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catch up through FS_vi A108
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| 19 <h2 id="FS.iv-p0.1">TREATISE ON HABITS (QQ[49]-54)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS_Q49">Q. 49. OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q50">Q. 50. OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q51">Q. 51. OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q52">Q. 52. OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q53">Q. 53. HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q54">Q. 54. OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> | |
| 20 <div id="FS_Q49" class="div3"> | |
| 21 <h3 id="FS_Q49-p0.1">Q. 49. OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 22 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 23 <p id="FS_Q49-p2"> After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly | |
| 24 of intrinsic principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle is power and habit; but as we have treated | |
| 25 of powers in the FP, Q[77], seqq., it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second place we shall consider virtues | |
| 26 and vices and other like habits, which are the principles of human acts. | |
| 27 </p><p id="FS_Q49-p3"> Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First, the substance of habits; second, their subject; third, | |
| 28 the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are distinguished from one another. | |
| 29 </p><p id="FS_Q49-p4"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q49-p5"><a href="#FS_Q49_A1"> (1) Whether habit is a quality?</a></p><p id="FS_Q49-p6"><a href="#FS_Q49_A2"> (2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?</a></p><p id="FS_Q49-p7"><a href="#FS_Q49_A3"> (3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q49-p8"><a href="#FS_Q49_A4"> (4) Of the necessity of habit.</a></p> | |
| 30 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 pr."><a name="35593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35593] | |
| 31 Iª-IIae q. 49 pr.</span></a> Post actus et passiones, | |
| 32 considerandum est de principiis humanorum actuum. Et primo, de | |
| 33 principiis intrinsecis; secundo, de principiis extrinsecis. | |
| 34 Principium autem intrinsecum est potentia et habitus; sed quia de | |
| 35 potentiis in prima parte dictum est, nunc restat de habitibus | |
| 36 considerandum. Et primo quidem, in generali; secundo vero, de | |
| 37 virtutibus et vitiis, et aliis huiusmodi habitibus, qui sunt | |
| 38 humanorum actuum principia. Circa ipsos autem habitus in generali, | |
| 39 quatuor consideranda sunt, primo quidem, de ipsa substantia | |
| 40 habituum, secundo, de subiecto eorum; tertio, de causa | |
| 41 generationis, augmenti et corruptionis ipsorum; quarto, de | |
| 42 distinctione ipsorum. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum | |
| 43 habitus sit qualitas. Secundo, utrum sit determinata species | |
| 44 qualitatis. Tertio, utrum habitus importet ordinem ad actum. | |
| 45 Quarto, de necessitate habitus.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 46 <div id="FS_Q49_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A1-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 1. Whether habit is a quality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p2"> | |
| 47 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the | |
| 48 verb 'to have.'" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also to the other categories: for we speak of ourselves as | |
| 49 "having" quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality. | |
| 50 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35594] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 51 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non sit qualitas. Dicit enim | |
| 52 Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>hoc nomen | |
| 53 habitus dictum est ab hoc verbo quod est habere</i>. Sed habere non | |
| 54 solum pertinet ad qualitatem, sed ad alia genera, dicimur enim | |
| 55 habere etiam quantitatem, et pecuniam, et alia huiusmodi. Ergo | |
| 56 habitus non est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p3"> | |
| 57 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may be clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). | |
| 58 But one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not a quality. | |
| 59 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35595] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 60 habitus ponitur unum praedicamentum; ut patet in libro | |
| 61 praedicamentorum. Sed unum praedicamentum non continetur sub alio. | |
| 62 Ergo habitus non est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p4"> | |
| 63 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the | |
| 64 order of that which has parts," as stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore | |
| 65 habit is not a quality. | |
| 66 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35596] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> | |
| 67 <i>Praeterea, omnis habitus est dispositio</i>, ut dicitur in | |
| 68 praedicamentis. Sed dispositio est ordo habentis partes, ut dicitur | |
| 69 in V Metaphys. Hoc autem pertinet ad praedicamentum situs. Ergo | |
| 70 habitus non est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p5"> | |
| 71 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change." | |
| 72 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35597] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 73 est quod philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod habitus est | |
| 74 qualitas de difficili mobilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A1-p6"> | |
| 75 <b>I answer that,</b> This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, | |
| 76 inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation | |
| 77 [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else. | |
| 78 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A1-p7"> Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various | |
| 79 predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so called because they result from the | |
| 80 various predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which are had, there | |
| 81 seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that | |
| 82 which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which | |
| 83 there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, further, there | |
| 84 are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: | |
| 85 thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says | |
| 86 (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; | |
| 87 as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which | |
| 88 are comprised under the predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit | |
| 89 between clothing and the man who is clothed." | |
| 90 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A1-p8"> But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit | |
| 91 is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. | |
| 92 25) that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself | |
| 93 or in regard to another: thus health is a habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say | |
| 94 that habit is a quality. | |
| 95 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 co."><a name="35598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35598] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 96 dicendum quod hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo | |
| 97 quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur, uno quidem modo, | |
| 98 secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid | |
| 99 habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in | |
| 100 seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud. Circa primum autem, considerandum est | |
| 101 quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod | |
| 102 habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde philosophus inter post | |
| 103 praedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera | |
| 104 consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius et posterius, et alia | |
| 105 huiusmodi. Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse | |
| 106 distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter | |
| 107 habens et id quod habetur, sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel | |
| 108 quantitatem nihil est medium. Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est | |
| 109 aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio, sicut dicitur | |
| 110 aliquis habere socium vel amicum. Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est | |
| 111 aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum | |
| 112 actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, | |
| 113 et aliud ornatum aut tectum, unde philosophus dicit, in V | |
| 114 Metaphys., quod <i>habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis | |
| 115 et habiti</i>, sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus. Et ideo | |
| 116 in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur | |
| 117 praedicamentum habitus, de quo dicit philosophus, in V Metaphys., | |
| 118 quod <i>inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est | |
| 119 habitus medius</i>. Si autem sumatur habere prout res aliqua | |
| 120 dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste | |
| 121 modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus | |
| 122 quaedam qualitas est, de quo philosophus, in V Metaphys., dicit | |
| 123 quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male | |
| 124 disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas | |
| 125 habitus quidam est. Et sic loquimur nunc de habitu. Unde dicendum | |
| 126 est quod habitus est qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p9"> | |
| 127 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes "to have" in the general sense: for thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said. | |
| 128 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35599] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 129 ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de habere communiter | |
| 130 sumpto, sic enim est commune ad multa genera, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p10"> | |
| 131 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument takes habit in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is had: | |
| 132 and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said. | |
| 133 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35600] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 134 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de habitu secundum quod | |
| 135 intelligitur aliquid medium inter habens et id quod habetur, sic | |
| 136 enim est quoddam praedicamentum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A1-p11"> | |
| 137 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher | |
| 138 goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species." "In saying | |
| 139 this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when | |
| 140 he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is | |
| 141 the order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation | |
| 142 and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes | |
| 143 perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue. | |
| 144 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35601] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 145 dicendum quod dispositio quidem semper importat ordinem alicuius | |
| 146 habentis partes, sed hoc contingit tripliciter, ut statim ibidem | |
| 147 philosophus subdit, scilicet aut secundum locum, aut secundum | |
| 148 potentiam, aut secundum speciem. In quo, ut Simplicius dicit in | |
| 149 commento praedicamentorum, comprehendit omnes dispositiones. | |
| 150 Corporales quidem, in eo quod dicit secundum locum, et hoc pertinet | |
| 151 ad praedicamentum situs, qui est ordo partium in loco. Quod autem | |
| 152 dicit secundum potentiam, includit illas dispositiones quae sunt in | |
| 153 praeparatione et idoneitate nondum perfecte, sicut scientia et | |
| 154 virtus inchoata. Quod autem dicit secundum speciem, includit | |
| 155 perfectas dispositiones, quae dicuntur habitus, sicut scientia et | |
| 156 virtus complete.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q49_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A2-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 2. Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p2"> | |
| 157 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of quality. Because, as we have said | |
| 158 <a href="#FS_Q49_A1" id="FS_Q49_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, habit, in so far as it is a quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill." But this | |
| 159 happens in regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner, | |
| 160 in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such things. Therefore habit is not a distinct | |
| 161 species of quality. | |
| 162 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35602] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 163 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non sit determinata species | |
| 164 qualitatis. Quia, ut dictum est, habitus, secundum quod est | |
| 165 qualitas, dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene aut male disponitur | |
| 166 dispositum. Sed hoc contingit secundum quamlibet qualitatem, nam et | |
| 167 secundum figuram contingit aliquid bene vel male esse dispositum, | |
| 168 et similiter secundum calorem et frigus, et secundum omnia | |
| 169 huiusmodi. Ergo habitus non est determinata species qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p3"> | |
| 170 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or habits, | |
| 171 just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition is not distinct from the other species of quality. | |
| 172 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35603] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 173 philosophus, in praedicamentis, caliditatem et frigiditatem dicit | |
| 174 esse dispositiones vel habitus, sicut aegritudinem et sanitatem. | |
| 175 Sed calor et frigus sunt in tertia specie qualitatis. Ergo habitus | |
| 176 vel dispositio non distinguuntur ab aliis speciebus qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p4"> | |
| 177 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or passion. | |
| 178 Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of another genus; but "differences should be proper to a genus," | |
| 179 as the Philosopher says in Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit is "a quality difficult to change," it seems not | |
| 180 to be a distinct species of quality. | |
| 181 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35604] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 182 difficile mobile non est differentia pertinens ad genus qualitatis, | |
| 183 sed magis pertinet ad motum vel passionem. Nullum autem genus | |
| 184 determinatur ad speciem per differentiam alterius generis; sed | |
| 185 oportet differentias per se advenire generi, ut philosophus dicit, | |
| 186 in VII Metaphys. Ergo, cum habitus dicatur esse qualitas difficile | |
| 187 mobilis, videtur quod non sit determinata species qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p5"> | |
| 188 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition." | |
| 189 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35605] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 190 est quod philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod <i>una species | |
| 191 qualitatis est habitus et dispositio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p6"> | |
| 192 <b>I answer that,</b> The Philosopher in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality. | |
| 193 Now Simplicius, in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the difference of these species as follows. He says "that | |
| 194 some qualities are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and are always there: but some are adventitious, | |
| 195 being caused from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter," i.e. those which are | |
| 196 adventitious, "are habits and dispositions, differing in the point of being easily or difficultly lost. As to natural qualities, | |
| 197 some regard a thing in the point of its being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the second species of quality: | |
| 198 while others regard a thing which is in act; and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply rooted, | |
| 199 we have the third species of quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is | |
| 200 the shape of an animated being." But this distinction of the species of quality seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes, | |
| 201 and passion-like qualities, which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many dispositions which are not adventitious | |
| 202 but natural, as health, beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the species, since that which is the | |
| 203 more natural is always first. | |
| 204 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p7"> Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and habits from other qualities. For quality, properly | |
| 205 speaking, implies a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "is that which a measure | |
| 206 determines": wherefore it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just as that in accordance | |
| 207 with which the material potentiality [potentia materiae] is determined to its substantial being, is called | |
| 208 quality, which is a difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the subject is determined | |
| 209 to its accidental being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the Philosopher | |
| 210 (Metaph. v, text. 19). | |
| 211 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p8"> Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, | |
| 212 or in regard to action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are matter and form; or again in regard to | |
| 213 quantity. If we take the mode or determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have the fourth species | |
| 214 of quality. And because quantity, considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of | |
| 215 good or evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or | |
| 216 slowly transitory. | |
| 217 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p9"> But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or passion, is considered in the second and third species | |
| 218 of quality. And therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory | |
| 219 or lasting. But in them, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil: because movements and passions | |
| 220 have not the aspect of an end, whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end. | |
| 221 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p10"> On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species | |
| 222 of quality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the | |
| 223 soul and of the body, that they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed | |
| 224 in accordance with its nature." And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause | |
| 225 why a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we consider both evil and good, and also changeableness, | |
| 226 whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph. | |
| 227 v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that by | |
| 228 "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions." For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, | |
| 229 it has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. And since nature is the first object of consideration | |
| 230 in anything, for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality. | |
| 231 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 co."><a name="35606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35606] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 232 dicendum quod philosophus, in praedicamentis, ponit inter quatuor | |
| 233 species qualitatis primam, dispositionem et habitum. Quarum quidem | |
| 234 specierum differentias sic assignat Simplicius, in commento | |
| 235 praedicamentorum, dicens quod <i>qualitatum quaedam sunt naturales, | |
| 236 quae secundum naturam insunt, et semper, quaedam autem sunt | |
| 237 adventitiae, quae ab extrinseco efficiuntur, et possunt amitti. Et | |
| 238 haec quidem</i>, quae sunt adventitiae, <i>sunt habitus et | |
| 239 dispositiones, secundum facile et difficile amissibile differentes. | |
| 240 Naturalium autem qualitatum quaedam sunt secundum id quod aliquid | |
| 241 est in potentia, et sic est secunda species qualitatis. Quaedam | |
| 242 vero secundum quod aliquid est in actu, et hoc vel in profundum, | |
| 243 vel secundum superficiem. Si in profundum quidem, sic est tertia | |
| 244 species qualitatis, secundum vero superficiem, est quarta species | |
| 245 qualitatis, sicut figura et forma, quae est figura animati</i>. Sed | |
| 246 ista distinctio specierum qualitatis inconveniens videtur. Sunt | |
| 247 enim multae figurae et qualitates passibiles non naturales, sed | |
| 248 adventitiae, et multae dispositiones non adventitiae, sed | |
| 249 naturales, sicut sanitas et pulchritudo et huiusmodi. Et praeterea | |
| 250 hoc non convenit ordini specierum, semper enim quod naturalius est, | |
| 251 prius est. Et ideo aliter accipienda est distinctio dispositionum | |
| 252 et habituum ab aliis qualitatibus. Proprie enim qualitas importat | |
| 253 quendam modum substantiae. Modus autem est, ut dicit Augustinus, | |
| 254 super Gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit, unde importat | |
| 255 quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram. Et ideo sicut id | |
| 256 secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse | |
| 257 substantiale dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita | |
| 258 id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse | |
| 259 accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam | |
| 260 differentia, ut patet per philosophum in V Metaphys. Modus autem | |
| 261 sive determinatio subiecti secundum esse accidentale, potest accipi | |
| 262 vel in ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti; vel secundum actionem et | |
| 263 passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae, quae sunt materia et | |
| 264 forma; vel secundum quantitatem. Si autem accipiatur modus vel | |
| 265 determinatio subiecti secundum quantitatem, sic est quarta species | |
| 266 qualitatis. Et quia quantitas, secundum sui rationem, est sine | |
| 267 motu, et sine ratione boni et mali; ideo ad quartam speciem | |
| 268 qualitatis non pertinet quod aliquid sit bene vel male, cito vel | |
| 269 tarde transiens. Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum | |
| 270 actionem et passionem, attenditur in secunda et tertia specie | |
| 271 qualitatis. Et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid facile vel | |
| 272 difficile fiat, vel quod sit cito transiens aut diuturnum. Non | |
| 273 autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel | |
| 274 mali, quia motus et passiones non habent rationem finis, bonum | |
| 275 autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem. Sed modus et | |
| 276 determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei, pertinet ad primam | |
| 277 speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio, dicit enim | |
| 278 philosophus, in VII Physic., loquens de habitibus animae et | |
| 279 corporis, quod sunt <i>dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum; | |
| 280 dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. Et quia | |
| 281 ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid</i>, | |
| 282 ut dicitur in II Physic. ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum | |
| 283 et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua | |
| 284 natura est finis generationis et motus. Unde in V Metaphys. | |
| 285 philosophus definit habitum, quod est dispositio secundum quam | |
| 286 aliquis disponitur bene vel male. Et in II Ethic. dicit quod | |
| 287 <i>habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel | |
| 288 male</i>. Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet | |
| 289 rationem boni, quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali. | |
| 290 Et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re, ideo habitus | |
| 291 ponitur prima species qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p11"> | |
| 292 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some quality | |
| 293 except in relation to something else. And if we add "well or ill," which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must | |
| 294 consider the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end. So in regard to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said | |
| 295 to be well or ill disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a | |
| 296 thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Consequently even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as | |
| 297 they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing, belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and | |
| 298 color, according to their suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat and cold, according to their suitability | |
| 299 to the nature of a thing, concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the Philosopher, in the first species | |
| 300 of | |
| 301 quality. | |
| 302 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35607] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 303 ergo dicendum quod dispositio ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum | |
| 304 est. Unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem, nisi in | |
| 305 ordine ad aliquid. Et si addatur bene vel male, quod pertinet ad | |
| 306 rationem habitus, oportet quod attendatur ordo ad naturam, quae est | |
| 307 finis. Unde secundum figuram, vel secundum calorem vel frigus, non | |
| 308 dicitur aliquis disponi bene vel male, nisi secundum ordinem ad | |
| 309 naturam rei, secundum quod est conveniens vel non conveniens. Unde | |
| 310 et ipsae figurae et passibiles qualitates, secundum quod | |
| 311 considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei, | |
| 312 pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones, nam figura, prout convenit | |
| 313 naturae rei, et color, pertinent ad pulchritudinem; calor autem et | |
| 314 frigus, secundum quod conveniunt naturae rei, pertinent ad | |
| 315 sanitatem. Et hoc modo caliditas et frigiditas ponuntur a | |
| 316 philosopho in prima specie qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some give another solution, as Simplicius says in his Commentary | |
| 317 on the Predicaments. | |
| 318 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35608] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet | |
| 319 solutio ad secundum. Licet a quibusdam aliter solvatur, ut | |
| 320 Simplicius dicit, in commento praedicamentorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p13"> | |
| 321 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This difference, "difficult to change," does not distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from disposition. | |
| 322 Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as the genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition | |
| 323 of habit (Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is divided against habit. Again, disposition, properly so | |
| 324 called, can be divided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect | |
| 325 within the same species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining the name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so | |
| 326 as to be easily lost: whereas we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost easily. And thus a disposition | |
| 327 becomes a habit, just as a boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse species of the one subaltern | |
| 328 genus: so that we call dispositions, those qualities of the first species, which by reason of their very nature are easily | |
| 329 lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g. sickness and health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by reason | |
| 330 of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences and virtues. And in this | |
| 331 sense, disposition does not become habit. The latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle: for | |
| 332 in order to confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of speaking, according to which, when a quality is, by reason | |
| 333 of its nature, easily changeable, and, through some accident, becomes difficultly changeable, then it is called a habit: while | |
| 334 the contrary happens in regard to qualities, by reason of their nature, difficultly changeable: for supposing a man to have | |
| 335 a science imperfectly, so as to be liable to lose it easily, we say that he is disposed to that science, rather than that | |
| 336 he has the science. From this it is clear that the word "habit" implies a certain lastingness: while the word "disposition" | |
| 337 does not. | |
| 338 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A2-p14"> Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are specific differences (of a quality), although they belong | |
| 339 to passion and movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences, though apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless | |
| 340 designate differences which are proper and essential to quality. In the same way, in the genus of substance we often take | |
| 341 accidental instead of substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential principles are | |
| 342 designated. | |
| 343 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35609] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 344 dicendum quod ista differentia, difficile mobile, non diversificat | |
| 345 habitum ab aliis speciebus qualitatis, sed a dispositione. | |
| 346 Dispositio autem dupliciter accipitur, uno modo, secundum quod est | |
| 347 genus habitus, nam in V Metaphys. dispositio ponitur in definitione | |
| 348 habitus; alio modo, secundum quod est aliquid contra habitum | |
| 349 divisum. Et potest intelligi dispositio proprie dicta condividi | |
| 350 contra habitum, dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut perfectum et | |
| 351 imperfectum in eadem specie, ut scilicet dispositio dicatur, | |
| 352 retinens nomen commune, quando imperfecte inest, ita quod de facile | |
| 353 amittitur; habitus autem, quando perfecte inest, ut non de facili | |
| 354 amittatur. Et sic dispositio fit habitus, sicut puer fit vir. Alio | |
| 355 modo possunt distingui sicut diversae species unius generis | |
| 356 subalterni, ut dicantur dispositiones illae qualitates primae | |
| 357 speciei, quibus convenit secundum propriam rationem ut de facili | |
| 358 amittantur, quia habent causas transmutabiles, ut aegritudo et | |
| 359 sanitas; habitus vero dicuntur illae qualitates quae secundum suam | |
| 360 rationem habent quod non de facili transmutentur, quia habent | |
| 361 causas immobiles, sicut scientiae et virtutes. Et secundum hoc | |
| 362 dispositio non fit habitus. Et hoc videtur magis consonum | |
| 363 intentioni Aristotelis. Unde ad huius distinctionis probationem | |
| 364 inducit communem loquendi consuetudinem, secundum quam qualitates | |
| 365 quae secundum rationem suam sunt facile mobiles, si ex aliquo | |
| 366 accidenti difficile mobiles reddantur, habitus dicuntur, et e | |
| 367 converso est de qualitatibus quae secundum suam rationem sunt | |
| 368 difficile mobiles; nam si aliquis imperfecte habeat scientiam, ut | |
| 369 de facili possit ipsam amittere, magis dicitur disponi ad scientiam | |
| 370 quam scientiam habere. Ex quo patet quod nomen habitus | |
| 371 diuturnitatem quandam importat; non autem nomen dispositionis. Nec | |
| 372 impeditur quin secundum hoc facile et difficile mobile sint | |
| 373 specificae differentiae, propter hoc quod ista pertinent ad | |
| 374 passionem et motum, et non ad genus qualitatis. Nam istae | |
| 375 differentiae, quamvis per accidens videantur se habere ad | |
| 376 qualitatem, designant tamen proprias et per se differentias | |
| 377 qualitatum. Sicut etiam in genere substantiae frequenter | |
| 378 accipiuntur differentiae accidentales loco substantialium, | |
| 379 inquantum per eas designantur principia essentialia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q49_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A3-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 3. Whether habit implies order to an act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p2"> | |
| 380 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. For everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher | |
| 381 says (De Anima iii, text 8), that "when one is become knowing by habit, one is still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise | |
| 382 than before learning." Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an act. | |
| 383 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35610] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 384 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non importet ordinem ad actum. | |
