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            <h2 id="SS.iii-p0.1">TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE (QQ[123]-170)</h2>
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               <h3 id="SS_Q123-p0.1">OF FORTITUDE (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p2"> After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude. We must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude;
                  (2) its parts; (3) the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to it.
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p3"> Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered: (1) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom; (3)
                  the vices opposed to fortitude.
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p4"> Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p5"> (1) Whether fortitude is a virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p6"> (2) Whether it is a special virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p7"> (3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p8"> (4) Whether it is only about fear of death?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p9"> (5) Whether it is only in warlike matters?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p10"> (6) Whether endurance is its chief act?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p11"> (7) Whether its action is directed to its own good?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p12"> (8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p13"> (9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p14"> (10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p15"> (11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q123-p16"> (12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues.</p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A1-p0.1">Whether fortitude is a virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q123_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.9" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:9</a>): "Virtue is perfected in infirmity." But fortitude is contrary to infirmity. Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it is a virtue, it is either theological, intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained among the theological
                     virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be gathered from what we have said above (
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html">FS, Q[57], A[2]</a>; 
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A1-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">FS, Q[62], A[3]</a>). Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7,8): "Some
                     seem to be brave through
                     ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers," both of which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral virtue, "and
                     some are called brave on account of certain passions"; for instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonor, or again
                     on account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does not act from passion but from choice, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A1-p3.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">FS, Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since it is a "good quality of the mind," as stated above (Ethic. iii,
                     7,8). But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results from the temperament of the body. Therefore it seems
                     that fortitude is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv, xxi, xxii) numbers fortitude among the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good." Hence
                     human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes a man good, and renders his work good. Now man's good is to
                     be in accordance with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man
                     good, to make his work accord with reason. This happens in three ways: first, by
                     rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the intellectual virtues; secondly, by establishing the rectitude of reason
                     in human affairs, and this belongs to justice; thirdly, by removing the obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in
                     human affairs. Now the human will is hindered in two ways from following the rectitude of reason. First, through being drawn
                     by some object of pleasure to something other than what the rectitude of reason requires; and this obstacle is removed by
                     the
                     virtue of temperance. Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that which is in accordance with reason, on account
                     of some difficulty that presents itself. In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the mind is requisite, whereby to resist
                     the aforesaid difficulty even as a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p7"> Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far as it conforms man to reason.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in the infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, of which the Apostle
                     was speaking. Now it belongs to fortitude of the mind to bear bravely with infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the
                     virtue of patience or fortitude, as also to acknowledge one's own infirmity, and this belongs to the perfection that is called
                     humility.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sometimes a person performs the exterior act of a virtue without having the virtue, and from some other cause than virtue.
                     Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in which people are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through
                     performing acts of fortitude without having the virtue. This may be done in three ways. First, because they tend to that which
                     is difficult as though it were not difficult: and this again happens in three
                     ways, for sometimes this is owing to ignorance, through not perceiving the greatness of the danger; sometimes it is owing
                     to the fact that one is hopeful of overcoming dangers---when, for instance, one has often experienced escape from danger;
                     and sometimes this is owing to a certain science and art, as in the case of soldiers who, through skill and practice in the
                     use of arms, think little of the dangers of battle, as they reckon themselves capable of defending themselves against them;
                     thus
                     Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i), "No man fears to do what he is confident of having learned to do well." Secondly, a man performs
                     an act of fortitude without having the virtue, through the impulse of a passion, whether of sorrow that he wishes to cast
                     off, or again of anger. Thirdly, through choice, not indeed of a due end, but of some temporal advantage to be obtained, such
                     as honor, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fortitude of the soul which is reckoned a virtue, as explained in the Reply to the First Objection, is so called from
                     its likeness to fortitude of the body. Nor is it inconsistent with the notion of virtue, that a man should have a natural
                     inclination to virtue by reason of his natural temperament, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html">FS, Q[63], A[1]</a>).
                  </p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A2-p0.1">Whether fortitude is a special virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q123_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.7" target="asv">Wis. 7:7</a>): "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude," where the text has "virtue" for "fortitude." Since
                     then the term "virtue" is common to all virtues, it seems that fortitude is a general virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is not lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honor of the virtues
                     and guards their behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of dangers,
                     steeled against pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a deformity that weakens virtue"; and he says the
                     same further on in connection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any special virtue.
                     Therefore fortitude is not a special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fortitude would seem to derive its name from firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in
                     Ethic. ii. Therefore fortitude is a general virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it among the other virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">FS, Q[61], AA[3]</a>,4), the term "fortitude" can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and in this sense
                     it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue, since as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii), it is requisite
                     for every virtue to act firmly and immovably. Secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing and withstanding
                     those things wherein it
                     is most difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore Tully says (Rhet. ii), that "fortitude is deliberate
                     facing of dangers and bearing of toils." In this sense fortitude is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special matter.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 116) the word virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural power
                     is, in one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in another sense is a principle of action, as stated in Metaph.
                     v, 17. And since this latter meaning is the more common, the term "virtue," as denoting the extreme limit of such a power,
                     is a common term, for virtue taken in a general sense is nothing else than a habit
                     whereby one acts well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the first sense, which sense is more specific, it is
                     applied to a special virtue, namely fortitude, to which it belongs to stand firm against all kinds of assaults.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense, as denoting firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds. Nevertheless even
                     as a special virtue with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the assaults of all vices. For he that can stand firm in
                     things that are most difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence, to resist those which are less difficult.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection takes fortitude in the first sense.
                  </p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A3-p0.1">Whether fortitude is about fear and dying?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude is not about fear and daring. For Gregory says (Moral. vii): "The fortitude of the just man is to
                     overcome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence, to quench the lusts of the present life." Therefore fortitude seems to be
                     about pleasures rather than about fear and daring.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), that it belongs to fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly
                     has nothing to do with the passions of fear and daring, but rather with a man's toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore
                     fortitude is not about fear and daring.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, not only daring, but also hope, is opposed to fear, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q45_A1.html">FS, Q[45], A[1]</a>, ad 2) in the treatise on passions. Therefore fortitude should not be about daring any more than about hope.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 9) that fortitude is about fear and daring.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it belongs to the virtue of fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from following the reason. Now to be
                     withdrawn from something difficult belongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil that entails difficulty,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A3.html">FS, Q[42], AA[3]</a>,5) in the treatise on passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of difficult things, which can
                     withdraw the will from following the reason. And it behooves one not only firmly to bear the assault of these difficulties
                     by restraining fear, but also moderately to withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel them altogether in order
                     to free oneself therefrom for the future, which seems to come under the notion of daring. Therefore fortitude is about fear
                     and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking then of the fortitude of the just man, as to its common relation to all virtues. Hence he first of all
                     mentions matters pertaining to temperance, as in the words quoted, and then adds that which pertains properly to fortitude
                     as a special virtue, by saying: "To love the trials of this life for the sake of an eternal reward."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dangers and toils do not withdraw the will from the course of reason, except in so far as they are an object of fear. Hence
                     fortitude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but mediately about dangers and toils, these being the objects of
                     those passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the object, for hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is about the same object,
                     and is opposed to fear by way of approach and withdrawal, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q45_A1.html">FS, Q[45], A[1]</a>). And since fortitude properly regards those temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as appears from Tully's definition
                     quoted in the Second Objection, it follows that fortitude properly is about fear and
                     daring and not about hope, except in so far as it is connected with daring, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A3-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q45_A2.html">FS, Q[45], A[2]</a>).
                  </p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A4-p0.1">Whether fortitude is only about dangers of death?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude is not only about dangers of death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fortitude is love
                     bearing all things readily for the sake of the object beloved": and (Music. vi) he says that fortitude is "the love which
                     dreads no hardship, not even death." Therefore fortitude is not only about danger of death, but also about other afflictions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the passions of the soul need to be reduced to a mean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue reducing
                     fears to a mean. Therefore fortitude is not only about fear of death, but also about other fears.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no virtue is about extremes. But fear of death is about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as stated
                     in Ethic. iii. Therefore the virtue of fortitude is not about fear of death.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Andronicus says that "fortitude is a virtue of the irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, it belongs to the virtue of fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of reason through fear of
                     bodily evil. Now it behooves one to hold firmly the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good is
                     equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason
                     in face of the greatest evils: because he
                     that stands firm against great things, will in consequence stand firm against less things, but not conversely. Moreover it
                     belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death,
                     since it does away all bodily goods. Wherefore Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxii) that "the soul is shaken by its fellow
                     body, with fear of toil and pain, lest the body be stricken and harassed with fear of death lest it be done away and destroyed."
                     Therefore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of dangers of death.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner of adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any kind
                     of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest evils; while through bearing others he is said to be brave in
                     a restricted sense.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since fear is born of love, any virtue that moderates the love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the fear of
                     contrary evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of money, as a consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and
                     the same is the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one's own life is natural: and hence the necessity of
                     a special virtue modifying the fear of death.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding right reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with reason
                     is not contrary to virtue.
                  </p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A5-p0.1">Whether fortitude is properly about dangers of death in battle?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle. For martyrs above all are commended for their fortitude.
                     But martyrs are not commended in connection with battle. Therefore fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "fortitude is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters": and Tully (De Offic.
                     i), under the heading, "That it pertains to fortitude to excel in battle rather than in civil life," says: "Although not a
                     few think that the business of war is of greater importance than the affairs of civil life, this opinion must be qualified:
                     and if we wish to judge the matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are more
                     important and more glorious than those connected with war." Now greater fortitude is about greater things. Therefore fortitude
                     is not properly concerned with death in battle.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, war is directed to the preservation of a country's temporal peace: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) that "wars
                     are waged in order to insure peace." Now it does not seem that one ought to expose oneself to the danger of death for the
                     temporal peace of one's country, since this same peace is the occasion of much license in morals. Therefore it seems that
                     the virtue of fortitude is not about the danger of death in battle.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that fortitude is chiefly about death in battle.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, fortitude strengthens a man's mind against the greatest danger, which is that of death. Now fortitude is a virtue; and it
                     is essential to virtue ever to tend to good; wherefore it is in order to pursue some good that man does not fly from the danger
                     of death. But the dangers of death arising out of sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not seem
                     to come on a man through his pursuing
                     some good. on the other hand, the dangers of death which occur in battle come to man directly on account of some good, because,
                     to wit, he is defending the common good by a just fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there is the general combat,
                     for instance, of those who fight in battle; secondly, there is the private combat, as when a judge or even private individual
                     does not refrain from giving a just judgment through fear of the impending sword, or any other danger though it
                     threaten death. Hence it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the mind against dangers of death, not only such as arise in a
                     general battle, but also such as occur in singular combat, which may be called by the general name of battle. Accordingly
                     it must be granted that fortitude is properly about dangers of death occurring in battle.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p7"> Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger of any other kind of death; especially since man may be in danger of
                     any kind of death on account of virtue: thus may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend through fear of deadly infection,
                     or not refuse to undertake a journey with some godly object in view through fear of shipwreck or robbers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Martyrs face the fight that is waged against their own person, and this for the sake of the sovereign good which is God;
                     wherefore their fortitude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the genus of fortitude that regards warlike actions, for
                     which reason they are said to have been valiant in battle. [*Office of Martyrs, ex. 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q123_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.34" target="asv">Heb. xi. 34</a>.]
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Personal and civil business is differentiated from the business of war that regards general wars. However, personal and civil
                     affairs admit of dangers of death arising out of certain conflicts which are private wars, and so with regard to these also
                     there may be fortitude properly so called.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The peace of the state is good in itself, nor does it become evil because certain persons make evil use of it. For there
                     are many others who make good use of it; and many evils prevented by it, such as murders and sacrileges, are much greater
                     than those which are occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins of the flesh.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q123_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A6-p0.1">Whether endurance is the chief act of fortitude?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that endurance is not the chief act of fortitude. For virtue "is about the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3).
                     Now it is more difficult to attack than to endure. Therefore endurance is not the chief act of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be able to act on another seems to argue greater power than not to be changed by another. Now to attack is to
                     act on another, and to endure is to persevere unchangeably. Since then fortitude denotes perfection of power, it seems that
                     it belongs to fortitude to attack rather than to endure.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one contrary is more distant from the other than its mere negation. Now to endure is merely not to fear, whereas
                     to attack denotes a movement contrary to that of fear, since it implies pursuit. Since then fortitude above all withdraws
                     the mind from fear, it seems that it regards attack rather than endurance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "certain persons are" said to be brave chiefly because they endure affliction.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, and according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 9), "fortitude is more concerned to allay fear, than to moderate daring."
                     For it is more difficult to allay fear than to moderate daring, since the danger which is the object of daring and fear, tends
                     by its very nature to check daring, but to increase fear. Now to attack belongs to fortitude in so far as the latter moderates
                     daring, whereas to endure follows the
                     repression of fear. Therefore the principal act of fortitude is endurance, that is to stand immovable in the midst of dangers
                     rather than to attack them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Endurance is more difficult than aggression, for three reasons. First, because endurance seemingly implies that one is being
                     attacked by a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that one is attacking as though one were the stronger party; and
                     it is more difficult to contend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly, because he that endures already feels the presence
                     of danger, whereas the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come; and
                     it is more difficult to be unmoved by the present than by the future. Thirdly, because endurance implies length of time, whereas
                     aggression is consistent with sudden movements; and it is more difficult to remain unmoved for a long time, than to be moved
                     suddenly to something arduous. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some hurry to meet danger, yet fly when the
                     danger is present; this is not the behavior of a brave man."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Endurance denotes indeed a passion of the body, but an action of the soul cleaving most resolutely [fortissime] to good,
                     the result being that it does not yield to the threatening passion of the body. Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the
                     body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that endures fears not, though he is confronted with the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not present to the aggressor.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q123_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A7-p0.1">Whether the brave man acts for the sake of the good of his habit?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the brave man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit. For in matters of action the end, though
                     first in intention, is last in execution. Now the act of fortitude, in the order of execution, follows the habit of fortitude.
                     Therefore it is impossible for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "We love virtues for the sake of happiness, and yet some make bold to counsel us
                     to be virtuous," namely by saying that we should desire virtue for its own sake, "without loving happiness. If they succeed
                     in their endeavor, we shall surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer love that for the sake of which alone
                     we love virtue." But fortitude is a virtue. Therefore the act of fortitude is directed not
                     to fortitude but to happiness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fortitude is love ready to bear all things for God's sake." Now God is
                     not the habit of fortitude, but something better, since the end must needs be better than what is directed to the end. Therefore
                     the brave man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "to the brave man fortitude itself is a good": and such is his end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> An end is twofold: proximate and ultimate. Now the proximate end of every agent is to introduce a likeness of that agent's
                     form into something else: thus the end of fire in heating is to introduce the likeness of its heat into some passive matter,
                     and the end of the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of his art. Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended,
                     may be called the remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made, external
                     matter is fashioned by art, so in things done, human deeds are fashioned by prudence. Accordingly we must conclude that the
                     brave man intends as his proximate end to reproduce in action a likeness of his habit, for he intends to act in accordance
                     with his habit: but his remote end is happiness or God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p7"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the First Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a habit were
                     its end, instead of the likeness of the habit in act, as stated. The other two objections consider the ultimate end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p8"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q123_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A9.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A8-p0.1">Whether the brave man delights in his act?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For "delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit" (Ethic. x,
                     4,6,8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure
                     in his act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose, commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q123_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv"> Gal. 5:22, </a> "But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," says that deeds of virtue are called "fruits because they refresh man's
                     mind with a holy and pure delight." Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he takes pleasure in his act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his
                     own body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight in the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body;
                     and consequently the brave man does all things with pleasure.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "the brave man seems to have no delight in his act."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A3.html">FS, Q[31], AA[3]</a>,4,5) where we were treating of the passions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily, resulting from bodily contact, the other
                     is spiritual, resulting from an apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results from deeds of virtue, since
                     in them we consider the good of reason. Now the principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain things that are
                     unpleasant as apprehended by the
                     soul---for instance, the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a natural good, but also as being necessary
                     for acts of virtue, and things connected with them---but also to endure things unpleasant in respect of bodily contact, such
                     as wounds and blows. Hence the brave man, on one side, has something that affords him delight, namely as regards spiritual
                     pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and the end thereof: while, on the other hand, he has cause for both spiritual
                     sorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence we read (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q123_A8-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.6.30" target="asv">2 Macc. 6:30</a>) that Eleazar said: "I suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul am well content to suffer these things because I fear Thee."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p7"> Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious assistance
                     of God's grace, which has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things in which it delights, than bodily pains have
                     to afflict it. Thus the Blessed Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that he felt as though he were
                     walking on roses.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p8"> Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes
                     spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and to whatever appertains thereto.
                     Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that "it is not necessary for a brave man to delight so as to perceive his
                     delight, but it suffices for him not to be sad."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The vehemence of the action or passion of one power hinders the action of another power: wherefore the pain in his senses
                     hinders the mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its proper operation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on account of their end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is principally
                     the case with fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen in
                     all virtues, except in so far as one attains the end."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome by the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and the sensitive
                     apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak,
                     in the presence of great bodily pain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A9.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q123_A9" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A10.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A9-p0.1">Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when
                     they are unforeseen. But Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "fortitude is the deliberate facing of danger, and bearing
                     of toil." Therefore fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "The brave man is not unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he takes measures beforehand,
                     and looks out as from the conning-tower of his mind, so as to encounter the future by his forethought, lest he should say
                     afterwards: This befell me because I did not think it could possibly happen." But it is not possible to be prepared for the
                     future in the case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is not
                     concerned with sudden happenings.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that the "brave man is of good hope." But hope looks forward to the future,
                     which is inconsistent with sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things must be considered in the operation of fortitude. One is in regard to its choice: and thus fortitude is not about
                     sudden occurrences: because the brave man chooses to think beforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able to
                     withstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to Gregory (Hom. xxv in Evang.), "the blow that is foreseen strikes
                     with less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we are
                     forearmed with the shield of foreknowledge." The other thing to be considered in the operation of fortitude regards the display
                     of the virtuous habit: and in this way fortitude is chiefly about sudden occurrences, because according to the Philosopher
                     (Ethic. iii, 8) the habit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a habit works by way of nature. Wherefore
                     if a person without forethought does that which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges on account of some sudden
                     danger, this is a very strong proof that habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p7"> Yet is it possible for a person even without the habit of fortitude, to prepare his mind against danger by long forethought:
                     in the same way as a brave man prepares himself when necessary. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p8"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p9"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A10.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q123_A10" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A12.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A10-p0.1">Whether the brave man makes use of anger in his action?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his action. For no one should employ as an instrument of his action that
                     which he cannot use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as to take it up and lay it aside when he will. For, as
                     the Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), when a bodily passion is in movement, it does not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore
                     a brave man should not employ anger for his action.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a man is competent to do a thing by himself, he should not seek the assistance of something weaker and more imperfect.
                     Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of fortitude, wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De
                     Ira i): "Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared for action but also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater
                     folly than for reason to seek help from anger? the steadfast from the unstaid, the
                     trusty from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick?" Therefore a brave man should not make use of anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account of sorrow
                     or desire; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild beasts are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain,
                     and adulterous persons dare many things for the sake of desire. Now fortitude employs neither sorrow nor desire for its action.
                     Therefore in like manner it should not employ anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "anger helps the brave."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A10-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q24_A2.html">FS, Q[24], A[2]</a>), concerning anger and the other passions there was a difference of opinion between the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For
                     the Stoics excluded anger and all other passions of the soul from the mind of a wise or good man: whereas the Peripatetics,
                     of whom Aristotle was the chief, ascribed to virtuous men both anger and the other passions of the soul albeit modified by
                     reason. And possibly they differed
                     not in reality but in their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A10-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q24_A2.html">FS, Q[24], A[2]</a>), gave the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, however they may comport themselves. And since
                     the sensitive appetite is moved by the command of reason, so that it may cooperate by rendering action more prompt, they held
                     that virtuous persons should employ both anger and the other passions of the soul, modified according to the dictate of
                     reason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave the name of passions to certain immoderate emotions of the sensitive appetite,
                     wherefore they called them sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason severed them altogether from virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p7"> Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but not immoderate anger.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Anger that is moderated in accordance with reason is subject to the command of reason: so that man uses it at his will, which
                     would not be the case were it immoderate.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason employs anger for its action, not as seeking its assistance, but because it uses the sensitive appetite as an instrument,
                     just as it uses the members of the body. Nor is it unbecoming for the instrument to be more imperfect than the principal agent,
                     even as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover, Seneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above words were
                     aimed by him directly at Aristotle.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whereas fortitude, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A10-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, has two acts, namely endurance and aggression, it employs anger, not for the act of endurance, because the reason by itself
                     performs this act, but for the act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the other passions, since it belongs
                     to anger to strike at the cause of sorrow, so that it directly cooperates with fortitude in attacking. On the other hand,
                     sorrow by its
                     very nature gives way to the thing that hurts; though accidentally it helps in aggression, either as being the cause of anger,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A10-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q47_A3.html">FS, Q[47], A[3]</a>), or as making a person expose himself to danger in order to escape from sorrow. In like manner desire, by its very nature,
                     tends to a pleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to withstand danger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one
                     to attack, in so far as one prefers to risk dangers rather than
                     lack pleasure. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "Of all the cases in which fortitude arises from a passion, the
                     most natural is when a man is brave through anger, making his choice and acting for a purpose," i.e. for a due end; "this
                     is true fortitude."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p11">Whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue?</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p12">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. For, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A10-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A10.html">(A[10])</a>, anger is closely allied with fortitude. Now anger is not accounted a principal passion; nor is daring which belongs to fortitude.
                     Therefore neither should fortitude be reckoned a cardinal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p13">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of virtue is good. But the direct object of fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is endurance of evil
                     and toil, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii). Therefore fortitude is not a cardinal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p14">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cardinal virtues are about those things upon which human life is chiefly occupied, just as a door turns upon
                     a hinge [cardine]. But fortitude is about dangers of death which are of rare occurrence in human life. Therefore fortitude
                     should not be reckoned a cardinal or principal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p15">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxii), Ambrose in his commentary on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q123_A10-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv">Lk. 6:20</a>, and Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), number fortitude among the four cardinal or principal virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p16">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A10-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">FS, Q[61], AA[3]</a>,4), those virtues are said to be cardinal or principal which have a foremost claim to that which belongs to the virtues in
                     common. And among other conditions of virtue in general one is that it is stated to "act steadfastly," according to Ethic.
                     ii, 4. Now fortitude above all lays claim to praise for steadfastness. Because he that stands firm is so much the more praised,
                     as he is more strongly
                     impelled to fall or recede. Now man is impelled to recede from that which is in accordance with reason, both by the pleasing
                     good and the displeasing evil. But bodily pain impels him more strongly than pleasure. For Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 36):
                     "There is none that does not shun pain more than he desires pleasure. For we perceive that even the most untamed beasts are
                     deterred from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pain." And among the pains of the mind and dangers those are mostly feared
                     which lead to death, and it is against them that the brave man stands firm. Therefore fortitude is a cardinal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Daring and anger do not cooperate with fortitude in its act of endurance, wherein its steadfastness is chiefly commended:
                     for it is by that act that the brave man curbs fear, which is a principal passion, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q123_A10-p17.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A4.html">FS, Q[25], A[4]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p18">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue is directed to the good of reason which it behooves to safeguard against the onslaught of evils. And fortitude is
                     directed to evils of the body, as contraries which it withstands, and to the good of reason, as the end, which it intends
                     to safeguard.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p19">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though dangers of death are of rare occurrence, yet the occasions of those dangers occur frequently, since on account of
                     justice which he pursues, and also on account of other good deeds, man encounters mortal adversaries.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p20"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p21"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A12.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q123_A12" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A10.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A12-p0.1">Whether fortitude excels among all other virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude excels among all other virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is higher, so to speak,
                     than the rest."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is about that which is difficult and good. But fortitude is about most difficult things. Therefore it is
                     the greatest of the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the person of a man is more excellent than his possessions. But fortitude is about a man's person, for it is this
                     that a man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue: whereas justice and the other moral virtues are about other
                     and external things. Therefore fortitude is the chief of the moral virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i): "Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 19): "Those virtues must needs be greatest which are most profitable to others."
                     Now liberality seems to be more useful than fortitude. Therefore it is a greater virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), "In things that are great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good": wherefore the better
                     a virtue the greater it is. Now reason's good is man's good, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) prudence, since it is a
                     perfection of reason, has the good essentially: while justice effects this good, since it belongs to justice to establish
                     the order of reason in all human affairs: whereas the other virtues safeguard this good,
                     inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest they lead man away from reason's good. As to the order of the latter, fortitude
                     holds the first place, because fear of dangers of death has the greatest power to make man recede from the good of reason:
                     and after fortitude comes temperance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in hindering the good of reason. Now
                     to be a thing essentially ranks before effecting it, and the latter ranks before safeguarding it by removing obstacles thereto.
                     Wherefore among the cardinal virtues, prudence ranks first, justice second, fortitude third, temperance fourth, and after
                     these the other virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ambrose places fortitude before the other virtues, in respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is useful both
                     in warfare, and in matters relating to civil or home life. Hence he begins by saying (De Offic. i): "Now we come to treat
                     of fortitude, which being higher so to speak than the others, is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue essentially regards the good rather than the difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to its
                     goodness rather than its difficulty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A man does not expose his person to dangers of death except in order to safeguard justice: wherefore the praise awarded to
                     fortitude depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "fortitude without justice is an occasion of
                     injustice; since the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p11"> The Fourth argument is granted.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Liberality is useful in conferring certain particular favors: whereas a certain general utility attaches to fortitude, since
                     it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that "just and brave men are most beloved,
                     because they are most useful in war and peace."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A10.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS.iii.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q124" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A12.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q124-p0.1">OF MARTYRDOM (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q124-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q124-p2"> We must now consider martyrdom, under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q124-p3"> (1) Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q124-p4"> (2) Of what virtue is it the act?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q124-p5"> (3) Concerning the perfection of this act;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q124-p6"> (4) The pain of martyrdom;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q124-p7"> (5) Its cause.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q124_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q124_A1-p0.1">Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that martyrdom is not an act of virtue. For all acts of virtue are voluntary. But martyrdom is sometimes not voluntary,
                     as in the case of the Innocents who were slain for Christ's sake, and of whom Hillary says (Super Matth. i) that "they attained
                     the ripe age of eternity through the glory of martyrdom." Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. Now it is unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q124_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q64_A5.html">Q[64], A[5]</a>), and yet martyrdom is achieved by so doing: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "during persecution certain holy women,
                     in order to escape from those who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into a river, and so ended their lives, and
                     their martyrdom is honored in the Catholic Church with most solemn veneration."
                     Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do an act of virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court martyrdom, rather
                     would it seem to be presumptuous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The reward of beatitude is not due save to acts of virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.10" target="asv">Mat. 5:10</a>): "Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." Therefore martyrdom
                     is an act of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q124_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A1.html">Q[123], AA[1]</a>,3), it belongs to virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. Now the good of reason consists in the truth as its proper
                     object, and in justice as its proper effect, as shown above (
                     <a id="SS_Q124_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q109_A1.html">Q[109], AA[1]</a>,2;
                     <a id="SS_Q124_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A12.html"> Q[123], A[12]</a>). And martyrdom consists essentially in standing firmly to truth and justice against the assaults of persecution. Hence it
                     is evident
                     that martyrdom is an act of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that in the case of the Innocents the use of their free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they suffered
                     martyrdom even voluntarily. Since, however, Scripture contains no proof of this, it is better to say that these babes in being
                     slain obtained by God's grace the glory of martyrdom which others acquire by their own will. For the shedding of one's blood
                     for Christ's sake takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore just as in the case
                     of baptized children the merit of Christ is conducive to the acquisition of glory through the baptismal grace, so in those
                     who were slain for Christ's sake the merit of Christ's martyrdom is conducive to the acquisition of the martyr's palm. Hence
                     Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (De Diversis lxvi), as though he were addressing them: "A man that does not believe
                     that children are benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt of your being crowned in suffering for Christ. You were not
                     old enough to believe in Christ's future sufferings, but you had a body wherein you could endure suffering of Christ Who was
                     to suffer."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "possibly the Church was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine authority thus
                     to honor the memory of those holy women [*Cf.
                     <a id="SS_Q124_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q64_A1.html"> Q[64], A[1]</a>, ad 2]."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now it has been stated (
                     <a id="SS_Q124_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q108_A1.html">FS, Q[108], A[1]</a>, ad 4) that some of the precepts of the Divine Law are to be understood in reference to the preparation of the mind, in the
                     sense that man ought to be prepared to do such and such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same way certain things belong
                     to an act of virtue as regards the preparation of the mind, so that in such and such a case
                     a man should act according to reason. And this observation would seem very much to the point in the case of martyrdom, which
                     consists in the right endurance of sufferings unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an occasion of acting unjustly:
                     yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to endure it in moderation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q124_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q124_A2-p0.1">Whether martyrdom is an act of fortitude?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that martyrdom is not an act of fortitude. For the Greek {martyr} signifies a witness. Now witness is borne to the
                     faith of Christ. according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.1.8" target="asv"> Acts 1:8, </a> "You shall be witnesses unto Me," etc. and Maximus says in a sermon: "The mother of martyrs is the Catholic faith which those
                     glorious warriors have sealed with their blood." Therefore martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the virtue which inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and without which
                     the act avails nothing. Now charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom: Thus Maximus says in a sermon: "The charity of Christ
                     is victorious in His martyrs." Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act of martyrdom, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.13" target="asv"> Jn. 15:13, </a> "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for
                     his friends." Moreover without charity martyrdom avails nothing, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:3, </a> "If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore martyrdom is an act
                     of charity rather than of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says in a sermon on St. Cyprian: "It is easy to honor a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a great
                     thing to imitate his faith and patience." Now that which calls chiefly for praise in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which
                     it is the act. Therefore martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "Blessed martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you? Most valiant warriors, how
                     shall I find words to proclaim the strength of your courage?" Now a person is praised on account of the virtue whose act he
                     performs. Therefore martyrdom is an act of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q124_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A1.html">Q[123], A[1]</a>, seqq.), it belongs to fortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially against dangers, and chiefly against
                     dangers of death, and most of all against those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in martyrdom man is firmly strengthened
                     in the good of virtue, since he cleaves to faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening danger of death, the imminence
                     of which is moreover due to
                     a kind of particular contest with his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a sermon (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "The crowd of
                     onlookers wondered to see an unearthly battle, and Christ's servants fighting erect, undaunted in speech, with souls unmoved,
                     and strength divine." Wherefore it is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude; for which reason the Church reads in
                     the office of Martyrs: They "became valiant in battle" [*
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.34" target="asv">Heb. 11:34</a>].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Two things must be considered in the act of fortitude. one is the good wherein the brave man is strengthened, and this is
                     the end of fortitude; the other is the firmness itself, whereby a man does not yield to the contraries that hinder him from
                     achieving that good, and in this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as civic fortitude strengthens a man's mind in
                     human justice, for the safeguarding of which he braves the danger of death, so
                     gratuitous fortitude strengthens man's soul in the good of Divine justice, which is "through faith in Christ Jesus," according
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.22" target="asv"> Rom. 3:22.</a> Thus martyrdom is related to faith as the end in which one is strengthened, but to fortitude as the eliciting habit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, as its first and chief motive cause, being the virtue commanding it, whereas
                     fortitude inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause, being the virtue that elicits it. Hence martyrdom is an act of
                     charity as commanding, and of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it manifests both virtues. It is due to charity
                     that it is meritorious, like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails
                     not without charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q124_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A6.html">Q[123], A[6]</a>), the chief act of fortitude is endurance: to this and not to its secondary act, which is aggression, martyrdom belongs.
                     And since patience serves fortitude on the part of its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is that martyrs are also praised
                     for their patience.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q124_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q124_A3-p0.1">Whether martyrdom is an act of the greatest perfection?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection. For seemingly that which is a matter of counsel and not
                     of precept pertains to perfection, because, to wit, it is not necessary for salvation. But it would seem that martyrdom is
                     necessary for salvation, since the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.10" target="asv">Rom. 10:10</a>), "With the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation," and it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.16" target="asv">1 Jn.
                        3:16
                     </a>), that "we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." Therefore martyrdom does not pertain to perfection.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it seems to point to greater perfection that a man give his soul to God, which is done by obedience, than that he
                     give God his body, which is done by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is preferable to all sacrifices."
                     Therefore martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it would seem better to do good to others than to maintain oneself in good, since the "good of the nation is better
                     than the good of the individual," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now he that suffers martyrdom profits himself
                     alone, whereas he that teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of teaching and guiding subjects is more perfect than
                     the act of martyrdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi) prefers martyrdom to virginity which pertains to perfection. Therefore martyrdom seems
                     to belong to perfection in the highest degree.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of an act of virtue in two ways. First, with regard to the species of that act, as compared to the virtue proximately
                     eliciting it. In this way martyrdom, which consists in the due endurance of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous
                     acts, because endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only in so far as it is directed to some good consisting
                     in an act of virtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of virtue
                     being the end is better.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p7"> A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with its first motive cause, which is the love of charity,
                     and it is in this respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life, since, as the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.14" target="asv">Col. 3:14</a>), that "charity . . . is the bond of perfection." Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof of the perfection
                     of charity: since a man's love for a thing is proved to be so much the greater, according as
                     that which he despises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which he chooses to suffer for its sake is more odious. But
                     it is evident that of all the goods of the present life man loves life itself most, and on the other hand he hates death more
                     than anything, especially when it is accompanied by the pains of bodily torment, "from fear of which even dumb animals refrain
                     from the greatest pleasures," as Augustine observes (QQ[83], qu. 36). And from this point of view it is clear that
                     martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts in respect of its genus, as being the sign of the greatest charity, according
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.15.13" target="asv"> Jn. 15:13</a>: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is no act of perfection, which is a matter of counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of precept, as being necessary
                     for salvation. Thus Augustine declares (De Adult. Conjug. xiii) that a man is under the obligation of observing continency,
                     through the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary to the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it
                     be necessary for salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary
                     for salvation to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many holy martyrs who through zeal for the faith or brotherly love gave
                     themselves up to martyrdom of their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be understood as referring to the preparation
                     of the mind.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of obedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we read of Christ (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.8" target="asv">Phil. 2:8</a>) that He became "obedient unto death." Hence it is evident that martyrdom is of itself more perfect than obedience considered
                     absolutely.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers martyrdom according to the proper species of its act, whence it derives no excellence over all other
                     virtuous acts; thus neither is fortitude more excellent than all virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q124_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q124_A4-p0.1">Whether death is essential to martyrdom?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that death is not essential to martyrdom. For Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption (Epist. ad Paul. et Eustoch.):
                     "I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace": and Gregory
                     says (Hom. iii in Evang.): "Although persecution has ceased to offer the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without
                     its martyrdom, since even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet
                     do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit." Therefore there can be martyrdom without suffering death.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we read of certain women as commended for despising life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh:
                     wherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity is preferable to the life of the body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh
                     has been forfeited or has been threatened in confession of the Christian faith, as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore
                     it seems that the name of martyr should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the integrity
                     of the flesh for the sake of Christ's faith, rather than if she were to forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also
                     Lucy said: "If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity will gain me a twofold crown."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But it belongs to fortitude to brave not only death but also other hardships,
                     as Augustine declares (Music. vi). Now there are many other hardships besides death, which one may suffer for Christ's faith,
                     namely imprisonment, exile, being stripped of one's goods, as mentioned in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.34" target="asv"> Heb. 10:34, </a> for which reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint Marcellus, notwithstanding that he died in prison.
                     Therefore it is not essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated above (A[2], ad 1; A[3]). Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death.
                     Therefore it is before death; and consequently death is not essential to martyrdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that "in dying for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in living
                     without faith."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p7"> I answer that As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q124_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q124_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, a martyr is so called as being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise things visible for the sake
                     of things invisible, as stated in 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11" target="asv">Heb. 11</a>. Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to the faith in showing by deed that he despises all things
                     present, in order to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains the life of the body he does not show by
                     deed that he
                     despises all things relating to the body. For men are wont to despise both their kindred and all they possess, and even to
                     suffer bodily pain, rather than lose life. Hence Satan testified against Job (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A4-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Job.2.4" target="asv">Job 2:4</a>): "Skin for skin, and all that a man hath he will give for his soul" [Douay: 'life'] i.e. for the life of his body. Therefore
                     the perfect notion of martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The authorities quoted, and the like that one may meet with, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh, or is condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it
                     is not evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the Christian faith, or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore
                     in the sight of men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and consequently this is not martyrdom properly speaking.
                     In the sight of God, however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed worthy
                     of a reward, as Lucy said.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q124_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A4.html">Q[123], AA[4]</a>,5), fortitude regards danger of death chiefly, and other dangers consequently; wherefore a person is not called a martyr
                     merely for suffering imprisonment, or exile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except in so far as these result in death.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in the voluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person willingly
                     suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however, that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for
                     Christ's sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued
                     until death ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this
                     state, and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q124_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q124_A5-p0.1">Whether faith alone is the cause of martyrdom?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.4.15" target="asv">1 Pet. 4:15,16</a>): "Let none of you suffer as a murderer, or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter of other men's things. But if as a Christian,
                     let him not be ashamed, but let him glorify God in this name." Now a man is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith
                     of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ gives the glory of martyrdom to those who suffer.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a martyr is a kind of witness. But witness is borne to the truth alone. Now one is not called a martyr for bearing
                     witness to any truth, but only for witnessing to the Divine truth, otherwise a man would be a martyr if he were to die for
                     confessing a truth of geometry or some other speculative science, which seems ridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause
                     of martyrdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most account which are directed to the common good, since "the good of
                     the nation is better than the good of the individual," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good
                     were the cause of martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be martyrs who die for the defense of their country.
                     Yet this is not consistent with Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyrdom of
                     those who die in a just war. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.10" target="asv">Mat. 5:10</a>): "Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake," which pertains to martyrdom, according to a gloss, as well
                     as Jerome's commentary on this passage. Now not only faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice. Therefore other
                     virtues can be the cause of martyrdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q124_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q124_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, martyrs are so called as being witnesses, because by suffering in body unto death they bear witness to the truth; not indeed
                     to any truth, but to the truth which is in accordance with godliness, and was made known to us by Christ: wherefore Christ's
                     martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the truth of faith.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p7"> But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, but also outward profession, which is expressed not only by words,
                     whereby one confesses the faith, but also by deeds, whereby a person shows that he has faith, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.18" target="asv"> James 2:18, </a> "I will show thee, by works, my faith." Hence it is written of certain people (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A5-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Titus.1.16" target="asv">Titus 1:16</a>): "They profess that they know God but in their works they deny Him." Thus all virtuous deeds, inasmuch as
                     they are referred to God, are professions of the faith whereby we come to know that God requires these works of us, and rewards
                     us for them: and in this way they can be the cause of martyrdom. For this reason the Church celebrates the martyrdom of Blessed
                     John the Baptist, who suffered death, not for refusing to deny the faith, but for reproving adultery.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A Christian is one who is Christ's. Now a person is said to be Christ's, not only through having faith in Christ, but also
                     because he is actuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of Christ, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.9" target="asv">Rom. 8:9</a>, "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His"; and again because in imitation of Christ he is dead to sins,
                     according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A5-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.24" target="asv"> Gal. 5:24, </a> "They that are Christ's have crucified their flesh with the vices and
                     concupiscences." Hence to suffer as a Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the faith, which is done by words,
                     but also to suffer for doing any good work, or for avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because this all comes under the head
                     of witnessing to the faith.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of other sciences has no connection with the worship of the Godhead: hence it is not called truth according to
                     godliness, and consequently the confession thereof cannot be said to be the direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie
                     is a sin, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q124_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q110_A3.html">Q[110], AA[3]</a>,4), avoidance of a lie, to whatever truth it may be contrary, may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a lie is a sin against
                     the Divine
                     Law.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good of one's country is paramount among human goods: yet the Divine good, which is the proper cause of martyrdom, is
                     of more account than human good. Nevertheless, since human good may become Divine, for instance when it is referred to God,
                     it follows that any human good in so far as it is referred to God, may be the cause of martyrdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A12.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q125" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q125-p0.1">OF FEAR* (FOUR ARTICLES) [*St. Thomas calls this vice indifferently 'fear' or 'timidity.' The translation requires one to
                  adhere to these terms on account of the connection with the passion of fear. Otherwise 'cowardice' would be a better rendering.]
               </h3>
               <p id="SS_Q125-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q125-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: (1) Fear; (2) Fearlessness; (3) Daring.</p>
               <p id="SS_Q125-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q125-p4"> (1) Whether fear is a sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q125-p5"> (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q125-p6"> (3) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q125-p7"> (4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q125_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q125_A1-p0.1">Whether fear is a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a passion, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q125_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">FS, Q[23], A[4]</a>; Q[42]). Now we are neither praised nor blamed for passions, as stated in Ethic. ii. Since then every sin is blameworthy,
                     it seems that fear is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a sin: since the "law of the Lord is unspotted" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.8" target="asv">Ps. 18:8</a>). Yet fear is commanded in God's law, for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.5" target="asv">Eph. 6:5</a>): "Servants, be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling." Therefore fear is
                     not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for sin is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii).
                     Now fear is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "a man would be insane or insensible to pain,
                     if nothing, not even earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear." Therefore fear is not a sin. .
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> our Lord said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.28" target="asv">Mat. 10:28</a>): "Fear ye not them that kill the body," and it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.2.6" target="asv">Ezech. 2:6</a>): "Fear not, neither be thou afraid of their words."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A human act is said to be a sin on account of its being inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order, as
                     stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q125_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q109_A2.html">Q[109], A[2]</a>;
                     <a id="SS_Q125_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q114_A1.html"> Q[114], A[1]</a>). Now this due order requires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason. And reason dictates that certain things
                     should be shunned and some sought after. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to be shunned more than
                     others; and among things to be sought after, that some are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a good
                     is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be shunned. The result is that reason dictates that certain goods
                     are to be sought after more than certain evils are to be avoided. Accordingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates
                     that we should endure rather than forfeit others that we should rather seek for, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other
                     hand, when the appetite fears so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned, the appetite is neither inordinate nor sinful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance in general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or
                     evil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the Philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor
                     blame, because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate
                     or inordinate manner.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in accordance with reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be lacking
                     in the service they owe their masters.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason dictates that we should shun the evils that we cannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us nothing. Hence
                     there is no sin in fearing them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q125_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q125_A2-p0.1">Whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated above
                     (
                     <a id="SS_Q125_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A4.html">Q[123], AA[4]</a>,5). But the sin of fear is not always connected with dangers of death, for a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.127.1" target="asv"> Ps. 127:1, </a> "Blessed are all they that fear the Lord," says that "it is human fear whereby we dread to suffer carnal dangers, or to lose
                     worldly goods." Again a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A2-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.27.44" target="asv"> Mat. 27:44,
                        
                     </a>"He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame word," says that "evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of pain, and
                     fear of contempt." Therefore the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now sometimes
                     a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or shame. Thus Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order
                     not to be Caesar's slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead
                     of being opposed thereto.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is opposed not to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Q[20], A[1];
                     
