is impossible without phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see
                     the intelligible species in the phantasms, as the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 7). Yet intellectual knowledge does not
                     consist in the phantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them the purity of the intelligible truth: and this not only
                     in natural knowledge, but also in that which we obtain by revelation. For Dionysius
                     says (Coel. Hier. i) that "the Divine glory shows us the angelic hierarchies under certain symbolic figures, and by its power
                     we are brought back to the single ray of light," i.e. to the simple knowledge of the intelligible truth. It is in this sense
                     that we must understand the statement of Gregory that "contemplatives do not carry along with them the shadows of things corporeal,"
                     since their contemplation is not fixed on them, but on the consideration of the intelligible truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By these words Gregory does not imply that the blessed Benedict, in that vision, saw God in His essence, but he wishes to
                     show that because "all creatures are small to him that sees God," it follows that all things can easily be seen through the
                     enlightenment of the Divine light. Wherefore he adds: "For however little he may see of the Creator's light, all created things
                     become petty to him."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A5-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q180_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A6-p0.1">Whether the operation of contemplation is fittingly divided into a threefold movement, circular, straight and oblique?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the operation of contemplation is unfittingly divided into a threefold movement, "circular," "straight,"
                     and "oblique" (Div. Nom. iv). For contemplation pertains exclusively to rest, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv"> Wis. 8:16, </a> "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her." Now movement is opposed to rest. Therefore the operations of the
                     contemplative life should not be described as movements.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the action of the contemplative life pertains to the intellect, whereby man is like the angels. Now Dionysius describes
                     these movements as being different in the angels from what they are in the soul. For he says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "circular"
                     movement in the angel is "according to his enlightenment by the beautiful and the good." On the other hand, he assigns the
                     circular movement of the soul to several things: the first of which is the
                     "withdrawal of the soul into itself from externals"; the second is "a certain concentration of its powers, whereby it is rendered
                     free of error and of outward occupation"; and the third is "union with those things that are above it." Again, he describes
                     differently their respective straight movements. For he says that the straight movement of the angel is that by which he proceeds
                     to the care of those things that are beneath him. On the other hand, he describes the straight movement of the soul
                     as being twofold: first, "its progress towards things that are near it"; secondly, "its uplifting from external things to
                     simple contemplation." Further, he assigns a different oblique movement to each. For he assigns the oblique movement of the
                     angels to the fact that "while providing for those who have less they remain unchanged in relation to God": whereas he assigns
                     the oblique movement of the soul to the fact that "the soul is enlightened in Divine knowledge by reasoning and discoursing."
                     Therefore it would seem that the operations of contemplation are unfittingly assigned according to the ways mentioned above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Richard of St. Victor (De Contempl. i, 5) mentions many other different movements in likeness to the birds of the
                     air. "For some of these rise at one time to a great height, at another swoop down to earth, and they do so repeatedly; others
                     fly now to the right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards or lag behind many times; others fly in a circle
                     now more now less extended; and others remain suspended almost immovably in one place."
                     Therefore it would seem that there are only three movements of contemplation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q119_A1.html">Q[119], A[1]</a>, ad 3), the operation of the intellect, wherein contemplation essentially consists, is called a movement, in so far as movement
                     is the act of a perfect thing, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 1). Since, however, it is through sensible objects
                     that we come to the knowledge of intelligible things, and since sensible operations do not take place without movement, the
                     result is that even
                     intelligible operations are described as movements, and are differentiated in likeness to various movements. Now of bodily
                     movements, local movements are the most perfect and come first, as proved in Phys. viii, 7; wherefore the foremost among intelligible
                     operations are described by being likened to them. These movements are of three kinds; for there is the "circular" movement,
                     by which a thing moves uniformly round one point as center, another is the "straight" movement, by which a thing goes
                     from one point to another; the third is "oblique," being composed as it were of both the others. Consequently, in intelligible
                     operations, that which is simply uniform is compared to circular movement; the intelligible operation by which one proceeds
                     from one point to another is compared to the straight movement; while the intelligible operation which unites something of
                     uniformity with progress to various points is compared to the oblique movement.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> External bodily movements are opposed to the quiet of contemplation, which consists in rest from outward occupations: but
                     the movements of intellectual operations belong to the quiet of contemplation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is like the angels in intellect generically, but the intellective power is much higher in the angel than in man. Consequently
                     these movements must be ascribed to souls and angels in different ways, according as they are differently related to uniformity.