| 385 Unumquodque enim agit secundum quod est actu. Sed philosophus | |
| 386 dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>cum aliquis fit sciens secundum | |
| 387 habitum, est etiam tunc in potentia, aliter tamen quam ante | |
| 388 addiscere</i>. Ergo habitus non importat habitudinem principii ad | |
| 389 actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p3"> | |
| 390 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing, belongs to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put | |
| 391 in the definition of power, as we read in Metaph. v, text. 17. Therefore to be the principle of an act belongs to power essentially. | |
| 392 Now that which is essential is first in every genus. If therefore, habit also is a principle of act, it follows that it is | |
| 393 posterior to power. And so habit and disposition will not be the first species of | |
| 394 quality. | |
| 395 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35611] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 396 illud quod ponitur in definitione alicuius, per se convenit illi. | |
| 397 Sed esse principium actionis ponitur in definitione potentiae; ut | |
| 398 patet in V Metaphys. Ergo esse principium actus per se convenit | |
| 399 potentiae. Quod autem est per se, est primum in unoquoque genere. | |
| 400 Si ergo etiam habitus sit principium actus, sequitur quod sit | |
| 401 posterior quam potentia. Et sic non erit prima species qualitatis | |
| 402 habitus vel dispositio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p4"> | |
| 403 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore | |
| 404 it is not essential to habit to be a principle of act. | |
| 405 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35612] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 406 sanitas quandoque est habitus, et similiter macies et pulchritudo. | |
| 407 Sed ista non dicuntur per ordinem ad actum. Non ergo est de ratione | |
| 408 habitus quod sit principium actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p5"> | |
| 409 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is that whereby something is done when necessary." And the Commentator says | |
| 410 (De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will." | |
| 411 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35613] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 412 est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono coniugali, quod | |
| 413 <i>habitus est quo aliquid agitur cum opus est</i>. Et Commentator | |
| 414 dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>habitus est quo quis agit cum | |
| 415 voluerit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A3-p6"> | |
| 416 <b>I answer that,</b> To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both in regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in which | |
| 417 the habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to every habit to have relation to an act. For it is essential | |
| 418 to habit to imply some relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable thereto. But a thing's nature, | |
| 419 which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an | |
| 420 operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit implies relation not | |
| 421 only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive | |
| 422 to the end. Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that | |
| 423 which is disposed, is well or ill disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something | |
| 424 else, that is to the end. | |
| 425 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A3-p7"> But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally relation | |
| 426 to an act. For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a relation to the thing's nature. If therefore the | |
| 427 nature of a thing, in which the habit is, consists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the habit principally | |
| 428 implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the notion of power is that it should be a | |
| 429 principle of act. Wherefore every habit is subjected in a power, implies principally relation to an act. | |
| 430 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 co."><a name="35614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35614] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 431 dicendum quod habere ordinem ad actum potest competere habitui et | |
| 432 secundum rationem habitus; et secundum rationem subiecti in quo est | |
| 433 habitus. Secundum quidem rationem habitus, convenit omni habitui | |
| 434 aliquo modo habere ordinem ad actum. Est enim de ratione habitus ut | |
| 435 importet habitudinem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, secundum | |
| 436 quod convenit vel non convenit. Sed natura rei, quae est finis | |
| 437 generationis, ulterius etiam ordinatur ad alium finem, qui vel est | |
| 438 operatio, vel aliquod operatum, ad quod quis pervenit per | |
| 439 operationem. Unde habitus non solum importat ordinem ad ipsam | |
| 440 naturam rei, sed etiam consequenter ad operationem, inquantum est | |
| 441 finis naturae, vel perducens ad finem. Unde et in V Metaphys. | |
| 442 dicitur in definitione habitus, quod est dispositio secundum quam | |
| 443 bene vel male disponitur dispositum aut secundum se, idest secundum | |
| 444 suam naturam, aut ad aliud, idest in ordine ad finem. Sed sunt | |
| 445 quidam habitus qui etiam ex parte subiecti in quo sunt, primo et | |
| 446 principaliter important ordinem ad actum. Quia ut dictum est, | |
| 447 habitus primo et per se importat habitudinem ad naturam rei. Si | |
| 448 igitur natura rei in qua est habitus, consistat in ipso ordine ad | |
| 449 actum, sequitur quod habitus principaliter importet ordinem ad | |
| 450 actum. Manifestum est autem quod natura et ratio potentiae est ut | |
| 451 sit principium actus. Unde omnis habitus qui est alicuius potentiae | |
| 452 ut subiecti, principaliter importat ordinem ad actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p8"> | |
| 453 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in | |
| 454 a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and operation, second act; as it is | |
| 455 explained in De Anima ii, text. 5. | |
| 456 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35615] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 457 ergo dicendum quod habitus est actus quidam, inquantum est | |
| 458 qualitas, et secundum hoc potest esse principium operationis. Sed | |
| 459 est in potentia per respectum ad operationem. Unde habitus dicitur | |
| 460 actus primus, et operatio actus secundus; ut patet in II de | |
| 461 anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p9"> | |
| 462 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the essence of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which | |
| 463 power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality. | |
| 464 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35616] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 465 dicendum quod non est de ratione habitus quod respiciat potentiam, | |
| 466 sed quod respiciat naturam. Et quia natura praecedit actionem, quam | |
| 467 respicit potentia; ideo prior species qualitatis ponitur habitus | |
| 468 quam potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A3-p10"> | |
| 469 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual disposition, in relation to nature, as stated above. But in so far as nature | |
| 470 is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to act. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Hist. Animal. x, 1), | |
| 471 that man, or one of his members, is called healthy, "when he can perform the operation of a healthy man." And the same applies | |
| 472 to other habits. | |
| 473 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35617] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 474 dicendum quod sanitas dicitur habitus, vel habitualis dispositio, | |
| 475 in ordine ad naturam, sicut dictum est. Inquantum tamen natura est | |
| 476 principium actus, ex consequenti importat ordinem ad actum. Unde | |
| 477 philosophus dicit, in X de historia Animal., quod homo dicitur | |
| 478 sanus, vel membrum aliquod, quando potest facere operationem sani. | |
| 479 Et est simile in aliis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q49_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q49_A4-p0.1">Q. 49. A. 4. Whether habits are necessary?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p2"> | |
| 480 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated | |
| 481 above. But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a thing is good, even as it is a being. | |
| 482 Therefore there is no necessity for habits. | |
| 483 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35618] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 484 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit necessarium esse habitus. | |
| 485 Habitus enim sunt quibus aliquid disponitur bene vel male ad | |
| 486 aliquid, sicut dictum est. Sed per suam formam aliquid bene vel | |
| 487 male disponitur, nam secundum formam aliquid est bonum, sicut et | |
| 488 ens. Ergo nulla necessitas est habituum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p3"> | |
| 489 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers, | |
| 490 without any habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity for habits. | |
| 491 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35619] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 492 habitus importat ordinem ad actum. Sed potentia importat principium | |
| 493 actus sufficienter, nam et potentiae naturales absque habitibus | |
| 494 sunt principia actuum. Ergo non fuit necessarium habitus esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p4"> | |
| 495 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is habit: and as power does not always act, so neither does habit. | |
| 496 Given, therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous. | |
| 497 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35620] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 498 sicut potentia se habet ad bonum et malum, ita et habitus, et sicut | |
| 499 potentia non semper agit, ita nec habitus. Existentibus igitur | |
| 500 potentiis, superfluum fuit habitum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p5"> | |
| 501 <b>On the contrary,</b> Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17). But perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in the | |
| 502 nature of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there should be habits. | |
| 503 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35621] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 504 est quod habitus sunt perfectiones quaedam, ut dicitur in VII | |
| 505 Physic. Sed perfectio est maxime necessaria rei, cum habeat | |
| 506 rationem finis. Ergo necessarium fuit habitus esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q49_A4-p6"> | |
| 507 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( | |
| 508 <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q49_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which disposition | |
| 509 a thing is well or ill disposed thereto. Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else, three conditions are necessary. | |
| 510 The first condition is that which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that it should | |
| 511 be related to it as | |
| 512 potentiality is to act. Whence, if there is a being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act, and whose substance | |
| 513 is its own operation, which itself is for itself, there we can find no room for habit and disposition, as is clearly the case | |
| 514 in God. | |
| 515 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A4-p7"> The second condition is, that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of determination | |
| 516 in several ways and to various things. Whence if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, but | |
| 517 in regard to that only, there we find no room for disposition and habit: for such a subject from its own nature has the due | |
| 518 relation to such an act. Wherefore if a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since that matter is | |
| 519 not in a state of potentiality to another form, as we said in the | |
| 520 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q56_A2" id="FS_Q49_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[56], A[2]</a>, there is no need for disposition or habit in respect of the form, or even in respect of operation, since the nature of the | |
| 521 heavenly body is not in a state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement. | |
| 522 </p><p id="FS_Q49_A4-p8"> The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those things to which it is in potentiality, several things | |
| 523 should occur, capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its form or to its operation. | |
| 524 Wherefore the simple qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in one single fixed way, are not called | |
| 525 dispositions or habits, but "simple qualities": but we call dispositions or habits, such things as | |
| 526 health, beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative adjustability. | |
| 527 For this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 24,25) that "habit is a disposition": and disposition is "the order | |
| 528 of that which has parts either as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species," as we have said above (A[1], ad 3). | |
| 529 Wherefore, since there are many things for whose natures and operations several things must concur which may vary in their | |
| 530 relative | |
| 531 adjustability, it follows that habit is necessary. | |
| 532 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 co."><a name="35622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35622] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 533 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat | |
| 534 dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, et ad operationem | |
| 535 vel finem eius, secundum quam bene vel male aliquid ad hoc | |
| 536 disponitur. Ad hoc autem quod aliquid indigeat disponi ad alterum, | |
| 537 tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, ut id quod disponitur, sit alterum | |
| 538 ab eo ad quod disponitur; et sic se habeat ad ipsum ut potentia ad | |
| 539 actum. Unde si aliquid sit cuius natura non sit composita ex | |
| 540 potentia et actu, et cuius substantia sit sua operatio, et ipsum | |
| 541 sit propter seipsum; ibi habitus vel dispositio locum non habet, | |
| 542 sicut patet in Deo. Secundo requiritur quod id quod est in potentia | |
| 543 ad alterum, possit pluribus modis determinari, et ad diversa. Unde | |
| 544 si aliquid sit in potentia ad alterum, ita tamen quod non sit in | |
| 545 potentia nisi ad ipsum, ibi dispositio et habitus locum non habet, | |
| 546 quia tale subiectum ex sua natura habet debitam habitudinem ad | |
| 547 talem actum. Unde si corpus caeleste sit compositum ex materia et | |
| 548 forma, cum illa materia non sit in potentia ad aliam formam, ut in | |
| 549 primo dictum est, non habet ibi locum dispositio vel habitus ad | |
| 550 formam; aut etiam ad operationem, quia natura caelestis corporis | |
| 551 non est in potentia nisi ad unum motum determinatum. Tertio | |
| 552 requiritur quod plura concurrant ad disponendum subiectum ad unum | |
| 553 eorum ad quae est in potentia, quae diversis modis commensurari | |
| 554 possunt, ut sic disponatur bene vel male ad formam vel ad | |
| 555 operationem. Unde qualitates simplices elementorum, quae secundum | |
| 556 unum modum determinatum naturis elementorum conveniunt, non dicimus | |
| 557 dispositiones vel habitus, sed simplices qualitates, dicimus autem | |
| 558 dispositiones vel habitus sanitatem, pulchritudinem et alia | |
| 559 huiusmodi, quae important quandam commensurationem plurium quae | |
| 560 diversis modis commensurari possunt. Propter quod philosophus | |
| 561 dicit, in V Metaphys., quod <i>habitus est dispositio, et | |
| 562 dispositio est ordo habentis partes vel secundum locum, vel | |
| 563 secundum potentiam, vel secundum speciem</i>; ut supra dictum est. | |
| 564 Quia igitur multa sunt entium ad quorum naturas et operationes | |
| 565 necesse est plura concurrere quae diversis modis commensurari | |
| 566 possunt, ideo necesse est habitus esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p9"> | |
| 567 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some disposition. | |
| 568 But the form itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the end, or the means to the end. And if the form is | |
| 569 limited to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form | |
| 570 be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be | |
| 571 disposed to its operations by means of habits. | |
| 572 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35623] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 573 ergo dicendum quod per formam perficitur natura rei, sed oportet | |
| 574 quod in ordine ad ipsam formam disponatur subiectum aliqua | |
| 575 dispositione. Ipsa tamen forma ordinatur ulterius ad operationem, | |
| 576 quae vel est finis, vel via in finem. Et si quidem habeat forma | |
| 577 determinate unam tantum operationem determinatam, nulla alia | |
| 578 dispositio requiritur ad operationem praeter ipsam formam. Si autem | |
| 579 sit talis forma quae possit diversimode operari, sicut est anima; | |
| 580 oportet quod disponatur ad suas operationes per aliquos | |
| 581 habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p10"> | |
| 582 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Power sometimes has a relation to many things: and then it needs to be determined by something else. But if a power has not | |
| 583 a relation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as we have said. For this reason the natural forces do | |
| 584 not perform their operations by means of habits: because they are of themselves determined to one mode of operation. | |
| 585 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35624] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 586 dicendum quod potentia quandoque se habet ad multa, et ideo oportet | |
| 587 quod aliquo alio determinetur. Si vero sit aliqua potentia quae non | |
| 588 se habeat ad multa, non indiget habitu determinante, ut dictum est. | |
| 589 Et propter hoc vires naturales non agunt operationes suas | |
| 590 mediantibus aliquibus habitibus, quia secundum seipsas sunt | |
| 591 determinatae ad unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q49_A4-p11"> | |
| 592 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on ( | |
| 593 <a href="#FS_Q54_A3" id="FS_Q49_A4-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[3]</a>): whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that the powers be determined | |
| 594 to good. | |
| 595 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 49 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35625] Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 596 dicendum quod non idem habitus se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut | |
| 597 infra patebit. Eadem autem potentia se habet ad bonum et malum. Et | |
| 598 ideo necessarii sunt habitus ut potentiae determinentur ad | |
| 599 bonum.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 600 <div id="FS_Q50" class="div3"> | |
| 601 <h3 id="FS_Q50-p0.1">Q. 50. OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 602 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 603 <p id="FS_Q50-p2"> We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q50-p3"><a href="#FS_Q50_A1"> (1) Whether there is a habit in the body?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p4"><a href="#FS_Q50_A2"> (2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p5"><a href="#FS_Q50_A3"> (3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p6"><a href="#FS_Q50_A4"> (4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p7"><a href="#FS_Q50_A5"> (5) Whether there is a habit in the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q50-p8"><a href="#FS_Q50_A6"> (6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances?</a></p> | |
| 604 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 pr."><a name="35626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35626] | |
| 605 Iª-IIae q. 50 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 606 subiecto habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum in | |
| 607 corpore sit aliquis habitus. Secundo, utrum anima sit subiectum | |
| 608 habitus secundum suam essentiam, vel secundum suam potentiam. | |
| 609 Tertio, utrum in potentiis sensitivae partis possit esse aliquis | |
| 610 habitus. Quarto, utrum in ipso intellectu sit aliquis habitus. | |
| 611 Quinto, utrum in voluntate sit aliquis habitus. Sexto, utrum in | |
| 612 substantiis separatis.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 613 <div id="FS_Q50_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A1-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 1. Whether there is a habit in the body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p2"> | |
| 614 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that whereby | |
| 615 we act when we will." But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit | |
| 616 in the body. | |
| 617 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35627] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 618 sic proceditur. Videtur quod in corpore non sit aliquis habitus. Ut | |
| 619 enim Commentator dicit, in III de anima, <i>habitus est quo quis | |
| 620 agit cum voluerit</i>. Sed actiones corporales non subiacent | |
| 621 voluntati, cum sint naturales. Ergo in corpore non potest esse | |
| 622 aliquis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p3"> | |
| 623 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily disposition | |
| 624 can be a habit. | |
| 625 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35628] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 626 omnes dispositiones corporales sunt facile mobiles. Sed habitus est | |
| 627 qualitas difficile mobilis. Ergo nulla dispositio corporalis potest | |
| 628 esse habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p4"> | |
| 629 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But change can only be in the third species of quality, which is | |
| 630 divided against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body. | |
| 631 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35629] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 632 omnes dispositiones corporales subiacent alterationi. Sed alteratio | |
| 633 non est nisi in tertia specie qualitatis, quae dividitur contra | |
| 634 habitum. Ergo nullus habitus est in corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p5"> | |
| 635 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called | |
| 636 habits. | |
| 637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35630] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 638 est quod philosophus, in praedicamentis, sanitatem corporis, vel | |
| 639 infirmitatem insanabilem, habitum nominari dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p6"> | |
| 640 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( | |
| 641 <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], AA[2]</a> seqq.), habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore | |
| 642 in so far as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every operation | |
| 643 of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, as to those | |
| 644 operations which proceed from | |
| 645 its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and we | |
| 646 have already said ( | |
| 647 <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q50_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required. As to the operations | |
| 648 which proceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits | |
| 649 are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts like habits | |
| 650 are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can | |
| 651 be secondarily in the body: to wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations | |
| 652 of the soul. | |
| 653 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p7"> If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is | |
| 654 related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions. | |
| 655 Yet they have not the nature of habit perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable. | |
| 656 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p8"> On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or | |
| 657 dispositions of the first species are in the body: and held that the first species of quality belonged to the soul alone. | |
| 658 And he held that Aristotle mentions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as though they belonged to the | |
| 659 first species of quality, but by way of example: so that he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy | |
| 660 or difficult to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are called habits and dispositions. But | |
| 661 this is clearly contrary to the intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health and sickness as examples, | |
| 662 as of virtue and science; and because in Phys. vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits. | |
| 663 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 co."><a name="35631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35631] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 664 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus est quaedam | |
| 665 dispositio alicuius subiecti existentis in potentia vel ad formam, | |
| 666 vel ad operationem. Secundum ergo quod habitus importat | |
| 667 dispositionem ad operationem, nullus habitus est principaliter in | |
| 668 corpore sicut in subiecto. Omnis enim operatio corporis est aut a | |
| 669 naturali qualitate corporis; aut est ab anima movente corpus. | |
| 670 Quantum igitur ad illas operationes quae sunt a natura, non | |
| 671 disponitur corpus per aliquem habitum, quia virtutes naturales sunt | |
| 672 determinatae ad unum; dictum est autem quod habitualis dispositio | |
| 673 requiritur ubi subiectum est in potentia ad multa. Operationes vero | |
| 674 quae sunt ab anima per corpus, principaliter quidem sunt ipsius | |
| 675 animae, secundario vero ipsius corporis. Habitus autem | |
| 676 proportionantur operationibus, unde ex similibus actibus similes | |
| 677 habitus causantur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Et ideo dispositiones ad | |
| 678 tales operationes principaliter sunt in anima. In corpore vero | |
| 679 possunt esse secundario, inquantum scilicet corpus disponitur et | |
| 680 habilitatur ad prompte deserviendum operationibus animae. Si vero | |
| 681 loquamur de dispositione subiecti ad formam, sic habitualis | |
| 682 dispositio potest esse in corpore, quod comparatur ad animam sicut | |
| 683 subiectum ad formam. Et hoc modo sanitas et pulchritudo, et | |
| 684 huiusmodi, habituales dispositiones dicuntur. Non tamen perfecte | |
| 685 habent rationem habituum, quia causae eorum ex sua natura de facili | |
| 686 transmutabiles sunt. Alexander vero posuit nullo modo habitum vel | |
| 687 dispositionem primae speciei esse in corpore, ut Simplicius refert | |
| 688 in commento Praedicament., sed dicebat primam speciem qualitatis | |
| 689 pertinere tantum ad animam. Et quod Aristoteles inducit in | |
| 690 praedicamentis de sanitate et aegritudine, non inducit quasi haec | |
| 691 pertineant ad primam speciem qualitatis, sed per modum exempli, ut | |
| 692 sit sensus quod sicut aegritudo et sanitas possunt esse facile vel | |
| 693 difficile mobiles, ita etiam qualitates primae speciei, quae | |
| 694 dicuntur habitus et dispositio. Sed patet hoc esse contra | |
| 695 intentionem Aristotelis. Tum quia eodem modo loquendi utitur | |
| 696 exemplificando de sanitate et aegritudine, et de virtute et de | |
| 697 scientia. Tum quia in VII Physic. expresse ponit inter habitus | |
| 698 pulchritudinem et sanitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p9"> | |
| 699 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from | |
| 700 nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the principle of which is the will. | |
| 701 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35632] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 702 ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de habitu secundum quod | |
| 703 est dispositio ad operationem, et de actibus corporis qui sunt a | |
| 704 natura, non autem de his qui sunt ab anima, quorum principium est | |
| 705 voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A1-p10"> | |
| 706 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they | |
| 707 may be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot | |
| 708 be removed; or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply | |
| 709 difficult to change, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject. And | |
| 710 therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is a habit simply: but that it is "as a habit," as we read | |
| 711 in the Greek [*{isos hexin} (Categor. viii)]. On the other hand, the qualities of the soul are called habits simply. | |
| 712 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35633] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 713 dicendum quod dispositiones corporales non sunt simpliciter | |
| 714 difficile mobiles, propter mutabilitatem corporalium causarum. | |
| 715 Possunt tamen esse difficile mobiles per comparationem ad tale | |
| 716 subiectum, quia scilicet, tali subiecto durante, amoveri non | |
| 717 possunt, vel quia sunt difficile mobiles per comparationem ad alias | |
| 718 dispositiones. Sed qualitates animae sunt simpliciter difficile | |
| 719 mobiles, propter immobilitatem subiecti. Et ideo non dicit quod | |
| 720 sanitas difficile mobilis simpliciter sit habitus, sed quod est ut | |
| 721 habitus, sicut in Graeco habetur. Qualitates autem animae dicuntur | |
| 722 simpliciter habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p11"> | |
| 723 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third species, | |
| 724 in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in some "becoming" and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called | |
| 725 passions or passible qualities. But when they have attained to perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then | |
| 726 passed into the first species of quality. But Simplicius in his Commentary | |
| 727 disapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in the third species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas | |
| 728 Aristotle puts heat in the third. | |
| 729 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A1-p12"> Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit, | |
| 730 differ in bodies by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives heat in this only that it is being heated, | |
| 731 and not so as to be able to give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like quality if it is permanent. | |
| 732 But when it has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and | |
| 733 if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so that disposition would | |
| 734 be a certain intensity of passion or passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or disposition. But Simplicius disapproves | |
| 735 of this, for such intensity and remissness do not imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the diverse | |
| 736 participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be no diversity among the species of quality. And therefore | |
| 737 we must say otherwise that, as was explained above ( | |
| 738 <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A1-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[2]</a>, ad 1), the adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to their suitability to nature, implies the notion | |
| 739 of disposition: and so, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities, which are heat and cold, moisture | |
| 740 and dryness, there results a change as to sickness and health. But change does not occur in regard to like habits and dispositions, | |
| 741 primarily and of | |
| 742 themselves. | |
| 743 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35634] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 744 dicendum quod dispositiones corporales quae sunt in prima specie | |
| 745 qualitatis, ut quidam posuerunt, differunt a qualitatibus tertiae | |
| 746 speciei in hoc, quod qualitates tertiae speciei sunt ut in fieri et | |
| 747 ut in motu, unde dicuntur passiones vel passibiles qualitates. | |
| 748 Quando autem iam pervenerint ad perfectum, quasi ad speciem, tunc | |
| 749 iam sunt in prima specie qualitatis. Sed hoc improbat Simplicius, | |
| 750 in commento praedicamentorum, quia secundum hoc calefactio esset in | |
| 751 tertia specie qualitatis, calor autem in prima, Aristoteles autem | |
| 752 ponit calorem in tertia. Unde Porphyrius dicit, sicut idem | |
| 753 Simplicius refert, quod passio vel passibilis qualitas, et | |
| 754 dispositio et habitus, differunt in corporibus secundum intensionem | |
| 755 et remissionem. Quando enim aliquid recipit caliditatem secundum | |
| 756 calefieri tantum, non autem ut calefacere possit; tunc est passio, | |