                     <a id="SS_Q125_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A4.html">FS, Q[40], A[4]</a>). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that timidity is opposed to fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[19], A[3]; 
                     <a id="SS_Q125_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q43_A1.html">FS, Q[43], A[1]</a>), all fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary to something he loves. Now love is not confined to
                     any particular kind of virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every virtue, since every virtuous man loves the good
                     proper to his virtue; while inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate love gives use to inordinate desire.
                     Hence in like
                     manner inordinate fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss
                     of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest fear of all is that which has the danger of death for its object, as we find proved
                     in Ethic. iii, 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards dangers of death. For this
                     reason timidity is said to be antonomastically* opposed to fortitude. [*Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we
                     substitute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so timidity, which is inordinate fear
                     of any evil, is employed to denote inordinate fear of the danger of death.]
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in its generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference to the end, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q125_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">FS, Q[1], A[3]</a>; 
                     <a id="SS_Q125_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">FS, Q[18], A[6]</a>): and it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a good. But a man who exposes himself
                     to danger of death in order to escape from slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is contrary to fortitude. Hence
                     the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), that "to die
                     in order to escape poverty, lust, or something disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun hardships
                     is a mark of effeminacy."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q125_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q45_A2.html">FS, Q[45], A[2]</a>), fear is the beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring. Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring
                     in moderation presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some kind of fear. It does not follow, however,
                     that any kind of despair results from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same kind. Now the despair that is
                     opposed to hope is
                     referred to another kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to fortitude regards dangers of death.
                     Hence the argument does not prove.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q125_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q125_A3-p0.1">Whether fear is a mortal sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q125_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html">FS, Q[23], A[1]</a>), fear is in the irascible faculty which is a part of the sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the sensuality,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q125_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A4.html">FS, Q[74], A[4]</a>). Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God. But fear does not this, for a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Judg.7.3" target="asv"> Judges 7:3, </a> "Whosoever is fearful," etc., says that "a man is fearful when he trembles at the very thought of conflict; yet he is not
                     so wholly terrified at heart, but that he can rally and take courage." Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection but also from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a
                     precept, but only from perfection; for a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.8" target="asv"> Dt. 20:8, </a> "What man is there that is fearful and fainthearted?" says: "We learn from this that no man can take up the profession of
                     contemplation or spiritual warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches." Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due: and yet this is due to the fearful, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.8" target="asv"> Apoc. 21:8, </a> "But the fearful and unbelieving and the abominable," etc., "shall have their portion in the pool burning with fire and brimstone
                     which is the second death." Therefore fear is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q125_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q125_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, fear is a sin through being inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be shunned according to reason.
                     Now sometimes this inordinateness of fear is confined to the sensitive appetites, without the accession of the rational appetite's
                     consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but only a venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches to the rational
                     appetite which is called the
                     will, which deliberately shuns something against the dictate of reason: and this inordinateness of fear is sometimes a mortal,
                     sometimes a venial sin. For if a man through fear of the danger of death or of any other temporal evil is so disposed as to
                     do what is forbidden, or to omit what is commanded by the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin: otherwise it is a venial
                     sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers fear as confined to the sensuality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This gloss also can be understood as referring to the fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may
                     reply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes his courage beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal
                     sin, it may happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus
                     sometimes a man sins mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside
                     from accomplishing what he purposed doing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man aside from a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a precept, but
                     for the perfection of a counsel. Such like fear is not a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin,
                     for instance when one has a reasonable cause for fear.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q125_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q125_A4-p0.1">Whether fear excuses from sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear is a sin, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q125_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q125_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But sin does not excuse from sin, rather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all would this be true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a
                     courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse, because, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does
                     not seem to be an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or spiritual. Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because instead
                     of inducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of temporal evil does not excuse from sin, because according to
                     the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), "one should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor anything that is not a result of one's own
                     wickedness." Therefore it seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in the Decretals (I, Q[1], Cap. Constat.): "A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by heretics,
                     has an ostensible excuse."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q125_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q125_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, fear is sinful in so far as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain evils to be shunned rather
                     than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges to be more
                     avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than the loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin
                     if through fear of death he were to promise
                     or give something to a robber, and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners, rather than to the good to whom
                     he should give in preference. On the other hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according to reason are less
                     to be avoided, and so incur evils which according to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from sin,
                     because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the soul are more to be feared than the evils of the body. and
                     evils of the body more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to incur evils of the soul, namely sins, in order
                     to avoid evils of the body, such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as loss of money; or if one were to
                     endure evils of the body in order to avoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet one's sin would be
                     extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear is less voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a certain
                     necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) says that these things that are done through fear
                     are not simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness, but in the point of its involuntariness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet the shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object of
                     fear.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to the opinion of Stoics, who held temporal goods not to be man's goods, it follows in consequence that temporal
                     evils are not man's evils, and that therefore they are nowise to be feared. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these
                     temporal things are goods of the least account, and this was also the opinion of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries
                     are indeed to be feared; but not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce
                     that which is good according to virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q126" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q126-p0.1">OF FEARLESSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q126-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q126-p2"> We must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q126-p3"> (1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q126-p4"> (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q126_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q126_A1-p0.1">Whether fearlessness is a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which is reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is written
                     in praise of the just man (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.28.1" target="asv">Prov. 28:1</a>): "The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread." Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is so fearful as death, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death,
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.28" target="asv"> Mat. 10:28, </a> "Fear ye not them that kill the body," etc., nor anything that can be inflicted by man, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.51.12" target="asv"> Is. 51:12, </a> "Who art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man?" Therefore it is not a sin to be fearless.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fear is born of love, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q126_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q125_A2.html">Q[125], A[2]</a>). Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to love nothing earthly, since according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "the
                     love of God to the abasement of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city." Therefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear
                     nothing earthly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of the unjust judge (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.2" target="asv">Lk. 18:2</a>) that "he feared not God nor regarded man."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear whereby
                     one dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of temporal goods. And every man has it instilled in him by nature
                     to love his own life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in due measure, that is, to love these things not as placing
                     his end therein, but as things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence it is
                     contrary to the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, to fall short of loving them in due measure. Nevertheless, one never
                     lapses entirely from this love: since what is natural cannot be wholly lost: for which reason the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.29" target="asv">Eph. 5:29</a>): "No man ever hated his own flesh." Wherefore even those that slay themselves do so from love of their own flesh, which
                     they desire to free from present stress. Hence it may happen that a man fears death and other temporal evils
                     less than he ought, for the reason that he loves them* less than he ought. [*Viz. the contrary goods. One would expect 'se'
                     instead of 'ea.' We should then read: For the reason that he loves himself less than he ought.] But that he fear none of these
                     things cannot result from an entire lack of love, but only from the fact that he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted
                     by the evils contrary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the result of pride of soul presuming on self and despising
                     others, according to the saying of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Job.41.24" target="asv"> Job 41:24,25</a>: "He [Vulg.: 'who'] was made to fear no one, he beholdeth every high thing": and sometimes it happens through a defect in
                     the reason; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that the "Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear nothing." [*"A man
                     would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were nothing that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at
                     sea, as is said to be the case with the Celts."] It is
                     therefore evident that fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from lack of love, pride of soul, or dullness of understanding:
                     yet the latter is excused from sin if it be invincible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The just man is praised for being without fear that withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for it is
                     written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.28" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:28</a>): "He that is without fear cannot be justified."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Death and whatever else can be inflicted by mortal man are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice: but they
                     are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as regards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in
                     others. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.16" target="asv">Prov. 14:16</a>): "A wise man feareth and declineth from evil."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us from loving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be feared;
                     wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.34.16" target="asv">Ecclus. 34:16</a>): "He that feareth the Lord shall tremble at nothing." But temporal goods are not to be despised, in so far as they are helping
                     us instrumentally to attain those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q126_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q126_A2-p0.1">Whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude. For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is
                     hindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is both brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness
                     is not opposed to fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of due love, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack
                     of due love is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly to prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness
                     is not opposed to fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the one side. Since then
                     fortitude has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the other, it seems that fearlessness is not opposed thereto.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons fearlessness to be opposed to fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q126_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html">Q[123], A[3]</a>), fortitude is concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral virtue observes the rational mean in the matter about which
                     it is concerned. Hence it belongs to fortitude that man should moderate his fear according to reason, namely that he should
                     fear what he ought, and when he ought, and so forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either by excess or by deficiency.
                     Wherefore just as timidity is
                     opposed to fortitude by excess of fear, in so far as a man fears what he ought not, and as he ought not, so too fearlessness
                     is opposed thereto by deficiency of fear, in so far as a man fears not what he ought to fear.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of fortitude is to endure death without fear, and to be aggressive, not anyhow, but according to reason: this the
                     fearless man does not do.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts the mean of fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude directly. But in
                     respect of its causes nothing hinders it from being opposed to other virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude by excess of daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear. Fortitude imposes
                     the mean on each passion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in its having different extremes in different respects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q127" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q127-p0.1">OF DARING [*Excessive daring or foolhardiness] (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q127-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q127-p2"> We must now consider daring; and under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q127-p3"> (1) Whether daring is a sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q127-p4"> (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q127_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q127_A1-p0.1">Whether daring is a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q127_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.39.21" target="asv">Job 39:21</a>) concerning the horse, by which according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi) the godly preacher is denoted, that "he goeth forth boldly
                     to meet armed men [*Vulg.: 'he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth to meet armed men']." But no vice redounds to a man's praise.
                     Therefore it is not a sin to be daring.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9), "one should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has been counseled."
                     But daring helps this quickness in doing. Therefore daring is not sinful but praiseworthy.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, daring is a passion caused by hope, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q127_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q45_A2.html">FS, Q[45], A[2]</a>) when we were treating of the passions. But hope is accounted not a sin but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring be
                     accounted a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q127_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.8.18" target="asv">Ecclus. 8:18</a>): "Go not on the way with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils." Now no man's fellowship is to be avoided save
                     on account of sin. Therefore daring is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Daring, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q127_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html">FS, Q[23], A[1]</a>; Q[55]), is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes moderated according to reason, and sometimes it lacks moderation, either
                     by excess or by deficiency, and on this account the passion is sinful. Again, the names of the passions are sometimes employed
                     in the sense of excess, thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, in which case it is sinful, and in the
                     same way daring as
                     implying excess is accounted a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The daring spoken of there is that which is moderated by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel, which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking
                     counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act rashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above
                     (
                     <a id="SS_Q127_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A3.html">Q[58], A[3]</a>). Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far praiseworthy as it is directed by reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some virtues, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4,5,6). Hence the names
                     of certain passions have to be applied to certain vices and virtues: and in order to designate vices we employ especially
                     the names of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the case of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and
                     love have a good for this object, and so we use them rather to designate virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q127_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q128.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q127_A2-p0.1">Whether daring is opposed to fortitude?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For excess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind. But presumption
                     pertains to pride which is opposed to humility. Therefore daring is opposed to humility rather than to fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, daring does not seem to call for blame, except in so far as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts
                     himself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with daring, or exposes to danger. But this seemingly pertains
                     to injustice. Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to fortitude but to justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fortitude is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q127_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html">Q[123], A[3]</a>). Now since timidity is opposed to fortitude in respect of an excess of fear, there is another vice opposed to timidity in
                     respect of a lack of fear. If then, daring is opposed to fortitude, in the point of excessive daring, there will likewise
                     be a vice opposed to it in the point of deficient daring. But there is no such vice. Therefore neither
                     should daring be accounted a vice in opposition to fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher in both the Second and Third Books of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q127_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q126_A2.html">Q[126], A[2]</a>), it belongs to a moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Wherefore every vice
                     that denotes lack of moderation in the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue, as immoderate to moderate. Now
                     daring, in so far as it denotes a vice, implies excess of passion, and this excess goes by the name of daring. Wherefore it
                     is evident that it is opposed to the
                     virtue of fortitude which is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q127_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q122_A3.html">Q[122], A[3]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Opposition between vice and virtue does not depend chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's very species. Wherefore
                     it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the same virtue as presumption which is its cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the direct opposition of a vice does not depend on its cause, so neither does it depend on its effect. Now the harm
                     done by daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition of daring depend on this.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movement of daring consists in a man taking the offensive against that which is in opposition to him: and nature inclines
                     him to do this except in so far as such inclination is hindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the
                     vice which exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only timidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great
                     a lack of timidity, for as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), "the daring are
                     precipitate and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is present," namely through fear.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q128.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q128" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q128_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q128-p0.1">OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE (ONE ARTICLE)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q128-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q128-p2"> We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall
                  treat of each part.
               </p>
               <div id="SS_Q128_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q128.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q128_A1-p0.1">Whether the parts of fortitude are suitably assigned?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to fortitude,
                     namely "magnificence," "confidence," "patience," and "perseverance." Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality; since
                     both are concerned about money, and "a magnificent man must needs be liberal," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2).
                     But liberality is a part of justice, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q128_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q117_A5.html">Q[117],
                        A[5]
                     </a>). Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue
                     by itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply
                     any relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to fortitude.
                     Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part thereof.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is
                     required in every virtue: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q128_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.13" target="asv">Mat. 24:13</a>): "He that shall persevere to the end he shall be saved." Therefore perseverance should not be accounted a part of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of fortitude, namely "magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence,
                     constancy, forbearance, stability." Andronicus also reckons seven virtues annexed to fortitude, and these are, "courage, strength
                     of will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence." Therefore it seems that Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude
                     is incomplete.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p8">
                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of fortitude. The first is "civic" fortitude, which produces brave deeds
                     through fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is "military" fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike
                     art or experience; the third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth
                     is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome; the
                     fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are
                     not comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p9">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q128_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q48.html">Q[48])</a>, a virtue can have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot
                     have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special
                     matter.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p10"> However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it: integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence
                     of which is requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because what fortitude practices in face of the greatest
                     hardships, namely dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain minor hardships and these virtues
                     are annexed to fortitude as secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q128_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html">Q[123], AA[3]</a>,6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance. Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The
                     first regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind ready for aggression. In this respect Tully mentions
                     "confidence," of which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "with this the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great
                     and honorable undertakings." The second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and
                     consists in not failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect Tully mentions "magnificence," which
                     he describes as being "the discussion and administration," i.e. accomplishment "of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain
                     broad and noble purpose of mind," so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be confined
                     to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because without
                     them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues
                     specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as secondary virtues to principal: thus "magnificence" is referred
                     by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great expenses, and "magnanimity," which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors.
                     Again, two things are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the mind be not broken by
                     sorrow, and fall away from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In this respect he mentions "patience,"
                     which he describes as "the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit."
                     The other is that by the prolonged suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q128_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.3" target="asv"> Heb. 12:3, </a> "That you be not wearied, fainting in your minds." In this respect he mentions "perseverance,"
                     which accordingly he describes as "the fixed and continued persistence in a well considered purpose." If these two be confined
                     to the proper matter of fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be referred to any kind of hardship
                     they will be virtues distinct from fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which
                     is the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by fortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a theological virtue, as stated above (Q[17], A[5]; 
                     <a id="SS_Q128_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">FS, Q[62], A[3]</a>). But by confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in himself, yet under God withal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To venture on anything great seems to involve danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although
                     magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or venturing on any other great things, they have a certain
                     connection with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other
                     hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death,
                     it is an integral part thereof.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is reckoned
                     a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the Article.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by Tully, namely "confidence, magnificence, forbearance," which he puts in
                     the place of patience, and "firmness," which he substitutes for perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely "magnanimity"
                     and "security," are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because
                     confidence denotes a man's hope for great things: and hope for anything
                     presupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated
                     above (
                     <a id="SS_Q128_A1-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A2.html">FS, Q[40], A[2]</a>) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped for.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p17"> A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the
                     thing hoped for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one, for one's own part, would hope
                     for something, but hope is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat contrary to hope, as stated
                     above, (
                     <a id="SS_Q128_A1-p17.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A4.html">FS, Q[40], A[4]</a>, ad 1). Hence Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He
                     adds a third, namely constancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnificence one needs
                     to have a constant mind. For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in accomplishing great things, but
                     also in discussing them generously in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may be called persevering
                     through not desisting on account of delays, and constant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p18"> Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions
                     "perseverance" and "magnificence," and with Macrobius, "magnanimity." "Strength of will" is the same as patience or forbearance,
                     for he says that "strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be attempted, and to endure what
                     reason says should be endured"---i.e. good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines it as
                     "strength of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose." Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says that
                     "manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue." Besides magnificence he mentions {andragathia}, i.e. manly
                     goodness which we may render "strenuousness." For magnificence consists not only in being constant in the accomplishment of
                     great deeds, which belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence and solicitude to that accomplishment,
                     and
                     this belongs to {andragathia}, strenuousness: wherefore he says that {andragathia} is the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks
                     out profitable works.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p19"> Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the four principal parts mentioned by Tully.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p20">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude,
                     they differ as to motive, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q128_A1-p20.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A1.html">Q[123], A[1]</a>, ad 2); wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p21"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p22"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q128.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q128_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q129" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q128_A1.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q129-p0.1">OF MAGNANIMITY* (EIGHT ARTICLES) [*Not in the ordinary restricted sense but as explained by the author]</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q129-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q129-p2"> We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including, however, the other parts under those mentioned by Tully,
                  with the exception of confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity, of which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall
                  consider (1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence; (3) Patience; (4) Perseverance. As regards the first we shall treat (1) of magnanimity;
                  (2) of its contrary vices. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q129-p3"> (1) Whether magnanimity is about honors?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q129-p4"> (2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q129-p5"> (3) Whether it is a virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q129-p6"> (4) Whether it is a special virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q129-p7"> (5) Whether it is a part of fortitude?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q129-p8"> (6) Of its relation to confidence;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q129-p9"> (7) Of its relation to assurance;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q129-p10"> (8) Of its relation to goods of fortune.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q129_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A1-p0.1">Whether magnanimity is about honors?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows, since
                     "magnanimity" signifies greatness of mind, and "mind" denotes the irascible part, as appears from De Anima iii, 42, where
                     the Philosopher says that "in the sensitive appetite are desire and mind," i.e. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But
                     honor is a concupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it seems that
                     magnanimity is not about honors.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about operations,
                     for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows that it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore
                     magnanimity is not about honors.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because
                     he tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring honors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity
                     is not about honors.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "magnanimity is about honor and dishonor."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to two
                     things, first to the matter about which is the field of its activity, secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right
                     use of such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly
                     because he is minded to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in two ways: in
                     one way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may be called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use
                     of some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great
                     when it consists in the best use of the greatest thing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p7"> The things which come into man's use are external things, and among these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is
                     the most akin to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q129_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], AA[1]</a>,2); and because it is offered to God and to the best; and again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame,
                     men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be magnanimous in respect of things that are great
                     absolutely and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore
                     that magnanimity is about honors.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Good and evil absolutely considered regard the concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is added,
                     they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity regards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something
                     great or difficult.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation, yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a difficult
                     good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the passions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope: even
                     so, we have stated (
                     <a id="SS_Q129_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A4.html">Q[123], AA[4]</a>,5) with regard to fortitude that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of fear and daring.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have
                     too great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this
                     would be deserving of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving
                     of honor, yet not so as to think much of the honor accorded by man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q129_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A2-p0.1">Whether magnanimity is essentially about great honors?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated
                     above 
                     <a id="SS_Q129_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about
                     either great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great honor.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor,
                     and consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is not only about great honors.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that magnanimity is about great honors.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p6"> I answer that According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand
                     the perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that power, as stated in De Coelo i, 116. Now the perfection
                     of a power is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such operations as are great or difficult: for every
                     power, however imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it is essential to a virtue to
                     be about the difficult and the good, as stated in Ethic. ii, 3.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p7"> Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act of virtue may be considered from two points of view.
                     First, from the point of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and establish the rational means in some particular
                     matter: and this difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The other difficulty is
                     on the part of the matter, which may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which
                     moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions,
                     because the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p8"> Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly
                     in some cases from the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are the objects of the passions. The passions
                     themselves have no great power of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite, which is the seat of
                     the passions, is naturally subject to reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions regard
                     only that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence
                     of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On the other hand, some passions have great power
                     of resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that are the objects of those passions: such are the love
                     or desire of money or of honor. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that which is
                     greatest in those passions, but also about that which is ordinary or little: because things external, though they be little,
                     are very desirable, as being necessary for human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two virtues, one
                     about ordinary or little sums of money, namely liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely "magnificence."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p9"> In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated
                     by its extremes, which are {philotimia}, i.e. love of honor, and {aphilotimia}, i.e. without love of honor: for sometimes
                     a man is commended for loving honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both these things may be
                     done in moderation. But with regard to great honors there is "magnanimity." Wherefore we must conclude that the
                     proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous man tends to such things as are deserving of honor.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Great and little are accidental to honor considered in itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason,
                     the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is much more difficult to observe it in great than in little
                     honors.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In anger and other matters only that which is greatest presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any
                     need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are things existing outside the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that makes good use of great things is much more able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous man
                     looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit,
                     man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honors, because
                     he does not deem them above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as
                     are ordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor, but despises it, since he recognizes that he does
                     not deserve it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q129_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A3-p0.1">Whether magnanimity is a virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every moral virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean
                     but the greater extreme: because the "magnanimous man deems himself worthy of the greatest things" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore
                     magnanimity is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q129_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>). But one may have a virtue without having magnanimity: since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whosoever is worthy
                     of little things and deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, but he is not magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not
                     a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Virtue is a good quality of the mind," as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q129_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">FS, Q[55], A[4]</a>). But magnanimity implies certain dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of "a magnanimous man
                     that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his utterance calm." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But magnanimity is opposed to humility, since "the magnanimous deems himself
                     worthy of great things, and despises others," according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For,
                     in the first place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is remiss and slow of action; thirdly, he employs
                     irony [*Cf. Q[113]] towards many; fourthly, he is unable to associate with others; fifthly, because he holds to the barren
                     things rather than to those that are fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in praise of certain men (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.15.18" target="asv">2 Macc. 15:18</a>): "Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas' companions, and the greatness of courage [animi magnitudinem] with which they fought
                     for their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword." Now, only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity
                     which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good.
                     Now among external human things honors take precedence of all others, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q129_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html">(A[1];</a> 
                     <a id="SS_Q129_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q11_A2.html">FS, Q[11], A[2]</a>, OBJ[3]). Therefore magnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), "the magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes," in so far as he tends
                     to what is greatest, "but in the matter of becomingness, he follows the mean," because he tends to the greatest things according
                     to reason, for "he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth" (Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass his deserts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the acts
                     of all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming to every virtuous man, but only to great men. on the
                     other hand, as regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all virtues are connected together, since their
                     habits reside together in the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition
                     thereto. Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby
                     he is disposed to practice that act if it were competent to him according to his state.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movements of the body are differentiated according to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it
                     happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results
                     from a man being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish, whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great
                     things; these are few and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow
                     movement. Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who are quick to quarrel about anything, and this
                     becomes not the magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these dispositions of bodily movements are competent
                     to the magnanimous man according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are naturally disposed to magnanimity these
                     conditions are found naturally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is in man something great which he possesses through the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him
                     through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of
                     the gifts he holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of
                     virtue; and the same is to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or
                     external fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency,
                     and magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from God's gifts: since he does not think so much of
                     others as to do anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and esteem them better than ourselves, in
                     so far as we see some of God's gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.14.4" target="asv">Ps. 14:4</a>): "In his sight a
                     vile person is contemned [*Douay: 'The malignant is brought to nothing, but he glorifieth,' etc.]," which indicates the contempt
                     of magnanimity, "but he honoreth them that fear the Lord," which points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore
                     evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one another, although they seem to tend in contrary directions,
                     because they proceed according to different considerations.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> These properties in so far as they belong to a magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in the
                     first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful of those from whom he has received favors, this points to
                     the fact that he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he repay them with yet greater favor; this belongs
                     to the perfection of gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the
                     acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking
                     in doing what becomes him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of works, but only with great works, such as
                     are becoming to him. He is also said, in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to truth, and so as either to say
                     of himself vile things that are not true, or deny of himself great things that are true, but because he does not disclose
                     all
                     his greatness, especially to the large number of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
                     3), "it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle
                     class." In the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with others: this means that he is not at home with others
                     than his friends: because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness of mind. But he associates
                     with all, both great and little, according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said, fifthly, that he prefers
                     to have barren things, not indeed any, but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to the useful, as
                     being greater: since the useful is sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q129_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A4-p0.1">Whether magnanimity is a special virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher
                     states (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whatever is great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a special
                     virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to any special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed
                     to the magnanimous man. For it is stated in Ethic. iv, 3 that "it belongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof" (which
                     is an act of prudence), "nor to act unjustly" (which is an act of justice), "that he is ready to do favors" (which is an act
                     of charity), "that he gives his services readily" (which is an act of liberality), that "he
                     is truthful" (which is an act of truthfulness), and that "he is not given to complaining" (which is an act of patience). Therefore
                     magnanimity is not a special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul, according to the saying of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.61.10" target="asv"> Is. 61:10, </a> "He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation," and afterwards he adds, "and as a bride adorned with her jewels." But
                     magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it from the other virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[123], A[2]), it belongs to a special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate matter. Now
                     magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a determinate matter, namely honors, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q129_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2): and honor, considered in itself, is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p7"> Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q129_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], A[1]</a>, ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it regards all the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a great
                     deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he
                     tends to what is worthy of great honors.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence,
                     and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore
                     he shows himself ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other virtues. on the other hand, it is a proof
                     of defect, that a man thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for
                     their sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the truth indicates a defect,
                     since it seems to be the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes a defect, because by so doing the
                     mind seems to give way to external evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids under a special aspect,
                     inasmuch as they are contrary to his excellence or greatness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment
                     results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in Ethic.
                     iv, 3.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q129_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A5-p0.1">Whether magnanimity is a part of fortitude?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be
                     the same as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "If magnanimity, which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul,
                     thou shalt live in great assurance": and Tully says (De Offic. i): "If a man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving,
                     and far removed from deception." Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a magnanimous man is not {philokindynos}, that is, a lover of danger. But
                     it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to
                     be called a part thereof.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared
                     or dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore
                     it is not a part thereof.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnanimity as a part of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q129_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">FS, Q[61], A[3]</a>), a principal virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of virtue in a principal matter. Now one of the
                     general modes of virtue is firmness of mind, because "a firm standing is necessary in every virtue," according to Ethic. ii.
                     And this is chiefly commended in those virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most difficult to preserve
                     firmness. Wherefore the more
                     difficult it is to stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the virtue which makes the mind firm in
                     that matter.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p7"> Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining
                     the greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves his life above all things, so does he
                     fly from dangers of death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity agrees with fortitude in confirming
                     the mind about some difficult matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind about a
                     matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto
                     as secondary to principal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1,3), "to lack evil is looked upon as a good," wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous
                     evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to
                     fortitude, and the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity may be considered as identical. Since, however,
                     there is a difference as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the
                     aforesaid, it follows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue
                     from fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks
                     "many" the same as "great." This is contrary to the nature of a magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger
                     for the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that are truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready
                     to expose himself to danger, since he does something great in the act of
                     fortitude, even as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous man is
                     not {mikrokindynos}, i.e. endangering himself for small things, but {megalokindynos}, i.e. endangering himself for great things.
                     And Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers like a rash man, nor fearest
                     them like a coward. For nothing makes the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer an
                     evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be desired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far,
                     to wit, as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires it. Now that which is so essentially is always of more
                     account than that which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things
                     is always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good things. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence
                     of the virtue of magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil, evil is of more import in this particular
                     respect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q129_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A6-p0.1">Whether confidence belongs to magnanimity?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity. For a man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in another,
                     according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:4,5, </a> "Such confidence we have, through Christ towards God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves."
                     But this seems inconsistent with the idea of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.12.2" target="asv">Is. 12:2</a>, "I will deal confidently and will not fear." But to be without fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also
                     belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward is due to confidence, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.3.6" target="asv"> Heb. 3:6, </a> where it is said that we are the house of Christ, "if we hold fast the confidence and glory of hope unto the end." Therefore
                     confidence is a virtue distinct from magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius enumerates it with magnanimity
                     (In Somn. Scip. i).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question (ad 6)
                     and in the prologue to this.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Confidence takes its name from "fides" [faith]: and it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But confidence
                     belongs to hope, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Job.11.18" target="asv"> Job 11:18, </a> "Thou shalt have confidence, hope being set before thee." Wherefore confidence apparently denotes chiefly that a man derives
                     hope through believing the word of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong opinion, and
                     since one may come to have
                     a strong opinion about something, not only on account of another's statement, but also on account of something we observe
                     in another, it follows that confidence may denote the hope of having something, which hope we conceive through observing something
                     either in oneself---for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man is confident that he will live long. or in another,
                     for instance, through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful, a man is confident that he will
                     receive help from him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p7"> Now it has been stated above (A[1], ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since
                     confidence denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which gives one a strong opinion that one will
                     obtain a certain good, it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to the "magnanimous to need nothing," for need is a mark of the deficient.
                     But this is to be understood according to the mode of a man, hence he adds "or scarcely anything." For it surpasses man to
                     need nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance, secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally
                     a social animal, for he is sufficient by himself to provide for his own life.
                     Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in others, for it is also a
                     point of excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his
                     own ability goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q129_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html">FS, Q[23], A[2]</a>; 
                     <a id="SS_Q129_A6-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A4.html">FS, Q[40], A[4]</a>), when we were treating of the passions, hope is directly opposed to despair, because the latter is about the same object,
                     namely good. But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because the latter's object is evil. Now confidence
                     denotes a certain strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is. Since, however,
                     fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it follows that
                     confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude. Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to fortitude,
                     it follows in consequence that confidence pertains to fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now
                     the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that
                     draws it to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may
                     denote the conditions of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the parts
                     of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified with magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral
                     part, as stated in the preceding Question.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q129_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A7-p0.1">Whether security belongs to magnanimity?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity. For security, as stated above (Q[128], ad 6), denotes freedom from
                     the disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively. Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude.
                     But fortitude does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is said to be secure because he is without care." But this seems to be contrary
                     to virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.15" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:15, </a> "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God." Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great
                     things in all the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is accounted the reward of virtue, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.11.14" target="asv"> Job 11:14,18, </a> "If thou wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being buried thou shalt sleep secure." Therefore
                     security does not belong to magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to magnanimity to give
                     way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune." But a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs
                     to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a man take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears.
                     Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect
                     freedom of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity,
                     so fear directly regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to
                     magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p7"> It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when
                     we were treating of the passion (
                     <a id="SS_Q129_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q45_A2.html">FS, Q[45], A[2]</a>). Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so security belongs indirectly
                     to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes despair.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness
                     of mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not fear:
                     in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and participation of, future happiness, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q129_A7-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A3.html">FS, Q[5], AA[3]</a>,7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's
                     reward.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q129_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A8-p0.1">Whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi): "virtue
                     suffices for itself." Now magnanimity takes every virtue great, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do
                     not conduce to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of
                     fortune: for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists of two things," that "a great soul is commended
                     for despising external things." Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that "it belongs to a great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart
                     from his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man." And Aristotle says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a magnanimous man does
                     not grieve at misfortune." Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of fortune, for every one grieves at the loss
                     of what is helpful to him. Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to
                     magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "good fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q129_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, magnanimity regards two things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great as its end. Now goods of
                     fortune conduce to both these things. For since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also by the
                     multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those who possess
                     goods of fortune. Likewise goods of
                     fortune are useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches, power
                     and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order
                     to act more expeditiously.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming
                     for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it. Wherefore,
                     since the magnanimous man does not think much of external goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by
                     them if he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q128_A1.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q130" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q130-p0.1">OF PRESUMPTION (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q130-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q130-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the first place, those that are opposed thereto by excess.
                  These are three, namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we shall consider pusillanimity which is opposed
                  to it by way of deficiency. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q130-p3"> (1) Whether presumption is a sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q130-p4"> (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q130_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q130_A1-p0.1">Whether presumption is a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle says: "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulg.:
                     'and stretching forth'] myself to those that are before." But it seems to savor of presumption that one should tend to what
                     is above oneself. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) "we should not listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because
                     we are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should relish those that make us immortal": and (Metaph. i) "that
                     man should pursue divine things as far as possible." Now divine and immortal things are seemingly far above man. Since then
                     presumption consists essentially in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that
                     presumption is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q130_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:5</a>): "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." If then presumption, by which one strives
                     at that for which one is not sufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of anything good: which is
                     absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q130_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.37.3" target="asv">Ecclus. 37:3</a>): "O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?" and a gloss answers: "From a creature's evil will." Now all that comes of the
                     root of an evil will is a sin. Therefore presumption is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by the Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is
                     done in accordance with human reason in opposition to the order established in general throughout natural things is vicious
                     and sinful. Now it is established throughout all natural things, that every action is commensurate with the power of the agent,
                     nor does any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is vicious and
                     sinful, as being contrary to the natural order, that any one should assume to do what is above his power: and this is what
                     is meant by presumption, as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that presumption is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders that which is above the active power of a natural thing, and yet not above the passive power of that same
                     thing: thus the air is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can be so changed as to obtain the action and movement
                     of fire, which surpass the active power of air. Thus too it would be sinful and presumptuous for a man while in a state of
                     imperfect virtue to attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to
                     perfect virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to advance towards perfect virtue. In this way
                     the Apostle stretched himself forth to the things that were before him, namely continually advancing forward.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Divine and immortal things surpass man according to the order of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely
                     the intellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things. In this respect the Philosopher says that "man ought
                     to pursue immortal and divine things," not that he should do what it becomes God to do, but that he should be united to Him
                     in intellect and will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "what we can do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense." Hence
                     since we can think and do good by the help of God, this is not altogether above our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous
                     for a man to attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without
                     confidence in God's assistance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q130_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q130_A2-p0.1">Whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against
                     the Holy Ghost, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q130_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>;
                     <a id="SS_Q130_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q21_A1.html"> Q[21], A[1]</a>). But the sin against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to charity. Neither therefore is presumption opposed
                     to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous
                     even if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed
                     to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as little things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3),
                     "on account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong others, because they deem external goods as something great."
                     Therefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but only by deficiency.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that the "vain man," i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a presumptuous
                     man, "is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q130_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A3.html">Q[129], A[3]</a>, ad 1), magnanimity observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it tends, but in proportion to our own
                     ability: for it does not tend to anything greater than is becoming to us.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p7"> Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short
                     of him: but he does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous man does not exceed his. It is in this
                     way that presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine justice
                     through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit,
                     as it implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless,
                     in so far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own
                     ability, it can be opposed to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man presumptuous
                     for going beyond his powers in something small. If, however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is
                     not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary honor, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q130_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A2.html">Q[129], A[2]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No one attempts what is above his ability, except in so far as he deems his ability greater than it is. In this one may err
                     in two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he has greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he
                     has. Secondly, as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and worthy of great things, by reason of something
                     that does not make him so, for instance by reason of riches or goods of
                     fortune. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "those who have these things without virtue, neither justly deem themselves
                     worthy of great things, nor are rightly called magnanimous."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p11"> Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply
                     as in the case of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has exceeded his power; while sometimes it is something
                     great, not simply, but only in the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes, despising and wronging others. This savors
                     of an excess of magnanimity, not in any truth, but in people's opinion. Hence Seneca says (De Quat.
                     Virtut.) that "when magnanimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man high-handed, proud, haughty restless, and bent on excelling
                     in all things, whether in words or in deeds, without any considerations of virtue." Thus it is evident that the presumptuous
                     man sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in reality, although in appearance he surpasses him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q131" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q131_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q131-p0.1">OF AMBITION (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q131-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q131-p2"> We must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q131-p3"> (1) Whether it is a sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q131-p4"> (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q131_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q131_A1-p0.1">Whether ambition is a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition denotes the desire of honor. Now honor is in itself a good thing, and the
                     greatest of external goods: wherefore those who care not for honor are reproved. Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is
                     it something deserving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably desired.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to him as a reward. Now honor is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher
                     states (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, 14). Therefore ambition of honor is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which heartens a man to do good and disheartens him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honor heartens men to
                     do good and to avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "with the bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor,
                     and the brave in honor": and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "honor fosters the arts." Therefore ambition is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q131_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:5</a>) that "charity is not ambitious, seeketh not her own." Now nothing is contrary to charity, except sin. Therefore ambition
                     is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q131_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], AA[1]</a>,2), honor denotes reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence. Now two things have to be considered with regard
                     to man's honor. The first is that a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for this is, as it were, something
                     Divine in him, wherefore on this count honor is due principally, not to him but to God. The second point that calls for observation
                     is that the thing in
                     which man excels is given to him by God, that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a man ought so far to be pleased that
                     others bear witness to his excellence, as this enables him to profit others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p7"> Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways. First, when a man desires recognition of an excellence which he
                     has not: this is to desire more than his share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires honor for himself without referring
                     it to God. Thirdly, when a man's appetite rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of others. Since then
                     ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is evident that it is always a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The desire for good should be regulated according to reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. In this way it
                     is sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason. Now those are reproved who care not for honor in accordance
                     with reason's dictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honor.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Honor is not the reward of virtue, as regards the virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward: since
                     the reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue. But it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others,
                     who have nothing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; which honor derives greatness from the very fact that
                     it bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward,
                     as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as some are heartened to do good and disheartened from doing evil, by the desire of honor, if this be desired in due
                     measure; so, if it be desired inordinately, it may become to man an occasion of doing many evil things, as when a man cares
                     not by what means he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that "the good as well as the wicked covet honors for
                     themselves, but the one," i.e. the good, "go about it in the right way," whereas "the
                     other," i.e. the wicked, "through lack of the good arts, make use of deceit and falsehood." Yet they who, merely for the sake
                     of honor, either do good or avoid evil, are not virtuous, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that
                     they who do brave things for the sake of honor are not truly brave.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q131_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q131_A2-p0.1">Whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one
                     side. Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q131_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q130_A2.html">Q[130], A[2]</a>). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by excess.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, magnanimity is about honors; whereas ambition seems to regard positions of dignity: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q131_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.4.7" target="asv">2 Macc. 4:7</a>) that "Jason ambitiously sought the high priesthood." Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, ambition seems to regard outward show: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q131_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.25.27" target="asv">Acts 25:27</a>) that "Agrippa and Berenice . . . with great pomp [ambitione]. . . had entered into the hall of audience" [*'Praetorium.'
                     The Vulgate has 'auditorium,' but the meaning is the same], and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q131_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiChr.16.14" target="asv">2 Para. 16:14</a>) that when Asa died they "burned spices and . . . ointments over his body" with very great pomp [ambitione]. But magnanimity
                     is not about outward show. Therefore
                     ambition is not opposed to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (De Offic. i) that "the more a man exceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires himself alone to dominate others."
                     But this pertains to ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an excess of magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q131_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q131_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, ambition signifies inordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about honors and makes use of them in a becoming manner.
                     Wherefore it is evident that ambition is opposed to magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as its end, in so far as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man attempts
                     in proportion to his ability. In this way presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man attempts
                     great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that magnanimity regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it makes right
                     use: and in this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess. Nor is
                     it impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various respects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Honor is due to those who are in a position of dignity, on account of a certain excellence of their estate: and accordingly
                     inordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to ambition. For if a man were to have an inordinate desire for a position
                     of dignity, not for the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use of a dignity exceeding his ability, he would not be
                     ambitious but presumptuous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The very solemnity of outward worship is a kind of honor, wherefore in such cases honor is wont to be shown. This is signified
                     by the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q131_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.2" target="asv"> James 2:2,3</a>: "If there shall come into your assembly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel . . . and you . . . shall say to him:
                     Sit thou here well," etc. Wherefore ambition does not regard outward worship, except in so far as this is a kind of honor.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A2.html"></a>
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               <h3 id="SS_Q132-p0.1">OF VAINGLORY (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q132-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q132-p2"> We must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q132-p3"> (1) Whether desire of glory is a sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q132-p4"> (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q132-p5"> (3) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q132-p6"> (4) Whether it is a capital vice?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q132-p7"> (5) Of its daughters.</p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q132_A1-p0.1">Whether the desire of glory is a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. For no one sins in being likened to God: in fact we are commanded (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.1" target="asv">Eph. 5:1</a>): "Be ye . . . followers of God, as most dear children." Now by seeking glory man seems to imitate God, Who seeks glory from
                     men: wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.43.6" target="asv">Is. 43:6,7</a>): "Bring My sons from afar, and My daughters from the ends of the earth. And every one that calleth on My name, I have created
                     him
                     for My glory." Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which incites a mar to do good is apparently not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For
                     Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "glory inflames every man to strive his utmost": and in Holy Writ glory is promised for
                     good works, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.7" target="asv"> Rom. 2:7</a>: "To them, indeed, who according to patience in good work . . . glory and honor" [*Vulg.: 'Who will render to every man according
                     to his works, to them indeed who
                     . . . seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life.']. Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that glory is "consistent good report about a person, together with praise": and
                     this comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii), viz. that glory is, "as it were, clear knowledge with
                     praise." Now it is no sin to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to call for praise, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.41.15" target="asv"> Ecclus. 41:15, </a> "Take care of a good name," and
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.17" target="asv"> Rom. 12:17,
                        
                     </a>"Providing good things not only in the sight of God, but also in the sight of all men." Therefore the desire of vainglory
                     is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v): "He is better advised who acknowledges that even the love of praise is sinful."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Glory signifies a certain clarity, wherefore Augustine says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.) that to be "glorified is the
                     same as to be clarified." Now clarity and comeliness imply a certain display: wherefore the word glory properly denotes the
                     display of something as regards its seeming comely in the sight of men, whether it be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since,
                     however, that which is clear simply can be seen by many, and by those who are far away, it
                     follows that the word glory properly denotes that somebody's good is known and approved by many, according to the saying of
                     Sallust (Catilin.) [*The quotation is from Livy: Hist., Lib. XXII C, 39]: "I must not boast while I am addressing one man."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p7"> But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only consists in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge
                     of few, or of one, or of oneself alone, as when one considers one's own good as being worthy of praise. Now it is not a sin
                     to know and approve one's own good: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:12</a>): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God that we may know the things that are
                     given us from God."
                     Likewise it is not a sin to be willing to approve one's own good works: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.16" target="asv">Mat. 5:16</a>): "Let your light shine before men." Hence the desire for glory does not, of itself, denote a sin: but the desire for empty
                     or vain glory denotes a sin: for it is sinful to desire anything vain, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.3" target="asv"> Ps. 4:3, </a> "Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?"
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p8"> Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the thing for which one seeks glory: as when a man seeks
                     glory for that which is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for something frail and perishable: secondly, on
                     the part of him from whom he seeks glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain: thirdly, on the part of the man
                     himself who seeks glory, for that he does not refer the desire of his own glory to a due end, such as God's honor,
                     or the spiritual welfare of his neighbor.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.13.13" target="asv"> Jn. 13:13, </a> "You call Me Master and Lord; and you say well" (Tract. lviii in Joan.): "Self-complacency is fraught with danger of one
                     who has to beware of pride. But He Who is above all, however much He may praise Himself, does not uplift Himself. For knowledge
                     of God is our need, not His: nor does any man know Him unless he be taught of Him Who knows." It is therefore evident that
                     God seeks glory, not for His
                     own sake, but for ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the good of others, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.16" target="asv"> Mat. 5:16, </a> "That they may see your good works, and glorify your Father Who is in heaven."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which we receive from God is not vain but true glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good works,
                     and of which it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.10.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 10:17,18</a>): "He that glorieth let him glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is approved, but he whom God commendeth."
                     It is true that some are heartened to do works of virtue, through desire for human glory, as also through the desire for other
                     earthly goods. Yet
                     he is not truly virtuous who does virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei v).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is requisite for man's perfection that he should know himself; but not that he should be known by others, wherefore it
                     is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be desired as being useful for something, either in order that God may be
                     glorified by men, or that men may become better by reason of the good they know to be in another man, or in order that man,
                     knowing by the testimony of others' praise the good which is in him, may himself
                     strive to persevere therein and to become better. In this sense it is praiseworthy that a man should "take care of his good
                     name," and that he should "provide good things in the sight of God and men": but not that he should take an empty pleasure
                     in human praise.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p12"></p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q132_A2-p0.1">Whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. For, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q132_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q132_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, vainglory consists in glorying in things that are not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and perishable things,
                     which pertains to covetousness; or in the testimony of men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to imprudence. Now
                     these vices are not contrary to magnanimity. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with
                     vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q132_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q130_A2.html">Q[130], A[2]</a>;
                     <a id="SS_Q132_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q131_A2.html"> Q[131], A[2]</a>): and these differ from vainglory. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.3" target="asv"> Phil. 2:3, </a> "Let nothing be done through contention, neither by vainglory," says: "Some among them were given to dissension and restlessness,
                     contending with one another for the sake of vainglory." But contention [*Cf. Q[38]] is not opposed to magnanimity. Neither
                     therefore is vainglory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading, "Magnanimity consists in two things: We should beware of the desire for glory,
                     since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should ever strive to keep untrammeled." Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q132_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], A[1]</a>, ad 3), glory is an effect of honor and praise: because from the fact that a man is praised, or shown any kind of reverence,
                     he acquires charity in the knowledge of others. And since magnanimity is about honor, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q132_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html">Q[129], AA[1]</a>,2), it follows that it also is about glory: seeing that as a man uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory in moderation.
                     Wherefore
                     inordinate desire of glory is directly opposed to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To think so much of little things as to glory in them is itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it is said of the magnanimous
                     man (Ethic. iv) that honor is of little account to him. In like manner he thinks little of other things that are sought for
                     honor's sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent with magnanimity to glory in things that are not; wherefore
                     it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that he cares more for truth
                     than for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man to glory in the testimony of human praise, as though
                     he deemed this something great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv), that he cares not to be praised.
                     And so, when a man looks upon little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from being contrary to magnanimity,
                     as well as to other virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He that is desirous of vainglory does in truth fall short of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the magnanimous
                     man thinks little of, as stated in the preceding Reply. But if we consider his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous
                     man by way of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something great in his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess
                     of his deserts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q132_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q127_A2.html">Q[127], A[2]</a>, ad 2), the opposition of vices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless contention, if done intentionally, is opposed
                     to magnanimity: since no one contends save for what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the
                     magnanimous man is not contentious, because nothing is great in his estimation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p11"></p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q132_A3-p0.1">Whether vainglory is a mortal sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. For nothing precludes the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vainglory precludes
                     the eternal reward: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.1" target="asv">Mat. 6:1</a>): "Take heed, that you do not give justice before men, to be seen by them: otherwise you shall not have a reward of your
                     Father Who is in heaven." Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever appropriates to himself that which is proper to God, sins mortally. Now by desiring vainglory, a man appropriates
                     to himself that which is proper to God. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.42.8" target="asv">Is. 42:8</a>): "I will not give My glory to another," and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:17</a>): "To . . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it be most dangerous and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this kind, because a gloss
                     of Augustine on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.2.4" target="asv">1 Thess. 2:4, </a> "God, Who proveth our hearts," says: "Unless a man war against the love of human glory he does not perceive its baneful power,
                     for though it be easy for anyone not to desire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to take pleasure
                     in it, when it is given." Chrysostom
                     also says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that "vainglory enters secretly, and robs us insensibly of all our inward possessions." Therefore
                     vainglory is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "while other vices find
                     their abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory finds a place even in the servants of Christ." Yet in the latter there
                     is no mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q132_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A12.html">Q[24], A[12]</a>;
                     <a id="SS_Q132_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q110_A4.html"> Q[110], A[4]</a>;
                     <a id="SS_Q132_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q112_A2.html"> Q[112], A[2]</a> ), a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity. Now the sin of vainglory, considered in itself, does not seem to be
                     contrary to charity as regards the love of one's neighbor: yet as regards the love of God it may be contrary to charity in
                     two ways. In one way, by reason of the matter about which one glories: for
                     instance when one glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe God, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.2" target="asv"> Ezech. 28:2, </a> "Thy heart is lifted up, and Thou hast said: I am God," and 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p6.5" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:7, </a> "What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received
                     it?" Or again when a man prefers to God the temporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p6.6" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.23" target="asv">Jer. 9:23,24</a>): "Let
                     not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in
                     his riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Or again when a man prefers the
                     testimony of man to God's; thus it is written in reproval of certain people (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p6.7" href="./asv.html#John.12.43" target="asv">Jn. 12:43</a>): "For they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p7"> In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, on the part of the one who glories, in that he refers his intention
                     to glory as his last end: so that he directs even virtuous deeds thereto, and, in order to obtain it, forbears not from doing
                     even that which is against God. In this way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 14) that "this vice,"
                     namely the love of human praise, "is so hostile to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory more than it
                     fears or loves God, that our Lord said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.44" target="asv">Jn. 5:44</a>): How can you believe, who receive glory one from another, and the glory which is from God alone, you do not seek?"
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p8"> If, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain, be not inconsistent with charity, neither as regards the matter
                     gloried in, nor as to the intention of him that seeks glory, it is not a mortal but a venial sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No man, by sinning, merits eternal life: wherefore a virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal life, if it be done for
                     the sake of vainglory, even though that vainglory be not a mortal sin. On the other hand when a man loses the eternal reward
                     simply through vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act, vainglory is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not every man that is desirous of vainglory, desires the excellence which belongs to God alone. For the glory due to God
                     alone differs from the glory due to a virtuous or rich man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin, not only on account of its gravity, but also because it is a disposition to grave
                     sins, in so far as it renders man presumptuous and too self-confident: and so it gradually disposes a man to lose his inward
                     goods.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p13"></p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q132_A4-p0.1">Whether vainglory is a capital vice?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that vainglory is not a capital vice. For a vice that always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital.
                     But vainglory always arises from pride. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, honor would seem to take precedence of glory, for this is its effect. Now ambition which is inordinate desire of
                     honor is not a capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a capital vice has a certain prominence. But vainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a sin, because it
                     is not always a mortal sin, nor considered as an appetible good, since human glory is apparently a frail thing, and is something
                     outside man himself. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers vainglory among the seven capital vices.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For some reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place vainglory
                     among the capital vices. Gregory, however (Moral. xxxi), reckons pride to be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which
                     is the immediate offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice: and not without reason. For pride, as we shall state
                     farther on (
                     <a id="SS_Q132_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q152_A1.html">Q[152], AA[1]</a>,2), denotes inordinate desire of
                     excellence. But whatever good one may desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence therefrom: wherefore the end
                     of every vice is directed to the end of pride, so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over the other vices,
                     and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources of vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods that are the
                     means whereby man acquires honor, glory seems to be the most conducive to that effect, inasmuch as it denotes the
                     manifestation of a man's goodness: since good is naturally loved and honored by all. Wherefore, just as by the glory which
                     is in God's sight man acquires honor in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in the sight of man he acquires excellence
                     in human things. Hence on account of its close connection with excellence, which men desire above all, it follows that it
                     is most desirable. And since many vices arise from the inordinate desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital
                     vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not impossible for a capital vice to arise from pride, since as stated above (in the body of the Article and 
                     <a id="SS_Q132_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html">FS, Q[84], A[2]</a>) pride is the queen and mother of all the vices.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Praise and honor, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q132_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q132_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, stand in relation to glory as the causes from which it proceeds, so that glory is compared to them as their end. For the
                     reason why a man loves to be honored and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain renown in the knowledge of
                     others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Vainglory stands prominent under the aspect of desirability, for the reason given above, and this suffices for it to be reckoned
                     a capital vice. Nor is it always necessary for a capital vice to be a mortal sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin,
                     inasmuch as venial sin can dispose man thereto.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q132_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q132_A5-p0.1">Whether the daughters of vainglory are suitably reckoned to be disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy,
                     discord, and love of novelties?
                  </h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably reckoned to be "disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention,
                     obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity [*Praesumptio novitatum, literally 'presumption of novelties']." For according to Gregory
                     (Moral. xxiii) boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride. Now pride does not arise from vainglory, rather is it
                     the other way about, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi). Therefore boastfulness should not be
                     reckoned among the daughters of vainglory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contention and discord seem to be the outcome chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with vainglory.
                     Therefore it seems that they are not the daughters of vainglory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that vainglory is always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i.e. mercy.
                     And yet this is nothing new, for it is an established custom among men. Therefore eccentricity should not be specially reckoned
                     as a daughter of vainglory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi), who there assigns the above daughters to vainglory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[34], A[5]; Q[35], A[4]; 
                     <a id="SS_Q132_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html">FS, Q[84], AA[3]</a>,4), the vices which by their very nature are such as to be directed to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its
                     daughters. Now the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own excellence, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q132_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q132_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,4): and to this end a man may tend in two ways. In one way directly, either by words, and this is boasting, or by deeds,
                     and
                     then if they be true and call for astonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont to wonder at most; but if they
                     be false, it is hypocrisy. In another way a man strives to make known his excellence by showing that he is not inferior to
                     another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the intellect, and thus we have "obstinacy," by which a man is too much
                     attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is better. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have
                     "discord," whereby a man is unwilling to give up his own will, and agree with others. Thirdly, as regards "speech," and then
                     we have "contention," whereby a man quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly as regards deeds, and this is "disobedience,"
                     whereby a man refuses to carry out the command of his superiors.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q132_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q112_A1.html">Q[112], A[1]</a>, ad 2), boasting is reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior cause, which is arrogance: but outward boasting, according
                     to Ethic. iv, is directed sometimes to gain, but more often to glory and honor, and thus it is the result of vainglory.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anger is not the cause of discord and contention, except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a man thinks it a glorious
                     thing for him not to yield to the will and words of others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Vainglory is reproved in connection with almsdeeds on account of the lack of charity apparent in one who prefers vainglory
                     to the good of his neighbor, seeing that he does the latter for the sake of the former. But a man is not reproved for presuming
                     to give alms as though this were something novel.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q131_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q133" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q133-p0.1">OF PUSILLANIMITY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q133-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q133-p2"> We must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q133-p3"> (1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q133-p4"> (2) To what virtue is it opposed?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q133_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q133_A1-p0.1">Whether pusillanimity is a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a fainthearted
                     man is not evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet
                     does not deem himself worthy of them." Now no one is worthy of great goods except the virtuous, since as the Philosopher again
                     says (Ethic. iv, 3), "none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor." Therefore the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently
                     pusillanimity is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Pride is the beginning of all sin" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>). But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud man sets himself above what he is, while the fainthearted
                     man withdraws from the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he who deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted."
                     Now sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for instance, Moses and Jeremias, who were worthy of the
                     office God chose them for, which they both humbly declined (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.11" target="asv">Ex. 3:11</a>;
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.1.6" target="asv"> Jer. 1:6</a>). Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.21" target="asv">Col. 3:21</a>): "Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged." Therefore pusillanimity is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a natural
                     inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with its power: as is evident in all natural things, whether animate
                     or inanimate. Now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is proportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he
                     can, so pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his power,
                     by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto. Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it
                     is that the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received from his master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted
                     fear, was punished by his master (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25" target="asv">Mat. 25</a>; 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.19" target="asv">Lk. 19</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their neighbor: and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil, because
                     he injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what might be profitable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i)
                     that if "they who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate
                     to the good they might have done had they been less retiring."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit from sinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and with
                     loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a man, by reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy
                     of doing certain great things that are worthy of great honor, and yet through not trying to make use of his virtue, he sins
                     sometimes venially, sometimes mortally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p10"> Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great things in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability
                     which he derives either from a good natural disposition, or from science, or from external fortune, and if he fails to use
                     those things for virtue, he becomes guilty of pusillanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result of pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion, whereby
                     he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he is competent. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.26.16" target="asv">Prov. 26:16</a>): "The sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences." For nothing hinders him from depreciating
                     himself in some things, and having a high opinion of himself in others.
                     Wherefore Gregory says (Pastoral. i) of Moses that "perchance he would have been proud, had he undertaken the leadership of
                     a numerous people without misgiving: and again he would have been proud, had he refused to obey the command of his Creator."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the office to which they were appointed by God, but their worthiness was of Divine grace:
                     yet they, considering the insufficiency of their own weakness, demurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into
                     pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q133_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q133_A2-p0.1">Whether pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity? </h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. For the Philosopher says (Ethic., 3) that "the fainthearted man
                     knows not himself: for he would desire the good things, of which he is worthy, if he knew himself." Now ignorance of self
                     seems opposed to prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to prudence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who through pusillanimity refused to make use of the money. Moreover
                     the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be slothful. Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is
                     an act of prudence, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q133_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A9.html">Q[47], A[9]</a>). Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed from inordinate fear: hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.35.4" target="asv">Is. 35:4</a>): "Say to the fainthearted: Take courage and fear not." It also seems to proceed from inordinate anger, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Col.3.21" target="asv"> Col. 3:21, </a> "Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged." Now inordinate fear is opposed to fortitude,
                     and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to
                     magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the vice that is in opposition to a particular virtue is the more grievous according as it is more unlike that virtue.
                     Now pusillanimity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption is. Therefore if pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity, it
                     follows that it is a more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary to the saying of 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.37.3" target="asv"> Ecclus. 37:3, </a> "O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?" Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed
                     to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as greatness and littleness of soul, as their very names denote. Now great and little
                     are opposites. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Pusillanimity may be considered in three ways. First, in itself; and thus it is evident that by its very nature it is opposed
                     to magnanimity, from which it differs as great and little differ in connection with the same subject. For just as the magnanimous
                     man tends to great things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of
                     soul. Secondly, it may be considered in reference to its cause, which on the part
                     of the intellect is ignorance of one's own qualification, and on the part of the appetite is the fear of failure in what one
                     falsely deems to exceed one's ability. Thirdly, it may be considered in reference to its effect, which is to shrink from the
                     great things of which one is worthy. But, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q133_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q132_A2.html">Q[132], A[2]</a>, ad 3), opposition between vice and virtue depends rather on their respective species than on their cause or effect. Hence
                     pusillanimity is directly
                     opposed to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers pusillanimity as proceeding from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said properly that it
                     is opposed to prudence, even in respect of its cause: because ignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but
                     from laziness in considering one's own ability, according to Ethic. iv, 3, or in accomplishing what is within one's power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers pusillanimity from the point of view of its effect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the point of view of cause. Nor is the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the dangers
                     of death: wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint that pusillanimity is opposed to fortitude. As regards anger,
                     if we consider it under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity,
                     which disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, however,
                     we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries inflicted whereby the soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened,
                     it conduces to pusillanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to its proper species pusillanimity is a graver sin than presumption, since thereby a man withdraws from good things,
                     which is a very great evil according to Ethic. iv. Presumption, however, is stated to be "wicked" on account of pride whence
                     it proceeds.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q134" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q134-p0.1">OF MAGNIFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q134-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q134-p2"> We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q134-p3"> (1) Whether magnificence is a virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q134-p4"> (2) Whether it is a special virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q134-p5"> (3) What is its matter?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q134-p6"> (4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q134_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q134_A1-p0.1">Whether magnificence is a virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q134_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence: because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "not every
                     liberal man is magnificent." Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to Ethic. ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean,
                     for it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now "great" and "little" are opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which
                     is "equal," as stated in Metaph. x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination, but on the contrary perfects it, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q134_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q108_A2.html">Q[108], A[2]</a>;
                     <a id="SS_Q134_A1-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q117_A1.html"> Q[117], A[1]</a>, OBJ[1]). Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the "magnificent man is not lavish towards himself": and this is
                     opposed to the natural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) "act is right reason about things to be made." Now magnificence is about
                     things to be made, as its very name denotes [*Magnificence= magna facere---i.e. to make great things]. Therefore it is an
                     act rather than a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Human virtue is a participation of Divine power. But magnificence [virtutis] belongs to Divine power, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q134_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.47.35" target="asv"> Ps. 47:35</a>: "His magnificence and His power is in the clouds." Therefore magnificence is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to De Coelo i, 16, "we speak of virtue in relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power," not as regards the
                     limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do
                     something great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes
                     a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent deeds.
                     Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence, either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto,
                     as explained above (Q[129], A[3], ad 2), as also (
                     <a id="SS_Q134_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>) when we were treating of the connection of virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is true that magnificence observes the extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes the mean,
                     if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity (
                     <a id="SS_Q134_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A3.html">Q[129], A[3]</a>, ad 1).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to magnificence to do something great. But that which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that
                     which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend
                     principally to be lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but because to do so is not something great.
                     Yet if anything regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man
                     accomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are done once, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are
                     of a lasting nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a suitable dwelling, as stated in Ethic.
                     iv.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) "there must needs be a virtue of act," i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the appetite is
                     inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q134_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q134_A2-p0.1">Whether magnificence is a special virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But
                     it may belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be great: as in the case of one who has a great virtue of
                     temperance, for he does a great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a special virtue, but denotes a perfect
                     degree of any virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same as that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to
                     something great, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q134_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html">Q[129], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore it belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore magnificence is not a special virtue distinct
                     from magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q134_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.11" target="asv">Ex. 15:11</a>): "Magnificent [Douay: 'glorious'] in holiness," and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q134_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.95.6" target="asv">Ps. 95:6</a>): "Holiness and magnificence [Douay: 'Majesty'] in His sanctuary." Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above
                     (
                     <a id="SS_Q134_A2-p4.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A8.html">Q[81], A[8]</a>). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion. Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the
                     others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher reckons it with other special virtues (Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It belongs to magnificence to do [facere] something great, as its name implies [magnificence= magna facere---i.e. to make
                     great things]. Now "facere" may be taken in two ways, in a strict sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly "facere" means to
                     work something in external matter, for instance to make a house, or something of the kind; in a broad sense "facere" is employed
                     to denote any action, whether it passes into external matter, as to burn or cut, or
                     remain in the agent, as to understand or will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p7"> Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something great, the doing [factio] being understood in the strict
                     sense, it is then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in the use of which it is possible to consider a
                     special aspect of goodness, namely that the work produced [factum] by the act is something great, namely in quantity, value,
                     or dignity, and this is what magnificence does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p8"> If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing something great, the doing [facere] being understood in a broad
                     sense, it is not a special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs to every perfect virtue to do something great in the genus of that virtue, if "doing" [facere] be taken in the
                     broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is proper to magnificence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to something great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either by making
                     [faciendo], or by any kind of action, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole
                     aspect of great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do something great, direct their principal intention,
                     not to something great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and the
                     greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p11"> On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something great, "doing" [facere] being taken in the strict
                     sense, but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "magnificence
                     is the discussing and administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind, discussion"
                     referring to the inward intention, and "administration" to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just as
                     magnanimity intends something great in every matter, it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that can be
                     produced in external matter [factibili].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intention of magnificence is the production of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no end
                     of human works is so great as the honor of God: wherefore magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine
                     honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the most commendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine
                     sacrifices": and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this reason
                     magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect is directed to religion or holiness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q134_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q134_A3-p0.1">Whether the matter of magnificence is great expenditure?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But
                     liberality is about expenditure, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q134_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q117_A2.html">Q[117], A[2]</a>). Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "every magnificent man is liberal" (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure.
                     Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but about gifts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing
                     an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of
                     magnificence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since "the virtues
                     do not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for themselves," as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi).
                     Therefore magnificence is not about great expenditure.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions in money, but
                     only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in scale." Therefore it is only about great expenditure.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q134_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q134_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it belongs to magnificence to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work, proportionate expenditure
                     is necessary, for great works cannot be produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to spend much
                     in order that some great work may be accomplished in becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a
                     magnificent man will produce a more
                     magnificent work with equal," i.e. proportionate, "expenditure." Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of money; and a man
                     may be hindered from making that outlay if he love money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to be both
                     this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to produce a great work, and also the very money which he employs
                     in going to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which love the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered
                     from
                     spending much.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q134_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A2.html">Q[129], A[2]</a>), those virtues that are about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing
                     about which the virtue is concerned, and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that same thing. Hence the
                     need for two virtues, concerned about money and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in general, and
                     magnificence, which regards
                     that which is great in the use of money.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man, inasmuch
                     as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expenditure),
                     the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent
                     man in relation to some great work which has to be produced, and
                     this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather
                     under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order
                     to do something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he brings to effect what the whole state is striving
                     for.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man
                     may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor
                     man cannot accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to
                     do so in things that are great by comparison to some particular work; which, though
                     little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little and great are relative terms,
                     as the Philosopher says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q134_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q134_A4-p0.1">Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above
                     
                     <a id="SS_Q134_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q134_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice. Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with expenditure,
                     which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the magnificent man is like the man of science." Now science has more
                     in common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not agree
                     with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal
                     virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p7"> In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things are necessary, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q134_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q80.html">Q[80])</a>. The one is that the secondary virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby.
                     Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and difficult, so also does
                     magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence
                     falls short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens
                     the person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from the dispossession of one's
                     property, which is of much less account than danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence regard
                     sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul, albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure
                     in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal
                     man from giving and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the
                     other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity
                     does, but in a determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible
                     part.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although magnificence does not agree with fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter: since it
                     tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of
                     fear.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Magnificence directs the use of art to something great, as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the reason.
                     Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in
                     hand. This is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those things, since if he did not take careful thought,
                     he would incur the risk of a great loss.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q135" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q135_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q135-p0.1">OF MEANNESS* (TWO ARTICLES) [*"Parvificentia," or doing mean things, just as "magnificentia" is doing great things.]</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q135-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q135-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q135-p3"> (1) Whether meanness is a vice?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q135-p4"> (2) Of the vice opposed to it.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q135_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q135_A1-p0.1">Whether meanness is a vice?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore
                     both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But magnificence is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue
                     rather than a vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "careful reckoning is mean." But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy,
                     since man's good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a mean man is loth to spend money." But this belongs to covetousness or
                     illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a special vice opposed to magnificence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q135_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">FS, Q[1], A[3]</a>; 
                     <a id="SS_Q135_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">FS, Q[18], A[6]</a>), moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many cases they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a
                     man is said to be mean [parvificus] because he intends to do something little [parvum]. Now according to the Philosopher (De
                     Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a mean man intends to do
                     something little, this must be understood in relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in two ways:
                     in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in another as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man intends
                     principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he intends the greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so
                     that he may produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4) that "the magnificent man with equal
                     expenditure will produce a more magnificent result." On the other hand, the mean man intends principally to spend little,
                     wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "he seeks how he may spend least." As a result of this he intends to produce
                     a little work, that is, he does not shrink from producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore the Philosopher
                     says that "the mean man after going to great expense forfeits the good" of the magnificent work, "for the trifle" that he
                     is unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to observe the proportion that reason demands between
                     expenditure and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence
                     it is manifest that meanness is a vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue moderates little things, according to the rule of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the
                     Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but for declining from the rule of reason in moderating
                     great or little things: hence meanness is a vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes us take counsel": wherefore a mean man is careful in his reckonings, because
                     he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods, even in things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but
                     sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes
                     use of his reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the magnificent man has this in common with the liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with pleasure,
                     so too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that
                     illiberality regards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment:
                     wherefore meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says
                     (Ethic. iv, 2) that "although meanness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither do
                     they harm one's neighbor, nor are they very disgraceful."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q135_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q135_A2-p0.1">Whether there is a vice opposed to meanness?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but
                     a virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q135_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q135_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness, it would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend much,
                     where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought to spend much, according to Ethic. iv, 2, and thus they have
                     something of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q135_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q135_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now those who spend excessively, do so in order to make a show of their wealth, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2. But this belongs
                     to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated above (Q[131], A[2] ). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of the Philosopher who (Ethic. ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two opposite vices.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Great is opposed to little. Also little and great are relative terms, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q135_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q135_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now just as expenditure may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in comparison with the work in that
                     it exceeds the proportion which reason requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest that the vice
                     of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe
                     due proportion between his expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it, whereby a man exceeds this same proportion,
                     by spending more than is proportionate to his work. This vice is called in Greek {banausia}, so called from the Greek {baunos},
                     because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes everything. It is also called {apyrokalia}, i.e. lacking good fire, since
                     like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called "consumptio" [waste].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Magnificence is so called from the great work done, but not from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for this belongs
                     to the vice which is opposed to meanness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice
                     of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value of the work, by spending much where it behooved
                     to spend little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great work, which the magnificent man intends principally,
                     in so far as when it behooves to spend much, it spends little or nothing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very species of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, whereas meanness
                     falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders this from being directed to the end of another vice, such as vainglory or any other.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q135_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q136" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q135_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q136-p0.1">OF PATIENCE (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q136-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q136-p2"> We must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q136-p3"> (1) Whether patience is a virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q136-p4"> (2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q136-p5"> (3) Whether it can be had without grace?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q136-p6"> (4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q136-p7"> (5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q136_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q136_A1-p0.1">Whether patience is a virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet
                     patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.49.10" target="asv"> Is. 49:10 </a>and 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.7.16" target="asv"> Apoc. 7:16, </a> "They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the heat nor the sun strike them." Therefore patience is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since virtue it is "that makes its possessor good." Yet patience is sometimes
                     found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many evils patiently that they may amass money, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.16" target="asv"> Eccles. 5:16, </a> "All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in misery and in sorrow." Therefore patience is not
                     a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q136_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q70_A1.html">FS, Q[70], A[1]</a>, ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the fruits (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22</a>). Therefore patience is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Patientia i): "The virtue of the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we even
                     preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q136_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A1.html">Q[123], A[1]</a>), the moral virtues are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of reason against the impulse of the passions.
                     Now among the passions sorrow is strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:10, </a> "The sorrow of the world worketh death," and
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.25" target="asv"> Ecclus. 30:25, </a> "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it." Hence the necessity
                     for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this patience does. Wherefore
                     Augustine says (De Patientia ii): "A man's patience it is whereby he bears evil with an equal mind," i.e. without being disturbed
                     by sorrow, "lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better things." It is therefore evident
                     that patience is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to the
                     goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but they will remain in their relation to the end, which will
                     be in heaven. Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling and other matters pertaining to the present
                     life, but it will remain in the point of being subject to God. In like manner the act
                     of patience, in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying the goods to which we had aspired by suffering.
                     Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv) that "patience itself will not be in heaven, since there is no need for it except where
                     evils have to be borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) "properly speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without inflicting
                     them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those who bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither
                     marvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may marvel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to
                     call them patient."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q136_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q11_A1.html">FS, Q[11], A[1]</a>), the very notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure in themselves, as stated in Ethic. i, 8.
                     Now the names of the virtues are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue. but as to the
                     pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from being overcome
                     by sorrow.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q136_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q136_A2-p0.1">Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now "patience
                     hath a perfect work" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.4" target="asv">James 1:4</a>). Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.21.19" target="asv">Lk. 21:19</a>): "In your patience you shall possess your souls." Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory
                     (Hom. xxxv in Evang.) "patience is the root and safeguard of all the virtues." Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is not reckoned among the four virtues which Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call principal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For it is virtue that "makes its possessor good, and renders the latter's
                     work good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater
                     according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues which are effective of good, incline
                     a man more directly to good than those which are a check on the things which lead man away
                     from good: and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good
                     (thus faith, hope, and charity /are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a check on things that
                     withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death,
                     about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any
                     kind
                     of hardship, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not
                     only of the theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in good, but also of fortitude and
                     temperance which withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by
                     patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust
                     injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle is the most perfect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p8"> Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect, that it is more perfect simply.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes
                     by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but
                     merely because it removes their obstacles.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q136_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q136_A3-p0.1">Whether it is possible to have patience without grace?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it is possible to have patience without grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it
                     possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for
                     the sake of evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and without the help of grace; for Augustine says
                     (De Patientia iii) that "men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they
                     love sinfully." Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good,
                     and this is to be truly patient.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens
                     are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be
                     truly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help of grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is quite evident that some go through much trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health
                     of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure
                     many evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.61.6" target="asv">Ps. 61:6</a>): "From Him," i.e. from God, "is my patience."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly undertakes
                     to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which gives pleasure." The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are
                     of themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the
                     sake of an end. Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to
                     endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now
                     the fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred
                     to charity, which loves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity, according
                     to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4, </a> "Charity is patient."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p7"> But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through grace, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5, </a> "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is clearly impossible
                     to have patience without the help of grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination
                     of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which
                     the concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance
                     with reason: and yet it is this that pertains to true patience.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good of a social virtue [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q136_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A5.html">FS, Q[61], A[5]</a>] is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace,
                     yet not without the help of God's grace [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q136_A3-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A2.html">FS, Q[109], A[2]</a>]. On the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the
                     comparison fails.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even the endurance of those evils which a man bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man naturally
                     has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural
                     love.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q136_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q136_A4-p0.1">Whether patience is a part of fortitude?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same
                     as fortitude: because, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q136_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A6.html">Q[123], A[6]</a>), the proper act of fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the Liber Sententiarum
                     Prosperi [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang.] that "patience consists in enduring evils inflicted by
                     others." Therefore
                     patience is not a part of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q136_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html">Q[123], A[3]</a>), and thus it is in the irascible. But patience seems to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in the concupiscible.
                     Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without
                     patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently, but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore
                     patience is not a part of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For it belongs
                     to patience "to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by others," as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang.). Now
                     of those evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to endure are those that are connected with the danger
                     of death, and about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in
                     this matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore
                     patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience brave (Sent. 811).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of death:
                     whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not failing
                     through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet
                     fortitude is chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow,
                     for a man is said to be patient, not because he does not fly, but because he
                     behaves in a praiseworthy manner by suffering [patiendo] things which hurt him here and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately
                     saddened by them. Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the concupiscible faculty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p9"> Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the
                     subject, but the matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance, although both are in
                     the concupiscible, because temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of touch, such as arise through
                     abstinence from pleasures of food and sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other
                     persons. Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to
                     patience that a man forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, however great they be.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may
                     patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is
                     it inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom
                     [*Homily v. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]
                     says on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.10" target="asv"> Mat. 4:10, </a> "Begone Satan," that "it is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most
                     wicked": and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that "the precepts of patience are not opposed to the
                     good of the commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our enemies." But in so far as patience regards
                     all kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q136_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q136_A5-p0.1">Whether patience is the same as longanimity? [*Longsuffering. It is necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the
                     comparison with magnanimity.]
                  </h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For Augustine says (De Patientia i) that "we speak of patience in God,
                     not as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked, that they may be converted." Wherefore it is written
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.5.4" target="asv">Ecclus. 5:4</a>): "The Most High is a patient rewarder." Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay:
                     for one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured, so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score
                     of place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of time, in so far as a person waits for a long time, is
                     not distinct from patience.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom. ii] on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.4" target="asv"> Rom. 2:4, </a> "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and patience, and longsuffering?" says: "It seems that longanimity differs
                     from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather than of set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while
                     those who take a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something
                     a long way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good, rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have
                     evil as their object, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common with magnanimity than with patience.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p7"> Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures
                     certain evils for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, endurance is easier: whereas if it be delayed a long
                     time, it is more difficult. Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a nature to cause sorrow, according
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.12" target="asv"> Prov. 13:12, </a> "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Hence there may be
                     patience in bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly longanimity and constancy are both comprised
                     under patience, in so far as both the delay of the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the toil which man endures
                     in persistently accomplishing a good work (which regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect of grievous evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p8"> For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience, says that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance
                     of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." By saying "arduous" he refers to constancy in good; when
                     he says "difficult" he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and by adding "continued"
                     or "long lasting," he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something in common with patience.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which is a long way off as to place, though distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that which
                     is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails. Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty
                     save in the point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time coming to us.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p11"> We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the reason for the difference assigned by this gloss is that
                     it is hard to bear with those who sin through weakness, merely because they persist a long time in evil, wherefore it is said
                     that they are borne with longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to be unendurable; for which reason
                     those who sin through pride are stated to be borne with patience.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A4.html"></a>
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            <div id="SS_Q137" class="div3">
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               <h3 id="SS_Q137-p0.1">OF PERSEVERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q137-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q137-p2"> We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q137-p3"> (1) Whether perseverance is a virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q137-p4"> (2) Whether it is a part of fortitude?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q137-p5"> (3) Of its relation to constancy;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q137-p6"> (4) Whether it needs the help of grace?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q137_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q137_A1-p0.1">Whether perseverance is a virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater than
                     perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "by virtue man lives aright," according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority
                     (De Persever. i), no one can be said to have perseverance while living, unless he persevere until death. Therefore perseverance
                     is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in Ethic.
                     ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "perseverance is the fixed
                     and continued persistence in a well-considered purpose." Therefore perseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of
                     every virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Andronicus [*Chrysippus: in De Affect.] says that "perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand, and
                     those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are indifferent." Now a habit that directs us to do something
                     well, or to omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), "virtue is about the difficult and the good"; and so where there is a special
                     kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts.
                     First, from the act's very species, which is considered in respect of the proper object of that act: secondly, from the length
                     of time, since to persist long in something difficult involves a special
                     difficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is accomplished belongs to a special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p7"> Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch
                     (which is of itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring in connection with dangers of death (which
                     also is something difficult in itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in enduring delays in the above
                     or other virtuous deeds, so far as necessity requires.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as it is found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to endure
                     long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not
                     endured for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is not on this account that perseverance has its
                     chief title to praise. Among other evils foremost are those which are opposed to
                     pleasures of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life: such are the lack of food and the like, which
                     at times call for long endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long time for one who grieves not much
                     at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate man, in whom these passions are not violent.
                     But they are most difficult to bear for one who is strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect virtue
                     that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be taken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something
                     imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of difficult
                     good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue: for even if it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he persists
                     in the more perfect good. Wherefore such like perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue derives perfection from the
                     aspect of good rather than from the aspect of difficulty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same name: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): "Faith is to believe without
                     seeing." Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence
                     without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish
                     it, for instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete
                     it. Accordingly we must reply that the term "perseverance" is sometimes used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere,
                     sometimes for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of perseverance chooses to persevere and begins
                     to carry out his choice by persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not persisting to the end. Now the end
                     is twofold: one is the end of the work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it belongs to perseverance
                     to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, for instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and the magnificent
                     man until his work be accomplished. There are, however, some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of life,
                     such as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end of the entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which
                     are the principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until the end of life. It is in this sense that
                     Augustine speaks of perseverance as denoting the consummate act of perseverance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue in two ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to that
                     virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end, belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which
                     intends this as its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit to its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence
                     is consequent upon every virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a "quality difficult to
                     change."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q137_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q137_A2-p0.1">Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), "perseverance
                     is about pains of touch." But these belong to temperance. Therefore perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply
                     moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with
                     reason. Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore
                     perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance
                     is not a part of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance as a part of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[123], A[2]; 
                     <a id="SS_Q137_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">FS, Q[61], AA[3]</a>,4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch
                     as it practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this
                     it has been stated (Q[123], A[2]) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it observes firmness in matters wherein it
                     is most difficult
                     to stand firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity that every virtue which has a title to praise
                     for the firm endurance of something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue. Now the endurance
                     of difficulty arising from delay in accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor is this so difficult
                     as to endure dangers of death. Therefore perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The annexing of secondary to principal virtues depends not only on the matter [*Cf.
                     <a id="SS_Q137_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q136_A4.html"> Q[136], A[4]</a>, ad 2], but also on the mode, because in everything form is of more account than matter. Wherefore although, as to matter,
                     perseverance seems to have more in common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more in common with fortitude,
                     in the point of standing firm against the difficulty arising from length of
                     time.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks (Ethic. vii, 4,7) does not moderate any passions, but consists merely in
                     a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, considered as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of
                     weariness or failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is in the irascible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the end, according
                     to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q137_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.13" target="asv">Mat. 24:13</a>, "He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved." Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance for it to
                     be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
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                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A2.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q137_A3-p0.1">Whether constancy pertains to perseverance?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that constancy does not pertain to perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q137_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q137_A5.html">Q[137], A[5]</a>): and patience differs from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "virtue is about the difficult and the good." Now it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but
                     only in great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of unchangeableness.
                     Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) condivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance, as
                     stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q137_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q128_A6.html">Q[128] , A[6]</a>). Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> One is said to be constant because one stands to a thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as appears
                     from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy belongs to perseverance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to
                     those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly
                     in good, against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly
                     in good against difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence
                     perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude, because the difficulty arising from continuance of action
                     is more intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external obstacles.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> External obstacles to persistence in good are especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="SS_Q137_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q136_A1.html">Q[136], A[1]</a>). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those things which occasion difficulty.
                     Now the end is of most account: wherefore constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is more difficult to persist in great deeds: yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any length
                     of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which
                     perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as it has something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the point
                     of their difference, as stated in the Article.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
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                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q137_A4-p0.1">Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? [*Cf. FS, Q[109], A[10]]</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that perseverance does not need the help of grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q137_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q137_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue
                     suffices for perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gift of Christ's grace is greater than the harm brought upon us by Adam, as appears from
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q137_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.15" target="asv"> Rom. 5:15, </a> seqq. Now "before sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what he had received," as Augustine says (De
                     Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ, persevere without the help
                     of a further grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than deeds of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q137_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.5.7" target="asv">Wis. 5:7</a>): "We . . . have walked through hard ways." Now some persevere in sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man
                     can also persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Persev. i): "We hold that perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in Christ."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 2; A[2], ad 3), perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of perseverance,
                     considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the gift of habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, it may
                     be taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until death: and in this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also
                     the gratuitous help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life, as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="SS_Q137_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A10.html">FS, Q[109], A[10]</a>), when we were treating of grace. Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, which changeableness is
                     not taken away from it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present life, it is not in the power of the free-will, albeit
                     repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its power to choose this: for it is often in our power to
                     choose yet not to accomplish.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a habit is
                     a thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who has the habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), "it was given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to persevere
                     of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace
                     of Christ, the predestined receive not only the possibility of persevering, but perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man
                     whom no man threatened, of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening God,
                     forfeited so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas these, although the world rage against their
                     constancy, have persevered in faith."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by falling
                     into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God's grace. On
                     the other hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering in good, because he is able, by himself, to sin:
                     wherefore he needs the help of grace for that end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138.html"></a>
               </div>
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            </div>
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               <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q138-p0.1">OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q138-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q138-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q138-p3"> (1) Of effeminacy;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q138-p4"> (2) Of pertinacity.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q138_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q138_A1-p0.1">Whether effeminacy* is opposed to perseverance? [*Mollities, literally 'softness']</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance. For a gloss on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q138_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:9,10, </a> "Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind," expounds the text thus: "Effeminate---i.e. obscene, given to
                     unnatural vice." But this is opposed to chastity. Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "delicacy is a kind of effeminacy." But to be delicate seems akin to intemperance.
                     Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but to temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the man who is fond of amusement is effeminate." Now immoderate fondness
                     of amusement is opposed to {eutrapelia}, which is the virtue about pleasures of play, as stated in Ethic. iv, 8. Therefore
                     effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the persevering man is opposed to the effeminate."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q138_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q137_A1.html">Q[137], AA[1]</a>,2), perseverance is deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on account of long endurance of difficulties
                     and toils: and it is directly opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on account of difficulties
                     which he cannot endure. This is what we understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be "soft" if it readily yields
                     to the touch. Now a thing
                     is not declared to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not
                     said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, if a
                     person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them."
                     Now it is evident that fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i) under
                     the
                     heading "True magnanimity consists of two things: It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down by fear, to be defeated
                     by lust, or who has proved himself unbeaten by toil, to yield to pleasure." Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger motive
                     of attraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive of withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation.
                     Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), properly speaking an effeminate man is one who withdraws from good
                     on
                     account of sorrow caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one way, by custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more
                     difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering
                     through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are compared to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore
                     those who are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being
                     womanish themselves, as it were.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the delicate
                     are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q138_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.28.56" target="asv">Dt. 28:56</a>): "The tender and delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her foot for . . . softness [Douay: 'niceness']."
                     Thus delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy
                     regards lack of pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for instance toil or the like.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In play two things may be considered. In the first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of play is opposed
                     to {eutrapelia}. Secondly, we may consider the relaxation or rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs
                     to effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs thereto to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q138_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q138_A2-p0.1">Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises from vainglory.
                     But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q138_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q132_A2.html">Q[132], A[2]</a>). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so either by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess:
                     because the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) "they
                     rejoice when they prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected." And if it be opposed by deficiency, it will be the
                     same as effeminacy, which is clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to
                     perseverance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the persevering man persists in good against sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against pleasures,
                     the brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But pertinacity is over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity
                     is not opposed to perseverance more than to other virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity is to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition is
                     opposed to religion, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q138_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q92_A1.html">Q[92], A[1]</a>). Therefore pertinacity is opposed to perseverance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Isidore says (Etym. x) "a person is said to be pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious." "Pervicacious"
                     has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man "perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients called
                     'vicia' what we call victory." These the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) calls {ischyrognomones}, that is "head-strong," or {idiognomones},
                     that is "self-opinionated," because they abide by their opinions more
                     than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is
                     clear that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy
                     for falling short of it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why a man is too persistent in his own opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own excellence:
                     wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause. Now it has been stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q138_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q127_A2.html">Q[127], A[2]</a>, ad 1;
                     <a id="SS_Q138_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q133_A2.html"> Q[133], A[2]</a>), that opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on their species.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting inordinately in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a certain pleasure
                     in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man. Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it
                     too much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or effeminate man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the other virtues persist against the onslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in the same
                     way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to praise seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity
                     is directly opposed to perseverance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q139" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q139-p0.1">OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q139-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q139-p2"> We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two
                  points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q139-p3"> (1) Whether fortitude is a gift?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q139-p4"> (2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q139_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q139_A1-p0.1">Whether fortitude is a gift?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should
                     not be reckoned a gift.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the acts of the gift remain in heaven, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q139_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A6.html">FS, Q[68], A[6]</a>). But the act of fortitude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "fortitude encourages the fainthearted
                     against hardships, which will be altogether absent from heaven." Therefore fortitude is not a gift.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly
                     pleasures of the passing show." Now noisome pleasures and delights are the concern of temperance rather than of fortitude.
                     Therefore it seems that fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the Holy Ghost (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q139_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated above (Q[123], A[2]; 
                     <a id="SS_Q139_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">FS, Q[61], A[3]</a>): and this firmness of mind is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with regard to goods or evils
                     that are difficult. Now man, according to his proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these respects,
                     so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous
                     work, or in enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated above (Q[123],
                     A[2]).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p7"> Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that he may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid
                     whatever perils may threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a man's power to attain the end of his
                     work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy Ghost works this in man,
                     by bringing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils. A
                     certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense
                     that fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q139_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">FS, Q[68], AA[1]</a>,2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Ghost.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give confidence
                     of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fortitude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the
                     end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from toil and evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch
                     as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which
                     seems to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q139_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q139_A2-p0.1">Whether the fourth beatitude: "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," corresponds to the gift of fortitude?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the gift
                     of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and
                     thirsting after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude corresponds to the gift of piety rather than
                     to the gift of fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift
                     of wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q139_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q45.html">Q[45])</a>. Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude, according to Ethic. i, 8.
                     Now the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore neither does any beatitude correspond to it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true
                     goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must toil."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q139_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q121_A2.html">Q[121], A[2]</a>), Augustine makes the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which they are set forth, observing at
                     the same time a certain fittingness between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning the hunger and thirst
                     for justice, to the fourth gift, namely fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p7"> Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A[1] ), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is
                     very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation of works of justice, but furthermore
                     to do them with an unsatiable desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, which is
                     related to all virtuous deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is
                     a gift.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as stated above (Q[23], A[8], ad 3; 
                     <a id="SS_Q139_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html">FS, Q[68], A[4]</a>, ad 3). Hence whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two of the fruits which correspond sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which regards the enduring
                     of evils: and longanimity, which may regard the long delay and accomplishment of goods.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q140" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q140-p0.1">OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q140-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q140-p2"> We must next consider the precepts of fortitude:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q140-p3"> (1) The precepts of fortitude itself;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q140-p4"> (2) The precepts of its parts.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q140_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q140_A1-p0.1">Whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the
                     Old Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q140_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.20" target="asv">Dt. 20</a>). Therefore precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law also.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but
                     not vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as stated above (Q[123], A[2]; 
                     <a id="SS_Q140_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html">FS, Q[61], A[2]</a>). Now the precepts are directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be proportionate to them. Therefore
                     the precepts of fortitude should have been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief precepts of the
                     Law.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in various
                     ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so that even in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others
                     of kingdoms, and others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of the Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: wherefore
                     the Divine Law contains precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues, with a
                     view to directing the mind to God. For this reason it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q140_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.3" target="asv">Dt. 20:3,4</a>): "Fear ye them not: because the Lord your God is in the midst of you, and will fight for you against your enemies."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p7"> As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and among them we find precepts of fortitude according to the
                     requirements of those goods.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Old Testament contained temporal promises, while the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal, according
                     to Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily
                     contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession
                     of eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q140_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.12" target="asv"> Mat. 11:12,
                        
