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+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="SS.iii" class="div2">
+            <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A6.html"></a>
+            <a href="summa.SS_Q123.html"></a>
+            <h2 id="SS.iii-p0.1">TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE (QQ[123]-170)</h2>
+            <div id="SS_Q123" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS.iii.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q123-p0.1">OF FORTITUDE (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p2"> After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude. We must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude;
+                  (2) its parts; (3) the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to it.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p3"> Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered: (1) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom; (3)
+                  the vices opposed to fortitude.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p4"> Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p5"> (1) Whether fortitude is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p6"> (2) Whether it is a special virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p7"> (3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p8"> (4) Whether it is only about fear of death?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p9"> (5) Whether it is only in warlike matters?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p10"> (6) Whether endurance is its chief act?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p11"> (7) Whether its action is directed to its own good?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p12"> (8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p13"> (9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p14"> (10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p15"> (11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q123-p16"> (12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q123_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A1-p0.1">Whether fortitude is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q123_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.9" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:9</a>): "Virtue is perfected in infirmity." But fortitude is contrary to infirmity. Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it is a virtue, it is either theological, intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained among the theological
+                     virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be gathered from what we have said above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html">FS, Q[57], A[2]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A1-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">FS, Q[62], A[3]</a>). Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7,8): "Some
+                     seem to be brave through
+                     ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers," both of which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral virtue, "and
+                     some are called brave on account of certain passions"; for instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonor, or again
+                     on account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does not act from passion but from choice, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A1-p3.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">FS, Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since it is a "good quality of the mind," as stated above (Ethic. iii,
+                     7,8). But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results from the temperament of the body. Therefore it seems
+                     that fortitude is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv, xxi, xxii) numbers fortitude among the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good." Hence
+                     human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes a man good, and renders his work good. Now man's good is to
+                     be in accordance with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man
+                     good, to make his work accord with reason. This happens in three ways: first, by
+                     rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the intellectual virtues; secondly, by establishing the rectitude of reason
+                     in human affairs, and this belongs to justice; thirdly, by removing the obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in
+                     human affairs. Now the human will is hindered in two ways from following the rectitude of reason. First, through being drawn
+                     by some object of pleasure to something other than what the rectitude of reason requires; and this obstacle is removed by
+                     the
+                     virtue of temperance. Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that which is in accordance with reason, on account
+                     of some difficulty that presents itself. In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the mind is requisite, whereby to resist
+                     the aforesaid difficulty even as a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p7"> Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far as it conforms man to reason.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in the infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, of which the Apostle
+                     was speaking. Now it belongs to fortitude of the mind to bear bravely with infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the
+                     virtue of patience or fortitude, as also to acknowledge one's own infirmity, and this belongs to the perfection that is called
+                     humility.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sometimes a person performs the exterior act of a virtue without having the virtue, and from some other cause than virtue.
+                     Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in which people are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through
+                     performing acts of fortitude without having the virtue. This may be done in three ways. First, because they tend to that which
+                     is difficult as though it were not difficult: and this again happens in three
+                     ways, for sometimes this is owing to ignorance, through not perceiving the greatness of the danger; sometimes it is owing
+                     to the fact that one is hopeful of overcoming dangers---when, for instance, one has often experienced escape from danger;
+                     and sometimes this is owing to a certain science and art, as in the case of soldiers who, through skill and practice in the
+                     use of arms, think little of the dangers of battle, as they reckon themselves capable of defending themselves against them;
+                     thus
+                     Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i), "No man fears to do what he is confident of having learned to do well." Secondly, a man performs
+                     an act of fortitude without having the virtue, through the impulse of a passion, whether of sorrow that he wishes to cast
+                     off, or again of anger. Thirdly, through choice, not indeed of a due end, but of some temporal advantage to be obtained, such
+                     as honor, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fortitude of the soul which is reckoned a virtue, as explained in the Reply to the First Objection, is so called from
+                     its likeness to fortitude of the body. Nor is it inconsistent with the notion of virtue, that a man should have a natural
+                     inclination to virtue by reason of his natural temperament, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html">FS, Q[63], A[1]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q123_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A2-p0.1">Whether fortitude is a special virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q123_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.7" target="asv">Wis. 7:7</a>): "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude," where the text has "virtue" for "fortitude." Since
+                     then the term "virtue" is common to all virtues, it seems that fortitude is a general virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is not lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honor of the virtues
+                     and guards their behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of dangers,
+                     steeled against pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a deformity that weakens virtue"; and he says the
+                     same further on in connection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any special virtue.