                     For the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two respects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth from
                     the variety of composite objects; secondly, because it understands the
                     truth of intelligible objects not discursively, but by simple intuition. On the other hand, the intellect of the soul acquires
                     intelligible truth from sensible objects, and understands it by a certain discoursing of the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p9"> Wherefore Dionysius assigns the "circular" movement of the angels to the fact that their intuition of God is uniform and
                     unceasing, having neither beginning nor end: even as a circular movement having neither beginning nor end is uniformly around
                     the one same center. But on the part of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack of uniformity needs to
                     be removed. First, that which arises from the variety of external things: this is removed by the soul
                     withdrawing from externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the circular movement of the soul is "the soul's
                     withdrawal into itself from external objects." Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires to be removed from the soul,
                     and this is owing to the discoursing of reason. This is done by directing all the soul's operations to the simple contemplation
                     of the intelligible truth, and this is indicated by his saying in the second place that "the soul's intellectual powers must
                     be
                     uniformly concentrated," in other words that discoursing must be laid aside and the soul's gaze fixed on the contemplation
                     of the one simple truth. In this operation of the soul there is no error, even as there is clearly no error in the understanding
                     of first principles which we know by simple intuition. Afterwards these two things being done, he mentions thirdly the uniformity
                     which is like that of the angels, for then all things being laid aside, the soul continues in the contemplation of
                     God alone. This he expresses by saying: "Then being thus made uniform unitedly," i.e. conformably, "by the union of its powers,
                     it is conducted to the good and the beautiful." The "straight" movement of the angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one
                     thing to another by considering them, but only to the order of his providence, namely to the fact that the higher angel enlightens
                     the lower angels through the angels that are intermediate. He indicates this when he says: "The angel's movement
                     takes a straight line when he proceeds to the care of things subject to him, taking in his course whatever things are direct,"
                     i.e. in keeping with the dispositions of the direct order. Whereas he ascribes the "straight" movement in the soul to the
                     soul's proceeding from exterior sensibles to the knowledge of intelligible objects. The "oblique" movement in the angels he
                     describes as being composed of the straight and circular movements, inasmuch as their care for those beneath them is in
                     accordance with their contemplation of God: while the "oblique" movement in the soul he also declares to be partly straight
                     and partly circular, in so far as in reasoning it makes use of the light received from God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These varieties of movement that are taken from the distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and backwards,
                     and from varying circles, are all comprised under either straight and oblique movement, because they all denote discursions
                     of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or from the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains,
                     from above to below: if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to
                     left; if from the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and forwards; if it be about accidents that surround a thing near
                     at hand or far remote, the movement will be circular. The discoursing of reason from sensible to intelligible objects, if
                     it be according to the order of natural reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if it be according to the Divine enlightenment,
                     it will belong to the oblique movement as explained above (ad 2). That alone which he describes as immobility belongs
                     to the circular movement.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p11"> Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of contemplation with much greater fulness and depth.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A6-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q180_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A7-p0.1">Whether there is delight in contemplation?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no delight in contemplation. For delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation
                     resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there is no delight in contemplation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all strife and struggle is a hindrance to delight. Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory
                     says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when the soul strives to contemplate God, it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost
                     overcomes, because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the incomprehensible light, and at another time it
                     almost succumbs, because even while tasting, it fails." Therefore there is no delight in
                     contemplation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delight is the result of a perfect operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Now the contemplation of wayfarers is imperfect,
                     according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12, </a> "We see now through a glass in a dark manner." Therefore seemingly there is no delight in the contemplative life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a lesion of the body is an obstacle to delight. Now contemplation causes a lesion of the body; wherefore it is stated
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.32" target="asv">Gn. 32</a>) that after Jacob had said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.30" target="asv">Gn. 32:30</a>), "'I have seen God face to face' . . . he halted on his foot (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.31" target="asv">Gn. 32:31</a>) . . . because he touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p5.4" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.32" target="asv">Gn. 32:32</a>). Therefore seemingly there is no delight in contemplation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written of the contemplation of wisdom (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv
                     in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There may be delight in any particular contemplation in two ways. First by reason of the operation itself [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A5.html">FS, Q[3], A[5]</a>], because each individual delights in the operation which befits him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation
                     of the truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal: the result being that "all men naturally desire to
                     know," so that consequently they delight in the knowledge of
                     truth. And more delightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom and knowledge, the result of which is
                     that he contemplates without difficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of its object, in so far as
                     one contemplates that which one loves; even as bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable in itself,
                     but because one sees a person whom one loves. Since, then, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the contemplation of
                     God, of which charity is the motive, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2, ad 1), it follows that there is delight in the contemplative life, not only by reason of the contemplation itself, but
                     also by reason of the Divine love.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p8"> In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all human delight, both because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q180_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A5.html">FS, Q[31], A[5]</a>), when we were treating of the passions, and because the love whereby God is loved out of charity surpasses all love. Hence
                     it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.9" target="asv">Ps. 33:9</a>): "O taste and see that the Lord is sweet."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the contemplative life consists chiefly in an act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since
                     it is through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God. And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows
                     that the term also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the appetite, since one delights in seeing the object
                     loved, and the very delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love.