                     </a>"The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away." Hence Peter commands (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q140_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.5.8" target="asv">1 Pet. 5:8,9</a>): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye, strong in faith,"
                     as also 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q140_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.7" target="asv"> James 4:7</a>: "Resist the devil, and he will fly from you." Since, however, men while tending to spiritual goods may be withdrawn from
                     them by corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had to be given even in the New Law, that they
                     might bravely endure temporal evils, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q140_A1-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.28" target="asv">Mat. 10:28</a>, "Fear ye not them that kill the body."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The law gives general directions in its precepts. But the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like the
                     things to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the precepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q140_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q122_A1.html">Q[122], A[1]</a>), the precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles, which need to be known to all from the outset.
                     Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which the notion of duty is manifest,
                     and not about acts of fortitude, because it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear dangers of death.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q140_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q140_A2-p0.1">Whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the precept of the parts of fortitude are unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and perseverance
                     are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence, magnanimity, and confidence, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q140_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q128.html">Q[128])</a>. Now we find precepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance. Therefore there should also have been precepts
                     of magnificence and magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is the guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.
                     xxxv). Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore patience should not have been commanded merely, as Augustine
                     says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the mind.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q140_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q128.html">Q[128];</a>
                     <a id="SS_Q140_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q136_A4.html"> Q[136], A[4]</a>;
                     <a id="SS_Q140_A2-p4.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q137_A2.html"> Q[137], A[2]</a>). Now the precepts of fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the precepts
                     of patience and perseverance should have been negative and not affirmative.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p5"> The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given by Holy Writ.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such things as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright man
                     needs not only the principal virtues, but also the secondary and annexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts
                     not only about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of the secondary and annexed virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the genus of fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of greatness
                     which they regard in their respective matters. Now things pertaining to excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather
                     than under precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of counsels, rather than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity.
                     On the other hand, the hardships and toils of the present life
                     pertain to patience and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them, but on account of the very nature
                     of those virtues. Hence the need of precepts of patience and perseverance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q140_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>), although affirmative precepts are always binding, they are not binding for always, but according to place and time. Wherefore
                     just as the affirmative precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to the preparedness of the mind, in the sense
                     that man be prepared to fulfil them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be understood in the same way.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fortitude, as distinct from patience and perseverance, is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed with caution;
                     nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in particular. On the other hand, patience and perseverance are about
                     minor hardships and toils, wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially in general, what is to be done in such
                     cases.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q141" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q141-p0.1">OF TEMPERANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q141-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q141-p2"> In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself; (2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance
                  we must consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices.
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q141-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q141-p4"> (1) Whether temperance is a virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q141-p5"> (2) Whether it is a special virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q141-p6"> (3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q141-p7"> (4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q141-p8"> (5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a kind of touch?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q141-p9"> (6) What is the rule of temperance?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q141-p10"> (7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q141-p11"> (8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues ?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q141_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A1-p0.1">Whether temperance is a virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue goes against the inclination of nature, since "there is in us a natural
                     aptitude for virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Now temperance withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines, according
                     to Ethic. ii, 3,8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>). But some people have temperance without having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet covetous
                     or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as appears from what we have said above (
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html">FS, Q[68], A[4]</a>). But seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have been already ascribed to the other virtues (QQ[8],9,19,45,52,
                     71,139). Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): "Temperance is the name of a virtue."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">FS, Q[55], A[3]</a>), it is essential to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius
                     states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with reason. Now temperance
                     evidently inclines man to this, since its very name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes. Therefore temperance
                     is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to
                     him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that those pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance
                     with reason. From such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore
                     it is clear that temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature,
                     but is in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The temperance which fulfils the conditions of perfect virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all who are
                     in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being subject to the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is
                     a virtue, though they do acts of temperance from a certain natural disposition, in so far as certain imperfect virtues are
                     either natural to man, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html">FS, Q[63], A[1]</a>), or
                     acquired by habituation, which virtues, through lack of prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear, whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh, according
                     to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q141_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.120" target="asv">Ps. 118:120</a>: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear." The gift of fear has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending, and in
                     this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A1-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A9.html">Q[19], A[9]</a>, ad 1). But it may have for its secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid
                     offending God. Now man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those things which are most seductive,
                     and these are the matter of temperance: wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q141_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A2-p0.1">Whether temperance is a special virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to temperance
                     to preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption for God's sake." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance
                     is not a special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we observe and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul." But this
                     is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just
                     is beautiful." Now the beautiful is considered as proper to temperance, according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic.
                     i, 27). Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it a special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is customary in human speech to employ a common term in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things
                     to which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is
                     the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly
                     the word "temperance" has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its common
                     signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a general virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain
                     temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human operations and passions: and this is common to every moral virtue.
                     Yet there is a logical difference between temperance and fortitude, even if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance
                     withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or
                     withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p7"> On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive
                     to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a special matter.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law. Wherefore
                     integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can, like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense,
                     and secondly in a sense of excellence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The things about which temperance is concerned have a most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are natural
                     to man, as we shall state further on (
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">AA[4]</a>,5). Hence tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, although it is a common property of all the
                     virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First,
                     in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what
                     we understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds
                     us, hold the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his animal
                     nature, as we shall state further on (
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">AA[4]</a>,5; Q[142], A[4]), wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In consequence beauty is a foremost attribute
                     of temperance which above all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad
                     sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute of temperance: for Isidore
                     says (Etym. x): "An honest man is one who has no
                     defilement, for honesty means an honorable state." This is most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that
                     bring most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q[142], A[4]).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q141_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A3-p0.1">Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that "temperance
                     is reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust and other wanton emotions of the mind." Now all the passions of the soul are
                     called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Virtue is about the difficult and the good" [*Ethic. ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear, especially
                     with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires and pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and
                     dangers, according to Augustine (QQ[83], qu. 36). Therefore it seems that the virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires
                     and pleasures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) "the grace of moderation belongs to temperance": and Tully says (De Offic.
                     ii, 27) that "it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the mind and to enforce moderation." Now moderation
                     is needed, not only in desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever pertains to the exterior. Therefore temperance
                     is not only about desires and pleasures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym.) [*The words quoted do not occur in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii, and De
                     Different. ii, 39]: that "it is temperance whereby lust and desire are kept under control."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[123], A[12]; Q[136], A[1]), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the passions
                     that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's passions is twofold, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html">FS, Q[23], A[2]</a>), when we were treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive appetite pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other
                     whereby it flies from sensible and bodily evils.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p7"> The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible
                     and bodily goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason, but are subject to it as instruments which
                     reason employs in order to attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing to the fact that the sensitive
                     appetite fails to tend towards them in accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral
                     virtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p8"> On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason,
                     not through being immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when a man flies from sensible and bodily evils,
                     which sometimes accompany the good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of reason. Hence it belongs to moral
                     virtue to make man while flying from evil to remain firm in the good of reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p9"> Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion,
                     viz. fear, which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with daring, which attacks the objects of fear in the
                     hope of attaining some good, so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly concerned with those passions
                     that tend towards sensible goods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows that arise
                     from the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring presupposes objects of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the
                     absence of the aforesaid pleasures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html">FS, Q[23], AA[1]</a>,2; 
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A3-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html">FS, Q[25], A[1]</a>), when we were treating of the passions, those passions which pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions pertaining
                     to the pursuit of good; and the passions of the irascible presuppose the passions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance
                     directly moderates the passions of the concupiscible which tend towards good, as a consequence,
                     it moderates all the other passions, inasmuch as moderation of the passions that precede results in moderation of the passions
                     that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the
                     things he desires.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards the object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to
                     temperance. on the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of
                     mind, which fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and fortitude about fears.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> External acts proceed from the internal passions of the soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of the
                     internal passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q141_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A4-p0.1">Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures of touch?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix)
                     that "the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which draw us to the things which withdraw us from the
                     laws of God and from the fruit of His goodness"; and a little further on he adds that "it is the duty of temperance to spurn
                     all bodily allurements and popular praise." Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only by
                     the desire for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the other senses, for these, too, belong to the
                     bodily allurements, and again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q141_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>). "Desire [*'Cupiditas,' which is the Douay version following the Greek {philargyria} renders 'desire of money'] is the root
                     of all evils." Therefore temperance is not only about desires of pleasures of touch.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is
                     temperate, but he is not magnificent." Now honors, whether small or great, of which he is speaking there, are an object of
                     pleasure, not of touch, but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only about desires for pleasures of touch.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect.
                     Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus. Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures of the body, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A5.html">FS, Q[31], A[5]</a>) in the treatise on the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the state of virtue through desire for spiritual
                     pleasures, for instance, through curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man knowledge, saying (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q141_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.5" target="asv">Gn. 3:5</a>): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil." Therefore
                     temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures
                     of touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the
                     proper matter of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, temperance is about desires and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and daring. Now fortitude is about
                     fear and daring with respect to the greatest evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of death. Wherefore
                     in like manner temperance must needs be about desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a natural
                     operation, it is so much the greater
                     according as it results from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural operations are those which preserve
                     the nature of the individual by means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union of the sexes. Hence temperance
                     is properly about pleasures of meat and drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the sense of touch. Wherefore
                     it follows that temperance is about pleasures of touch.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but as
                     concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and this is a general condition of every virtue. However,
                     we may also reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can he control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs
                     chiefly and properly to temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and
                     secondarily other pleasures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which is proportionate
                     to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The pleasures of the other senses play a different part in man and in other animals. For in other animals pleasures do not
                     result from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch: thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear
                     its voice, in relation to his food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the other senses, not only for this reason,
                     but also on account of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore temperance
                     is about the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to pleasures of touch, not principally but consequently: while in
                     so far as the sensible objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their becomingness, as when a man is pleased
                     at a well-harmonized sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature. Hence these passions are not
                     of such importance that temperance can be referred to them antonomastically.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the senses,
                     and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded
                     by moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they
                     need no control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a
                     hindrance to another greater and more binding.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of nature, and consequently it does not follow that temperance is about
                     all pleasures of touch.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q141_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A5-p0.1">Whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink,
                     which are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which regard the touch. But according to what has been said
                     
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, temperance is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human life. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper
                     to the taste rather than about those proper to the touch.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, temperance is about the passions rather than about things themselves. Now, according to De Anima ii, 3, "the touch
                     is the sense of food," as regards the very substance of the food, whereas "savor" which is the proper object of the taste,
                     is "the pleasing quality of the food." Therefore temperance is about the taste rather than about the touch.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Ethic. vii, 4,7: "temperance and intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and
                     incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy," to which delicacy pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in
                     savors which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "seemingly temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do with the
                     taste."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, temperance is about the greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human life either in the species or
                     in the individual. In these matters certain things are to be considered as principal and others as secondary. The principal
                     thing is the use itself of the necessary means, of the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the species, or of food
                     and drink which are necessary for the
                     preservation of the individual: while the very use of these necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p7"> In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the use more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in
                     woman, and a pleasing savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the pleasure of touch, that results
                     essentially from the use of these necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the touch. Secondarily, however,
                     temperance and intemperance are about pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible objects
                     of these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things that have relation to the touch. But since the taste
                     is more akin to the touch than the other senses are, it follows that temperance is more about the taste than about the other
                     senses.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The use of food and the pleasure that essentially results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says (De
                     Anima ii, 3) that "touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or cold, wet or dry." To the taste belongs the discernment
                     of savors, which make the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its being suitable for nourishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The pleasure resulting from savor is additional, so to speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the
                     use of food and drink.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Delicacy regards principally the substance of the food, but secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in which
                     it is served.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q141_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A6-p0.1">Whether the rule of temperance depends on the need of the present life?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not regulated
                     according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the soul, it is above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of temperance
                     does not depend on the needs of the body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the needs of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin against
                     temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required by nature, which is content with very little. But this would
                     seem unreasonable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no
                     sin in using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for the sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore
                     the need of the body is not the rule of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): "In both Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule forbidding him
                     to love the things of this life, or to deem any of them desirable for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself of
                     those things with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a lover, in so far as they are requisite for the needs of
                     this life and of his station."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[109], A[2]; Q[123], A[12]), the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason: because "man's good is to
                     be in accord with reason," as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is that by which it directs
                     certain things towards their end, and the good of reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of end,
                     and the end is the rule of whatever is
                     directed to the end. Now all the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed to some necessity of this life
                     as to their end. Wherefore temperance takes the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects of which it makes
                     use, and uses them only for as much as the need of this life requires.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above, the need of this life is regarded as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed that sometimes
                     the end of the worker differs from the end of the work, thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes
                     the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of
                     the thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is
                     useful for life is subordinate.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The need of human life may be taken in two ways. First, it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term "necessary"
                     to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something
                     without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not only the former of these needs, but also the latter.
                     Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man desires
                     pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound condition of body." Other things that are not necessary
                     for this purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to health and a sound condition of body; and these
                     temperance makes not use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But others are not a hindrance to those
                     things, and these temperance uses moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in keeping with those among
                     whom
                     one dwells. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) says that the "temperate man also desires other pleasant things," those
                     namely that are not necessary for health or a sound condition of body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to these things."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need according to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the requirements
                     of the body, but also on the requirements of external things, such as riches and station, and more still on the requirements
                     of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided
                     that not only they be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily condition,
                     but also that they be not inconsistent with good," i.e. good conduct, nor "beyond his substance," i.e. his means. And Augustine
                     says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi) that the "temperate man considers the need" not only "of this life" but also "of his station."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q141_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A7-p0.1">Whether temperance is a cardinal virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue. For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is
                     about those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated
                     in Ethic. iii, 10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it to control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to
                     be more impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q141_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.4" target="asv">Prov. 27:4</a>): "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth; and who can bear the violence [impetum] of one provoked?" Therefore
                     meekness is a principal virtue rather than temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence of desire and concupiscence, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A7-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A4.html">FS, Q[25], A[4]</a>). But humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore, seemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than
                     temperance which controls concupiscence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory reckons temperance among the principal virtues (Moral. ii, 49).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[123], A[11]; Q[61], A[3]), a principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost claim
                     to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which
                     is requisite in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, both
                     because these pleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain from
                     them, and to control the desire for them, and because their objects are more necessary to the present life, as stated above
                     
                     <a id="SS_Q141_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. For this reason temperance is reckoned a principal or cardinal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The longer the range of its operation, the greater is the agent's power [virtus] shown to be: wherefore the very fact that
                     the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power.
                     This is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident, for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes, although its
                     impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause,
                     wherefore it is more lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a more principal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of hope is higher than the object of desire, wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the irascible.
                     But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appetite with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore
                     temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q141_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A8-p0.1">Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and
                     seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and the regard for what is beautiful." Now virtue deserves
                     praise for being honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest of the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the virtue. Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of
                     touch than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance
                     is a greater virtue than justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of
                     death which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these occur every day; so that temperance is in more general
                     use than fortitude. Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the "greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for which reason
                     we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the good of the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual,"
                     wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the
                     many more than temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man and another, while fortitude regards dangers
                     of battle which are endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the
                     desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues
                     than temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance, not on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance,
                     but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and
                     the lower animals.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since virtue is about the difficult and the good, the excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good,
                     wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein temperance excels.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which is general because it regards the many conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is general
                     because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former way, temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply,
                     although in some respects temperance may be described as greater not only than fortitude but also than justice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q142" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q142-p0.1">OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q142-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q142-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q142-p3"> (1) Whether insensibility is a sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q142-p4"> (2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q142-p5"> (3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q142-p6"> (4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q142_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q142_A1-p0.1">Whether insensibility is a vice?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that insensibility is not a vice. For those are called insensible who are deficient with regard to pleasures
                     of touch. Now seemingly it is praiseworthy and virtuous to be altogether deficient in such matters: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.2" target="asv">Dan. 10:2,3</a>): "In those days Daniel mourned the days of three weeks, I ate no desirable bread, and neither flesh nor wine entered my
                     mouth, neither was I anointed with ointment." Therefore
                     insensibility is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "man's good is to be in accord with reason," according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now abstinence from all pleasures
                     of touch is most conducive to man's progress in the good of reason: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.1.17" target="asv">Dan. 1:17</a>) that "to the children" who took pulse for their food (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.1.12" target="asv">Dan. 1:12</a>), "God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book and wisdom." Therefore insensibility, which rejects these pleasures
                     altogether, is not sinful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is a very effective means of avoiding sin would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy
                     in avoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to insensibility. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that "if
                     we deny ourselves pleasures we are less liable to sin." Therefore there is nothing vicious in insensibility.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the Philosopher
                     (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11). Therefore insensibility is a vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious. Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that are necessary
                     for man's life. Wherefore the natural order requires that man should make use of these pleasures, in so far as they are necessary
                     for man's well-being, as regards the preservation either of the individual or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were
                     to reject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are necessary for
                     nature's preservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the order of nature. And this pertains to the vice of insensibility.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p7"> It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and even necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from
                     such pleasures as result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's health, certain persons refrain from pleasures
                     of meat, drink, and sex; as also for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes and soldiers have to deny themselves
                     many pleasures, in order to fulfil their respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to
                     recover health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures, as a kind of diet, and those who are desirous of giving
                     themselves up to contemplation and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal things. Nor do any of these things pertain
                     to the vice of insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through any horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some praiseworthy
                     end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights of contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the
                     text goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately afterwards.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since man cannot use his reason without his sensitive powers. which need a bodily organ. as stated in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q142_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">FP, Q[84], AA[7]</a>,8, man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use his reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that
                     afford pleasure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if he abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using
                     pleasures of the body will be greater or less, according as
                     man needs more or less the powers of his body in accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore it is commendable for those who
                     undertake the duty of giving themselves to contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual good, by a kind of spiritual
                     procreation, as it were, to abstain from many pleasures, but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily occupations and
                     carnal procreation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned, not altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity requires.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q142_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q142_A2-p0.1">Whether intemperance is a childish sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin. For Jerome in commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.3" target="asv"> Mat. 18:3, </a> "Unless you be converted, and become as little children," says that "a child persists not in anger, is unmindful of injuries,
                     takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful woman," all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore intemperance is not a
                     childish sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, children have none but natural desires. Now "in respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance," according to
                     the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, children should be fostered and nourished: whereas concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is concerned,
                     are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.5" target="asv"> Col. 3:5, </a> "Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are . . . concupiscence" [*Vulg.: 'your members which are upon the earth,
                     fornication . . . concupiscence'], etc. Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "we apply the term intemperance* to childish faults." [*{Akolasia} which Aristotle
                     refers to {kolazo} to punish, so that its original sense would be 'impunity' or 'unrestraint.']
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to be childish for two reasons. First, because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does not mean
                     that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense. Secondly. by way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of
                     intemperance are said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is one of unchecked concupiscence, which is likened to a
                     child in three ways. First, as rewards that which they both desire, for like a child
                     concupiscence desires something disgraceful. This is because in human affairs a thing is beautiful according as it harmonizes
                     with reason. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) under the heading "Comeliness is twofold," that "the beautiful is that
                     which is in keeping with man's excellence in so far as his nature differs from other animals." Now a child does not attend
                     to the order of reason; and in like manner "concupiscence does not listen to reason," according to Ethic. vii, 6. Secondly,
                     they are alike as to the result. For a child, if left to his own will, becomes more self-willed: hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.8" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:8</a>): "A horse not broken becometh stubborn, and a child left to himself will become headstrong." So, too, concupiscence, if
                     indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 5): "Lust served became a custom, and custom not resisted
                     became necessity." Thirdly, as to the remedy which is applied to both. For a child is corrected by
                     being restrained; hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.23.13" target="asv">Prov. 23:13,14</a>): "Withhold not correction from a child . . . Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul from Hell." In like manner
                     by resisting concupiscence we moderate it according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates this when he says (Music.
                     vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to spiritual things, and remain fixed "thereon, the impulse of custom," i.e. carnal
                     concupiscence, "is broken, and being suppressed is gradually weakened:
                     for it was stronger when we followed it, and though not wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it." Hence
                     the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "as a child ought to live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the
                     concupiscible to accord with reason."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes the term "childish" as denoting what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the sin of
                     intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A desire may be said to be natural in two ways. First, with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance are
                     about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and sex, which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly,
                     a desire may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing that nature requires for its own preservation; and
                     in this way it does not happen often that one sins in the matter of natural
                     desires, for nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no sin in desiring this, save only where it is
                     desired in excess as to quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to natural desires, according to
                     the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p9"> There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and these are certain incentives to desire devised by human
                     curiosity [*Cf. Q[167]], such as the nice [curiosa] preparation of food, or the adornment of women. And though children do
                     not affect these things much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason given above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which regards nature should be nourished and fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason in
                     them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q142_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q142_A3-p0.1">Whether cowardice* is a greater vice than intemperance? [*Cf. Q[125]]</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to the
                     good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a more excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q142_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q142_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[141], A[8]). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher
                     says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable, if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures
                     or pains." Now seemingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other passions; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3,
                     that "it is more difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which
                     would seem to be stronger than fear." Therefore intemperance, which is overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice,
                     which is overcome by fear.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires
                     to be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death, which pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more
                     grievous sin than intemperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice." Therefore it
                     is more sinful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> one may be compared with another in two ways. First, with regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man
                     who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than cowardice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p7"> First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death, to avoid which the principal motive is the necessity
                     of preserving life. On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire of which is not so necessary for the preservation
                     of life, because, as stated above (A[2], ad 2), intemperance is more about certain annexed pleasures or desires than about
                     natural desires or pleasures. Now the more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin.
                     Wherefore intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the part of the object or motive matter.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p8"> In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a
                     man is, the more grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who are demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially
                     in dangers of death, stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive of intemperance. Secondly, because the more
                     voluntary a sin the graver it is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than cowardice has,
                     and this for two reasons. The first is because actions done through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external
                     agent, so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure
                     are simply voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an intemperate man are more voluntary individually and less
                     voluntary generically. For no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is enticed by individual pleasures which make
                     of him an intemperate man. Hence the most effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell on the consideration of singulars.
                     It is the other way about in matters relating to cowardice: because the particular action that imposes itself on a man is
                     less voluntary, for instance to cast aside his shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more voluntary, for instance
                     to save himself by flight. Now that which is more voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes
                     place, is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply more voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly,
                     because it is easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since pleasures of food and sex, which are the
                     matter of intemperance, are of everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by frequent practice in their
                     regard to become temperate; whereas dangers of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for man to encounter
                     them frequently in order to cease being a coward.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The excellence of fortitude in comparison with temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard to the
                     end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is directed to the common good more than temperance is. And from this
                     point of view cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance, since by cowardice some people forsake the defense of
                     the common good. Secondly, with regard to the difficulty, because it is more difficult
                     to endure dangers of death than to refrain from any pleasures whatever: and from this point of view there is no need for cowardice
                     to take precedence of intemperance. For just as it is a greater strength that does not succumb to a stronger force, so on
                     the other hand to be overcome by a stronger force is proof of a lesser vice, and to succumb to a weaker force, is the proof
                     of a greater vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which one shuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures whatever
                     of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers
                     of death, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex: although the latter is more difficult to resist than anger,
                     sorrow, and fear, occasioned by certain other evils.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a general than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such cases we have
                     the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q142_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q143.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q142_A4-p0.1">Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of sins?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so is disgrace due to sin.
                     Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance: for instance murder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is
                     not the most disgraceful of sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those sins which are the more common are seemingly less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now sins
                     of intemperance are most common, because they are about things connected with the common use of human life, and in which many
                     happen to sin. Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most disgraceful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) temperance and intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain
                     desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and pleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease
                     as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory. Now honor is due to excellence, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q142_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], A[1]</a>), and glory denotes clarity (
                     <a id="SS_Q142_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], A[1]</a>, ad 3). Accordingly intemperance is most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is most repugnant to human excellence,
                     since it is about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q142_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A2.html">Q[141], AA[2]</a>,3).
                     Wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A4-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.48.21" target="asv">Ps. 48:21</a>): "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them." Secondly,
                     because it is most repugnant to man's clarity or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of intemperance dim
                     the light of reason from which all the clarity and beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as being
                     most slavish.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Gregory says [*Moral. xxxiii. 12], "the sins of the flesh," which are comprised under the head of intemperance, although
                     less culpable, are more disgraceful. The reason is that culpability is measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while
                     disgrace regards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the unbecomingness of the sin in respect of the sinner.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The commonness of a sin diminishes the shamefulness and disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as regards the nature
                     of the vices themselves.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When we say that intemperance is most disgraceful, we mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely, that are connected
                     with human passions which to a certain extent are in conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode of
                     human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices are apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by
                     way of excess: for instance, if a man delight in eating human flesh, or in
                     committing the unnatural vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q143.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q143" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q143_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q143-p0.1">OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q143-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q143-p2"> We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q143_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q143.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q143_A1-p0.1">Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to
                     be "continence, mildness, and modesty." For continence is reckoned to be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance
                     is comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q143_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">Q[141], A[4]</a>). Therefore mildness is not a part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q143_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.4.5" target="asv">Phil. 4:5</a>): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Now external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q143_A1-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A8.html">Q[58], A[8]</a>). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty,
                     shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness, sobriety, purity." Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus]
                     that "the companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity, refinement, method, contentment." [*'Per-se-sufficientiam'
                     which could be rendered 'self-sufficiency,' but for the fact that
                     this is taken in a bad sense. See
                     <a id="SS_Q143_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q169_A1.html"> Q[169], A[1]</a>.] Therefore it seems that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (QQ[48],128), a cardinal virtue may have three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and potential.
                     The integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the concurrence of which are necessary for virtue: and in this respect there
                     are two integral parts of temperance, "shamefacedness," whereby one recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance,
                     and "honesty," whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q143_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A2.html">Q[141], A[2]</a>, ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance excel others
                     in disgrace.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p7"> The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of a virtue have to be differentiated according to the
                     difference of matter or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two kinds. For some are directed
                     to nourishment: and in these as regards meat, there is "abstinence," and as regards drink properly there is "sobriety." Other
                     pleasures are directed to the power of procreation, and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the act
                     itself of procreation, there is "chastity," and as to the pleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing,
                     touching, or fondling, we have "purity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p8"> The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the mode
                     in some principal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs
                     to temperance to moderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore any virtue that is effective
                     of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards something, may be
                     reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p9"> This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the soul; secondly, in the outward movements and actions of
                     the body; thirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains,
                     we find in the soul three movements towards a particular object. In the first place there is the movement of the will when
                     stirred by the impulse of passion: and this movement is restrained by "continence," the effect of which is that,
                     although a man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to them. Another inward movement towards something
                     is the movement of hope, and of the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by "humility." The third movement
                     is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and this is restrained by "meekness" or "mildness."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p10"> With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint is the effect of "modesty," which, according to Andronicus,
                     has three parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what not to do, and to observe the right order,
                     and to persevere in what we do: this he assigns to "method." The second is that a man observe decorum in what he does, and
                     this he ascribes to "refinement." The third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse between
                     a man and his friends, and this is called "gravity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p11"> With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this
                     Macrobius assigns "lowliness," and Andronicus "contentment"; secondly, we must not be too nice in our requirements, and to
                     this Macrobius ascribes "moderation," Andronicus "simplicity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is true that continence differs from virtue, just as imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on (
                     <a id="SS_Q143_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q165_A1.html">Q[165], A[1]</a>); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has something in common with temperance both as to matter, since
                     it is about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of
                     temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of temperance not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the
                     mode of restraint and moderation as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the matter of external action justice considers what is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain
                     moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to the moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the
                     moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p16"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p17"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q143.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q143_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q144" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q143_A1.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q144-p0.1">OF SHAMEFACEDNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q144-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q144-p2"> We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in the first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness
                  and honesty. With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q144-p3"> (1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q144-p4"> (2) What is its object?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q144-p5"> (3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q144-p6"> (4) What kind of people are ashamed?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q144_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q144_A1-p0.1">Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is proper to a virtue "to observe the mean as fixed by reason": this is
                     clear from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6. Now shamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher
                     observes (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy.
                     But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is
                     it a part of justice. since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas justice is not about the passions; nor again
                     is it a part of fortitude, because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and aggressive,
                     while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is about
                     desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide
                     Orth. ii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of
                     honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness is the companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse
                     to wantonness, a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the support of what is honest, a seeker after
                     the beautiful." Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain vices are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate
                     prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, "like acts beget like habits," according to Ethic. ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore
                     from many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i,
                     12). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that shamefacedness is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in
                     Phys. vii, 17,18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of
                     virtue. Now shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the fear of something base, namely of that which
                     is disgraceful. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "shamefacedness is fear of a
                     base action." Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="SS_Q144_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html">FS, Q[40], A[1]</a>; 
                     <a id="SS_Q144_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A2.html">FS, Q[41], A[2]</a>; 
                     <a id="SS_Q144_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A3.html">FS, Q[42], A[3]</a>), when we were treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does not apprehend that which would
                     be disgraceful and base to do, as being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to avoid; nor does he
                     actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue,
                     since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p9"> Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this
                     way /shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue's
                     definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be "an elective habit," that is to say, operating from choice.
                     Now shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion.
                     Hence it falls short of the notion of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and disgrace. Now it has been stated (
                     <a id="SS_Q144_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q142_A4.html">Q[142], A[4]</a>) that the vice of intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness pertains more to temperance than to
                     any other virtue, by reason of its motive cause, which is a base action though not according to the species of the passion,
                     namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as the vices opposed to other virtues are
                     base and disgraceful, shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of
                     honesty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow that
                     whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence
                     shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the object
                     of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a
                     man would be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of shamefacedness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p15"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p16"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q144_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q144_A2-p0.1">Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shamefacedness
                     is fear of disgrace." Now sometimes those who do nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q144_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.8" target="asv"> Ps. 67:8, </a> "For thy sake I have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face." Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful
                     action.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance
                     when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most beautiful according to Ethic. i, 8. Yet sometimes people are ashamed
                     to do virtuous deeds, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q144_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.9.26" target="asv"> Lk. 9:26, </a> "He that shall be ashamed of Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed," etc. Therefore shamefacedness is not
                     about a disgraceful action.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a disgraceful action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the action
                     the more ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser sins, while he glories in those which are most
                     grievous, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q144_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.51.3" target="asv"> Ps. 51:3, </a> "Why dost thou glory in malice?" Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that "shamefacedness is fear of
                     doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q144_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A2.html">FS, Q[41], A[2]</a>; 
                     <a id="SS_Q144_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A3.html">FS, Q[42], A[3]</a>), when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid.
                     Now disgrace is twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the deformity of a voluntary act: and this,
                     properly speaking, has not the character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone does not
                     appear to be arduous and above man's ability: wherefore it is not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the Philosopher
                     says (Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of fear.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p8"> The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in the reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity
                     of glory consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the character of an arduous evil, just as honor has
                     the character of an arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first and foremost reproach or ignominy.
                     And since reproach is properly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that shamefacedness
                     regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "a man is less ashamed of those
                     defects which are not the result of any fault of his own."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p9"> Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man refrains from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another
                     way a man while doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear of reproach. In the former case, according to
                     Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person "blushing," in the latter we say that he is "ashamed."
                     Hence he says that "the man who is ashamed acts in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due to sin which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
                     6) that "a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the cause." Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which
                     he is subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv,
                     3). Thus we find it said of the apostles (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q144_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.41" target="asv">Acts 5:41</a>) that "they
                     (the apostles) went from the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the
                     name of Jesus." It is owing to imperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the reproaches which he suffers on
                     account of virtue, since the more virtuous a man is, the more he despises external things, whether good or evil. Wherefore
                     it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q144_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.51.7" target="asv">Is. 51:7</a>): "Fear ye not the reproach of men."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q144_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q63_A3.html">Q[63], A[3]</a>), though honor is not really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain excellence: and the same applies to reproach,
                     for though it is properly due to sin alone, yet, at least in man's opinion, it regards any kind of defect. Hence a man is
                     ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and the like.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as such. Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either because
                     he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical
                     for doing virtuous deeds.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful, either because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in comparison
                     with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain abundance of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice
                     than of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance of power. The same applies to other sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q144_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q144_A3-p0.1">Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in Rhet.
                     ii, 6 that "men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire approbation." Now men desire this especially from people
                     of the better sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely
                     connected with him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those
                     whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to Rhet. ii, 6, "a man does not forbid his neighbor what he
                     does himself." Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most closely connected with him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men take more shame from those who retail their information to many, such
                     as jokers and fable-tellers." But those who are more closely connected with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should
                     not take shame chiefly from them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done
                     nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first time; by those whose friends they wish to become." Now these
                     are less closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by those who are more closely united to him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that "man is made most ashamed by those who are to be continually with him."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor denotes attestation to someone's excellence, especially the excellence
                     which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of which is shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person's defect,
                     especially that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person's attestation is considered to be, the more does he
                     make another person ashamed. Now a person's attestation may be considered as being more
                     weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or because of its effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person's
                     attestations for two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of his judgement, as in the case of wise and virtuous men,
                     by whom man is more desirous of being honored and by whom he is brought to a greater sense of shame. Hence children and the
                     lower animals inspire no one with shame, by reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on account of his knowledge of the
                     matter
                     attested, because "everyone judges well of what is known to him" [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we are more liable to be made
                     ashamed by persons connected with us, since they are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers and persons entirely
                     unknown to us, who are ignorant of what we do, inspire us with no shame at all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p8"> An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are
                     more desirous of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are more liable to be made ashamed by those who are
                     able to do them some harm. And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons connected with us make us more ashamed,
                     since we are to be continually in their society, as though this entailed a continual harm to us: whereas the harm
                     that comes from strangers and passersby ceases almost at once.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> People of the better sort make us ashamed for the same reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because just
                     as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since they have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their
                     judgments hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom we live is more cogent since they know more
                     about our concerns in detail.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We fear not the attestation of those who are connected with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that they
                     look upon our defect as disgraceful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm they do by making many think ill of us.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make us more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to
                     wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition
                     seems greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in one whom he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the
                     more disgraceful. The reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom we
                     ask something for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be, is that we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed
                     in our request, or by failing to become their friends.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q144_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q144_A4-p0.1">Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness
                     are not ashamed, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q144_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.3.3" target="asv"> Jer. 3:3, </a> "Thou hadst a harlot's forehead, thou wouldst not blush." Therefore those who are virtuous are more inclined to be ashamed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil": and this
                     happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, shamefacedness is "fear of disgrace" [*Ethic. iv, 9]. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance
                     if they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly. Therefore a virtuous man can be ashamed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q144_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q143.html">Q[143])</a>. Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is
                     also.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a "virtuous man is not shamefaced."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q144_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q144_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2) shamefacedness is fear of some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not feared: first, because it is
                     not reckoned an evil; secondly because one reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult to avoid.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p8"> Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First, because the things that should make him ashamed are not
                     deemed by him to be disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are without shame, for instead of disapproving
                     of their sins, they boast of them. Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to themselves, or as easy to avoid.
                     In this way the old and the virtuous are not shamefaced. Yet they are so disposed, that if there were anything
                     disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shame is in the virtuous
                     hypothetically."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst men through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average
                     men it is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and yet are not altogether free from evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only vice, but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q144_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.5.22" target="asv">1 Thess. 5:22, </a> "From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves." The Philosopher, too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should
                     avoid "not only what is really evil, but also those things that are regarded as evil."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 1) the virtuous man despises ignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve, wherefore
                     he is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as though it entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it: wherefore
                     Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness lays the first foundation of temperance," by inspiring man with the horror
                     of whatever is disgraceful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q143_A1.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q145" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q145-p0.1">OF HONESTY* (FOUR ARTICLES) [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point
                  of view of decorum.]
               </h3>
               <p id="SS_Q145-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q145-p2"> We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q145-p3"> (1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q145-p4"> (2) Its relation with the beautiful [*As honesty here denotes moral goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty];</p>
               <p id="SS_Q145-p5"> (3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q145-p6"> (4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q145_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q145_A1-p0.1">Whether honesty is the same as virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that "the honest is what is
                     desired for its own sake." Now virtue is desired, not for its own sake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher
                     says (Ethic. i, 9) that "happiness is the reward and the end of virtue." Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) "honesty means an honorable state." Now honor is due to many things besides virtue,
                     since "it is praise that is the proper due of virtue" (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "principal part of virtue is the interior choice," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems
                     to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.40" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:40, </a> "Let all things be done decently [honeste] and according to order" among you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth. According to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.11.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 11:14, </a> "good things and evil, life and death [poverty and riches] are from God" [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine
                     edition. For riches the Vulgate has 'honestas']. But virtue does not consist in external wealth. Therefore honesty is not
                     the same as virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides honesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also divided.
                     Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Isidore says (Etym. x) "honesty means an honorable state," wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through being worthy
                     of honor. Now honor, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q145_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q144_A2.html">Q[144], A[2]</a>, ad 2), is due to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according to his virtue, as stated in Phys. vii,
                     17. Therefore, properly speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of those things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for their
                     own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such as happiness which is the last end; while some are desired,
                     not only for their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in themselves, even if no further good accrued to
                     us through them, but also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are
                     conducive to some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable for their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De
                     Invent. Rhet. ii, 52) that "some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by their own worth, such as virtue, truth,
                     knowledge." And this suffices to give a thing the character of honest.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some of the things which are honored besides virtue are more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and such like
                     things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue which we practice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim
                     to the name of honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, in so far as they are a help to the practice of
                     virtue, such as rank, power, and riches [*Ethic. i, 8]. For as the Philosopher says
                     (Ethic. iv, 3) that these things "are honored by some people, but in truth it is only the good man who is worthy of honor."
                     Now a man is good in respect of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the latter is desirable for the sake
                     of something else, while honor is due to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the character of honesty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As we have stated honest denotes that to which honor is due. Now honor is an attestation to someone's excellence, as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="SS_Q145_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], AA[1]</a>,2). But one attests only to what one knows; and the internal choice is not made known save by external actions. Wherefore
                     external conduct has the character of honesty, in so far as it reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists
                     radically in the internal choice, but
                     its expression lies in the external conduct.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is because the excellence of wealth is commonly regarded as making a man deserving of honor, that sometimes the name of
                     honesty is given to external prosperity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q145_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q145_A2-p0.1">Whether the honest is the same as the beautiful?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the honest is not the same as the beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite, since
                     the honest is "what is desirable for its own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. But the beautiful regards rather the
                     faculty of vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the same as the honest.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beauty requires a certain clarity, which is characteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honor. Since then
                     honor and glory differ, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q145_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], A[1]</a>, ad 3), it seems also that the honest and the beautiful differ.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, honesty is the same as virtue, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q145_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.16.15" target="asv">Ezech. 16:15</a>): "Trusting in thy beauty thou playest the harlot because of thy renown." Therefore the honest is not the same as the beautiful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.23" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:23,24</a>): "Those that are our uncomely [inhonesta] parts, have more abundant comeliness [honestatem], but our comely [honesta] parts
                     have no need." Now by uncomely parts he means the baser members, and by comely parts the beautiful members. Therefore the
                     honest and the beautiful are apparently the same.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity
                     and due proportion. For he states that God is said to be beautiful, as being "the cause of the harmony and clarity of the
                     universe." Hence the beauty of the body consists in a man having his bodily limbs well proportioned, together with a certain
                     clarity of color. In like manner spiritual beauty consists in a man's conduct or actions
                     being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason. Now this is what is meant by honesty, which we have
                     stated 
                     <a id="SS_Q145_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html">(A[1])</a> to be the same as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates according to reason all that is connected with man. Wherefore "honesty
                     is the same as spiritual beauty." Hence Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 30): "By honesty I mean intelligible beauty, which we
                     properly designate as spiritual," and further on he adds that "many things are
                     beautiful to the eye, which it would be hardly proper to call honest."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object that moves the appetite is an apprehended good. Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon as it is apprehended,
                     it is taken to be something becoming and good. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the beautiful and the good are beloved
                     by all." Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it implies spiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this reason Tully
                     says (De Offic. i, 5): "Thou perceivest the form and the features, so to
                     speak, of honesty; and were it to be seen with the eye, would, as Plato declares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q145_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], A[1]</a>, ad 3), glory is the effect of honor: because through being honored or praised, a person acquires clarity in the eyes of
                     others. Wherefore, just as the same thing makes a man honorable and glorious, so is the same thing honest and beautiful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument applies to the beauty of the body: although it might be replied that to be proud of one's honesty is to play
                     the harlot because of one's spiritual beauty, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.17" target="asv"> Ezech. 28:17, </a> "Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast lost thy wisdom in thy beauty."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q145_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q145_A3-p0.1">Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the honest does not differ from the useful and the pleasant. For the honest is "what is desirable for
                     its own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired for its own sake, for "it seems ridiculous to ask
                     a man why he wishes to be pleased," as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore the honest does not differ from the
                     pleasant.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful good: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): "There is a thing
                     that attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility":
                     and "that is money." Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.11.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 11:14</a>): "Poverty and riches [honestas] are from God," and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.2" target="asv">Ecclus. 13:2</a>): "He shall
                     take a burden upon him that hath fellowship with one more honorable," i.e. richer, "than himself." Therefore the honest differs
                     not from the useful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can be useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement
                     (De Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Q[83], qu. 30): "The honest is that which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies reference to
                     something else."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The honest concurs in the same subject with the useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as stated
                     above 
                     <a id="SS_Q145_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it has a certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever is regulated
                     in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man. Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is
                     becoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is
                     naturally pleasing to man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue (Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is
                     pleasing is honest, since a thing may be becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason. A pleasing thing of
                     this kind is beside man's reason which perfects his nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is referred to
                     something else as its end namely happiness. Accordingly the honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p7"> Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest as having a certain excellence deserving of honor on
                     account of its spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest to desire, and useful, as referred to something
                     else. The pleasant, however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since whatever is useful and honest is
                     pleasing in some respect, whereas the converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired for its own sake by the rational appetite. which tends to that which is in
                     accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Riches are denominated honesty according of the opinion of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to be
                     the instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (A[1], ad 2).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing incompatible with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that
                     it is contrary to man's last end, which is a good in accordance with reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect,
                     with regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say that every useful thing as such may be classed among those that
                     are honest.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q145_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q145_A4-p0.1">Whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and
                     whole in respect of one same thing. Now "temperance is a part of honesty," according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore
                     honesty is not a part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Esdra 3:21</a>) that "wine . . . makes all thoughts honest." But the use of wine, especially in excess, in which sense the passage quoted
                     should seemingly be taken, pertains to intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor. Now "it is the just and the brave who receive most honor," according
                     to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore
                     Eleazar said as related in 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.6.28" target="asv">2 Macc. 6:28</a>: "I suffer an honorable [honesta] death, for the most venerable and most holy laws."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i] reckons honesty a part of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as pertaining
                     especially to temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q145_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, honesty is a kind of spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful: and opposites are most manifest
                     of one another. Wherefore seemingly honesty belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels that which is most disgraceful
                     and unbecoming to man, namely animal lusts. Hence by its very name temperance is most significative of the good of reason
                     to which it belongs to moderate and
                     temper evil desires. Accordingly honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is reckoned as a part thereof,
                     not as a subjective part, nor as an annexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition attaching thereto.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Temperance is accounted a subjective part of honesty taken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is reckoned a
                     part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man is intoxicated, "the wine makes his thoughts honest" according to his own reckoning because he deems himself great
                     and deserving of honor [*Cf.
                     <a id="SS_Q145_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q148_A6.html"> Q[148], A[6]</a>].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude than to temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good: yet
                     greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it holds in check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated
                     above. Thus honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule given by the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.23" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:23</a>) when he says that "our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness,"
                     which, namely, destroys whatever is uncomely.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q146" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q146_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q146-p0.1">OF ABSTINENCE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q146-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q146-p2"> We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those which are about pleasures of food; secondly, those
                  which are about pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence, which is about meat and drink, and sobriety,
                  which is specifically about drink.
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q146-p3"> With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered: (1) Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its
                  opposite vice which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q146-p4"> (1) Whether abstinence is a virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q146-p5"> (2) Whether it is a special virtue?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q146_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q146_A1-p0.1">Whether abstinence is a virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q146_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.20" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:20</a>): "The kingdom of God is not in speech but in power [virtute]." Now the kingdom of God does not consist in abstinence, for
                     the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q146_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.17" target="asv">Rom. 14:17</a>): "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink," where a gloss [*Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11] observes that "justice
                     consists neither in abstaining nor in eating." Therefore abstinence
                     is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing himself to God: "This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to
                     take food as physic." Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art to regulate medicine. Therefore, in like manner,
                     to regulate one's food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every virtue "observes the mean," as stated in Ethic. ii, 6,7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean
                     but to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no virtue excludes another virtue. But abstinence excludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "impatience
                     not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer's mind from its peaceful seclusion." Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "sometimes
                     the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer," so that abstinence excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not
                     a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q146_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.5" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:5,6</a>): "Join with your faith virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge abstinence"; where abstinence is numbered among
                     other virtues. Therefore abstinence is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of food. Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as denoting
                     retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it signifies neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something indifferent.
                     Secondly, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and then it signifies either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is
                     the meaning of Peter's words quoted above, where he says that we ought "to join
                     abstinence with knowledge," namely that in abstaining from food a man should act with due regard for those among whom he lives,
                     for his own person, and for the requirements of health.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The use of and abstinence from food, considered in themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle says
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q146_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:8</a>): "Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if we eat not [*Vulg.: 'Neither if we eat . . . nor if we eat not'], shall
                     we have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more," i.e. spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of
                     God, in so far as they are done reasonably through
                     faith and love of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The regulation of food, in the point of quantity and quality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of the
                     body: but in the point of internal affections with regard to the good of reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine
                     says (QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11): "It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or how much food a man takes, so long as he
                     does it with due regard for the people among whom he lives, for his own person, and for
                     the requirements of his health: but it matters how readily and uncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or
                     necessity to abstain."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures which are too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fortitude to strengthen
                     the soul against fears that deter it from the good of reason. Wherefore, just as fortitude is commended on account of a certain
                     excess, from which all the parts of fortitude take their name, so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from which
                     all its parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, since it is a part
                     of temperance, is named from deficiency, and yet it observes the mean, in so far as it is in accord with right reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those vices result from abstinence in so far as it is not in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one abstain
                     as one ought, i.e. with gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e. for God's glory and not one's own.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q146_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q146_A2-p0.1">Whether abstinence is a special virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue. For every virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not
                     praiseworthy by itself; for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "the virtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the
                     other virtues." Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Pet. xlii) that "the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any creature
                     of God is evil, but merely in order to chastise the body." Now this belongs to chastity, as its very name denotes. Therefore
                     abstinence is not a special virtue distinct from chastity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as man should be content with moderate meat, so should he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q146_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:8, </a> "Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should be [Vulg.: 'are'] content." Now there is no special virtue
                     in being content with moderate clothes. Neither, therefore, is there in abstinence which moderates food.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons abstinence as a special part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q146_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q136_A1.html">Q[136], A[1]</a>;
                     <a id="SS_Q146_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A3.html"> Q[141], A[3]</a>) moral virtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the passions: hence whenever we find a special motive
                     why a passion departs from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue. Now pleasures of the table are of a nature
                     to withdraw man from the good of reason, both because they are so great, and because food is necessary to man who needs
                     it for the maintenance of life, which he desires above all other things. Therefore abstinence is a special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtues are of necessity connected together, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q146_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>). Wherefore one virtue receives help and commendation from another, as justice from fortitude. Accordingly in this way the
                     virtue of abstinence receives commendation on account of the other virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not only against the allurements of lust, but also against those of gluttony:
                     since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the onslaughts of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields
                     to them. Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue through being a help to chastity, since one virtue helps
                     another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The use of clothing was devised by art, whereas the use of food is from nature. Hence it is more necessary to have a special
                     virtue for the moderation of food than for the moderation of clothing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q146_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q147" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q146_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q147-p0.1">OF FASTING (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q147-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q147-p2"> We must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q147-p3"> (1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q147-p4"> (2) Of what virtue is it the act?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q147-p5"> (3) Whether it is a matter of precept?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q147-p6"> (4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q147-p7"> (5) The time of fasting;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q147-p8"> (6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q147-p9"> (7) The hour of eating for those who fast;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q147-p10"> (8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q147_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A1-p0.1">Whether fasting is an act of virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fasting is not an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is acceptable to God. But fasting is not always
                     acceptable to God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.58.3" target="asv"> Is. 58:3, </a> "Why have we fasted and Thou hast not regarded?" Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no act of virtue forsakes the mean of virtue. Now fasting forsakes the mean of virtue, which in the virtue of abstinence
                     takes account of the necessity of supplying the needs of nature, whereas by fasting something is retrenched therefrom: else
                     those who do not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is competent to all, both good and evil, is not an act of virtue. Now such is fasting, since every one
                     is fasting before eating. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned together with other virtuous acts (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:5,6</a>) where the Apostle says: "In fasting, in knowledge, in chastity, etc. [Vulg.: 'in chastity, in knowledge']."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> An act is virtuous through being directed by reason to some virtuous [honestum] [*Cf.
                     <a id="SS_Q147_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html"> Q[145], A[1]</a>] good. Now this is consistent with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold purpose. First, in order to bridle
                     the lusts of the flesh, wherefore the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:5,6</a>): "In fasting, in chastity," since fasting is the guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome [*Contra Jov. ii.] "Venus
                     is
                     cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not there," that is to say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and drink. Secondly, we have
                     recourse to fasting in order that the mind may arise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly things: hence it is related
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Dan.10" target="asv">Dan. 10</a>) of Daniel that he received a revelation from God after fasting for three weeks. Thirdly, in order to satisfy for sins: wherefore
                     it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Joel.2.12" target="asv">Joel 2:12</a>): "Be converted to Me with all your heart, in fasting and in
                     weeping and in mourning." The same is declared by Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et Jejun. [*Serm. lxxii (ccxxx, de Tempore)]):
                     "Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the mind, subjects one's flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite and humble, scatters
                     the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire of lust, kindles the true light of chastity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An act that is virtuous generically may be rendered vicious by its connection with certain circumstances. Hence the text
                     goes on to say: "Behold in the day of your fast your own will is founded," and a little further on (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.58.4" target="asv">Is. 58:4</a>): "You fast for debates and strife and strike with the fist wickedly." These words are expounded by Gregory (Pastor. iii,
                     19) as follows: "The will indicates joy and the fist anger. In vain then is the
                     flesh restrained if the mind allowed to drift to inordinate movements be wrecked by vice." And Augustine says (in the same
                     sermon) that "fasting loves not many words, deems wealth superfluous, scorns pride, commends humility, helps man to perceive
                     what is frail and paltry."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The mean of virtue is measured not according to quantity but according to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Now reason
                     judges it expedient, on account of some special motive, for a man to take less food than would be becoming to him under ordinary
                     circumstances, for instance in order to avoid sickness, or in order to perform certain bodily works with greater ease: and
                     much more does reason direct this to the avoidance of spiritual evils and the
                     pursuit of spiritual goods. Yet reason does not retrench so much from one's food as to refuse nature its necessary support:
                     thus Jerome says:* "It matters not whether thou art a long or a short time in destroying thyself, since to afflict the body
                     immoderately, whether by excessive lack of nourishment, or by eating or sleeping too little, is to offer a sacrifice of stolen
                     goods." [*The quotation is from the Corpus of Canon Law (Cap. Non mediocriter, De Consecrationibus, dist. 5). Gratian there
                     ascribes the quotation to St. Jerome, but it is not to be found in the saint's works.] In like manner right reason does not
                     retrench so much from a man's food as to render him incapable of fulfilling his duty. Hence Jerome says (in the same reference)
                     "Rational man forfeits his dignity, if he sets fasting before chastity, or night-watchings before the well-being of his senses."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fasting of nature, in respect of which a man is said to be fasting until he partakes of food, consists in a pure negation,
                     wherefore it cannot be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is only the fasting of one who abstains in some measure from food for
                     a reasonable purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting [jejunium jejunii] [*Literally the 'fast of fasting']: while
                     the latter is called the faster's fast, because he fasts for a purpose.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q147_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A2-p0.1">Whether fasting is an act of abstinence?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fasting is not an act of abstinence. For Jerome [*The quotation is from the Ordinary Gloss, where the
                     reference is lacking] commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.17.20" target="asv"> Mat. 17:20, </a> "This kind of devil" says: "To fast is to abstain not only from food but also from all manner of lusts." Now this belongs
                     to every virtue. Therefore fasting is not exclusively an act of abstinence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says in a Lenten Homily (xvi in Evang.) that "the Lenten fast is a tithe of the whole year." Now paying
                     tithes is an act of religion, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q147_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q87_A1.html">Q[87], A[1]</a>). Therefore fasting is an act of religion and not of abstinence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, abstinence is a part of temperance, as stated above (QQ[143],146, A[1], ad 3). Now temperance is condivided with
                     fortitude, to which it belongs to endure hardships, and this seems very applicable to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an
                     act of abstinence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "fasting is frugality of fare and abstinence from food."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Habit and act have the same matter. Wherefore every virtuous act about some particular matter belongs to the virtue that
                     appoints the mean in that matter. Now fasting is concerned with food, wherein the mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore
                     it is evident that fasting is an act of abstinence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Properly speaking fasting consists in abstaining from food, but speaking metaphorically it denotes abstinence from anything
                     harmful, and such especially is sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p8"> We may also reply that even properly speaking fasting is abstinence from all manner of lust, since, as stated above (A[1],
                     ad 1), an act ceases to be virtuous by the conjunction of any vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing prevents the act of one virtue belonging to another virtue, in so far as it is directed to the end of that virtue,
                     as explained above (
                     <a id="SS_Q147_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>, ad 2;
                     <a id="SS_Q147_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q85_A3.html"> Q[85], A[3]</a>). Accordingly there is no reason why fasting should not be an act of religion, or of chastity, or of any other virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to fortitude as a special virtue, to endure, not any kind of hardship, but only those connected with the danger
                     of death. To endure hardships resulting from privation of pleasure of touch, belongs to temperance and its parts: and such
                     are the hardships of fasting.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q147_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A3-p0.1">Whether fasting is a matter of precept?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fasting is not a matter of precept. For precepts are not given about works of supererogation which are
                     a matter of counsel. Now fasting is a work of supererogation: else it would have to be equally observed at all places and
                     times. Therefore fasting is not a matter of precept.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever infringes a precept commits a mortal sin. Therefore if fasting were a matter of precept, all who do not
                     fast would sin mortally, and a widespreading snare would be laid for men.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 17) that "the Wisdom of God having taken human nature, and called us to a state of
                     freedom, instituted a few most salutary sacraments whereby the community of the Christian people, that is, of the free multitude,
                     should be bound together in subjection to one God." Now the liberty of the Christian people seems to be hindered by a great
                     number of observances no less than by a great number of sacraments. For Augustine says
                     (Ad inquis. Januar., Ep. lv) that "whereas God in His mercy wished our religion to be distinguished by its freedom and the
                     evidence and small number of its solemn sacraments, some people render it oppressive with slavish burdens." Therefore it seems
                     that the Church should not have made fasting a matter of precept.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi) speaking of fasting says: "Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands
                     of the elders as though they were laws of the apostles." Therefore fasting is a matter of precept.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as it belongs to the secular authority to make legal precepts which apply the natural law to matters of common weal
                     in temporal affairs, so it belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to prescribe by statute those things that concern the common
                     weal of the faithful in spiritual goods.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p7"> Now it has been stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q147_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q147_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that fasting is useful as atoning for and preventing sin, and as raising the mind to spiritual things. And everyone is bound
                     by the natural dictate of reason to practice fasting as far as it is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore fasting in general
                     is a matter of precept of the natural law, while the fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and profitable to
                     the Christian people, is a matter of precept
                     of positive law established by ecclesiastical authority: the latter is the Church fast, the former is the fast prescribed
                     by nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fasting considered in itself denotes something not eligible but penal: yet it becomes eligible in so far as it is useful
                     to some end. Wherefore considered absolutely it is not binding under precept, but it is binding under precept to each one
                     that stands in need of such a remedy. And since men, for the most part, need this remedy, both because "in many things we
                     all offend" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.3.2" target="asv">James 3:2</a>), and because "the flesh lusteth against the
                     spirit" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.17" target="asv">Gal. 5:17</a>), it was fitting that the Church should appoint certain fasts to be kept by all in common. In doing this the Church does
                     not make a precept of a matter of supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is of general obligation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those commandments which are given under the form of a general precept, do not bind all persons in the same way, but subject
                     to the requirements of the end intended by the lawgiver. It will be a mortal sin to disobey a commandment through contempt
                     of the lawgiver's authority, or to disobey it in such a way as to frustrate the end intended by him: but it is not a mortal
                     sin if one fails to keep a commandment, when there is a reasonable motive, and
                     especially if the lawgiver would not insist on its observance if he were present. Hence it is that not all, who do not keep
                     the fasts of the Church, sin mortally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine is speaking there of those things "that are neither contained in the authorities of Holy Scripture, nor found among
                     the ordinances of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church." On the other hand, the fasts
                     that are of obligation are appointed by the councils of bishops and are sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church.
                     Nor are they opposed to the freedom of the faithful, rather are they of use in
                     hindering the slavery of sin, which is opposed to spiritual freedom, of which it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.13" target="asv">Gal. 5:13</a>): "You, brethren, have been called unto liberty; only make not liberty an occasion to the flesh."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q147_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A4-p0.1">Whether all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church. For the commandments of the Church are binding even as
                     the commandments of God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.16" target="asv"> Lk. 10:16, </a> "He that heareth you heareth Me." Now all are bound to keep the commandments of God. Therefore in like manner all are bound
                     to keep the fasts appointed by the Church.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, children especially are seemingly not exempt from fasting, on account of their age: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Joel.2.15" target="asv">Joel 2:15</a>): "Sanctify a fast," and further on (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Joel.2.16" target="asv">Joel 2:16</a>): "Gather together the little ones, and them that suck the breasts." Much more therefore are all others bound to keen the
                     fasts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, spiritual things should be preferred to temporal, and necessary things to those that are not necessary. Now bodily
                     works are directed to temporal gain; and pilgrimages, though directed to spiritual things, are not a matter of necessity.
                     Therefore, since fasting is directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary thing by the commandment of the Church,
                     it seems that the fasts of the Church ought not to be omitted on account of a pilgrimage, or
                     bodily works.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is better to do a thing willingly than through necessity, as stated in 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.9.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 9:7.</a> Now the poor are wont to fast through necessity, owing to lack of food. Much more therefore ought they to fast willingly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It seems that no righteous man is bound to fast. For the commandments of the Church are not binding in opposition to Christ's
                     teaching. But our Lord said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.5.34" target="asv">Lk. 5:34</a>) that "the children of the bridegroom cannot fast whilst the bridegroom is with them [*Vulg.: 'Can you make the children
                     of the bridegroom fast, whilst the bridegroom is with them?']." Now He is with all the righteous by dwelling in them in a
                     special manner [*Cf.
                     