| 757 si sit cito transiens, vel passibilis qualitas, si sit manens. | |
| 758 Quando autem iam ad hoc perducitur quod potest etiam alterum | |
| 759 calefacere, tunc est dispositio, si autem ulterius intantum | |
| 760 confirmetur quod sit difficile mobilis, tunc erit habitus, ut sic | |
| 761 dispositio sit quaedam intensio seu perfectio passionis vel | |
| 762 passibilis qualitatis, habitus autem dispositionis. Sed hoc | |
| 763 improbat Simplicius, quia talis intensio et remissio non important | |
| 764 diversitatem ex parte ipsius formae, sed ex diversa participatione | |
| 765 subiecti. Et ita non diversificarentur per hoc species qualitatis. | |
| 766 Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, | |
| 767 commensuratio ipsarum qualitatum passibilium secundum convenientiam | |
| 768 ad naturam, habet rationem dispositionis, et ideo, facta | |
| 769 alteratione circa ipsas qualitates passibiles, quae sunt calidum et | |
| 770 frigidum, humidum et siccum, fit ex consequenti alteratio secundum | |
| 771 aegritudinem et sanitatem. Primo autem et per se non est alteratio | |
| 772 secundum huiusmodi habitus et dispositiones.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A2-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 2. Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p2"> | |
| 773 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of dispositions | |
| 774 and habits in relation to nature, as stated above ( | |
| 775 <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[2]</a>). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it is in respect of its essence that the soul | |
| 776 is the nature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in the soul in respect of its essence and not in | |
| 777 respect of its powers. | |
| 778 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35635] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 779 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus sint in anima magis secundum | |
| 780 essentiam quam secundum potentiam. Dispositiones enim et habitus | |
| 781 dicuntur in ordine ad naturam, ut dictum est. Sed natura magis | |
| 782 attenditur secundum essentiam animae quam secundum potentias, quia | |
| 783 anima secundum suam essentiam est natura corporis talis, et forma | |
| 784 eius. Ergo habitus sunt in anima secundum eius essentiam et non | |
| 785 secundum potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p3"> | |
| 786 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of | |
| 787 accident, as we have said in the | |
| 788 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q50_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[77], A[1]</a>, ad 5. Therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers. | |
| 789 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35636] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 790 accidentis non est accidens. Habitus autem est quoddam accidens. | |
| 791 Sed potentiae animae sunt de genere accidentium, ut in primo dictum | |
| 792 est. Ergo habitus non est in anima ratione suae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p4"> | |
| 793 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it | |
| 794 is prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject. | |
| 795 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35637] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 796 subiectum est prius eo quod est in subiecto. Sed habitus, cum | |
| 797 pertineat ad primam speciem qualitatis, est prior quam potentia, | |
| 798 quae pertinet ad secundam speciem. Ergo habitus non est in potentia | |
| 799 animae sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p5"> | |
| 800 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul. | |
| 801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35638] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 802 est quod philosophus, in I Ethic., ponit diversos habitus in | |
| 803 diversis partibus animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A2-p6"> | |
| 804 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( | |
| 805 <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q50_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], AA[2]</a>,3), habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a relation | |
| 806 to nature, it cannot be in the soul---that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing the | |
| 807 human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation | |
| 808 to the soul, than in the | |
| 809 soul by reason of its relation to the body. But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according | |
| 810 to 2 Pet. 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature": thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in | |
| 811 the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on ( | |
| 812 <a href="FS_vii.html#FS_Q110_A4" id="FS_Q50_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[110], A[4]</a>). | |
| 813 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A2-p7"> On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in | |
| 814 so far as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, as we | |
| 815 have said above ( | |
| 816 <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q50_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the | |
| 817 soul in respect of its powers. | |
| 818 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 co."><a name="35639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35639] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 819 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat | |
| 820 dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam, vel ad operationem. Si | |
| 821 ergo accipiatur habitus secundum quod habet ordinem ad naturam, sic | |
| 822 non potest esse in anima, si tamen de natura humana loquamur, quia | |
| 823 ipsa anima est forma completiva humanae naturae; unde secundum hoc, | |
| 824 magis potest esse aliquis habitus vel dispositio in corpore per | |
| 825 ordinem ad animam, quam in anima per ordinem ad corpus. Sed si | |
| 826 loquamur de aliqua superiori natura, cuius homo potest esse | |
| 827 particeps, secundum illud II Petr. I, <i>ut simus consortes naturae | |
| 828 divinae</i>, sic nihil prohibet in anima secundum suam essentiam | |
| 829 esse aliquem habitum, scilicet gratiam, ut infra dicetur. Si vero | |
| 830 accipiatur habitus in ordine ad operationem, sic maxime habitus | |
| 831 inveniuntur in anima, inquantum anima non determinatur ad unam | |
| 832 operationem, sed se habet ad multas, quod requiritur ad habitum, ut | |
| 833 supra dictum est. Et quia anima est principium operationum per suas | |
| 834 potentias, ideo secundum hoc, habitus sunt in anima secundum suas | |
| 835 potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p8"> | |
| 836 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a | |
| 837 form and nature to which someone is disposed. | |
| 838 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35640] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 839 ergo dicendum quod essentia animae pertinet ad naturam humanam, non | |
| 840 sicut subiectum disponendum ad aliquid aliud, sed sicut forma et | |
| 841 natura ad quam aliquis disponitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p9"> | |
| 842 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But since among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the subject, | |
| 843 according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a further accident. In this way we say that one accident | |
| 844 is the subject of another; as superficies is the subject of color, in which sense power is the subject of habit. | |
| 845 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35641] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 846 dicendum quod accidens per se non potest esse subiectum accidentis. | |
| 847 Sed quia etiam in ipsis accidentibus est ordo quidam, subiectum | |
| 848 secundum quod est sub uno accidente, intelligitur esse subiectum | |
| 849 alterius. Et sic dicitur unum accidens esse subiectum alterius, ut | |
| 850 superficies coloris. Et hoc modo potest potentia esse subiectum | |
| 851 habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A2-p10"> | |
| 852 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Habit takes precedence of power, according as it implies a disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a relation | |
| 853 to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does | |
| 854 not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes precedence | |
| 855 of power, as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act takes | |
| 856 precedence of potentiality. For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though potentiality is prior in order of generation | |
| 857 and time, as stated in Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13. | |
| 858 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35642] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 859 dicendum quod habitus praemittitur potentiae, secundum quod | |
| 860 importat dispositionem ad naturam, potentia autem semper importat | |
| 861 ordinem ad operationem, quae est posterior, cum natura sit | |
| 862 operationis principium. Sed habitus cuius potentia est subiectum, | |
| 863 non importat ordinem ad naturam, sed ad operationem. Unde est | |
| 864 posterior potentia. Vel potest dici quod habitus praeponitur | |
| 865 potentiae sicut completum incompleto, et actus potentiae. Actus | |
| 866 enim naturaliter est prior; quamvis potentia sit prior ordine | |
| 867 generationis et temporis, ut dicitur in VII et IX Metaphys.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A3-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 3. Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p2"> | |
| 868 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational | |
| 869 part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to | |
| 870 put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part. | |
| 871 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35643] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 872 sic proceditur. Videtur quod in potentiis sensitivae partis non | |
| 873 possit esse aliquis habitus. Sicut enim potentia nutritiva pars est | |
| 874 irrationalis, ita et sensitiva. Sed in potentiis nutritivae partis | |
| 875 non ponitur aliquis habitus. Ergo nec in potentiis sensitivae | |
| 876 partis aliquis habitus debet poni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p3"> | |
| 877 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is | |
| 878 no will, which is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above ( | |
| 879 <a href="#FS_Q49_A3" id="FS_Q50_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[3]</a>). Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers. | |
| 880 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35644] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 881 sensitivae partes sunt communes nobis et brutis. Sed in brutis non | |
| 882 sunt aliqui habitus, quia non est in eis voluntas, quae in | |
| 883 definitione habitus ponitur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo in potentiis | |
| 884 sensitivis non sunt aliqui habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p4"> | |
| 885 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues: and just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so it | |
| 886 virtue related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there are no sciences: since science is of universals, | |
| 887 which the sensitive powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of virtue in the sensitive part. | |
| 888 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35645] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 889 habitus animae sunt scientiae et virtutes, et sicut scientia | |
| 890 refertur ad vim apprehensivam, ita virtus ad vim appetitivam. Sed | |
| 891 in potentiis sensitivis non sunt aliquae scientiae, cum scientia | |
| 892 sit universalium, quae vires sensitivae apprehendere non possunt. | |
| 893 Ergo etiam nec habitus virtutum in partibus sensitivis esse | |
| 894 possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p5"> | |
| 895 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "some virtues," namely, temperance and fortitude, "belong to the irrational part." | |
| 896 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35646] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 897 est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod aliquae virtutes, | |
| 898 scilicet temperantia et fortitudo, sunt irrationabilium | |
| 899 partium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p6"> | |
| 900 <b>I answer that,</b> The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly, according | |
| 901 as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as | |
| 902 nature is; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordained to various things. And thus there can | |
| 903 be habits in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something. | |
| 904 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 co."><a name="35647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35647] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 905 dicendum quod vires sensitivae dupliciter possunt considerari, uno | |
| 906 modo, secundum quod operantur ex instinctu naturae; alio modo, | |
| 907 secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis. Secundum igitur quod | |
| 908 operantur ex instinctu naturae, sic ordinantur ad unum, sicut et | |
| 909 natura. Et ideo sicut in potentiis naturalibus non sunt aliqui | |
| 910 habitus, ita etiam nec in potentiis sensitivis, secundum quod ex | |
| 911 instinctu naturae operantur. Secundum vero quod operantur ex | |
| 912 imperio rationis, sic ad diversa ordinari possunt. Et sic possunt | |
| 913 in eis esse aliqui habitus, quibus bene aut male ad aliquid | |
| 914 disponuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p7"> | |
| 915 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits | |
| 916 in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: | |
| 917 for in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. | |
| 918 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35648] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 919 ergo dicendum quod vires nutritivae partis non sunt natae obedire | |
| 920 imperio rationis, et ideo non sunt in eis aliqui habitus. Sed vires | |
| 921 sensitivae natae sunt obedire imperio rationis, et ideo in eis esse | |
| 922 possunt aliqui habitus; nam secundum quod obediunt rationi, | |
| 923 quodammodo rationales dicuntur, ut in I Ethic. dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A3-p8"> | |
| 924 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such animals | |
| 925 act from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to operations. There are in them, however, certain | |
| 926 dispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom | |
| 927 to do things in this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain extent, we can | |
| 928 admit the existence of habits in dumb animals: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36): "We find the most untamed beasts, | |
| 929 deterred by fear of pain, from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we | |
| 930 say that they are tame and gentle." But the habit is incomplete, as to the use of the will, for they have not that power of | |
| 931 using or of refraining, which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no | |
| 932 habits in them. | |
| 933 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35649] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 934 dicendum quod vires sensitivae in brutis animalibus non operantur | |
| 935 ex imperio rationis; sed si sibi relinquantur bruta animalia, | |
| 936 operantur ex instinctu naturae. Et sic in brutis animalibus non | |
| 937 sunt aliqui habitus ordinati ad operationes. Sunt tamen in eis | |
| 938 aliquae dispositiones in ordine ad naturam, ut sanitas et | |
| 939 pulchritudo. Sed quia bruta animalia a ratione hominis per quandam | |
| 940 consuetudinem disponuntur ad aliquid operandum sic vel aliter, hoc | |
| 941 modo in brutis animalibus habitus quodammodo poni possunt, unde | |
| 942 Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>videmus | |
| 943 immanissimas bestias a maximis voluptatibus absterreri dolorum | |
| 944 metu, quod cum in earum consuetudinem verterit, domitae et | |
| 945 mansuetae vocantur</i>. Deficit tamen ratio habitus quantum ad usum | |
| 946 voluntatis, quia non habent dominium utendi vel non utendi, quod | |
| 947 videtur ad rationem habitus pertinere. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, | |
| 948 in eis habitus esse non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A3-p9"> | |
| 949 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: | |
| 950 but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is | |
| 951 more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since | |
| 952 in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at | |
| 953 the command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby | |
| 954 man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom | |
| 955 conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason. | |
| 956 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A3-p10"> On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are | |
| 957 ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for there are | |
| 958 no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements. | |
| 959 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35650] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 960 dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus natus est moveri ab appetitu | |
| 961 rationali, ut dicitur in III de anima, sed vires rationales | |
| 962 apprehensivae natae sunt accipere a viribus sensitivis. Et ideo | |
| 963 magis convenit quod habitus sint in viribus sensitivis appetitivis | |
| 964 quam in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis, cum in viribus sensitivis | |
| 965 appetitivis non sint habitus nisi secundum quod operantur ex | |
| 966 imperio rationis. Quamvis etiam in ipsis interioribus viribus | |
| 967 sensitivis apprehensivis possint poni aliqui habitus, secundum quos | |
| 968 homo fit bene memorativus vel cogitativus vel imaginativus, unde | |
| 969 etiam philosophus dicit, in cap. de memoria, quod <i>consuetudo | |
| 970 multum operatur ad bene memorandum</i>, quia etiam istae vires | |
| 971 moventur ad operandum ex imperio rationis. Vires autem | |
| 972 apprehensivae exteriores, ut visus et auditus et huiusmodi, non | |
| 973 sunt susceptivae aliquorum habituum, sed secundum dispositionem | |
| 974 suae naturae ordinantur ad suos actus determinatos; sicut et membra | |
| 975 corporis, in quibus non sunt habitus, sed magis in viribus | |
| 976 imperantibus motum ipsorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A4-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 4. Whether there is any habit in the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p2"> | |
| 977 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above | |
| 978 <a href="#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q50_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in De Anima i, text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But | |
| 979 the intellect is not an act of the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the intellect is not the subject of a habit. | |
| 980 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35651] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 981 sic proceditur. Videtur quod in intellectu non sint aliqui habitus. | |
| 982 Habitus enim operationibus conformantur, ut dictum est. Sed | |
| 983 operationes hominis sunt communes animae et corpori, ut dicitur in | |
| 984 I de anima. Ergo et habitus. Sed intellectus non est actus | |
| 985 corporis, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo intellectus non est | |
| 986 subiectum alicuius habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p3"> | |
| 987 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter, | |
| 988 is act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has potentiality and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at | |
| 989 the same time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is composed of matter and form. | |
| 990 Now the intellect is form without matter. Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the | |
| 991 same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in the "conjunction," which | |
| 992 is composed of soul and body. | |
| 993 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35652] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 994 omne quod est in aliquo, est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Sed | |
| 995 id quod est forma sine materia, est actus tantum, quod autem est | |
| 996 compositum ex forma et materia, habet potentiam et actum simul. | |
| 997 Ergo in eo quod est forma tantum, non potest esse aliquid quod sit | |
| 998 simul in potentia et actu, sed solum in eo quod est compositum ex | |
| 999 materia et forma. Sed intellectus est forma sine materia. Ergo | |
| 1000 habitus, qui habet potentiam simul cum actu, quasi medium inter | |
| 1001 utrumque existens, non potest esse in intellectu; sed solum in | |
| 1002 coniuncto, quod est compositum ex anima et corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p4"> | |
| 1003 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text. | |
| 1004 25). But that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore | |
| 1005 also it is stated (De Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick witted." Therefore the habits of | |
| 1006 knowledge are not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the act | |
| 1007 of some part of the body. | |
| 1008 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35653] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1009 habitus est dispositio secundum quam aliquis bene vel male | |
| 1010 disponitur ad aliquid, ut dicitur in V Metaph. Sed quod aliquis | |
| 1011 bene vel male sit dispositus ad actum intellectus, provenit ex | |
| 1012 aliqua corporis dispositione, unde etiam in II de anima dicitur | |
| 1013 quod <i>molles carne bene aptos mente videmus</i>. Ergo habitus | |
| 1014 cognoscitivi non sunt in intellectu, qui est separatus; sed in | |
| 1015 aliqua potentia quae est actus alicuius partis corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p5"> | |
| 1016 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the | |
| 1017 intellective part of the soul. | |
| 1018 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35654] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 1019 est quod philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit scientiam et sapientiam | |
| 1020 et intellectum, qui est habitus principiorum, in ipsa intellectiva | |
| 1021 parte animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p6"> | |
| 1022 <b>I answer that,</b> concerning intellective habits there have been various opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one "possible" [* | |
| 1023 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A2" id="FS_Q50_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[2]</a>, ad 2] intellect for all men, were bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in the interior | |
| 1024 sensitive powers. For it is manifest that men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly | |
| 1025 in that, which, being only one, would be common | |
| 1026 to all men. Wherefore if there were but one single "possible" intellect of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ | |
| 1027 from one another, could not be in the "possible" intellect as their subject, but would be in the interior sensitive powers, | |
| 1028 which differ in various men. | |
| 1029 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p7"> Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers | |
| 1030 are rational, not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, | |
| 1031 which are wisdom, science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. Wherefore they are not in the sensitive | |
| 1032 powers, but in the intellect itself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8,18) that when | |
| 1033 the "possible" intellect "is thus identified with each thing," that is, when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars | |
| 1034 by the intelligible species, "then it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this happens when the | |
| 1035 intellect can act of itself," i.e. by considering: "and even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not in the same way | |
| 1036 as before learning and discovering." Therefore the "possible" intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by | |
| 1037 which the | |
| 1038 intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the second place, this supposition is contrary | |
| 1039 to the truth. For as to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power to operate, belongs also the habit. But to understand | |
| 1040 and to consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in the intellect | |
| 1041 itself. | |
| 1042 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 co."><a name="35655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35655] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1043 dicendum quod circa habitus cognoscitivos diversimode sunt aliqui | |
| 1044 opinati. Quidam enim, ponentes intellectum possibilem esse unum in | |
| 1045 omnibus hominibus, coacti sunt ponere quod habitus cognoscitivi non | |
| 1046 sunt in ipso intellectu, sed in viribus interioribus sensitivis. | |
| 1047 Manifestum est enim quod homines in habitibus diversificantur, unde | |
| 1048 non possunt habitus cognoscitivi directe poni in eo quod, unum | |
| 1049 numero existens, est omnibus hominibus commune. Unde si intellectus | |
| 1050 possibilis sit unus numero omnium hominum, habitus scientiarum, | |
| 1051 secundum quos homines diversificantur, non poterunt esse in | |
| 1052 intellectu possibili sicut in subiecto, sed erunt in viribus | |
| 1053 interioribus sensitivis, quae sunt diversae in diversis. Sed ista | |
| 1054 positio, primo quidem, est contra intentionem Aristotelis. | |
| 1055 Manifestum est enim quod vires sensitivae non sunt rationales per | |
| 1056 essentiam, sed solum per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. | |
| 1057 Philosophus autem ponit intellectuales virtutes, quae sunt | |
| 1058 sapientia, scientia et intellectus, in eo quod est rationale per | |
| 1059 essentiam. Unde non sunt in viribus sensitivis, sed in ipso | |
| 1060 intellectu. Expresse etiam dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus | |
| 1061 possibilis, cum sic fiat singula, idest cum reducatur in actum | |
| 1062 singulorum per species intelligibiles, tunc fit secundum actum eo | |
| 1063 modo quo sciens dicitur esse in actu, quod quidem accidit cum | |
| 1064 aliquis possit operari per seipsum, scilicet considerando. Est | |
| 1065 quidem igitur et tunc potentia quodammodo; non tamen similiter ut | |
| 1066 ante addiscere aut invenire. Ipse ergo intellectus possibilis est | |
| 1067 in quo est habitus scientiae quo potest considerare etiam cum non | |
| 1068 considerat. Secundo etiam, haec positio est contra rei veritatem. | |
| 1069 Sicut enim eius est potentia cuius est operatio, ita etiam eius est | |
| 1070 habitus cuius est operatio. Intelligere autem et considerare est | |
| 1071 proprius actus intellectus. Ergo et habitus quo consideratur, est | |
| 1072 proprie in ipso intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p8"> | |
| 1073 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some said, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that, since every operation of man is to a certain | |
| 1074 extent an operation of the "conjunctum," as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul | |
| 1075 only, but in the "conjunctum." And from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, | |
| 1076 as ran the argument, given above. But the argument is no cogent. For habit is not a | |
| 1077 disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to | |
| 1078 be in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to the power as its object. | |
| 1079 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A4-p9"> Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in | |
| 1080 De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text. | |
| 1081 3,39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and not on the part of | |
| 1082 the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And therefore we must say that the "possible" intellect is the | |
| 1083 subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore the | |
| 1084 "possible" intellect is the subject of intellectual habits. | |
| 1085 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35656] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1086 ergo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt, ut Simplicius refert in | |
| 1087 commento praedicamentorum, quod quia omnis operatio hominis est | |
| 1088 quodammodo coniuncti, ut philosophus dicit in I de anima; ideo | |
| 1089 nullus habitus est animae tantum, sed coniuncti. Et per hoc | |
| 1090 sequitur quod nullus habitus sit in intellectu, cum intellectus sit | |
| 1091 separatus, ut ratio proposita procedebat. Sed ista ratio non cogit. | |
| 1092 Habitus enim non est dispositio obiecti ad potentiam, sed magis | |
| 1093 dispositio potentiae ad obiectum, unde habitus oportet quod sit in | |
| 1094 ipsa potentia quae est principium actus, non autem in eo quod | |
| 1095 comparatur ad potentiam sicut obiectum. Ipsum autem intelligere non | |
| 1096 dicitur commune esse animae et corpori, nisi ratione phantasmatis, | |
| 1097 ut dicitur in I de anima. Patet autem quod phantasma comparatur ad | |
| 1098 intellectum possibilem ut obiectum, ut dicitur in III de anima. | |
| 1099 Unde relinquitur quod habitus intellectivus sit principaliter ex | |
| 1100 parte ipsius intellectus, non autem ex parte phantasmatis, quod est | |
| 1101 commune animae et corpori. Et ideo dicendum est quod intellectus | |
| 1102 possibilis est subiectum habitus, illi enim competit esse subiectum | |
| 1103 habitus, quod est in potentia ad multa; et hoc maxime competit | |
| 1104 intellectui possibili. Unde intellectus possibilis est subiectum | |
| 1105 habituum intellectualium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p10"> | |
| 1106 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the "possible" | |
| 1107 intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the "possible" intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and | |
| 1108 perfect act. | |
| 1109 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35657] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1110 dicendum quod, sicut potentia ad esse sensibile convenit materiae | |
| 1111 corporali, ita potentia ad esse intelligibile convenit intellectui | |
| 1112 possibili. Unde nihil prohibet in intellectu possibili esse | |
| 1113 habitum, qui est medius inter puram potentiam et actum | |
| 1114 perfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A4-p11"> | |
| 1115 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the "possible intellect," therefore it is by the | |
| 1116 good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. | |
| 1117 And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the "possible" intellect. | |
| 1118 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35658] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1119 dicendum quod, quia vires apprehensivae interius praeparant | |
| 1120 intellectui possibili proprium obiectum; ideo ex bona dispositione | |
| 1121 harum virium, ad quam cooperatur bona dispositio corporis, redditur | |
| 1122 homo habilis ad intelligendum. Et sic habitus intellectivus | |
| 1123 secundario potest esse in istis viribus. Principaliter autem est in | |
| 1124 intellectu possibili.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A5-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 5. Whether any habit is in the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p2"> | |
| 1125 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, | |
| 1126 by means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does not act by means of species. Therefore the will is | |
| 1127 not the subject of habit. | |
| 1128 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35659] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 1129 sic proceditur. Videtur quod in voluntate non sit aliquis habitus. | |
| 1130 Habitus enim qui in intellectu est, sunt species intelligibiles, | |
| 1131 quibus intelligit actu. Sed voluntas non operatur per aliquas | |
| 1132 species. Ergo voluntas non est subiectum alicuius habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p3"> | |
| 1133 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as there is to the "possible" intellect, because the former is an | |
| 1134 active power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the powers to their acts, as stated above ( | |
| 1135 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q50_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore there is no habit in the will. | |
| 1136 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35660] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1137 in intellectu agente non ponitur aliquis habitus, sicut in | |
| 1138 intellectu possibili, quia est potentia activa. Sed voluntas est | |