+                     Therefore fortitude is not a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fortitude would seem to derive its name from firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in
+                     Ethic. ii. Therefore fortitude is a general virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it among the other virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">FS, Q[61], AA[3]</a>,4), the term "fortitude" can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and in this sense
+                     it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue, since as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii), it is requisite
+                     for every virtue to act firmly and immovably. Secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing and withstanding
+                     those things wherein it
+                     is most difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore Tully says (Rhet. ii), that "fortitude is deliberate
+                     facing of dangers and bearing of toils." In this sense fortitude is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 116) the word virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural power
+                     is, in one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in another sense is a principle of action, as stated in Metaph.
+                     v, 17. And since this latter meaning is the more common, the term "virtue," as denoting the extreme limit of such a power,
+                     is a common term, for virtue taken in a general sense is nothing else than a habit
+                     whereby one acts well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the first sense, which sense is more specific, it is
+                     applied to a special virtue, namely fortitude, to which it belongs to stand firm against all kinds of assaults.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense, as denoting firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds. Nevertheless even
+                     as a special virtue with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the assaults of all vices. For he that can stand firm in
+                     things that are most difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence, to resist those which are less difficult.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection takes fortitude in the first sense.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q123_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A3-p0.1">Whether fortitude is about fear and dying?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude is not about fear and daring. For Gregory says (Moral. vii): "The fortitude of the just man is to
+                     overcome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence, to quench the lusts of the present life." Therefore fortitude seems to be
+                     about pleasures rather than about fear and daring.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), that it belongs to fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly
+                     has nothing to do with the passions of fear and daring, but rather with a man's toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore
+                     fortitude is not about fear and daring.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, not only daring, but also hope, is opposed to fear, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q45_A1.html">FS, Q[45], A[1]</a>, ad 2) in the treatise on passions. Therefore fortitude should not be about daring any more than about hope.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 9) that fortitude is about fear and daring.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it belongs to the virtue of fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from following the reason. Now to be
+                     withdrawn from something difficult belongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil that entails difficulty,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A3.html">FS, Q[42], AA[3]</a>,5) in the treatise on passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of difficult things, which can
+                     withdraw the will from following the reason. And it behooves one not only firmly to bear the assault of these difficulties
+                     by restraining fear, but also moderately to withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel them altogether in order
+                     to free oneself therefrom for the future, which seems to come under the notion of daring. Therefore fortitude is about fear
+                     and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking then of the fortitude of the just man, as to its common relation to all virtues. Hence he first of all
+                     mentions matters pertaining to temperance, as in the words quoted, and then adds that which pertains properly to fortitude
+                     as a special virtue, by saying: "To love the trials of this life for the sake of an eternal reward."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dangers and toils do not withdraw the will from the course of reason, except in so far as they are an object of fear. Hence
+                     fortitude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but mediately about dangers and toils, these being the objects of
+                     those passions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the object, for hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is about the same object,
+                     and is opposed to fear by way of approach and withdrawal, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q45_A1.html">FS, Q[45], A[1]</a>). And since fortitude properly regards those temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as appears from Tully's definition
+                     quoted in the Second Objection, it follows that fortitude properly is about fear and
+                     daring and not about hope, except in so far as it is connected with daring, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A3-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q45_A2.html">FS, Q[45], A[2]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q123_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A4-p0.1">Whether fortitude is only about dangers of death?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude is not only about dangers of death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fortitude is love
+                     bearing all things readily for the sake of the object beloved": and (Music. vi) he says that fortitude is "the love which
+                     dreads no hardship, not even death." Therefore fortitude is not only about danger of death, but also about other afflictions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the passions of the soul need to be reduced to a mean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue reducing
+                     fears to a mean. Therefore fortitude is not only about fear of death, but also about other fears.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no virtue is about extremes. But fear of death is about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as stated
+                     in Ethic. iii. Therefore the virtue of fortitude is not about fear of death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Andronicus says that "fortitude is a virtue of the irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, it belongs to the virtue of fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of reason through fear of
+                     bodily evil. Now it behooves one to hold firmly the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good is
+                     equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason
+                     in face of the greatest evils: because he
+                     that stands firm against great things, will in consequence stand firm against less things, but not conversely. Moreover it
+                     belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death,
+                     since it does away all bodily goods. Wherefore Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxii) that "the soul is shaken by its fellow
+                     body, with fear of toil and pain, lest the body be stricken and harassed with fear of death lest it be done away and destroyed."