                     <a id="SS_Q147_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q8_A3.html">FP, Q[8], A[3]</a>], wherefore our Lord said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.28.20" target="asv">Mat. 28:20</a>): "Behold I am with you . . . even to the consummation of the world." Therefore the righteous are not bound by the commandment
                     of the Church to fast.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q147_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">FS, Q[90], A[2]</a>; 
                     <a id="SS_Q147_A4-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q98_A2.html">FS, Q[98], AA[2]</a>,6), general precepts are framed according to the requirements of the many. Wherefore in making such precepts the lawgiver
                     considers what happens generally and for the most part, and he does not intend the precept to be binding on a person in whom
                     for some special reason there is something incompatible with observance of the precept. Yet discretion must be
                     brought to bear on the point. For if the reason be evident, it is lawful for a man to use his own judgment in omitting to
                     fulfil the precept, especially if custom be in his favor, or if it be difficult for him to have recourse to superior authority.
                     on the other hand, if the reason be doubtful, one should have recourse to the superior who has power to grant a dispensation
                     in such cases. And this must be done in the fasts appointed by the Church, to which all are bound in general, unless there
                     be some special obstacle to this observance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The commandments of God are precepts of the natural law, which are, of themselves, necessary for salvation. But the commandments
                     of the Church are about matters which are necessary for salvation, not of themselves, but only through the ordinance of the
                     Church. Hence there may be certain obstacles on account of which certain persons are not bound to keep the fasts in question.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In children there is a most evident reason for not fasting, both on account of their natural weakness, owing to which they
                     need to take food frequently, and not much at a time, and because they need much nourishment owing to the demands of growth,
                     which results from the residuum of nourishment. Wherefore as long as the stage of growth lasts, which as a rule lasts until
                     they have completed the third period of seven years, they are not bound to keep the
                     Church fasts: and yet it is fitting that even during that time they should exercise themselves in fasting, more or less, in
                     accordance with their age. Nevertheless when some great calamity threatens, even children are commanded to fast, in sign of
                     more severe penance, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Jonah.3.7" target="asv"> Jonah 3:7, </a> "Let neither men nor beasts . . . taste anything . . . nor drink water."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Apparently a distinction should be made with regard to pilgrims and working people. For if the pilgrimage or laborious work
                     can be conveniently deferred or lessened without detriment to the bodily health and such external conditions as are necessary
                     for the upkeep of bodily or spiritual life, there is no reason for omitting the fasts of the Church. But if one be under the
                     necessity of starting on the pilgrimage at once, and of making long stages, or
                     of doing much work, either for one's bodily livelihood, or for some need of the spiritual life, and it be impossible at the
                     same time to keep the fasts of the Church, one is not bound to fast: because in ordering fasts the Church would not seem to
                     have intended to prevent other pious and more necessary undertakings. Nevertheless, in such cases one ought seemingly, to
                     seek the superior's dispensation; except perhaps when the above course is recognized by custom, since when superiors are silent
                     they would seem to consent.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those poor who can provide themselves with sufficient for one meal are not excused, on account of poverty, from keeping the
                     fasts of the Church. On the other hand, those would seem to be exempt who beg their food piecemeal, since they are unable
                     at any one time to have a sufficiency of food.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> This saying of our Lord may be expounded in three ways. First, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxx in Matth.), who says that
                     "the disciples, who are called children of the bridegroom, were as yet of a weakly disposition, wherefore they are compared
                     to an old garment." Hence while Christ was with them in body they were to be fostered with kindness rather than drilled with
                     the harshness of fasting. According to this interpretation, it is fitting that
                     dispensations should be granted to the imperfect and to beginners, rather than to the elders and the perfect, according to
                     a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.130.2" target="asv"> Ps. 130:2, </a> "As a child that is weaned is towards his mother." Secondly, we may say with Jerome [*Bede, Comment. in Luc. v] that our
                     Lord is speaking here of the fasts of the observances of the Old Law. Wherefore our Lord means to say that the apostles were
                     not to be held back by the old observances, since they were to be filled with the
                     newness of grace. Thirdly, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27), who states that fasting is of two kinds. one
                     pertains to those who are humbled by disquietude, and this is not befitting perfect men, for they are called "children of
                     the bridegroom"; hence when we read in Luke: "The children of the bridegroom cannot fast [*Hom. xiii, in Matth.]," we read
                     in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.9.15" target="asv"> Mat. 9:15</a>: "The children of the bridegroom cannot mourn [*Vulg.: 'Can the children of the bridegroom
                     mourn?']." The other pertains to the mind that rejoices in adhering to spiritual things: and this fasting is befitting the
                     perfect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q147_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A5-p0.1">Whether the times for the Church fast are fittingly ascribed?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the times for the Church fast are unfittingly appointed. For we read (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4" target="asv">Mat. 4</a>) that Christ began to fast immediately after being baptized. Now we ought to imitate Christ, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.16" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:16</a>, "Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ." Therefore we ought to fast immediately after the Epiphany when Christ's
                     baptism is celebrated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is unlawful in the New Law to observe the ceremonies of the Old Law. Now it belongs to the solemnities of the
                     Old Law to fast in certain particular months: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.8.19" target="asv">Zech. 8:19</a>): "The fast of the fourth month and the fast of the fifth, and the fast of the seventh, and the fast of the tenth shall be
                     to the house of Judah, joy and gladness and great solemnities." Therefore the fast of certain months, which are called
                     Ember days, are unfittingly kept in the Church.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27), just as there is a fast "of sorrow," so is there a fast "of
                     joy." Now it is most becoming that the faithful should rejoice spiritually in Christ's Resurrection. Therefore during the
                     five weeks which the Church solemnizes on account of Christ's Resurrection, and on Sundays which commemorate the Resurrection,
                     fasts ought to be appointed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the general custom of the Church.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q147_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q147_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3), fasting is directed to two things, the deletion of sin, and the raising of the mind to heavenly things. Wherefore fasting
                     ought to be appointed specially for those times, when it behooves man to be cleansed from sin, and the minds of the faithful
                     to be raised to God by devotion: and these things are particularly requisite before the feast of Easter, when sins are loosed
                     by baptism, which is solemnly
                     conferred on Easter-eve, on which day our Lord's burial is commemorated, because "we are buried together with Christ by baptism
                     unto death" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.4" target="asv">Rom. 6:4</a>). Moreover at the Easter festival the mind of man ought to be devoutly raised to the glory of eternity, which Christ restored
                     by rising from the dead, and so the Church ordered a fast to be observed immediately before the Paschal feast; and for the
                     same reason, on the eve of the chief festivals, because it is then that one
                     ought to make ready to keep the coming feast devoutly. Again it is the custom in the Church for Holy orders to be conferred
                     every quarter of the year (in sign whereof our Lord fed four thousand men with seven loaves, which signify the New Testament
                     year as Jerome says [*Comment. in Marc. viii]): and then both the ordainer, and the candidates for ordination, and even the
                     whole people, for whose good they are ordained, need to fast in order to make themselves ready for the ordination. Hence it
                     is
                     related (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.12" target="asv">Lk. 6:12</a>) that before choosing His disciples our Lord "went out into a mountain to pray": and Ambrose [*Exposit. in Luc.] commenting
                     on these words says: "What shouldst thou do, when thou desirest to undertake some pious work, since Christ prayed before sending
                     His apostles?"
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p7"> With regard to the forty day's fast, according to Gregory (Hom. xvi in Evang.) there are three reasons for the number. First,
                     "because the power of the Decalogue is accomplished in the four books of the Holy Gospels: since forty is the product of ten
                     multiplied by four." Or "because we are composed of four elements in this mortal body through whose lusts we transgress the
                     Lord's commandments which are delivered to us in the Decalogue. Wherefore it is fitting we should punish
                     that same body forty times. or, because, just as under the Law it was commanded that tithes should be paid of things, so we
                     strive to pay God a tithe of days, for since a year is composed of three hundred and sixty-six days, by punishing ourselves
                     for thirty-six days" (namely, the fasting days during the six weeks of Lent) "we pay God a tithe of our year." According to
                     Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 16) a fourth reason may be added. For the Creator is the "Trinity," Father, Son, and Holy
                     Ghost: while the number "three" refers to the invisible creature, since we are commanded to love God, with our whole heart,
                     with our whole soul, and with our whole mind: and the number "four" refers to the visible creature, by reason of heat, cold,
                     wet and dry. Thus the number "ten" [*Ten is the sum of three, three, and four] signifies all things, and if this be multiplied
                     by four which refers to the body whereby we make use of things, we have the number forty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p8"> Each fast of the Ember days is composed of three days, on account of the number of months in each season: or on account of
                     the number of Holy orders which are conferred at these times.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Christ needed not baptism for His own sake, but in order to commend baptism to us. Wherefore it was competent for Him to
                     fast, not before, but after His baptism, in order to invite us to fast before our baptism.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Church keeps the Ember fasts, neither at the very same time as the Jews, nor for the same reasons. For they fasted in
                     July, which is the fourth month from April (which they count as the first), because it was then that Moses coming down from
                     Mount Sinai broke the tables of the Law (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32" target="asv">Ex. 32</a>), and that, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.39.2" target="asv"> Jer. 39:2, </a> "the walls of the city were first broken through." In the fifth month, which we call August, they fasted
                     because they were commanded not to go up on to the mountain, when the people had rebelled on account of the spies (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Num.14" target="asv">Num. 14</a>): also in this month the temple of Jerusalem was burnt down by Nabuchodonosor (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p10.4" href="./asv.html#Jer.52" target="asv">Jer. 52</a>) and afterwards by Titus. In the seventh month which we call October, Godolias was slain, and the remnants of the people
                     were dispersed (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p10.5" href="./asv.html#Jer.51" target="asv">Jer. 51</a>). In the tenth month, which we call January, the people who were with Ezechiel in captivity heard of the destruction of the
                     temple (Ezech.
                     4).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "fasting of joy" proceeds from the instigation of the Holy Ghost Who is the Spirit of liberty, wherefore this fasting
                     should not be a matter of precept. Accordingly the fasts appointed by the commandment of the Church are rather "fasts of sorrow"
                     which are inconsistent with days of joy. For this reason fasting is not ordered by the Church during the whole of the Paschal
                     season, nor on Sundays: and if anyone were to fast at these times in
                     contradiction to the custom of Christian people, which as Augustine declares (Ep. xxxvi) "is to be considered as law," or
                     even through some erroneous opinion (thus the Manichees fast, because they deem such fasting to be of obligation)---he would
                     not be free from sin. Nevertheless fasting considered in itself is commendable at all times; thus Jerome wrote (Ad Lucin.,
                     Ep. lxxi): "Would that we might fast always."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q147_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A6-p0.1">Whether it is requisite for fasting that one eat but once?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not requisite for fasting that one eat but once. For, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q147_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q147_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, which observes due quantity of food not less than the number of meals. Now
                     the quantity of food is not limited for those who fast. Therefore neither should the number of meals be limited.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Just as man is nourished by meat, so is he by drink: wherefore drink breaks the fast, and for this reason we cannot
                     receive the Eucharist after drinking. Now we are not forbidden to drink at various hours of the day. Therefore those who fast
                     should not be forbidden to eat several times.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, digestives are a kind of food: and yet many take them on fasting days after eating. Therefore it is not essential
                     to fasting to take only one meal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the common custom of the Christian people.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Fasting is instituted by the Church in order to bridle concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard nature. Now only one meal is
                     seemingly sufficient for this purpose, since thereby man is able to satisfy nature; and yet he withdraws something from concupiscence
                     by minimizing the number of meals. Therefore it is appointed by the Church, in her moderation, that those who fast should
                     take one meal in the day.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It was not possible to fix the same quantity of food for all, on account of the various bodily temperaments, the result being
                     that one person needs more, and another less food: whereas, for the most part, all are able to satisfy nature by only one
                     meal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fasting is of two kinds [*Cf. A[1], ad 3]. One is the natural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eucharist. This
                     is broken by any kind of drink, even of water, after which it is not lawful to receive the Eucharist. The fast of the Church
                     is another kind and is called the "fasting of the faster," and this is not broken save by such things as the Church intended
                     to forbid in instituting the fast. Now the Church does not intend to command
                     abstinence from drink, for this is taken more for bodily refreshment, and digestion of the food consumed, although it nourishes
                     somewhat. It is, however, possible to sin and lose the merit of fasting, by partaking of too much drink: as also by eating
                     immoderately at one meal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although digestives nourish somewhat they are not taken chiefly for nourishment, but for digestion. Hence one does not break
                     one's fast by taking them or any other medicines, unless one were to take digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great
                     quantity and by way of food.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q147_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A7-p0.1">Whether the ninth hour is suitably fixed for the faster's meal?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ninth hour is not suitably fixed for the faster's meal. For the state of the New Law is more perfect
                     than the state of the Old Law. Now in the Old Testament they fasted until evening, for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.23.32" target="asv">Lev. 23:32</a>): "It is a sabbath . . . you shall afflict your souls," and then the text continues: "From evening until evening you shall
                     celebrate your sabbaths." Much more therefore under the New Testament should the
                     fast be ordered until the evening.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the fast ordered by the Church is binding on all. But all are not able to know exactly the ninth hour. Therefore
                     it seems that the fixing of the ninth hour should not form part of the commandment to fast.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q147_A7-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q147_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Now the mean of moral virtue does not apply in the same way to all, since what is much for one is little for another, as
                     stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Therefore the ninth hour should not be fixed for those who fast.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Council of Chalons [*The quotation is from the Capitularies (Cap. 39) of Theodulf, bishop of Orleans (760-821) and is
                     said to be found in the Corpus Juris, Cap. Solent, dist. 1, De Consecratione] says: "During Lent those are by no means to
                     be credited with fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of Vespers," which in the Lenten season is said after
                     the ninth hour. Therefore we ought to fast until the ninth hour.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q147_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q147_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3,5), fasting is directed to the deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it ought to add something to the common custom, yet
                     so as not to be a heavy burden to nature. Now the right and common custom is for men to eat about the sixth hour: both because
                     digestion is seemingly finished (the natural heat being withdrawn inwardly at night-time on account of the surrounding cold
                     of the night), and the humor spread
                     about through the limbs (to which result the heat of the day conduces until the sun has reached its zenith), and again because
                     it is then chiefly that the nature of the human body needs assistance against the external heat that is in the air, lest the
                     humors be parched within. Hence, in order that those who fast may feel some pain in satisfaction for their sins, the ninth
                     hour is suitably fixed for their meal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p7"> Moreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of Christ's Passion, which was brought to a close at the ninth hour, when "bowing
                     His head, He gave up the ghost" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.19.30" target="asv">Jn. 19:30</a>): because those who fast by punishing their flesh, are conformed to the Passion of Christ, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A7-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.24" target="asv"> Gal. 5:24, </a> "They that are Christ's, have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The state of the Old Testament is compared to the night, while the state of the New Testament is compared to the day, according
                     to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.12" target="asv"> Rom. 13:12, </a> "The night is passed and the day is at hand." Therefore in the Old Testament they fasted until night, but not in the New
                     Testament.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fasting requires a fixed hour based, not on a strict calculation, but on a rough estimate: for it suffices that it be about
                     the ninth hour, and this is easy for anyone to ascertain.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A little more or a little less cannot do much harm. Now it is not a long space of time from the sixth hour at which men for
                     the most part are wont to eat, until the ninth hour, which is fixed for those who fast. Wherefore the fixing of such a time
                     cannot do much harm to anyone, whatever his circumstances may be. If however this were to prove a heavy burden to a man on
                     account of sickness, age, or some similar reason, he should be dispensed from
                     fasting, or be allowed to forestall the hour by a little.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q147_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A8-p0.1">Whether it is fitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unfitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods. For it has
                     been stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q147_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q147_A6.html">(A[6])</a> that fasting was instituted as a curb on the concupiscence of the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by drinking wine more
                     than by eating flesh; according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A8-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.20.1" target="asv"> Prov. 20:1, </a> "Wine is a luxurious thing," and 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A8-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.18" target="asv"> Eph. 5:18, </a> "Be not drunk with wine, wherein
                     is luxury." Since then those who fast are not forbidden to drink wine, it seems that they should not be forbidden to eat flesh
                     meat.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some fish are as delectable to eat as the flesh of certain animals. Now "concupiscence is desire of the delectable,"
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q147_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q30_A1.html">FS, Q[30], A[1]</a>). Therefore since fasting which was instituted in order to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the eating of fish, neither
                     should it exclude the eating of flesh meat.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, on certain fasting days people make use of eggs and cheese. Therefore one can likewise make use of them during the
                     Lenten fast.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the common custom of the faithful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q147_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q147_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, fasting was instituted by the Church in order to bridle the concupiscences of the flesh, which regard pleasures of touch
                     in connection with food and sex. Wherefore the Church forbade those who fast to partake of those foods which both afford most
                     pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very great incentive to lust. Such are the flesh of animals that take their rest
                     on the earth, and of those that breathe
                     the air and their products, such as milk from those that walk on the earth, and eggs from birds. For, since such like animals
                     are more like man in body, they afford greater pleasure as food, and greater nourishment to the human body, so that from their
                     consumption there results a greater surplus available for seminal matter, which when abundant becomes a great incentive to
                     lust. Hence the Church has bidden those who fast to abstain especially from these foods.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Three things concur in the act of procreation, namely, heat, spirit [*Cf. P. I., Q. 118, A[1], ad 3], and humor. Wine and
                     other things that heat the body conduce especially to heat: flatulent foods seemingly cooperate in the production of the vital
                     spirit: but it is chiefly the use of flesh meat which is most productive of nourishment, that conduces to the production of
                     humor. Now the alteration occasioned by heat, and the increase in vital spirits
                     are of short duration, whereas the substance of the humor remains a long time. Hence those who fast are forbidden the use
                     of flesh meat rather than of wine or vegetables which are flatulent foods.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the institution of fasting, the Church takes account of the more common occurrences. Now, generally speaking, eating flesh
                     meat affords more pleasure than eating fish, although this is not always the case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast
                     to eat flesh meat, rather than to eat fish.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eggs and milk foods are forbidden to those who fast, for as much as they originate from animals that provide us with flesh:
                     wherefore the prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of the prohibition of eggs and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast
                     is the most solemn of all, both because it is kept in imitation of Christ, and because it disposes us to celebrate devoutly
                     the mysteries of our redemption. For this reason the eating of flesh meat is
                     forbidden in every fast, while the Lenten fast lays a general prohibition even on eggs and milk foods. As to the use of the
                     latter things in other fasts the custom varies among different people, and each person is bound to conform to that custom
                     which is in vogue with those among whom he is dwelling. Hence Jerome says [*Augustine, De Lib. Arb. iii, 18; cf. De Nat. et
                     Grat. lxvii]: "Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as though they were the
                     laws
                     of the apostles."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148.html"></a>
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               <h3 id="SS_Q148-p0.1">OF GLUTTONY (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q148-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q148-p2"> We must now consider gluttony. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q148-p3"> (1) Whether gluttony is a sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q148-p4"> (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q148-p5"> (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q148-p6"> (4) Its species;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q148-p7"> (5) Whether it is a capital sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q148-p8"> (6) Its daughters.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q148_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q148_A1-p0.1">Whether gluttony is a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that gluttony is not a sin. For our Lord said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.11" target="asv">Mat. 15:11</a>): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man." Now gluttony regards food which goes into a man. Therefore, since
                     every sin defiles a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid" [*Ep. lxxi, ad Lucin.]. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and man cannot
                     avoid this, for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "Since in eating pleasure and necessity go together, we fail to discern between
                     the call of necessity and the seduction of pleasure," and Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): "Who is it, Lord, that does not
                     eat a little more than necessary?" Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in every kind of sin the first movement is a sin. But the first movement in taking food is not a sin, else hunger
                     and thirst would be sinful. Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) that "unless we first tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous appetite, we
                     have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual combat." But man's inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and drinking, but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be inordinate through
                     leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of moral virtue consists: and a thing is said to be a sin through being contrary
                     to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which goes into man by way of food, by reason of its substance and nature, does not defile a man spiritually. But the
                     Jews, against whom our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees deemed certain foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their
                     signification, but by reason of their nature [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q148_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A6.html">FS, Q[102], A[6]</a>, ad 1]. It is the inordinate desire of food that defiles a man spiritually.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above, the vice of gluttony does not regard the substance of food, but in the desire thereof not being regulated
                     by reason. Wherefore if a man exceed in quantity of food, not from desire of food, but through deeming it necessary to him,
                     this pertains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It is a case of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds
                     the measure in eating, from a desire for the pleasures of the palate.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The appetite is twofold. There is the natural appetite, which belongs to the powers of the vegetal soul. In these powers
                     virtue and vice are impossible, since they cannot be subject to reason; wherefore the appetitive power is differentiated from
                     the powers of secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and thirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another,
                     the sensitive appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this appetite that
                     the vice of gluttony consists. Hence the first movement of gluttony denotes inordinateness in the sensitive appetite, and
                     this is not without sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p11"></p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q148_A2-p0.1">Whether gluttony is a mortal sin? </h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that gluttony is not a mortal sin. For every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Decalogue: and this,
                     apparently, does not apply to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q148_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q132_A3.html">Q[132], A[3]</a>). But gluttony is not opposed to charity, neither as regards the love of God, nor as regards the love of one's neighbor.
                     Therefore gluttony is never a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Cf. Append. to St. Augustine's works: Serm. civ (xli, de sanctis)]: "Whenever
                     a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins." But this pertains
                     to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is accounted among the lesser, that is to say venial, sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "As long as the vice of gluttony has a hold on a man, all that he has done
                     valiantly is forfeited by him: and as long as the belly is unrestrained, all virtue comes to naught." But virtue is not done
                     away save by mortal sin. Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q148_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q148_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the vice of gluttony properly consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now the order of reason in regulating the concupiscence
                     may be considered from two points of view. First, with regard to things directed to the end, inasmuch as they may be incommensurate
                     and consequently improportionate to the end; secondly, with regard to the end itself, inasmuch as concupiscence turns man
                     away from his due end.
                     Accordingly, if the inordinate concupiscence in gluttony be found to turn man away from the last end, gluttony will be a mortal
                     sin. This is the case when he adheres to the pleasure of gluttony as his end, for the sake of which he contemns God, being
                     ready to disobey God's commandments, in order to obtain those pleasures. On the other hand, if the inordinate concupiscence
                     in the vice of gluttony be found to affect only such things as are directed to the end, for instance when a man has too
                     great a desire for the pleasures of the palate, yet would not for their sake do anything contrary to God's law, it is a venial
                     sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The vice of gluttony becomes a mortal sin by turning man away from his last end: and accordingly, by a kind of reduction,
                     it is opposed to the precept of hallowing the sabbath, which commands us to rest in our last end. For mortal sins are not
                     all directly opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which contain injustice: because the precepts of the
                     Decalogue pertain specially to justice and its parts, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q148_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q122_A1.html">Q[122], A[1]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In so far as it turns man away from his last end, gluttony is opposed to the love of God, who is to be loved, as our last
                     end, above all things: and only in this respect is gluttony a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This saying of Augustine refers to gluttony as denoting inordinate concupiscence merely in regard of things directed to the
                     end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Gluttony is said to bring virtue to naught, not so much on its own account, as on account of the vices which arise from it.
                     For Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19): "When the belly is distended by gluttony, the virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p11"></p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q148_A3-p0.1">Whether gluttony is the greatest of sins?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that gluttony is the greatest of sins. For the grievousness of a sin is measured by the grievousness of the
                     punishment. Now the sin of gluttony is most grievously punished, for Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in Matth.]: "Gluttony turned
                     Adam out of Paradise, gluttony it was that drew down the deluge at the time of Noah." According to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.16.49" target="asv"> Ezech. 16:49, </a> "This was the iniquity of Sodom, thy sister . . . fulness of bread," etc.
                     Therefore the sin of gluttony is the greatest of all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every genus the cause is the most powerful. Now gluttony is apparently the cause of other sins, for a gloss on
                     