                     Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when we see one whom we love, we are so aflame as to love him more." And
                     this is the ultimate perfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be not only seen but also loved.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of an external thing, hinders delight in that thing. For a man delights not
                     in a thing against which he strives: but in that for which he strives; when he has obtained it, other things being equal,
                     he delights yet more: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3) that "the more peril there was in the battle, the greater
                     the joy in the triumph." But there is no strife or struggle in contemplation on the
                     part of the truth which we contemplate, though there is on the part of our defective understanding and our corruptible body
                     which drags us down to lower things, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.15" target="asv"> Wis. 9:15, </a> "The corruptible body ss a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things."
                     Hence it is that when man attains to the contemplation of truth, he loves it yet more, while he hates the more his own deficiency
                     and the weight of his corruptible
                     body, so as to say with the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.24" target="asv">Rom. 7:24</a>): "Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Wherefore Gregory say (Hom. xiv in Ezech.):
                     "When God is once known by desire and understanding, He withers all carnal pleasure in us."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The contemplation of God in this life is imperfect in comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like manner the
                     delight of the wayfarer's contemplation is imperfect as compared with the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it
                     is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A7-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.9" target="asv">Ps. 35:9</a>): "Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure." Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to
                     be had by wayfarers is imperfect, it is more
                     delightful than all other contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that which is contemplated. Hence
                     the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. i, 5): "We may happen to have our own little theories about those sublime beings and
                     godlike substances, and though we grasp them but feebly, nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they give us more
                     delight than any of those things that are round about us": and Gregory says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The
                     contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries the soul away above itself, it opens heaven and discovers
                     the spiritual world to the eyes of the mind."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot, "because we need to grow weak in the love of the world ere we wax strong
                     in the love of God," as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.). "Thus when we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot
                     sound while the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans only on that foot which is sound."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A7-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q180_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q180_A8-p0.1">Whether the contemplative life is continuous?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contemplative life is not continuous. For the contemplative life consists essentially in things pertaining
                     to the intellect. Now all the intellectual perfections of this life will be made void, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8, </a> "Whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed." Therefore the contemplative
                     life is made void.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man tastes the sweetness of contemplation by snatches and for a short time only: wherefore Augustine says (Confess.
                     x, 40), "Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in my inmost soul, to a strange sweetness . . . yet through my grievous
                     weight I sink down again." Again, Gregory commenting on the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.4.15" target="asv"> Job 4:15, </a> "When a spirit passed before me," says (Moral. v, 33): "The mind does not remain long at rest in the
                     sweetness of inward contemplation, for it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the very immensity of the light." Therefore
                     the contemplative life is not continuous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is not connatural to man cannot be continuous. Now the contemplative life, according to the Philosopher
                     (Ethic. x, 7), "is better than the life which is according to man." Therefore seemingly the contemplative life is not continuous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> our Lord said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q180_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.42" target="asv">Lk. 10:42</a>): "Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her," since as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.), "the
                     contemplative life begins here so that it may be perfected in our heavenly home."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be described as continuous in two ways: first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is evident
                     that in regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and unchangeable
                     things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for there is nothing contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in
                     Topic. i, 13. But even in our regard contemplative life is continuous---both
                     because it is competent to us in respect of the incorruptible part of the soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it can endure
                     after this life---and because in the works of the contemplative life we work not with our bodies, so that we are the more
                     able to persevere in the works thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. x, 7).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The manner of contemplation is not the same here as in heaven: yet the contemplative life is said to remain by reason of
                     charity, wherein it has both its beginning and its end. Gregory speaks in this sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The contemplative
                     life begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, because the fire of love which begins to burn here is aflame
                     with a yet greater love when we see Him Whom we love."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No action can last long at its highest pitch. Now the highest point of contemplation is to reach the uniformity of Divine
                     contemplation, according to Dionysius [*Cf. Coel. Hier. iii], and as we have stated above (A[6], ad 2). Hence although contemplation
                     cannot last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as regards the other contemplative acts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher declares the contemplative life to be above man, because it befits us "so far as there is in us something
                     divine" (Ethic. x, 7), namely the intellect, which is incorruptible and impassible in itself, wherefore its act can endure
                     longer.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q180_A8-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q179_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q181" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q180_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q181-p0.1">OF THE ACTIVE LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q181-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q181-p2"> We must now consider the active life, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q181-p3"> (1) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active life?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q181-p4"> (2) Whether prudence pertains to the active life?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q181-p5"> (3) Whether teaching pertains to the active life?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q181-p6"> (4) Of the duration of the active life.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q181_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q181_A1-p0.1">Whether all the actions of the moral virtues pertain to the active life?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life. For seemingly the active life regards
                     only our relations with other persons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the active life is to give bread to the