+                     Therefore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of dangers of death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner of adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any kind
+                     of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest evils; while through bearing others he is said to be brave in
+                     a restricted sense.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since fear is born of love, any virtue that moderates the love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the fear of
+                     contrary evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of money, as a consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and
+                     the same is the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one's own life is natural: and hence the necessity of
+                     a special virtue modifying the fear of death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding right reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with reason
+                     is not contrary to virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q123_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A5-p0.1">Whether fortitude is properly about dangers of death in battle?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle. For martyrs above all are commended for their fortitude.
+                     But martyrs are not commended in connection with battle. Therefore fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "fortitude is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters": and Tully (De Offic.
+                     i), under the heading, "That it pertains to fortitude to excel in battle rather than in civil life," says: "Although not a
+                     few think that the business of war is of greater importance than the affairs of civil life, this opinion must be qualified:
+                     and if we wish to judge the matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are more
+                     important and more glorious than those connected with war." Now greater fortitude is about greater things. Therefore fortitude
+                     is not properly concerned with death in battle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, war is directed to the preservation of a country's temporal peace: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) that "wars
+                     are waged in order to insure peace." Now it does not seem that one ought to expose oneself to the danger of death for the
+                     temporal peace of one's country, since this same peace is the occasion of much license in morals. Therefore it seems that
+                     the virtue of fortitude is not about the danger of death in battle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that fortitude is chiefly about death in battle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, fortitude strengthens a man's mind against the greatest danger, which is that of death. Now fortitude is a virtue; and it
+                     is essential to virtue ever to tend to good; wherefore it is in order to pursue some good that man does not fly from the danger
+                     of death. But the dangers of death arising out of sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not seem
+                     to come on a man through his pursuing
+                     some good. on the other hand, the dangers of death which occur in battle come to man directly on account of some good, because,
+                     to wit, he is defending the common good by a just fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there is the general combat,
+                     for instance, of those who fight in battle; secondly, there is the private combat, as when a judge or even private individual
+                     does not refrain from giving a just judgment through fear of the impending sword, or any other danger though it
+                     threaten death. Hence it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the mind against dangers of death, not only such as arise in a
+                     general battle, but also such as occur in singular combat, which may be called by the general name of battle. Accordingly
+                     it must be granted that fortitude is properly about dangers of death occurring in battle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p7"> Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger of any other kind of death; especially since man may be in danger of
+                     any kind of death on account of virtue: thus may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend through fear of deadly infection,
+                     or not refuse to undertake a journey with some godly object in view through fear of shipwreck or robbers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Martyrs face the fight that is waged against their own person, and this for the sake of the sovereign good which is God;
+                     wherefore their fortitude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the genus of fortitude that regards warlike actions, for
+                     which reason they are said to have been valiant in battle. [*Office of Martyrs, ex. 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q123_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.34" target="asv">Heb. xi. 34</a>.]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Personal and civil business is differentiated from the business of war that regards general wars. However, personal and civil
+                     affairs admit of dangers of death arising out of certain conflicts which are private wars, and so with regard to these also
+                     there may be fortitude properly so called.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The peace of the state is good in itself, nor does it become evil because certain persons make evil use of it. For there
+                     are many others who make good use of it; and many evils prevented by it, such as murders and sacrileges, are much greater
+                     than those which are occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins of the flesh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q123_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A6-p0.1">Whether endurance is the chief act of fortitude?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that endurance is not the chief act of fortitude. For virtue "is about the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3).