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.135.10" target="asv">Ps. 135:10</a>, "Who smote Egypt with their first-born," says: "Lust, concupiscence, pride are the first-born of gluttony." Therefore gluttony
                     is the greatest of sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man should love himself in the first place after God, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q148_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A4.html">Q[25], A[4]</a>). Now man, by the vice of gluttony, inflicts an injury on himself: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.37.34" target="asv">Ecclus. 37:34</a>): "By surfeiting many have perished." Therefore gluttony is the greatest of sins, at least excepting those that are against
                     God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The sins of the flesh, among which gluttony is reckoned, are less culpable according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The gravity of a sin may be measured in three ways. First and foremost it depends on the matter in which the sin is committed:
                     and in this way sins committed in connection with Divine things are the greatest. From this point of view gluttony is not
                     the greatest sin, for it is about matters connected with the nourishment of the body. Secondly, the gravity of a sin depends
                     on the person who sins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony is diminished
                     rather than aggravated, both on account of the necessity of taking food, and on account of the difficulty of proper discretion
                     and moderation in such matters. Thirdly, from the point of view of the result that follows, and in this way gluttony has a
                     certain gravity, inasmuch as certain sins are occasioned thereby.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These punishments are to be referred to the vices that resulted from gluttony, or to the root from which gluttony sprang,
                     rather than to gluttony itself. For the first man was expelled from Paradise on account of pride, from which he went on to
                     an act of gluttony: while the deluge and the punishment of the people of Sodom were inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection argues from the standpoint of the sins that result from gluttony. Nor is a cause necessarily more powerful,
                     unless it be a direct cause: and gluttony is not the direct cause but the accidental cause, as it were, and the occasion of
                     other vices.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The glutton intends, not the harm to his body, but the pleasure of eating: and if injury results to his body, this is accidental.
                     Hence this does not directly affect the gravity of gluttony, the guilt of which is nevertheless aggravated, if a man incur
                     some bodily injury through taking too much food.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p11"></p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q148_A4-p0.1">Whether the species of gluttony are fittingly distinguished?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the species of gluttony are unfittingly distinguished by Gregory who says (Moral. xxx, 18): "The vice of gluttony
                     tempts us in five ways. Sometimes it forestalls the hour of need; sometimes it seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the
                     food to be daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of refreshment by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the very
                     heat of an immoderate appetite"---which are contained in the following verse:
                     "Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p3"> For the above are distinguished according to diversity of circumstance. Now circumstances, being the accidents of an act,
                     do not differentiate its species. Therefore the species of gluttony are not distinguished according to the aforesaid.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as time is a circumstance, so is place. If then gluttony admits of one species in respect of time, it seems that
                     there should likewise be others in respect of place and other circumstances.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as temperance observes due circumstances, so do the other moral virtues. Now the species of the vices opposed
                     to the other moral virtues are not distinguished according to various circumstances. Neither, therefore, are the species of
                     gluttony distinguished thus.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Gregory quoted above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q148_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q148_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, gluttony denotes inordinate concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered in eating, namely the food we eat,
                     and the eating thereof. Accordingly, the inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to the
                     food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance or species of food a man seeks "sumptuous"---i.e. costly food; as regards
                     its quality, he seeks food prepared too
                     nicely---i.e. "daintily"; and as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating "too much."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p8"> Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper
                     time for eating, which is to eat "hastily," or one fails to observe the due manner of eating, by eating "greedily."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p9"> Isidore [*De Summo Bon. ii, 42] comprises the first and second under one heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in
                     "what" he eats, or in "how much," "how" or "when he eats."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The corruption of various circumstances causes the various species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by reason
                     of which the species of moral things are differentiated. For in him that seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by
                     the very species of the food; in him that forestalls the time concupiscence is disordered through impatience of delay, and
                     so forth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Place and other circumstances include no special motive connected with eating, that can cause a different species of gluttony.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In all other vices, whenever different circumstances correspond to different motives, the difference of circumstances argues
                     a specific difference of vice: but this does not apply to all circumstances, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q148_A4-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A9.html">FS, Q[72], A[9]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p14"></p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q148_A5-p0.1">Whether gluttony is a capital vice?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that gluttony is not a capital vice. For capital vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause,
                     other vices originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has not the aspect of end, since it is sought, not for its
                     own sake, but for the body's nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a capital vice would seem to have a certain pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony, which,
                     in respect of its genus, is apparently the least of sins, seeing that it is most akin to what is in respect of its genus,
                     is apparently the least gluttony is not a capital vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin results from a man forsaking the food of virtue on account of something useful to the present life, or pleasing
                     to the senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of utility, there is but one capital vice, namely covetousness. Therefore,
                     seemingly, there would be but one capital vice in respect of pleasures: and this is lust, which is a greater vice than gluttony,
                     and is about greater pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons gluttony among the capital vices.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q148_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html">FS, Q[84], A[3]</a>), a capital vice denotes one from which, considered as final cause, i.e. as having a most desirable end, other vices originate:
                     wherefore through desiring that end men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered most desirable through having
                     one of the conditions of happiness which is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to happiness, according
                     to Ethic. i, 8; x, 3,7,8.
                     Therefore the vice of gluttony, being about pleasures of touch which stand foremost among other pleasures, is fittingly reckoned
                     among the capital vices.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is true that food itself is directed to something as its end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of life, is most
                     desirable and whereas life cannot be sustained without food, it follows that food too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all
                     the toil of man's life is directed thereto, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.6.7" target="asv"> Eccles. 6:7, </a> "All the labor of man is for his mouth." Yet gluttony seems to be about pleasures of food rather than about food
                     itself; wherefore, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), "with such food as is good for the worthless body, men desire
                     to be fed," wherein namely the pleasure consists, "rather than to be filled: since the whole end of that desire is this---not
                     to thirst and not to hunger."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the conversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the aversion.
                     Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has the most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself: and consequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital vices,
                     namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is useful is desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something
                     else: wherefore seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of desirability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in
                     respect of such things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A4.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q148_A6-p0.1">Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to gluttony?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to gluttony, to wit, "unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness, loquaciousness,
                     and dullness of mind as regards the understanding." For unseemly joy results from every sin, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv"> Prov. 2:14, </a> "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things." Likewise dullness of mind is associated with
                     every sin, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv"> Prov. 14:22, </a> "They err
                     that work evil." Therefore they are unfittingly reckoned to be daughters of gluttony.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result of gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.28.8" target="asv"> Is. 28:8, </a> "All tables were full of vomit and filth." But this seems to be not a sin but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is
                     a matter of counsel, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.31.25" target="asv"> Ecclus. 31:25, </a> "If thou hast been forced to eat much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee." Therefore it should
                     not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reckons scurrility as a daughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the
                     daughters of gluttony.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to gluttony.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q148_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q148_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2,3), gluttony consists properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore those vices are reckoned among
                     the daughters of gluttony, which are the results of eating and drinking immoderately. These may be accounted for either on
                     the part of the soul or on the part of the body. on the part of the soul these results are of four kinds. First, as regards
                     the reason, whose keenness is dulled by
                     immoderate meat and drink, and in this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony, "dullness of sense in the understanding,"
                     on account of the fumes of food disturbing the brain. Even so, on the other hand, abstinence conduces to the penetrating power
                     of wisdom, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.2.3" target="asv"> Eccles. 2:3, </a> "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind in wisdom." Secondly, as regards the. appetite,
                     which is disordered in many ways by immoderation in eating
                     and drinking, as though reason were fast asleep at the helm, and in this respect "unseemly joy" is reckoned, because all the
                     other inordinate passions are directed to joy or sorrow, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. To this we must refer the saying of 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p6.3" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Esdra 3:20, </a> that "wine . . . gives every one a confident and joyful mind." Thirdly, as regards inordinate words, and thus we have "loquaciousness,"
                     because as Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), "unless gluttons were carried away by
                     immoderate speech, that rich man who is stated to have feasted sumptuously every day would not have been so tortured in his
                     tongue." Fourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in this way we have "scurrility," i.e. a kind of levity resulting from
                     lack of reason, which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but also to restrain outward behavior. Hence a gloss on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.4" target="asv">Eph. 5:4</a>, "Or foolish talking or scurrility," says that "fools call this geniality---i.e. jocularity, because it is wont to raise
                     a
                     laugh." Both of these, however, may be referred to the words which may happen to be sinful, either by reason of excess which
                     belongs to "loquaciousness," or by reason of unbecomingness, which belongs to "scurrility."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p7"> On the part of the body, mention is made of "uncleanness," which may refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind
                     of superfluities, or especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.3" target="asv"> Eph. 5:3, </a> "But fornication and all uncleanness," says: "That is, any kind of incontinence that has reference to lust."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Joy in the act or end of sin results from every sin, especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random riotous
                     joy which is described as "unseemly" arises chiefly from immoderate partaking of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that
                     dullness of sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin, whereas dullness of sense in speculative matters arises
                     chiefly from gluttony, for the reason given above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it does one good to vomit after eating too much, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by immoderate
                     meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting as a remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and not from the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may be
                     referred to either vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A8.html"></a>
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            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q149" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A6.html"></a>
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               <h3 id="SS_Q149-p0.1">OF SOBRIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q149-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q149-p2"> We must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q149-p3"> (1) What is the matter of sobriety?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q149-p4"> (2) Whether it is a special virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q149-p5"> (3) Whether the use of wine is lawful?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q149-p6"> (4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q149_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q149_A1-p0.1">Whether drink is the matter of sobriety?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that drink is not the matter proper to sobriety. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.3" target="asv">Rom. 12:3</a>): "Not to be more wise than it behooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety." Therefore sobriety is also about wisdom,
                     and not only about drink.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concerning the wisdom of God, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>) that "she teacheth sobriety [Douay: 'temperance'], and prudence, and justice, and fortitude," where sobriety stands for
                     temperance. Now temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and sexual matters. Therefore sobriety is not only
                     about drink.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sobriety would seem to take its name from "measure" [*'Bria,' a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini's
                     Lexicon]. Now we ought to be guided by the measure in all things appertaining to us: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.2.12" target="asv">Titus 2:12</a>): "We should live soberly and justly and godly," where a gloss remarks: "Soberly, in ourselves"; and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.9" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:9</a>): "Women . . . in decent apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and
                     sobriety." Consequently it would seem that sobriety regards not only the interior man, but also things appertaining to external
                     apparel. Therefore drink is not the matter proper to sobriety.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.31.32" target="asv">Ecclus. 31:32</a>): "Wine taken with sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou shalt be sober."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> When a virtue is denominated from some condition common to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that in which
                     it is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that condition of virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and
                     temperance about pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from "measure," for a man is said to be sober because he
                     observes the "bria," i.e. the measure. Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to that
                     matter wherein /the observance of the measure is most deserving of praise. Such matter is the drinking of intoxicants, because
                     the measured use thereof is most profitable, while immoderate excess therein is most harmful, since it hinders the use of
                     reason even more than excessive eating. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.31.37" target="asv">Ecclus. 31:37,38</a>): "Sober drinking is health to soul and body; wine drunken with excess raiseth quarrels, and wrath and many ruins." For this
                     reason sobriety is
                     especially concerned with drink, not any kind of drink, but that which by reason of its volatility is liable to disturb the
                     brain, such as wine and all intoxicants. Nevertheless, sobriety may be employed in a general sense so as to apply to any matter,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q149_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A2.html">Q[123], A[2]</a>;
                     <a id="SS_Q149_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A2.html"> Q[141], A[2]</a>) with regard to fortitude and temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to his body, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is
                     said to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its delight, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.22.5" target="asv"> Ps. 22:5, </a> "My chalice which inebriateth me, how goodly is it!" Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in speaking of the contemplation
                     of wisdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All the things that belong properly to temperance are necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful. Wherefore
                     it behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This is the business of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used
                     to designate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially
                     concerned with drink.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although a measure is needful in all things, sobriety is not properly employed in connection with all things, but only in
                     those wherein there is most need for a measure.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q149_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q149_A2-p0.1">Whether sobriety is by itself a special virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now
                     there is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety, which is about drink, a special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of touch as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to
                     make food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment. Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not
                     a. special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment, drink is distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats
                     and of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue, seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding
                     to each different kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it would seem that sobriety is not a special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius [*In Somno Scip. i, 8] reckons sobriety to be a special part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q149_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q146_A2.html">Q[146], A[2]</a>), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against those things which may hinder it. Hence wherever we
                     find a special hindrance to reason, there must needs be a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating drink is a special
                     kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch as it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to remove this
                     hindrance to reason a special virtue,
                     which is sobriety, is requisite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Meat and drink are alike capable of hindering the good of reason, by embroiling the reason with immoderate pleasure: and
                     in this respect abstinence is about both meat and drink alike. But intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated
                     above, wherefore it requires a special virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The virtue of abstinence is about meat and drink, considered, not as food but as a hindrance to reason. Hence it does not
                     follow that special kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds of food.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In all intoxicating drinks there is one kind of hindrance to the use of reason: so that the difference of drinks bears an
                     accidental relation to virtue. Hence this difference does not call for a difference of virtue. The same applies to the difference
                     of meats.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q149_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q149_A3-p0.1">Whether the use of wine is altogether unlawful?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the use of wine is altogether unlawful. For without wisdom, a man cannot be in the state of salvation:
                     since it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.28" target="asv">Wis. 7:28</a>): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom," and further on (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.19" target="asv">Wis. 9:19</a>): "By wisdom they were healed, whosoever have pleased Thee, O Lord, from the beginning." Now the use of wine is a hindrance
                     to wisdom, for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A3-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Eccl.2.3" target="asv">Eccles. 2:3</a>):
                     "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom." Therefore wine-drinking is altogether
                     unlawful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.21" target="asv">Rom. 14:21</a>): "It is good not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is offended or scandalized, or made
                     weak." Now it is sinful to forsake the good of virtue, as likewise to scandalize one's brethren. Therefore it is unlawful
                     to make use of wine.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i] that "after the deluge wine and flesh were sanctioned: but Christ came in the last
                     of the ages and brought back the end into line with the beginning." Therefore it seems unlawful to use wine under the Christian
                     law.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.23" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:23</a>): "Do not still drink water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake, and thy frequent infirmities"; and it is written
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.31.36" target="asv">Ecclus. 31:36</a>): "Wine drunken with moderation is the joy of the soul and the heart."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> No meat or drink, considered in itself, is unlawful, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.11" target="asv"> Mat. 15:11, </a> "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man." Wherefore it is not unlawful to drink wine as such. Yet it may become
                     unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a circumstance on the part of the drinker, either because he is easily the
                     worse for taking wine, or because he is bound by a vow not to drink wine: sometimes it results from the mode of
                     drinking, because to wit he exceeds the measure in drinking: and sometimes it is on account of others who would be scandalized
                     thereby.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man may have wisdom in two ways. First, in a general way, according as it is sufficient for salvation: and in this way
                     it is required, in order to have wisdom, not that a man abstain altogether from wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate
                     use. Secondly, a man may have wisdom in some degree of perfection: and in this way, in order to receive wisdom perfectly,
                     it is requisite for certain persons that they abstain altogether from wine, and this
                     depends on circumstances of certain persons and places.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Apostle does not declare simply that it is good to abstain from wine, but that it is good in the case where this would
                     give scandal to certain people.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ withdraws us from some things as being altogether unlawful, and from others as being obstacles to perfection. It is
                     in the latter way that he withdraws some from the use of wine, that they may aim at perfection, even as from riches and the
                     like.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q149_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q149_A4-p0.1">Whether sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing. For old age gives a man a certain standing;
                     wherefore honor and reverence are due to the old, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.32" target="asv"> Lev. 19:32, </a> "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man." Now the Apostle declares that old men especially should
                     be exhorted to sobriety, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Titus.2.2" target="asv"> Titus 2:2, </a> "That the aged man be sober." Therefore sobriety
                     is most requisite in persons of standing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a bishop has the highest degree in the Church: and the Apostle commands him to be sober, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.3.2" target="asv">1 Tim. 3:2, </a> "It behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless, the husband of one wife, sober, prudent," etc. Therefore sobriety is chiefly
                     required in persons of high standing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sobriety denotes abstinence from wine. Now wine is forbidden to kings, who hold the highest place in human affairs:
                     while it is allowed to those who are in a state of affliction, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.31.4" target="asv">Prov. 31:4</a>, "Give not wine to kings," and further on (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.31.6" target="asv">Prov. 31:6</a>), "Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to them that are grieved in mind." Therefore sobriety is more requisite
                     in persons of standing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.3.11" target="asv">1 Tim. 3:11</a>): "The women in like manner, chaste . . . sober," etc., and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Titus.2.6" target="asv">Titus 2:6</a>) "Young men in like manner exhort that they be sober."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue includes relationship to two things, to the contrary vices which it removes, and to the end to which it leads. Accordingly
                     a particular virtue is more requisite in certain persons for two reasons. First, because they are more prone to the concupiscences
                     which need to be restrained by virtue, and to the vices which are removed by virtue. In this respect, sobriety is most requisite
                     in the young and in women, because concupiscence of pleasure thrives in
                     the young on account of the heat of youth, while in women there is not sufficient strength of mind to resist concupiscence.
                     Hence, according to Valerius Maximus [*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1] among the ancient Romans women drank no wine. Secondly, sobriety
                     is more requisite in certain persons, as being more necessary for the operations proper to them. Now immoderate use of wine
                     is a notable obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore sobriety is specially prescribed to the old, in whom reason should
                     be vigorous in instructing others: to bishops and all ministers of the Church, who should fulfil their spiritual duties with
                     a devout mind; and to kings, who should rule their subjects with wisdom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p7"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p8"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p9"></p>
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            <div id="SS_Q150" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q150-p0.1">OF DRUNKENNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q150-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q150-p2"> We must now consider drunkenness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q150-p3"> (1) Whether drunkenness is a sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q150-p4"> (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q150-p5"> (3) Whether it is the most grievous sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q150-p6"> (4) Whether it excuses from sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q150-p7"></p>
               <div id="SS_Q150_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q150_A1-p0.1">Whether drunkenness is a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that drunkenness is not a sin. For every sin has a corresponding contrary sin, thus timidity is opposed to
                     daring, and presumption to pusillanimity. But no sin is opposed to drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is voluntary [*Augustine, De Vera Relig. xiv]. But no man wishes to be drunk, since no man wishes to be
                     deprived of the use of reason. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever causes another to sin, sins himself. Therefore, if drunkenness were a sin, it would follow that it is a
                     sin to ask a man to drink that which makes him drunk, which would seem very hard.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every sin calls for correction. But correction is not applied to drunkards: for Gregory [*Cf. Canon Denique, dist.
                     4 where Gratian refers to a letter of St. Gregory to St. Augustine of Canterbury] says that "we must forbear with their ways,
                     lest they become worse if they be compelled to give up the habit." Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q150_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.13" target="asv">Rom. 13:13</a>): "Not in rioting and drunkenness."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Drunkenness may be understood in two ways. First, it may signify the defect itself of a man resulting from his drinking much
                     wine, the consequence being that he loses the use of reason. In this sense drunkenness denotes not a sin, but a penal defect
                     resulting from a fault. Secondly, drunkenness may denote the act by which a man incurs this defect. This act may cause drunkenness
                     in two ways. In one way, through the wine being too strong, without the drinker
                     being cognizant of this: and in this way too, drunkenness may occur without sin, especially if it is not through his negligence,
                     and thus we believe that Noah was made drunk as related in 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q150_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.9" target="asv">Gn. 9</a>. In another way drunkenness may result from inordinate concupiscence and use of wine: in this way it is accounted a sin,
                     and is comprised under gluttony as a species under its genus. For gluttony is divided into "surfeiting [Douay:,'rioting']
                     and drunkenness," which are forbidden by the Apostle
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q150_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.13" target="asv">Rom. 13:13</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11), insensibility which is opposed to temperance "is not very common," so that like
                     its species which are opposed to the species of intemperance it has no name. Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed;
                     and yet if a man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of molesting nature grievously, he would not be free from
                     sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection regards the resulting defect which is involuntary: whereas immoderate use of wine is voluntary, and it is
                     in this that the sin consists.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even as he that is drunk is excused if he knows not the strength of the wine, so too is he that invites another to drink
                     excused from sin, if he be unaware that the drinker is the kind of person to be made drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance
                     be lacking neither is excused from sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes the correction of a sinner is to be foregone, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q150_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A6.html">Q[33], A[6]</a>). Hence Augustine says in a letter (Ad Aurel. Episc. Ep. xxii), "Meseems, such things are cured not by bitterness, severity,
                     harshness, but by teaching rather than commanding, by advice rather than threats. Such is the course to be followed with the
                     majority of sinners: few are they whose sins should be treated with severity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q150_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q150_A2-p0.1">Whether drunkenness is a mortal sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that drunkenness is not a mortal sin. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the Appendix
                     to St. Augustine's works] that "drunkenness if indulged in assiduously, is a mortal sin." Now assiduity denotes a circumstance
                     which does not change the species of a sin; so that it cannot aggravate a sin infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial
                     sin, as shown above (
                     <a id="SS_Q150_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A5.html">FS, Q[88], A[5]</a>). Therefore if drunkenness
                     /is not a mortal sin for some other reason, neither is it for this.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to St. Augustine's works]: "Whenever a man takes more meat and drink
                     than is necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins." Now the lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness,
                     which is caused by immoderate drink, is a venial sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no mortal sin should be committed on the score of medicine. Now some drink too much at the advice of the physician,
                     that they may be purged by vomiting; and from this excessive drink drunkenness ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal
                     sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> We read in the Canons of the apostles (Can. xli, xlii): "A bishop, priest or deacon who is given to drunkenness or gambling,
                     or incites others thereto, must either cease or be deposed; a subdeacon, reader or precentor who does these things must either
                     give them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the laity." Now such punishments are not inflicted save for mortal
                     sins. Therefore drunkenness is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The sin of drunkenness, as stated in the foregoing Article, consists in the immoderate use and concupiscence of wine. Now
                     this may happen to a man in three ways. First, so that he knows not the drink to be immoderate and intoxicating: and then
                     drunkenness may be without sin, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q150_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q150_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Secondly, so that he perceives the drink to be immoderate, but without knowing it to be intoxicating, and then drunkenness
                     may involve a
                     venial sin. Thirdly, it may happen that a man is well aware that the drink is immoderate and intoxicating, and yet he would
                     rather be drunk than abstain from drink. Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, because morals take their species not
                     from things that occur accidentally and beside the intention, but from that which is directly intended. In this way drunkenness
                     is a mortal sin, because then a man willingly and knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs
                     virtuous deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally by running the risk of falling into sin. For Ambrose says (De Patriarch.
                     [*De Abraham i.]): "We learn that we should shun drunkenness, which prevents us from avoiding grievous sins. For the things
                     we avoid when sober, we unknowingly commit through drunkenness." Therefore drunkenness, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Assiduity makes drunkenness a mortal sin, not on account of the mere repetition of the act, but because it is impossible
                     for a man to become drunk assiduously, without exposing himself to drunkenness knowingly and willingly, since he has many
                     times experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to drunkenness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To take more meat or drink than is necessary belongs to the vice of gluttony, which is not always a mortal sin: but knowingly
                     to take too much drink to the point of being drunk, is a mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): "Drunkenness is
                     far from me: Thou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me. But full feeding sometimes hath crept upon Thy servant."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q150_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A6.html">Q[141], A[6]</a>), meat and drink should be moderate in accordance with the demands of the body's health. Wherefore, just as it happens sometimes
                     that the meat and drink which are moderate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so too it may happen conversely,
                     that what is excessive for a healthy man is moderate for one that is ailing. In this way when a man eats or drinks much at
                     the physician's advice
                     in order to provoke vomiting, he is not to be deemed to have taken excessive meat or drink. There is, however, no need for
                     intoxicating drink in order to procure vomiting, since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: wherefore this is no sufficient
                     cause for excusing a man from drunkenness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q150_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q150_A3-p0.1">Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that drunkenness is the gravest of sins. For Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Matth.) that "nothing gains the
                     devil's favor so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the vices." And it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv,
                     can. Ante omnia): "Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by the clergy, for it foments and fosters all the
                     vices."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, from the very fact that a thing excludes the good of reason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of drunkenness.
                     Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of its punishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely;
                     for Ambrose says [*De Elia et de Jejunio v] that "there would be no slavery, were there no drunkards." Therefore drunkenness
                     is the greatest of sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), spiritual vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one of the carnal
                     vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to be evil because it removes a good. Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver the evil.
                     Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a human good. Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are graver
                     than the sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the good of human reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man is most prone to sins of intemperance, because such like concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us, and for this
                     reason these sins are said to find greatest favor with the devil, not for being graver than other sins, but because they occur
                     more frequently among men.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in one way by that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which takes
                     away the use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has more the character of an evil, than that which takes away
                     the use of reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas
                     the goods of virtue, which are taken away by things that are contrary to reason,
                     are always good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Drunkenness was the occasional cause of slavery, in so far as Cham brought the curse of slavery on to his descendants, for
                     having laughed at his father when the latter was made drunk. But slavery was not the direct punishment of drunkenness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q150_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q150_A4-p0.1">Whether drunkenness excuses from sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that drunkenness does not excuse from sin. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "the drunkard deserves
                     double punishment." Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of excusing from it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one sin does not excuse another, but increases it. Now drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is not an excuse for sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that just as man's reason is tied by drunkenness, so is it by concupiscence.
                     But concupiscence is not an excuse for sin: neither therefore is drunkenness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 43), Lot was to be excused from incest on account of drunkenness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things are to be observed in drunkenness, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q150_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q150_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, namely the resulting defect and the preceding act. on the part of the resulting defect whereby the use of reason is fettered,
                     drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, in so far as it causes an act to be involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of
                     the preceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because, if the drunkenness that results from that act be
                     without sin, the subsequent sin is entirely excused from fault, as perhaps in the case of Lot. If, however, the preceding
                     act was sinful, the person is not altogether excused from the subsequent sin, because the latter is rendered voluntary through
                     the voluntariness of the preceding act, inasmuch as it was through doing something unlawful that he fell into the subsequent
                     sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is diminished, even as the character of voluntariness is diminished. Wherefore Augustine
                     says (Contra Faust. xxii, 44) that "Lot's guilt is to be measured, not by the incest, but by his drunkenness."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher does not say that the drunkard deserves more severe punishment, but that he deserves double punishment for
                     his twofold sin. Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the law of a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii,
                     9, ordered "those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely punished than if they had been sober, because they do
                     wrong in more ways than one." In this, as Aristotle observes (Polit. ii, 9), "he seems
                     to have considered the advantage," namely of the prevention of wrong, "rather than the leniency which one should have for
                     drunkards," seeing that they are not in possession of their faculties.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, not in the point of its being itself a sin, but in the point of the defect that results
                     from it, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Concupiscence does not altogether fetter the reason, as drunkenness does, unless perchance it be so vehement as to make a
                     man insane. Yet the passion of concupiscence diminishes sin, because it is less grievous to sin through weakness than through
                     malice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q151" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q151-p0.1">OF CHASTITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q151-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q151-p2"> We must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of chastity: (2) virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust,
                  which is the contrary vice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q151-p3"> (1) Whether chastity is a virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q151-p4"> (2) Whether it is a general virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q151-p5"> (3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q151-p6"> (4) Of its relation to purity.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q151_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q151_A1-p0.1">Whether chastity is a virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that chastity is not a virtue. For here we are treating of virtues of the soul. But chastity, seemingly, belongs
                     to the body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in a certain way as regards the use of certain parts of
                     the body. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is "a voluntary habit," as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can
                     be taken away by force from a woman to whom violence is done. Therefore it seems that chastity is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But chastity is reckoned among the fruits (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q151_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.23" target="asv">Gal. 5:23</a>). Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Decem Chord. [*Serm. ix de Tempore]): "Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in virtue, since chastity
                     is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of lust, while thou wishest thy wife to be victorious."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason "chastises" concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the Philosopher
                     states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above (
                     <a id="SS_Q151_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html">FS, Q[64], A[1]</a>). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its subject, though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity that
                     a man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the judgment of his reason and the choice of his will.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), "so long as her mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy even
                     in body, not even the violence of another's lust can deprive her body of its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering
                     continency." He also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "in the mind there is a virtue which is the companion of fortitude, whereby
                     it is resolved to suffer any evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "it is impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is it possible
                     to be just unless one live by faith." Whence he argues that in unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other virtue,
                     because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as he adds (Contra Julian. iv, 3) "virtues are distinguished from
                     vices not by their functions," i.e. their acts, "but by their ends."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Chastity is a virtue in so far as it works in accordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it is reckoned
                     among the fruits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q151_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q151_A2-p0.1">Whether chastity is a general virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that chastity is a general virtue. For Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that "chastity of the mind is the well-ordered
                     movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to the greater things." But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore chastity
                     is a general virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Chastity" takes its name from "chastisement" [*Cf. A[1] ]. Now every movement of the appetitive part should be
                     chastised by reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some movement of the appetite, it seems that every moral virtue
                     is chastity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, chastity is opposed to fornication. But fornication seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q151_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.27" target="asv">Ps. 72:27</a>): "Thou shalt destroy [Vulg.: 'hast destroyed'] all them that go awhoring from [Douay: 'are disloyal to'] Thee." Therefore
                     chastity is a general virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons it to be a part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The word "chastity" is employed in two ways. First, properly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter, namely
                     the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures. Secondly, the word "chastity" is employed metaphorically: for just as a
                     mingling of bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper matter of chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so
                     too the spiritual union of the mind with certain things conduces to a pleasure which is the
                     matter of a spiritual chastity metaphorically speaking, as well as of a spiritual fornication likewise metaphorically so called.
                     For if the human mind delight in the spiritual union with that to which it behooves it to be united, namely God, and refrains
                     from delighting in union with other things against the requirements of the order established by God, this may be called a
                     spiritual chastity, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q151_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.11.2" target="asv">2 Cor. 11:2, </a> "I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present
                     you as a chaste virgin to Christ." If, on the other hand, the mind be united to any other things whatsoever, against the prescription
                     of the Divine order, it will be called spiritual fornication, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q151_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.3.1" target="asv">Jer. 3:1</a>, "But thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers." Taking chastity in this sense, it is a general virtue, because every
                     virtue withdraws the human mind from delighting in a union with unlawful things. Nevertheless, the essence of this chastity
                     consists principally in charity and
                     the other theological virtues, whereby the human mind is united to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes chastity in the metaphorical sense.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q151_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q151_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[142], A[2]), the concupiscence of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a child, because the desire of pleasure
                     is connatural to us, especially of pleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of nature. Hence it is that if
                     the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered by consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a child left
                     to his own will. Wherefore the
                     concupiscence of these pleasures stands in very great need of being chastised: and consequently chastity is applied antonomastically
                     to such like concupiscences, even as fortitude is about those matters wherein we stand in the greatest need of strength of
                     mind.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers spiritual fornication metaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q151_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q151_A3-p0.1">Whether chastity is a distinct virtue from abstinence?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same, one
                     virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the same sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of
                     the palate which are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are the matter of chastity, pertain to the touch,
                     it seems that chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices of intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now "chastity"
                     takes its name from "chastisement" of the contrary vices. Since then certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that
                     abstinence is chastity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern of temperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which
                     are the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures,
                     which are the matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. cxlvii ad Amand. Cf. Gratian, Dist. xliv.], commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q151_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.1.7" target="asv"> Titus 1:7, </a> "Not given to wine, no striker," etc.: "The belly and
                     the organs of generation are neighbors, that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their complicity in vice." Therefore
                     abstinence and chastity are not distinct virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q151_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:5,6</a>) reckons "chastity" together with "fastings" which pertain to abstinence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q151_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">Q[141], A[4]</a>), temperance is properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that where there are different kinds of pleasure,
                     there are different virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate to the actions whose perfections they
                     are, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4,5: and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food whereby the nature of the
                     individual is maintained
                     differ generically from actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the nature of the species is preserved.
                     Therefore chastity, which is about venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which is about pleasures of the
                     palate.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch, not as regards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of touch. which
                     judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but as regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in
                     Ethic. iii, 10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in character. Wherefore there must needs be different
                     virtues, though they regard the one sense.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and therefore
                     they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, since if one consent to them this increases the force of concupiscence
                     and weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly
                     mind from its heights as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts
                     which belong to the married state."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain to the maintenance of man's nature, except in so far as they are directed
                     to pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But
                     the pleasures of the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal pleasures, are essentially directed to the preservation
                     of man's life: wherefore by their very nature they have a special virtue, although this
                     virtue which is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as its end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q151_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q151_A4-p0.1">Whether purity belongs especially to chastity?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that purity does not belong especially to chastity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity is
                     a virtue of the soul." Therefore it is not something belonging to chastity, but is of itself a virtue distinct from chastity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "pudicitia" [purity] is derived from "pudor," which is equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene [*De
                     Fide Orth. ii, 15], is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to all sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to
                     chastity than to the other virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "every kind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach." Now it would
                     seem to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach. Therefore purity belongs to all the parts of temperance,
                     and not especially to chastity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Perseverantia xx): "We must give praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none but a
                     lawful use the organs intended for procreation." Now the use of these organs is the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity
                     belongs properly to chastity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (OBJ[2]), "pudicitia" [purity] takes its name from "pudor," which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs
                     be properly about the things of which man is most ashamed. Now men are most ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks
                     (De Civ. Dei xiv, 18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by the honesty [*Cf. Q[145]] of marriage, is
                     not devoid of shame: and this because the movement of the organs of generation is not
                     subject to the command of reason, as are the movements of the other external members. Now man is ashamed not only of this
                     sexual union but also of all the signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6). Consequently purity regards venereal
                     matters properly, and especially the signs thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And since the latter are more
                     wont to be observed, purity regards rather these external signs, while chastity regards rather sexual union. Therefore
                     purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct therefrom, but as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Nevertheless
                     the one is sometimes used to designate the other.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is here speaking of purity as designating chastity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although every vice has a certain disgrace, the vices of intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q151_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q142_A4.html">Q[142], A[4]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Among the vices of intemperance, venereal sins are most deserving of reproach, both on account of the insubordination of
                     the genital organs, and because by these sins especially, the reason is absorbed.
                  </p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q152" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q152-p0.1">OF VIRGINITY (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q152-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q152-p2"> We must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q152-p3"> (1) In what does virginity consist?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q152-p4"> (2) Whether it is lawful?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q152-p5"> (3) Whether it is a virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q152-p6"> (4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q152-p7"> (5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q152_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q152_A1-p0.1">Whether virginity consists in integrity of the flesh?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virginity does not consist in integrity of the flesh. For Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup.) [*The quotation
                     is from De Sancta Virgin. xiii] that "virginity is the continual meditation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh." But meditation
                     does not concern the flesh. Therefore virginity is not situated in the flesh.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virginity denotes a kind of purity. Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity dwells in the soul." Therefore
                     virginity is not incorruption of the flesh.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the integrity of the flesh would seem to consist in the seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken
                     without loss of virginity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "those organs may be injured through being wounded
                     by mischance. Physicians, too, sometimes do for the sake of health that which makes one shudder to see: and a midwife has
                     been known to destroy by touch the proof of virginity that she sought." And he adds: "Nobody, I
                     think, would be so foolish as to deem this maiden to have forfeited even bodily sanctity, though she lost the integrity of
                     that organ." Therefore virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in resolution of the semen: and this may take place without copulation,
                     whether one be asleep or awake. Yet seemingly virginity is not lost without copulation: for Augustine says (De Virgin. xiii)
                     that "virginal integrity and holy continency that refrains from all sexual intercourse is the portion of angels." Therefore
                     virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "virginity is continence whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and observed
                     in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Virginity takes its name apparently from "viror" [freshness], and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining its
                     freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so too, virginity denotes that the person possessed thereof is
                     unseared by the heat of concupiscence which is experienced in achieving the greatest bodily pleasure which is that of sexual
                     intercourse. Hence, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 5) that "virginal chastity is integrity free
                     of pollution."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p8"> Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The first is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of
                     the seal of virginity. The second is the link between that which concerns the soul and that which concerns the body, and this
                     is the resolution of the semen, causing sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the part of the soul, namely the purpose
                     of attaining this pleasure. Of these three the first is accidental to the moral act, which as such must be
                     considered in reference to the soul. The second stands in the relation of matter to the moral act, since the sensible passions
                     are the matters of moral acts. But the third stands in the position of form and complement, because the essence of morality
                     is perfected in that which concerns the reason. Since then virginity consists in freedom from the aforesaid corruption, it
                     follows that the integrity of the bodily organ is accidental to virginity; while freedom from pleasure in resolution of the
                     semen is related thereto materially; and the purpose of perpetually abstaining from this pleasure is the formal and completive
                     element in virginity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This definition of Augustine's expresses directly that which is formal in virginity. For "meditation" denotes reason's purpose;
                     and the addition "perpetual" does not imply that a virgin must always retain this meditation actually, but that she should
                     bear in mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The material element is expressed indirectly by the words "on incorruption
                     in a corruptible body." This is added to show the difficulty of
                     virginity: for if the flesh were incorruptible, it would not be difficult to maintain a perpetual meditation on incorruption.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is true that purity, as to its essence, is in the soul; but as to its matter, it is in the body: and it is the same with
                     virginity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "although virginity resides in the flesh," and for this reason
                     is a bodily quality, "yet it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency fosters and preserves."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above, the integrity of a bodily organ is accidental to virginity, in so far as a person, through purposely abstaining
                     from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily organ. Hence if the organ lose its integrity by chance in some other
                     way, this is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of a hand or foot.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may arise in two ways. If this be the result of the mind's purpose, it destroys
                     virginity, whether copulation takes place or not. Augustine, however, mentions copulation, because such like resolution is
                     the ordinary and natural result thereof. In another way this may happen beside the purpose of the mind, either during sleep,
                     or through violence and without the mind's consent, although the flesh derives
                     pleasure from it, or again through weakness of nature, as in the case of those who are subject to a flow of semen. In such
                     cases virginity is not forfeit, because such like pollution is not the result of impurity which excludes virginity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q152_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q152_A2-p0.1">Whether virginity is unlawful?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just
                     as the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.16" target="asv"> Gn. 2:16, </a> "Of every tree" that is in "paradise, thou shalt eat," indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation
                     of the individual, so also the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.28" target="asv"> Gn. 1:28, </a> "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth," express a precept of the natural law, in reference to
                     the preservation of the species. Therefore just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food, as this would be to act counter
                     to the good of the individual, so too it is a sin to abstain altogether from the act of procreation, for this is to act against
                     the good of the species.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is apparently sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue,
                     since it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2), that "he who revels in every pleasure,
                     and abstains from not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from all is loutish and insensible." Therefore virginity
                     is something sinful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in olden times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius
                     Maximus asserts [*Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9]. Hence according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) Plato "is said to have sacrificed
                     to nature, in order that he might atone for his perpetual continency as though it were a sin." Therefore virginity is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But virginity is a matter of direct counsel: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.25" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:25</a>): "Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel." Therefore virginity is not an unlawful thing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In human acts, those are sinful which are against right reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an end
                     should be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again, man's good is threefold as stated in Ethic. i, 8; one consisting
                     in external things, for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily goods; the third, consisting in the goods of the soul
                     among which the goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the
                     active life, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our Lord declared (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.42" target="asv">Lk. 10:42</a>), "Mary hath chosen the better part." Of these goods those that are external are directed to those which belong to the body,
                     and those which belong to the body are directed to those which belong to the soul; and furthermore those which belong to the
                     active life are directed to those which belong to the life of contemplation. Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use
                     external goods in a measure
                     proportionate to the body, and in like manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from possessing certain things
                     (which otherwise it were good for him to possess), for the sake of his body's good, or of the contemplation of truth, this
                     is not sinful, but in accord /with right reason. In like manner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more freely
                     to give himself to the contemplation of truth, this is in accordance with the rectitude of reason. Now holy virginity refrains
                     from all venereal pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine contemplation: for the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.34" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:34</a>): "The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may be holy in both body and in spirit.
                     But she that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband." Therefore it follows that virginity
                     instead of being sinful is worthy of praise.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A precept implies a duty, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q152_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q122_A1.html">Q[122], A[1]</a>). Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the duty that has to be fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind cannot
                     be set aside without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is
                     not binding on each one of the multitude. For the multitude has many obligations which cannot be discharged by the individual;
                     but are fulfilled by one person doing this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of natural law which binds man
                     to eat must needs be fulfilled by each individual, otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the precept
                     of procreation regards the whole multitude of men, which needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance spiritually.
                     Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human multitude, if some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while
                     others abstaining from this betake themselves to the contemplation of Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole
                     human race. Thus too in an army, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and others fight with the sword: yet
                     all these things are necessary for the multitude, although they cannot be done by one person.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The person who, beside the dictate of right reason, abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for pleasure
                     as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal:
                     and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated above. Now the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to
                     quantity but to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore it is said
                     of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that "in point of quantity he goes to the extreme, but in point of becomingness he follows
                     the mean."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Laws are framed according to what occurs more frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone refrained from
                     all venereal pleasure through love of the contemplation of truth: as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence it was not
                     through thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, but "because he yielded to the false opinion of his fellow countrymen,"
                     as Augustine remarks (De Vera Relig. iii).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q152_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q152_A3-p0.1">Whether virginity is a virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For "no virtue is in us by nature," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1).
                     Now virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q152_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>). Yet some have other virtues without having virginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom without virtue, no
                     one could go there without virginity, which would involve the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But virginity is not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. xxii
                     ad Eustoch.]: "Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the virgin after her downfall." Therefore seemingly virginity
                     is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is lost without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not
                     a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and conjugal purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity
                     is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): "Love of virginity moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we
                     should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q152_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q152_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the formal and completive element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal pleasure, which purpose is rendered
                     praiseworthy by its end, in so far, to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine things: while the material
                     element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest that where
                     a good action has a special matter
                     through having a special excellence, there is a special kind of virtue: for example, magnificence which is about great expenditure
                     is for this reason a special virtue distinct from liberality, which is about all uses of money in general. Now to keep oneself
                     free from the experience of venereal pleasure has an excellence of its own deserving of greater praise than keeping oneself
                     free from inordinate venereal pleasure. Wherefore virginity is a special virtue being related to chastity as
                     magnificence to liberality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Men have from their birth that which is material in virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal experience.
                     But they have not that which is formal in virginity, namely the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God's sake, which
                     purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin. xi): "Nor do we praise virgins for being
                     virgins, but, because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy
                     continency."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtues are connected together by reason of that which is formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="SS_Q152_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A3.html">Q[129], A[3]</a>, ad 2), but not by reason of that which is material in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from providing the matter
                     of one virtue, and not the matter of another virtue: thus a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of magnificence.
                     It is in this way that one who
                     has the other virtues lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the flesh: nevertheless he can have
                     that which is formal in virginity, his mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding this same integrity
                     of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so: even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the purpose
                     of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a position to do so: or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in mind
                     as to
                     purpose bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which preparedness of the mind no man can be virtuous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards that which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material therein.
                     For if a magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he does not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner
                     a person who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of virginity but the purpose of virginity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p12"> As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ,
                     which we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something else which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit,
                     that one who has experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that experience. For God cannot make that which is done
                     not to have been done, as stated in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q152_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A4.html">FP, Q[25] , A[4]</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose, confirmed by vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says (De Virgin.
                     viii) that "by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and
                     flesh." Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely because it abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence attaches
                     to it above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however, adds something to chastity in general; but it does not attain
                     to that which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire freedom from venereal pleasure; virginity alone achieves this. Wherefore
                     virginity alone is accounted a virtue above chastity, even as magnificence is
                     reckoned above liberality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p15"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p16"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q152_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q152_A4-p0.1">Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than marriage. For Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): "Continence was
                     equally meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who begot children." Now a greater virtue has greater merit.
                     Therefore virginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his virtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence,
                     it would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than any married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity
                     is not preferable to marriage.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the common good takes precedence of the private good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is
                     directed to the common good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is to a man's wellbeing, such is sexual
                     intercourse to the welfare of the human race." On the other hand, virginity is ordered to the individual good, namely in order
                     to avoid what the Apostle calls the "tribulation of the flesh," to which married people are
                     subject (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:28</a>). Therefore virginity is not greater than conjugal continence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): "Both solid reason and the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage sinful,
                     nor is it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or even to that of widowhood."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the error of Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to marriage.
                     This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ Who both chose a virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a virgin,
                     and by the teaching of the Apostle who (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 7</a>) counsels virginity as the greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both because a Divine good takes precedence of a human
                     good, and because the good of the
                     soul is preferable to the good of the body, and again because the good of the contemplative life is better than that of the
                     active life. Now virginity is directed to the good of the soul in respect of the contemplative life, which consists in thinking
                     "on the things of God" [Vulg.: 'the Lord'], whereas marriage is directed to the good of the body, namely the bodily increase
                     of the human race, and belongs to the active life, since the man and woman who embrace the married life have to think "on
                     the things of the world," as the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.34" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:34</a>). Without doubt therefore virginity is preferable to conjugal continence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Merit is measured not only by the kind of action, but still more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so disposed,
                     that he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in keeping with the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal
                     continence was equally meritorious with the virginal continence of John, as regards the essential reward, but not as regards
                     the accidental reward. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that both
                     "the celibacy of John and the marriage of Abraham fought Christ's battle in keeping with the difference of the times: but
                     John was continent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only in habit."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Though virginity is better than conjugal continence, a married person may be better than a virgin for two reasons. First,
                     on the part of chastity itself; if to wit, the married person is more prepared in mind to observe virginity, if it should
                     be expedient, than the one who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xxii) charges the virgin to say: "I
                     am no better than Abraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity
                     of marriage." Further on he gives the reason for this: "For what I do now, he would have done better, if it were fitting for
                     him to do it then; and what they did I would even do now if it behooved me now to do it." Secondly, because perhaps the person
                     who is not a virgin has some more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. xliv): "Whence does a virgin know
                     the things that belong to the Lord, however solicitous she be about them, if perchance on account of some mental fault she
                     be not yet ripe for martyrdom, whereas this woman to whom she delighted in preferring herself is already able to drink the
                     chalice of the Lord?"
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The common good takes precedence of the private good, if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good is
                     better generically. It is thus that the virginity that is consecrated to God is preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence Augustine
                     says (De Virgin. ix): "It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the flesh, even of those women who in these times seek
                     naught else from marriage but children in order to make them servants of
                     Christ, cannot compensate for lost virginity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q152_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q152_A5-p0.1">Whether virginity is the greatest of virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virginity is the greatest of virtues. For Cyprian says (De Virgin. [*De Habitu Virg.]): "We address ourselves
                     now to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, but no less exalted is their vocation. They are a flower of the Church's sowing,
                     the pride and ornament of spiritual grace, the most honored portion of Christ's flock."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a greater reward is due to the greater virtue. Now the greatest reward is due to virginity, namely the hundredfold
                     fruit, according to a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.23" target="asv"> Mat. 13:23.</a> Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more a virtue conforms us to Christ, the greater it is. Now virginity above all conforms us to Christ; for it
                     is declared in the
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.14.4" target="asv"> Apocalypse 14:4 </a>that virgins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth," and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A5-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.14.3" target="asv">Apoc. 14:3</a>) that they sing "a new canticle," which "no" other "man" could say. Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): "No one, methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom," and (De Virgin. xlv): "The
                     authority of the Church informs the faithful in no uncertain manner, so that they know in what place the martyrs and the holy
                     virgins who have departed this life are commemorated in the Sacrament of the Altar." By this we are given to understand that
                     martyrdom, and also the monastic state, are preferable to virginity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in some particular genus: and thus virginity is most excellent, namely in
                     the genus of chastity, since it surpasses the chastity both of widowhood and of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed
                     to chastity antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is ascribed to chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin.
                     i, 7): "Can anyone esteem any beauty greater than a virgin's, since she is beloved of her
                     King, approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord, consecrated to her God?" Secondly, a thing may be most excellent simply,
                     and in this way virginity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the end always excels that which is directed to
                     the end; and the more effectively a thing is directed to the end, the better it is. Now the end which renders virginity praiseworthy
                     is that one may have leisure for Divine things, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q152_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q152_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Wherefore the
                     theological virtues as well as the virtue of religion, the acts of which consist in being occupied about Divine things, are
                     preferable to virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more mightily in order to cleave to God---since for this end they hold their
                     own life in contempt; and those who dwell in monasteries---since for this end they give up their own will and all that they
                     may possess---than virgins who renounce venereal pleasure for that same purpose. Therefore virginity is not simply the
                     greatest of virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virgins are "the more honored portion of Christ's flock," and "their glory more sublime" in comparison with widows and married
                     women.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to virginity, according to Jerome [*Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.], on account of its superiority
                     to widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed, and to marriage, to which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But according
                     to Augustine (De QQ. Evang. i, 9), "the hundredfold fruit is given to martyrs, the sixtyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold
                     to married persons." Wherefore it does not follow that virginity is simply
                     the greatest of virtues, but only in comparison with other degrees of chastity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virgins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth," because they imitate Christ, by integrity not only of the mind but also
                     of the flesh, as Augustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore they follow the Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that
                     they follow more closely, because other virtues make us cleave to God more closely by imitation of the mind. The "new hymn"
                     which virgins alone sing, is their joy at having preserved integrity of the
                     flesh.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q153" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q153-p0.1">OF LUST (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q153-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q153-p2"> We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity: (1) Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first
                  head there are five points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q153-p3"> (1) What is the matter of lust?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q153-p4"> (2) Whether all copulation is unlawful?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q153-p5"> (3) Whether lust is a mortal sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q153-p6"> (4) Whether lust is a capital vice?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q153-p7"> (5) Concerning its daughters.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q153_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q153_A1-p0.1">Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the matter of lust is not only venereal desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that
                     "lust affects to be called surfeit and abundance." But surfeit regards meat and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore
                     lust is not properly about venereal desires and pleasures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.20.1" target="asv">Prov. 20:1</a>): "Wine is a lustful [Douay: 'luxurious'] thing." Now wine is connected with pleasure of meat and drink. Therefore these
                     would seem to be the matter of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, lust is defined "as the desire of wanton pleasure" [*Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton pleasure
                     regards not only venereal matters but also many others. Therefore lust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii [*Written by St. Augustine]): "He that soweth in the flesh, of the flesh shall
                     reap corruption." Now the sowing of the flesh refers to venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Isidore says (Etym. x), "a lustful man is one who is debauched with pleasures." Now venereal pleasures above all debauch
                     a man's mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with such like pleasures.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is referred
                     to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc
                     in a man's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv"> Gal. 5:19 </a>says "lust is any kind of surfeit."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the sense in which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because the
                     use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the name of lust has a special application to venereal pleasures, to which
                     also wantonness is specially applicable, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. xiv, 15,16).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q153_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q153_A2-p0.1">Whether no venereal act can be without sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin. For nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal
                     act is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly
                     mind from its height as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts." Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without
                     sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by "excess" and "deficiency"
                     as stated in Ethic. ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that "it is
                     incompatible with the act of understanding," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vi
                     in Num.; Cf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] states, rendered the hearts of the
                     prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy. Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without
                     which no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without
                     sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): "This is a sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no sin
                     is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, nor a commandment": and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse
                     between the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every venereal act is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything
                     to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a
                     fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the
                     preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good, so, too, is the
                     preservation of the nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the preservation
                     of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence Augustine
                     says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is to a man's well being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human
                     race." Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be taken in due manner and order, as required for
                     the welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided they be performed in due manner and
                     order, in keeping with the end of human procreation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways. First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this nothing
                     but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the perfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered
                     by that which is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual intercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from
                     the height, i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug.
                     viii): "Just as that was good which Martha did when busy about serving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing
                     the word of God: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna's conjugal chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and
                     much more that of the Virgin Mary."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (Q[152], A[2], ad 2; 
                     <a id="SS_Q153_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q64_A2.html">FS, Q[64], A[2]</a>), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure
                     attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned
                     with the amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this depends on the disposition of the body; what matters
                     is how much the interior appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary to
                     virtue, from the fact that the free act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with the aforesaid pleasure.
                     For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in accordance with
                     reason, else it would be against virtue for a person to set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are
                     not subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for
                     rebelling against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), "the child, shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which
                     is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin." Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a
                     sin, but that it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q153_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q153_A3-p0.1">Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be a sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which
                     is the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. i, 18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission
                     of other superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his
                     own, except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in venereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly, no vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now wine is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the Apostle
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.18" target="asv">Eph. 5:18</a>), "Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust [Douay: 'luxury']." Therefore lust is forbidden.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p6"> Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh:
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv"> Gal. 5:19</a> [Douay: 'luxury'].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves one to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more
                     sinful it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is
                     most necessary for the common good, namely the preservation of the human race. Wherefore there is the greatest necessity for
                     observing the order of reason in this matter: so that if anything be done in this connection
                     against the dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists essentially in exceeding the order and mode
                     of reason in the matter of venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says in the same book (De Gener. Anim. i, 18), "the semen is a surplus that is needed." For it is said
                     to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of the nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the
                     generative power. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not to be needed, so that it matters not how they
                     are emitted, provided one observe the decencies of social life. It is different with
                     the emission of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the end for which it is needed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.20" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:20</a>) in speaking against lust, "You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body." Wherefore by inordinately
                     using the body through lust a man wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine says (De Decem. Chord. 10
                     [*Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.)]): "God Who thus governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this order and commandment,
                     lest unlawful pleasures
                     should destroy His temple which thou hast begun to be."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The opposite of lust is not found in many, since men are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised under
                     insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for sexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q153_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q153_A4-p0.1">Whether lust is a capital vice?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is apparently the same as "uncleanness," according to a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.3" target="asv"> Eph. 5:3 </a>(Cf. 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.21" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:21</a>). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a capital vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "as pride of mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind
                     safeguard the chastity of the flesh." Now it is seemingly contrary to the nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice.
                     Therefore lust is not a capital vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, lust is caused by despair, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.19" target="asv"> Eph. 4:19, </a> "Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness." But despair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted
                     a daughter of sloth, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q153_A4-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q35_A4.html">Q[35], A[4]</a>, ad 2). Much less, therefore, is lust a capital vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the capital vices.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[148], A[5]; 
                     <a id="SS_Q153_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html">FS, Q[84], AA[3]</a>,4), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many
                     sins, all of which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which
                     is very great. Wherefore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive appetite, both on account of the intensity
                     of the
                     pleasure, and because such like concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is evident that lust is a capital vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q153_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q148_A6.html">Q[148], A[6]</a>), according to some, the uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a certain uncleanness of the body, and thus
                     the objection is not to the point. If, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it is caused by gluttony
                     materially---in so far as gluttony provides the bodily matter of lust---and not under the aspect of final cause, in which
                     respect chiefly the
                     capital vices are said to be the cause of others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q153_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q132_A4.html">Q[132], A[4]</a>, ad 1), when we were treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of all sins, so that even the capital vices
                     originate therefrom.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures chiefly through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by despair,
                     so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly
                     necessary for a capital vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q153_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q153_A5-p0.1">Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy,
                     rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence or despair of a future world." For mental blindness,
                     thoughtlessness and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every sin, even as prudence is in every virtue.
                     Therefore they should not be reckoned especially as daughters of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated above (Q[128], ad 6;
                     <a id="SS_Q153_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q137_A3.html"> Q[137], A[3]</a>). But lust is contrary, not to fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is the origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28).
                     Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four, namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking."
                     There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and disordered
                     in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently
                     intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher
                     powers, namely the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p8"> Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good,
                     and this act is hindered by lust, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.56" target="asv"> Dan. 13:56, </a> "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart." In this respect we have "blindness of mind." The second act
                     is counsel about what is to be done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the concupiscence of lust. Hence
                     Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc.
                     1), speaking of lecherous love: "This thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation, thou canst not control it by counseling."
                     In this respect there is "rashness," which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q153_A5-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q53_A3.html">Q[53], A[3]</a>). The third act is judgment about the things to be done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the lustful
                     old men (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A5-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.9" target="asv">Dan. 13:9</a>): "They perverted their own mind . . . that they might not . . . remember just
                     judgments." In this respect there is "thoughtlessness." The fourth act is the reason's command about the thing to be done,
                     and this also is impeded by lust, in so far as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered from doing what
                     his reason ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy" must be referred.] [*The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine
                     edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man who declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little
                     false tear will undo those words."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p9"> On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One is the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love,"
                     which regards the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand there is "hatred of God," by reason of
                     His forbidding the desired pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to the end. With regard to this there
                     is "love of this world," whose pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is "despair
                     of a future world," because through being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since
                     they are distasteful to him.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices opposed
                     to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal species of intemperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from pleasures
                     pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q153_A5-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q143.html">Q[143])</a>. Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first named inconstancy
                     arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles a man's heart and renders it effeminate,
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A5-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.4.11" target="asv"> Osee 4:11, </a> "Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay: 'understanding']." Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii)
                     that "the less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death." Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly
                     stated, for the daughters of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf.
                     <a id="SS_Q153_A5-p11.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q35_A4.html"> Q[35], A[4]</a>, ad 2;
                     <a id="SS_Q153_A5-p11.4" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q118_A8.html"> Q[118], A[8]</a>, ad 1;
                     <a id="SS_Q153_A5-p11.5" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q148_A6.html"> Q[148],
                        A[6]
                     </a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires for himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the special point
                     of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a daughter of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold
                     inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer "obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of
                     the heart the mouth speaketh" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A5-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.34" target="asv">Mat. 12:34</a>), the lustful man, whose heart is full of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly, on account of
                     the cause: for, since lust
                     causes thoughtlessness and rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or giving a thought to his words.
                     which are described as "scurrilous." Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks pleasure, he directs
                     his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to "wanton words." Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by his words,
                     for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a man's sentiments, and so he gives way "to foolish talking," for
                     instance, by expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to anything else.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q154" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q154-p0.1">OF THE PARTS OF LUST (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q154-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q154-p2"> We must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are twelve points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q154-p3"> (1) Into what parts is lust divided?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q154-p4"> (2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q154-p5"> (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q154-p6"> (4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like seduction?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q154-p7"> (5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q154-p8"> (6) Of seduction;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q154-p9"> (7) Of rape;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q154-p10"> (8) Of adultery;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q154-p11"> (9) Of incest;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q154-p12"> (10) Of sacrilege;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q154-p13"> (11) Of the sin against nature;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q154-p14"> (12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q154_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A1-p0.1">Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned to lust, namely, "simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction,
                     rape, and the unnatural vice." For diversity of matter does not diversify the species. Now the aforesaid division is made
                     with regard to diversity of matter, according as the woman with whom a man has intercourse is married or a virgin, or of some
                     other condition. Therefore it seems that the species of lust are diversified in this way.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery does
                     not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man having intercourse with one who is another's, so that he commits
                     an injustice. Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with a woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen
                     that a man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow. Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust,
                     even as adultery is.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another woman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter
                     sin is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among the species thereof.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.21" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:21</a>): "Lest again, when I come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them /that sinned before, and have not done penance
                     for the uncleanness and fornication and lasciviousness that they have committed." Therefore it seems that also uncleanness
                     and lasciviousness should be reckoned species of lust, as well as fornication.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among its parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it
                     is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv">Gal. 5:19</a>): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: 'luxury']." Therefore
                     it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p8">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals 36, qu. i [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p9"> I answer that As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q153_A3.html">Q[153], A[3]</a>), the sin of lust consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right reason. This may happen in two ways.
                     First, in respect of the matter wherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due matter, other due circumstances
                     are not observed. And since a circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is derived from its object
                     which is also its matter, it
                     follows that the species of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p10"> Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways. First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the
                     venereal act. In this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the "vice against nature," which attaches to every
                     venereal act from which generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing and advancement of the child when born,
                     there is "simple fornication," which is the union of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman. Secondly,
                     the matter wherein the venereal act is consummated may be discordant with right reason in relation to other persons; and this
                     in two ways. First, with regard to the woman, with whom a man has connection, by reason of due honor not being paid to her;
                     and thus there is "incest," which consists in the misuse of a woman who is related by consanguinity or affinity. Secondly,
                     with regard to the person under whose authority the woman is placed: and if she be under the authority of a husband, it is
                     "adultery," if under the authority of her father, it is "seduction," in the absence of violence, and "rape" if violence be
                     employed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p11"> These species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than of the man, because in the venereal act the woman is
                     passive and is by way of matter, whereas the man is by way of agent; and it has been stated above (OBJ[1]) that the aforesaid
                     species are assigned with regard to a difference of matter.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected with a formal difference of object, which difference results from different
                     modes of opposition to right reason, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A1-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A7.html">FS, Q[18], A[7]</a>), nothing hinders the deformities of different vices concurring in the one act, and in this way adultery is comprised under
                     lust and injustice. Nor is this deformity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the lust that obeys concupiscence
                     so far as to lead to injustice, is thereby shown to be more grievous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a spiritual marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the violation
                     of such a woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner, the other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced
                     to other species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected with undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not constitute
                     the species of a moral act, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A1-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">FS, Q[18], A[2]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As a gloss says on this passage, "uncleanness" stands for lust against nature, while "lasciviousness" is a man's abuse of
                     boys, wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also reply that "lasciviousness" relates to certain acts circumstantial
                     to the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> According to a gloss on this passage "lust" there signifies any kind of excess.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p18"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p19"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q154_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A2-p0.1">Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal sin. For things that come under the same head would seem to be on a
                     par with one another. Now fornication comes under the same head as things that are not mortal sins: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.29" target="asv">Acts 15:29</a>): "That you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." But
                     there is not mortal sin in these observances, according to
                     
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4, </a> "Nothing is rejected that is received with thanksgiving." Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a Divine precept. But the Lord commanded (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.1.2" target="asv">Osee 1:2</a>): "Go take thee a wife of fornications, and have of her children of fornications." Therefore fornication is not a mortal
                     sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in Holy Writ without disapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without disapprobation
                     by Holy Writ in connection with the patriarchs. Thus we read (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.16.4" target="asv">Gn. 16:4</a>) that Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and further on (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.30.5" target="asv">Gn. 30:5</a>, 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.30.9" target="asv">9</a>) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the handmaids of his wives; and again (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p4.4" href="./asv.html#Gen.38.18" target="asv">Gn. 38:18</a>) that Juda was with Thamar whom he
                     thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But simple fornication is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the
                     love of God, since it is not a sin directly against. God, nor as regards the love of our neighbor, since thereby no one is
                     injured. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition. But simple fornication has not this result: because a gloss of Ambrose
                     [*The quotation is from the Gloss of Peter Lombard, who refers it to St. Ambrose: whereas it is from Hilary the deacon] on
                     
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:8, </a> "Godliness is profitable to all things," says: "The whole of Christian teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness: if a
                     man conforms to this, even though he gives way to the
                     inconstancy of the flesh, doubtless he will be punished, but he will not perish." Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal
                     sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that "what food is to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse
                     to the welfare of the human race." But inordinate use of food is not always a mortal sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate
                     sexual intercourse; and this would seem to apply especially to simple fornication, which is the least grievous of the aforesaid
                     species.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p8">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.4.13" target="asv">Tob. 4:13</a>): "Take heed to keep thyself . . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know a crime." Now crime denotes
                     a mortal sin. Therefore fornication and all intercourse with other than one's wife is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p9"> Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God's kingdom. But fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the
                     Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.21" target="asv">Gal. 5:21</a>), who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices, adds: "They who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of
                     God." Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p10"> Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can. Praedicandum): "They should know that the same penance is to be
                     enjoined for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilful murder and other criminal offenses." Therefore simple fornication
                     is a criminal or mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p11">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to be a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. in
                     Deut., qu. 37] on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.17" target="asv"> Dt. 23:17, </a> says: "This is a prohibition against going with whores, whose vileness is venial." For instead of "venial" it should be "venal,"
                     since such is the wanton's trade. In order to make this evident, we must take note that every sin committed directly against
                     human life is a mortal sin. Now
                     simple fornication implies an inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the offspring to be born of this union. For
                     we find in all animals where the upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and female, that these come together
                     not indeterminately, but the male with a certain female, whether one or several; such is the case with all birds: while, on
                     the other hand, among those animals, where the female alone suffices for the offspring's upbringing, the union is indeterminate,
                     as
                     in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the mother's
                     care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his father as guide and guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods
                     both internal and external. Hence human nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the sexes and demands that a man should
                     be united to a determinate woman and should abide with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in
                     the human race the male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of
                     the child: and this certainly would cease if the union of sexes were indeterminate.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p12"> This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which for the above reason is said to belong to the natural
                     law. Since, however, the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the whole human race, and common goods depend
                     on the law for their determination, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">FS, Q[90], A[2]</a>), it follows that this union of man and woman, which is called matrimony, is determined by some law. What this
                     determination is for us will be stated in the Third Part of this work (XP, Q[50], seqq.), where we shall treat of the sacrament
                     of matrimony. Wherefore, since fornication is an indeterminate union of the sexes, as something incompatible with matrimony,
                     it is opposed to the good of the child's upbringing, and consequently it is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p13"> Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by fornication, make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the
                     child: because a matter that comes under the determination of the law is judged according to what happens in general, and
                     not according to what may happen in a particular case.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these things, not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because the
                     matters mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute between Jews and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing
                     unanimously. For among the Gentiles, fornication was not deemed unlawful, on account of the corruption of natural reason:
                     whereas the Jews, taught by the Divine law, considered it to be unlawful. The other
                     things mentioned were loathsome to the Jews through custom introduced by the law into their daily life. Hence the Apostles
                     forbade these things to the Gentiles, not as though they were unlawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to the
                     Jews, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q103_A4.html">FS, Q[103], A[4]</a>, ad 3).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is contrary to right reason. Now man's reason is right, in so far as it is ruled
                     by the Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that which a man does by God's will and in obedience to His command,
                     is not contrary to right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general order of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously
                     by the Divine power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary
                     to the usual course of nature. Therefore just as Abraham did not sin in being willing to slay his innocent son, because he
                     obeyed God, although considered in itself it was contrary to right human reason in general, so, too, Osee sinned not in committing
                     fornication by God's command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called fornication, though it be so called in reference
                     to the general course of things. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "When God commands a thing to be done against
                     the customs or agreement of any people, though it were never done by them heretofore, it is to be done"; and afterwards he
                     adds: "For as among the powers of human society, the greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser, so must God
                     in preference to all."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens with no purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we treat
                     of matrimony (
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A2-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A5.html">XP, Q[65], A[5]</a>, ad 2). As to Juda there is no need to excuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our neighbor, because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born, as
                     we have shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a manner disadvantageous to the future child.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p18">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A person, who, while given to works of piety, yields to the inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, in so far
                     as these works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and because by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy;
                     but not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal inconstancy impenitent until death.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p19">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> One copulation may result in the begetting of a man, wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the future
                     child, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not only as to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other
                     hand, one meal does not hinder the good of a man's whole life, wherefore the act of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason
                     of its genus. It would, however, be a mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to partake
                     of a food which would alter the whole condition of his life, as was the case with Adam.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p20"> Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised under lust, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous
                     pleasure is a lesser sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p21"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p22"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q154_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A3-p0.1">Whether fornication is the most grievous of sins?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of sins. For seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it proceeds
                     from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is in fornication, for a gloss on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:9 </a>says that the "flame of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust." Therefore it seems that fornication is the gravest of sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a sin is the more grievous that is committed against a person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more
                     grievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger. Now according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:18, </a> "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body," which is most intimately connected with a man. Therefore it
                     seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greater a good is, the graver would seem to be the sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is seemingly
                     opposed to the good of the whole human race, as appears from what was said in the foregoing Article. It is also against Christ,
                     according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:15, </a> "Shall I . . . take the members of Christ, and make them the members of a harlot?" Therefore fornication is the most grievous
                     of sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) that the sins of the flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways, first with regard to the sin in itself, secondly with regard to some accident.
                     The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin itself, by reason of its species, which is determined according to
                     the good to which that sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the good of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a
                     graver sin, as to its species, than those sins which are contrary to external goods,
                     such as theft and the like; while it is less grievous than those which are directly against God, and sins that are injurious
                     to the life of one already born, such as murder.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that which is in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure that
                     is in the sensitive appetite, lessens sin, because a sin is the less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse
                     of a greater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure is in fornication. Hence Augustine says (De Agone
                     Christiano [*Serm. ccxciii; ccl de Temp.; see Appendix to St. Augustine's works])
                     that of all a Christian's conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of chastity; wherein the fight is a daily one, but
                     victory rare: and Isidore declares (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "mankind is subjected to the devil by carnal lust more than
                     by anything else," because, to wit, the vehemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fornicator is said to sin against his own body, not merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in the
                     flesh, which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts against the good of his own body by an undue resolution
                     and defilement thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does it follow from this that fornication is the most grievous
                     sin, because in man reason is of greater value than the body, wherefore if there
                     be a sin more opposed to reason, it will be more grievous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of the human race, in so far as it is prejudicial to the individual begetting
                     of the one man that may be born. Now one who is already an actual member of the human species attains to the perfection of
                     the species more than one who is a man potentially, and from this point of view murder is a more grievous sin than fornication
                     and every kind of lust, through being more opposed to the good of the human
                     species. Again, a Divine good is greater than the good of the human race: and therefore those sins also that are against God
                     are more grievous. Moreover, fornication is a sin against God, not directly as though the fornicator intended to offend God,
                     but consequently, in the same way as all mortal sins. And just as the members of our body are Christ's members, so too, our
                     spirit is one with Christ, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.17" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:17, </a> "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit."
                     Wherefore also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q154_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A4-p0.1">Whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and kisses. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.3" target="asv">Eph. 5:3</a>): "Fornication and all uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among you, as becometh saints," then
                     he adds: "Or obscenity" (which a gloss refers to "kissing and fondling"), "or foolish talking" (as "soft speeches"), "or scurrility"
                     (which "fools call geniality---i.e. jocularity"), and afterwards he continues (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.5" target="asv">Eph.
                        5:5
                     </a>): "For know ye this and understand that no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person (which is the serving of idols), hath
                     inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God," thus making no further mention of obscenity, as neither of foolish talking
                     or scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being prejudicial to the good of the future child's begetting and upbringing.
                     But these are not affected by kisses and touches or blandishments. Therefore there is no mortal sin in these.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things that are mortal sins in themselves can never be good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done
                     sometimes without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in themselves.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a kiss. But according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.28" target="asv"> Mat. 5:28, </a> "Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart." Much more therefore
                     are lustful kisses and other like things mortal sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p6"> Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. lxii), "By their very intercourse, their blandishments, their converse,
                     their embraces, those who are associated in a sleep that knows neither honor nor shame, acknowledge their disgrace and crime."
                     Therefore by doing these things a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to be a mortal works. /sin in two ways. First, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress,
                     or touch does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is possible to do such things without lustful pleasure,
                     either as being the custom of one's country, or on account of some obligation or reasonable cause. Secondly, a thing is said
                     to be a mortal sin by reason of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to lead someone
                     into heresy, sins mortally on account of his corrupt intention. Now it has been stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A8.html">FS, Q[74], A[8]</a>), that it is a mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but also to the delectation of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication
                     is a mortal sin, and much more so the other kinds of lust, it follows that in such like sins not only consent to the act but
                     also consent to the pleasure is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and caresses are done for this
                     delectation, it follows that they are mortal sins, and only in this way are they said to be lustful. Therefore in so far as
                     they are lustful, they are mortal sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle makes no further mention of these three because they are not sinful except as directed to those that he had mentioned
                     before.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although kisses and touches do not by their very nature hinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from lust, which
                     is the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are mortally sinful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that such things are not mortal sins in their species.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q154_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A5-p0.1">Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a sin. For the same things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit
                     while he sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep obtained the gift of wisdom from the Lord (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 3:2, </a> Par. 1). Therefore a man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal pollution would seem to be a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man has the use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently
                     discuss matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one thing, or dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while
                     asleep, so that nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a sin, seeing that it is a sin according to its genus.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who cannot act according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep,
                     is instructed and reproved by God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.33.15" target="asv"> Job 33:15,16, </a> "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of men [*Vulg.: 'When deep sleep falleth upon men.'
                     St. Thomas is apparently quoting from memory, as the passage is given correctly above
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A5-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q95_A6.html">, Q[95], A[6]</a>, OBJ[1]] . . .
                     Then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn." Therefore a man, while asleep,
                     can act according to or against his reason, and this is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems that nocturnal pollution
                     is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15): "When the same image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to the
                     mind of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish the imaginary from the real union of bodies, the flesh is
                     at once moved, with the result that usually follows such motions; and yet there is as little sin in this as there is in speaking
                     and therefore thinking about such things while one is awake."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways. First, in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For every
                     sin depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first movement of the sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except in
                     so far as it can be suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of reason's judgment, there is no sin in it. Now during
                     sleep reason has not a free judgment. For there is no one who while sleeping does not regard
                     some of the images formed by his imagination as though they were real, as stated above in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A8.html">FP, Q[84], A[8]</a>, ad 2. Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is deprived of reason's judgment, is not imputed to him as a sin, as
                     neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p7"> Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause.
                     For when there is excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is disintegrated either through overheating of the
                     body or some other disturbance, the sleeper dreams things that are connected with the discharge of this excessive or disintegrated
                     humor: the same thing happens when nature is cumbered with other superfluities, so that phantasms
                     relating to the discharge of those superfluities are formed in the imagination. Accordingly if this excess of humor be due
                     to a sinful cause (for instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal pollution has the character of sin from its cause:
                     whereas if the excess or disintegration of these superfluities be not due to a sinful cause, nocturnal pollution is not sinful,
                     neither in itself nor in its cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p8"> A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and the inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper
                     on account of some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was awake, is sometimes purely speculative, for
                     instance when one thinks about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while sometimes it is accompanied by a
                     certain emotion either of concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt to arise from
                     thinking about carnal sins with concupiscence for such pleasures, because this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul,
                     so that the sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent to acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher
                     says (Ethic. i, 13) that "in so far as certain movements in some degree pass" from the waking state to the state of sleep,
                     "the dreams of good men are better than those of any other people": and Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15) that
                     "even during sleep, the soul may have conspicuous merit on account of its good disposition." Thus it is evident that nocturnal
                     pollution may be sinful on the part of its cause. on the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal pollution ensues after thoughts
                     about carnal acts, though they were speculative, or accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful, neither in itself
                     nor in its cause.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p9"> The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the work of a devil the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed
                     so as to induce the aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous sin, namely the neglect to guard against
                     the wiles of the devil. Hence the words of the hymn at even: "Our enemy repress, that so our bodies no uncleanness know" [*Translation
                     W. K. Blount].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p10"> On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man's part, and through the wickedness of the devil alone. Thus we
                     read in the Collationes Patrum (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to suffer from nocturnal pollution on festivals,
                     and that the devil brought this about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion. Hence it is manifest that nocturnal
                     pollution is never a sin, but is sometimes the result of a previous sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from God while he was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It
                     is for this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to God (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A5-p11.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 3:10</a>), as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The use of reason is more or less hindered in sleep, according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less overcome by
                     sleep, on account of the violence or attenuation of the evaporations. Nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to
                     be unable to elicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A5-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A8.html">FP, Q[84], A[8]</a>, ad 2. Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason's apprehension is not hindered during sleep to the same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by reason
                     turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of human thought. Hence nothing hinders man's reason during sleep
                     from apprehending anew something arising out of the traces left by his previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him, or
                     again through Divine revelation, or the interference of a good or bad angel.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q154_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A6-p0.1">Whether seduction should be reckoned a species of lust?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust. For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a
                     virgin, according to the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1) [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]. But this may occur between an unmarried
                     man and an unmarried woman, which pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust, distinct
                     from fornication.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i, 4]): "Let no man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is adultery."
                     Now a species is not contained under another that is differentiated in opposition to it. Therefore since adultery is a species
                     of lust, it seems that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to do a person an injury would seem to pertain to injustice rather than to lust. Now the seducer does an injury
                     to another, namely the violated maiden's father, who "can take the injury as personal to himself" [*Gratian, ad can. Lex illa],
                     and sue the seducer for damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Seduction consists properly in the venereal act whereby a virgin is violated. Therefore, since lust is properly about venereal
                     actions, it would seem that seduction is a species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> When the matter of a vice has a special deformity, we must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice. Now lust is
                     a sin concerned with venereal matter, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q153_A1.html">Q[153], A[1]</a>). And a special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin who is under her father's care: both on the part of the maid,
                     who through being violated without any previous compact of marriage is both hindered from contracting a lawful marriage
                     and is put on the road to a wanton life from which she was withheld lest she should lose the seal of virginity: and on the
                     part of the father, who is her guardian, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.42.11" target="asv">Ecclus. 42:11</a>, "Keep a sure watch over a shameless daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a laughing-stock to thy enemies." Therefore
                     it is evident that seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, while still under the guardianship of her parents,
                     is a determinate species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although a virgin is free from the bond of marriage, she is not free from her father's power. Moreover, the seal of virginity
                     is a special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication, in that it should be removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is
                     not simple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots, women, namely, who are no longer virgins, as a gloss
                     observes on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12" target="asv">2 Cor. 12</a>:, "And have not done penance for the uncleanness and
                     fornication," etc.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense, as applicable in a general way to any sin of lust. Wherefore seduction, in
                     the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a married man and any woman other than his wife. This is clear from his
                     adding: "Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not." In this sense, too, we are to understand the words
                     of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Num.5.13" target="asv"> Num. 5:13</a>: "If [Vulg.: 'But'] the adultery is secret, and
                     cannot be provided by witnesses, because she was not found in adultery [stupro]."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater deformity through being united to another sin. Now the sin of lust obtains a
                     greater deformity from the sin of injustice, because the concupiscence would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it refrains
                     not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an injustice. In fact a twofold injustice attaches to it. One is on the
                     part of the virgin, who, though not violated by force, is nevertheless seduced,
                     and thus the seducer is bound to compensation. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.16" target="asv">Ex. 22:16,17</a>): "If a man seduce a virgin not yet espoused, and lie with her, he shall endow her and have her to wife. If the maid's father
                     will not give her to him, he shall give money according to the dowry, which virgins are wont to receive." The other injury
                     is done to the maid's father: wherefore the seducer is bound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A6-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.28" target="asv">Dt.
                        22:28,29
                     </a>): "If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, who is not espoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the matter come to judgment:
                     he that lay with her shall give to the father of the maid fifty sicles of silver, and shall have her to wife, and because
                     he hath humbled her, he may not put her away all the days of his life": and this, lest he should prove to have married her
                     in mockery, as Augustine observes. [*QQ. in Dt., qu. xxxiv.]
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q154_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A7-p0.1">Whether rape is a species of lust, distinct from seduction?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that rape is not a species of lust, distinct from seduction. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 26) that "seduction
                     [stuprum], or rape, properly speaking, is unlawful intercourse, and takes its name from its causing corruption: wherefore
                     he that is guilty of rape is a seducer." Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a species of lust distinct from
                     seduction.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, rape, apparently, implies violence. For it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex
                     illa]) that "rape is committed when a maid is taken away by force from her father's house that after being violated she may
                     be taken to wife." But the employment of force is accidental to lust, for this essentially regards the pleasure of intercourse.
                     Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sin of lust is curbed by marriage: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:2</a>): "For fear of fornication, let every man have his own wife." Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it was
                     enacted in the council of Meaux: "We decree that those who are guilty of rape, or of abducting or seducing women, should not
                     have those women in marriage, although they should have subsequently married them with the consent of their parents."
                     Therefore rape is not a determinate species of lust distinct from seduction.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a man may have knowledge of his newly married wife without committing a sin of lust. Yet he may commit rape if he
                     take her away by force from her parents' house, and have carnal knowledge of her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a
                     determinate species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as Isidore states (Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin of lust. Therefore rape
                     is a species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a species of lust: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes
                     there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p8"> They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate a virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards
                     the virgin and towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to the virgin, for instance if she allows herself
                     to be taken away by force from her father's house. Again, the force employed in rape differs in another way, because sometimes
                     a maid is taken away by force from her parents' house, and is forcibly violated: while sometimes, though
                     taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated, but of her own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act of
                     marriage: for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is employed. There is rape without seduction if a man abduct
                     a widow or one who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says [*Ep. v ad Caesarium; Cf. can. Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2], "We abhor
                     abductors whether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness of their crime."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p9"> There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force, violates a virgin unlawfully.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one is sometimes used to signify the other.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The employment of force would seem to arise from the greatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not fear
                     to endanger himself by offering violence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to be judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For
                     one who is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed, who has a right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas
                     one that is not promised to another must first of all be restored to her father's care, and then the abductor may lawfully
                     marry her with her parents' consent. Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since
                     whosoever steals a thing he is bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not dissolve a marriage already contracted, although
                     it is an impediment to its being contracted. As to the decree of the council in question, it was made in abhorrence of this
                     crime, and has been abrogated. Wherefore Jerome [*The quotation is from Can. Tria. xxxvi, qu. 2] declares the contrary: "Three
                     kinds of lawful marriage," says he, "are mentioned in Holy Writ. The first is that of a chaste maiden given away
                     lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The second is when a man finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal knowledge
                     of her. If the father be willing, the man shall endow her according to the father's estimate, and shall pay the price of her
                     purity [*Cf.
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A7-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.23" target="asv"> Dt. 22:23-29</a>]. The third is, when the maiden is taken away from such a man, and is given to another at the father's will."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p13"> We may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to others in marriage, especially if the betrothal be expressed
                     by words in the present tense.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The man who is just married has, in virtue of the betrothal, a certain right in her: wherefore, although he sins by using
                     violence, he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence Pope Gelasius says [*Can. Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; xxxvi, qu. 1]: "This
                     law of bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when a maiden, with regard to whose marriage nothing had so far been decided,
                     was taken away by force."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p15"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p16"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q154_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A9.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A8-p0.1">Whether adultery is determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species. For adultery takes its
                     name from a man having intercourse "with a woman who is not his own [ad alteram]," according to a gloss [*St. Augustine: Serm.
                     li, 13 de Divers. lxiii] on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.14" target="asv"> Ex. 20:14.</a> Now a woman who is not one's own may be of various conditions, namely either a virgin, or under her father's care, or a harlot,
                     or of any other
                     description. Therefore it seems that adultery is not a species of lust distinct from the others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i]: "It matters not for what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the
                     Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is an adulterer," and in like manner one who is over enamored
                     of any woman. Now every kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore adultery is in every kind of lust: and consequently
                     it should not be reckoned a species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there would seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there
                     is the same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either case a woman is violated who is under another person's
                     authority. Therefore adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Pope Leo [*St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf. Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5] says that "adultery is
                     sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of the marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one's
                     own lust, or with the consent of the other party." Now this implies a special deformity of lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate
                     species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Adultery, as its name implies, "is access to another's marriage-bed [ad alienum torum]" [*Cf. Append. Gratian, ad can. Ille
                     autem. xxxii, qu. 1]. By so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offense against chastity and the good of human procreation.
                     First, by accession to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage, which is contrary to the good of the upbringing of his
                     own children. Secondly, by accession to a woman who is united to another in marriage, and
                     thus he hinders the good of another's children. The same applies to the married woman who is corrupted by adultery. Wherefore
                     it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.23.32" target="asv">Ecclus. 23:32,33</a>): "Every woman . . . that leaveth her husband . . . shall be guilty of sin. For first she hath been unfaithful to the law
                     of the Most High" (since there it is commanded: "Thou shalt not commit adultery"); "and secondly, she hath offended against
                     her husband," by making it uncertain that the children are his: "thirdly,
                     she hath fornicated in adultery, and hath gotten children of another man," which is contrary to the good of her offspring.
                     The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins, while the two others belong especially to the deformity of adultery.
                     Hence it is manifest that adultery is a determinate species of lust, through having a special deformity in venereal acts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If a married man has intercourse with another woman, his sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus it is
                     always adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of marriage, or with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse;
                     and thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man has intercourse with another's wife; and sometimes it has the character
                     of seduction, or of some other sin, according to various conditions
                     affecting the woman with whom he has intercourse: and it has been stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q154_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that the species of lust correspond to the various conditions of women.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of human offspring, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q154_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But adultery is specially opposed to matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage faith which is due between husband
                     and wife. And since the man who is too ardent a lover of his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if he use her indecently,
                     although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense be called an adulterer; and even more so
                     than he that is too ardent a lover of another woman.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The wife is under her husband's authority, as united to him in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father's authority,
                     as one who is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin of adultery is contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and
                     the sin of seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned to differ specifically. Of other matters concerning adultery
                     we shall speak in the Third Part [*
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A8-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A3.html">XP,
                        Q[59], A[3]
                     </a>; XP, QQ[60],62], when we treat of matrimony.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A9.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q154_A9" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A10.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A9-p0.1">Whether incest is a determinate species of lust?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that incest is not a determinate species of lust. For incest [*'Incestus' is equivalent to 'in-castus = 'unchaste']
                     takes its name from being a privation of chastity. But all kinds of lust are opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that
                     incest is not a species of lust, but is lust itself in general.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Cf. Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "incest is intercourse between
                     a man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity." Now affinity differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one
                     but several species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a deformity, does not constitute a determinate species of vice. But intercourse
                     between those who are related by consanguinity or affinity does not, of itself, contain any deformity, else it would never
                     have been lawful. Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The species of lust are distinguished according to the various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful intercourse.
                     Now incest implies a special condition on the part of the woman, because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by
                     consanguinity or affinity as stated (OBJ[2]). Therefore incest is a determinate species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q154_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,6) wherever we find something incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there must needs be a determinate species
                     of lust. Now sexual intercourse with women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to venereal union on three counts.
                     First, because man naturally owes a certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood relations, who are descended
                     in near degree from the same
                     parents: so much so indeed that among the ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates [*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1], it was not deemed
                     right for a son to bathe with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now from what has been said (Q[142], A[4]:
                     Q[151], A[4]), it is evident that in venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent with respect, wherefore men
                     are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is unseemly that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse. This reason seems
                     to be indicated (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A9-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.7" target="asv">Lev. 18:7</a>) where we read: "She is thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness," and the same is expressed further on with regard
                     to others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p7"> The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not
                     debarred from venereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very frequent and thus men's minds would be enervated
                     by lust. Hence in the Old Law [*
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18" target="asv">Lev. 18</a>] the prohibition was apparently directed specially to those persons who must needs live together.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p8"> The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife,
                     all his wife's relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, as though they were of the same blood as himself.
                     Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16): "The demands of charity are most perfectly satisfied by men uniting together
                     in the bonds that the various ties of friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and
                     becoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships in one, but each should have one."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p9"> Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is natural that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred,
                     if to this be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse, his love would be too ardent and would become a
                     very great incentive to lust: and this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that incest is a determinate species of
                     lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Unlawful intercourse between persons related to one another would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of the
                     opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of love, as stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse
                     between such persons is called "incest" antonomastically.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Persons are related by affinity through one who is related by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the other,
                     consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of unbecomingness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is something essentially unbecoming and contrary to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related by
                     blood, for instance between parents and children who are directly and immediately related to one another, since children naturally
                     owe their parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a horse (De Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother by mistake
                     and threw itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done,
                     because some animals even have a natural respect for those that have begotten them. There is not the same essential unbecomingness
                     attaching to other persons who are related to one another not directly but through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness
                     or unbecomingness varies according to custom, and human or Divine law: because, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A9-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q154_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, sexual intercourse, being directed to the common good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De
                     Civ. Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation
                     when religion forbade it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A8.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A10.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q154_A10" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A11.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A10-p0.1">Whether sacrilege can be a species of lust?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of lust. For the same species is not contained under different genera that
                     are not subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species of irreligion, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A10-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q99_A2.html">Q[99], A[2]</a>). Therefore sacrilege cannot be reckoned a species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]), do not place sacrilege among other sins which are
                     reckoned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be done by the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege
                     is not reckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice. Therefore neither should it be reckoned a species of
                     lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that "if it is wicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one's earthly bounds, how much
                     more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds of morals!" Now to go beyond one's earthly bounds in sacred
                     matters is a sin of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal
                     desire in sacred matters. But venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege
                     is a species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A10-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">FS, Q[18], AA[6]</a>,7), the act of a virtue or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or vice, assumes the latter's species: thus,
                     theft committed for the sake of adultery, passes into the species of adultery. Now it is evident that as Augustine states
                     (De Virgin. 8), the observance of chastity, by being directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of religion, as in the
                     case of those who vow and keep
                     chastity. Wherefore it is manifest that lust also, by violating something pertaining to the worship of God, belongs to the
                     species of sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may be accounted a species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Lust, by being directed to another vice as its end, becomes a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be also
                     a species of irreligion, as of a higher genus.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The enumeration referred to, includes those sins which are species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a species
                     of lust in so far as it is directed to another vice as its end, and may coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful
                     intercourse between persons mutually united by spiritual relationship, is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Intercourse
                     with a virgin consecrated to God, inasmuch as she is the spouse of
                     Christ, is sacrilege resembling adultery. If the maiden be under her father's authority, it will be spiritual seduction; and
                     if force be employed it will be spiritual rape, which kind of rape even the civil law punishes more severely than others.
                     Thus the Emperor Justinian says [*Cod. i, iii de Episc. et Cler. 5]: "If any man dare, I will not say to rape, but even to
                     tempt a consecrated virgin with a view to marriage, he shall be liable to capital punishment."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing. Now a consecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired for
                     sexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired for possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege
                     may also come under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an injury be done to a consecrated person. Again, one
                     may commit a sacrilege by partaking gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless,
                     sacrilege is ascribed more specially to lust which is opposed to chastity for the observance of which certain persons are
                     specially consecrated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A9.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A11.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q154_A11" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A10.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A12.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A11-p0.1">Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species of lust. For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the
                     enumeration given above (A[1], OBJ[1]). Therefore it is not a species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is comprised under vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under vice,
                     but under bestiality, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, lust regards acts directed to human generation, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A11-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q153_A2.html">Q[153], A[2]</a>): Whereas the unnatural vice concerns acts from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species
                     of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned together with the other species of lust (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.21" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:21</a>) where we read: "And have not done penance for the uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness," where a gloss says:
                     "Lasciviousness, i.e., unnatural lust."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q154_A6.html">AA[6]</a>,9) wherever there occurs a special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered unbecoming, there is a determinate
                     species of lust. This may occur in two ways: First, through being contrary to right reason, and this is common to all lustful
                     vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the human race:
                     and this is called "the unnatural
                     vice." This may happen in several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any copulation, for the sake of venereal pleasure:
                     this pertains to the sin of "uncleanness" which some call "effeminacy." Secondly, by copulation with a thing of undue species,
                     and this is called "bestiality." Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male with male, or female with female, as the Apostle
                     states (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A11-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.27" target="asv">Rom. 1:27</a>): and this is called the "vice of sodomy." Fourthly, by not observing the
                     natural manner of copulation, either as to undue means, or as to other monstrous and bestial manners of copulation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There we enumerated the species of lust that are not contrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is opposed to human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the virtue,
                     and therefore is reducible to the same genus.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The lustful man intends not human generation but venereal pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts from
                     which human generation follows: and it is that which is sought in the unnatural vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A10.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A12.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q154_A12" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A11.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A12-p0.1">Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the unnatural vice is not the greatest sin among the species of lust. For the more a sin is contrary to
                     charity the graver it is. Now adultery, seduction and rape which are injurious to our neighbor are seemingly more contrary
                     to the love of our neighbor, than unnatural sins, by which no other person is injured. Therefore the unnatural sin is not
                     the greatest among the species of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sins committed against God would seem to be the most grievous. Now sacrilege is committed directly against God,
                     since it is injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous according as we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin
                     is committed. Now the order of charity requires that a man love more those persons who are united to him---and such are those
                     whom he defiles by incest---than persons who are not connected with him, and whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural
                     vice. Therefore incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more it is against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the sin
                     of uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature, since it would seem especially in accord with nature
                     that agent and patient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow that uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural
                     vices. But this is not true. Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among
                     sins of lust.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De adult. conjug. [*The quotation is from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. Augustine, De Bono Conjugali,
                     viii.]) that "of all these," namely the sins belonging to lust, "that which is against nature is the worst."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are
                     those things that are according to nature, because reason presupposes things as determined by nature, before disposing of
                     other things according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just
                     as in speculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that which is about things
                     the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on man, so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act against
                     things as determined by nature. Therefore, since by the unnatural vices man transgresses that which has been determined by
                     nature with regard to the use of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter this sin is gravest of all. After it comes
                     incest, which, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q154_A12-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q154_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, is contrary to the natural respect which we owe persons related
                     to us.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p8"> With regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression merely of that which is determined by right reason, on
                     the presupposition, however, of natural principles. Now it is more against reason to make use of the venereal act not only
                     with prejudice to the future offspring, but also so as to injure another person besides. Wherefore simple fornication, which
                     is committed without injustice to another person, is the least grave among the species of lust. Then, it is a
                     greater injustice to have intercourse with a woman who is subject to another's authority as regards the act of generation,
                     than as regards merely her guardianship. Wherefore adultery is more grievous than seduction. And both of these are aggravated
                     by the use of violence. Hence rape of a virgin is graver than seduction, and rape of a wife than adultery. And all these are
                     aggravated by coming under the head of sacrilege, as stated above (A[10], ad 2).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary
                     to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says
                     (Confess. iii, 8): "Those foul offenses that are against nature should be everywhere and at all times detested and punished,
                     such as were those of the people of Sodom, which should all nations commit,
                     they should all stand guilty of the same crime, by the law of God which hath not so made men that they should so abuse one
                     another. For even that very intercourse which should be between God and us is violated, when that same nature, of which He
                     is the Author, is polluted by the perversity of lust."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Vices against nature are also against God, as stated above (ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity of sacrilege,
                     as the order impressed on human nature is prior to and more firm than any subsequently established order.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The nature of the species is more intimately united to each individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins against
                     the specific nature are more grievous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a thing than on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins against
                     nature, the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness, which consists in the mere omission of copulation with another.
                     While the most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the due species is not observed. Hence a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A12-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.37.2" target="asv"> Gn. 37:2, </a> "He accused his brethren of a most wicked crime," says that
                     "they copulated with cattle." After this comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right sex is not observed. Lastly comes
                     the sin of not observing the right manner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the "vas" than if it
                     affects the manner of copulation in respect of other circumstances.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A11.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A5.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q155" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A12.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q155-p0.1">OF CONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q155-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q155-p2"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q155-p3"> We must next consider the potential parts of temperance: (1) continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head
                  we must consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence there are four points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q155-p4"> (1) Whether continence is a virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q155-p5"> (2) What is its matter?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q155-p6"> (3) What is its subject?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q155-p7"> (4) Of its comparison with temperance.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q155_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q155_A1-p0.1">Whether continence is a virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For species and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division. But
                     continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1,9). Therefore continence is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19), "a virtue is a thing that
                     no one makes ill use of." Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for instance, if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself
                     from doing it. Therefore continence is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is lawful, but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q155_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.23" target="asv"> Gal. 5:23, </a> "Faith, modesty," etc., says that by continence a man refrains even from things that are lawful. Therefore continence is
                     not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a virtue. Now such is continence, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that "continence
                     is a habit unconquered by pleasure." Therefore continence is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The word "continence" is taken by various people in two ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from all
                     venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q155_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.23" target="asv">Gal. 5:23</a>). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the first place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies
                     to continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q155_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q152_A3.html">Q[152], A[3]</a> ) to be a virtue. Others,
                     however, understand continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires, which in him are vehement. In this sense
                     the Philosopher takes continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also it is used in the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. xii,
                     10,11). In this way continence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so far, to wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition
                     to the passions, lest it be led astray by them: yet it does not attain to the perfect nature of a moral virtue, by
                     which even the sensitive appetite is subject to reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in the sensitive
                     appetite. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "continence is not a virtue but a mixture," inasmuch as it has something
                     of virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p7"> If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher includes continence in the same division with virtue in so far as the former falls short of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Properly speaking, man is that which is according to reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds [tenet se] to
                     that which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself. Now whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according
                     to reason. Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to that which is in accord with right reason, and not to
                     that which is in accord with perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to
                     right reason, even as good desires are opposed to perverse reason. Wherefore he is properly and truly continent who holds
                     to right reason, by abstaining from evil desires, and not he who holds to perverse reason, by abstaining from good desires:
                     indeed, the latter should rather be said to be obstinate in evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The gloss quoted takes continence in the first sense, as denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from unlawful
                     goods, but also from certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in order to give its whole attention to the more perfect
                     goods.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q155_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q155_A2-p0.1">Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are not the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46): "General
                     decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is virtuous is restrained* in its every action." [*"Continentem"
                     according to St. Thomas' reading; St. Ambrose wrote "concinentem = harmonious"].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for the good of right reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Now other
                     passions lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence than the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the
                     fear of mortal dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him behave like a madman, as Seneca remarks [*De Ira
                     i, 1]. Therefore continence does not properly regard the desires for pleasures of touch.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): "It is continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel."
                     Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to
                     