| 1139 maxime potentia activa, quia movet omnes potentias ad suos actus, | |
| 1140 ut supra dictum est. Ergo in ipsa non est aliquis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p4"> | |
| 1141 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing. | |
| 1142 But the will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in | |
| 1143 the will. | |
| 1144 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35661] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1145 in potentiis naturalibus non est aliquis habitus, quia ex sua | |
| 1146 natura sunt ad aliquid determinatae. Sed voluntas ex sua natura | |
| 1147 ordinatur ad hoc quod tendat in bonum ordinatum ratione. Ergo in | |
| 1148 voluntate non est aliquis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p5"> | |
| 1149 <b>On the contrary,</b> Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just" (Ethic. v, | |
| 1150 1). Therefore the will is the subject of a habit. | |
| 1151 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35662] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 1152 est quod iustitia est habitus quidam. Sed iustitia est in | |
| 1153 voluntate, est enim iustitia <i>habitus secundum quem aliqui volunt | |
| 1154 et operantur iusta</i>, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo voluntas est | |
| 1155 subiectum alicuius habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p6"> | |
| 1156 <b>I answer that,</b> Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will | |
| 1157 is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit | |
| 1158 whereby it is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is clear that it is principally related | |
| 1159 to the will; inasmuch as habit "is that which one uses when one wills," as stated above | |
| 1160 | |
| 1161 <a href="#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q50_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. | |
| 1162 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 co."><a name="35663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35663] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1163 dicendum quod omnis potentia quae diversimode potest ordinari ad | |
| 1164 agendum, indiget habitu quo bene disponatur ad suum actum. Voluntas | |
| 1165 autem, cum sit potentia rationalis, diversimode potest ad agendum | |
| 1166 ordinari. Et ideo oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum ponere, quo | |
| 1167 bene disponatur ad suum actum. Ex ipsa etiam ratione habitus | |
| 1168 apparet quod habet quendam principalem ordinem ad voluntatem, prout | |
| 1169 habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p7"> | |
| 1170 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive | |
| 1171 power there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing | |
| 1172 but a certain inclination, as we have said above ( | |
| 1173 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A4" id="FS_Q50_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[4]</a>; | |
| 1174 <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A2" id="FS_Q50_A5-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[22], A[2]</a>). And therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the | |
| 1175 nature of the power itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of human life, | |
| 1176 that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has | |
| 1177 a relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there | |
| 1178 be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits. | |
| 1179 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35664] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1180 ergo dicendum quod, sicut in intellectu est aliqua species quae est | |
| 1181 similitudo obiecti, ita oportet in voluntate, et in qualibet vi | |
| 1182 appetitiva, esse aliquid quo inclinetur in suum obiectum, cum nihil | |
| 1183 aliud sit actus appetitivae virtutis quam inclinatio quaedam, ut | |
| 1184 supra dictum est. Ad ea ergo ad quae sufficienter inclinatur per | |
| 1185 naturam ipsius potentiae, non indiget aliqua qualitate inclinante. | |
| 1186 Sed quia necessarium est ad finem humanae vitae, quod vis | |
| 1187 appetitiva inclinetur in aliquid determinatum, ad quod non | |
| 1188 inclinatur ex natura potentiae, quae se habet ad multa et diversa; | |
| 1189 ideo necesse est quod in voluntate, et in aliis viribus | |
| 1190 appetitivis, sint quaedam qualitates inclinantes, quae dicuntur | |
| 1191 habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p8"> | |
| 1192 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active intellect is active only, and in no way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved | |
| 1193 (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs | |
| 1194 to that which is somehow in potentiality. | |
| 1195 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35665] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1196 dicendum quod intellectus agens est agens tantum, et nullo modo | |
| 1197 patiens. Sed voluntas, et quaelibet vis appetitiva, est movens | |
| 1198 motum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo non est similis ratio de | |
| 1199 utroque, nam esse susceptivum habitus convenit ei quod est | |
| 1200 quodammodo in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A5-p9"> | |
| 1201 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will from the very nature of the power inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, | |
| 1202 the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more | |
| 1203 promptly. | |
| 1204 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35666] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1205 dicendum quod voluntas ex ipsa natura potentiae inclinatur in bonum | |
| 1206 rationis. Sed quia hoc bonum multipliciter diversificatur, | |
| 1207 necessarium est ut ad aliquod determinatum bonum rationis voluntas | |
| 1208 per aliquem habitum inclinetur, ad hoc quod sequatur promptior | |
| 1209 operatio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q50_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q50_A6-p0.1">Q. 50. A. 6. Whether there are habits in the angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p2"> | |
| 1210 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It | |
| 1211 is not proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels) | |
| 1212 after the manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject: for accident of any kind is foreign | |
| 1213 to them." But every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels. | |
| 1214 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35667] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum | |
| 1215 sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Angelis non sint habitus. Dicit | |
| 1216 enim maximus, Commentator Dionysii, in VII cap. de Cael. Hier., non | |
| 1217 convenit arbitrari virtutes intellectuales, idest spirituales, more | |
| 1218 accidentium, quemadmodum et in nobis sunt, in divinis | |
| 1219 intellectibus, scilicet Angelis, esse, ut aliud in alio sit sicut | |
| 1220 in subiecto, accidens enim omne illinc repulsum est. Sed omnis | |
| 1221 habitus est accidens. Ergo in Angelis non sunt habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p3"> | |
| 1222 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other | |
| 1223 things, in God's goodness." But that which is of itself [per se] is prior to and more power than that which is by another | |
| 1224 [per aliud]. Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with God, and therefore not by means | |
| 1225 of habits. And this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage adds: | |
| 1226 "For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified | |
| 1227 of itself." | |
| 1228 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35668] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1229 sicut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Cael. Hier., <i>sanctae | |
| 1230 caelestium essentiarum dispositiones super omnia alia Dei bonitatem | |
| 1231 participant</i>. Sed semper quod est per se, est prius et potius eo | |
| 1232 quod est per aliud. Ergo Angelorum essentiae per seipsas | |
| 1233 perficiuntur ad conformitatem Dei. Non ergo per aliquos habitus. Et | |
| 1234 haec videtur esse ratio maximi, qui ibidem subdit, <i>si enim hoc | |
| 1235 esset, non utique maneret in semetipsa harum essentia, nec | |
| 1236 deificari per se, quantum foret possibile, valuisset</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p4"> | |
| 1237 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that | |
| 1238 which has parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in them. | |
| 1239 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35669] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1240 habitus est dispositio quaedam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Sed | |
| 1241 dispositio, ut ibidem dicitur, est ordo habentis partes. Cum ergo | |
| 1242 Angeli sint simplices substantiae, videtur quod in eis non sint | |
| 1243 dispositiones et habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p5"> | |
| 1244 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring | |
| 1245 of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits." | |
| 1246 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35670] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 1247 est quod Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod <i>Angeli | |
| 1248 primae hierarchiae nominantur calefacientes et throni et effusio | |
| 1249 sapientiae, manifestatio deiformis ipsorum habituum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p6"> | |
| 1250 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence | |
| 1251 Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential, | |
| 1252 through the absence of matter in them." And Simplicius says the same in his Commentary on the Predicaments: "Wisdom which | |
| 1253 is in the soul is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. For | |
| 1254 everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself." | |
| 1255 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p7"> Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is manifest from what we have said ( | |
| 1256 <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q50_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>) that only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are | |
| 1257 immaterial substances, and that there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded from them habit and | |
| 1258 any kind of accident. Yet since though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still | |
| 1259 some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, | |
| 1260 so far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance | |
| 1261 are not of the same kind. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that: "The habits of the intellectual | |
| 1262 substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it contains in | |
| 1263 itself." | |
| 1264 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p8"> However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the | |
| 1265 lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect | |
| 1266 of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But the angelic intellect is | |
| 1267 not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for | |
| 1268 this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. | |
| 1269 And therefore, as we said in the | |
| 1270 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q50_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[55], A[1]</a>, so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard | |
| 1271 to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself, | |
| 1272 and other things according to the mode of its | |
| 1273 substance, as stated in De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand. | |
| 1274 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p9"> But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order | |
| 1275 to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard | |
| 1276 to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "godlike," that is to say, that by them | |
| 1277 they are made like to God. | |
| 1278 </p><p id="FS_Q50_A6-p10"> But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in angels, since they are immaterial.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 co."><a name="35671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35671] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1279 dicendum quod quidam posuerunt in Angelis non esse habitus; sed | |
| 1280 quaecumque dicuntur de eis, essentialiter dicuntur. Unde maximus, | |
| 1281 post praedicta verba quae induximus, dicit, <i>habitudines earum, | |
| 1282 atque virtutes quae in eis sunt, essentiales sunt, propter | |
| 1283 immaterialitatem</i>. Et hoc etiam Simplicius dicit, in commento | |
| 1284 praedicamentorum, <i>sapientia quae est in anima, habitus est, quae | |
| 1285 autem in intellectu, substantia. Omnia enim quae sunt divina, et | |
| 1286 per se sufficientia sunt, et in seipsis existentia</i>. Quae quidem | |
| 1287 positio partim habet veritatem, et partim continet falsitatem. | |
| 1288 Manifestum est enim ex praemissis quod subiectum habitus non est | |
| 1289 nisi ens in potentia. Considerantes igitur praedicti commentatores | |
| 1290 quod Angeli sunt substantiae immateriales, et quod non est in illis | |
| 1291 potentia materiae; secundum hoc, ab eis habitum excluserunt, et | |
| 1292 omne accidens. Sed quia, licet in Angelis non sit potentia | |
| 1293 materiae, est tamen in eis aliqua potentia (esse enim actum purum | |
| 1294 est proprium Dei); ideo inquantum invenitur in eis de potentia, | |
| 1295 intantum in eis possunt habitus inveniri. Sed quia potentia | |
| 1296 materiae et potentia intellectualis substantiae non est unius | |
| 1297 rationis, ideo per consequens nec habitus unius rationis est | |
| 1298 utrobique. Unde Simplicius dicit, in commento praedicamentorum, | |
| 1299 quod <i>habitus intellectualis substantiae non sunt similes his qui | |
| 1300 sunt hic habitibus; sed magis sunt similes simplicibus et | |
| 1301 immaterialibus speciebus quas continet in seipsa</i>. Circa | |
| 1302 huiusmodi tamen habitum aliter se habet intellectus angelicus, et | |
| 1303 aliter intellectus humanus. Intellectus enim humanus, cum sit | |
| 1304 infimus in ordine intellectuum, est in potentia respectu omnium | |
| 1305 intelligibilium, sicut materia prima respectu omnium formarum | |
| 1306 sensibilium, et ideo ad omnia intelligenda indiget aliquo habitu. | |
| 1307 Sed intellectus angelicus non se habet sicut pura potentia in | |
| 1308 genere intelligibilium, sed sicut actus quidam, non autem sicut | |
| 1309 actus purus (hoc enim solius Dei est), sed cum permixtione alicuius | |
| 1310 potentiae, et tanto minus habet de potentialitate, quanto est | |
| 1311 superior. Et ideo, ut in primo dictum est, inquantum est in | |
| 1312 potentia, indiget perfici habitualiter per aliquas species | |
| 1313 intelligibiles ad operationem propriam, sed inquantum est actu, per | |
| 1314 essentiam suam potest aliqua intelligere, ad minus seipsum, et alia | |
| 1315 secundum modum suae substantiae, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis, et | |
| 1316 tanto perfectius, quanto est perfectior. Sed quia nullus Angelus | |
| 1317 pertingit ad perfectionem Dei, sed in infinitum distat; propter | |
| 1318 hoc, ad attingendum ad ipsum Deum per intellectum et voluntatem, | |
| 1319 indigent aliquibus habitibus, tanquam in potentia existentes | |
| 1320 respectu illius puri actus. Unde Dionysius dicit habitus eorum esse | |
| 1321 deiformes, quibus scilicet Deo conformantur. Habitus autem qui sunt | |
| 1322 dispositiones ad esse naturale, non sunt in Angelis, cum sint | |
| 1323 immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p11"> | |
| 1324 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of Maximus must be understood of material habits and accidents. | |
| 1325 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35672] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1326 ergo dicendum quod verbum maximi intelligendum est de habitibus et | |
| 1327 accidentibus materialibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p12"> | |
| 1328 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, | |
| 1329 as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far | |
| 1330 do they need to have habits. | |
| 1331 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35673] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1332 dicendum quod quantum ad hoc quod convenit Angelis per suam | |
| 1333 essentiam, non indigent habitu. Sed quia non ita sunt per seipsos | |
| 1334 entes, quin participent sapientiam et bonitatem divinam; ideo | |
| 1335 inquantum indigent participare aliquid ab exteriori, intantum | |
| 1336 necesse est in eis ponere habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q50_A6-p13"> | |
| 1337 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In angels there are no essential parts: but there are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by several | |
| 1338 species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several things. | |
| 1339 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 50 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35674] Iª-IIae q. 50 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1340 dicendum quod in Angelis non sunt partes essentiae, sed sunt partes | |
| 1341 secundum potentiam, inquantum intellectus eorum per plures species | |
| 1342 perficitur, et voluntas eorum se habet ad plura.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 1343 <div id="FS_Q51" class="div3"> | |
| 1344 <h3 id="FS_Q51-p0.1">Q. 51. OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 1345 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 1346 <p id="FS_Q51-p2"> We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as | |
| 1347 to their diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: | |
| 1348 </p><p id="FS_Q51-p3"><a href="#FS_Q51_A1"> (1) Whether any habit is from nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q51-p4"><a href="#FS_Q51_A2"> (2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q51-p5"><a href="#FS_Q51_A3"> (3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q51-p6"><a href="#FS_Q51_A4"> (4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?</a></p> | |
| 1349 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 pr."><a name="35675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35675] | |
| 1350 Iª-IIae q. 51 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa | |
| 1351 habituum. Et primo, quantum ad generationem ipsorum; secundo, | |
| 1352 quantum ad augmentum; tertio, quantum ad diminutionem et | |
| 1353 corruptionem. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum aliquis | |
| 1354 habitus sit a natura. Secundo, utrum aliquis habitus ex actibus | |
| 1355 causetur. Tertio, utrum per unum actum possit generari habitus. | |
| 1356 Quarto, utrum aliqui habitus sint in hominibus infusi a Deo.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 1357 <div id="FS_Q51_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A1-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 1. Whether any habit is from nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p2"> | |
| 1358 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. | |
| 1359 But habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on De Anima iii. Therefore habit is not from nature. | |
| 1360 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35676] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1361 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus sit a natura. Eorum | |
| 1362 enim quae sunt a natura, usus non subiacet voluntati. Sed habitus | |
| 1363 est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, ut dicit Commentator, in III de | |
| 1364 anima. Ergo habitus non est a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p3"> | |
| 1365 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore the | |
| 1366 habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one. | |
| 1367 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35677] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1368 natura non facit per duo quod per unum potest facere. Sed potentiae | |
| 1369 animae sunt a natura. Si igitur habitus potentiarum a natura | |
| 1370 essent, habitus et potentia essent unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p4"> | |
| 1371 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above ( | |
| 1372 <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q51_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is | |
| 1373 clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature. | |
| 1374 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35678] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1375 natura non deficit in necessariis. Sed habitus sunt necessarii ad | |
| 1376 bene operandum, ut supra dictum est. Si igitur habitus aliqui | |
| 1377 essent a natura, videtur quod natura non deficeret quin omnes | |
| 1378 habitus necessarios causaret. Patet autem hoc esse falsum. Ergo | |
| 1379 habitus non sunt a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p5"> | |
| 1380 <b>On the contrary,</b> In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature: wherefore | |
| 1381 also first principles are said to be known naturally. | |
| 1382 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35679] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 1383 est quod in VI Ethic., inter alios habitus ponitur intellectus | |
| 1384 principiorum, qui est a natura, unde et principia prima dicuntur | |
| 1385 naturaliter cognita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p6"> | |
| 1386 <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is natural | |
| 1387 to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural | |
| 1388 to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, | |
| 1389 in respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first, | |
| 1390 because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. | |
| 1391 For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine, | |
| 1392 health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle. | |
| 1393 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p7"> Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either | |
| 1394 of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without | |
| 1395 it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition has a certain latitude, | |
| 1396 it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the | |
| 1397 individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic | |
| 1398 principle, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art. | |
| 1399 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p8"> But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (Q[50], A[2]), | |
| 1400 may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in respect of the specific | |
| 1401 nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect | |
| 1402 of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way does it | |
| 1403 happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, | |
| 1404 since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said | |
| 1405 in the | |
| 1406 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FS_Q51_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[55], A[2]</a>; | |
| 1407 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A3" id="FS_Q51_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[3]</a>. | |
| 1408 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p9"> There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic | |
| 1409 principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive | |
| 1410 powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and in respect of the individual | |
| 1411 nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the | |
| 1412 understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that | |
| 1413 man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part: | |
| 1414 and in like manner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part---this he cannot know except | |
| 1415 through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end | |
| 1416 of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses. | |
| 1417 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p10"> But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from | |
| 1418 the disposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well, since we need the sensitive powers for | |
| 1419 the operation of the intellect. | |
| 1420 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p11"> In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance | |
| 1421 of the habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the principles of common law are called the "nurseries | |
| 1422 of virtue." The reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, | |
| 1423 does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers. | |
| 1424 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A1-p12"> But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. | |
| 1425 For some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or such like. | |
| 1426 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 co."><a name="35680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35680] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1427 dicendum quod aliquid potest esse naturale alicui dupliciter. Uno | |
| 1428 modo, secundum naturam speciei, sicut naturale est homini esse | |
| 1429 risibile, et igni ferri sursum. Alio modo, secundum naturam | |
| 1430 individui, sicut naturale est Socrati vel Platoni esse aegrotativum | |
| 1431 vel sanativum, secundum propriam complexionem. Rursus, secundum | |
| 1432 utramque naturam potest dici aliquid naturale dupliciter, uno modo, | |
| 1433 quia totum est a natura; alio modo, quia secundum aliquid est a | |
| 1434 natura, et secundum aliquid est ab exteriori principio. Sicut cum | |
| 1435 aliquis sanatur per seipsum, tota sanitas est a natura, cum autem | |
| 1436 aliquis sanatur auxilio medicinae, sanitas partim est a natura, | |
| 1437 partim ab exteriori principio. Sic igitur si loquamur de habitu | |
| 1438 secundum quod est dispositio subiecti in ordine ad formam vel | |
| 1439 naturam, quolibet praedictorum modorum contingit habitum esse | |
| 1440 naturalem. Est enim aliqua dispositio naturalis quae debetur | |
| 1441 humanae speciei, extra quam nullus homo invenitur. Et haec est | |
| 1442 naturalis secundum naturam speciei. Sed quia talis dispositio | |
| 1443 quandam latitudinem habet, contingit diversos gradus huiusmodi | |
| 1444 dispositionis convenire diversis hominibus secundum naturam | |
| 1445 individui. Et huiusmodi dispositio potest esse vel totaliter a | |
| 1446 natura, vel partim a natura et partim ab exteriori principio, sicut | |
| 1447 dictum est de his qui sanantur per artem. Sed habitus qui est | |
| 1448 dispositio ad operationem, cuius subiectum est potentia animae, ut | |
| 1449 dictum est, potest quidem esse naturalis et secundum naturam | |
| 1450 speciei, et secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam | |
| 1451 speciei, secundum quod se tenet ex parte ipsius animae, quae, cum | |
| 1452 sit forma corporis, est principium specificum. Secundum autem | |
| 1453 naturam individui, ex parte corporis, quod est materiale | |
| 1454 principium. Sed tamen neutro modo contingit in hominibus esse | |
| 1455 habitus naturales ita quod sint totaliter a natura. In Angelis | |
| 1456 siquidem contingit, eo quod habent species intelligibiles | |
| 1457 naturaliter inditas, quod non competit animae humanae, ut in primo | |
| 1458 dictum est. Sunt ergo in hominibus aliqui habitus naturales, | |
| 1459 tanquam partim a natura existentes et partim ab exteriori | |
| 1460 principio; aliter quidem in apprehensivis potentiis, et aliter in | |
| 1461 appetitivis. In apprehensivis enim potentiis potest esse habitus | |
| 1462 naturalis secundum inchoationem, et secundum naturam speciei, et | |
| 1463 secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, ex | |
| 1464 parte ipsius animae, sicut intellectus principiorum dicitur esse | |
| 1465 habitus naturalis. Ex ipsa enim natura animae intellectualis, | |
| 1466 convenit homini quod statim, cognito quid est totum et quid est | |
| 1467 pars, cognoscat quod omne totum est maius sua parte, et simile est | |
| 1468 in ceteris. Sed quid sit totum, et quid sit pars, cognoscere non | |
| 1469 potest nisi per species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus acceptas. | |
| 1470 Et propter hoc philosophus, in fine posteriorum, ostendit quod | |
| 1471 cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu. Secundum vero | |
| 1472 naturam individui, est aliquis habitus cognoscitivus secundum | |
| 1473 inchoationem naturalis, inquantum unus homo, ex dispositione | |
| 1474 organorum, est magis aptus ad bene intelligendum quam alius, | |
| 1475 inquantum ad operationem intellectus indigemus virtutibus | |
| 1476 sensitivis. In appetitivis autem potentiis non est aliquis habitus | |
| 1477 naturalis secundum inchoationem, ex parte ipsius animae, quantum ad | |
| 1478 ipsam substantiam habitus, sed solum quantum ad principia quaedam | |
| 1479 ipsius, sicut principia iuris communis dicuntur esse seminalia | |
| 1480 virtutum. Et hoc ideo, quia inclinatio ad obiecta propria, quae | |
| 1481 videtur esse inchoatio habitus, non pertinet ad habitum, sed magis | |
| 1482 pertinet ad ipsam rationem potentiarum. Sed ex parte corporis, | |
| 1483 secundum naturam individui, sunt aliqui habitus appetitivi secundum | |
| 1484 inchoationes naturales. Sunt enim quidam dispositi ex propria | |
| 1485 corporis complexione ad castitatem vel mansuetudinem, vel ad | |
| 1486 aliquid huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p13"> | |
| 1487 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection takes nature as divided against reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man. | |
| 1488 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35681] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1489 ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de natura secundum quod | |
| 1490 dividitur contra rationem et voluntatem, cum tamen ipsa ratio et | |
| 1491 voluntas ad naturam hominis pertineant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p14"> | |
| 1492 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something may be added even naturally to the nature of a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance, | |
| 1493 with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would | |
| 1494 have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by which something is known, must needs be the | |
| 1495 actual likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel | |
| 1496 knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things. Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels' | |
| 1497 intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood: for it is by participation of the | |
| 1498 Divine wisdom and not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those things which they understand. And so | |
| 1499 it is clear that not everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power. | |
| 1500 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35682] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1501 dicendum quod aliquid etiam naturaliter potest superaddi potentiae, | |
| 1502 quod tamen ad ipsam potentiam pertinere non potest. Sicut in | |
| 1503 Angelis non potest pertinere ad ipsam potentiam intellectivam quod | |
| 1504 sit per se cognoscitiva omnium, quia oporteret quod esset actus | |
| 1505 omnium, quod solius Dei est. Id enim quo aliquid cognoscitur, | |
| 1506 oportet esse actualem similitudinem eius quod cognoscitur, unde | |
| 1507 sequeretur, si potentia Angeli per seipsam cognosceret omnia, quod | |
| 1508 esset similitudo et actus omnium. Unde oportet quod superaddantur | |
| 1509 potentiae intellectivae ipsius aliquae species intelligibiles, quae | |
| 1510 sunt similitudines rerum intellectarum, quia per participationem | |
| 1511 divinae sapientiae, et non per essentiam propriam, possunt | |
| 1512 intellectus eorum esse actu ea quae intelligunt. Et sic patet quod | |
| 1513 non omne id quod pertinet ad habitum naturalem, potest ad potentiam | |
| 1514 pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A1-p15"> | |
| 1515 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some not, | |
| 1516 as we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some habits are natural, therefore all are natural. | |
| 1517 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35683] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1518 dicendum quod natura non aequaliter se habet ad causandas omnes | |
| 1519 diversitates habituum, quia quidam possunt causari a natura, quidam | |
| 1520 non, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non sequitur, si aliqui habitus | |
| 1521 sint naturales, quod omnes sint naturales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q51_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A2-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 2. Whether any habit is caused by acts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p2"> | |
| 1522 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit is a quality, as we have said above ( | |