                     hungry," and after mentioning many things that regard our relations with other people he adds finally, "and to give to each
                     and every one whatever he needs." Now we are directed in our relations to others, not by
                     all the acts of moral virtues, but only by those of justice and its parts, as stated above (Q[58], AA[2],8; 
                     <a id="SS_Q181_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A2.html">FS, Q[60], AA[2]</a>,3). Therefore the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that Lia who was blear-eyed but fruitful signifies the active life: which "being
                     occupied with work, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbor both by word and example to its imitation it begets a
                     numerous offspring of good deeds." Now this would seem to belong to charity, whereby we love our neighbor, rather than to
                     the moral virtues. Therefore seemingly the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to the active
                     life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q181_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A2.html">Q[180], A[2]</a>), the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and perfection belong to the same thing. Therefore
                     it would seem that the moral virtues do not pertain to the active life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 15): "In the active life all vices must first of all be extirpated by the practice of good
                     works, in order that in the contemplative life the mind's eye being purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine
                     light." Now all vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral virtues. Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain
                     to the active life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q181_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q179_A1.html">Q[179], A[1]</a>) the active and the contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of men intent on different ends: one
                     of which occupations is the consideration of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative life, while the other is
                     external work to which the active life is directed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed chiefly, not to the contemplation of truth but to operation. Wherefore
                     the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that "for virtue knowledge is of little or no avail." Hence it is clear that the moral
                     virtues belong essentially to the active life; for which reason the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 8) subordinates the moral virtues
                     to active happiness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The chief of the moral virtues is justice by which one man is directed in his relations towards another, as the Philosopher
                     proves (Ethic. v, 1). Hence the active life is described with reference to our relations with other people, because it consists
                     in these things, not exclusively, but principally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is possible, by the acts of all the moral virtues, for one to direct one's neighbor to good by example: and this is what
                     Gregory here ascribes to the active life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of another virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter virtue,
                     so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things
                     are comprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good
                     in themselves, and not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral
                     virtues belong to the active life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p11"> It may also be replied, however, that the active life is a disposition to the contemplative life.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q181_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q181_A2-p0.1">Whether prudence pertains to the active life?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the active life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the cognitive
                     power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power. Now prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive
                     power. Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the "active life being occupied with work, sees less," wherefore it is signified
                     by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that one may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore
                     it seems that prudence does not pertain to the active life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence stands between the moral and the intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the active
                     life, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q181_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q181_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, so do the intellectual virtues pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that prudence pertains neither
                     to the active nor to the contemplative life, but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes mention (De Civ.
                     Dei xix, 2,3,19).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that prudence pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 3; 
                     <a id="SS_Q181_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">FS, Q[18], A[6]</a>), if one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, especially in moral matters, to the species of the thing to
                     which it is directed: for instance "he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer," according
                     to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2). Now it is evident that the knowledge of prudence is directed to the works of the moral virtues
                     as its end,
                     since it is "right reason applied to action" (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends of the moral virtues are the principles of prudence,
                     as the Philosopher says in the same book. Accordingly, as it was stated above (A[1], ad 3) that the moral virtues in one who
                     directs them to the quiet of contemplation belong to the contemplative life, so the knowledge of prudence, which is of itself
                     directed to the works of the moral virtues, belongs directly to the active life, provided we take prudence in its
                     proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p7"> If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any kind of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain
                     part thereof, belongs to the contemplative life. In this sense Tully (De Offic. i, 5) says that "the man who is able most
                     clearly and quickly to grasp the truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be considered most prudent and wise."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moral works take their species from their end, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q181_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html">FS, Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6), wherefore the knowledge pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the very knowledge of truth;
                     whereas the knowledge of prudence, through having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the active life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> External occupation makes a man see less in intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with which the
                     works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the external occupation of the active life enables a man to see more
                     clearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence, both on account of experience, and on account of the
                     mind's attention, since "brains avail when the mind is attentive" as Sallust observes
                     [*Bell. Catilin., LI].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence is said to be intermediate between the intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same subject
                     as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same matter as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is intermediate
                     between the active and the contemplative life as regards the things about which it is occupied, because it is occupied sometimes
                     with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with eternal things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q181_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q181_A3-p0.1">Whether teaching is a work of the active or of the contemplative life?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that teaching is a work not of the active but of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.)