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q155_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10, </a> "Cupidity [Douay: 'The desire of money'] ({philargyria}), is the root of all evils." Therefore continence is not properly
                     about the desires for pleasures of touch
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal matters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied
                     only to the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of touch is not its proper matter.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but bestial, both as regards food---for instance, the pleasure of eating
                     human flesh; and as regards venereal matters---for instance the abuse of animals or boys. But continence is not about such
                     like things, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of continence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "continence and incontinence are about the same things as temperance and intemperance."
                     Now temperance and intemperance are about the desires for pleasures of touch, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q155_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">Q[141], A[4]</a>). Therefore continence and incontinence are also about that same matter.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain curbing, in so far as a man contains himself from following his passions.
                     Hence continence is properly said in reference to those passions which urge a man towards the pursuit of something, wherein
                     it is praiseworthy that reason should withhold man from pursuing: whereas it is not properly about those passions, such as
                     fear and the like, which denote some kind of withdrawal: since in these it is praiseworthy to
                     remain firm in pursuing what reason dictates, as stated above (Q[123], AA[3],4). Now it is to be observed that natural inclinations
                     are the principles of all supervening inclinations, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q155_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A2.html">FP, Q[60], A[2]</a>). Wherefore the more they follow the inclination of nature, the more strongly do the passions urge to the pursuance of an
                     object. Now nature inclines chiefly to those things that are necessary to it, whether for the maintenance of the individual,
                     such as
                     food, or for the maintenance of the species, such as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain to the touch. Therefore
                     continence and incontinence refer properly to desires for pleasures of touch.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as temperance may be used in a general sense in connection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter wherein
                     it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult
                     to contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a general sense and relatively may be applied to any
                     other matter: and in this sense Ambrose speaks of continence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Properly speaking we do not speak of continence in relation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude implies.
                     As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the pursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of
                     the soul---in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured him---rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a
                     man may be said to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> External goods, such as honors, riches and the like, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of choice
                     in themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak
                     of a person as being continent or incontinent, not simply, but relatively, by adding that they are continent or incontinent
                     in regard to wealth, or honor and so forth. Hence Tully either understood
                     continence in a general sense, as including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a restricted sense as denoting
                     desire for pleasures of touch.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Venereal pleasures are more vehement than pleasures of the palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence and incontinence
                     in reference to venereal matters rather than in reference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are applicable
                     to both.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Continence is a good of the human reason: wherefore it regards those passions which can be connatural to man. Hence the Philosopher
                     says (Ethic. vii, 5) that "if a man were to lay hold of a child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural passion
                     whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be continent [*See A[4]], not absolutely, but relatively."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p15"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p16"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q155_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q155_A3-p0.1">Whether the subject of continence is the concupiscible power?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the subject of continence is the concupiscible power. For the subject of a virtue should be proportionate
                     to the virtue's matter. Now the matter of continence, as stated 
                     <a id="SS_Q155_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q155_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, is desires for the pleasures of touch, which pertain to the concupiscible power. Therefore continence is in the concupiscible
                     power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Opposites are referred to one same thing" [*Categ. viii]. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose passions
                     overcome reason, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that "incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupiscible, by
                     following which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to reason." Therefore continence is likewise in the concupiscible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the subject of a human virtue is either the reason, or the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the
                     concupiscible and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason, for then it would be an intellectual virtue; nor is
                     it in the will, since continence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor again is it in the irascible, because
                     it is not properly about the passions of the irascible, as stated above (A[2], ad 2). Therefore
                     it follows that it is in the concupiscible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every virtue residing in a certain power removes the evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil act
                     of the concupiscible: since "the continent man has evil desires," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore
                     continence is not in the concupiscible power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that subject have a different disposition from that which it has while subjected
                     to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent,
                     since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires. Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible
                     as its subject. Again the reason has the same disposition in both, since
                     both the continent and the incontinent have right reason, and each of them, while undisturbed by passion, purposes not to
                     follow his unlawful desires. Now the primary difference between them is to be found in their choice: since the continent man,
                     though subject to vehement desires, chooses not to follow them, because of his reason; whereas the incontinent man chooses
                     to follow them, although his reason forbids. Hence continence must needs reside in that power of the soul, whose act it is
                     to
                     choose; and that is the will, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q155_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A1.html">FS, Q[13], A[1]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Continence has for its matter the desires for pleasures of touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance which
                     is in the concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist them. For this reason it must be in another power, since
                     resistance is of one thing against another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will stands between reason and the concupiscible, and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is moved by the
                     reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupiscible. Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its
                     first mover, and incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both belong immediately to the will as their proper subject.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the passions are not in the will as their subject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus it is
                     that the will of the continent man resists desires.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q155_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q155_A4-p0.1">Whether continence is better than temperance?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that continence is better than temperance. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q155_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.26.20" target="asv">Ecclus. 26:20</a>): "No price is worthy of a continent soul." Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the greater the virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater reward;
                     for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q155_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.5" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:5</a>): "He . . . is not crowned, except he strive lawfully," and the continent man, since he is subject to vehement evil desires,
                     strives more than the temperate man, in whom these things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater virtue than
                     temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will is a more excellent power than the concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is
                     in the concupiscible, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q155_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q155_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore continence is a greater virtue than temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to a principal
                     virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q155_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q155_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, continence has a twofold signification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal pleasures; and if continence be
                     taken in this sense, it is greater than temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what we said above (Q[152],
                     A[5]) concerning the preeminence of virginity over chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be taken
                     as denoting the resistance of the reason
                     to evil desires when they are vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far greater than continence, because the
                     good of a virtue derives its praise from that which is in accord with reason. Now the good of reason flourishes more in the
                     temperate man than in the continent man, because in the former even the sensitive appetite is obedient to reason, being tamed
                     by reason so to speak, whereas in the continent man the sensitive appetite strongly resists reason by its evil desires. Hence
                     continence is compared to temperance, as the imperfect to the perfect.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted may be understood in two ways. First in reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence
                     from all things venereal: and thus it means that "no price is worthy of a continent soul," in the genus of chastity the fruitfulness
                     of the flesh is the purpose of marriage is equalled to the continence of virginity or of widowhood, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q155_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q152_A4.html">Q[152], AA[4]</a>,5). Secondly it may be understood in
                     reference to the general sense in which continence denotes any abstinence from things unlawful: and thus it means that "no
                     price is worthy of a continent soul," because its value is not measured with gold or silver, which are appreciable according
                     to weight.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The strength or weakness of concupiscence may proceed from two causes. For sometimes it is owing to a bodily cause: because
                     some people by their natural temperament are more prone to concupiscence than others; and again opportunities for pleasure
                     which inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for others. Such like weakness of concupiscence diminishes
                     merit, whereas strength of concupiscence increases it. on the other hand,
                     weakness or strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spiritual cause, for instance the vehemence of charity, or
                     the strength of reason, as in the case of a temperate man. In this way weakness of concupiscence, by reason of its cause,
                     increases merit, whereas strength of concupiscence diminishes it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will is more akin to the reason than the concupiscible power is. Wherefore the good of reason---on account of which virtue
                     is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to the will but also to the concupiscible power, as happens in the temperate
                     man---is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the will, as in the case of one who is continent.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A12.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q156" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q156-p0.1">OF INCONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q156-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q156-p2"> We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q156-p3"> (1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q156-p4"> (2) Whether incontinence is a sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q156-p5"> (3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q156-p6"> (4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in desire?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q156_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q156_A1-p0.1">Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but
                     from the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women
                     are not described either as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result from the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from
                     the bodily temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is especially people of a quick or choleric and
                     atrabilious temper whose incontinence is one of unbridled desire." Therefore incontinence regards the body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because "the flesh
                     lusteth against the spirit," and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul. Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for we ascribe
                     neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly
                     on the part of the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part
                     of the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions
                     can arise in the sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet these passions, however vehement they be, are
                     not the sufficient cause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so
                     long as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions. If, however, the passions gain such strength
                     as to take away the use of reason altogether---as in the case of those who become insane through the vehemence of their passions---the
                     essential conditions of continence or incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the judgment of reason, which
                     the continent man follows and the incontinent forsakes. From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is
                     on the part of the soul, which fails to resist a passion by the reason. This happens in two ways, according to the Philosopher
                     (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when the soul yields to the passions, before the reason has given its counsel; and this is called
                     "unbridled incontinence" or "impetuosity": secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been counselled, through holding
                     weakly to reason's judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is called "weakness." Hence it is manifest that incontinence
                     pertains chiefly to the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The human soul is the form of the body, and has certain powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these organs
                     conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of
                     the intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from the senses, and the will is urged by passions of the
                     sensitive appetite. Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak
                     temperament, the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds to it weakly; although in /rare cases
                     the opposite occurs, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q156_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.31.10" target="asv"> Prov. 31:10, </a> "Who shall find a valiant woman?" And since small and weak things "are accounted as though they were not" [*Aristotle, Phys.
                     ii, 5] the Philosopher speaks of women as though they had not the firm judgment of reason, although the contrary happens in
                     some women. Hence he states that "we do not describe women
                     as being continent, because they are vacillating" through being unstable of reason, and "are easily led" so that they follow
                     their passions readily.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man at once follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the impulse
                     of passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious persons [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q156_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A5.html">FS, Q[46], A[5]</a>], or from its vehemence, as in the melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most vehemently aroused. Even
                     so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand to that which is counselled, because he
                     holds to it in weakly fashion by reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with regard to woman (ad 1).
                     This is also the case with phlegmatic temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are due to the fact
                     that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain negligence
                     of the spirit in not resisting strongly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q156_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q156_A2-p0.1">Whether incontinence is a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "No man sins in what he cannot
                     avoid." Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q156_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.21" target="asv"> Wis. 8:21, </a> "I know [Vulg.: 'knew'] that I could not . . . be continent, except God gave it." Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore
                     incontinence is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for Dionysius
                     says (Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul, through incontinence of divine love, exclaimed: I live, now not I" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q156_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.20" target="asv">Gal. 2:20</a>). Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is numbered together with other sins (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q156_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.3.3" target="asv">2 Tim. 3:3</a>) where it is written: "Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful," etc. Therefore incontinence is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus incontinence
                     is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence (
                     <a id="SS_Q156_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q155_A2.html">Q[155], A[2]</a> ). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first, because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in
                     accord with reason; secondly, because he plunges into
                     shameful pleasures. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "incontinence is censurable not only because it is wrong"---that
                     is, by straying from reason---"but also because it is wicked"---that is, by following evil desires. Secondly, incontinence
                     about a matter is considered, properly---inasmuch as it is a straying from reason---but not simply; for instance when a man
                     does not observe the mode of reason in his desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in themselves.
                     About such things there is incontinence, not simply but relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence
                     (
                     <a id="SS_Q156_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q155_A2.html">Q[155], A[2]</a>, ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from the fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails
                     to observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of themselves desirable.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p7"> Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but metaphorically. for instance about the desires for
                     things of which one cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may be said to be incontinent in these matters
                     metaphorically, because just as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even so is a man entirely led by his
                     good desire which is in accord with reason. Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the perfection
                     of virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God's help, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q156_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.5" target="asv"> Jn. 15:5</a>: "Without Me you can do nothing." Wherefore the fact that man needs God's help in order to be continent, does not show incontinence
                     to be no sin, for, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, "what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way, ourselves."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through
                     a certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his
                     reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not properly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q156_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q156_A3-p0.1">Whether the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against
                     his conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q156_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47, </a> "That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Now the incontinent
                     man would seem to act against his conscience more than the intemperate because, according to Ethic. vii, 3, the incontinent
                     man,
                     though knowing how wicked are the things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion, whereas the intemperate man judges
                     what he desires to be good. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most
                     grave, are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence would appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance.
                     For a person's sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows
                     he is doing wrong, and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the
                     intemperate man that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be admonished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent
                     man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate,
                     since the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which the intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the
                     incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12,13) that "impenitence is a sin against
                     the Holy Ghost." Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) "the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for
                     he holds on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined to repentance." Therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely
                     than the incontinent.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to Augustine [*De Duab. Anim. x, xi] sin is chiefly an act of the will, because "by the will we sin and live aright"
                     [*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the
                     intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom:
                     whereas in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a passion. And
                     since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is "a disposition difficult to remove," the result is that the incontinent man
                     repents at once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so the intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned,
                     because the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit. Wherefore in reference to such persons it is written
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q156_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv">Prov. 2:14</a>) that "they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things." Hence it follows that "the
                     intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent," as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 7).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the ignorance,
                     the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance
                     in the reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and then such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver
                     the sin, because the inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be
                     greater. Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man, ignorance arises from the appetite being inclined to something,
                     either by passion, as in the incontinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus
                     in the intemperate than in the incontinent. In one respect as regards duration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance
                     lasts only while the passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas
                     the ignorance of the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is likened
                     to phthisis or any chronic disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect the ignorance of the intemperate
                     man is greater as regards the thing ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some particular detail of choice
                     (in so far as he deems that he must choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man's ignorance is
                     about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing good, in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed.
                     Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7,8) that "the incontinent man is better than the intemperate, because he retains
                     the best principle [*{To beltiston, e arche}, 'the best thing, i.e. the principle']," to wit, the right estimate of the end.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches concupiscence,
                     besides the application of the external remedy of admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his desires,
                     so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q156_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q142_A2.html">Q[142], A[2]</a> ). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his curing is more difficult, for two
                     reasons. The first is on the part of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end, which holds the same
                     position as the principle in demonstrations. Now it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to the principle;
                     and it is the same in practical matters with one who errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part of the inclination
                     of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this proceeds from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the
                     inclination of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily suppressed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained
                     above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he
                     does not sin except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man sins even through slight concupiscence and
                     sometimes forestalls it. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more
                     the intemperate man, "because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with calm," i.e. slight desire. "For what would he
                     have done if he had desired it with passion?"
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q156_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q156_A4-p0.1">Whether the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to resist
                     the passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): "It is not wonderful,
                     indeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains." Now, "as Heraclitus says,
                     it is more difficult to resist desire than anger" [*Ethic. ii. 3]. Therefore
                     incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence of anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion be so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as
                     in the case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment
                     of reason, than one who is incontinent in desire: since "anger listens to reason somewhat, but desire does not" as the Philosopher
                     states (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent
                     in desire.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is. Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since
                     it leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire
                     leads. Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of desire."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The sin of incontinence may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall of
                     reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than incontinence of anger, because the movement of desire is more inordinate
                     than the movement of anger. There are four reasons for this, and the Philosopher indicates them, Ethic. vii, 6: First, because
                     the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since the angry man tends to
                     avenge the injury done to him, and reason dictates this in a certain degree. Yet he does not tend thereto perfectly, because
                     he does not intend the due mode of vengeance. on the other hand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with sense
                     and nowise in accord with reason. Secondly, because the movement of anger results more from the bodily temperament owing to
                     the quickness of the movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one who by bodily temperament is disposed to anger is
                     more readily angry than one who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent: wherefore also it happens more
                     often that the children of those who are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the children of those
                     who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence. Now that which results from the natural disposition
                     of the body is deemed more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because anger seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain
                     to
                     disguise itself and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject to concupiscence works with pleasure, whereas
                     the angry man works as though forced by a certain previous displeasure.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p7"> Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to the evil into which one falls through forsaking reason;
                     and thus incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because it leads to things that are harmful to one's
                     neighbor.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for the moment it
                     is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its impetuousness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because nowise
                     does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it is more disgraceful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers incontinence with regard to its result.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q157" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q157-p0.1">OF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q157-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q157-p2"> We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices. Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points
                  of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q157-p3"> (1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q157-p4"> (2) Whether each of them is a virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q157-p5"> (3) Whether each is a part of temperance?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q157-p6"> (4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q157_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q157_A1-p0.1">Whether clemency and meekness are absolutely the same?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher
                     (Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is "desire of vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2]. Since, then, clemency "is leniency of a superior
                     in inflicting punishment on an inferior," as Seneca states (De Clementia ii, 3), and vengeance is taken by means of punishment,
                     it would seem that clemency and meekness are the same.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that "clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when
                     unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person," so that apparently clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep.
                     ccxi], hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and clemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness
                     are absolutely the same.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same vice is not opposed to different virtues. But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and
                     clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are absolutely the same.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca (OBJ[1] ) "clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior": whereas
                     meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each to everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely
                     the same.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Ethic. ii, 3, a moral virtue is "about passions and actions." Now internal passions are principles of external
                     actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore virtues that moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards
                     the same effect as virtues that moderate actions, although they differ specifically. Thus it belongs properly to justice to
                     restrain man from theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire of money,
                     which is restrained by liberality; so that liberality concurs with justice towards the effect, which is abstention from theft.
                     This applies to the case in point; because through the passion of anger a man is provoked to inflict a too severe punishment,
                     while it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment, and this might be prevented by excessive anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p7"> Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet
                     they differ from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment, while meekness properly mitigates the passion
                     of anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Meekness regards properly the desire itself of vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is applied
                     externally for the purpose of vengeance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man's affections incline to the moderation of things that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from one man
                     loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter's punishment in itself, but only as directed to something else, for
                     instance justice, or the correction of the person punished. Hence love makes one quick to mitigate punishment ---and this
                     pertains to clemency---while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this reason
                     Tully says that "the mind provoked to hatred" that is to punish too severely, "is restrained by clemency," from inflicting
                     too severe a punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred but punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the passion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly concerned
                     with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those
                     are called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in punishing." Those who delight in a man's punishment
                     for its own sake may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human
                     feeling that leads one man to love another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q157_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q157_A2-p0.1">Whether both clemency and meekness are virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these
                     are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect" [*Ethic. ii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain
                     decrease; for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases anger. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, meekness or mildness is included (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.4" target="asv">Mat. 5:4</a>) among the beatitudes, and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.23" target="asv">Gal. 5:23</a>) among the fruits. Now the virtues differ from the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not comprised under virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): "Every good man is conspicuous for his clemency and meekness." Now it is virtue properly
                     that belongs to a good man, since "virtue it is that makes its possessor good, and renders his works good also" (Ethic. ii,
                     6). Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The nature of moral virtue consists in the subjection of appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13).
                     Now this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For clemency, in mitigating punishment, "is guided by reason," according
                     to Seneca (De Clementia ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates anger according to right reason, as stated in Ethic. iv,
                     5. Wherefore it is manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the external
                     infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external
                     punishing, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q157_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Yet they are not really opposed to one another, since they are both according to right reason. For severity is inflexible
                     in the infliction of
                     punishment when right reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also according to right reason, when and where
                     this is requisite. Wherefore they are not opposed to one another as they are not about the same thing.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), "the habit that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is
                     denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the name of meekness." For the virtue is more akin to diminution
                     than to excess, because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for injuries done to him, than to be lacking in that
                     desire, since "scarcely anyone belittles an injury done to himself," as Sallust
                     observes [*Cf. Q[120]]. As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not in respect of that which is according to right reason,
                     but as regards that which is according to common law, which is the object of legal justice: yet on account of some particular
                     consideration, it mitigates the punishment, deciding, as it were, that a man is not to be punished any further. Hence Seneca
                     says (De Clementia ii, 1): "Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those whom she sets free are declared immune from
                     all further punishment; and remission of punishment due amounts to a pardon." Wherefore it is clear that clemency is related
                     to severity as equity [the Greek 'epieikeia' [*Cf. Q[120]]] to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as regards the infliction
                     of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet clemency differs from equity, as we shall state further on (A[3], ad 1).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the fruits are delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being
                     reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q157_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q157_A3-p0.1">Whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts of temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above
                     
                     <a id="SS_Q157_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which pertains to justice, as stated above (Q[120], A[2]). Therefore
                     seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences; whereas meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger
                     and vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): "A man may be said to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty." Now
                     this is opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness
                     are parts of prudence rather than of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge." Tully
                     also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so far as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode whence
                     the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the mode and name of justice consist in a certain "equality," those
                     of fortitude in a certain "strength of mind," those of temperance in a certain "restraint," inasmuch as it restrains the most
                     vehement concupiscences of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness likewise
                     consist in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates punishment, while meekness represses anger, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q157_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as principal virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be
                     parts thereof.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Two points must be considered in the mitigation of punishment. one is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance with
                     the lawgiver's intention, although not according to the letter of the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The
                     other point is a certain moderation of a man's inward disposition, so that he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment.
                     This belongs properly to clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii,
                     3) that "it is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge." This moderation of soul comes from a certain
                     sweetness of disposition, whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful to another. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia
                     ii, 3) that "clemency is a certain smoothness of the soul"; for, on the other hand, there would seem to be a certain roughness
                     of soul in one who fears not to pain others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The annexation of secondary to principal virtues depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form of
                     the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency agree with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they
                     agree not in matter.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Unsoundness" is corruption of "soundness." Now just as soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition
                     due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind lapsing from the disposition due to the human species.
                     This occurs both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of reason, and in respect of the appetitive power,
                     as when a man loses that humane feeling whereby "every man is naturally friendly
                     towards all other men" (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But
                     that a man who takes pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind, is because he seems on this account
                     to be devoid of the humane feeling which gives rise to clemency.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q157_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q157_A4-p0.1">Whether clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because it directs
                     man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God. Now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it
                     is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.21" target="asv">James 1:21</a>): "With meekness receive the ingrafted word," and (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.5.13" target="asv">Ecclus. 5:13</a>): "Be meek to hear the word" of God. Again, Dionysius says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.)
                     that "Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition on account of his great meekness." Therefore meekness is the greatest
                     of virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear
                     to be most acceptable to God. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.34" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:34,35</a>): "That which is agreeable" to God is "faith and meekness"; wherefore Christ expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.29" target="asv">Mat. 11:29</a>), where He says: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart"; and Hilary declares
                     [*Comment. in Matth. iv, 3] that "Christ dwells in us by our meekness of soul." Again, it is most acceptable to men; wherefore
                     it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.3.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 3:19</a>): "My son, do thy works in meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men": for which reason it is also declared
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p3.4" href="./asv.html#Prov.20.28" target="asv">Prov. 20:28</a>) that the King's "throne is strengthened by clemency." Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest of virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that "the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil,
                     but overcome evil by good." Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety which would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because
                     a gloss of Ambrose [*Hilary the deacon] on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:8, </a> "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable to all things," observes that "piety is the sum total of the Christian religion."
                     Therefore
                     meekness and clemency are the greatest virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but are annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing prevents certain virtues from being greatest, not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a particular genus.
                     It is impossible for clemency or meekness to be absolutely the greatest virtues, since they owe their praise to the fact that
                     they withdraw a man from evil, by mitigating anger or punishment. Now it is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil.
                     Wherefore those virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise prudence and justice, which
                     direct one to good simply, are absolutely greater virtues than clemency and meekness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p7"> Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil
                     inclinations. For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on account of its impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man's
                     free judgment of truth: wherefore meekness above all makes a man self-possessed. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.31" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:31</a>): "My son, keep thy soul in meekness." Yet the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch are more
                     shameful, and harass more incessantly, for which reason temperance is more rightly reckoned as a principal virtue. as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="SS_Q157_A4-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A7.html">Q[141], A[7]</a>, ad 2). As to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity, the greatest of
                     the virtues, since thereby we do good towards our neighbor, and hinder his evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes man
                     self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above; secondly, because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict
                     the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): "To
                     be meek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it condemn
                     our evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know better and have a clearer insight of the truth."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God and men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the virtues,
                     towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor's evils.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and clemency by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our
                     neighbor's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For piety relieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a superior,
                     for instance God or one's parents: mercy relieves a neighbor's evil, because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as
                     one looks upon it as affecting oneself, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q157_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q30_A2.html">Q[30], A[2]</a>): and this results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for the same things: meekness does this, by removing
                     anger that urges to vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far as it judges equitable that a person
                     be no further punished.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q158" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q158-p0.1">OF ANGER (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q158-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q158-p2"> We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed to meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency.
                  Concerning anger there are eight points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q158-p3"> (1) Whether it is lawful to be angry?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q158-p4"> (2) Whether anger is a sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q158-p5"> (3) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q158-p6"> (4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q158-p7"> (5) Of its species;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q158-p8"> (6) Whether anger is a capital vice?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q158-p9"> (7) Of its daughters;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q158-p10"> (8) Whether it has a contrary vice?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q158_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A1-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to be angry?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For Jerome in his exposition on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv"> Mat. 5:22, </a> "Whosoever is angry with his brother," etc. says: "Some codices add 'without cause.' However, in the genuine codices the
                     sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbidden altogether." Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "The soul's evil is to be without reason." Now anger is always without reason:
                     for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger does not listen perfectly to reason"; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45)
                     that "when anger sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends it by its riot"; and Cassian says (De Inst.
                     Caenob. viii, 6): "From whatever cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds
                     the eye of the mind." Therefore it is always evil to be angry.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is "desire for vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2] according to a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.17" target="asv"> Lev. 19:17, </a> "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart." Now it would seem unlawful to desire vengeance, since this should be left
                     to God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.35" target="asv"> Dt. 32:35, </a> "Revenge is Mine." Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always an evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since
                     God judges with tranquillity according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.12.18" target="asv"> Wis. 12:18.</a> Therefore to be angry is always an evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He that is angry without cause,
                     shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless,
                     judgments unstable, crimes unchecked." Therefore to be angry is not always an evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking anger is a passion of the sensitive appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above
                     (
                     <a id="SS_Q158_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A1.html">FS, Q[46], A[1]</a>) when we were treating of the passions. Now with regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may be
                     found in them in two ways. First by reason of the passion's very species, which is derived from the passion's object. Thus
                     envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil,
                     since it is displeasure at another's good, and such displeasure is in itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher
                     remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention of envy denotes something evil." Now this does not apply to anger, which is the
                     desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly, evil is found in a passion in respect of the
                     passion's quantity, that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one
                     is
                     angry, more or less than right reason demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one's anger is deserving
                     of praise.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they deemed
                     anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q158_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q24_A2.html">FS, Q[24], A[2]</a> ) when we were treating of the passions. It is in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger whereby
                     one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing him a wrong.---But, according to the
                     Peripatetics, to whose opinion Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions of the soul are movements
                     of the sensitive appetite, whether they be moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not always evil.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First, antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude,
                     and has therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appetite is directed
                     against vice and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is called "zealous anger." Wherefore Gregory says (Moral.
                     v, 45): "We must beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it
                     overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead of following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid,
                     to obey." This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason in the execution of the act, does not destroy
                     the rectitude of reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "zealous anger troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful
                     anger blinds it." Nor is it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted in the execution of what
                     reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in its act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done, while
                     having to act.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire
                     vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it
                     is moved thereto by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with the order of judgment, it is God's work, since
                     he who has power to punish "is God's minister," as stated in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.4" target="asv"> Rom.
                        13:4.
                     </a>
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> We can and ought to be like to God in the desire for good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our
                     desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory
                     says (Moral. v, 45) that "anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it bows to the command of reason."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q158_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A2-p0.1">Whether anger is a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by sinning. But "we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither
                     do we incur blame thereby," as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Consequently no passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="SS_Q158_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A1.html">FS, Q[46], A[1]</a>) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but
                     to a person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine asserts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger,
                     for a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.5" target="asv"> Ps. 4:5, </a> "Be ye angry and sin not," says: "The movement of anger is not in our power." Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. vii,
                     6) that "the angry man acts with displeasure." Now displeasure is contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene [*De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30]. But it is not contrary to man's nature
                     to be angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible; wherefore Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton.
                     Monach.] that "to be angry is the property of man." Therefore it is not a sin to be angry.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.31" target="asv">Eph. 4:31</a>): "Let all indignation and anger [*Vulg.: 'Anger and indignation'] . . . be put away from you."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Anger, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q158_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q158_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is properly the name of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so far as it is regulated by reason, whereas
                     it is evil if it set the order of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may be considered in relation
                     to two things. First, in relation to the appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore if one desire
                     revenge to be taken in
                     accordance with the order of reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called "zealous anger" [*Cf. Greg., Moral.
                     v, 45]. On the other hand, if one desire the taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of reason, for
                     instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order
                     prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire
                     of
                     anger will be sinful, and this is called sinful anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p8"> Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the
                     movement of anger should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor externally; and if this condition be disregarded,
                     anger will not lack sin, even though just vengeance be desired.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since passion may be either regulated or not regulated by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely does not
                     include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and
                     deserving of praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason, it may be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore
                     the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "it is he who is angry in a certain way,
                     that is praised or blamed."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appetite turns
                     as to a mutable good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is master of his actions through the judgment of his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that judgment,
                     it is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole, i.e. so that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check
                     each one, if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger is not in man's power, to the extent namely that
                     no such movement arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not
                     entirely sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the Philosopher that "the angry man acts with displeasure," means that
                     he is displeased, not with his being angry, but with the injury which he deems done to himself: and through this displeasure
                     he is moved to seek vengeance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The irascible power in man is naturally subject to his reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is in
                     accord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is contrary to man's nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q158_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A3-p0.1">Whether all anger is a mortal sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all anger is a mortal sin. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.2" target="asv">Job 5:2</a>): "Anger killeth the foolish man [*Vulg.: 'Anger indeed killeth the foolish']," and he speaks of the spiritual killing, whence
                     mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal condemnation. Now anger deserves eternal condemnation; for our Lord
                     said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv">Mat. 5:22</a>): "Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment": and a gloss on this passage says that "the three
                     things mentioned there, namely judgment, council, and hell-fire, signify in a pointed manner different abodes in the state
                     of eternal damnation corresponding to various sins."
                     Therefore anger is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatsoever is contrary to charity is a mortal sin. Now anger is of itself contrary to charity, as Jerome declares
                     in his commentary on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv"> Mat. 5:22, </a> "Whosoever is angry with his brother," etc. where he says that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor. Therefore anger
                     is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.5" target="asv"> Ps. 4:5, </a> "Be ye angry and sin not," says: "Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful in two ways, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q158_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q158_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. First, on the part of the appetible object, as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger is a mortal sin in the point
                     of its genus, because it is contrary to charity and justice. Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a venial sin by
                     reason of the imperfection of the act. This imperfection is considered either in relation to the
                     subject desirous of vengeance, as when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment of his reason; or in relation to the
                     desired object, as when one desires to be avenged in a trifling matter, which should be deemed of no account, so that even
                     if one proceeded to action, it would not be a mortal sin, for instance by pulling a child slightly by the hair, or by some
                     other like action. Secondly, the movement of anger may be inordinate in the mode of being angry, for instance, if one be too
                     fiercely angry inwardly, or if one exceed in the outward signs of anger. In this way anger is not a mortal sin in the point
                     of its genus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin, for instance if through the fierceness of his anger a man fall away from
                     the love of God and his neighbor.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It does not follow from the passage quoted that all anger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually by
                     anger, because, through not checking the movement of anger by their reason, they fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming
                     God or by doing injury to their neighbor.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition to the words of the Law: "Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the
                     judgment" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.21" target="asv">Mat. 5:21</a>). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of the movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave injury of
                     his neighbor: and should the consent of reason be given to this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the case where anger is contrary to charity, it is a mortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we have
                     said.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q158_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A4-p0.1">Whether anger is the most grievous sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlviii in Joan.] that "nothing is more repulsive
                     than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a ruthless* face, and most of all than a cruel soul." [*'Severo'. The
                     correct text is 'Si vero.' The translation would then run thus . . . 'and nothing uglier.' And if his 'face is ugly, how much
                     uglier is his soul!']. Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would seem to be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing
                     is said to be evil because it hurts." Now anger is most hurtful, because it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master
                     of himself; for Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan.) that "anger differs in no way from madness; it is a demon while it
                     lasts, indeed more troublesome than one harassed by a demon." Therefore anger is the most
                     grievous sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, inward movements are judged according to their outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most
                     grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the beam; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest anger grow into hatred
                     and a mote become a beam." Therefore anger is not the most grievous sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q158_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q158_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), the inordinateness of anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an undue object, and with regard
                     to an undue mode of being angry. As to the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the least of sins, for
                     anger desires the evil of punishment for some person, under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the part of the
                     evil which it desires the sin of anger
                     agrees with those sins which desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred; but while hatred desires absolutely
                     another's evil as such, and the envious man desires another's evil through desire of his own glory, the angry man desires
                     another's evil under the aspect of just revenge. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is more grievous than envy, and envy
                     than anger: since it is worse to desire evil as an evil, than as a good; and to desire evil as an external good such as honor
                     or
                     glory, than under the aspect of the rectitude of justice. On the part of the good, under the aspect of which the angry man
                     desires an evil, anger concurs with the sin of concupiscence that tends to a good. In this respect again, absolutely speaking.
                     the sin of anger is apparently less grievous than that of concupiscence, according as the good of justice, which the angry
                     man desires, is better than the pleasurable or useful good which is desired by the subject of concupiscence. Wherefore the
                     Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "the incontinent in desire is more disgraceful than the incontinent in anger."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p7"> On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence
                     on account of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.4" target="asv"> Prov. 27:4, </a> "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth: and who can bear the violence of one provoked?" Hence Gregory says
                     (Moral. v, 45): "The heart goaded by the pricks of anger is convulsed, the body trembles, the tongue entangles itself, the
                     face is inflamed, the eyes are enraged and fail utterly to recognize those whom we know: the tongue makes sounds indeed, but
                     there is no sense in its utterance."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of the outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers the inordinate movement of anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Murder results from hatred and envy no less than from anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the aspect
                     of justice, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q158_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A5-p0.1">Whether the Philosopher suitably assigns the species of anger?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some
                     angry persons are "choleric," some "sullen," and some "ill-tempered" or "stern." According to him, a person is said to be
                     "sullen" whose anger "is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time." But this apparently pertains to the circumstance
                     of time. Therefore it seems that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of
                     the other circumstances.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "ill-tempered" or "stern" persons "are those whose anger is not appeased without revenge,
                     or punishment." Now this also pertains to the unquenchableness of anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is the same
                     as bitterness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv">Mat. 5:22</a>): "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca,
                     shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say" to his brother, "Thou fool." But these degrees are not referable
                     to the aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of anger is not fitting.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi] says "there are three species of irascibility," namely, "the anger which is
                     called wrath [*'Fellea,' i.e. like gall. But in 
                     <a id="SS_Q158_A5-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A8.html">FS, Q[46], A[8]</a>, St. Thomas quoting the same authority has {Cholos} which we render 'wrath']," and "ill-will" which is a disease of the mind,
                     and "rancour." Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid. For "wrath" he describes as "having beginning
                     and movement," and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to "choleric" persons: "ill-will" he describes as "an anger
                     that endures and grows old," and this the Philosopher ascribes to "sullenness"; while he describes "rancour" as "reckoning
                     the time for vengeance," which tallies with the Philosopher's description of the "ill-tempered." The same division is given
                     by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to the passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated when
                     treating of the passions (
                     <a id="SS_Q158_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A8.html">FS, Q[46], A[8]</a>) how it is to be applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene
                     had in view. Here, however, we have to take the distinction of these species in its application to the sin of anger, and as
                     set down by the
                     Philosopher.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p7"> For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and
                     this regards "choleric" persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight cause. Secondly, in relation to the duration
                     of anger, for that anger endures too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because the cause of anger, to wit,
                     the inflicted injury, remains too long in a man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a lasting
                     displeasure, wherefore he is "grievous" and "sullen" to himself. In another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which
                     a man seeks with a stubborn desire: this applies to "ill-tempered" or "stern" people, who do not put aside their anger until
                     they have inflicted punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger, or his pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration in
                     the aforesaid species.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both "sullen" and "ill-tempered" people have a long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a "sullen" person has an
                     abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into
                     the outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except
                     his displeasure wear away with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the
                     anger of "ill-tempered" persons is long-lasting on account of their intense desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out
                     with time, and can be quelled only by revenge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not refer to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course of
                     the human act [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q158_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A8.html">FS, Q[46], A[8]</a>, OBJ[3]]. For the first degree is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever is angry with his brother."
                     The second degree is when the anger is manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into effect; and in reference
                     to this He says:
                     "Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca!" which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is when the sin conceived inwardly
                     breaks out into effect. Now the effect of anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge; and the least of hurts is that
                     which is done by a mere word; wherefore in reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou fool!" Consequently
                     it is clear that the second adds to the first, and the third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal
                     sin, in the case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A[3], ad 2), much more so are the others. Wherefore some kind of
                     condemnation is assigned as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case "judgment" is assigned, and this is the least
                     severe, for as Augustine says [*Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9], "where judgment is to be delivered, there is an opportunity for
                     defense": in the second case "council" is assigned, "whereby the judges deliberate together on the punishment to be
                     inflicted": to the third case is assigned "hell-fire," i.e. "decisive condemnation."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q158_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A6-p0.1">Whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among the capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice
                     known by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.29.22" target="asv"> Prov. 29:22, </a> "An angry [Douay: 'passionate'] man provoketh quarrels," says: "Anger is the door to all vices: if it be closed, peace is
                     ensured within to all the virtues; if it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime." Now no capital vice is the origin
                     of all sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places anger among the capital vices.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q158_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html">FS, Q[84], A[3]</a>,4), a capital vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two reasons for which many vices can arise
                     from anger. The first is on the part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability, in so far as revenge is desired
                     under the aspect of just or honest*, which is attractive by its excellence, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q158_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q158_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. [*Honesty must be taken
                     here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. Q[145], A[1]]. The second
                     is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates the mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident
                     that anger is a capital vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the most part, the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results from
                     an injury inflicted.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (Q[118], A[7]; Q[148], A[5]; Q[153], A[4]; 
                     <a id="SS_Q158_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A4.html">FS, Q[84], A[4]</a>), it belongs to the notion of a capital vice to have a most desirable end, so that many sins are committed through the desire
                     thereof. Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of good, has a more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter
                     desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is more a capital vice than hatred is.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Anger is stated to be the door to the vices accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the judgment
                     of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is, however, directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called
                     its daughters.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q158_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A7-p0.1">Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to anger, namely "quarreling, swelling of the mind, contumely,
                     clamor, indignation and blasphemy." For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] to be a daughter of pride.
                     Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters
                     of anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "a swollen mind" would seem to be the same as pride. Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but "the mother of
                     all vices," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of the mind should not be reckoned among the daughters
                     of anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. one is on the
                     part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems unworthy [indignum] of acting thus towards him, and this is
                     called "indignation." The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in so far as he devises various means of vengeance,
                     and with such like thoughts fills his mind, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Job.15.2" target="asv"> Job 15:2,
                        
                     </a>"Will a wise man . . . fill his stomach with burning heat?" And thus we have "swelling of the mind."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p7"> Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man
                     manifests his anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (A[5], ad 3) of the man who says to his brother, "Raca": and
                     this refers to "clamor," which denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is when a man breaks out into injurious
                     words, and if these be against God, it is "blasphemy," if against one's neighbor, it is "contumely."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p8"> Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus anger gives rise to "quarrels," by which we are to understand
                     all manner of injuries inflicted on one's neighbor through anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up against God: since,
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 10:14, </a> "the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God," i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him is the first part of
                     pride [*Cf.
                     <a id="SS_Q158_A7-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A7.html"> Q[162], A[7]</a>, ad 2]; and this gives rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out through a
                     disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely displeasure,
                     even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure. Now through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes
                     to hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from sloth rather than from anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to take vengeance;
                     and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q158_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A8-p0.1">Whether there is a vice opposed to anger resulting from lack of anger?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there. is not a vice opposed to anger, resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God.
                     Now by being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who judges "with tranquillity" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.12.18" target="asv">Wis. 12:18</a>). Therefore seemingly it is not a vice to be altogether without anger.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether useless. But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca
                     proves in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it seems that lack of anger is not a vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "man's evil is to be without reason." Now the judgment of reason remains
                     unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of anger amounts to a vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He who is not angry,
                     whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites
                     not only the wicked but even the good to do wrong."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not through
                     passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which
                     anger is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth., in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St.
                     John Chrysostom): "Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment. For
                     anger, properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion": and when a man is angry with reason, his anger is no longer from
                     passion: wherefore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger is taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite,
                     which is with passion resulting from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in man, to the movement
                     of his will, since the lower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless there be an obstacle.
                     Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, unless the movement of the will be altogether
                     lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the passion of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed
                     to punishment by the judgment of reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He that is entirely without anger when he ought to be angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's punishing
                     by judgment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The passion of anger, like all other movements of the sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more prompt
                     execution [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q158_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q24_A3.html">FS, Q[24], A[3]</a>] of reason's dictate: else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas "nature does nothing without purpose"
                     [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also of
                     the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause
                     is removed, so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q159" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q159_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q159-p0.1">OF CRUELTY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q159-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q159-p2"> We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q159-p3"> (1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q159-p4"> (2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q159_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q159_A1-p0.1">Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency. For Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are said to be cruel
                     who exceed in punishing," which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance.
                     Therefore apparently cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q159_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.6.23" target="asv">Jer. 6:23</a>): "They are cruel, and will have no mercy"; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now mercy is not the same as clemency,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q159_A1-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A4.html">Q[157], A[4]</a>, ad 3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of punishment, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q159_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A1.html">Q[157], A[1]</a>): whereas cruelty applies to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q159_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.11.17" target="asv"> Prov. 11:17, </a> "But he that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred." Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "the opposite of clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness of heart in
                     exacting punishment."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Cruelty apparently takes its name from "cruditas" [rawness]. Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to have
                     an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and bitter taste. Now it has been stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q159_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html">Q[157], A[3]</a>, ad 1; A[4], ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment.
                     Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate punishment according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which inclines one to
                     this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing, as regards the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards
                     the hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment, belongs to cruelty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both shun and recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For it belongs
                     to mercy [*Cf.
                     <a id="SS_Q159_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q30_A1.html"> Q[30], A[1]</a>] to relieve another's unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to mitigate another's unhappiness
                     by the cessation of punishment. And since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more directly opposed to clemency
                     than to mercy; yet on
                     account of the mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for mercilessness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of beneficence
                     is in itself a punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q159_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q160.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q159_A2-p0.1">Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue.
                     Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess. Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty
                     are the same.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "severity is as it were savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without attending
                     to piety": so that savagery would seem to exclude that mitigation of punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by
                     piety. Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (A[1], ad 1). Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by way of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency,
                     which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining
                     to deficiency is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission or laxity. For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): "Let there
                     be love, but not that which enervates, let there be severity, but without fury, let
                     there be zeal without unseemly savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency." Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "a man who is angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is not
                     said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> "Savagery" and "brutality" take their names from a likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For animals
                     of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not for some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs
                     to reason alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies to those who in inflicting punishment have not
                     in view a default of the person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a
                     man's torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial,
                     and resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature, as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand,
                     cruelty not only regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty differs
                     from savagery or brutality, as human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But savagery
                     or brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue,
                     which the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or "god-like," which according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts
                     of the Holy Ghost. Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to
                     the gift of piety.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A severe man is not said to be simply savage, because this implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as regards the truth,"
                     on account of some likeness to savagery which is not inclined to mitigate punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished on account
                     of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other hand, cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission
                     of punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q160.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q159_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q160" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q159_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q160_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q160-p0.1">OF MODESTY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q160-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q160-p2"> We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of its species. Under the first head there are two points
                  of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q160-p3"> (1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q160-p4"> (2) What is the matter of modesty?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q160_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q160.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q160_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q160_A1-p0.1">Whether modesty is a part of temperance?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance. For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every
                     virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and "good," according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), "consists in mode, species,
                     and order." Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be reckoned a part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its
                     name. Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of our neighbor, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q160_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.24" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:24,25, </a> "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the
                     truth." Now admonishing wrong-doers is an act of justice or of charity, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q160_A1-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A1.html">Q[33], A[1]</a>). Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as a part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q160_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">Q[141], A[4]</a>;
                     <a id="SS_Q160_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html"> Q[157], A[3]</a>), temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is most difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of
                     pleasures of touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of very great moment, there must needs be another
                     virtue about matters of lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by the virtues with regard
                     to everything: thus it was stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q160_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q134_A3.html">Q[134], A[3]</a>, ad 1), that while magnificence is about great expenditure, there is need in addition for liberality, which is concerned
                     with ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult.
                     This virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its principal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a name is common to many it is sometimes appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of angel is
                     appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, mode which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially
                     appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some things need tempering on account of their strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in all things:
                     wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong passions, and modesty about weaker passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Modesty is to be taken there for the general moderation which is necessary in all virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q160.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q160_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q160_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q160_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q160_A2-p0.1">Whether modesty is only about outward actions?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that modesty is only about outward actions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to other
                     persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q160_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.4.5" target="asv">Phil. 4:5</a>): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the virtues that are about the passions are distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is
                     seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it will not be concerned with inward passions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one same virtue is both about things pertaining to the appetite---which is proper to the moral virtues---and
                     about things pertaining to knowledge---which is proper to the intellectual virtues---and again about things pertaining to
                     the irascible and concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it cannot be about all these things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> In all these things it is necessary to observe the "mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all of
                     them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q160_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q160_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, modesty differs from temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint is most difficult, while modesty
                     moderates those that present less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various opinions about modesty. For wherever they
                     found a special kind of good or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the province of modesty, which they
                     confined to lesser matters. Now it
                     is clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a special difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance
                     from modesty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p7"> In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation
                     of punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters
                     that require moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. one is the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this
                     is moderated by "humility." The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is
                     moderated by "studiousness" which is opposed to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which require to
                     be done becomingly and honestly [*Cf.
                     <a id="SS_Q160_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html"> Q[145], A[1]</a>], whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in dress and the like.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p8"> To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed certain special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus]
                     mentions "meekness, simplicity, humility," and other kindred virtues, of which we have spoken above (Q[143]); while Aristotle
                     (Ethic. ii, 7) assigned {eutrapelia} to pleasures in games, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q160_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html">FS, Q[60], A[5]</a>). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully; and in this way modesty regards not only outward but
                     also inward actions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals. Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain
                     outward signs.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Various virtues assigned by various authorities are comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from regarding
                     matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not so great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there
                     is between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which is about passions, because in actions and passions that
                     present no great difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part
                     of moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of moderation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p11"> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p13"></p>
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               <h3 id="SS_Q161-p0.1">OF HUMILITY (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q161-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q161-p2"> We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite,
                  Curiosity; (3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as affecting outward attire.
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q161-p3"> Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q161-p4"> (1) Whether humility is a virtue?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q161-p5"> (2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q161-p6"> (3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q161-p7"> (4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q161-p8"> (5) Of its comparison with the other virtues;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q161-p9"> (6) Of the degrees of humility.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q161_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161.html"></a>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q161_A1-p0.1">Whether humility is a virtue?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue conveys the notion of a penal evil, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.104.18" target="asv"> Ps. 104:18, </a> "They humbled his feet in fetters." Therefore humility is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now humility seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.23" target="asv">Ecclus. 19:23</a>): "There is one that humbleth himself wickedly." Therefore humility is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But humility is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims
                     at great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem that humility is not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, virtue is "the disposition of that which is perfect" (Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the
                     imperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is
                     not a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions, according to Ethic. ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the
                     Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore
                     it would seem not to be a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Origen commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.1.48" target="asv"> Lk. 1:48, </a> "He hath regarded the humility of His handmaid," says (Hom. viii in Luc.): "One of the virtues, humility, is particularly
                     commended in Holy Writ; for our Saviour said: 'Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.'"
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q161_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html">FS, Q[23], A[2]</a>) when we were treating of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive to the appetite, namely the aspect of
                     good, and likewise something repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In respect of the former there
                     arises the movement of hope, and in respect of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q161_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html">FS, Q[61], A[2]</a>)
                     that for those appetitive movements which are a kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a moderating and restraining
                     moral virtue, while for those which are a kind of recoil, there is need, on the part of the appetite, of a moral virtue to
                     strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold virtue is necessary with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper and
                     restrain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and this belongs to the virtue of humility: and another to
                     strengthen the mind against despair, and urge it on to the pursuit of great things according to right reason; and this is
                     magnanimity. Therefore it is evident that humility is a virtue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Isidore observes (Etym. x), "a humble man is so called because he is, as it were, 'humo acclinis'" [*Literally, 'bent
                     to the ground'], i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This may happen in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for
                     instance when one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment. Secondly, through an intrinsic principle: and
                     this may be done sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own
                     failings, assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus Abraham said to the Lord (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.18.27" target="asv">Gn. 18:27</a>), "I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes." In this way humility is a virtue. Sometimes, however, this may
                     be ill-done, for instance when man, "not understanding his honor, compares himself to senseless beasts, and becomes like to
                     them" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.48.13" target="asv">Ps. 48:13</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as it is a virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest
                     place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs and pretense: wherefore this is "false humility," of which Augustine
                     says in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is "grievous pride," since to wit, it would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes,
                     however, this is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way,
                     properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does not consist externals, but chiefly in the inward choice
                     of the mind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at great things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to great
                     things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this,
                     that each is according to right reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature nor in
                     respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To Him humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but
                     only as regards His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be perfect in a restricted sense, for instance in respect
                     of its nature or state or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in
                     comparison with God his perfection is found wanting, according to the word of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.17" target="asv"> Is. 40:17, </a> "All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all." In this way humility may be competent to every man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another is defined
                     according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is a matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special
                     virtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p14"></p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q161_A2-p0.1">Whether humility has to do with the appetite?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite but the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride.
                     Now pride concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 22) that "pride, when it extends outwardly
                     to the body, is first of all shown in the eyes": wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.130.1" target="asv">Ps. 130:1</a>), "Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty." Now eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. Therefore it
                     would seem that humility is chiefly concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks little of oneself.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "almost the whole of Christian teaching is humility." Consequently nothing
                     contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things,
                     according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:31</a>, "Be zealous for the better gifts." Therefore it belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things but the
                     estimate thereof.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain excessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive
                     withdrawal: thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the
                     soul against the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore if humility were to curb the desire of
                     great things, it would follow that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is
                     evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire but with the estimate of great things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Andronicus [*De Affectibus] assigns humility to outward show; for he says that humility is "the habit of avoiding
                     excessive expenditure and parade." Therefore it is not concerned with the movement of the appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]) that "the humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of the Lord,
                     rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners." But choice concerns the appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite
                     rather than with the estimative power.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q161_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it belongs properly to humility, that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that which is above him. For this
                     purpose he must know his disproportion to that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own deficiency belongs
                     to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite. Nevertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself; and consequently
                     it must be said that humility, properly
                     speaking, moderates the movement of the appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it excludes respect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are especially
                     wont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare themselves with others. But it does not follow from this that humility
                     is essentially concerned with knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is contrary to humility to aim at greater things through confiding in one's own powers: but to aim at greater things through
                     confidence in God's help, is not contrary to humility; especially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is
                     one exalted in God's sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): "It is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another
                     to raise oneself up against God. He that abases himself before Him, him He
                     raiseth up; he that raises himself up against Him, him He casteth down."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In fortitude there is the same reason for restraining daring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since the reason
                     in both cases is that man should set the good of reason before dangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous
                     hope which pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for strengthening the soul against despair. Because the reason
                     for strengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one's proper good
                     lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good which was competent to him; while the chief reason for suppressing
                     presumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent
                     to him according to the position in which God has placed him. Wherefore humility would seem to denote in the first place man's
                     subjection to God; and for this reason Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) ascribes humility, which he understands by
                     poverty of spirit, to the gift of fear whereby man reveres God. Hence it follows that the relation of fortitude to daring
                     differs from that of humility to hope. Because fortitude uses daring more than it suppresses it: so that excess of daring
                     is more like fortitude than lack of daring is. On the other hand, humility suppresses hope or confidence in self more than
                     it uses it; wherefore excessive self-confidence is more opposed to humility than lack of confidence is.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont to be done with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility. Accordingly
                     humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals, as signs of the inward movement of the appetite.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p13"></p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q161_A3-p0.1">Whether one ought, by humility, to subject oneself to all men?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one ought not, by humility, to subject oneself to all men. For, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), humility
                     consists chiefly in man's subjection to God. Now one ought not to offer to a man that which is due to God, as is the case
                     with all acts of religious worship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not to subject oneself to man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gratia xxxiv): "Humility should take the part of truth, not of falsehood." Now some men
                     are of the highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves to their inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by
                     humility, to subject oneself to all men.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further no one ought to do that which conduces to the detriment of another's spiritual welfare. But if a man subject himself
                     to another by humility, this is detrimental to the person to whom he subjects himself; for the latter might wax proud, or
                     despise the other. Hence Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest through excessive humility the superior lose his authority."
                     Therefore a man ought not, by humility, to subject himself to all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.3" target="asv">Phil. 2:3</a>): "In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> We may consider two things in man, namely that which is God's, and that which is man's. Whatever pertains to defect is man's:
                     but whatever pertains to man's welfare and perfection is God's, according to the saying of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.13.9" target="asv"> Osee 13:9, </a> "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me." Now humility, as stated above (A[1], ad 5; A[2], ad 3), properly
                     regards the reverence whereby man is subject to God. Wherefore every man, in respect of
                     that which is his own, ought to subject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that which the latter has of God's: but humility
                     does not require a man to subject what he has of God's to that which may seem to be God's in another. For those who have a
                     share of God's gifts know that they have them, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:12</a>: "That we may know the things that are given us from God." Wherefore without prejudice to humility they may set the gifts
                     they have received from God
                     above those that others appear to have received from Him; thus the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.5" target="asv">Eph. 3:5</a>): "(The mystery of Christ) was not known to the sons of men as it is now revealed to His holy apostles." In like manner.
                     humility does not require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that which his neighbor has of man's: otherwise
                     each one would have to esteem himself a greater sinner than anyone else: whereas the Apostle says without prejudice to humility
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.15" target="asv">Gal.
                        2:15
                     </a>): "We by nature are Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners." Nevertheless a man may esteem his neighbor to have some good
                     which he lacks himself, or himself to have some evil which another has not: by reason of which, he may subject himself to
                     him with humility.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We must not only revere God in Himself, but also that which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of reverence
                     as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with humility to all our neighbors for God's sake, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.13" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:13, </a> "Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's sake"; but to God alone do we owe the worship of latria.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If we set what our neighbor has of God's above that which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a gloss
                     [*St. Augustine, QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 71] on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.3" target="asv"> Phil. 2:3, </a> "Esteem others better than themselves," says: "We must not esteem by pretending to esteem; but we should in truth think it
                     possible for another person to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we are, although our own
                     good whereby
                     we are apparently better than he, be not hidden."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly in the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul, may
                     subject himself to another, without giving the other man an occasion of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine
                     means in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "With fear, the superior should prostrate himself at your feet in the sight of God." On the
                     other hand, due moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even
                     as of other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If, however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom
                     an occasion of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with humility; since he does not give scandal, although others
                     take it.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p11"></p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q161_A4-p0.1">Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one
                     is subject to God, as stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q161_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Now it belongs to a theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility should be reckoned a theological virtue
                     rather than a part of temperance or modesty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed
                     to it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a
                     part, not of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q161_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A5.html">Q[129], A[5]</a>). Therefore it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): "If thou wilt hear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the philosophers,
                     know that humility which God regards is the same as what they called {metriotes}, i.e. measure or moderation." Now this evidently
                     pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a part of modesty or temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q161_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q137_A2.html">Q[137], A[2]</a>, ad 1;
                     <a id="SS_Q161_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html"> Q[157], A[3]</a>, ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the
                     mode of temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or suppression of the impetuosity of a passion.
                     Hence whatever virtues restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of the emotions, are
                     reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress the movement
                     of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part
                     of temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a man who aims at small things in proportion to his
                     mode is not magnanimous but "temperate," and such a man we may call humble. Moreover, for the reason given above (
                     <a id="SS_Q161_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q160_A2.html">Q[160], A[2]</a>), among the various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is comprised is modesty as understood by Tully (De
                     Invent. Rhet. ii, 54), inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit: wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A4-p6.4" href="./asv.html#iPet.3.4" target="asv">1 Pet. 3:4</a>): "In the incorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The theological virtues, whose object is our last end, which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the causes
                     of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused by reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part
                     of modesty or temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by reason of a sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated
                     above (
                     <a id="SS_Q161_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q137_A2.html">Q[137], A[2]</a>, ad 1;
                     <a id="SS_Q161_A4-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html"> Q[157], A[3]</a>, ad 2). Consequently, although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned as a part of modesty or temperance
                     by reason of its mode.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter, they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned
                     a part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q161_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q161_A5-p0.1">Whether humility is the greatest of the virtues?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that humility is the greatest of the virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the
                     publican (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18" target="asv">Lk. 18</a>), says [*Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi.] that "if humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it overtakes
                     the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the
                     angels by the judgment seat of God." Hence it is clear that humility is
                     set above justice. Now justice is either the most exalted of all the virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher
                     (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. [*S. 10, C[1]]): "Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality?
                     Attend first of all to the foundation of humility." Now this would seem to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue.
                     Therefore apparently it is greater than the other virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater reward. Now the greatest reward is due to humility, since "he that humbleth
                     himself shall be exalted" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.11" target="asv">Lk. 14:11</a>). Therefore humility is the greatest of virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 16), "Christ's whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through
                     the human nature which He assumed." Now He especially proposed His humility for our example, saying (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.29" target="asv">Mat. 11:29</a>): "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart." Moreover, Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 1) that the "lesson proposed
                     to us in the mystery of our redemption is the humility of God." Therefore humility would
                     seem to be the greatest of virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Charity is set above all the virtues, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.14" target="asv">Col. 3:14</a>, "Above all . . . things have charity." Therefore humility is not the greatest of virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The good of human virtue pertains to the order of reason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end: wherefore
                     the theological virtues are the greatest because they have the last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered
                     in reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance, as to its essence, is in the reason itself from which
                     it issues, but by participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and
                     this ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice. Now humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance
                     of all kinds and in all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some special matter. Therefore after the theological
                     virtues, after the intellectual virtues which regard the reason itself, and after justice, especially legal justice, humility
                     stands before all others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Humility is not set before justice, but before that justice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue; even
                     so, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is said of the publican (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.14" target="asv">Lk. 18:14</a>) that through the merit of his humility "he went down into his house justified." Hence Chrysostom says [*De incompr. Nat.
                     Dei, Hom. v]: "Bring me a pair of two-horse chariots: in the one harness pride with justice,
                     in the other sin with humility: and you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not by its own strength, but by that of
                     humility: while you will see the other pair beaten, not by the weakness of justice, but by the weight and size of pride."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is, by reason of a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that which
                     is the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the foundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building.
                     Now the virtues are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two
                     ways. First by way of removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first
                     place, inasmuch as it expels pride, which "God resisteth," and makes man submissive and ever open to receive the influx of
                     Divine grace. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.6" target="asv">James 4:6</a>): "God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble." In this sense humility is said to be the foundation of the spiritual
                     edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among virtues directly, because it is the first step towards God. Now the first step towards
                     God is by faith, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv"> Heb. 11:6,
                        