+                     Now it is more difficult to attack than to endure. Therefore endurance is not the chief act of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be able to act on another seems to argue greater power than not to be changed by another. Now to attack is to
+                     act on another, and to endure is to persevere unchangeably. Since then fortitude denotes perfection of power, it seems that
+                     it belongs to fortitude to attack rather than to endure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one contrary is more distant from the other than its mere negation. Now to endure is merely not to fear, whereas
+                     to attack denotes a movement contrary to that of fear, since it implies pursuit. Since then fortitude above all withdraws
+                     the mind from fear, it seems that it regards attack rather than endurance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "certain persons are" said to be brave chiefly because they endure affliction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, and according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 9), "fortitude is more concerned to allay fear, than to moderate daring."
+                     For it is more difficult to allay fear than to moderate daring, since the danger which is the object of daring and fear, tends
+                     by its very nature to check daring, but to increase fear. Now to attack belongs to fortitude in so far as the latter moderates
+                     daring, whereas to endure follows the
+                     repression of fear. Therefore the principal act of fortitude is endurance, that is to stand immovable in the midst of dangers
+                     rather than to attack them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Endurance is more difficult than aggression, for three reasons. First, because endurance seemingly implies that one is being
+                     attacked by a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that one is attacking as though one were the stronger party; and
+                     it is more difficult to contend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly, because he that endures already feels the presence
+                     of danger, whereas the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come; and
+                     it is more difficult to be unmoved by the present than by the future. Thirdly, because endurance implies length of time, whereas
+                     aggression is consistent with sudden movements; and it is more difficult to remain unmoved for a long time, than to be moved
+                     suddenly to something arduous. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some hurry to meet danger, yet fly when the
+                     danger is present; this is not the behavior of a brave man."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Endurance denotes indeed a passion of the body, but an action of the soul cleaving most resolutely [fortissime] to good,
+                     the result being that it does not yield to the threatening passion of the body. Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the
+                     body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that endures fears not, though he is confronted with the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not present to the aggressor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q123_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A7-p0.1">Whether the brave man acts for the sake of the good of his habit?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the brave man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit. For in matters of action the end, though
+                     first in intention, is last in execution. Now the act of fortitude, in the order of execution, follows the habit of fortitude.