                     that "the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods, at least through a glass, proclaim them to their brethren,
                     whose minds they inflame with love for their hidden beauty." But this pertains to teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of
                     the contemplative life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, act and habit would seem to be referable to the same kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the Philosopher
                     says (Metaph. i, 1) that "to be able to teach is an indication of knowledge." Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain
                     to the contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to the contemplative life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of the contemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another,
                     belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it belongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another,
                     by teaching him, of the truth we have meditated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words of wisdom."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The act of teaching has a twofold object. For teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the interior
                     concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or object of the interior concept; and as to this object teaching
                     belongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs to the active life, when a man conceives
                     a truth inwardly, so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the
                     contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine
                     says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): "Let them choose for themselves the better part," namely the contemplative life, "let them
                     be busy with the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with salutary knowledge," thus stating clearly
                     that teaching belongs to the contemplative life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p7"> The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this
                     object all doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine as to its matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration and
                     love of truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Habit and act have a common object. Hence this argument clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains
                     to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in so far as he is able to express his interior concept in words,
                     so as to bring another man to understand the truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who prays for another does nothing towards the man for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible truth;
                     whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by external action. Hence the comparison fails.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q181_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q181_A4-p0.1">Whether the active life remains after this life?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the active life remains after this life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life,
                     as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q181_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q181_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the moral virtues endure after this life according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9). Therefore the active life remains
                     after this life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, teaching others belongs to the active life, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q181_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q181_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. But in the life to come when "we shall be like the angels," teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is in the angels
                     of whom one "enlightens, cleanses, and perfects" [*Coel. Hier. iii, viii] another, which refers to the "receiving of knowledge,"
                     according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it would seem that the active life remains after this
                     life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more lasting a thing is in itself, the more is it able to endure after this life. But the active life is seemingly
                     more lasting in itself: for Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that "we can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are nowise
                     able to maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative life." Therefore the active life is much more able than the contemplative
                     to endure after this life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active life ends with this world, but the contemplative life begins here, to be perfected
                     in our heavenly home."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q181_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q181_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the active life has its end in external actions: and if these be referred to the quiet of contemplation, for that very reason
                     they belong to the contemplative life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of external actions will cease,
                     and if there be any external actions at all, these will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as Augustine says
                     at the end of De Civitate Dei xxii, 30,
                     "there we shall rest and we shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and praise." And he had said before (De Civ. Dei
                     xxii, 30) that "there God will be seen without end, loved without wearying, praised without tiring: such will be the occupation
                     of all, the common love, the universal activity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q181_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q136_A1.html">Q[136], A[1]</a>, ad 1), the moral virtues will remain not as to those actions which are about the means, but as to the actions which are
                     about the end. Such acts are those that conduce to the quiet of contemplation, which in the words quoted above Augustine denotes
                     by "rest," and this rest excludes not only outward disturbances but also the inward disturbance of the passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The contemplative life, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q181_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A4.html">Q[180], A[4]</a>), consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, and as to this, one angel does not teach another, since according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q181_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.10" target="asv"> Mat. 18:10, </a> "the little ones' angels," who belong to the lower order, "always see the face of the Father"; and so, in the life to come,
                     no man will teach another of God, but "we shall" all "see Him as He is" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q181_A4-p8.3" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn.