                     </a>"He that cometh to God must believe." In this sense faith is the foundation in a more excellent way than humility.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To him that despises earthly things, heavenly things are promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who despise
                     earthly riches, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.19" target="asv"> Mat. 6:19,20, </a> "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth . . . but lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven." Likewise heavenly consolations
                     are promised to those who despise worldly joys, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.5" target="asv"> Mat. 4:5, </a> "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be
                     comforted." In the same way spiritual uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone merits it, but because it
                     is proper to it to despise earthly uplifting. Wherefore Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]): "Think not that he who
                     humbles himself remains for ever abased, for it is written: 'He shall be exalted.' And do not imagine that his exaltation
                     in men's eyes is effected by bodily uplifting."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility to us, was because it especially removes the obstacle to man's spiritual
                     welfare consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and spiritual things, in which he is hindered by striving to become great in
                     earthly things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spiritual welfare, showed by giving an example of humility,
                     that outward exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility is, as it were, a
                     disposition to man's untrammeled access to spiritual and divine goods. Accordingly as perfection is greater than disposition,
                     so charity, and other virtues whereby man approaches God directly, are greater than humility.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q161_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q161_A6-p0.1">Whether twelve degrees of humility are fittingly distinguished in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the twelve degrees of humility that are set down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict [*St. Thomas gives
                     these degrees in the reverse order to that followed by St. Benedict] are unfittingly distinguished. The first is to be "humble
                     not only in heart, but also to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the ground"; the second is "to speak few
                     and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice"; the third is "not to be easily moved, and
                     disposed to laughter"; the fourth is "to maintain silence until one is asked"; the fifth is "to do nothing but to what one
                     is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery"; the sixth is "to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all"; the seventh
                     is "to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes"; the eighth is "to confess one's sin"; the ninth is "to
                     embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances"; the tenth is "to subject oneself to a superior";
                     the
                     eleventh is "not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires"; the twelfth is "to fear God and to be always mindful of everything
                     that God has commanded." For among these there are some things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obedience and patience.
                     Again there are some that seem to involve a false opinion---and this is inconsistent with any virtue---namely to declare oneself
                     more despicable than all men, and to confess and believe oneself to be in all ways worthless and unprofitable.
                     Therefore these are unfittingly placed among the degrees of humility.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, humility proceeds from within to externals, as do other virtues. Therefore in the aforesaid degrees, those which
                     concern outward actions are unfittingly placed before those which pertain to inward actions.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Anselm (De Simil. ci, seqq.) gives seven degrees of humility, the first of which is "to acknowledge oneself contemptible";
                     the second, "to grieve for this"; the third, "to confess it"; the fourth, "to convince others of this, that is to wish them
                     to believe it"; the fifth, "to bear patiently that this be said of us"; the sixth, "to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt";
                     the seventh, "to love being thus treated." Therefore the aforesaid degrees
                     would seem to be too numerous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.3.15" target="asv"> Mat. 3:15 </a>says: "Perfect humility has three degrees. The first is to subject ourselves to those who are above us, and not to set ourselves
                     above our equals: this is sufficient. The second is to submit to our equals, and not to set ourselves before our inferiors;
                     this is called abundant humility. The third degree is to subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is perfect righteousness."
                     Therefore the aforesaid degrees
                     would seem to be too numerous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): "The measure of humility is apportioned to each one according to his rank. It
                     is imperiled by pride, for the greater a man is the more liable is he to be entrapped." Now the measure of a man's greatness
                     cannot be fixed according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it would seem that it is not possible to assign the aforesaid
                     degrees to humility.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q161_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A2.html">(A[2])</a> humility has essentially to do with the appetite, in so far as a man restrains the impetuosity of his soul, from tending
                     inordinately to great things: yet its rule is in the cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be above what
                     we are. Also, the principle and origin of both these things is the reverence we bear to God. Now the inward disposition of
                     humility leads to certain outward signs in
                     words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that which is hidden within, as happens also with the other virtues. For "a man
                     is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, by his countenance" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A6-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.26" target="asv">Ecclus. 19:26</a>). Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of humility include something regarding the root of humility, namely the twelfth degree,
                     "that a man fear God and bear all His commandments in mind."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p8"> Again, they include certain things with regard to the appetite, lest one aim inordinately at one's own excellence. This is
                     done in three ways. First, by not following one's own will, and this pertains to the eleventh degree; secondly, by regulating
                     it according to one's superior judgment, and this applies to the tenth degree; thirdly, by not being deterred from this on
                     account of the difficulties and hardships that come in our way, and this belongs to the ninth degree.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p9"> Certain things also are included referring to the estimate a man forms in acknowledging his own deficiency, and this in three
                     ways. First by acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings; this belongs to the eighth degree: secondly, by deeming oneself
                     incapable of great things, and this pertains to the seventh degree: thirdly, that in this respect one should put others before
                     oneself, and this belongs to the sixth degree.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p10"> Again, some things are included that refer to outward signs. One of these regards deeds, namely that in one's work one should
                     not depart from the ordinary way; this applies to the fifth degree. Two others have reference to words, namely that one should
                     not be in a hurry to speak, which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not immoderate in speech, which refers to
                     the second. The others have to do with outward gestures, for instance in restraining haughty looks, which
                     regards the first, and in outwardly checking laughter and other signs of senseless mirth, and this belongs to the third degree.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and avow oneself the most despicable of men, as regards the hidden faults which
                     we acknowledge in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God which others have. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. lii): "Bethink
                     you that some persons are in some hidden way better than you, although outwardly you are better than they." Again, without
                     falsehood one may avow and believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in
                     respect of one's own capability, so as to refer all one's sufficiency to God, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A6-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:5, </a> "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God." And there is
                     nothing unbecoming in ascribing to humility those things that pertain to other virtues, since, just as one vice arises from
                     another, so, by a natural sequence, the act of one virtue proceeds from the act of another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man arrives at humility in two ways. First and chiefly by a gift of grace, and in this way the inner man precedes the outward
                     man. The other way is by human effort, whereby he first of all restrains the outward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking
                     out the inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees of humility are here enumerated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the degrees mentioned by Anselm are reducible to knowledge, avowal, and desire of one's own abasement. For the first
                     degree belongs to the knowledge of one's own deficiency; but since it would be wrong for one to love one's own failings, this
                     is excluded by the second degree. The third and fourth degrees regard the avowal of one's own deficiency; namely that not
                     merely one simply assert one's failing, but that one convince another of it. The other
                     three degrees have to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward excellence, but outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity,
                     whether it consist of words or deeds. For as Gregory says (Regist. ii, 10, 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A6-p13.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 36</a>), "there is nothing great in being humble towards those who treat us with regard, for even worldly people do this: but we
                     should especially be humble towards those who make us suffer," and this belongs to the fifth and sixth degrees: or the appetite
                     may even go so far as lovingly to
                     embrace external abasement, and this pertains to the seventh degree; so that all these degrees are comprised under the sixth
                     and seventh mentioned above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> These degrees refer, not to the thing itself, namely the nature of humility, but to the degrees among men, who are either
                     of higher or lower or of equal degree.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> This argument also considers the degrees of humility not according to the nature of the thing, in respect of which the aforesaid
                     degrees are assigned, but according to the various conditions of men.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p16"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p17"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q160_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q162" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q162-p0.1">OF PRIDE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q162-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q162-p2"> We must next consider pride, and (1) pride in general; (2) the first man's sin, which we hold to have been pride. Under the
                  first head there are eight points of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q162-p3"> (1) Whether pride is a sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q162-p4"> (2) Whether it is a special vice?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q162-p5"> (3) Wherein does it reside as in its subject?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q162-p6"> (4) Of its species;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q162-p7"> (5) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q162-p8"> (6) Whether it is the most grievous of all sins?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q162-p9"> (7) Of its relation to other sins;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q162-p10"> (8) Whether it should be reckoned a capital vice?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q162_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A1-p0.1">Whether pride is a sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not a sin. For no sin is the object of God's promise. For God's promises refer to what He will
                     do; and He is not the author of sin. Now pride is numbered among the Divine promises: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.60.15" target="asv">Is. 60:15</a>): "I will make thee to be an everlasting pride [Douay: 'glory'], a joy unto generation and generation." Therefore pride is
                     not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is not a sin to wish to be like unto God: for every creature has a natural desire for this; and especially does
                     this become the rational creature which is made to God's image and likeness. Now it is said in Prosper's Lib. Sent. 294, that
                     "pride is love of one's own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who is supremely excellent." Hence Augustine says (Confess.
                     ii, 6): "Pride imitates exaltedness; whereas Thou alone art God exalted over all."
                     Therefore pride is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a sin is opposed not only to a virtue but also to a contrary vice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But
                     no vice is found to be opposed to pride. Therefore pride is not a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.4.14" target="asv">Tob. 4:14</a>): "Never suffer pride to reign in thy mind or in thy words."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Pride [superbia] is so called because a man thereby aims higher [supra] than he is; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x): "A
                     man is said to be proud, because he wishes to appear above (super) what he really is"; for he who wishes to overstep beyond
                     what he is, is proud. Now right reason requires that every man's will should tend to that which is proportionate to him. Therefore
                     it is evident that pride denotes something opposed to right reason, and this shows it
                     to have the character of sin, because according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 4), "the soul's evil is to be opposed to reason."
                     Therefore it is evident that pride is a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pride [superbia] may be understood in two ways. First, as overpassing [supergreditur] the rule of reason, and in this sense
                     we say that it is a sin. Secondly, it may simply denominate "super-abundance"; in which sense any super-abundant thing may
                     be called pride: and it is thus that God promises pride as significant of super-abundant good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on
                     the same passage (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.61.6" target="asv">Is. 61:6</a>) says that "there is a good and an
                     evil pride"; or "a sinful pride which God resists, and a pride that denotes the glory which He bestows."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p8"> It may also be replied that pride there signifies abundance of those things in which men may take pride.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason has the direction of those things for which man has a natural appetite; so that if the appetite wander from the rule
                     of reason, whether by excess or by default, it will be sinful, as is the case with the appetite for food which man desires
                     naturally. Now pride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
                     13) that pride is the "desire for inordinate exaltation": and hence it is that, as he
                     asserts (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13; xix, 12), "pride imitates God inordinately: for it hath equality of fellowship under Him, and
                     wishes to usurp Hi. dominion over our fellow-creatures."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pride is directly opposed to the virtue of humility, which, in a way, is concerned about the same matter as magnanimity,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A1.html">Q[161], A[1]</a>, ad 3). Hence the vice opposed to pride by default is akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which is opposed by default to magnanimity.
                     For just as it belongs to magnanimity to urge the mind to great things against despair, so it belongs to humility to withdraw
                     the mind from the
                     inordinate desire of great things against presumption. Now pusillanimity, if we take it for a deficiency in pursuing great
                     things, is properly opposed to magnanimity by default; but if we take it for the mind's attachment to things beneath what
                     is becoming to a man, it is opposed to humility by default; since each proceeds from a smallness of mind. In the same way,
                     on the other hand, pride may be opposed by excess, both to magnanimity and humility, from different points of view: to humility,
                     inasmuch as it scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch as it tends to great things inordinately. Since, however, pride
                     implies a certain elation, it is more directly opposed to humility, even as pusillanimity, which denotes littleness of soul
                     in tending towards great things, is more directly opposed to magnanimity.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q162_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A2-p0.1">Whether pride is a special sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not a special sin. For Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "you will find no sin that
                     is not labelled pride"; and Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. iii, 2) that "without pride no sin is, or was, or ever will be
                     possible." Therefore pride is a general sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.33.17" target="asv"> Job 33:17, </a> "That He may withdraw man from wickedness [*Vulg.: 'From the things that he is doing, and may deliver him from pride'],"
                     says that "a man prides himself when he transgresses His commandments by sin." Now according to Ambrose [*De Parad. viii],
                     "every sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin is
                     pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. But pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says (Moral.
                     xxxiv, 23): "Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one virtue; it raises itself up against all the powers of
                     the soul, and like an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body"; and Isidore says (Etym. [*De Summo Bono
                     ii, 38]) that it is "the downfall of all virtues." Therefore pride is not a special
                     sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every special sin has a special matter. Now pride has a general matter, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that
                     "one man is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is elated by mean and earthly things, another by sublime and
                     heavenly virtues." Therefore pride is not a special but a general sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix): "If he look into the question carefully, he will find that, according to God's law,
                     pride is a very different sin from other vices." Now the genus is not different from its species. Therefore pride is not a
                     general but a special sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The sin of pride may be considered in two ways. First with regard to its proper species, which it has under the aspect of
                     its proper object. In this way pride is a special sin, because it has a special object: for it is inordinate desire of one's
                     own excellence, as stated (A[1], ad 2). Secondly, it may be considered as having a certain influence towards other sins. In
                     this way it has somewhat of a generic character, inasmuch as all sins may arise from pride,
                     in two ways. First directly, through other sins being directed to the end of pride which is one's own excellence, to which
                     may be directed anything that is inordinately desired. Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it were, that is by removing
                     an obstacle, since pride makes a man despise the Divine law which hinders him from sinning, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.2.20" target="asv"> Jer. 2:20, </a> "Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p8"> It must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride admits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride
                     sometimes, but it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For though one may break the commandments of
                     the Law by any kind of sin, through contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always break the Divine commandments
                     through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance. and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason Augustine
                     says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "many things are done amiss which are not done through pride."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words are introduced by Augustine into his book De Nat. et Grat., not as being his own, but as those of someone with
                     whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the assertion, and shows that not all sins are committed through pride.
                     We might, however, reply that these authorities must be understood as referring to the outward effect of pride, namely the
                     breaking of the commandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act
                     of pride, namely contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed, not always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance,
                     sometimes through weakness, as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but not affectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays his father, is a parricide
                     effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend it. Accordingly he who breaks God's commandment is said to pride
                     himself against God, effectively always, but not always affectively.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. In one way by direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not corrupt every
                     virtue, but only humility; even as every special sin destroys the special virtue opposed to it, by acting counter thereto.
                     In another way a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: and thus pride destroys every virtue, in so far
                     as it finds an occasion of pride in every virtue, just as in everything else
                     pertaining to excellence. Hence it does not follow that it is a general sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Pride regards a special aspect in its object, which aspect may be found in various matters: for it is inordinate love of
                     one's excellence, and excellence may be found in various things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q162_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A3-p0.1">Whether the subject of pride is the irascible faculty?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the subject of pride is not the irascible faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17): "A swollen mind
                     is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light." Now the knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible
                     but to the rational faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that "the proud observe other people's conduct not so as to set themselves beneath
                     them with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with pride": wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue
                     observation. Now observation pertains not to the irascible but to the rational faculty.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further. pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it consists
                     essentially in the contempt of God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 10:14, </a> "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God." Now the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appetite,
                     cannot extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot be in the irascible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as stated in Prosper's Liber Sententiarum, sent. 294, "Pride is love of one's own excellence." But love is not in
                     the irascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the gift of fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the irascible.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act cannot be
                     other than the object of the power, which is the subject of both. Now the proper object of pride is something difficult, for
                     pride is the desire of one's own excellence, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways.
                     First in a strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even as anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of
                     the sensitive appetite. Secondly, the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to belong also to the intellective
                     appetite, to which also anger is sometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the angels, not as a passion,
                     but as denoting the sentence of justice pronouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood in this broad sense is
                     not distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated above in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A4.html">FP, Q[59], A[4]</a>; 
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A3-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A5.html">FS, Q[82], A[5]</a>, ad 1 and 2.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p8"> Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, were merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive
                     appetite might tend, pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of the sensitive appetite. But since the difficult
                     thing which pride has in view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say that the subject of pride
                     is the irascible not only strictly so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider
                     acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appetite. Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause. For the
                     proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.25" target="asv"> Mat. 11:25, </a> "Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent," i.e. from the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes,
                     "and hast revealed them to little ones," i.e. to the humble.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p10"> Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.6.34" target="asv">Ecclus. 6:34</a>): "If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive instruction." The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is
                     directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth;
                     thus Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that "the proud, although certain hidden truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot
                     realize
                     their sweetness: and if they know of them they cannot relish them." Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A3-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.11.2" target="asv">Prov. 11:2</a>): "Where humility is there also is wisdom."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A2.html">Q[161], AA[2]</a>, 6), humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem. Now pride does not observe this rule
                     of right reason, for he esteems himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate desire for his own excellence,
                     since a man is ready to believe what he desires very much, the result being that his appetite is borne towards things higher
                     than what become
                     him. Consequently whatsoever things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to pride: and one of those is the observing
                     of other people's failings, just as, on the other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17), "holy men, by a like observation
                     of other people's virtues, set others above themselves." Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in the rational faculty,
                     but that one of its causes is in the reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general signification,
                     as stated above.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), "love precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause," wherefore
                     it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It is in this sense that pride is said to be "love of one's own excellence,"
                     inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his superiority over others, and this belongs properly to pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q162_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A5.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A4-p0.1">Whether the four species of pride are fittingly assigned by Gregory?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly assigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): "There are four
                     marks by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself; either when they think that their good is from themselves,
                     or if they believe it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their own merits; or when they boast of having what
                     they have not, or despise others and wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what they
                     have." For pride is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue from faith. Now it pertains to unbelief,
                     if a man deem that he has not received his good from God, or that he has the good of grace through his own merits. Therefore
                     this should not be reckoned a species of pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species of different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>;
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A4-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q112.html"> Q[112])</a>. Therefore it should not be accounted a species of pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride, which are not mentioned here. For Jerome [*Reference unknown] says
                     that "nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful": and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that "it
                     belongs to pride to excuse oneself of a sin one has committed." Again, presumption whereby one aims at having what is above
                     one, would seem to have much to do with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not
                     sufficiently account for the different species of pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm [*Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq.] divides the uplifting of pride,
                     saying that there is "pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of deed." Bernard [*De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq.] also
                     reckons twelve degrees of pride, namely "curiosity, frivolity of mind, senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance,
                     presumption, defense of one's sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful
                     habit." Now these apparently are not comprised under the species mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to
                     be assigned unfittingly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The authority of Gregory suffices.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2,3), pride denotes immoderate desire of one's own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is not in accord with right reason.
                     Now it must be observed that all excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be considered in three ways. First,
                     in itself. For it is evident that the greater the good that one has, the greater the excellence that one derives from it.
                     Hence when a man ascribes to himself a
                     good greater than what he has, it follows that his appetite tends to his own excellence in a measure exceeding his competency:
                     and thus we have the third species of pride, namely "boasting of having what one has not."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p8"> Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to
                     have it of another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another as though he had it of himself, the result
                     is that his appetite is borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of one's own good in two ways, efficiently
                     and meritoriously: and thus we have the first two species of pride, namely "when a man thinks he has from
                     himself that which he has from God," or "when he believes that which he has received from above to be due to his own merits."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p9"> Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it, in so far as a man obtains greater excellence through
                     possessing some good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his appetite is borne inordinately towards
                     his own excellence: and thus we have the fourth species of pride, which is "when a man despises others and wishes to be singularly
                     conspicuous."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways. First, universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is destroyed
                     by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice, and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication,
                     judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were
                     he to say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question in
                     point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that there is a good which is not from God, or that grace is given
                     to men for their merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and not to unbelief, through inordinate desire of
                     one's own excellence, to boast of one's goods as though one had them of oneself, or of one's own merits.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as regards the outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what he has
                     not: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned by Gregory to be a species of pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he has from another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to ingratitude.
                     To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to the third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the
                     good of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is above one, would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth
                     species, which consists in wishing to be preferred to others.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in thought,
                     then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p14"> The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we
                     have spoken above (
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A4-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A6.html">Q[161], A[6]</a>). For the first degree of humility is to "be humble in heart, and to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the
                     ground": and to this is opposed "curiosity," which consists in looking around in all directions curiously and inordinately.
                     The second degree of humility is "to speak few and
                     sensible words, and not to be loud of voice": to this is opposed "frivolity of mind," by which a man is proud of speech. The
                     third degree of humility is "not to be easily moved and disposed to laughter," to which is opposed "senseless mirth." The
                     fourth degree of humility is "to maintain silence until one is asked," to which is opposed "boasting". The fifth degree of
                     humility is "to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery," to which is opposed "singularity,"
                     whereby a man wishes to seem more holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is "to believe and acknowledge oneself viler
                     than all," to which is opposed "arrogance," whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh degree of humility is "to
                     think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes," to which is opposed "presumption," whereby a man thinks himself
                     capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of humility is "to confess one's sins," to which is opposed "defense
                     of one's sins." The ninth degree is "to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances," to which
                     is opposed "deceitful confession," whereby a man being unwilling to be punished for his sins confesses them deceitfully. The
                     tenth degree of humility is "obedience," to which is opposed "rebelliousness." The eleventh degree of humility is "not to
                     delight in fulfilling one's own desires"; to this is opposed "license," whereby a man delights in doing freely whatever he
                     will.
                     The last degree of humility is "fear of God": to this is opposed "the habit of sinning," which implies contempt of God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p15"> In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated, but also certain things that precede and follow them,
                     as we have stated above with regard to humility (
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A4-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A6.html">Q[161], A[6]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p16"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p17"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A5.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q162_A5" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A6.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A5-p0.1">Whether pride is a mortal sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin. For a gloss on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.7.4" target="asv">Ps. 7:4</a>, "O Lord my God, if I have done this thing," says: "Namely, the universal sin which is pride." Therefore if pride were a
                     mortal sin, so would every sin be.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But pride is apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love
                     of God, nor as to the love of one's neighbor, because the excellence which, by pride, one desires inordinately, is not always
                     opposed to God's honor, or our neighbor's good. Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride is not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom,
                     for as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23), "sometimes a man is elated by sublime and heavenly virtues." Therefore pride is not
                     a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "pride is a most evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the elect."
                     But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins. Therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly regards the subjection of man to God, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A1.html">Q[161], A[1]</a>, ad 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in so far as a man raises himself above that which is appointed
                     to him according to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.10.13" target="asv">2 Cor. 10:13</a>), "But we will not glory beyond our measure; but according to the measure
                     of the rule which God hath measured to us." Wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:14</a>): "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God" because, to wit, the root of pride is found to consist in man
                     not being, in some way, subject to God and His rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is of its very nature
                     a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away from God: and consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin. Nevertheless
                     just as in other sins
                     which are mortal by their genus (for instance fornication and adultery) there are certain motions that are venial by reason
                     of their imperfection (through forestalling the judgment of reason, and being without its consent), so too in the matter of
                     pride it happens that certain motions of pride are venial sins, when reason does not consent to them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A2.html">(A[2])</a> pride is a general sin, not by its essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all sins may have their origin in pride.
                     Hence it does not follow that all sins are mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we have stated to be a
                     mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pride is always contrary to the love of God, inasmuch as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule as he
                     ought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor; when, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his
                     neighbor: and this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has established order among men, so that one ought to
                     be subject to another.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct cause, but as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a virtue
                     an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from being the accidental cause of another, as stated in Phys. viii,
                     1. Hence some are even proud of their humility.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A4.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A6.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q162_A6" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A7.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A6-p0.1">Whether pride is the most grievous of sins?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of sins. For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it
                     would seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "Other sins find their
                     vent in the accomplishment of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy them." Therefore pride is not
                     the most grievous of sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "The greater evil is opposed to the greater good," as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to
                     which pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q61_A5.html">Q[61], A[5]</a>). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues, such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth,
                     are more grievous sins than pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser evil. But pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.28" target="asv"> Rom. 1:28, </a> where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men of science were delivered "to a reprobate sense, to do those
                     things which are not convenient." Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.51" target="asv"> Ps. 118:51, </a> "The proud did iniquitously," says: "The greatest sin in man is pride."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to a mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion from
                     the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and complement. Now on the part of the conversion, there is no reason
                     for pride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride covets inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible
                     with the good of virtue. But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme gravity,
                     because in other sins man turns away from God, either through ignorance or through weakness, or through desire for any other
                     good whatever; whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply through being unwilling to be subject to God and His rule. Hence
                     Boethius [*Cf. Cassian, de Caenob. Inst. xii, 7] says that "while all vices flee from God, pride alone withstands God"; for
                     which reason it is specially stated (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.6" target="asv">James 4:6</a>) that "God resisteth the proud." Wherefore aversion
                     from God and His commandments, which is a consequence as it were in other sins, belongs to pride by its very nature, for its
                     act is the contempt of God. And since that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always of greater weight than that which
                     belongs to it through something else, it follows that pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because it exceeds
                     in aversion which is the formal complement of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First, on account of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in its
                     onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and "still more difficult is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its connaturality,"
                     as stated in Ethic. ii, 3,9. A difficulty of this kind in avoiding sin diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man sins
                     the more grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous temptation,
                     as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 12,15).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p8"> Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since
                     it takes occasion even from good deeds, as stated (A[5], ad 3). Hence Augustine says pointedly that it "lies in wait for good
                     deeds"; and it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.141.4" target="asv">Ps. 141:4</a>): "In the way wherein I walked, the proud [*Cf.
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.139.6" target="asv"> Ps. 139:6, </a> 'The proud have hidden a net for me.'] [Vulg.: 'they'] have hidden a snare for me." Hence no
                     very great gravity attaches to the movement of pride while creeping in secretly, and before it is discovered by the judgment
                     of reason: but once discovered by reason, it is easily avoided, both by considering one's own infirmity, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.9" target="asv"> Ecclus. 10:9, </a> "Why is earth and ashes proud?" and by considering God's greatness, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Job.15.13" target="asv"> Job 15:13, </a> "Why doth thy spirit swell against God?" as well as by considering the imperfection of the goods on which
                     man prides himself, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p8.5" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.6" target="asv"> Is. 40:6, </a> "All flesh is grass, and all the glory thereof as the flower of the field"; and farther on (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p8.6" href="./asv.html#Isa.64.6" target="asv">Is. 64:6</a>), "all our justices" are become "like the rag of a menstruous woman."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Opposition between a vice and a virtue is inferred from the object, which is considered on the part of conversion. In this
                     way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins, as neither has humility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the greatest
                     on the part of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other sins. For unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud
                     contempt, is rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of ignorance
                     or weakness. The same applies to despair and the like.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more evident
                     absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh,
                     which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that "pride is the
                     worst of all vices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest
                     and foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous deeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. on the other
                     hand, carnal lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a shameful nature: and yet, under God's dispensation,
                     it is less grievous than pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels it not, falls into the lusts of the flesh,
                     that being thus humbled he may rise from his abasement."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p11"> From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows
                     the patient to contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be more grievous by the very fact that,
                     as a remedy, God allows men to fall into other sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A5.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A7.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q162_A7" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A8.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A7-p0.1">Whether pride is the first sin of all?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all. For the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not
                     accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done "amiss
                     which are not done with pride." Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:14</a>) that the "beginning of . . . pride is to fall off from God." Therefore falling away from God precedes pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to the order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of
                     all virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.3.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 3:13</a>): "Evil men and seducers shall grow worse and worse"; so that apparently man's beginning of wickedness is not the greatest
                     of sins. But pride is the greatest of sins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is not the first sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality. Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "pride apes fortitude
                     and daring." Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p7">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p8">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The first thing in every genus is that which is essential. Now it has been stated above 
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A6.html">(A[6])</a> that aversion from God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride essentially, and to other sins, consequently.
                     Hence it is that pride fulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is "the beginning of all sins," as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A7-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html">FS, Q[84], A[2]</a>), when we were treating of the causes of sin on the part
                     of the aversion which is the chief part of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pride is said to be "the beginning of all sin," not as though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of sin
                     is naturally liable to arise from pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To fall off from God is said to be the beginning of pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being
                     the first part of pride. For it has been said above 
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A7-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A5.html">(A[5])</a> that pride regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence it scorns to be subject to a creature for
                     God's sake.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no need for the order of virtues to be the same as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that which
                     is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore as faith is the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last
                     of sins, to which sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A7-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.136.7" target="asv"> Ps. 136:7, </a> "Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof," says that "by heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse
                     into unbelief," and the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A7-p11.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.19" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:19</a>) that "some rejecting a good conscience have made shipwreck concerning the faith."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins because that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence pride
                     is the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to pride there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed
                     through ignorance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered
                     more grievous. And as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the
                     withdrawal from sin, a gloss on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A7-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.13" target="asv"> Ps. 18:13, </a> "I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin," says: "Namely from the sin of pride, which is the last in those who return to
                     God, and the first in those who withdraw from God."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The Philosopher associates pride with feigned fortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man thinks he
                     is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be daring or brave.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A6.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A8.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q162_A8" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A8-p0.1">Whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital vice, since Isidore [*Comment. in Deut. xvi] and Cassian [*De Inst.
                     Caenob. v, 1: Collat. v, 2] number pride among the capital vices.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since both covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice.
                     Therefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "pride begets envy, nor is it ever without this companion." Now envy is
                     reckoned a capital vice, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A8-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q36_A4.html">Q[36], A[4]</a>). Much more therefore is pride a capital vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not include pride among the capital vices.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q162_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,5, ad 1) pride may be considered in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin; secondly, as having a general influence
                     towards all sins. Now the capital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many kinds of sin arise. Wherefore
                     some, considering pride in the light of a special sin, numbered it together with the other capital vices. But Gregory, taking
                     into consideration its general
                     influence towards all vices, as explained above (A[2], OBJ[3]), did not place it among the capital vices, but held it to be
                     the "queen and mother of all the vices." Hence he says (Moral. xxxi, 45): "Pride, the queen of vices, when it has vanquished
                     and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that they may despoil
                     it and produce vices of all kinds."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the cause thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while vainglory covets
                     the outward show of excellence.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that envy, which is a capital vice, arises from pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but that it
                     is still more principal than the capital vices themselves.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A7.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A6.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q163" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q163-p0.1">OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q163-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q163-p2"> We must now consider the first man's sin which was pride: and (1) his sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby
                  he was led to sin.
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q163-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q163-p4"> (1) Whether pride was the first man's first sin?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q163-p5"> (2) What the first man coveted by sinning?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q163-p6"> (3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q163-p7"> (4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q163_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q163_A1-p0.1">Whether pride was the first man's first sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride was not the first man's first sin. For the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.19" target="asv">Rom. 5:19</a>) that "by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners." Now the first man's first sin is the one by which all men
                     were made sinners in the point of original sin. Therefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man's first sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says, commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.4.3" target="asv"> Lk. 4:3, </a> "And the devil said to Him," that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same order as in overcoming the first man. Now
                     Christ was first tempted to gluttony, as appears from
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.3" target="asv"> Mat. 4:3, </a> where it was said to Him: "If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread." Therefore the first man's
                     first sin was not pride but gluttony.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man sinned at the devil's suggestion. Now the devil in tempting man promised him knowledge (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.5" target="asv">Gn. 3:5</a>). Therefore inordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which pertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity,
                     and not pride, was the first sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xi] on 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:14</a>, "The woman being seduced was in the transgression," says: "The Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded
                     to accept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them to touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched
                     it, they would be like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them the godhead . . ." Now it pertains to unbelief
                     to believe such a
                     thing. Therefore man's first sin was unbelief and not pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." Now man's first sin is the beginning of all sin, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv"> Rom. 5:12, </a> "By one man sin entered into this world." Therefore man's first sin was pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is first
                     found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward movement of the soul before being in the outward act of the
                     body; since, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the body is not forfeited so long as the sanctity of the
                     soul remains. Also, among the inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the end before
                     being moved towards that which is desired for the sake of the end; and consequently man's first sin was where it was possible
                     for his appetite to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so appointed in the state of innocence, that there was no
                     rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the first inordinateness in the human appetite
                     to result from his coveting a sensible good, to which the concupiscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason. It
                     remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the human appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some spiritual
                     good. Now he would not have coveted it inordinately, by desiring it according to his measure as established by the Divine
                     rule. Hence it follows that man's first sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his measure: and this pertains
                     to pride. Therefore it is evident that man's first sin was pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man's disobedience to the Divine command was not willed by man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one presuppose
                     inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he willed it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he
                     coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his disobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with
                     the statement of Augustine, who says (Ad Oros [*Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4]) that
                     "man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent's prompting, and scorned God's commands."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first parents. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.6" target="asv">Gn. 3:6</a>): "The woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she took of the fruit
                     thereof, and did eat." Yet the very goodness and beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but the persuasive
                     words of the serpent, who said (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.5" target="asv">Gn. 3:5</a>): "Your eyes shall be opened and you
                     shall be as Gods": and it was by coveting this that the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony resulted from the
                     sin of pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The desire for knowledge resulted in our first parents from their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent began
                     by saying: "You shall be as Gods," and added: "Knowing good and evil."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30), "the woman had not believed the serpent's statement that they were debarred
                     by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not already filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud
                     self-presumption." This does not mean that pride preceded the promptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had
                     spoken his words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being that she
                     believed the demon to have spoken truly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p12"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p13"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q163_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q163_A2-p0.1">Whether the first man's pride consisted in his coveting God's likeness?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man's pride did not consist in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting
                     that which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness is competent to man according to his nature: for
                     it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>): "Let us make man to our image and likeness." Therefore he did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this
                     was the serpent's suggestion: "You shall be as Gods knowing good and evil." Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man,
                     according to the saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: "All men naturally desire knowledge."
                     Therefore he did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first man was endowed with wisdom, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.5" target="asv"> Ecclus. 17:5, </a> "He filled them with the knowledge of understanding." Since then every sin consists in a deliberate act of the appetite,
                     namely choice, it would seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. But it is impossible for man
                     to be like God, according to the saying of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.11" target="asv"> Ex. 15:11, </a> "Who is
                     like to Thee among the strong, O Lord?" Therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.68.5" target="asv"> Ps. 68:5</a> [*Enarr. in 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.68" target="asv">Ps. 68</a>], "Then did I restore [Douay: 'pay'] that which I took not away," says: "Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they
                     lost happiness."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute equality [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q163_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q93_A1.html">FP, Q[93], A[1]</a>]: and such a likeness to God our first parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not conceivable to the mind,
                     especially of a wise man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p7"> The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates
                     somewhat of God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "The same things are like and unlike
                     to God; like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike, according as an effect falls short of its
                     cause." Now every good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first good.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p8"> Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it
                     follows that he coveted God's likeness inordinately.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p9"> It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so
                     far as the rational creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be considered in reference to three things. First, as
                     to natural being: and this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation, both on man---of whom it is written
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>) that God made man "to His image and likeness"---and on the angel, of whom it is
                     written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.12" target="asv">Ezech. 28:12</a>): "Thou wast the seal of resemblance." Secondly, as to knowledge: and this likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation,
                     wherefore immediately after the words just quoted, "Thou wast the seal of resemblance," we read: "Full of wisdom." But the
                     first man, at his creation, had not yet received this likeness actually but only in potentiality. Thirdly, as to the power
                     of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness actually at the very
                     outset of his creation, because to each there remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p10"> Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted God's likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned
                     by coveting a likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God's likeness as regards "knowledge of good
                     and evil," according to the serpent's instigation, namely that by his own natural power he might decide what was good, and
                     what was evil for him to do; or again that he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him.
                     Secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as regards his own power of operation, namely that by his own natural power
                     he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman's mind was filled with
                     love of her own power." On the other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God's likeness, as regards power. Wherefore Augustine
                     says (De Vera Relig. 13) that "he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God's." Nevertheless both coveted somewhat to
                     be
                     equal to God, in so far as each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the Divine rule.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man did not sin by coveting this, as stated.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that is, above
                     one's measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.70.18" target="asv"> Ps. 70:18, </a> "O God, who is like Thee?" says: "He who desires to be of himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God.
                     Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man who refused to be, as a servant, bound by His
                     command."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the likeness of equality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q163_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q163_A3-p0.1">Whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15):
                     "Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid sin." Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid
                     sin, because they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore the sin of our first parents was more grievous than
                     other sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin of our first parents was most severely punished, since by it "death
                     entered into this world," as the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>). Therefore that sin was more grievous than other sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the greatest (Metaph. ii, 4 [*Ed. Diel. i, 1]). Now the sin of our first parents
                     was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Origen says [*Peri Archon i, 3]: "I think that a man who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall suddenly:
                     this can happen only by degrees and little by little." Now our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade.
                     Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin. one results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that adultery
                     is a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity of sin results from some circumstance of place, person, or time.
                     The former gravity is more essential to sin and is of greater moment: hence a sin is said to be grave in respect of this gravity
                     rather than of the other. Accordingly we must say that the first man's sin was not
                     graver than all other sins of men, as regards the species of the sin. For though pride, of its genus, has a certain pre-eminence
                     over other sins, yet the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God is greater than the pride whereby one covets God's likeness
                     inordinately, such as the pride of our first parents, as stated 
                     <a id="SS_Q163_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q163_A2.html">(A[2])</a>.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p7"> But if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their
                     state. We must accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively but not simply.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the gravity of sin as resulting from the person of the sinner.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The severity of the punishment awarded to that first sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its species
                     but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed the innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence
                     brought disorder upon the whole human nature.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Where things are directly subordinate, the first must needs be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one follows
                     from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that the first sin is the greatest.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q163_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q163_A4-p0.1">Whether Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's. For it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:14</a>): "Adam was not seduced, but the woman being seduced was in the transgression": and so it would seem that the woman sinned
                     through ignorance, but the man through assured knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47,48, </a> "That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not according to his will,
                     shall be beaten with many stripes: but he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes."
                     Therefore Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Decem Chordis 3 [*Serm. ix; xcvi de Temp.]): "If the man is the head, he should live better,
                     and give an example of good deeds to his wife, that she may imitate him." Now he who ought to do better, sins more grievously,
                     if he commit a sin. Therefore Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost would seem to be the most grievous. Now Adam, apparently, sinned against the Holy
                     Ghost, because while sinning he relied on God's mercy [*Cf.
                     <a id="SS_Q163_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q21_A2.html"> Q[21], A[2]</a>, OBJ[3]. St. Thomas is evidently alluding to the words of Peter Lombard quoted there], and this pertains to the sin of presumption.
                     Therefore it seems that Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Punishment corresponds to guilt. Now the woman was more grievously punished than the man, as appears from 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3" target="asv">Gn. 3</a>. Therefore she sinned more grievously than the man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated 
                     <a id="SS_Q163_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q163_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, the gravity of a sin depends on the species rather than on a circumstance of that sin. Accordingly we must assert that,
                     if we consider the condition attaching to these persons, the man's sin is the more grievous, because he was more perfect than
                     the woman.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p7"> As regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is considered to be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Augustine
                     says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 35): "Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of sex, though parity of pride."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p8"> But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned more grievously, for three reasons. First, because she was more puffed
                     up than the man. For the woman believed in the serpent's persuasive words, namely that God had forbidden them to eat of the
                     tree, lest they should become like to Him; so that in wishing to attain to God's likeness by eating of the forbidden fruit,
                     her pride rose to the height of desiring to obtain something against God's will. On the other hand, the man
                     did not believe this to be true; wherefore he did not wish to attain to God's likeness against God's will: but his pride consisted
                     in wishing to attain thereto by his own power. Secondly, the woman not only herself sinned, but suggested sin to the man;
                     wherefore she sinned against both God and her neighbor. Thirdly, the man's sin was diminished by the fact that, as Augustine
                     says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 42), "he consented to the sin out of a certain friendly good-will, on account of which a man
                     sometimes will offend God rather than make an enemy of his friend. That he ought not to have done so is shown by the just
                     issue of the Divine sentence."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p9"> It is therefore evident that the woman's sin was more grievous than the man's.</p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The woman was deceived because she was first of all puffed up with pride. Wherefore her ignorance did not excuse, but aggravated
                     her sin, in so far as it was the cause of her being puffed up with still greater pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers the circumstance of personal condition, on account of which the man's sin was more grievous than
                     the woman's.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The man's reliance on God's mercy did not reach to contempt of God's justice, wherein consists the sin against the Holy Ghost,
                     but as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi [*De Civ. Dei xiv, 11]), it was due to the fact that, "having had no experience of
                     God's severity, he thought the sin to be venial," i.e. easily forgiven [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q163_A4-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q89_A3.html">FS, Q[89], A[3]</a>, ad 1].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A8.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q164" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q164-p0.1">OF THE PUNISHMENTS OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q164-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q164-p2"> We must now consider the punishments of the first sin; and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Death, which
                  is the common punishment; (2) the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis.
               </p>
               <div id="SS_Q164_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q164_A1-p0.1">Whether death is the punishment of our first parents' sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that death is not the punishment of our first parents' sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called
                     a punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature but vitiates it. Now death is natural to man: and this is evident
                     both from the fact that his body is composed of contraries, and because "mortal" is included in the definition of man. Therefore
                     death is not a punishment of our first parents' sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, death and other bodily defects are similarly found in man as well as in other animals, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.19" target="asv"> Eccles. 3:19, </a> "The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both equal." But in dumb animals death is not a punishment
                     of sin. Therefore neither is it so in men.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sin of our first parents was the sin of particular individuals: whereas death affects the entire human nature.
                     Therefore it would seem that it is not a punishment of our first parents' sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all are equally descended from our first parents. Therefore if death were the punishment of our first parents' sin,
                     it would follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure. But this is clearly untrue, since some die sooner, and some
                     more painfully, than others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the evil of punishment is from God, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q164_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A6.html">FP, Q[48], A[6]</a>; 
                     <a id="SS_Q164_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A2.html">FP, Q[49], A[2]</a>). But death, apparently, is not from God: for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>): "God made not death." Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, seemingly, punishments are not meritorious, since merit is comprised under good, and punishment under evil. Now
                     death is sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr's death. Therefore it would seem that death is not a punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p8">
                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, punishment would seem to be painful. But death apparently cannot be painful, since man does not feel it when he
                     is dead, and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death is not a punishment of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p9">
                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, if death were a punishment of sin, it would have followed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first parents
                     lived a long time after their sin (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.5.5" target="asv">Gn. 5:5</a>). Therefore, seemingly, death is not a punishment of sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p10">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p11">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> If any one, on account of his fault, be deprived of a favor bestowed on him the privation of that favor is a punishment of
                     that fault. Now as we stated in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q164_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html">FP, Q[95], A[1]</a>; 
                     <a id="SS_Q164_A1-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>, God bestowed this favor on man, in his primitive state, that as long as his mind was subject to God, the lower powers of
                     his soul would be subject to his rational mind, and his body to his soul. But inasmuch as through
                     sin man's mind withdrew from subjection to God, the result was that neither were his lower powers wholly subject to his reason,
                     whence there followed so great a rebellion of the carnal appetite against the reason: nor was the body wholly subject to the
                     soul; whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life and soundness of body depend on the body being subject to the
                     soul, as the perfectible is subject to its perfection. Consequently, on the other hand, death, sickness, and all defects of
                     the body are due to the lack of the body's subjection to the soul.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p12"> It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appetite against the spirit is a punishment of our first parents'
                     sin, so also are death and all defects of the body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds from the principles of nature. Now the essential principles of nature are form
                     and matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is, of itself, immortal: wherefore death is not natural to man on
                     the part of his form. The matter of man is a body such as is composed of contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary
                     consequence, and in this respect death is natural to man. Now this condition attached
                     to the nature of the human body results from a natural necessity, since it was necessary for the human body to be the organ
                     of touch, and consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this was impossible, were it not composed of contraries, as
                     the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 11). On the other hand, this condition is not attached to the adaptability of matter
                     to form because, if it were possible, since the form is incorruptible, its matter should rather be incorruptible. In the same
                     way
                     a saw needs to be of iron, this being suitable to its form and action, so that its hardness may make it fit for cutting. But
                     that it be liable to rust is a necessary result of such a matter and is not according to the agent's choice; for, if the craftsman
                     were able, of the iron he would make a saw that would not rust. Now God Who is the author of man is all-powerful, wherefore
                     when He first made man, He conferred on him the favor of being exempt from the necessity resulting from such a matter:
                     which favor, however, was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents. Accordingly death is both natural on account of
                     a condition attaching to matter, and penal on account of the loss of the Divine favor preserving man from death [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q164_A1-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A6.html">FS, Q[85], A[6]</a>].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p14">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This likeness of man to other animals regards a condition attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of contraries.
                     But it does not regard the form, for man's soul is immortal, whereas the souls of dumb animals are mortal.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our first parents were made by God not only as particular individuals, but also as principles of the whole human nature to
                     be transmitted by them to their posterity, together with the Divine favor preserving them from death. Hence through their
                     sin the entire human nature, being deprived of that favor in their posterity, incurred death.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p16">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by way of a punishment appointed by a judge: and such a defect should be equal in
                     those to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is that which results accidentally from this punishment; for instance,
                     that one who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed, should fall down in the road. Such a defect is not
                     proportionate to the sin, nor does a human judge take it into account, since he
                     cannot foresee chance happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for the first sin and proportionately corresponding
                     thereto, was the withdrawal of the Divine favor whereby the rectitude and integrity of human nature was maintained. But the
                     defects resulting from this withdrawal are death and other penalties of the present life. Wherefore these punishments need
                     not be equal in those to whom the first sin equally appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all future events, Divine
                     providence has so disposed that these penalties are apportioned in different ways to various people. This is not on account
                     of any merits or demerits previous to this life, as Origen held [*Peri Archon ii, 9]: for this is contrary to the words of
                     