| 1523 <a href="#FS_Q49_A1" id="FS_Q51_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[1]</a>). Now every quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity. Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts, | |
| 1524 does not receive but rather gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts. | |
| 1525 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35684] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1526 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus possit ex actu causari. | |
| 1527 Habitus enim est qualitas quaedam, ut supra dictum est. Omnis autem | |
| 1528 qualitas causatur in aliquo subiecto, inquantum est alicuius | |
| 1529 receptivum. Cum igitur agens ex hoc quod agit, non recipiat | |
| 1530 aliquid, sed magis ex se emittat; videtur quod non possit aliquis | |
| 1531 habitus in agente ex propriis actibus generari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p3"> | |
| 1532 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or | |
| 1533 cooled: whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If | |
| 1534 therefore habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, active and | |
| 1535 passive: which is impossible, as stated in Physics iii, 8. | |
| 1536 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35685] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1537 illud in quo causatur aliqua qualitas, movetur ad qualitatem illam, | |
| 1538 sicut patet in re calefacta vel infrigidata, quod autem producit | |
| 1539 actum causantem qualitatem, movet, ut patet de calefaciente vel | |
| 1540 infrigidante. Si igitur in aliquo causaretur habitus per actum sui | |
| 1541 ipsius, sequeretur quod idem esset movens et motum, agens et | |
| 1542 patiens. Quod est impossibile, ut dicitur in VII Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p4"> | |
| 1543 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as | |
| 1544 is clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes | |
| 1545 the habit. | |
| 1546 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35686] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1547 effectus non potest esse nobilior sua causa. Sed habitus est | |
| 1548 nobilior quam actus praecedens habitum, quod patet ex hoc, quod | |
| 1549 nobiliores actus reddit. Ergo habitus non potest causari ab actu | |
| 1550 praecedente habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p5"> | |
| 1551 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts. | |
| 1552 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35687] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 1553 est quod philosophus, in II Ethic., docet habitus virtutum et | |
| 1554 vitiorum ex actibus causari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p6"> | |
| 1555 <b>I answer that,</b> In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active principle | |
| 1556 of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed | |
| 1557 or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the | |
| 1558 passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the | |
| 1559 appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and | |
| 1560 further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident | |
| 1561 proposition. Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle, | |
| 1562 but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and | |
| 1563 moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed | |
| 1564 in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in | |
| 1565 the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect, | |
| 1566 according as it is moved by first propositions. | |
| 1567 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 co."><a name="35688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35688] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1568 dicendum quod in agente quandoque est solum activum principium sui | |
| 1569 actus, sicut in igne est solum principium activum calefaciendi. Et | |
| 1570 in tali agente non potest aliquis habitus causari ex proprio actu, | |
| 1571 et inde est quod res naturales non possunt aliquid consuescere vel | |
| 1572 dissuescere, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Invenitur autem aliquod agens | |
| 1573 in quo est principium activum et passivum sui actus, sicut patet in | |
| 1574 actibus humanis. Nam actus appetitivae virtutis procedunt a vi | |
| 1575 appetitiva secundum quod movetur a vi apprehensiva repraesentante | |
| 1576 obiectum, et ulterius vis intellectiva, secundum quod ratiocinatur | |
| 1577 de conclusionibus, habet sicut principium activum propositionem per | |
| 1578 se notam. Unde ex talibus actibus possunt in agentibus aliqui | |
| 1579 habitus causari, non quidem quantum ad primum activum principium, | |
| 1580 sed quantum ad principium actus quod movet motum. Nam omne quod | |
| 1581 patitur et movetur ab alio, disponitur per actum agentis, unde ex | |
| 1582 multiplicatis actibus generatur quaedam qualitas in potentia | |
| 1583 passiva et mota, quae nominatur habitus. Sicut habitus virtutum | |
| 1584 moralium causantur in appetitivis potentiis, secundum quod moventur | |
| 1585 a ratione, et habitus scientiarum causantur in intellectu, secundum | |
| 1586 quod movetur a primis propositionibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p7"> | |
| 1587 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something | |
| 1588 from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused. | |
| 1589 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35689] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1590 ergo dicendum quod agens, inquantum est agens, non recipit aliquid. | |
| 1591 Sed inquantum agit motum ab alio, sic recipit aliquid a movente, et | |
| 1592 sic causatur habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p8"> | |
| 1593 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself | |
| 1594 as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29. | |
| 1595 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35690] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1596 dicendum quod idem, secundum idem, non potest esse movens et motum. | |
| 1597 Nihil autem prohibet idem a seipso moveri secundum diversa, ut in | |
| 1598 VIII Physic. probatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A2-p9"> | |
| 1599 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle | |
| 1600 than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced | |
| 1601 in the appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than | |
| 1602 the science of conclusions. | |
| 1603 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35691] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1604 dicendum quod actus praecedens habitum inquantum procedit a | |
| 1605 principio activo, procedit a nobiliori principio quam sit habitus | |
| 1606 generatus, sicut ipsa ratio est nobilius principium quam sit | |
| 1607 habitus virtutis moralis in vi appetitiva per actuum consuetudines | |
| 1608 generatus; et intellectus principiorum est nobilius principium quam | |
| 1609 scientia conclusionum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q51_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A3-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 3. Whether a habit can be caused by one act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p2"> | |
| 1610 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit | |
| 1611 of one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act. | |
| 1612 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35692] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1613 sic proceditur. Videtur quod per unum actum possit habitus | |
| 1614 generari. Demonstratio enim actus rationis est. Sed per unam | |
| 1615 demonstrationem causatur scientia quae est habitus conclusionis | |
| 1616 unius. Ergo habitus potest causari ex uno actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p3"> | |
| 1617 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by | |
| 1618 multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it can be the generating cause of a habit. | |
| 1619 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35693] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1620 sicut contingit actus crescere per multiplicationem, ita contingit | |
| 1621 actum crescere per intensionem. Sed multiplicatis actibus, | |
| 1622 generatur habitus. Ergo etiam si multum intendatur unus actus, | |
| 1623 poterit esse causa generativa habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p4"> | |
| 1624 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act | |
| 1625 can cause a habit. | |
| 1626 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35694] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1627 sanitas et aegritudo sunt habitus quidam. Sed ex uno actu contingit | |
| 1628 hominem vel sanari vel infirmari. Ergo unus actus potest habitum | |
| 1629 causare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p5"> | |
| 1630 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short | |
| 1631 time make a man blessed and happy." But "happiness is an operation in respect of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13). | |
| 1632 Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act. | |
| 1633 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35695] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 1634 est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod <i>una hirundo ver | |
| 1635 non facit, nec una dies, ita utique nec beatum nec felicem una | |
| 1636 dies, nec paucum tempus. Sed beatitudo est operatio secundum | |
| 1637 habitum perfectae virtutis</i>, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo habitus | |
| 1638 virtutis, et eadem ratione alius habitus, non causatur per unum | |
| 1639 actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p6"> | |
| 1640 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said already | |
| 1641 <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q51_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, habit is caused by act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused | |
| 1642 in that which is passive the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that because fire cannot at | |
| 1643 once overcome the combustible, it does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that by overcoming | |
| 1644 it entirely, it may impress | |
| 1645 its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power | |
| 1646 in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a single act, | |
| 1647 what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely | |
| 1648 overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the | |
| 1649 habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many. | |
| 1650 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 co."><a name="35696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35696] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1651 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, habitus per actum generatur | |
| 1652 inquantum potentia passiva movetur ab aliquo principio activo. Ad | |
| 1653 hoc autem quod aliqua qualitas causetur in passivo, oportet quod | |
| 1654 activum totaliter vincat passivum. Unde videmus quod, quia ignis | |
| 1655 non potest statim vincere suum combustibile, non statim inflammat | |
| 1656 ipsum, sed paulatim abiicit contrarias dispositiones, ut sic | |
| 1657 totaliter vincens ipsum, similitudinem suam ipsi imprimat. | |
| 1658 Manifestum est autem quod principium activum quod est ratio, non | |
| 1659 totaliter potest supervincere appetitivam potentiam in uno actu, eo | |
| 1660 quod appetitiva potentia se habet diversimode et ad multa; | |
| 1661 iudicatur autem per rationem, in uno actu, aliquid appetendum | |
| 1662 secundum determinatas rationes et circumstantias. Unde ex hoc non | |
| 1663 totaliter vincitur appetitiva potentia, ut feratur in idem ut in | |
| 1664 pluribus, per modum naturae, quod pertinet ad habitum virtutis. Et | |
| 1665 ideo habitus virtutis non potest causari per unum actum, sed per | |
| 1666 multos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p7"> But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the "possible" [*See | |
| 1667 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A2" id="FS_Q51_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[2]</a> ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular | |
| 1668 reason," that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard then to the former passive principle, it is | |
| 1669 possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one | |
| 1670 act, the power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm | |
| 1671 assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many | |
| 1672 acts of the reason, even on the part of the "possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act | |
| 1673 of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same | |
| 1674 acts | |
| 1675 need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et | |
| 1676 Remin. 1) that "meditation strengthens memory." Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle | |
| 1677 is of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once. | |
| 1678 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> In apprehensivis autem potentiis considerandum est quod | |
| 1679 duplex est passivum, unum quidem ipse intellectus possibilis; aliud | |
| 1680 autem intellectus quem vocat Aristoteles passivum, qui est ratio | |
| 1681 particularis, idest vis cogitativa cum memorativa et imaginativa. | |
| 1682 Respectu igitur primi passivi, potest esse aliquod activum quod uno | |
| 1683 actu totaliter vincit potentiam sui passivi, sicut una propositio | |
| 1684 per se nota convincit intellectum ad assentiendum firmiter | |
| 1685 conclusioni; quod quidem non facit propositio probabilis. Unde ex | |
| 1686 multis actibus rationis oportet causari habitum opinativum, etiam | |
| 1687 ex parte intellectus possibilis, habitum autem scientiae possibile | |
| 1688 est causari ex uno rationis actu, quantum ad intellectum | |
| 1689 possibilem. Sed quantum ad inferiores vires apprehensivas, | |
| 1690 necessarium est eosdem actus pluries reiterari, ut aliquid firmiter | |
| 1691 memoriae imprimatur. Unde philosophus, in libro de memoria et | |
| 1692 reminiscentia, dicit quod <i>meditatio confirmat memoriam</i>. | |
| 1693 Habitus autem corporales possibile est causari ex uno actu, si | |
| 1694 activum fuerit magnae virtutis, sicut quandoque medicina fortis | |
| 1695 statim inducit sanitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A3-p8"> Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="35697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35697] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 1696 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q51_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q51_A4-p0.1">Q. 51. A. 4. Whether any habits are infused in man by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p2"> | |
| 1697 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, | |
| 1698 He would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue. | |
| 1699 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35698] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 1700 sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus hominibus infundatur a | |
| 1701 Deo. Deus enim aequaliter se habet ad omnes. Si igitur quibusdam | |
| 1702 infundit habitus aliquos, omnibus eos infunderet. Quod patet esse | |
| 1703 falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p3"> | |
| 1704 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works in all things according to the mode which is suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence | |
| 1705 to preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above | |
| 1706 | |
| 1707 <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q51_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts. | |
| 1708 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35699] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1709 Deus operatur in omnibus secundum modum qui convenit naturae | |
| 1710 ipsorum, quia divinae providentiae est naturam salvare, ut dicit | |
| 1711 Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed habitus in homine naturaliter | |
| 1712 causantur ex actibus, ut dictum est. Non ergo causat Deus in | |
| 1713 hominibus aliquos habitus absque actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p4"> | |
| 1714 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a like habit | |
| 1715 is caused" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Consequently there will be two habits of the same species in the same man, one acquired, the | |
| 1716 other infused. Now this seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a | |
| 1717 habit is not infused into man by God. | |
| 1718 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35700] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1719 si aliquis habitus a Deo infunditur, per illum habitum homo potest | |
| 1720 multos actus producere. Sed ex illis actibus causatur similis | |
| 1721 habitus, ut in II Ethic. dicitur. Sequitur ergo duos habitus | |
| 1722 eiusdem speciei esse in eodem, unum acquisitum, et alterum infusum. | |
| 1723 Quod videtur esse impossibile, non enim duae formae unius speciei | |
| 1724 possunt esse in eodem subiecto. Non ergo habitus aliquis infunditur | |
| 1725 homini a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p5"> | |
| 1726 <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written ( | |
| 1727 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q51_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:5</a>): "God filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding." Now wisdom and understanding are habits. Therefore some habits | |
| 1728 are infused into man by God. | |
| 1729 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35701] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 1730 est quod dicitur Eccli. XV, <i>implevit eum dominus spiritu | |
| 1731 sapientiae et intellectus</i>. Sed sapientia et intellectus quidam | |
| 1732 habitus sunt. Ergo aliqui habitus homini a Deo infunduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q51_A4-p6"> | |
| 1733 <b>I answer that,</b> Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons. | |
| 1734 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A4-p7"> The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human | |
| 1735 nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above ( | |
| 1736 <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q51_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[5]</a>). And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those | |
| 1737 habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except | |
| 1738 by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues. | |
| 1739 </p><p id="FS_Q51_A4-p8"> The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes, as we have said in | |
| 1740 the | |
| 1741 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A6" id="FS_Q51_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[105], A[6]</a>. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature | |
| 1742 could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can | |
| 1743 be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the | |
| 1744 science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly. | |
| 1745 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 co."><a name="35702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35702] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1746 dicendum quod duplici ratione aliqui habitus homini a Deo | |
| 1747 infunduntur. Prima ratio est, quia aliqui habitus sunt quibus homo | |
| 1748 bene disponitur ad finem excedentem facultatem humanae naturae, qui | |
| 1749 est ultima et perfecta hominis beatitudo, ut supra dictum est. Et | |
| 1750 quia habitus oportet esse proportionatos ei ad quod homo disponitur | |
| 1751 secundum ipsos, ideo necesse est quod etiam habitus ad huiusmodi | |
| 1752 finem disponentes, excedant facultatem humanae naturae. Unde tales | |
| 1753 habitus nunquam possunt homini inesse nisi ex infusione divina, | |
| 1754 sicut est de omnibus gratuitis virtutibus. Alia ratio est, quia | |
| 1755 Deus potest producere effectus causarum secundarum absque ipsis | |
| 1756 causis secundis, ut in primo dictum est. Sicut igitur quandoque, ad | |
| 1757 ostensionem suae virtutis, producit sanitatem absque naturali | |
| 1758 causa, quae tamen per naturam posset causari; ita etiam quandoque, | |
| 1759 ad ostendendam suam virtutem, infundit homini illos etiam habitus | |
| 1760 qui naturali virtute possunt causari. Sicut apostolis dedit | |
| 1761 scientiam Scripturarum et omnium linguarum, quam homines per | |
| 1762 studium vel consuetudinem acquirere possunt, licet non ita | |
| 1763 perfecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p9"> | |
| 1764 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to all, but in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, gives | |
| 1765 certain things to some, which He does not give to others. | |
| 1766 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35703] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1767 ergo dicendum quod Deus, quantum ad suam naturam, aequaliter se | |
| 1768 habet ad omnes, sed secundum ordinem suae sapientiae certa ratione | |
| 1769 quaedam tribuit aliquibus, quae non tribuit aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p10"> | |
| 1770 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows from | |
| 1771 this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature. | |
| 1772 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35704] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1773 dicendum quod hoc quod Deus in omnibus operatur secundum modum | |
| 1774 eorum, non excludit quin Deus quaedam operetur quae natura operari | |
| 1775 non potest, sed ex hoc sequitur quod nihil operatur contra id quod | |
| 1776 naturae convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q51_A4-p11"> | |
| 1777 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies | |
| 1778 of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he | |
| 1779 had before. | |
| 1780 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 51 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35705] Iª-IIae q. 51 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1781 dicendum quod actus qui producuntur ex habitu infuso, non causant | |
| 1782 aliquem habitum, sed confirmant habitum praeexistentem, sicut | |
| 1783 medicinalia remedia adhibita homini sano per naturam, non causant | |
| 1784 aliquam sanitatem, sed sanitatem prius habitam corroborant.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 1785 <div id="FS_Q52" class="div3"> | |
| 1786 <h3 id="FS_Q52-p0.1">Q. 52. OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 1787 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 1788 <p id="FS_Q52-p2"> We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q52-p3"><a href="#FS_Q52_A1"> (1) Whether habits increase?</a></p><p id="FS_Q52-p4"><a href="#FS_Q52_A2"> (2) Whether they increase by addition?</a></p><p id="FS_Q52-p5"><a href="#FS_Q52_A3"> (3) Whether each act increases the habit?</a></p> | |
| 1789 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 pr."><a name="35706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35706] | |
| 1790 Iª-IIae q. 52 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 1791 augmento habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum | |
| 1792 habitus augeantur. Secundo, utrum augeantur per additionem. Tertio, | |
| 1793 utrum quilibet actus augeat habitum.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 1794 <div id="FS_Q52_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q52_A1-p0.1">Q. 52. A. 1. Whether habits increase?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p2"> | |
| 1795 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the | |
| 1796 genus quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of habits. | |
| 1797 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35707] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 1798 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus augeri non possint. Augmentum | |
| 1799 enim est circa quantitatem, ut dicitur in V Physic. Sed habitus non | |
| 1800 sunt in genere quantitatis, sed in genere qualitatis. Ergo circa | |
| 1801 eos augmentum esse non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p3"> | |
| 1802 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems | |
| 1803 that it cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase. | |
| 1804 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35708] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1805 habitus est perfectio quaedam, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Sed | |
| 1806 perfectio, cum importet finem et terminum, non videtur posse | |
| 1807 recipere magis et minus. Ergo habitus augeri non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p4"> | |
| 1808 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which can be more or less are subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more | |
| 1809 hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits | |
| 1810 cannot increase. | |
| 1811 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35709] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1812 in his quae recipiunt magis et minus, contingit esse alterationem, | |
| 1813 alterari enim dicitur quod de minus calido fit magis calidum. Sed | |
| 1814 in habitibus non est alteratio, ut probatur in VII Physic. Ergo | |
| 1815 habitus augeri non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p5"> | |
| 1816 <b>On the contrary,</b> Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the disciples said to our Lord ( | |
| 1817 <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q52_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.5" target="asv">Lk. 17:5</a>): "Lord, increase our faith." Therefore habits increase. | |
| 1818 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35710] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 1819 est quod fides est quidam habitus, et tamen augetur, unde discipuli | |
| 1820 domino dicunt, domine, adauge nobis fidem, ut habetur Luc. XVII. | |
| 1821 Ergo habitus augentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p6"> | |
| 1822 <b>I answer that,</b> Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, | |
| 1823 on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal | |
| 1824 quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain | |
| 1825 quantity is reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so | |
| 1826 also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, therefore "in things | |
| 1827 which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8). | |
| 1828 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p7"> Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of | |
| 1829 the participation of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect of the form itself, | |
| 1830 thus the form is said to be "little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science. But in so far as we consider | |
| 1831 the perfection of a form in respect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or | |
| 1832 "less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form | |
| 1833 has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature, | |
| 1834 and another to consider it in respect of its participation by a subject. | |
| 1835 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p8"> In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as | |
| 1836 Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the other Platonists held that qualities and habits | |
| 1837 themselves were susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and so had a certain want of definiteness, | |
| 1838 on account of the infinity of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves | |
| 1839 were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect | |
| 1840 of the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes | |
| 1841 to this opinion in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding | |
| 1842 opinions. For they held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that | |
| 1843 some are not, as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible | |
| 1844 of more or less, but that material forms are. | |
| 1845 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p9"> In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, | |
| 1846 must be something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for whatever attains to that thing, is contained under | |
| 1847 the species, and whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher | |
| 1848 says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or | |
| 1849 subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, | |
| 1850 or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature, | |
| 1851 which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are not denominated from a relation | |
| 1852 to something else: and much more so, substance, which is "per se" being. But those things which receive their species | |
| 1853 from something to which they are related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and nonetheless | |
| 1854 they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness of that to which they are related, and from which they receive | |
| 1855 their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on | |
| 1856 account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to | |
| 1857 the nature of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which various dispositions may | |
| 1858 be suitable; which disposition is therefore variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health remains. Whence | |
| 1859 the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it | |
| 1860 always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health." | |
| 1861 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p10"> Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were | |
| 1862 given to the most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or less. Thus therefore it is clear how a | |
| 1863 quality or form may increase or decrease of itself, and how it cannot. | |
| 1864 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p11"> But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by the subject, thus again we find that some qualities | |
| 1865 and forms are susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the cause of this diversity to the fact that | |
| 1866 substance in itself cannot be susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And therefore every form which is | |
| 1867 participated substantially by its subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus of | |
| 1868 substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, | |
| 1869 therefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. | |
| 1870 15) that when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made. But other qualities which are | |
| 1871 further removed from quantity, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less, in respect | |
| 1872 of their participation by the subject. | |
| 1873 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p12"> Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives | |
| 1874 its species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible. Wherefore in two ways it may happen that | |
| 1875 a form cannot be participated more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect of that form. And for | |
| 1876 this reason no substantial form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, | |
| 1877 text. 10) that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is in the species of substance," that is, in | |
| 1878 respect of its participation of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter," i.e. in respect of material | |
| 1879 dispositions, "more or less are found in substance." | |
| 1880 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p13"> Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, | |
| 1881 it must needs participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do not speak of the species of number as | |
| 1882 varying in respect of more or less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible unity. The same is to be | |
| 1883 said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long, | |
| 1884 three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon. | |
| 1885 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p14"> This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments (Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible | |
| 1886 of more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": | |
| 1887 to wit, because indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever participates their nature must participate | |
| 1888 it in its indivisibility. | |
| 1889 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p15"> It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. | |
| 1890 17), that in two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: | |
| 1891 thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, | |
| 1892 in respect of participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is participated more | |
| 1893 in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition | |
| 1894 do not give species to the subject: nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility. | |
| 1895 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A1-p16"> We shall say further on ( | |