                        3:2
                     </a>). This is in keeping with the saying of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q181_A4-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.34" target="asv"> Jeremiah 31:34</a>: "They shall teach no more every man his neighbor . . . saying: Know the Lord: for all shall know me, from the least of them
                     even to the greatest."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p9"> But as regards things pertaining to the "dispensation of the mysteries of God," one angel teaches another by cleansing, enlightening,
                     and perfecting him: and thus they have something of the active life so long as the world lasts, from the fact that they are
                     occupied in administering to the creatures below them. This is signified by the fact that Jacob saw angels "ascending" the
                     ladder---which refers to contemplation---and "descending" ---which refers to action. Nevertheless, as
                     Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3), "they do not wander abroad from the Divine vision, so as to be deprived of the joys of inward
                     contemplation." Hence in them the active life does not differ from the contemplative life as it does in us for whom the works
                     of the active life are a hindrance to contemplation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p10"> Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the administering to lower creatures, for this is competent to
                     us not by reason of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of our seeing God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That the durability of the active life in the present state surpasses the durability of the contemplative life arises not
                     from any property of either life considered in itself, but from our own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights
                     of contemplation by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral. ii, 3) that "the mind through its very weakness being
                     repelled from that immense height recoils on itself."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q181_A4-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182.html"></a>
               </div>
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               <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q182" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q181_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q182-p0.1">OF THE ACTIVE LIFE IN COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q182-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q182-p2"> We must now consider the active life in comparison with the contemplative life, under which head there are four points of
                  inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q182-p3"> (1) Which of them is of greater import or excellence?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q182-p4"> (2) Which of them has the greater merit?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q182-p5"> (3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q182-p6"> (4) Of their order.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q182_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q182_A1-p0.1">Whether the active life is more excellent than the contemplative?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative. For "that which belongs to better men would
                     seem to be worthier and better," as the Philosopher says (Top. iii, 1). Now the active life belongs to persons of higher rank,
                     namely prelates, who are placed in a position of honor and power; wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "in
                     our actions we must not love honor or power in this life." Therefore it would seem that the
                     active life is more excellent than the contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all habits and acts, direction belongs to the more important; thus the military art, being the more important,
                     directs the art of the bridle-maker [*Ethic. i, 1]. Now it belongs to the active life to direct and command the contemplative,
                     as appears from the words addressed to Moses (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.19.21" target="asv">Ex. 19:21</a>), "Go down and charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass the" fixed "limits to see the Lord." Therefore the
                     active life is
                     more excellent than the contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man should be taken away from a greater thing in order to be occupied with lesser things: for the Apostle says
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:31</a>): "Be zealous for the better gifts." Now some are taken away from the state of the contemplative life to the occupations
                     of the active life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the state of prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the
                     active life is more excellent than the contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.42" target="asv">Lk. 10:42</a>): "Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her." Now Mary figures the contemplative life. Therefore
                     the contemplative life is more excellent than the active.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing prevents certain things being more excellent in themselves, whereas they are surpassed by another in some respect.
                     Accordingly we must reply that the contemplative life is simply more excellent than the active: and the Philosopher proves
                     this by eight reasons (Ethic. x, 7,8). The first is, because the contemplative life becomes man according to that which is
                     best in him, namely the intellect, and according to its proper objects, namely things
                     intelligible; whereas the active life is occupied with externals. Hence Rachael, by whom the contemplative life is signified,
                     is interpreted "the vision of the principle," [*Or rather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from {rah} and {irzn}; Cf.
                     Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.] whereas as Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) the active life is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. The
                     second reason is because the contemplative life can be more continuous, although not as regards the highest degree of
                     contemplation, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q182_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q180_A8.html">Q[180], A[8]</a>, ad 2;
                     <a id="SS_Q182_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q181_A4.html"> Q[181], A[4]</a>, ad 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is described as "sitting" all the time "at the Lord's
                     feet." Thirdly, because the contemplative life is more delightful than the active; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.
                     Serm. ciii) that "Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted." Fourthly, because in the contemplative life man is more self-sufficient,
                     since
                     he needs fewer things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.41" target="asv">Lk. 10:41</a>): "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many things." Fifthly, because the contemplative life is loved
                     more for its own sake, while the active life is directed to something else. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.4" target="asv">Ps. 36:4</a>): "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of
                     my life, that I may see the delight of the Lord."
                     Sixthly, because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p6.5" href="./asv.html#Ps.45.11" target="asv"> Ps. 45:11, </a> "Be still and see that I am God." Seventhly, because the contemplative life is according to Divine things, whereas active
                     life is according to human things; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ): "'In the beginning was the Word': to
                     Him was Mary hearkening: 'The Word was made flesh': Him was Martha serving." Eighthly, because the contemplative life is according
                     to that
                     which is most proper to man, namely his intellect; whereas in the works of the active life the lower powers also, which are
                     common to us and brutes, have their part; wherefore (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p6.6" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.7" target="asv">Ps. 35:7</a>) after the words, "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord," that which is special to man is added (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p6.7" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>): "In Thy light we shall see light."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p7"> Our Lord adds a ninth reason (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.42" target="asv">Lk. 10:42</a>) when He says: "Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her," which words Augustine (De Verb.