+                     Therefore it is impossible for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "We love virtues for the sake of happiness, and yet some make bold to counsel us
+                     to be virtuous," namely by saying that we should desire virtue for its own sake, "without loving happiness. If they succeed
+                     in their endeavor, we shall surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer love that for the sake of which alone
+                     we love virtue." But fortitude is a virtue. Therefore the act of fortitude is directed not
+                     to fortitude but to happiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fortitude is love ready to bear all things for God's sake." Now God is
+                     not the habit of fortitude, but something better, since the end must needs be better than what is directed to the end. Therefore
+                     the brave man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "to the brave man fortitude itself is a good": and such is his end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> An end is twofold: proximate and ultimate. Now the proximate end of every agent is to introduce a likeness of that agent's
+                     form into something else: thus the end of fire in heating is to introduce the likeness of its heat into some passive matter,
+                     and the end of the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of his art. Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended,
+                     may be called the remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made, external
+                     matter is fashioned by art, so in things done, human deeds are fashioned by prudence. Accordingly we must conclude that the
+                     brave man intends as his proximate end to reproduce in action a likeness of his habit, for he intends to act in accordance
+                     with his habit: but his remote end is happiness or God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p7"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the First Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a habit were
+                     its end, instead of the likeness of the habit in act, as stated. The other two objections consider the ultimate end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A7-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q123_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A8-p0.1">Whether the brave man delights in his act?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For "delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit" (Ethic. x,
+                     4,6,8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure
+                     in his act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose, commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q123_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv"> Gal. 5:22, </a> "But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," says that deeds of virtue are called "fruits because they refresh man's
+                     mind with a holy and pure delight." Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he takes pleasure in his act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his
+                     own body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight in the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body;
+                     and consequently the brave man does all things with pleasure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "the brave man seems to have no delight in his act."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A3.html">FS, Q[31], AA[3]</a>,4,5) where we were treating of the passions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily, resulting from bodily contact, the other
+                     is spiritual, resulting from an apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results from deeds of virtue, since
+                     in them we consider the good of reason. Now the principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain things that are
+                     unpleasant as apprehended by the
+                     soul---for instance, the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a natural good, but also as being necessary
+                     for acts of virtue, and things connected with them---but also to endure things unpleasant in respect of bodily contact, such
+                     as wounds and blows. Hence the brave man, on one side, has something that affords him delight, namely as regards spiritual
+                     pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and the end thereof: while, on the other hand, he has cause for both spiritual
+                     sorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence we read (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q123_A8-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.6.30" target="asv">2 Macc. 6:30</a>) that Eleazar said: "I suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul am well content to suffer these things because I fear Thee."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p7"> Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious assistance
+                     of God's grace, which has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things in which it delights, than bodily pains have
+                     to afflict it. Thus the Blessed Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that he felt as though he were
+                     walking on roses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p8"> Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes
+                     spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and to whatever appertains thereto.
+                     Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that "it is not necessary for a brave man to delight so as to perceive his
+                     delight, but it suffices for him not to be sad."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The vehemence of the action or passion of one power hinders the action of another power: wherefore the pain in his senses
+                     hinders the mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its proper operation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on account of their end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is principally
+                     the case with fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen in
+                     all virtues, except in so far as one attains the end."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome by the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and the sensitive
+                     apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak,
+                     in the presence of great bodily pain.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A8-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q123_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A9-p0.1">Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when
+                     they are unforeseen. But Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "fortitude is the deliberate facing of danger, and bearing
+                     of toil." Therefore fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "The brave man is not unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he takes measures beforehand,
+                     and looks out as from the conning-tower of his mind, so as to encounter the future by his forethought, lest he should say
+                     afterwards: This befell me because I did not think it could possibly happen." But it is not possible to be prepared for the
+                     future in the case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is not
+                     concerned with sudden happenings.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that the "brave man is of good hope." But hope looks forward to the future,
+                     which is inconsistent with sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things must be considered in the operation of fortitude. One is in regard to its choice: and thus fortitude is not about
+                     sudden occurrences: because the brave man chooses to think beforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able to
+                     withstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to Gregory (Hom. xxv in Evang.), "the blow that is foreseen strikes
+                     with less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we are
+                     forearmed with the shield of foreknowledge." The other thing to be considered in the operation of fortitude regards the display
+                     of the virtuous habit: and in this way fortitude is chiefly about sudden occurrences, because according to the Philosopher
+                     (Ethic. iii, 8) the habit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a habit works by way of nature. Wherefore
+                     if a person without forethought does that which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges on account of some sudden
+                     danger, this is a very strong proof that habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p7"> Yet is it possible for a person even without the habit of fortitude, to prepare his mind against danger by long forethought:
+                     in the same way as a brave man prepares himself when necessary. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A9-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q123_A10" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A12.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A10-p0.1">Whether the brave man makes use of anger in his action?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his action. For no one should employ as an instrument of his action that
+                     which he cannot use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as to take it up and lay it aside when he will. For, as
+                     the Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), when a bodily passion is in movement, it does not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore
+                     a brave man should not employ anger for his action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a man is competent to do a thing by himself, he should not seek the assistance of something weaker and more imperfect.