| 1896 <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q52_A1-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[1]</a>) how it is with the virtues. | |
| 1897 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 co."><a name="35711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35711] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 1898 dicendum quod augmentum, sicut et alia ad quantitatem pertinentia, | |
| 1899 a quantitatibus corporalibus ad res spirituales intelligibiles | |
| 1900 transfertur; propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad res | |
| 1901 corporeas, quae sub imaginatione cadunt. Dicitur autem in | |
| 1902 quantitatibus corporeis aliquid magnum, secundum quod ad debitam | |
| 1903 perfectionem quantitatis perducitur, unde aliqua quantitas | |
| 1904 reputatur magna in homine, quae non reputatur magna in elephante. | |
| 1905 Unde et in formis dicimus aliquid magnum, ex hoc quod est | |
| 1906 perfectum. Et quia bonum habet rationem perfecti, propter hoc <i>in | |
| 1907 his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius</i>, | |
| 1908 ut Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin. Perfectio autem formae | |
| 1909 dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo, secundum ipsam formam; | |
| 1910 alio modo, secundum quod subiectum participat formam. Inquantum | |
| 1911 igitur attenditur perfectio formae secundum ipsam formam, sic | |
| 1912 dicitur ipsa esse parva vel magna; puta magna vel parva sanitas vel | |
| 1913 scientia. Inquantum vero attenditur perfectio formae secundum | |
| 1914 participationem subiecti, dicitur magis et minus; puta magis vel | |
| 1915 minus album vel sanum. Non autem ista distinctio procedit secundum | |
| 1916 hoc, quod forma habeat esse praeter materiam aut subiectum, sed | |
| 1917 quia alia est consideratio eius secundum rationem speciei suae, et | |
| 1918 alia secundum quod participatur in subiecto. Secundum hoc igitur, | |
| 1919 circa intensionem et remissionem habituum et formarum, fuerunt | |
| 1920 quatuor opiniones apud philosophos, ut Simplicius narrat in | |
| 1921 commento praedicamentorum. Plotinus enim et alii Platonici ponebant | |
| 1922 ipsas qualitates et habitus suscipere magis et minus, propter hoc | |
| 1923 quod materiales erant, et ex hoc habebant indeterminationem | |
| 1924 quandam, propter materiae infinitatem. Alii vero in contrarium | |
| 1925 ponebant quod ipsae qualitates et habitus secundum se non | |
| 1926 recipiebant magis et minus; sed qualia dicuntur magis et minus, | |
| 1927 secundum diversam participationem; puta quod iustitia non dicatur | |
| 1928 magis et minus, sed iustum. Et hanc opinionem tangit Aristoteles in | |
| 1929 praedicamentis. Tertia fuit opinio Stoicorum, media inter has. | |
| 1930 Posuerunt enim quod aliqui habitus secundum se recipiunt magis et | |
| 1931 minus, sicuti artes; quidam autem non, sicut virtutes. Quarta | |
| 1932 opinio fuit quorundam dicentium quod qualitates et formae | |
| 1933 immateriales non recipiunt magis et minus, materiales autem | |
| 1934 recipiunt. Ut igitur huius rei veritas manifestetur, considerandum | |
| 1935 est quod illud secundum quod sortitur aliquid speciem, oportet esse | |
| 1936 fixum et stans, et quasi indivisibile, quaecumque enim ad illud | |
| 1937 attingunt, sub specie continentur; quaecumque autem recedunt ab | |
| 1938 illo, vel in plus vel in minus, pertinent ad aliam speciem, vel | |
| 1939 perfectiorem vel imperfectiorem. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII | |
| 1940 Metaphys., quod species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus additio | |
| 1941 vel diminutio variat speciem. Si igitur aliqua forma, vel | |
| 1942 quaecumque res, secundum seipsam vel secundum aliquid sui, | |
| 1943 sortiatur rationem speciei; necesse est quod, secundum se | |
| 1944 considerata, habeat determinatam rationem, quae neque in plus | |
| 1945 excedere, neque in minus deficere possit. Et huiusmodi sunt calor | |
| 1946 et albedo, et aliae huiusmodi qualitates quae non dicuntur in | |
| 1947 ordine ad aliud, et multo magis substantia, quae est per se ens. | |
| 1948 Illa vero quae recipiunt speciem ex aliquo ad quod ordinantur, | |
| 1949 possunt secundum seipsa diversificari in plus vel in minus, et | |
| 1950 nihilominus sunt eadem specie, propter unitatem eius ad quod | |
| 1951 ordinantur, ex quo recipiunt speciem. Sicut motus secundum se est | |
| 1952 intensior et remissior, et tamen remanet eadem species, propter | |
| 1953 unitatem termini, ex quo specificatur. Et idem potest considerari | |
| 1954 in sanitate, nam corpus pertingit ad rationem sanitatis, secundum | |
| 1955 quod habet dispositionem convenientem naturae animalis, cui possunt | |
| 1956 dispositiones diversae convenientes esse; unde potest variari | |
| 1957 dispositio in plus vel in minus, et tamen semper remanet ratio | |
| 1958 sanitatis. Unde philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod <i>sanitas | |
| 1959 ipsa recipit magis et minus, non enim eadem est commensuratio in | |
| 1960 omnibus, neque in uno et eodem semper; sed remissa permanet sanitas | |
| 1961 usque ad aliquid</i>. Huiusmodi autem diversae dispositiones vel | |
| 1962 commensurationes sanitatis se habent secundum excedens et excessum, | |
| 1963 unde si nomen sanitatis esset impositum soli perfectissimae | |
| 1964 commensurationi, tunc ipsa sanitas non diceretur maior vel minor. | |
| 1965 Sic igitur patet qualiter aliqua qualitas vel forma possit secundum | |
| 1966 seipsam augeri vel minui, et qualiter non. Si vero consideremus | |
| 1967 qualitatem vel formam secundum participationem subiecti, sic etiam | |
| 1968 inveniuntur quaedam qualitates et formae recipere magis et minus, | |
| 1969 et quaedam non. Huiusmodi autem diversitatis causam Simplicius | |
| 1970 assignat ex hoc, quod substantia secundum seipsam non potest | |
| 1971 recipere magis et minus, quia est ens per se. Et ideo omnis forma | |
| 1972 quae substantialiter participatur in subiecto, caret intensione et | |
| 1973 remissione, unde in genere substantiae nihil dicitur secundum magis | |
| 1974 et minus. Et quia quantitas propinqua est substantiae, et figura | |
| 1975 etiam consequitur quantitatem; inde est quod neque etiam in istis | |
| 1976 dicitur aliquid secundum magis aut minus. Unde philosophus dicit, | |
| 1977 in VII Physic., quod cum aliquid accipit formam et figuram, non | |
| 1978 dicitur alterari, sed magis fieri. Aliae vero qualitates, quae sunt | |
| 1979 magis distantes a substantia, et coniunguntur passionibus et | |
| 1980 actionibus, recipiunt magis et minus secundum participationem | |
| 1981 subiecti. Potest autem et magis explicari huiusmodi diversitatis | |
| 1982 ratio. Ut enim dictum est, id a quo aliquid habet speciem, oportet | |
| 1983 manere fixum et stans in indivisibili. Duobus igitur modis potest | |
| 1984 contingere quod forma non participatur secundum magis et minus. Uno | |
| 1985 modo, quia participans habet speciem secundum ipsam. Et inde est | |
| 1986 quod nulla forma substantialis participatur secundum magis et | |
| 1987 minus. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod, | |
| 1988 sicut numerus non habet magis neque minus, sic neque substantia | |
| 1989 quae est secundum speciem, idest quantum ad participationem formae | |
| 1990 specificae; sed si quidem quae cum materia, idest, secundum | |
| 1991 materiales dispositiones invenitur magis et minus in substantia. | |
| 1992 Alio modo potest contingere ex hoc quod ipsa indivisibilitas est de | |
| 1993 ratione formae, unde oportet quod, si aliquid participet formam | |
| 1994 illam, quod participet illam secundum rationem indivisibilitatis. | |
| 1995 Et inde est quod species numeri non dicuntur secundum magis et | |
| 1996 minus, quia unaquaeque species in eis constituitur per | |
| 1997 indivisibilem unitatem. Et eadem ratio est de speciebus quantitatis | |
| 1998 continuae quae secundum numeros accipiuntur ut bicubitum et | |
| 1999 tricubitum; et de relationibus, ut duplum et triplum; et de | |
| 2000 figuris, ut trigonum et tetragonum. Et hanc rationem ponit | |
| 2001 Aristoteles in praedicamentis, ubi, assignans rationem quare | |
| 2002 figurae non recipiunt magis et minus, dicit, <i>quae quidem enim | |
| 2003 recipiunt trigoni rationem et circuli, similiter trigona vel | |
| 2004 circuli sunt</i>, quia scilicet indivisibilitas est de ipsa eorum | |
| 2005 ratione, unde quaecumque participant rationem eorum, oportet quod | |
| 2006 indivisibiliter participent. Sic igitur patet quod, cum habitus et | |
| 2007 dispositiones dicantur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, ut dicitur in | |
| 2008 VII Physic., dupliciter potest intensio et remissio in habitibus et | |
| 2009 dispositionibus considerari. Uno modo, secundum se, prout dicitur | |
| 2010 maior vel minor sanitas; vel maior vel minor scientia, quae ad | |
| 2011 plura vel pauciora se extendit. Alio modo, secundum participationem | |
| 2012 subiecti, prout scilicet aequalis scientia vel sanitas magis | |
| 2013 recipitur in uno quam in alio, secundum diversam aptitudinem vel ex | |
| 2014 natura vel ex consuetudine. Non enim habitus et dispositio dat | |
| 2015 speciem subiecto, neque iterum in sui ratione includit | |
| 2016 indivisibilitatem. Quomodo autem circa virtutes se habeat, infra | |
| 2017 dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p17"> | |
| 2018 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the word "great" is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so also is the | |
| 2019 word "growth," the term of which is something great. | |
| 2020 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35712] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2021 ergo dicendum quod, sicut nomen magnitudinis derivatur a | |
| 2022 quantitatibus corporalibus ad intelligibiles perfectiones formarum; | |
| 2023 ita etiam et nomen augmenti, cuius terminus est magnum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p18"> | |
| 2024 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the subject | |
| 2025 its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore | |
| 2026 there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less. | |
| 2027 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35713] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2028 dicendum quod habitus quidem perfectio est, non tamen talis | |
| 2029 perfectio quae sit terminus sui subiecti, puta dans ei esse | |
| 2030 specificum. Neque etiam in sui ratione terminum includit, sicut | |
| 2031 species numerorum. Unde nihil prohibet quin recipiat magis et | |
| 2032 minus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A1-p19"> | |
| 2033 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first | |
| 2034 species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. | |
| 2035 In like manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, | |
| 2036 an alteration follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20). | |
| 2037 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35714] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2038 dicendum quod alteratio primo quidem est in qualitatibus tertiae | |
| 2039 speciei. In qualitatibus vero primae speciei potest esse alteratio | |
| 2040 per posterius, facta enim alteratione secundum calidum et frigidum, | |
| 2041 sequitur animal alterari secundum sanum et aegrum. Et similiter, | |
| 2042 facta alteratione secundum passiones appetitus sensitivi, vel | |
| 2043 secundum vires sensitivas apprehensivas, sequitur alteratio | |
| 2044 secundum scientias et virtutes, ut dicitur in VII Physic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q52_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q52_A2-p0.1">Q. 52. A. 2. Whether habits increases by addition?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p2"> | |
| 2045 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred | |
| 2046 to forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. | |
| 2047 i, text. 31) it is said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing." Therefore in habits also there is | |
| 2048 no increase without addition. | |
| 2049 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35715] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2050 sic proceditur. Videtur quod augmentum habituum fiat per | |
| 2051 additionem. Nomen enim augmenti, ut dictum est, a quantitatibus | |
| 2052 corporalibus transfertur ad formas. Sed in quantitatibus | |
| 2053 corporalibus non fit augmentum sine additione, unde in I de | |
| 2054 Generat. dicitur quod <i>augmentum est praeexistenti magnitudini | |
| 2055 additamentum</i>. Ergo et in habitibus non fit augmentum nisi per | |
| 2056 additionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p3"> | |
| 2057 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habit is not increased except by means of some agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for | |
| 2058 instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase without addition. | |
| 2059 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35716] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2060 habitus non augetur nisi aliquo agente. Sed omne agens aliquid | |
| 2061 facit in subiecto patiente, sicut calefaciens facit calorem in ipso | |
| 2062 calefacto. Ergo non potest esse augmentum nisi aliqua fiat | |
| 2063 additio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p4"> | |
| 2064 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be | |
| 2065 more white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less | |
| 2066 white, is not made more white, except by an added whiteness. | |
| 2067 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35717] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2068 sicut id quod non est album, est in potentia ad album; ita id quod | |
| 2069 est minus album, est in potentia ad magis album. Sed id quod non | |
| 2070 est album, non fit album nisi per adventum albedinis. Ergo id quod | |
| 2071 est minus album, non fit magis album nisi per aliquam aliam | |
| 2072 albedinem supervenientem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p5"> | |
| 2073 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot, | |
| 2074 that was not hot, when the thing was less hot." Therefore, in like manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when | |
| 2075 they increase. | |
| 2076 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35718] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2077 est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Physic., <i>ex calido fit magis | |
| 2078 calidum, nullo facto in materia calido, quod non esset calidum | |
| 2079 quando erat minus calidum</i>. Ergo, pari ratione, nec in aliis | |
| 2080 formis quae augentur, est aliqua additio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p6"> | |
| 2081 <b>I answer that,</b> The solution of this question depends on what we have said above | |
| 2082 <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. For we said that increase and decrease in forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way not on | |
| 2083 the part of the very form considered in itself, through the diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase | |
| 2084 of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form; but by the subject participating more or | |
| 2085 less perfectly, one and the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is made actually hot, beginning, | |
| 2086 as it were, to participate a form, not as though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text. 32, so, by | |
| 2087 an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot, as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though | |
| 2088 something were added to the form. | |
| 2089 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p7"> For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition, this could only be either in the form itself or in | |
| 2090 the subject. If it be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated | |
| 2091 <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that such an addition or subtraction would change the species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from | |
| 2092 being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be understood as applying to the subject, this could only be | |
| 2093 either because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man | |
| 2094 who, after being cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because some other subject is added sharing in | |
| 2095 the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in either of these two ways we | |
| 2096 have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a greater white or hot thing. | |
| 2097 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p8"> Since, however, as stated above | |
| 2098 <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, certain accidents are of themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find increase by addition. For | |
| 2099 movement increases by an addition either to the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species remains the | |
| 2100 same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i.e. | |
| 2101 in so far as the same movement can be executed more | |
| 2102 or less speedily or readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone learns several conclusions | |
| 2103 of geometry, the same specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science increases, as to the subject's | |
| 2104 participation thereof, in intensity, in so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering the same conclusions. | |
| 2105 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p9"> As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said | |
| 2106 to be simply healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect measure, this | |
| 2107 is the result of a change in the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity on the part of | |
| 2108 the subject partaking of them. | |
| 2109 </p><p id="FS_Q52_A2-p10"> How this question affects virtues we shall state further on ( | |
| 2110 <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q52_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[1]</a> ). | |
| 2111 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 co."><a name="35719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35719] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2112 dicendum quod huius quaestionis solutio dependet ex praemissa. | |
| 2113 Dictum est enim supra quod augmentum et diminutio in formis quae | |
| 2114 intenduntur et remittuntur, accidit uno modo non ex parte ipsius | |
| 2115 formae secundum se consideratae, sed ex diversa participatione | |
| 2116 subiecti. Et ideo huiusmodi augmentum habituum et aliarum formarum, | |
| 2117 non fit per additionem formae ad formam; sed fit per hoc quod | |
| 2118 subiectum magis vel minus perfecte participat unam et eandem | |
| 2119 formam. Et sicut per agens quod est actu, fit aliquid actu calidum, | |
| 2120 quasi de novo incipiens participare formam, non quod fiat ipsa | |
| 2121 forma, ut probatur VII Metaphys.; ita per actionem intensam ipsius | |
| 2122 agentis efficitur magis calidum, tanquam perfectius participans | |
| 2123 formam, non tanquam formae aliquid addatur. Si enim per additionem | |
| 2124 intelligeretur huiusmodi augmentum in formis, hoc non posset esse | |
| 2125 nisi vel ex parte ipsius formae, vel ex parte subiecti. Si autem ex | |
| 2126 parte ipsius formae, iam dictum est quod talis additio vel | |
| 2127 subtractio speciem variaret; sicut variatur species coloris, quando | |
| 2128 de pallido fit album. Si vero huiusmodi additio intelligatur ex | |
| 2129 parte subiecti, hoc non posset esse nisi vel quia aliqua pars | |
| 2130 subiecti recipit formam quam prius non habebat, ut si dicatur | |
| 2131 frigus crescere in homine qui prius frigebat in una parte, quando | |
| 2132 iam in pluribus partibus friget, vel quia aliquod aliud subiectum | |
| 2133 additur participans eandem formam, sicut si calidum adiungatur | |
| 2134 calido, vel album albo. Sed secundum utrumque istorum duorum | |
| 2135 modorum, non dicitur aliquid magis album vel calidum, sed maius. | |
| 2136 Sed quia quaedam accidentia augentur secundum seipsa, ut supra | |
| 2137 dictum est, in quibusdam eorum fieri potest augmentum per | |
| 2138 additionem. Augetur enim motus per hoc quod ei aliquid additur vel | |
| 2139 secundum tempus in quo est, vel secundum viam per quam est, et | |
| 2140 tamen manet eadem species, propter unitatem termini. Augetur etiam | |
| 2141 nihilominus motus per intensionem, secundum participationem | |
| 2142 subiecti, inquantum scilicet idem motus potest vel magis vel minus | |
| 2143 expedite aut prompte fieri. Similiter etiam et scientia potest | |
| 2144 augeri secundum seipsam per additionem, sicut cum aliquis plures | |
| 2145 conclusiones geometriae addiscit, augetur in eo habitus eiusdem | |
| 2146 scientiae secundum speciem. Augetur nihilominus scientia in aliquo, | |
| 2147 secundum participationem subiecti, per intensionem, prout scilicet | |
| 2148 expeditius et clarius unus homo se habet alio in eisdem | |
| 2149 conclusionibus considerandis. In habitibus autem corporalibus non | |
| 2150 multum videtur fieri augmentum per additionem. Quia non dicitur | |
| 2151 animal sanum simpliciter, aut pulchrum, nisi secundum omnes partes | |
| 2152 suas sit tale. Quod autem ad perfectiorem commensurationem | |
| 2153 perducatur, hoc contingit secundum transmutationem simplicium | |
| 2154 qualitatum; quae non augentur nisi secundum intensionem, ex parte | |
| 2155 subiecti participantis. Quomodo autem se habeat circa virtutes, | |
| 2156 infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p11"> | |
| 2157 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First, by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living things. | |
| 2158 Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated | |
| 2159 in Phys. iv, text. 63. | |
| 2160 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35720] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2161 ergo dicendum quod etiam in magnitudine corporali contingit | |
| 2162 dupliciter esse augmentum. Uno modo, per additionem subiecti ad | |
| 2163 subiectum; sicut est in augmento viventium. Alio modo, per solam | |
| 2164 intensionem, absque omni additione; sicut est in his quae | |
| 2165 rarefiunt, ut dicitur in IV Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p12"> | |
| 2166 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The cause that increases a habit, always effects something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject | |
| 2167 to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to extend further. | |
| 2168 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35721] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2169 dicendum quod causa augens habitum, facit quidem semper aliquid in | |
| 2170 subiecto, non autem novam formam. Sed facit quod subiectum | |
| 2171 perfectius participet formam praeexistentem, aut quod amplius se | |
| 2172 extendat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A2-p13"> | |
| 2173 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> What is not already white, is potentially white, as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a new | |
| 2174 form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in potentiality to those forms, since it has them already | |
| 2175 actually: but it is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it receives through the agent's action. | |
| 2176 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35722] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2177 dicendum quod id quod nondum est album, est in potentia ad formam | |
| 2178 ipsam, tanquam nondum habens formam, et ideo agens causat novam | |
| 2179 formam in subiecto. Sed id quod est minus calidum aut album, non | |
| 2180 est in potentia ad formam, cum iam actu formam habeat, sed est in | |
| 2181 potentia ad perfectum participationis modum. Et hoc consequitur per | |
| 2182 actionem agentis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q52_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q52_A3-p0.1">Q. 52. A. 3. Whether every act increases its habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p2"> | |
| 2183 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes | |
| 2184 of habits, as stated above ( | |
| 2185 <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q52_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Therefore a habit increases when its acts are multiplied. | |
| 2186 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35723] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2187 sic proceditur. Videtur quod quilibet actus augeat habitum. | |
| 2188 Multiplicata enim causa, multiplicatur effectus. Sed actus sunt | |
| 2189 causa habituum aliquorum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo habitus | |
| 2190 augetur, multiplicatis actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p3"> | |
| 2191 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike | |
| 2192 (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase it. | |
| 2193 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35724] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2194 de similibus idem est iudicium. Sed omnes actus ab eodem habitu | |
| 2195 procedentes sunt similes, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo, si aliqui | |
| 2196 actus augeant habitum, quilibet actus augebit ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p4"> | |
| 2197 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit. | |
| 2198 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35725] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2199 simile augetur suo simili. Sed quilibet actus est similis habitui a | |
| 2200 quo procedit. Ergo quilibet actus auget habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p5"> | |
| 2201 <b>On the contrary,</b> Opposite effects do not result from the same cause. But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they | |
| 2202 proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not every act that increases a habit. | |
| 2203 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35726] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 2204 idem non est contrariorum causa. Sed, sicut dicitur in II Ethic., | |
| 2205 aliqui actus ab habitu procedentes diminuunt ipsum; utpote cum | |
| 2206 negligenter fiunt. Ergo non omnis actus habitum auget.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p6"> | |
| 2207 <b>I answer that,</b> "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being | |
| 2208 the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different mode of participation. For it is not only black that is | |
| 2209 unlike white, but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from less white to more white, even as from | |
| 2210 one opposite to another, as stated in Phys. v, text. 52. | |
| 2211 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 co."><a name="35727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35727] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2212 dicendum quod similes actus similes habitus causant, ut dicitur in | |
| 2213 II Ethic. Similitudo autem et dissimilitudo non solum attenditur | |
| 2214 secundum qualitatem eandem vel diversam; sed etiam secundum eundem | |
| 2215 vel diversum participationis modum. Est enim dissimile non solum | |
| 2216 nigrum albo, sed etiam minus album magis albo, nam etiam motus fit | |
| 2217 a minus albo in magis album, tanquam ex opposito in oppositum, ut | |
| 2218 dicitur in V Physic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p7"> But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above ( | |
| 2219 <a href="#FS_Q50_A5" id="FS_Q52_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[5]</a>); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing | |
| 2220 an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion | |
| 2221 to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase | |
| 2222 thereof, if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For not every morsel of food actually | |
| 2223 increases the animal's size as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the multiplication of food results | |
| 2224 at last in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls short of the | |
| 2225 intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof. | |
| 2226 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Quia vero usus habituum in voluntate hominis | |
| 2227 consistit, ut ex supradictis patet; sicut contingit quod aliquis | |
| 2228 habens habitum non utitur illo, vel etiam agit actum contrarium; | |
| 2229 ita etiam potest contingere quod utitur habitu secundum actum non | |
| 2230 respondentem proportionaliter intensioni habitus. Si igitur | |
| 2231 intensio actus proportionaliter aequetur intensioni habitus, vel | |
| 2232 etiam superexcedat; quilibet actus vel auget habitum, vel disponit | |
| 2233 ad augmentum ipsius; ut loquamur de augmento habituum ad | |
| 2234 similitudinem augmenti animalis. Non enim quodlibet alimentum | |
| 2235 assumptum actu auget animal, sicut nec quaelibet gutta cavat | |
| 2236 lapidem, sed, multiplicato alimento, tandem fit augmentum. Ita | |
| 2237 etiam, multiplicatis actibus, crescit habitus. Si vero intensio | |
| 2238 actus proportionaliter deficiat ab intensione habitus, talis actus | |
| 2239 non disponit ad augmentum habitus, sed magis ad diminutionem | |
| 2240 ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q52_A3-p8"> From this it is clear how to solve the objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 52 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="35728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35728] Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 2241 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 2242 <div id="FS_Q53" class="div3"> | |
| 2243 <h3 id="FS_Q53-p0.1">Q. 53. HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 2244 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 2245 <p id="FS_Q53-p2"> We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q53-p3"><a href="#FS_Q53_A1"> (1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?</a></p><p id="FS_Q53-p4"><a href="#FS_Q53_A2"> (2) Whether it can be diminished?</a></p><p id="FS_Q53-p5"><a href="#FS_Q53_A3"> (3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?</a></p> | |
| 2246 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 pr."><a name="35729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35729] | |
| 2247 Iª-IIae q. 53 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 2248 corruptione et diminutione habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. | |
| 2249 Primo, utrum habitus corrumpi possit. Secundo, utrum possit | |
| 2250 diminui. Tertio, de modo corruptionis et diminutionis.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 2251 <div id="FS_Q53_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q53_A1-p0.1">Q. 53. A. 1. Whether a habit can be corrupted?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p2"> | |
| 2252 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant | |
| 2253 to act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long | |
| 2254 as its subject remains. | |
| 2255 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35730] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2256 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus corrumpi non possit. Habitus | |
| 2257 enim inest sicut natura quaedam, unde operationes secundum habitum | |
| 2258 sunt delectabiles. Sed natura non corrumpitur, manente eo cuius est | |
| 2259 natura. Ergo neque habitus corrumpi potest, manente subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p3"> | |
| 2260 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness | |
| 2261 ceases through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through | |
| 2262 corruption of its subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance that is incorruptible" (De Anima i, | |
| 2263 text. 65). In like manner, neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary: | |
| 2264 since intelligible species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52). Therefore the habit of science can nowise | |
| 2265 be lost. | |
| 2266 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35731] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2267 omnis corruptio formae vel est per corruptionem subiecti, vel est a | |
| 2268 contrario, sicut aegritudo corrumpitur corrupto animali, vel etiam | |
| 2269 superveniente sanitate. Sed scientia, quae est quidam habitus, non | |
| 2270 potest corrumpi per corruptionem subiecti, quia intellectus, qui | |
| 2271 est subiectum eius, est substantia quaedam, et non corrumpitur, ut | |
| 2272 dicitur in I de anima. Similiter etiam non potest corrumpi a | |
| 2273 contrario, nam species intelligibiles non sunt ad invicem | |
| 2274 contrariae, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys. Ergo habitus scientiae | |
| 2275 nullo modo corrumpi potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p4"> | |
| 2276 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all corruption results from some movement. But the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by | |
| 2277 a direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement | |
| 2278 of the body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible species residing in the intellect: since | |
| 2279 the intellect independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which | |