                     Dom. Serm. ciii) expounds thus: "Not---Thou hast chosen badly but---She has chosen better. Why better? Listen---because it
                     shall not be taken away from her. But the burden of necessity shall at length be taken from thee: whereas the sweetness of
                     truth is eternal."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p8"> Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer the active life on account of the needs of the present
                     life. Thus too the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2): "It is better to be wise than to be rich, yet for one who is in need,
                     it is better to be rich . . ."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not only the active life concerns prelates, they should also excel in the contemplative life; hence Gregory says (Pastor.
                     ii, 1): "A prelate should be foremost in action, more uplifted than others in contemplation."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The contemplative life consists in a certain liberty of mind. For Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that "the contemplative
                     life obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not of temporal but of eternal things." And Boethius says (De Consol.
                     v, 2): "The soul of man must needs be more free while it continues to gaze on the Divine mind, and less so when it stoops
                     to bodily things." Wherefore it is evident that the active life does not directly
                     command the contemplative life, but prescribes certain works of the active life as dispositions to the contemplative life;
                     which it accordingly serves rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that "the active
                     life is bondage, whereas the contemplative life is freedom."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes a man is called away from the contemplative life to the works of the active life, on account of some necessity
                     of the present life, yet not so as to be compelled to forsake contemplation altogether. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
                     xix, 19): "The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an honest toil," the work namely of the
                     active life. "If no one imposes this burden upon us we must devote ourselves to the
                     research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even
                     then we must not altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive ourselves of its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm
                     us." Hence it is clear that when a person is called from the contemplative life to the active life, this is done by way not
                     of subtraction but of addition.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q182_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q182_A2-p0.1">Whether the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed
                     is due to labor, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:8, </a> "Every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor." Now labor is ascribed to the active life, and rest to
                     the contemplative life; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "Whosoever is converted to God must first of all sweat from
                     labor, i.e. he must take Lia,
                     that afterwards he may rest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle." Therefore the active life is of greater
                     merit than the contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.21.22" target="asv"> Jn. 21:22, </a> "So I will have him to remain till I come," says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan.): "This may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect
                     works follow Me conformed to the example of My passion, and let contemplation begun here remain until I come, that it may
                     be perfected when I shall come." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that
                     "contemplation begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home." Now the life to come will be a state not of meriting
                     but of receiving the reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative life would seem to have less of the character of merit
                     than the active, but more of the character of reward.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.) that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls." Now by the
                     zeal for souls a man turns to the occupations of the active life. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is not
                     of greater merit than the active.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Great are the merits of the active life, but greater still those of the contemplative."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q182_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A4.html">FS, Q[114], A[4]</a>), the root of merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Q[25], A[1]), charity consists in the love of God and our neighbor,
                     the love of God is by itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated above (Q[27], A[8]). Wherefore that
                     which pertains more directly to the love of God is generically more meritorious than that which pertains directly to the love
                     of our neighbor for
                     God's sake. Now the contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of God; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
                     xix, 19) that "the love of" the Divine "truth seeks a holy leisure," namely of the contemplative life, for it is that truth
                     above all which the contemplative life seeks, as stated above (Q[181], A[4], ad 2). On the other hand, the active life is
                     more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor, because it is "busy about much serving" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.40" target="asv">Lk. 10:40</a>).
                     Wherefore the contemplative life is generically of greater merit than the active life. This is moreover asserted by Gregory
                     (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "The contemplative life surpasses in merit the active life, because the latter labors under the stress
                     of present work," by reason of the necessity of assisting our neighbor, "while the former with heartfelt relish has a foretaste
                     of the coming rest," i.e. the contemplation of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p7"> Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of the active life than another by the works of the contemplative
                     life. For instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then suffer separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation
                     for the time being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake. Thus the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.3" target="asv">Rom. 9:3</a>): "I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ, for my brethren"; which words Chrysostom
                     expounds as follows (De Compunct. i, 7 [*Ad Demetr. de Compunct. Cordis.]): "His mind was so steeped in the love of Christ
                     that, although he desired above all to be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he pleased Christ."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> External labor conduces to the increase of the accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the essential
                     reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign
                     thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine
                     contemplation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the state of future happiness man has arrived at perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and
                     if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the greater charity. But in the present life contemplation
                     is not without some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it does not remove the idea of merit, but
                     causes a yet greater merit on account of the practice of greater Divine charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually when something is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, God specially accepts
                     that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in sacrifice. Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his soul,
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.24" target="asv"> Ecclus. 30:24, </a> "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God"; in the second place, the souls of others, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.17" target="asv"> Apoc. 22:17, </a> "He that heareth, let him
                     say: Come." And the more closely a man unites his own or another's soul to God, the more acceptable is his sacrifice to God;
                     wherefore it is more acceptable to God that one apply one's own soul and the souls of others to contemplation than to action.