+                     Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of fortitude, wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De
+                     Ira i): "Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared for action but also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater
+                     folly than for reason to seek help from anger? the steadfast from the unstaid, the
+                     trusty from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick?" Therefore a brave man should not make use of anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account of sorrow
+                     or desire; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild beasts are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain,
+                     and adulterous persons dare many things for the sake of desire. Now fortitude employs neither sorrow nor desire for its action.
+                     Therefore in like manner it should not employ anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "anger helps the brave."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A10-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q24_A2.html">FS, Q[24], A[2]</a>), concerning anger and the other passions there was a difference of opinion between the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For
+                     the Stoics excluded anger and all other passions of the soul from the mind of a wise or good man: whereas the Peripatetics,
+                     of whom Aristotle was the chief, ascribed to virtuous men both anger and the other passions of the soul albeit modified by
+                     reason. And possibly they differed
+                     not in reality but in their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A10-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q24_A2.html">FS, Q[24], A[2]</a>), gave the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, however they may comport themselves. And since
+                     the sensitive appetite is moved by the command of reason, so that it may cooperate by rendering action more prompt, they held
+                     that virtuous persons should employ both anger and the other passions of the soul, modified according to the dictate of
+                     reason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave the name of passions to certain immoderate emotions of the sensitive appetite,
+                     wherefore they called them sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason severed them altogether from virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p7"> Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but not immoderate anger.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Anger that is moderated in accordance with reason is subject to the command of reason: so that man uses it at his will, which
+                     would not be the case were it immoderate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason employs anger for its action, not as seeking its assistance, but because it uses the sensitive appetite as an instrument,
+                     just as it uses the members of the body. Nor is it unbecoming for the instrument to be more imperfect than the principal agent,
+                     even as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover, Seneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above words were
+                     aimed by him directly at Aristotle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whereas fortitude, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A10-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, has two acts, namely endurance and aggression, it employs anger, not for the act of endurance, because the reason by itself
+                     performs this act, but for the act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the other passions, since it belongs
+                     to anger to strike at the cause of sorrow, so that it directly cooperates with fortitude in attacking. On the other hand,
+                     sorrow by its
+                     very nature gives way to the thing that hurts; though accidentally it helps in aggression, either as being the cause of anger,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A10-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q47_A3.html">FS, Q[47], A[3]</a>), or as making a person expose himself to danger in order to escape from sorrow. In like manner desire, by its very nature,
+                     tends to a pleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to withstand danger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one
+                     to attack, in so far as one prefers to risk dangers rather than
+                     lack pleasure. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "Of all the cases in which fortitude arises from a passion, the
+                     most natural is when a man is brave through anger, making his choice and acting for a purpose," i.e. for a due end; "this
+                     is true fortitude."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p11">Whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue?</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p12">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. For, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A10-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A10.html">(A[10])</a>, anger is closely allied with fortitude. Now anger is not accounted a principal passion; nor is daring which belongs to fortitude.
+                     Therefore neither should fortitude be reckoned a cardinal virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p13">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of virtue is good. But the direct object of fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is endurance of evil
+                     and toil, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii). Therefore fortitude is not a cardinal virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p14">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cardinal virtues are about those things upon which human life is chiefly occupied, just as a door turns upon
+                     a hinge [cardine]. But fortitude is about dangers of death which are of rare occurrence in human life. Therefore fortitude
+                     should not be reckoned a cardinal or principal virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p15">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxii), Ambrose in his commentary on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q123_A10-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv">Lk. 6:20</a>, and Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), number fortitude among the four cardinal or principal virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p16">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A10-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">FS, Q[61], AA[3]</a>,4), those virtues are said to be cardinal or principal which have a foremost claim to that which belongs to the virtues in
+                     common. And among other conditions of virtue in general one is that it is stated to "act steadfastly," according to Ethic.