| 2280 reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. | |
| 2281 For the same reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher | |
| 2282 declares (Ethic. i, 10), "virtue is more lasting than learning." | |
| 2283 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35732] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2284 omnis corruptio est per aliquem motum. Sed habitus scientiae, qui | |
| 2285 est in anima, non potest corrumpi per motum per se ipsius animae, | |
| 2286 quia anima per se non movetur. Movetur autem per accidens per motum | |
| 2287 corporis. Nulla autem transmutatio corporalis videtur posse | |
| 2288 corrumpere species intelligibiles existentes in intellectu, cum | |
| 2289 intellectus sit per se locus specierum, sine corpore, unde ponitur | |
| 2290 quod nec per senium nec per mortem corrumpuntur habitus. Ergo | |
| 2291 scientia corrumpi non potest. Et per consequens, nec habitus | |
| 2292 virtutis, qui etiam est in anima rationali, et, sicut philosophus | |
| 2293 dicit in I Ethic., <i>virtutes sunt permanentiores | |
| 2294 disciplinis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p5"> | |
| 2295 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that "forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science." Moreover, | |
| 2296 by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2). | |
| 2297 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35733] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2298 est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de longitudine et brevitate | |
| 2299 vitae, quod scientiae corruptio est oblivio et deceptio. Peccando | |
| 2300 etiam aliquis habitum virtutis amittit. Et ex contrariis actibus | |
| 2301 virtutes generantur et corrumpuntur, ut dicitur II Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q53_A1-p6"> | |
| 2302 <b>I answer that,</b> A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary; indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore | |
| 2303 a habit has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case | |
| 2304 with bodily habits---for instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted | |
| 2305 indirectly. There are, however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an | |
| 2306 incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such is the habit of science which is chiefly | |
| 2307 indeed in the "possible" intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as stated above ( | |
| 2308 <a href="#FS_Q50_A3" id="FS_Q53_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible" intellect, but only | |
| 2309 on the part of the lower sensitive powers. | |
| 2310 </p><p id="FS_Q53_A1-p7"> We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, | |
| 2311 either on the part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot | |
| 2312 be corrupted directly. Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the "possible" intellect, has no contrary; | |
| 2313 nor can the active intellect, which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in the | |
| 2314 "possible" intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly | |
| 2315 and indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by | |
| 2316 any forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost | |
| 2317 by being forgotten." There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit caused by the reason, to wit, the habit of | |
| 2318 conclusions, which is called science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the part of those | |
| 2319 very propositions which are the starting point of the reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the assertion | |
| 2320 "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is | |
| 2321 contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a | |
| 2322 true opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception is the corruption of science." | |
| 2323 As to virtues, some of them are intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and to these applies what | |
| 2324 we have said of science and opinion. Some, however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the soul; and the | |
| 2325 same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to | |
| 2326 it | |
| 2327 to be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever | |
| 2328 its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice. | |
| 2329 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 co."><a name="35734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35734] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2330 dicendum quod secundum se dicitur aliqua forma corrumpi per | |
| 2331 contrarium suum, per accidens autem, per corruptionem sui subiecti. | |
| 2332 Si igitur fuerit aliquis habitus cuius subiectum est corruptibile, | |
| 2333 et cuius causa habet contrarium, utroque modo corrumpi poterit, | |
| 2334 sicut patet de habitibus corporalibus, scilicet sanitate et | |
| 2335 aegritudine. Illi vero habitus quorum subiectum est incorruptibile, | |
| 2336 non possunt corrumpi per accidens. Sunt tamen habitus quidam qui, | |
| 2337 etsi principaliter sint in subiecto incorruptibili, secundario | |
| 2338 tamen sunt in subiecto corruptibili, sicut habitus scientiae, qui | |
| 2339 principaliter est quidem in intellectu possibili, secundario autem | |
| 2340 in viribus apprehensivis sensitivis, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo | |
| 2341 ex parte intellectus possibilis, habitus scientiae non potest | |
| 2342 corrumpi per accidens; sed solum ex parte inferiorum virium | |
| 2343 sensitivarum. Est igitur considerandum si possunt huiusmodi habitus | |
| 2344 per se corrumpi. Si igitur fuerit aliquis habitus qui habeat | |
| 2345 aliquod contrarium, vel ex parte sua vel ex parte suae causae, | |
| 2346 poterit per se corrumpi, si vero non habet contrarium, non poterit | |
| 2347 per se corrumpi. Manifestum est autem quod species intelligibilis | |
| 2348 in intellectu possibili existens, non habet aliquid contrarium. | |
| 2349 Neque iterum intellectui agenti, qui est causa eius, potest aliquid | |
| 2350 esse contrarium. Unde si aliquis habitus sit in intellectu | |
| 2351 possibili immediate ab intellectu agente causatus, talis habitus | |
| 2352 est incorruptibilis et per se et per accidens. Huiusmodi autem sunt | |
| 2353 habitus primorum principiorum, tam speculabilium quam practicorum, | |
| 2354 qui nulla oblivione vel deceptione corrumpi possunt, sicut | |
| 2355 philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., de prudentia, quod non perditur | |
| 2356 per oblivionem. Aliquis vero habitus est in intellectu possibili ex | |
| 2357 ratione causatus, scilicet habitus conclusionum, qui dicitur | |
| 2358 scientia, cuius causae dupliciter potest aliquid contrarium esse. | |
| 2359 Uno modo, ex parte ipsarum propositionum ex quibus ratio procedit, | |
| 2360 etenim enuntiationi quae est, bonum est bonum, contraria est ea | |
| 2361 quae est, bonum non est bonum, secundum philosophum, in II | |
| 2362 Periherm. Alio modo, quantum ad ipsum processum rationis; prout | |
| 2363 syllogismus sophisticus opponitur syllogismo dialectico vel | |
| 2364 demonstrativo. Sic igitur patet quod per falsam rationem potest | |
| 2365 corrumpi habitus verae opinionis, aut etiam scientiae. Unde | |
| 2366 philosophus dicit quod deceptio est corruptio scientiae, sicut | |
| 2367 supra dictum est. Virtutum vero quaedam sunt intellectuales, quae | |
| 2368 sunt in ipsa ratione, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., de quibus est eadem | |
| 2369 ratio quae est de scientia vel opinione. Quaedam vero sunt in parte | |
| 2370 animae appetitiva, quae sunt virtutes morales, et eadem ratio est | |
| 2371 de vitiis oppositis. Habitus autem appetitivae partis causantur per | |
| 2372 hoc quod ratio nata est appetitivam partem movere. Unde per | |
| 2373 iudicium rationis in contrarium moventis quocumque modo, scilicet | |
| 2374 sive ex ignorantia, sive ex passione, vel etiam ex electione, | |
| 2375 corrumpitur habitus virtutis vel vitii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p8"> | |
| 2376 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature | |
| 2377 of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty. | |
| 2378 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35735] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2379 ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., habitus | |
| 2380 similitudinem habet naturae, deficit tamen ab ipsa. Et ideo, cum | |
| 2381 natura rei nullo modo removeatur ab ipsa, habitus difficile | |
| 2382 removetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p9"> | |
| 2383 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although there is no contrary to intelligible species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of reason, | |
| 2384 as stated above. | |
| 2385 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35736] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2386 dicendum quod, etsi speciebus intelligibilibus non sit aliquid | |
| 2387 contrarium, enuntiationibus tamen et processui rationis potest | |
| 2388 aliquid esse contrarium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A1-p10"> | |
| 2389 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove | |
| 2390 an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded | |
| 2391 by corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the | |
| 2392 very root of the habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. | |
| 2393 Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must be understood in respect, not of the subject | |
| 2394 or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does | |
| 2395 not. | |
| 2396 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35737] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2397 dicendum quod scientia non removetur per motum corporalem quantum | |
| 2398 ad ipsam radicem habitus, sed solum quantum ad impedimentum actus; | |
| 2399 inquantum intellectus indiget in suo actu viribus sensitivis, | |
| 2400 quibus impedimentum affertur per corporalem transmutationem. Sed | |
| 2401 per intelligibilem motum rationis potest corrumpi habitus | |
| 2402 scientiae, etiam quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus. Et similiter | |
| 2403 etiam potest corrumpi habitus virtutis. Tamen quod dicitur, | |
| 2404 virtutes esse permanentiores disciplinis, intelligendum est non ex | |
| 2405 parte subiecti vel causae, sed ex parte actus, nam virtutum usus | |
| 2406 est continuus per totam vitam, non autem usus disciplinarum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q53_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q53_A2-p0.1">Q. 53. A. 2. Whether a habit can diminish?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p2"> | |
| 2407 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed | |
| 2408 either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish. | |
| 2409 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35738] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2410 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus diminui non possit. Habitus | |
| 2411 enim est quaedam qualitas et forma simplex. Simplex autem aut totum | |
| 2412 habetur, aut totum amittitur. Ergo habitus, etsi corrumpi possit, | |
| 2413 diminui non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p3"> | |
| 2414 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does | |
| 2415 not become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow that a species might be predicated of its individuals | |
| 2416 more or less. And if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject, it would follow that something is | |
| 2417 accidental to a habit, proper thereto and not common to the habit and its subject. Now | |
| 2418 whenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate, as stated in De Anima i, text. | |
| 2419 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a separable form; which is impossible. | |
| 2420 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35739] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2421 omne quod convenit accidenti, convenit eidem secundum se, vel | |
| 2422 ratione sui subiecti. Habitus autem secundum seipsum non intenditur | |
| 2423 et remittitur, alioquin sequeretur quod aliqua species de suis | |
| 2424 individuis praedicaretur secundum magis et minus. Si igitur | |
| 2425 secundum participationem subiecti diminui possit, sequeretur quod | |
| 2426 aliquid accidat habitui proprium, quod non sit commune ei et | |
| 2427 subiecto. Cuicumque autem formae convenit aliquid proprium praeter | |
| 2428 suum subiectum, illa forma est separabilis, ut dicitur in I de | |
| 2429 anima. Sequitur ergo quod habitus sit forma separabilis, quod est | |
| 2430 impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p4"> | |
| 2431 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined | |
| 2432 with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its | |
| 2433 inherence in its subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense. | |
| 2434 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35740] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2435 ratio et natura habitus, sicut et cuiuslibet accidentis, consistit | |
| 2436 in concretione ad subiectum, unde et quodlibet accidens definitur | |
| 2437 per suum subiectum. Si igitur habitus secundum seipsum non | |
| 2438 intenditur neque remittitur, neque etiam secundum concretionem sui | |
| 2439 ad subiectum diminui poterit. Et ita nullo modo diminuetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p5"> | |
| 2440 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore | |
| 2441 a habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish. | |
| 2442 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35741] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2443 est quod contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Augmentum autem et | |
| 2444 diminutio sunt contraria. Cum igitur habitus possit augeri, videtur | |
| 2445 quod etiam possit diminui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p6"> | |
| 2446 <b>I answer that,</b> Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as we have already explained ( | |
| 2447 <a href="#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q53_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[52], A[1]</a>). And since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as | |
| 2448 that which corrupts them: since the diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even as, on the other | |
| 2449 hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of its increase. | |
| 2450 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 co."><a name="35742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35742] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2451 dicendum quod habitus dupliciter diminuuntur, sicut et augentur, ut | |
| 2452 ex supradictis patet. Et sicut ex eadem causa augentur ex qua | |
| 2453 generantur, ita ex eadem causa diminuuntur ex qua corrumpuntur, nam | |
| 2454 diminutio habitus est quaedam via ad corruptionem, sicut e converso | |
| 2455 generatio habitus est quoddam fundamentum augmenti ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p7"> | |
| 2456 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the different | |
| 2457 ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through | |
| 2458 its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things. | |
| 2459 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35743] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2460 ergo dicendum quod habitus secundum se consideratus, est forma | |
| 2461 simplex, et secundum hoc non accidit ei diminutio, sed secundum | |
| 2462 diversum modum participandi, qui provenit ex indeterminatione | |
| 2463 potentiae ipsius participantis, quae scilicet diversimode potest | |
| 2464 unam formam participare, vel quae potest ad plura vel ad pauciora | |
| 2465 extendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p8"> | |
| 2466 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would hold, if the essence itself of a habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but that | |
| 2467 a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject. | |
| 2468 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35744] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2469 dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si ipsa essentia habitus nullo | |
| 2470 modo diminueretur. Hoc autem non ponimus, sed quod quaedam | |
| 2471 diminutio essentiae habitus non habet principium ab habitu, sed a | |
| 2472 participante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A2-p9"> | |
| 2473 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No matter how we take an accident, its very notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take | |
| 2474 an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the | |
| 2475 subject: for "whiteness is that whereby a thing is white." Accordingly in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not | |
| 2476 put the subject as though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but | |
| 2477 we give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we say that "simitas" is "a curvature of the nose." But | |
| 2478 if we take accidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in the concrete, the relation begins | |
| 2479 in the subject and terminates at the accident: for "a white thing" is "something that has whiteness." Accordingly in defining | |
| 2480 this kind of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a "simum" | |
| 2481 is a "snub-nose." Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence | |
| 2482 of the accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and decrease in | |
| 2483 certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. The same applies | |
| 2484 to habits and other qualities; save that certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits increase or diminish | |
| 2485 by a | |
| 2486 kind of addition, as we have already clearly explained ( | |
| 2487 <a href="#FS_Q52_A2" id="FS_Q53_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[52], A[2]</a>). | |
| 2488 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35745] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2489 dicendum quod, quocumque modo significetur accidens, habet | |
| 2490 dependentiam ad subiectum secundum suam rationem, aliter tamen et | |
| 2491 aliter. Nam accidens significatum in abstracto, importat | |
| 2492 habitudinem ad subiectum quae incipit ab accidente, et terminatur | |
| 2493 ad subiectum, nam albedo dicitur qua aliquid est album. Et ideo in | |
| 2494 definitione accidentis abstracti non ponitur subiectum quasi prima | |
| 2495 pars definitionis, quae est genus; sed quasi secunda, quae est | |
| 2496 differentia; dicimus enim quod simitas est curvitas nasi. Sed in | |
| 2497 concretis incipit habitudo a subiecto, et terminatur ad accidens, | |
| 2498 dicitur enim album quod habet albedinem. Propter quod in | |
| 2499 definitione huiusmodi accidentis ponitur subiectum tanquam genus, | |
| 2500 quod est prima pars definitionis, dicimus enim quod simum est nasus | |
| 2501 curvus. Sic igitur id quod convenit accidentibus ex parte subiecti, | |
| 2502 non autem ex ipsa ratione accidentis, non attribuitur accidenti in | |
| 2503 abstracto, sed in concreto. Et huiusmodi est intensio et remissio | |
| 2504 in quibusdam accidentibus, unde albedo non dicitur magis et minus, | |
| 2505 sed album. Et eadem ratio est in habitibus et aliis qualitatibus, | |
| 2506 nisi quod quidam habitus augentur vel diminuuntur per quandam | |
| 2507 additionem, ut ex supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q53_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q53_A3-p0.1">Q. 53. A. 3. Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p2"> | |
| 2508 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than | |
| 2509 passion-like qualities, as we have explained above ( | |
| 2510 <a href="#FS_Q49_A2" id="FS_Q53_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[2]</a>, ad 3; | |
| 2511 <a href="#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q53_A3-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[50], A[1]</a>). But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not lessened through | |
| 2512 not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to make something hot. | |
| 2513 Therefore neither are habits diminished or corrupted through cessation from act. | |
| 2514 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35746] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2515 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non corrumpatur aut diminuatur | |
| 2516 per solam cessationem ab opere. Habitus enim permanentiores sunt | |
| 2517 quam passibiles qualitates, ut ex supradictis apparet. Sed | |
| 2518 passibiles qualitates non corrumpuntur neque diminuuntur per | |
| 2519 cessationem ab actu, non enim albedo diminuitur si visum non | |
| 2520 immutet, neque calor si non calefaciat. Ergo neque habitus | |
| 2521 diminuuntur vel corrumpuntur per cessationem ab actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p3"> | |
| 2522 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation | |
| 2523 from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from | |
| 2524 act. | |
| 2525 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35747] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2526 corruptio et diminutio sunt quaedam mutationes. Sed nihil mutatur | |
| 2527 absque aliqua causa movente. Cum igitur cessatio ab actu non | |
| 2528 importet aliquam causam moventem, non videtur quod per cessationem | |
| 2529 ab actu possit esse diminutio vel corruptio habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p4"> | |
| 2530 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above | |
| 2531 time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither, therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through | |
| 2532 length of time, if one fails for long to exercise them. | |
| 2533 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35748] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2534 habitus scientiae et virtutis sunt in anima intellectiva, quae est | |
| 2535 supra tempus. Ea vero quae sunt supra tempus, non corrumpuntur | |
| 2536 neque diminuuntur per temporis diuturnitatem. Ergo neque huiusmodi | |
| 2537 habitus corrumpuntur vel diminuuntur per temporis diuturnitatem, si | |
| 2538 diu aliquis absque exercitio permaneat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p5"> | |
| 2539 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of | |
| 2540 science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship." In like manner other | |
| 2541 habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act. | |
| 2542 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35749] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2543 est quod philosophus, in libro de Longit. et Brevit. vitae, dicit | |
| 2544 quod corruptio scientiae non solum est deceptio, sed etiam oblivio. | |
| 2545 Et in VIII Ethic. dicitur quod multas amicitias inappellatio | |
| 2546 dissolvit. Et eadem ratione, alii habitus virtutum per cessationem | |
| 2547 ab actu diminuuntur vel tolluntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p6"> | |
| 2548 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement | |
| 2549 by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly, indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It | |
| 2550 is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, | |
| 2551 as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened | |
| 2552 that habit. For it has been stated | |
| 2553 <a href="#FS_Q53_A1" id="FS_Q53_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency. Consequently all habits that are gradually | |
| 2554 undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even | |
| 2555 destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue. For it is evident | |
| 2556 that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose | |
| 2557 the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions | |
| 2558 or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination | |
| 2559 of the sensitive appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from | |
| 2560 act. The same applies to the intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those things that are pictured | |
| 2561 by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition | |
| 2562 to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his | |
| 2563 intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus | |
| 2564 the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act. | |
| 2565 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 co."><a name="35750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35750] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2566 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic., aliquid potest esse | |
| 2567 movens dupliciter, uno modo, per se, quod scilicet movet secundum | |
| 2568 rationem propriae formae, sicut ignis calefacit; alio modo, per | |
| 2569 accidens, sicut id quod removet prohibens. Et hoc modo cessatio ab | |
| 2570 actu causat corruptionem vel diminutionem habituum, inquantum | |
| 2571 scilicet removetur actus qui prohibebat causas corrumpentes vel | |
| 2572 diminuentes habitum. Dictum est enim quod habitus per se | |
| 2573 corrumpuntur vel diminuuntur ex contrario agente. Unde quorumcumque | |
| 2574 habituum contraria subcrescunt per temporis tractum, quae oportet | |
| 2575 subtrahi per actum ab habitu procedentem; huiusmodi habitus | |
| 2576 diminuuntur, vel etiam tolluntur totaliter, per diuturnam | |
| 2577 cessationem ab actu; ut patet et in scientia et in virtute. | |
| 2578 Manifestum est enim quod habitus virtutis moralis facit hominem | |
| 2579 promptum ad eligendum medium in operationibus et passionibus. Cum | |
| 2580 autem aliquis non utitur habitu virtutis ad moderandas passiones | |
| 2581 vel operationes proprias, necesse est quod proveniant multae | |
| 2582 passiones et operationes praeter modum virtutis, ex inclinatione | |
| 2583 appetitus sensitivi, et aliorum quae exterius movent. Unde | |
| 2584 corrumpitur virtus, vel diminuitur, per cessationem ab actu. | |
| 2585 Similiter etiam est ex parte habituum intellectualium, secundum | |
| 2586 quos est homo promptus ad recte iudicandum de imaginatis. Cum | |
| 2587 igitur homo cessat ab usu intellectualis habitus, insurgunt | |
| 2588 imaginationes extraneae, et quandoque ad contrarium ducentes; ita | |
| 2589 quod, nisi per frequentem usum intellectualis habitus, quodammodo | |
| 2590 succidantur vel comprimantur, redditur homo minus aptus ad recte | |
| 2591 iudicandum, et quandoque totaliter disponitur ad contrarium. Et sic | |
| 2592 per cessationem ab actu diminuitur, vel etiam corrumpitur | |
| 2593 intellectualis habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p7"> | |
| 2594 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat were | |
| 2595 to increase. | |
| 2596 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35751] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2597 ergo dicendum quod ita etiam calor per cessationem a calefaciendo | |
| 2598 corrumperetur, si per hoc incresceret frigidum, quod est calidi | |
| 2599 corruptivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p8"> | |
| 2600 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive of corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles, thereto, as explained | |
| 2601 above. | |
| 2602 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35752] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2603 dicendum quod cessatio ab actu est movens ad corruptionem vel | |
| 2604 diminutionem, sicut removens prohibens, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q53_A3-p9"> | |
| 2605 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore | |
| 2606 in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. | |
| 2607 Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget. | |
| 2608 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 53 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35753] Iª-IIae q. 53 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2609 dicendum quod pars intellectiva animae secundum se est supra | |
| 2610 tempus, sed pars sensitiva subiacet tempori. Et ideo per temporis | |
| 2611 cursum, transmutatur quantum ad passiones appetitivae partis et | |
| 2612 etiam quantum ad vires apprehensivas. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV | |
| 2613 Physic., quod tempus est causa oblivionis.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 2614 <div id="FS_Q54" class="div3"> | |
| 2615 <h3 id="FS_Q54-p0.1">Q. 54. OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 2616 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 2617 <p id="FS_Q54-p2"> We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q54-p3"><a href="#FS_Q54_A1"> (1) Whether many habits can be in one power?</a></p><p id="FS_Q54-p4"><a href="#FS_Q54_A2"> (2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?</a></p><p id="FS_Q54-p5"><a href="#FS_Q54_A3"> (3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?</a></p><p id="FS_Q54-p6"><a href="#FS_Q54_A4"> (4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?</a></p> | |
| 2618 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 pr."><a name="35754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35754] | |
| 2619 Iª-IIae q. 54 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 2620 distinctione habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, | |
| 2621 utrum multi habitus possint esse in una potentia. Secundo, utrum | |
| 2622 habitus distinguantur secundum obiecta. Tertio, utrum habitus | |
| 2623 distinguantur secundum bonum et malum. Quarto, utrum unus habitus | |
| 2624 ex multis habitibus constituatur.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 2625 <div id="FS_Q54_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A1-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 1. Whether many habits can be in one power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p2"> | |
| 2626 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the | |
| 2627 same thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and powers are distinguished in respect of the same | |
| 2628 thing, viz. their acts and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore there cannot be many habits in | |
| 2629 one power. | |
| 2630 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35755] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2631 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possint esse multi habitus in una | |
| 2632 potentia. Eorum enim quae secundum idem distinguuntur multiplicato | |
| 2633 uno, multiplicatur et aliud. Sed secundum idem potentiae et habitus | |
| 2634 distinguuntur, scilicet secundum actus et obiecta. Similiter ergo | |
| 2635 multiplicantur. Non ergo possunt esse multi habitus in una | |
| 2636 potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p3"> | |
| 2637 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple subject there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is | |
| 2638 the cause of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there | |
| 2639 cannot be many habits in one power. | |
| 2640 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35756] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2641 potentia est virtus quaedam simplex. Sed in uno subiecto simplici | |
| 2642 non potest esse diversitas accidentium, quia subiectum est causa | |
| 2643 accidentis; ab uno autem simplici non videtur procedere nisi unum. | |
| 2644 Ergo in una potentia non possunt esse multi habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p4"> | |
| 2645 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at | |
| 2646 the same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same time by many habits. Therefore several | |
| 2647 habits cannot be at the same time in one power. | |
| 2648 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35757] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2649 sicut corpus formatur per figuram, ita potentia formatur per | |
| 2650 habitum. Sed unum corpus non potest simul formari diversis figuris. | |
| 2651 Ergo neque una potentia potest simul formari diversis habitibus. | |
| 2652 Non ergo plures habitus possunt simul esse in una potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p5"> | |
| 2653 <b>On the contrary,</b> The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are the habits of various sciences. | |
| 2654 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35758] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2655 est quod intellectus est una potentia, in qua tamen sunt diversarum | |
| 2656 scientiarum habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A1-p6"> | |
| 2657 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 2658 <a href="#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q54_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>), habits are dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to nature, or to operation, which is the | |
| 2659 end of nature. As to those habits which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in one same subject: since | |
| 2660 in one subject we may take parts in various ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are various habits. | |
| 2661 Thus, if we take the humors | |
| 2662 as being parts of the human body, according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we have the habit or disposition | |