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A1-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.11" target="asv"> Rom. 9:11, </a> "When they . . . had not done any good or evil"; and also contrary to statements made in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q164_A1-p16.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q90_A4.html">FP, Q[90], A[4]</a>; 
                     <a id="SS_Q164_A1-p16.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A3.html">FP, Q[118], A[3]</a>, namely that the soul is not created
                     before the body: but either in punishment of their parents' sins, inasmuch as the child is something belonging to the father,
                     wherefore parents are often punished in their children; or again it is for a remedy intended for the spiritual welfare of
                     the person who suffers these penalties, to wit that he may thus be turned away from his sins, or lest he take pride in his
                     virtues, and that he may be crowned for his patience.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p17">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Death may be considered in two ways. First, as an evil of human nature, and thus it is not of God, but is a defect befalling
                     man through his fault. Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely as being a just punishment, and thus it is from God.
                     Wherefore Augustine says (Retract. i, 21) that God is not the author of death, except in so far as it is a punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p18">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 5), "just as the wicked abuse not only evil but also good things, so do the righteous
                     make good use not only of good but also of evil things. Hence it is that both evil men make evil use of the law, though the
                     law is good, while good men die well, although death is an evil." Wherefore inasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their
                     death is to them meritorious.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p19">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> Death may be considered in two ways. First, as the privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt, since it is the privation
                     of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of sense but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as denoting
                     the corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may speak of corruption even as of generation in two ways: in
                     one way as being the term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which
                     life departs, death is said to be present. In this way also death has no pain of sense. In another way corruption may be taken
                     as including the previous alteration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in motion towards death; just as a thing is
                     said to be engendered, while in motion towards the state of having been engendered: and thus death may be painful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p20">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. [*De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. i, 16. Cf. Gen. ad lit. ii. 32]), "although our first parents
                     lived thereafter many years, they began to die on the day when they heard the death-decree, condemning them to decline to
                     old age."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p21"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p22"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q164_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q164_A2-p0.1">Whether the particular punishments of our first parents are suitably appointed in Scripture?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the particular punishments of our first parents are unsuitably appointed in Scripture. For that which
                     would have occurred even without sin should not be described as a punishment for sin. Now seemingly there would have been
                     "pain in child-bearing," even had there been no sin: for the disposition of the female sex is such that offspring cannot be
                     born without pain to the bearer. Likewise the "subjection of woman to man" results from the
                     perfection of the male, and the imperfection of the female sex. Again it belongs to the nature of the earth "to bring forth
                     thorns and thistles," and this would have occurred even had there been no sin. Therefore these are unsuitable punishments
                     of the first sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which pertains to a person's dignity does not, seemingly, pertain to his punishment. But the "multiplying of
                     conceptions" pertains to a woman's dignity. Therefore it should not be described as the woman's punishment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the punishment of our first parents' sin is transmitted to all, as we have stated with regard to death 
                     <a id="SS_Q164_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q164_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But all "women's conceptions" are not "multiplied," nor does "every man eat bread in the sweat of his face." Therefore these
                     are not suitable punishments of the first sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the place of paradise was made for man. Now nothing in the order of things should be without purpose. Therefore
                     it would seem that the exclusion of man from paradise was not a suitable punishment of man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p6">
                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, this place of the earthly paradise is said to be naturally inaccessible. Therefore it was useless to put other obstacles
                     in the way lest man should return thither, to wit the cherubim, and the "flaming sword turning every way."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p7">
                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, immediately after his sin man was subject to the necessity of dying, so that he could not be restored to immortality
                     by the beneficial tree of life. Therefore it was useless to forbid him to eat of the tree of life, as instanced by the words
                     of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.22" target="asv"> Gn. 3:22</a>: "See, lest perhaps he . . . take . . . of the tree of life . . . and live for ever."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p8">
                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, to mock the unhappy seems inconsistent with mercy and clemency, which are most of all ascribed to God in Scripture,
                     according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.144.9" target="asv"> Ps. 144:9, </a> "His tender mercies are over all His works." Therefore God is unbecomingly described as mocking our first parents, already
                     reduced through sin to unhappy straits, in the words of
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.22" target="asv"> Gn. 3:22, </a> "Behold Adam is become as one of Us, knowing good and evil."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p9">
                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, clothes are necessary to man, like food, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:8, </a> "Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we are content." Therefore just as food was appointed to our first
                     parents before their sin, so also should clothing have been ascribed to them. Therefore after their sin it was unsuitable
                     to say that God made for them garments of skin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p10">
                     <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, the punishment inflicted for a sin should outweigh in evil the gain realized through the sin: else the punishment
                     would not deter one from sinning. Now through sin our first parents gained in this, that their eyes were opened, according
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.7" target="asv"> Gn. 3:7.</a> But this outweighs in good all the penal evils which are stated to have resulted from sin. Therefore the punishments resulting
                     from our first parents' sin are unsuitably described.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p11">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> These punishments were appointed by God, Who does all things, "in number, weight, and measure [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast ordered
                     all things in measure, and number, and weight.']" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p12">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the foregoing Article, on account of their sin, our first parents were deprived of the Divine favor, whereby
                     the integrity of human nature was maintained in them, and by the withdrawal of this favor human nature incurred penal defects.
                     Hence they were punished in two ways. In the first place by being deprived of that which was befitting the state of integrity,
                     namely the place of the earthly paradise: and this is indicated (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.23" target="asv">Gn.
                        3:23
                     </a>) where it is stated that "God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure." And since he was unable, of himself, to return to
                     that state of original innocence, it was fitting that obstacles should be placed against his recovering those things that
                     were befitting his original state, namely food (lest he should take of the tree of life) and place; for "God placed before
                     . . . paradise . . . Cherubim, and a flaming sword." Secondly, they were punished by having appointed to them
                     things befitting a nature bereft of the aforesaid favor: and this as regards both the body and the soul. With regard to the
                     body, to which pertains the distinction of sex, one punishment was appointed to the woman and another to the man. To the woman
                     punishment was appointed in respect of two things on account of which she is united to the man; and these are the begetting
                     of children, and community of works pertaining to family life. As regards the begetting of children, she was punished in two
                     ways: first in the weariness to which she is subject while carrying the child after conception, and this is indicated in the
                     words (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.16" target="asv">Gn. 3:16</a>), "I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions"; secondly, in the pain which she suffers in giving birth, and this is
                     indicated by the words (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p12.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.16" target="asv">Gn. 3:16</a>), "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth." As regards family life she was punished by being subjected to her husband's authority,
                     and this is conveyed in the words
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p12.4" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.16" target="asv">Gn. 3:16</a>), "Thou shalt be under thy husband's power."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p13"> Now, just as it belongs to the woman to be subject to her husband in matters relating to the family life, so it belongs to
                     the husband to provide the necessaries of that life. In this respect he was punished in three ways. First, by the barrenness
                     of the earth, in the words (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.17" target="asv">Gn. 3:17</a>), "Cursed is the earth in thy work." Secondly, by the cares of his toil, without which he does not win the fruits of the
                     earth; hence the words (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.17" target="asv">Gn. 3:17</a>), "With labor and toil
                     shalt thou eat thereof all the days of thy life." Thirdly, by the obstacles encountered by the tillers of the soil, wherefore
                     it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p13.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.18" target="asv">Gn. 3:18</a>), "Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p14"> Likewise a triple punishment is ascribed to them on the part of the soul. First, by reason of the confusion they experienced
                     at the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit; hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.7" target="asv">Gn. 3:7</a>): "The eyes of them both were opened; and . . . they perceived themselves to be naked." Secondly, by the reproach for their
                     sin, indicated by the words (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.22" target="asv">Gn. 3:22</a>), "Behold Adam is become as one of Us." Thirdly, by the reminder of their
                     coming death, when it was said to him (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p14.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.19" target="asv">Gn. 3:19</a>): "Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return." To this also pertains that God made them garments of skin, as a sign of
                     their mortality.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p15">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the state of innocence child-bearing would have been painless: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Just as, in
                     giving birth, the mother would then be relieved not by groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity, so in bearing
                     and conceiving the union of both sexes would be one not of lustful desire but of deliberate action" [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q164_A2-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q98_A2.html">FP, Q[98], A[2]</a>].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p16"> The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as inflicted in punishment of the woman, not as to his headship
                     (since even before sin the man was the "head" and governor "of the woman"), but as to her having now to obey her husband's
                     will even against her own.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p17"> If man had not sinned, the earth would have brought forth thorns and thistles to be the food of animals, but not to punish
                     man, because their growth would bring no labor or punishment for the tiller of the soil, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii,
                     18). Alcuin [*Interrog. et Resp. in Gen. lxxix], however, holds that, before sin, the earth brought forth no thorns and thistles,
                     whatever: but the former opinion is the better.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p18">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The multiplying of her conceptions was appointed as a punishment to the woman, not on account of the begetting of children,
                     for this would have been the same even before sin, but on account of the numerous sufferings to which the woman is subject,
                     through carrying her offspring after conception. Hence it is expressly stated: "I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p19">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These punishments affect all somewhat. For any woman who conceives must needs suffer sorrows and bring forth her child with
                     pain: except the Blessed Virgin, who "conceived without corruption, and bore without pain" [*St. Bernard, Serm. in Dom. inf.
                     oct. Assum. B. V. M.], because her conceiving was not according to the law of nature, transmitted from our first parents.
                     And if a woman neither conceives nor bears, she suffers from the defect of
                     barrenness, which outweighs the aforesaid punishments. Likewise whoever tills the soil must needs eat his bread in the sweat
                     of his brow: while those who do not themselves work on the land, are busied with other labors, for "man is born to labor"
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p19.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.7" target="asv">Job 5:7</a>): and thus they eat the bread for which others have labored in the sweat of their brow.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p20">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the place of the earthly paradise avails not man for his use, it avails him for a lesson; because he knows himself
                     deprived of that place on account of sin, and because by the things that have a bodily existence in that paradise, he is instructed
                     in things pertaining to the heavenly paradise, the way to which is prepared for man by Christ.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p21">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Apart from the mysteries of the spiritual interpretation, this place would seem to be inaccessible, chiefly on account of
                     the extreme heat in the middle zone by reason of the nighness of the sun. This is denoted by the "flaming sword," which is
                     described as "turning every way," as being appropriate to the circular movement that causes this heat. And since the movements
                     of corporal creatures are set in order through the ministry of the angels,
                     according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4), it was fitting that, besides the sword turning every way, there should be cherubim
                     "to keep the way of the tree of life." Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 40): "It is to be believed that even in the
                     visible paradise this was done by heavenly powers indeed, so that there was a fiery guard set there by the ministry of angels."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p22">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> After sin, if man had ate of the tree of life, he would not thereby have recovered immortality, but by means of that beneficial
                     food he might have prolonged his life. Hence in the words "And live for ever," "for ever" signifies "for a long time." For
                     it was not expedient for man to remain longer in the unhappiness of this life.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p23">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 39), "these words of God are not so much a mockery of our first parents as a deterrent
                     to others, for whose benefit these things are written, lest they be proud likewise, because Adam not only failed to become
                     that which he coveted to be, but did not keep that to which he was made."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p24">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Clothing is necessary to man in his present state of unhappiness for two reasons. First, to supply a deficiency in respect
                     of external harm caused by, for instance, extreme heat or cold. Secondly, to hide his ignominy and to cover the shame of those
                     members wherein the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is most manifest. Now these two motives do not apply to the
                     primitive state. because then man's body could not be hurt by any outward thing, as
                     stated in the 
                     <a id="SS_Q164_A2-p24.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A2.html">FP, Q[97], A[2]</a>, nor was there in man's body anything shameful that would bring confusion on him. Hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p24.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.23" target="asv">Gn. 2:23</a>): "And they were both naked, to wit Adam and his wife, and were not ashamed." The same cannot be said of food, which is necessary
                     to entertain the natural heat, and to sustain the body.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p25">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 31), "We must not imagine that our first parents were created with their eyes closed,
                     especially since it is stated that the woman saw that the tree was fair, and good to eat. Accordingly the eyes of both were
                     opened so that they saw and thought on things which had not occurred to their minds before, this was a mutual concupiscence
                     such as they had not hitherto."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p26"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p27"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165.html"></a>
               </div>
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               <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q165" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q165-p0.1">OF OUR FIRST PARENTS' TEMPTATION (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q165-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q165-p2"> We must now consider our first parents' temptation, concerning which there are two points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q165-p3"> (1) Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q165-p4"> (2) Of the manner and order of that temptation.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q165_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q165_A1-p0.1">Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it was not fitting for man to be tempted by the devil. For the same final punishment is appointed to the
                     angels' sin and to man's, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q165_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.41" target="asv"> Mat. 25:41, </a> "Go [Vulg.: 'Depart from Me'] you cursed into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels." Now the
                     angels' first sin did not follow a temptation from without. Therefore neither should man's first sin have resulted from an
                     outward temptation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God, Who foreknows the future, knew that through the demon's temptation man would fall into sin, and thus He knew
                     full well that it was not expedient for man to be tempted. Therefore it would seem unfitting for God to allow him to be tempted.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems to savor of punishment that anyone should have an assailant, just as on the other hand the cessation of
                     an assault is akin to a reward. Now punishment should not precede fault. Therefore it was unfitting for man to be tempted
                     before he sinned.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q165_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.34.11" target="asv">Ecclus. 34:11</a>): "He that hath not been tempted [Douay: 'tried'], what manner of things doth he know?"
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> God's wisdom "orders all things sweetly" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q165_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv">Wis. 8:1</a>), inasmuch as His providence appoints to each one that which is befitting it according to its nature. For as Dionysius says
                     (Div. Nom. iv), "it belongs to providence not to destroy, but to maintain, nature." Now it is a condition attaching to human
                     nature that one creature can be helped or impeded by another. Wherefore it was fitting that God should both allow man in the
                     state of
                     innocence to be tempted by evil angels, and should cause him to be helped by good angels. And by a special favor of grace,
                     it was granted him that no creature outside himself could harm him against his own will, whereby he was able even to resist
                     the temptation of the demon.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Above the human nature there is another that admits of the possibility of the evil of fault: but there is not above the angelic
                     nature. Now only one that is already become evil through sin can tempt by leading another into evil. Hence it was fitting
                     that by an evil angel man should be tempted to sin, even as according to the order of nature he is moved forward to perfection
                     by means of a good angel. An angel could be perfected in good by something
                     above him, namely by God, but he could not thus be led into sin, because according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q165_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.13" target="asv"> James 1:13, </a> "God is not a tempter of evils."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as God knew that man, through being tempted, would fall into sin, so too He knew that man was able, by his free will,
                     to resist the tempter. Now the condition attaching to man's nature required that he should be left to his own will, according
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q165_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 15:14, </a> "God left" man "in the hand of his own counsel." Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 4): "It seems to me that man would
                     have had no prospect of any special praise,
                     if he were able to lead a good life simply because there was none to persuade him to lead an evil life; since both by nature
                     he had the power, and in his power he had the will, not to consent to the persuader."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An assault is penal if it be difficult to resist it: but, in the state of innocence, man was able, without any difficulty,
                     to resist temptation. Consequently the tempter's assault was not a punishment to man.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q165_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q165_A2-p0.1">Whether the manner and order of the first temptation was fitting?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the manner and order of the first temptation was not fitting. For just as in the order of nature the angel
                     was above man, so was the man above the woman. Now sin came upon man through an angel: therefore in like manner it should
                     have come upon the woman through the man; in other words the woman should have been tempted by the man, and not the other
                     way about.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the temptation of our first parents was by suggestion. Now the devil is able to make suggestions to man without
                     making use of an outward sensible creature. Since then our first parents were endowed with a spiritual mind, and adhered less
                     to sensible than to intelligible things, it would have been more fitting for man to be tempted with a merely spiritual, instead
                     of an outward, temptation.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one cannot fittingly suggest an evil except through some apparent good. But many other animals have a greater appearance
                     of good than the serpent has. Therefore man was unfittingly tempted by the devil through a serpent.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the serpent is an irrational animal. Now wisdom, speech, and punishment are not befitting an irrational animal.
                     Therefore the serpent is unfittingly described (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q165_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.1" target="asv">Gn. 3:1</a>) as "more subtle than any of the beasts of the earth," or as "the most prudent of all beasts" according to another version
                     [*The Septuagint]: and likewise is unfittingly stated to have spoken to the woman, and to have been punished by God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> That which is first in any genus should be proportionate to all that follow it in that genus. Now in every kind of sin we
                     find the same order as in the first temptation. For, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12), it begins with the concupiscence
                     of sin in the sensuality, signified by the serpent; extends to the lower reason, by pleasure, signified by the woman; and
                     reaches to the higher reason by consent in the sin, signified by the man. Therefore the
                     order of the first temptation was fitting.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Man is composed of a twofold nature, intellective and sensitive. Hence the devil, in tempting man, made use of a twofold
                     incentive to sin: one on the part of the intellect, by promising the Divine likeness through the acquisition of knowledge
                     which man naturally desires to have; the other on the part of sense. This he did by having recourse to those sensible things,
                     which are most akin to man, partly by tempting the man through the woman who was akin to him
                     in the same species; partly by tempting the woman through the serpent, who was akin to them in the same genus; partly by suggesting
                     to them to eat of the forbidden fruit, which was akin to them in the proximate genus.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the act of tempting the devil was by way of principal agent; whereas the woman was employed as an instrument of temptation
                     in bringing about the downfall of the man, both because the woman was weaker than the man, and consequently more liable to
                     be deceived, and because, on account of her union with man, the devil was able to deceive the man especially through her.
                     Now there is no parity between principal agent and instrument, because the principal
                     agent must exceed in power, which is not requisite in the instrumental agent.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A suggestion whereby the devil suggests something to man spiritually, shows the devil to have more power against man than
                     outward suggestion has, since by an inward suggestion, at least, man's imagination is changed by the devil [*Cf. 
                     <a id="SS_Q165_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q91_A3.html">FP, Q[91], A[3]</a>]; whereas by an outward suggestion, a change is wrought merely on an outward creature. Now the devil had a minimum of power
                     against man before sin, wherefore he was unable to
                     tempt him by inward suggestion, but only by outward suggestion.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 3), "we are not to suppose that the devil chose the serpent as his means of temptation;
                     but as he was possessed of the lust of deceit, he could only do so by the animal he was allowed to use for that purpose."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29), "the serpent is described as most prudent or subtle, on account of the cunning
                     of the devil, who wrought his wiles in it: thus, we speak of a prudent or cunning tongue, because it is the instrument of
                     a prudent or cunning man in advising something prudently or cunningly. Nor indeed (Gen. ad lit. xi, 28) did the serpent understand
                     the sounds which were conveyed through it to the woman; nor again are we to
                     believe that its soul was changed into a rational nature, since not even men, who are rational by nature, know what they say
                     when a demon speaks in them. Accordingly (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29) the serpent spoke to man, even as the ass on which Balaam sat
                     spoke to him, except that the former was the work of a devil, whereas the latter was the work of an angel. Hence (Gen. ad
                     lit. xi, 36) the serpent was not asked why it had done this, because it had not done this in its own nature, but the devil
                     in
                     it, who was already condemned to everlasting fire on account of his sin: and the words addressed to the serpent were directed
                     to him who wrought through the serpent."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p12"> Moreover, as again Augustine says (Super Gen. contra Manich. ii, 17,18), "his, that is, the devil's, punishment mentioned
                     here is that for which we must be on our guard against him, not that which is reserved till the last judgment. For when it
                     was said to him: 'Thou art cursed among all cattle and beasts of the earth,' the cattle are set above him, not in power, but
                     in the preservation of their nature, since the cattle lost no heavenly bliss, seeing that they never had it, but
                     they continue to live in the nature which they received." It is also said to him: "'Upon thy breast and belly shalt thou creep,'"
                     according to another version [*The Septuagint] "Here the breast signifies pride, because it is there that the impulse of the
                     soul dominates, while the belly denotes carnal desire, because this part of the body is softest to the touch: and on these
                     he creeps to those whom he wishes to deceive." The words, "'Earth shalt thou eat all the days of thy life' may be
                     understood in two ways. Either 'Those shall belong to thee, whom thou shalt deceive by earthly lust,' namely sinners who are
                     signified under the name of earth, or a third kind of temptation, namely curiosity, is signified by these words: for to eat
                     earth is to look into things deep and dark." The putting of enmities between him and the woman "means that we cannot be tempted
                     by the devil, except through that part of the soul which bears or reflects the likeness of a woman. The seed of the devil
                     is the temptation to evil, the seed of the woman is the fruit of good works, whereby the temptation to evil is resisted. Wherefore
                     the serpent lies in wait for the woman's heel, that if at any time she fall away towards what is unlawful, pleasure may seize
                     hold of her: and she watches his head that she may shut him out at the very outset of the evil temptation."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q166" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q166-p0.1">OF STUDIOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q166-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q166-p2"> We must next consider studiousness and its opposite, curiosity. Concerning studiousness there are two points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q166-p3"> (1) What is the matter of studiousness?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q166-p4"> (2) Whether it is a part of temperance?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q166_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q166_A1-p0.1">Whether the proper matter of studiousness is knowledge?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that knowledge is not the proper matter of studiousness. For a person is said to be studious because he applies
                     study to certain things. Now a man ought to apply study to every matter, in order to do aright what has to be done. Therefore
                     seemingly knowledge is not the special matter of studiousness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, studiousness is opposed to curiosity. Now curiosity, which is derived from "cura" [care], may also refer to elegance
                     of apparel and other such things, which regard the body; wherefore the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q166_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.14" target="asv">Rom. 13:14</a>): "Make not provision [curam] for the flesh in its concupiscences."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q166_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.6.13" target="asv">Jer. 6:13</a>): "From the least of them even to the greatest, all study [Douay: 'are given to'] covetousness." Now covetousness is not
                     properly about knowledge, but rather about the possession of wealth, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q166_A1-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q118_A2.html">Q[118], A[2]</a>). Therefore studiousness, which is derived from "study," is not properly about knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q166_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.11" target="asv">Prov. 27:11</a>): "Study wisdom, my son, and make my heart joyful, that thou mayest give an answer to him that reproacheth." Now study, which
                     is commended as a virtue, is the same as that to which the Law urges. Therefore studiousness is properly about "knowledge."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking, study denotes keen application of the mind to something. Now the mind is not applied to a thing except
                     by knowing that thing. Wherefore the mind's application to knowledge precedes its application to those things to which man
                     is directed by his knowledge. Hence study regards knowledge in the first place, and as a result it regards any other things
                     the working of which requires to be directed by knowledge. Now the virtues lay claim to that
                     matter about which they are first and foremost; thus fortitude is concerned about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures
                     of touch. Therefore studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing can be done aright as regards other matters, except in so far as is previously directed by the knowing reason. Hence
                     studiousness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a prior regard for knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man's mind is drawn, on account of his affections, towards the things for which he has an affection, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q166_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.21" target="asv"> Mat. 6:21, </a> "Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also." And since man has special affection for those things which foster the flesh,
                     it follows that man's thoughts are concerned about things that foster his flesh, so that man seeks to know how he may best
                     sustain his body. Accordingly curiosity is accounted to be
                     about things pertaining to the body by reason of things pertaining to knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Covetousness craves the acquisition of gain, and for this it is very necessary to be skilled in earthly things. Accordingly
                     studiousness is ascribed to things pertaining to covetousness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q166_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q166_A2-p0.1">Whether studiousness is a part of temperance?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that studiousness is not a part of temperance. For a man is said to be studious by reason of his studiousness.
                     Now all virtuous persons without exception are called studious according to the Philosopher, who frequently employs the term
                     "studious" ({spoudaios}) in this sense (Ethic. ix, 4,8,9). [*In the same sense Aristotle says in Ethic. iii, 2, that "every
                     vicious person is ignorant of what he ought to do."] Therefore studiousness is a general
                     virtue, and not a part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, studiousness, as stated 
                     <a id="SS_Q166_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q166_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, pertains to knowledge. But knowledge has no connection with the moral virtues which are in the appetitive part of the soul,
                     and pertains rather to the intellectual virtues which are in the cognitive part: wherefore solicitude is an act of prudence
                     as stated above (Q[47], A[9]). Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a virtue that is ascribed as part of a principal virtue resembles the latter as to mode. Now studiousness does not
                     resemble temperance as to mode, because temperance takes its name from being a kind of restraint, wherefore it is more opposed
                     to the vice that is in excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from being the application of the mind to something, so
                     that it would seem to be opposed to the vice that is in default, namely, neglect of study,
                     rather than to the vice which is in excess, namely curiosity. wherefore, on account of its resemblance to the latter, Isidore
                     says (Etym. x) that "a studious man is one who is curious to study." Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Morib. 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q166_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.21" target="asv">Eccl. 21</a>): "We are forbidden to be curious: and this is a great gift that temperance bestows." Now curiosity is prevented by moderate
                     studiousness. Therefore studiousness is a part of temperance.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q166_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A3.html">Q[141], AA[3]</a>,4,5), it belongs to temperance to moderate the movement of the appetite, lest it tend excessively to that which is desired
                     naturally. Now just as in respect of his corporeal nature man naturally desires the pleasures of food and sex, so, in respect
                     of his soul, he naturally desires to know something; thus the Philosopher observes at the beginning of his Metaphysics i,
                     1: "All men have a natural desire
                     for knowledge."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p7"> The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of studiousness; wherefore it follows that studiousness is a potential
                     part of temperance, as a subordinate virtue annexed to a principal virtue. Moreover, it is comprised under modesty for the
                     reason given above (
                     <a id="SS_Q166_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q160_A2.html">Q[160], A[2]</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence is the complement of all the moral virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Consequently, in so far as the knowledge
                     of prudence pertains to all the virtues, the term "studiousness," which properly regards knowledge, is applied to all the
                     virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the appetitive power, which moves all the powers, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q166_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">FS, Q[9], A[1]</a>). Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is connected with the act of knowledge itself; and this good pertains to
                     the intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true estimate about each thing. The other good pertains to the act
                     of the appetitive power, and consists in man's appetite
                     being directed aright in applying the cognitive power in this or that way to this or that thing. And this belongs to the virtue
                     of seriousness. Wherefore it is reckoned among the moral virtues.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 93) in order to be virtuous we must avoid those things to which we are most naturally
                     inclined. Hence it is that, since nature inclines us. chiefly to fear dangers of death, and to seek pleasures of the flesh,
                     fortitude is chiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint
                     from pleasures of the flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has contrary
                     inclinations. For on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of things; and so it behooves him to exercise
                     a praiseworthy restraint on this desire, lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the part of his bodily nature, man
                     is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination studiousness is a kind
                     of restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination, this virtue
                     derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name. The
                     former is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness
                     is directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly,
                     as by that which removes an obstacle.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q167" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q167-p0.1">OF CURIOSITY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q167-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q167-p2"> We must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q167-p3"> (1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q167-p4"> (2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q167_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q167_A1-p0.1">Whether curiosity can be about intellective knowledge?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6),
                     there can be no mean and extremes in things which are essentially good. Now intellective knowledge is essentially good: because
                     man's perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being reduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge
                     of truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the good of the human soul is to
                     be in accordance with reason," whose perfection consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about
                     intellective knowledge.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge
                     is from God, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.1" target="asv"> Ecclus. 1:1, </a> "All wisdom is from the Lord God," and 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.17" target="asv">Wis. 7:17</a>, "He hath given me the true knowledge of things that are, to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of
                     the elements," etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to God, since "all things are naked and open
                     to His eyes" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.4.13" target="asv">Heb. 4:13</a>), and "the Lord is a God of all knowledge" (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p3.4" href="./asv.html#iKgs.2.3" target="asv">1 Kings 2:3</a>). Therefore however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good. Now the desire of good is not sinful. Therefore
                     the vice of curiosity cannot be about the intellective knowledge of truth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical
                     sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them: for Jerome says (Super
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.1.8" target="asv"> Daniel 1:8</a>): "Those who refused to partake of the king's meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had considered the wisdom
                     and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful, would never have consented to learn that
                     which was unlawful": and Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that "if the philosophers made any true statements, we
                     must claim them for our own use, as from unjust possessors." Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge cannot be sinful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome [*Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17] says: "Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the dialectic
                     art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?"
                     Now vanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore curiosity about intellective sciences may be sinful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q167_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q166_A2.html">Q[166], A[2]</a>, ad 2) studiousness is directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study in the pursuit of knowledge.
                     Now we must judge differently of the knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit of the knowledge
                     of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some result,
                     either because one takes pride in
                     knowing the truth, according to 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:1, </a> "Knowledge puffeth up," or because one uses the knowledge of truth in order to sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p7"> On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by
                     his study to the knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for instance those who study to know the truth
                     that they may take pride in their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.21" target="asv">Eccl. 21</a>): "Some there are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of the majesty of that nature which ever remains
                     the same, imagine they are
                     doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness they explore the whole mass of this body which we call the
                     world. So great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in the very heavens about which they argue." In
                     like manner, those who study to learn something in order to sin are engaged in a sinful study, according to the saying of
                     
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.5" target="asv"> Jer. 9:5, </a> "They have taught their tongue to speak lies, they have labored to commit iniquity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p8"> Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study directed to the learning of truth being itself inordinate;
                     and this in four ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable study from a study that is an obligation incumbent
                     on him; hence Jerome says [*Epist. xxi ad Damas]: "We see priests forsaking the gospels and the prophets, reading stage-plays,
                     and singing the love songs of pastoral idylls." Secondly, when a man studies to learn of one, by whom it is
                     unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who seek to know the future through the demons. This is superstitious curiosity,
                     of which Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 4): "Maybe, the philosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity
                     in seeking knowledge from the demons."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p9"> Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures, without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the
                     knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that "in studying creatures, we must not be moved by empty and
                     perishable curiosity; but we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p10"> Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall
                     into error: wherefore it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.3.22" target="asv">Ecclus. 3:22</a>): "Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . . and in many of His
                     works be not curious," and further on (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.3.26" target="asv">Ecclus. 3:26</a>), "For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath detained their minds in
                     vanity."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man's good consists in the knowledge of truth; yet man's sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth, but
                     in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7,8). Hence there may be sin in the
                     knowledge of certain truths, in so far as the desire of such knowledge is not directed in due manner to the knowledge of the
                     sovereign truth, wherein supreme happiness consists.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although this argument shows that the knowledge of truth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing the
                     knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the knowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good
                     should be regulated in due manner.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired through
                     God revealing it to them, as stated in
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv"> Rom. 1:19.</a> Since, however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the faith, the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Col.2.8" target="asv">Col. 2:8</a>): "Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men . . . and not according
                     to
                     Christ": and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad Polycarp.) of certain philosophers that "they make an unholy use of divine things
                     against that which is divine, and by divine wisdom strive to destroy the worship of God."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q167_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q167_A2-p0.1">Whether the vice of curiosity is about sensitive knowledge?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about sensitive knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense
                     of sight, so too are some things known by the senses of touch and taste. Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and
                     taste is not curiosity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the vice of curiosity about things known by the
                     sight.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, curiosity would seem to refer to watching games; wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, 8) that when "a fall occurred
                     in the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly, and overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes." But
                     it does not seem to be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on account of the representation, wherein man takes
                     a natural delight, as the Philosopher states (Poet. vi). Therefore the vice of curiosity
                     is not about the knowledge of sensible objects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire into our neighbor's actions, as Bede observes [*Comment. in 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>]. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of others, because according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.12" target="asv"> Ecclus. 17:12, </a> God "gave to every one of them commandment concerning his neighbor." Therefore the vice of curiosity does not regard the
                     knowledge of such like particular sensible objects.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that "concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious." Now according to Bede (Comment. in
                     
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>) "concupiscence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the discovery
                     and dispraise of our neighbor's faults," and all these are particular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the
                     eves is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life, which are
                     members of the same division (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>), it seems that the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two things. For in the first place, both in man and in other animals, it
                     is directed to the upkeep of the body, because by knowledge of this kind, man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them,
                     and seek those things that are necessary for the body's sustenance. In the second place, it is directed in a manner special
                     to man, to intellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly to employ
                     study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be sinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not directed
                     to something useful, but turns man away from some useful consideration. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), "I go no more
                     to see a dog coursing a hare in the circus; but in the open country, if I happen to be passing, that coursing haply will distract
                     me from some weighty thought, and draw me after it . . . and unless Thou, having made me see my weakness, didst
                     speedily admonish me, I become foolishly dull." Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is directed to something harmful,
                     as looking on a woman is directed to lust: even so the busy inquiry into other people's actions is directed to detraction.
                     on the other hand, if one be ordinately intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity of sustaining
                     nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is
                     virtuous.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising from the use of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures arising
                     from the knowledge acquired through all the senses. According to Augustine (Confess. x, 35) "it is called concupiscence of
                     the eyes" because "the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge, so that all sensible things are said to be
                     seen," and as he says further on: "By this it may more evidently be discerned
                     wherein pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant,
                     savory, soft; but curiosity, for trial's sake, seeketh even the contraries of these, not for the sake of suffering annoyance,
                     but out of the lust of experiment and knowledge."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it renders a man prone to the vices of lust and cruelty on account of things he sees represented.
                     Hence Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.] that such sights make men adulterers and shameless.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One may watch other people's actions or inquire into them, with a good intent, either for one's own good---that is in order
                     to be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our neighbor---or for our neighbor's good---that is in order to correct him,
                     if he do anything wrong, according to the rule of charity and the duty of one's position. This is praiseworthy, according
                     to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.24" target="asv"> Heb. 10:24, </a> "Consider one another to provoke unto charity
                     and to good works." But to observe our neighbor's faults with the intention of looking down upon them, or of detracting them,
                     or even with no further purpose than that of disturbing them, is sinful: hence it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.24.15" target="asv">Prov. 24:15</a>), "Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p10"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p11"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q168" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q168-p0.1">OF MODESTY AS CONSISTING IN THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q168-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q168-p2"> We must next consider modesty as consisting in the outward movements of the body, and under this head there are four points
                  of inquiry:
               </p>
               <p id="SS_Q168-p3"> (1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in the outward movements of the body that are done seriously?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q168-p4"> (2) Whether there can be a virtue about playful actions?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q168-p5"> (3) Of the sin consisting in excess of play;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q168-p6"> (4) Of the sin consisting in lack of play.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q168_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q168_A1-p0.1">Whether any virtue regards the outward movements of the body?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no virtue regards the outward movements of the body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual beauty
                     of the soul, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.44.14" target="asv"> Ps. 44:14, </a> "All the glory of the king's daughter is within," and a gloss adds, "namely, in the conscience." Now the movements of the
                     body are not within, but without. Therefore there can be no virtue about them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Virtues are not in us by nature," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward bodily movements are in
                     man by nature, since it is by nature that some are quick, and some slow of movement, and the same applies to other differences
                     of outward movements. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of this kind.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every moral virtue is either about actions directed to another person, as justice, or about passions, as temperance
                     and fortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not directed to another person, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue
                     is connected with them.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, study should be applied to all works of virtue, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q168_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q166_A1.html">Q[166], A[1]</a>, OBJ[1]; A[2], ad 1). Now it is censurable to apply study to the ordering of one's outward movements: for Ambrose says (De
                     Offic. i, 18): "A becoming gait is one that reflects the carriage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the foot-print
                     of tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor affectation, but natural and artless movement."
                     Therefore seemingly there is no virtue about the style of outward movements.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p6">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The beauty of honesty [*Cf.
                     <a id="SS_Q168_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html"> Q[145], A[1]</a>] pertains to virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to the beauty of honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i,
                     18): "The sound of the voice and the gesture of the body are distasteful to me, whether they be unduly soft and nerveless,
                     or coarse and boorish. Let nature be our model; her reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of honesty." Therefore
                     there is a virtue about
                     the style of outward movement.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p7">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to man being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward movements
                     of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members are set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident
                     that there is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these movements.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p8"> Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold standpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the
                     person; secondly, in respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or place. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic.
                     i, 18): "Beauty of conduct consists in becoming behavior towards others, according to their sex and person," and this regards
                     the first. As to the second, he adds: "This is the best way to order our behavior, this is the polish becoming
                     to every action."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p9"> Hence Andronicus [*De Affectibus] ascribes two things to these outward movements: namely "taste" [ornatus] which regards
                     what is becoming to the person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of what is becoming in movement and behavior; and
                     "methodicalness" [bona ordinatio] which regards what is becoming to the business in hand, and to one's surroundings, wherefore
                     he calls it "the practical knowledge of separation," i.e. of the distinction of "acts."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Outward movements are signs of the inward disposition, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.27" target="asv"> Ecclus. 19:27, </a> "The attire of the body, and the laughter of the teeth, and the gait of the man, show what he is"; and Ambrose says (De Offic.
                     i, 18) that "the habit of mind is seen in the gesture of the body," and that "the body's movement is an index of the soul."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is from natural disposition that a man is inclined to this or that style of outward movement, nevertheless what
                     is lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let nature guide the
                     movement: and if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the defect."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated (ad 1) outward movements are indications of the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the
                     soul. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that "from these things," i.e. the outward movements, "the man that lies hidden
                     in our hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful, or impure, or on the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free
                     from blemish." It is moreover from our outward movements that other men form
                     their judgment about us, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.26" target="asv"> Ecclus. 19:26, </a> "A man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his countenance." Hence moderation of outward
                     movements is directed somewhat to other persons, according to the saying of Augustine in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "In all your
                     movements, let nothing be done to offend the eye of another, but only that which is becoming to the holiness of your state."
                     Wherefore the moderation of outward movements may
                     be reduced to two virtues, which the Philosopher mentions in Ethic. iv, 6,7. For, in so far as by outward movements we are
                     directed to other persons, the moderation of our outward movements belongs to "friendliness or affability" [*Cf.
                     <a id="SS_Q168_A1-p12.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q114_A1.html"> Q[114], A[1]</a>]. This regards pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds in reference to others with whom a man comes in contact.
                     And, in so far as outward movements are signs of our inward disposition, their moderation belongs
                     to the virtue of truthfulness [*Cf. Q[9]], whereby a man, by word and deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is censurable to study the style of one's outward movements, by having recourse to pretense in them, so that they do not
                     agree with one's inward disposition. Nevertheless it behooves one to study them, so that if they be in any way inordinate,
                     this may be corrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let them be without artifice, but not without correction."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q168_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A3.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q168_A2-p0.1">Whether there can be a virtue about games?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): "Our Lord said: 'Woe to you
                     who laugh, for you shall weep.' Wherefore I consider that all, and not only excessive, games should be avoided." Now that
                     which can be done virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be a virtue about games.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us," as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q168_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">FS, Q[55], A[4]</a>). Now Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.]: "It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun. Listen to what happened
                     to those who played: 'The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play.'" Therefore there can be no virtue about
                     games.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6) that "playful actions are not directed to something else." But it is a requisite
                     of virtue that the agent in choosing should "direct his action to something else," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4).
                     Therefore there can be no virtue about games.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): "I pray thee, spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax the high
                     pressure of his attention to work." Now this relaxation of the mind from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore
                     it becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at times. Moreover the Philosopher [*Ethic. ii, 7; iv,
                     8] assigns to games the virtue of {eutrapelia}, which we may call "pleasantness."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as man needs bodily rest for the body's refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is finite
                     and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it with his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed
                     amount of work. Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain work, he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all
                     the more since when the soul works, the body is at work likewise, in so far as the intellective
                     soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs. Now sensible goods are connatural to man, and therefore, when the
                     soul arises above sensibles, through being intent on the operations of reason, there results in consequence a certain weariness
                     of soul, whether the operations with which it is occupied be those of the practical or of the speculative reason. Yet this
                     weariness is greater if the soul be occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby it is raised higher above sensible
                     things; although perhaps certain outward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor. In either case, however,
                     one man is more soul-wearied than another, according as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now just as weariness
                     of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so weariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and the
                     soul's rest is pleasure, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q168_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">FS, Q[25], A[2]</a>; 
                     <a id="SS_Q168_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">FS, Q[31],
                        A[1]
                     </a>, ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of soul must needs consist in the application of some pleasure, by slackening
                     the tension of the reason's study. Thus in the Conferences of the Fathers xxiv, 21, it is related of Blessed John the Evangelist,
                     that when some people were scandalized on finding him playing together with his disciples, he is said to have told one of
                     them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And when the latter had done this several times, he asked him whether
                     he could do it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it, the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John
                     drew the inference that in like manner man's mind would break if its tension were never relaxed.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p7"> Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence
                     it is necessary at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the soul. This is in agreement with the
                     statement of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8) that "in the intercourse of this life there is a kind of rest that is associated
                     with games": and consequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p8"> Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points which require especial caution. The first and chief
                     is that the pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious deeds or words. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic.
                     i, 29) that "one kind of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene." Another thing to be observed is that one lose
                     not the balance of one's mind altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): "We should beware lest, when
                     we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony which is the concord of good works": and Tully says (De Offic. i,
                     29), that, "just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute freedom in their games, but only that which is consistent with
                     good behavior, so our very fun should reflect something of an upright mind." Thirdly, we must be careful, as in all other
                     human actions, to conform ourselves to persons, time, and place, and take due account of other circumstances, so that our
                     fun
                     "befit the hour and the man," as Tully says (De Offic. i, 29).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p9"> Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore
                     there can be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of wittiness ({eutrapelia}), and a man is said to be
                     pleasant through having a happy turn* of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this
                     virtue restrains a man from immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty. [*{Eutrapelia} is derived from
                     {trepein} = 'to turn'].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above, fun should fit with business and persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that "when the audience
                     is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with
                     the gravity of the subject." Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with things of the greatest moment, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.6" target="asv"> Prov. 8:6, </a> "Hear, for I will speak of great things." Wherefore
                     Ambrose does not altogether exclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he begins by saying: "Although
                     jokes are at times fitting and pleasant, nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule; since how can we
                     have recourse to things which are not to be found in Holy Writ?"
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying of Chrysostom refers to the inordinate use of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of games their end;
                     of whom it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.15.12" target="asv">Wis. 15:12</a>): "They have accounted our life a pastime." Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "We are so begotten by nature that
                     we appear to be made not for play and fun, but rather for hardships, and for occupations of greater gravity and moment."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Playful actions themselves considered in their species are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such actions
                     is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and accordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make
                     use of fun. Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "It is indeed lawful to make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we
                     have recourse to sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done our
                     duty by grave and serious matters."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p13"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p14"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A3.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q168_A3" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A4.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q168_A3-p0.1">Whether there can be sin in the excess of play?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be sin in the excess of play. For that which is an excuse for sin is not held to be sinful.
                     Now play is sometimes an excuse for sin, for many things would be grave sins if they were done seriously, whereas if they
                     be done in fun, are either no sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems that there is no sin in excessive play.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all other vices are reducible to the seven capital vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 17). But excess of play
                     does not seem reducible to any of the capital vices. Therefore it would seem not to be a sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, comedians especially would seem to exceed in play, since they direct their whole life to playing. Therefore if excess
                     of play were a sin, all actors would be in a state of sin; moreover all those who employ them, as well as those who make them
                     any payment, would sin as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem untrue; for it is related in the Lives of the Fathers
                     (ii. 16; viii. 63) that is was revealed to the Blessed Paphnutius that a certain
                     jester would be with him in the life to come.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.13" target="asv"> Prov. 14:13, </a> "Laughter shall be mingled with sorrow and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy," remarks: "A mourning that will last for
                     ever." Now there is inordinate laughter and inordinate joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin therein, since
                     mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In all things dirigible according to reason, the excessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which falls
                     short of the rule of reason. Now it has been stated 
                     <a id="SS_Q168_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q168_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to reason. Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond
                     the rule of reason: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very species of the acts employed for the purpose
                     of
                     fun, and this kind of jesting, according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is stated to be "discourteous, insolent, scandalous,
                     and obscene," when to wit a man, for the purpose of jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or such as are injurious to
                     his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal sins. And thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p7"> Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack of due circumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue
                     times or places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or persons. This may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the
                     strong attachment to play, when a man prefers the pleasure he derives therefrom to the love of God, so as to be willing to
                     disobey a commandment of God or of the Church rather than forego, such like amusements. Sometimes, however, it
                     is a venial sin, for instance where a man is not so attached to amusement as to be willing for its sake to do anything in
                     disobedience to God.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain things are sinful on account of the intention alone, because they are done in order to injure someone. Such an intention
                     is excluded by their being done in fun, the intention of which is to please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from
                     sin, or diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins according to their species, such as murder, fornication, and the like:
                     and fun is no excuse for these; in fact they make fun scandalous and
                     obscene.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Excessive play pertains to senseless mirth, which Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) calls a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it is
                     written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.6" target="asv">Ex. 32:6</a>): "The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated 
                     <a id="SS_Q168_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q168_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, play is necessary for the intercourse of human life. Now whatever is useful to human intercourse may have a lawful employment
                     ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation of play-actors, the object of which is to cheer the heart of man, is not unlawful
                     in itself; nor are they in a state of sin provided that their playing be moderated, namely that they use no unlawful words
                     or deeds in order to amuse, and that
                     they do not introduce play into undue matters and seasons. And although in human affairs, they have no other occupation in
                     reference to other men, nevertheless in reference to themselves, and to God, they perform other actions both serious and virtuous,
                     such as prayer and the moderation of their own passions and operations, while sometimes they give alms to the poor. Wherefore
                     those who maintain them in moderation do not sin but act justly, by rewarding them for their services. on the other
                     hand, if a man spends too much on such persons, or maintains those comedians who practice unlawful mirth, he sins as encouraging
                     them in their sin. Hence Augustine says (Tract. c. in Joan.) that "to give one's property to comedians is a great sin, not
                     a virtue"; unless by chance some play-actor were in extreme need, in which case one would have to assist him, for Ambrose
                     says (De Offic. [*Quoted in Canon Pasce, dist. 86]): "Feed him that dies of hunger; for whenever thou canst save a man by
                     feeding him, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A2.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A4.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q168_A4" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q169.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q168_A4-p0.1">Whether there is a sin in lack of mirth?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no sin in lack of mirth. For no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of a
                     penitent says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. 15) [*Spurious]: "Let him refrain from games and the sights of the world, if he wishes
                     to obtain the grace of a full pardon." Therefore there is no sin in lack of mirth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no sin is included in the praise given to holy men. But some persons are praised for having refrained from mirth;
                     for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.15.17" target="asv">Jer. 15:17</a>): "I sat not in the assembly of jesters," and (Tobias 3:17): "Never have I joined myself with them that play; neither have
                     I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness." Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the virtues, and he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither gives
                     nor receives the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the lack of mirth. Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous
                     rather than sinful.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8) reckons the lack of mirth to be a vice.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> In human affairs whatever is against reason is a sin. Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others, by offering
                     no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment. Wherefore Seneca [*Martin of Braga, Formula Vitae Honestae: cap.
                     De Continentia] says (De Quat. Virt., cap. De Continentia): "Let your conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think
                     you rude, or despise you as a cad." Now a man who is without mirth, not only is lacking
                     in playful speech, but is also burdensome to others, since he is deaf to the moderate mirth of others. Consequently they are
                     vicious, and are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 8).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p7"> Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and pleasures it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and
                     rest are not in quest for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 6, it follows that "lack of
                     mirth is less sinful than excess thereof." Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 10): "We should make few friends for the
                     sake of pleasure, since but little sweetness suffices to season life, just as little salt suffices for our
                     meat."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is called upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a vice in default, because
                     this very diminishment of mirth in them is in accordance with reason.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Jeremias speaks there in accordance with the times, the state of which required that man should mourn; wherefore he adds:
                     "I sat alone, because Thou hast filled me with threats." The words of Tobias 3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident
                     from his adding: "Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Austerity, as a virtue, does not exclude all pleasures, but only such as are excessive and inordinate; wherefore it would
                     seem to pertain to affability, which the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6) calls "friendliness," or {eutrapelia}, otherwise wittiness.
                     Nevertheless he names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement with temperance, to which it belongs to restrain pleasure.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p11"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p12"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A3.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q169.html"></a>
               </div>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A2.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A1.html"></a>
            </div>
            <div id="SS_Q169" class="div3">
               <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A4.html"></a>
               <a href="summa.SS_Q169_A1.html"></a>
               <h3 id="SS_Q169-p0.1">OF MODESTY IN THE OUTWARD APPAREL (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q169-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q169-p2"> We must now consider modesty as connected with the outward apparel, and under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q169-p3"> (1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel?</p>
               <p id="SS_Q169-p4"> (2) Whether women sin mortally by excessive adornment?</p>
               <div id="SS_Q169_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q169.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q169_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q169_A1-p0.1">Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel. For outward adornment does not belong
                     to us by nature, wherefore it varies according to different times and places. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii,
                     12) that "among the ancient Romans it was scandalous for one to wear a cloak with sleeves and reaching to the ankles, whereas
                     now it is scandalous for anyone hailing from a reputable place to be without them." Now
                     according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1) there is in us a natural aptitude for the virtues. Therefore there is no virtue
                     or vice about such things.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if there were virtue and vice in connection with outward attire, excess in this matter would be sinful. Now excess
                     in outward attire is not apparently sinful, since even the ministers of the altar use most precious vestments in the sacred
                     ministry. Likewise it would seem not to be sinful to be lacking in this, for it is said in praise of certain people (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.37" target="asv">Heb. 11:37</a>): "They wandered about in sheepskins and in goatskins." Therefore
                     it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in this matter.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every virtue is either theological, or moral, or intellectual. Now an intellectual virtue is not conversant with
                     matter of this kind, since it is a perfection regarding the knowledge of truth. Nor is there a theological virtue connected
                     therewith, since that has God for its object; nor are any of the moral virtues enumerated by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7),
                     connected with it. Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection with
                     this kind of attire.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Honesty [*Cf. Q[145]] pertains to virtue. Now a certain honesty is observed in the outward apparel; for Ambrose says (De
                     Offic. i, 19): "The body should be bedecked naturally and without affectation, with simplicity, with negligence rather than
                     nicety, not with costly and dazzling apparel, but with ordinary clothes, so that nothing be lacking to honesty and necessity,
                     yet nothing be added to increase its beauty." Therefore there can be virtue and vice in
                     the outward attire.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is not in the outward things themselves which man uses, that there is vice, but on the part of man who uses them immoderately.
                     This lack of moderation occurs in two ways. First, in comparison with the customs of those among whom one lives; wherefore
                     Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "Those offenses which are contrary to the customs of men, are to be avoided according to
                     the customs generally prevailing, so that a thing agreed upon and confirmed by custom
                     or law of any city or nation may not be violated at the lawless pleasure of any, whether citizen or foreigner. For any part,
                     which harmonizeth not with its whole, is offensive." Secondly, the lack of moderation in the use of these things may arise
                     from the inordinate attachment of the user, the result being that a man sometimes takes too much pleasure in using them, either
                     in accordance with the custom of those among whom he dwells or contrary to such custom. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr.
                     Christ. iii, 12): "We must avoid excessive pleasure in the use of things, for it leads not only wickedly to abuse the customs
                     of those among whom we dwell, but frequently to exceed their bounds, so that, whereas it lay hidden, while under the restraint
                     of established morality, it displays its deformity in a most lawless outbreak."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p7"> In point of excess, this inordinate attachment occurs in three ways. First when a man seeks glory from excessive attention
                     to dress; in so far as dress and such like things are a kind of ornament. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xl in Ev.): "There are
                     some who think that attention to finery and costly dress is no sin. Surely, if this were no fault, the word of God would not
                     say so expressly that the rich man who was tortured in hell had been clothed in purple and fine linen. No one,
                     forsooth, seeks costly apparel" (such, namely, as exceeds his estate) "save for vainglory." Secondly, when a man seeks sensuous
                     pleasure from excessive attention to dress, in so far as dress is directed to the body's comfort. Thirdly, when a man is too
                     solicitous [*Cf.
                     <a id="SS_Q169_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q55_A6.html"> Q[55], A[6]</a>] in his attention to outward apparel.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p8"> Accordingly Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons three virtues in connection with outward attire; namely "humility," which
                     excludes the seeking of glory, wherefore he says that humility is "the habit of avoiding excessive expenditure and parade";
                     "contentment" [*Cf. Q[143], OBJ[4]], which excludes the seeking of sensuous pleasure, wherefore he says that "contentedness
                     is the habit that makes a man satisfied with what is suitable, and enables him to determine what is becoming in
                     his manner of life" (according to the saying of the Apostle, 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:8</a>): "Having food and wherewith to be covered, with these let us be content;"---and "simplicity," which excludes excessive solicitude
                     about such things, wherefore he says that "simplicity is a habit that makes a man contented with what he has."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p9"> In the point of deficiency there may be inordinate attachment in two ways. First, through a man's neglect to give the requisite
                     study or trouble to the use of outward apparel. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is a mark of effeminacy
                     to let one's cloak trail on the ground to avoid the trouble of lifting it up." Secondly, by seeking glory from the very lack
                     of attention to outward attire. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "not only
                     the glare and pomp of outward things, but even dirt and the weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation, all the more
                     dangerous as being a decoy under the guise of God's service"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "both excess and
                     inordinate defect are a subject of ostentation."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although outward attire does not come from nature, it belongs to natural reason to moderate it; so that we are naturally
                     inclined to be the recipients of the virtue that moderates outward raiment.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p11">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who are placed in a position of dignity, or again the ministers of the altar, are attired in more costly apparel than
                     others, not for the sake of their own glory, but to indicate the excellence of their office or of the Divine worship: wherefore
                     this is not sinful in them. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): "Whoever uses outward things in such a way as
                     to exceed the bounds observed by the good people among whom he dwells, either
                     signifies something by so doing, or is guilty of sin, inasmuch as he uses these things for sensual pleasure or ostentation."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p12"> Likewise there may be sin on the part of deficiency: although it is not always a sin to wear coarser clothes than other people.
                     For, if this be done through ostentation or pride, in order to set oneself above others, it is a sin of superstition; whereas,
                     if this be done to tame the flesh, or to humble the spirit, it belongs to the virtue of temperance. Hence Augustine says (De
                     Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): "Whoever uses transitory things with greater restraint than is customary with
                     those among whom he dwells, is either temperate or superstitious." Especially, however, is the use of coarse raiment befitting
                     to those who by word and example urge others to repentance, as did the prophets of whom the Apostle is speaking in the passage
                     quoted. Wherefore a gloss on
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.3.4" target="asv"> Mat. 3:4, </a> says: "He who preaches penance, wears the garb of penance."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This outward apparel is an indication of man's estate; wherefore excess, deficiency, and mean therein, are referable to the
                     virtue of truthfulness, which the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) assigns to deeds and words, which are indications of something
                     connected with man's estate.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p14"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p15"></p>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q169.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q169_A2.html"></a>
               </div>
               <div id="SS_Q169_A2" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q169_A1.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q170.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q169_A2-p0.1">Whether the adornment of women is devoid of mortal sin?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal sin. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the Divine
                     law is a mortal sin. Now the adornment of women is contrary to a precept of the Divine law; for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.3.3" target="asv">1 Pet. 3:3</a>): "Whose," namely women's, "adorning, let it not be the outward plaiting of the hair, or the wearing of gold, or the putting
                     on of apparel." Wherefore a gloss of Cyprian says: "Those who are clothed
                     in silk and purple cannot sincerely put on Christ: those who are bedecked with gold and pearls and trinkets have forfeited
                     the adornments of mind and body." Now this is not done without a mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women cannot be devoid
                     of mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.): "I hold that not only virgins and widows, but also wives and all women without exception,
                     should be admonished that nowise should they deface God's work and fabric, the clay that He has fashioned, with the aid of
                     yellow pigments, black powders or rouge, or by applying any dye that alters the natural features." And afterwards he adds:
                     "They lay hands on God, when they strive to reform what He has formed. This is an
                     assault on the Divine handiwork, a distortion of the truth. Thou shalt not be able to see God, having no longer the eyes that
                     God made, but those the devil has unmade; with him shalt thou burn on whose account thou art bedecked." But this is not due
                     except to mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as it is unbecoming for a woman to wear man's clothes, so is it unbecoming for her to adorn herself inordinately.
                     Now the former is a sin, for it is written (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.5" target="asv">Dt. 22:5</a>): "A woman shall not be clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use woman's apparel." Therefore it seems that also
                     the excessive adornment of women is a mortal sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p5">
                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, If this were true it would seem that the makers of these means of adornment sin mortally.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As regards the adornment of women, we must bear in mind the general statements made above 
                     <a id="SS_Q169_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q169_A1.html">(A[1])</a> concerning outward apparel, and also something special, namely that a woman's apparel may incite men to lust, according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.7.10" target="asv"> Prov. 7:10, </a> "Behold a woman meeteth him in harlot's attire, prepared to deceive souls."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p7"> Nevertheless a woman may use means to please her husband, lest through despising her he fall into adultery. Hence it is written
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.34" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:34</a>) that the woman "that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband." Wherefore if a married
                     woman adorn herself in order to please her husband she can do this without sin.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p8"> But those women who have no husband nor wish to have one, or who are in a state of life inconsistent with marriage, cannot
                     without sin desire to give lustful pleasure to those men who see them, because this is to incite them to sin. And if indeed
                     they adorn themselves with this intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally; whereas if they do so from frivolity,
                     or from vanity for the sake of ostentation, it is not always mortal, but sometimes venial. And the same
                     applies to men in this respect. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): "I do not wish you to be hasty in forbidding
                     the wearing of gold or costly attire except in the case of those who being neither married nor wishful to marry, should think
                     how they may please God: whereas the others think on the things of the world, either husbands how they may please their wives,
                     or wives how they may please their husbands, except that it is unbecoming for women though married to uncover their hair,
                     since the Apostle commands them to cover the head." Yet in this case some might be excused from sin, when they do this not
                     through vanity but on account of some contrary custom: although such a custom is not to be commended.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As a gloss says on this passage, "The wives of those who were in distress despised their husbands, and decked themselves
                     that they might please other men": and the Apostle forbids this. Cyprian is speaking in the same sense; yet he does not forbid
                     married women to adorn themselves in order to please their husbands, lest the latter be afforded an occasion of sin with other
                     women. Hence the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.9" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:9</a>): "Women . . . in
                     ornate [Douay: 'decent'] apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, not with plaited hair, or gold, or pearls,
                     or costly attire": whence we are given to understand that women are not forbidden to adorn themselves soberly and moderately
                     but to do so excessively, shamelessly, and immodestly.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p10">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Cyprian is speaking of women painting themselves: this is a kind of falsification, which cannot be devoid of sin. Wherefore
                     Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): "To dye oneself with paints in order to have a rosier or a paler complexion is a lying
                     counterfeit. I doubt whether even their husbands are willing to be deceived by it, by whom alone" (i.e. the husbands) "are
                     they to be permitted, but not ordered, to adorn themselves." However, such
                     painting does not always involve a mortal sin, but only when it is done for the sake of sensuous pleasure or in contempt of
                     God, and it is to like cases that Cyprian refers.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p11"> It must, however, be observed that it is one thing to counterfeit a beauty one has not, and another to hide a disfigurement
                     arising from some cause such as sickness or the like. For this is lawful, since according to the Apostle (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.23" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:23</a>), "such as we think to be the less honorable members of the body, about these we put more abundant honor."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p12">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the foregoing Article, outward apparel should be consistent with the estate of the person, according to the
                     general custom. Hence it is in itself sinful for a woman to wear man's clothes, or vice versa; especially since this may be
                     a cause of sensuous pleasure; and it is expressly forbidden in the Law (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22" target="asv">Dt. 22</a>) because the Gentiles used to practice this change of attire for the purpose of idolatrous superstition. Nevertheless this
                     may be
                     done sometimes without sin on account of some necessity, either in order to hide oneself from enemies, or through lack of
                     other clothes, or for some similar motive.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p13">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the case of an art directed to the production of goods which men cannot use without sin, it follows that the workmen sin
                     in making such things, as directly affording others an occasion of sin; for instance, if a man were to make idols or anything
                     pertaining to idolatrous worship. But in the case of an art the products of which may be employed by man either for a good
                     or for an evil use, such as swords, arrows, and the like, the practice of such an
                     art is not sinful. These alone should be called arts; wherefore Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlix super Matth.]: "The name of art
                     should be applied to those only which contribute towards and produce necessaries and mainstays of life." In the case of an
                     art that produces things which for the most part some people put to an evil use, although such arts are not unlawful in themselves,
                     nevertheless, according to the teaching of Plato, they should be extirpated from the State by the governing authority.
                     Accordingly, since women may lawfully adorn themselves, whether to maintain the fitness of their estate, or even by adding
                     something thereto, in order to please their husbands, it follows that those who make such means of adornment do not sin in
                     the practice of their art, except perhaps by inventing means that are superfluous and fantastic. Hence Chrysostom says (Super
                     Matth.) that "even the shoemakers' and clothiers' arts stand in need of restraint, for they have lent their art to lust, by
                     abusing its needs, and debasing art by art."
                  </p>
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            <div id="SS_Q170" class="div3">
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               <h3 id="SS_Q170-p0.1">OF THE PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
               <p id="SS_Q170-p1"></p>
               <p id="SS_Q170-p2"> We must next consider the precepts of temperance:</p>
               <p id="SS_Q170-p3"> (1) The precepts of temperance itself;</p>
               <p id="SS_Q170-p4"> (2) The precepts of its parts.</p>
               <div id="SS_Q170_A1" class="div4">
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q170.html"></a>
                  <a href="summa.SS_Q170_A2.html"></a>
                  <h4 id="SS_Q170_A1-p0.1">Whether the precepts of temperance are suitably given in the Divine law?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. Because fortitude is a greater virtue
                     than temperance, as stated above (Q[123], A[12]; Q[141], A[8]; 
                     <a id="SS_Q170_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A4.html">FS, Q[66], A[4]</a> ). Now there is no precept of fortitude among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the most important among the precepts
                     of the Law. Therefore it was unfitting to include among the precepts of the decalogue the prohibition of
                     adultery, which is contrary to temperance, as stated above (Q[154], AA[1],8).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, temperance is not only about venereal matters, but also about pleasures of meat and drink. Now the precepts of the
                     decalogue include no prohibition of a vice pertaining to pleasures of meat and drink, or to any other species of lust. Neither,
                     therefore, should they include a precept prohibiting adultery, which pertains to venereal pleasure.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the lawgiver's intention inducement to virtue precedes the prohibition of vice, since vices are forbidden in
                     order that obstacles to virtue may be removed. Now the precepts of the decalogue are the most important in the Divine law.
                     Therefore the precepts of the decalogue should have included an affirmative precept directly prescribing the virtue of temperance,
                     rather than a negative precept forbidding adultery which is directly opposed thereto.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Scripture in the decalogue (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q170_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.14" target="asv">Ex. 20:14</a>, 
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q170_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.17" target="asv">17</a>).
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Apostle says (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q170_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>), "the end of the commandment is charity," which is enjoined upon us in the two precepts concerning the love of God and of
                     our neighbor. Wherefore the decalogue contains those precepts which tend more directly to the love of God and of our neighbor.
                     Now among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery would seem most of all opposed to the love of our neighbor, since thereby
                     a man lays hold of another's
                     property for his own use, by abusing his neighbor's wife. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue include a special prohibition
                     of adultery, not only as committed in deed, but also as desired in thought.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Among the species of vices opposed to fortitude there is not one that is so directly opposed to the love of our neighbor
                     as adultery, which is a species of lust that is opposed to temperance. And yet the vice of daring, which is opposed to fortitude,
                     is wont to be sometimes the cause of murder, which is forbidden by one of the precepts of the decalogue: for it is written
                     (
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q170_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.8.18" target="asv">Ecclus. 8:18</a>): "Go not on the way with a bold man lest he
                     burden thee with his evils."
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gluttony is not directly opposed to the love of our neighbor, as adultery is. Nor indeed is any other species of lust, for
                     a father is not so wronged by the seduction of the virgin over whom he has no connubial right, as is the husband by the adultery
                     of his wife, for he, not the wife herself, has power over her body [*
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q170_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:4</a>].
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q170_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q122_A1.html">Q[122], AA[1]</a>,4) the precepts of the decalogue are universal principles of the Divine law; hence they need to be common precepts. Now it
                     was not possible to give any common affirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice of temperance varies according
                     to different times, as Augustine remarks (De Bono Conjug. xv, 7), and according to different human laws and customs.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p10"></p>
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                  <h4 id="SS_Q170_A2-p0.1">Whether the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are suitably given in the Divine law?</h4>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p1"></p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p2">
                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. For the precepts
                     of the Decalogue, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), are certain universal principles of the whole Divine law. Now "pride is the
                     beginning of all sin," according to
                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q170_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv"> Ecclus. 10:15.</a> Therefore among the precepts of the Decalogue there should have been one forbidding pride.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p3">
                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a place before all should have been given in the decalogue to those precepts by which men are especially induced
                     to fulfil the Law, because these would seem to be the most important. Now since humility subjects man to God, it would seem
                     most of all to dispose man to the fulfilment of the Divine law; wherefore obedience is accounted one of the degrees of humility,
                     as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q170_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A6.html">Q[161], A[6]</a>); and the same apparently applies
                     to meekness, the effect of which is that a man does not contradict the Divine Scriptures, as Augustine observes (De Doctr.
                     Christ. ii, 7). Therefore it seems that the Decalogue should have contained precepts of humility and meekness.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p4">
                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was stated in the foregoing Article that adultery is forbidden in the decalogue, because it is contrary to the
                     love of our neighbor. But inordinateness of outward movements, which is contrary to modesty, is opposed to neighborly love:
                     wherefore Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxii): "In all your movements let nothing be done to offend the eye of any person
                     whatever." Therefore it seems that this kind of inordinateness should also have been
                     forbidden by a precept of the Decalogue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p5">
                     <b>On the contrary,</b> suffices the authority of Scripture.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p6">
                     <b>I answer that,</b> The virtues annexed to temperance may be considered in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, in their effects. Considered
                     in themselves they have no direct connection with the love of God or of our neighbor; rather do they regard a certain moderation
                     of things pertaining to man himself. But considered in their effects, they may regard the love of God or of our neighbor:
                     and in this respect the decalogue contains precepts that relate to the prohibition of
                     the effects of the vices opposed to the parts of temperance. Thus the effect of anger, which is opposed to meekness, is sometimes
                     that a man goes on to commit murder (and this is forbidden in the Decalogue), and sometimes that he refuses due honor to his
                     parents, which may also be the result of pride, which leads many to transgress the precepts of the first table.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p7">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pride is the beginning of sin, but it lies hidden in the heart; and its inordinateness is not perceived by all in common.
                     Hence there was no place for its prohibition among the precepts of the Decalogue, which are like first self-evident principles.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p8">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those precepts which are essentially an inducement to the observance of the Law presuppose the Law to be already given, wherefore
                     they cannot be first precepts of the Law so as to have a place in the Decalogue.
                  </p>
                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p9">
                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Inordinate outward movement is not injurious to one's neighbor, if we consider the species of the act, as are murder, adultery,
                     and theft, which are forbidden in the decalogue; but only as being signs of an inward inordinateness, as stated above (
                     <a id="SS_Q170_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q168_A1.html">Q[168], A[1]</a>, ad 1,3).
                  </p>
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