                     Consequently the statement that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls," does not mean that the merit
                     of the active life is preferable to the merit of the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to God
                     one's own soul and the souls of others, than any other external gifts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q182_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q182_A3-p0.1">Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active life. For the contemplative life requires a certain stillness
                     of mind, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.45.11" target="asv"> Ps. 45:11, </a> "Be still, and see that I am God"; whereas the active life involves restlessness, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q182_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.41" target="asv"> Lk. 10:41, </a> "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, clearness of vision is a requisite for the contemplative life. Now active life is a hindrance to clear vision; for
                     Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it "is blear-eyed and fruitful, because the active life, being occupied with work,
                     sees less." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one contrary hinders the other. Now the active and the contemplative life are apparently contrary to one another,
                     since the active life is busy about many things, while the contemplative life attends to the contemplation of one; wherefore
                     they differ in opposition to one another. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation, must first of all train in the camp
                     of action."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The active life may be considered from two points of view. First, as regards the attention to and practice of external works:
                     and thus it is evident that the active life hinders the contemplative, in so far as it is impossible for one to be busy with
                     external action, and at the same time give oneself to Divine contemplation. Secondly, active life may be considered as quieting
                     and directing the internal passions of the soul; and from this point of view the
                     active life is a help to the contemplative, since the latter is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal passions. Hence
                     Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation must first of all train in the camp of
                     action. Thus after careful study they will learn whether they no longer wrong their neighbor, whether they bear with equanimity
                     the wrongs their neighbors do to them, whether their soul is neither overcome with joy in the presence of temporal goods,
                     nor cast down with too great a sorrow when those goods are withdrawn. In this way they will known when they withdraw within
                     themselves, in order to explore spiritual things, whether they no longer carry with them the shadows of the things corporeal,
                     or, if these follow them, whether they prudently drive them away." Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contemplative,
                     by quelling the interior passions which give rise to the phantasms whereby contemplation is hindered.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p7"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for these arguments consider the occupation itself of external actions,
                     and not the effect which is the quelling of the passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p8"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A3-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q182_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q182_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS.v.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q182_A4-p0.1">Whether the active life precedes the contemplative?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the active life does not precede the contemplative. For the contemplative life pertains directly to the
                     love of God; while the active life pertains to the love of our neighbor. Now the love of God precedes the love of our neighbor,
                     since we love our neighbor for God's sake. Seemingly therefore the contemplative life also precedes the active life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "It should be observed that while a well-ordered life proceeds from action to
                     contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn from the contemplative to the active life." Therefore the active
                     is not simply prior to the contemplative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it would seem that there is not necessarily any order between things that are suitable to different subjects. Now
                     the active and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects; for Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Often those who
                     were able to contemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when pressed with occupation; and frequently they
                     who might live advantageously occupied with the service of their fellow-creatures are killed
                     by the sword of their inaction."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p5">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with regard to its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes
                     the active, inasmuch as it applies itself to things which precede and are better than others, wherefore it moves and directs
                     the active life. For the higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is compared to the lower reason which is assigned
                     to action, and the husband is compared to his wife, who should be ruled by her husband, as
                     Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3,7,12).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p6"> Secondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because it comes first in the order of generation. In this way the active precedes
                     the contemplative life, because it disposes one to it, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q182_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q182_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[181], A[1], ad 3); and, in the order of generation, disposition precedes form, although the latter precedes simply and
                     according to its nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The contemplative life is directed to the love of God, not of any degree, but to that which is perfect; whereas the active
                     life is necessary for any degree of the love of our neighbor. Hence Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "Without the contemplative
                     life it is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided one omit not the good actions we are able to do; but we cannot
                     enter therein without the active life, if we neglect to do the good we can do."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p8"> From this it is also evident that the active precedes the contemplative life, as that which is common to all precedes, in
                     the order of generation, that which is proper to the perfect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Progress from the active to the contemplative life is according to the order of generation; whereas the return from the contemplative
                     life to the active is according to the order of direction, in so far as the active life is directed by the contemplative.
                     Even thus habit is acquired by acts, and by the acquired habit one acts yet more perfectly, as stated in Ethic. ii, 7.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q182_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that is prone to yield to his passions on account of his impulse to action is simply more apt for the active life by reason
                     of his restless spirit. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "there be some so restless that when they are free from labor
                     they labor all the more, because the more leisure they have for thought, the worse interior turmoil they have to bear." Others,
                     on the contrary, have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they
                     are apt for contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves wholly to action, this would be detrimental to them. Wherefore
                     Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "some are so slothful of mind that if they chance to have any hard work to do they give
                     way at the very outset." Yet, as he adds further on, "often . . . love stimulates slothful souls to work, and fear restrains
                     souls that are disturbed in contemplation." Consequently those who are more adapted to the active life can prepare themselves
                     for the contemplative by the practice of the active life; while none the less, those who are more adapted to the contemplative
                     life can take upon themselves the works of the active life, so as to become yet more apt for contemplation.
                  </p>
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