| 2663 of health: while, if we take like parts, such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect of nature is | |
| 2664 strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i.e. the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion | |
| 2665 to nature, is beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in the same subject. | |
| 2666 </p><p id="FS_Q54_A1-p7"> If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again, | |
| 2667 there may be several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated | |
| 2668 above ( | |
| 2669 <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q54_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>): for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly shown above ( | |
| 2670 <a href="#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q54_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Now a passive power is compared to the determinate act | |
| 2671 of any species, as matter to form: because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so, too, is a passive | |
| 2672 power determined by the nature of one active object to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move | |
| 2673 one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits | |
| 2674 are qualities or forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a determinate species. Consequently several | |
| 2675 habits, even as several specifically different acts, can belong to one power. | |
| 2676 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 co."><a name="35759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35759] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2677 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus sunt dispositiones | |
| 2678 quaedam alicuius in potentia existentis ad aliquid, sive ad | |
| 2679 naturam, sive ad operationem vel finem naturae. Et de illis quidem | |
| 2680 habitibus qui sunt dispositiones ad naturam, manifestum est quod | |
| 2681 possunt plures esse in uno subiecto, eo quod unius subiecti possunt | |
| 2682 diversimode partes accipi, secundum quarum dispositionem habitus | |
| 2683 dicuntur. Sicut, si accipiantur humani corporis partes humores, | |
| 2684 prout disponuntur secundum naturam humanam, est habitus vel | |
| 2685 dispositio sanitatis, si vero accipiantur partes similes ut nervi | |
| 2686 et ossa et carnes, earum dispositio in ordine ad naturam, est | |
| 2687 fortitudo aut macies, si vero accipiantur membra, ut manus et pes | |
| 2688 et huiusmodi, earum dispositio naturae conveniens, est pulchritudo. | |
| 2689 Et sic sunt plures habitus vel dispositiones in eodem. Si vero | |
| 2690 loquamur de habitibus qui sunt dispositiones ad opera, qui proprie | |
| 2691 pertinent ad potentias; sic etiam contingit unius potentiae esse | |
| 2692 habitus plures. Cuius ratio est, quia subiectum habitus est | |
| 2693 potentia passiva, ut supra dictum est, potentia enim activa tantum | |
| 2694 non est alicuius habitus subiectum, ut ex supradictis patet. | |
| 2695 Potentia autem passiva comparatur ad actum determinatum unius | |
| 2696 speciei, sicut materia ad formam, eo quod, sicut materia | |
| 2697 determinatur ad unam formam per unum agens, ita etiam potentia | |
| 2698 passiva a ratione unius obiecti activi determinatur ad unum actum | |
| 2699 secundum speciem. Unde sicut plura obiecta possunt movere unam | |
| 2700 potentiam passivam, ita una potentia passiva potest esse subiectum | |
| 2701 diversorum actuum vel perfectionum secundum speciem. Habitus autem | |
| 2702 sunt quaedam qualitates aut formae inhaerentes potentiae, quibus | |
| 2703 inclinatur potentia ad determinatos actus secundum speciem. Unde ad | |
| 2704 unam potentiam possunt plures habitus pertinere, sicut et plures | |
| 2705 actus specie differentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p8"> | |
| 2706 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as in natural things, diversity of species is according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter, as | |
| 2707 stated in Metaph. v, text. 33 (since things that differ in matter belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity | |
| 2708 of objects entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in Ethic. vi, 1, that "those objects that differ | |
| 2709 generically belong to different departments of the soul"); while specific difference of | |
| 2710 objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently of habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ in | |
| 2711 species, but not vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in species: but it does not follow that | |
| 2712 different habits are in different powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may be included in one | |
| 2713 genus, and several species be contained in one species; so does it happen that there are several species of habits and | |
| 2714 powers. | |
| 2715 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35760] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2716 ergo dicendum quod, sicut in rebus naturalibus diversitas specierum | |
| 2717 est secundum formam, diversitas autem generum est secundum | |
| 2718 materiam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. (ea enim sunt diversa genere, | |
| 2719 quorum est materia diversa), ita etiam diversitas obiectorum | |
| 2720 secundum genus, facit distinctionem potentiarum (unde philosophus | |
| 2721 dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>ad ea quae sunt genere altera, sunt | |
| 2722 etiam animae particulae aliae</i>); diversitas vero obiectorum | |
| 2723 secundum speciem, facit diversitatem actuum secundum speciem, et | |
| 2724 per consequens habituum. Quaecumque autem sunt diversa genere, sunt | |
| 2725 etiam specie diversa, sed non convertitur. Et ideo diversarum | |
| 2726 potentiarum sunt diversi actus specie, et diversi habitus, non | |
| 2727 autem oportet quod diversi habitus sint diversarum potentiarum, sed | |
| 2728 possunt esse plures unius. Et sicut sunt genera generum, et species | |
| 2729 specierum; ita etiam contingit esse diversas species habituum et | |
| 2730 potentiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p9"> | |
| 2731 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a power is simple as to its essence, it is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically different | |
| 2732 acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many superficially different habits from being in one power. | |
| 2733 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35761] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2734 dicendum quod potentia, etsi sit quidem simplex secundum essentiam, | |
| 2735 est tamen multiplex virtute, secundum quod ad multos actus specie | |
| 2736 differentes se extendit. Et ideo nihil prohibet in una potentia | |
| 2737 esse multos habitus specie differentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A1-p10"> | |
| 2738 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A body is informed by its shape as by its own terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a power, | |
| 2739 but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at | |
| 2740 the same time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another; just as neither can a body have several shapes, | |
| 2741 save in so far as one shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided | |
| 2742 figure. For the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time "actually"; and yet it can know several things | |
| 2743 at the same time "habitually." | |
| 2744 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35762] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2745 dicendum quod corpus formatur per figuram sicut per propriam | |
| 2746 terminationem, habitus autem non est terminatio potentiae, sed est | |
| 2747 dispositio ad actum sicut ad ultimum terminum. Et ideo non possunt | |
| 2748 esse unius potentiae simul plures actus, nisi forte secundum quod | |
| 2749 unus comprehenditur sub alio, sicut nec unius corporis plures | |
| 2750 figurae, nisi secundum quod una est in alia, sicut trigonum in | |
| 2751 tetragono. Non enim potest intellectus simul multa actu | |
| 2752 intelligere. Potest tamen simul habitu multa scire.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q54_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A2-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 2. Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p2"> | |
| 2753 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of | |
| 2754 science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by | |
| 2755 objects specifically distinct. | |
| 2756 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35763] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2757 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non distinguantur secundum | |
| 2758 obiecta. Contraria enim sunt specie differentia. Sed idem habitus | |
| 2759 scientiae est contrariorum, sicut medicina sani et aegri. Non ergo | |
| 2760 secundum obiecta specie differentia, habitus distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p3"> | |
| 2761 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different sciences are different habits. But the same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both | |
| 2762 the physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished | |
| 2763 by their objects. | |
| 2764 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35764] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2765 diversae scientiae sunt diversi habitus. Sed idem scibile pertinet | |
| 2766 ad diversas scientias, sicut terram esse rotundam demonstrat et | |
| 2767 naturalis et astrologus, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo habitus non | |
| 2768 distinguuntur secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p4"> | |
| 2769 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, | |
| 2770 if it be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, | |
| 2771 if it be done in order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also belong to different habits. | |
| 2772 Therefore diversity of habits does not follow diversity of objects. | |
| 2773 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35765] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2774 eiusdem actus est idem obiectum. Sed idem actus potest pertinere ad | |
| 2775 diversos habitus virtutum, si ad diversos fines referatur, sicut | |
| 2776 dare pecuniam alicui, si sit propter Deum, pertinet ad caritatem; | |
| 2777 si vero sit propter debitum solvendum, pertinet ad iustitiam. Ergo | |
| 2778 etiam idem obiectum potest ad diversos habitus pertinere. Non ergo | |
| 2779 est diversitas habituum secundum diversitatem obiectorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p5"> | |
| 2780 <b>On the contrary,</b> Acts differ in species according to the diversity of their objects, as stated above ( | |
| 2781 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q54_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a>). But habits are dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects. | |
| 2782 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35766] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 2783 actus differunt specie secundum diversitatem obiectorum, ut supra | |
| 2784 dictum est. Sed habitus sunt dispositiones quaedam ad actus. Ergo | |
| 2785 etiam habitus distinguuntur secundum diversa obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A2-p6"> | |
| 2786 <b>I answer that,</b> A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms | |
| 2787 differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished | |
| 2788 from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species. | |
| 2789 Habits, however, imply order to something: and all things that imply order to something, | |
| 2790 are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying | |
| 2791 a twofold order: viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to nature. | |
| 2792 </p><p id="FS_Q54_A2-p7"> Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things. First, in respect of the active principles of such | |
| 2793 dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear from what | |
| 2794 follows. | |
| 2795 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 co."><a name="35767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35767] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2796 dicendum quod habitus et est forma quaedam, et est habitus. Potest | |
| 2797 ergo distinctio habituum secundum speciem attendi aut secundum | |
| 2798 communem modum quo formae specie distinguuntur; aut secundum | |
| 2799 proprium modum distinctionis habituum. Distinguuntur siquidem | |
| 2800 formae ad invicem secundum diversa principia activa, eo quod omne | |
| 2801 agens facit simile secundum speciem. Habitus autem importat ordinem | |
| 2802 ad aliquid. Omnia autem quae dicuntur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, | |
| 2803 distinguuntur secundum distinctionem eorum ad quae dicuntur. Est | |
| 2804 autem habitus dispositio quaedam ad duo ordinata, scilicet ad | |
| 2805 naturam, et ad operationem consequentem naturam. Sic igitur | |
| 2806 secundum tria, habitus specie distinguuntur. Uno quidem modo, | |
| 2807 secundum principia activa talium dispositionum; alio vero modo, | |
| 2808 secundum naturam; tertio vero modo, secundum obiecta specie | |
| 2809 differentia; ut per sequentia explicabitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p8"> | |
| 2810 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which | |
| 2811 may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they | |
| 2812 are both known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And consequently in so far as they concur in the one | |
| 2813 aspect of cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit. | |
| 2814 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35768] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2815 ergo dicendum quod in distinctione potentiarum, vel etiam habituum, | |
| 2816 non est considerandum ipsum obiectum materialiter; sed ratio | |
| 2817 obiecti differens specie, vel etiam genere. Quamvis autem contraria | |
| 2818 specie differant diversitate rerum, tamen eadem ratio est | |
| 2819 cognoscendi utrumque, quia unum per aliud cognoscitur. Et ideo | |
| 2820 inquantum conveniunt in una ratione cognoscibilis, pertinent ad | |
| 2821 unum habitum cognoscitivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p9"> | |
| 2822 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The physicist proves the earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means of | |
| 2823 mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g. | |
| 2824 by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism | |
| 2825 producing science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And | |
| 2826 consequently various means are as so many active principles, in respect of which the habits of science are distinguished. | |
| 2827 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35769] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2828 dicendum quod terram esse rotundam per aliud medium demonstrat | |
| 2829 naturalis, et per aliud astrologus, astrologus enim hoc demonstrat | |
| 2830 per media mathematica, sicut per figuras eclipsium, vel per aliud | |
| 2831 huiusmodi; naturalis vero hoc demonstrat per medium naturale, sicut | |
| 2832 per motum gravium ad medium, vel per aliud huiusmodi. Tota autem | |
| 2833 virtus demonstrationis, quae est syllogismus faciens scire, ut | |
| 2834 dicitur in I Poster., dependet ex medio. Et ideo diversa media sunt | |
| 2835 sicut diversa principia activa, secundum quae habitus scientiarum | |
| 2836 diversificantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10"> | |
| 2837 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89; Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative | |
| 2838 matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does. Moreover | |
| 2839 the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been | |
| 2840 said ( | |
| 2841 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[6]</a>; | |
| 2842 <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A2" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.2" shape="rect"> Q[19], | |
| 2843 A[2] | |
| 2844 </a>, ad 1; | |
| 2845 <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q34_A4" id="FS_Q54_A2-p10.3" shape="rect"> Q[34], A[4]</a>). | |
| 2846 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35770] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2847 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Physic. et in VII | |
| 2848 Ethic., ita se habet finis in operabilibus, sicut principium in | |
| 2849 demonstrativis. Et ideo diversitas finium diversificat virtutes | |
| 2850 sicut et diversitas activorum principiorum. Sunt etiam ipsi fines | |
| 2851 obiecta actuum interiorum, qui maxime pertinent ad virtutes, ut ex | |
| 2852 supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q54_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A3-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 3. Whether habits are divided into good and bad?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p2"> | |
| 2853 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards | |
| 2854 contraries, as was stated above (A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad. | |
| 2855 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35771] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2856 sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus non distinguantur secundum | |
| 2857 bonum et malum. Bonum enim et malum sunt contraria. Sed idem | |
| 2858 habitus est contrariorum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo habitus non | |
| 2859 distinguuntur secundum bonum et malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p3"> | |
| 2860 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, | |
| 2861 as the Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. | |
| 2862 Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil. | |
| 2863 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35772] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2864 bonum convertitur cum ente, et sic, cum sit commune omnibus, non | |
| 2865 potest sumi ut differentia alicuius speciei; ut patet per | |
| 2866 philosophum in IV Topic. Similiter etiam malum, cum sit privatio et | |
| 2867 non ens, non potest esse alicuius entis differentia. Non ergo | |
| 2868 secundum bonum et malum possunt habitus specie distingui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p4"> | |
| 2869 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be different evil habits about one same object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters | |
| 2870 of concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, | |
| 2871 as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into good and bad. | |
| 2872 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35773] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2873 circa idem obiectum contingit esse diversos habitus malos, sicut | |
| 2874 circa concupiscentias intemperantiam et insensibilitatem, et | |
| 2875 similiter etiam plures habitus bonos, scilicet virtutem humanam et | |
| 2876 virtutem heroicam sive divinam, ut patet per philosophum in VII | |
| 2877 Ethic. Non ergo distinguuntur habitus secundum bonum et malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p5"> | |
| 2878 <b>On the contrary,</b> A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits. | |
| 2879 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35774] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra | |
| 2880 est quod habitus bonus contrariatur habitui malo, sicut virtus | |
| 2881 vitio. Sed contraria sunt diversa secundum speciem. Ergo habitus | |
| 2882 differunt specie secundum differentiam boni et mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A3-p6"> | |
| 2883 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 2884 <a href="#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q54_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, habits are specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles, but also in their relation | |
| 2885 to nature. Now, this happens in two ways. First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way | |
| 2886 a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the | |
| 2887 agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which | |
| 2888 disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, | |
| 2889 whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished | |
| 2890 specifically by the difference of good and bad. | |
| 2891 </p><p id="FS_Q54_A3-p7"> Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable | |
| 2892 to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And thus human virtue, which disposes | |
| 2893 to an act befitting human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act befitting some higher | |
| 2894 nature. | |
| 2895 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 co."><a name="35775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35775] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2896 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, habitus specie distinguuntur non | |
| 2897 solum secundum obiecta et principia activa, sed etiam in ordine ad | |
| 2898 naturam. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum | |
| 2899 convenientiam ad naturam, vel etiam secundum disconvenientiam ab | |
| 2900 ipsa. Et hoc modo distinguuntur specie habitus bonus et malus, nam | |
| 2901 habitus bonus dicitur qui disponit ad actum convenientem naturae | |
| 2902 agentis; habitus autem malus dicitur qui disponit ad actum non | |
| 2903 convenientem naturae. Sicut actus virtutum naturae humanae | |
| 2904 conveniunt, eo quod sunt secundum rationem, actus vero vitiorum, | |
| 2905 cum sint contra rationem, a natura humana discordant. Et sic | |
| 2906 manifestum est quod secundum differentiam boni et mali, habitus | |
| 2907 specie distinguuntur. Alio modo secundum naturam habitus | |
| 2908 distinguuntur, ex eo quod habitus unus disponit ad actum | |
| 2909 convenientem naturae inferiori; alius autem habitus disponit ad | |
| 2910 actum convenientem naturae superiori. Et sic virtus humana, quae | |
| 2911 disponit ad actum convenientem naturae humanae, distinguitur a | |
| 2912 divina virtute vel heroica, quae disponit ad actum convenientem | |
| 2913 cuidam superiori naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p8"> | |
| 2914 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same habit may be about contraries in so far as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen | |
| 2915 that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are | |
| 2916 divided into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad; but not by reason of one habit being something | |
| 2917 good, and another about something bad. | |
| 2918 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35776] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 2919 ergo dicendum quod contrariorum potest esse unus habitus, secundum | |
| 2920 quod contraria conveniunt in una ratione. Nunquam tamen contingit | |
| 2921 quod habitus contrarii sint unius speciei, contrarietas enim | |
| 2922 habituum est secundum contrarias rationes. Et ita secundum bonum et | |
| 2923 malum habitus distinguuntur, scilicet inquantum unus habitus est | |
| 2924 bonus et alius malus, non autem ex hoc quod unus est boni et alius | |
| 2925 mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p9"> | |
| 2926 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the good which is common to every being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but some determinate | |
| 2927 good by reason of suitability to some determinate, viz. the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a difference | |
| 2928 of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate repugnant to a determinate nature. | |
| 2929 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35777] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2930 dicendum quod bonum commune omni enti non est differentia | |
| 2931 constituens speciem alicuius habitus, sed quoddam bonum | |
| 2932 determinatum, quod est secundum convenientiam ad determinatam | |
| 2933 naturam, scilicet humanam. Similiter etiam malum quod est | |
| 2934 differentia constitutiva habitus, non est privatio pura, sed est | |
| 2935 aliquid determinatum repugnans determinatae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A3-p10"> | |
| 2936 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Several good habits about one same specific thing are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as stated | |
| 2937 above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which | |
| 2938 is in keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are contrary to one virtue. | |
| 2939 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35778] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2940 dicendum quod plures habitus boni circa idem specie, distinguuntur | |
| 2941 secundum convenientiam ad diversas naturas, ut dictum est. Plures | |
| 2942 vero habitus mali distinguuntur circa idem agendum secundum | |
| 2943 diversas repugnantias ad id quod est secundum naturam, sicut uni | |
| 2944 virtuti contrariantur diversa vitia circa eandem materiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q54_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q54_A4-p0.1">Q. 54. A. 4. Whether one habit is made up of many habits?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p2"> | |
| 2945 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits. For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems | |
| 2946 to be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by little out of several acts, as stated | |
| 2947 above ( | |
| 2948 <a href="#FS_Q51_A3" id="FS_Q54_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[3]</a>). Therefore one habit is made up of several. | |
| 2949 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35779] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 2950 sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus habitus ex pluribus habitibus | |
| 2951 constituatur. Illud enim cuius generatio non simul perficitur, sed | |
| 2952 successive, videtur constitui ex pluribus partibus. Sed generatio | |
| 2953 habitus non est simul, sed successive ex pluribus actibus, ut supra | |
| 2954 habitum est. Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex pluribus | |
| 2955 habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p3"> | |
| 2956 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude, | |
| 2957 temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many. | |
| 2958 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35780] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2959 ex partibus constituitur totum. Sed uni habitui assignantur multae | |
| 2960 partes, sicut Tullius ponit multas partes fortitudinis, | |
| 2961 temperantiae et aliarum virtutum. Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex | |
| 2962 pluribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p4"> | |
| 2963 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to | |
| 2964 but one science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made up of many. | |
| 2965 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35781] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2966 de una sola conclusione potest scientia haberi et actu et habitu. | |
| 2967 Sed multae conclusiones pertinent ad unam scientiam totam, sicut ad | |
| 2968 geometriam vel arithmeticam. Ergo unus habitus constituitur ex | |
| 2969 multis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p5"> | |
| 2970 <b>On the contrary,</b> A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form. But nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made | |
| 2971 up of many. | |
| 2972 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35782] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 2973 habitus, cum sit qualitas quaedam, est forma simplex. Sed nullum | |
| 2974 simplex constituitur ex pluribus. Ergo unus habitus non | |
| 2975 constituitur ex pluribus habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q54_A4-p6"> | |
| 2976 <b>I answer that,</b> A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every perfection | |
| 2977 should be in proportion with that which it perfects. Hence, just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in so | |
| 2978 far as they have something in common, i.e. some general objective aspect, so also a habit extends to many things, in so far | |
| 2979 as they are related to one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or to | |
| 2980 one nature, or to one principle, as was clearly stated above ( | |
| 2981 <a href="#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q54_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3). | |
| 2982 </p><p id="FS_Q54_A4-p7"> If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this | |
| 2983 multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality, | |
| 2984 not composed to several habits, even though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to many things save in relation | |
| 2985 to one, whence it derives its unity. | |
| 2986 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 co."><a name="35783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35783] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo | |
| 2987 dicendum quod habitus ad operationem ordinatus, de quo nunc | |
| 2988 principaliter intendimus, est perfectio quaedam potentiae. Omnis | |
| 2989 autem perfectio proportionatur suo perfectibili. Unde sicut | |
| 2990 potentia, cum sit una, ad multa se extendit secundum quod | |
| 2991 conveniunt in aliquo uno, idest in generali quadam ratione obiecti; | |
| 2992 ita etiam habitus ad multa se extendit secundum quod habent ordinem | |
| 2993 ad aliquod unum, puta ad unam specialem rationem obiecti, vel unam | |
| 2994 naturam, vel unum principium, ut ex supradictis patet. Si igitur | |
| 2995 consideremus habitum secundum ea ad quae se extendit, sic | |
| 2996 inveniemus in eo quandam multiplicitatem. Sed quia illa | |
| 2997 multiplicitas est ordinata ad aliquid unum, ad quod principaliter | |
| 2998 respicit habitus, inde est quod habitus est qualitas simplex, non | |
| 2999 constituta ex pluribus habitibus, etiam si ad multa se extendat. | |
| 3000 Non enim unus habitus se extendit ad multa, nisi in ordine ad unum, | |
| 3001 ex quo habet unitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p8"> | |
| 3002 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That a habit is engendered little by little, is due, not to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact that | |
| 3003 the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly changeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins | |
| 3004 by being imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same applies to other qualities. | |
| 3005 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35784] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum | |
| 3006 ergo dicendum quod successio in generatione habitus non contingit | |
| 3007 ex hoc quod pars eius generetur post partem, sed ex eo quod | |
| 3008 subiectum non statim consequitur dispositionem firmam et difficile | |
| 3009 mobilem; et ex eo quod primo imperfecte incipit esse in subiecto, | |
| 3010 et paulatim perficitur. Sicut etiam est de aliis qualitatibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p9"> | |
| 3011 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue, are not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but subjective | |
| 3012 or potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q[57], A[6], ad 4; | |
| 3013 <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q48" id="FS_Q54_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[48])</a>. | |
| 3014 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35785] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3015 dicendum quod partes quae singulis virtutibus cardinalibus | |
| 3016 assignantur, non sunt partes integrales, ex quibus constituatur | |
| 3017 totum sed partes subiectivae sive potentiales, ut infra | |
| 3018 patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q54_A4-p10"> | |
| 3019 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly. | |
| 3020 And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in | |
| 3021 him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, forasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions | |
| 3022 and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from | |
| 3023 another. | |
| 3024 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 54 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35786] Iª-IIae q. 54 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3025 dicendum quod ille qui in aliqua scientia acquirit per | |
| 3026 demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis unius, habet quidem habitum, | |
| 3027 sed imperfecte. Cum vero acquirit per aliquam demonstrationem | |
| 3028 scientiam conclusionis alterius, non aggeneratur in eo alius | |
| 3029 habitus; sed habitus qui prius inerat fit perfectior, utpote ad | |
| 3030 plura se extendens; eo quod conclusiones et demonstrationes unius | |
| 3031 scientiae ordinatae sunt, et una derivatur ex alia.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 3032 | |
| 3033 | |
| 3034 ` | |
| 3035 </div> | |
| 3036 </body> | |
| 3037 </html> |