+                     ii, 4. Now fortitude above all lays claim to praise for steadfastness. Because he that stands firm is so much the more praised,
+                     as he is more strongly
+                     impelled to fall or recede. Now man is impelled to recede from that which is in accordance with reason, both by the pleasing
+                     good and the displeasing evil. But bodily pain impels him more strongly than pleasure. For Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 36):
+                     "There is none that does not shun pain more than he desires pleasure. For we perceive that even the most untamed beasts are
+                     deterred from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pain." And among the pains of the mind and dangers those are mostly feared
+                     which lead to death, and it is against them that the brave man stands firm. Therefore fortitude is a cardinal virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Daring and anger do not cooperate with fortitude in its act of endurance, wherein its steadfastness is chiefly commended:
+                     for it is by that act that the brave man curbs fear, which is a principal passion, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q123_A10-p17.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A4.html">FS, Q[25], A[4]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue is directed to the good of reason which it behooves to safeguard against the onslaught of evils. And fortitude is
+                     directed to evils of the body, as contraries which it withstands, and to the good of reason, as the end, which it intends
+                     to safeguard.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p19">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though dangers of death are of rare occurrence, yet the occasions of those dangers occur frequently, since on account of
+                     justice which he pursues, and also on account of other good deeds, man encounters mortal adversaries.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p20"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A10-p21"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A12.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q123_A12" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q123_A12-p0.1">Whether fortitude excels among all other virtues?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude excels among all other virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is higher, so to speak,
+                     than the rest."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is about that which is difficult and good. But fortitude is about most difficult things. Therefore it is
+                     the greatest of the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the person of a man is more excellent than his possessions. But fortitude is about a man's person, for it is this
+                     that a man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue: whereas justice and the other moral virtues are about other
+                     and external things. Therefore fortitude is the chief of the moral virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i): "Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 19): "Those virtues must needs be greatest which are most profitable to others."
+                     Now liberality seems to be more useful than fortitude. Therefore it is a greater virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), "In things that are great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good": wherefore the better
+                     a virtue the greater it is. Now reason's good is man's good, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) prudence, since it is a
+                     perfection of reason, has the good essentially: while justice effects this good, since it belongs to justice to establish
+                     the order of reason in all human affairs: whereas the other virtues safeguard this good,
+                     inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest they lead man away from reason's good. As to the order of the latter, fortitude
+                     holds the first place, because fear of dangers of death has the greatest power to make man recede from the good of reason:
+                     and after fortitude comes temperance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in hindering the good of reason. Now
+                     to be a thing essentially ranks before effecting it, and the latter ranks before safeguarding it by removing obstacles thereto.
+                     Wherefore among the cardinal virtues, prudence ranks first, justice second, fortitude third, temperance fourth, and after
+                     these the other virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ambrose places fortitude before the other virtues, in respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is useful both
+                     in warfare, and in matters relating to civil or home life. Hence he begins by saying (De Offic. i): "Now we come to treat
+                     of fortitude, which being higher so to speak than the others, is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue essentially regards the good rather than the difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to its
+                     goodness rather than its difficulty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A man does not expose his person to dangers of death except in order to safeguard justice: wherefore the praise awarded to
+                     fortitude depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "fortitude without justice is an occasion of
+                     injustice; since the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p11"> The Fourth argument is granted.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Liberality is useful in conferring certain particular favors: whereas a certain general utility attaches to fortitude, since
+                     it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that "just and brave men are most beloved,
+                     because they are most useful in war and peace."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q123_A12-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS.iii.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q124" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A12.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q124-p0.1">OF MARTYRDOM (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q124-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q124-p2"> We must now consider martyrdom, under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q124-p3"> (1) Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q124-p4"> (2) Of what virtue is it the act?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q124-p5"> (3) Concerning the perfection of this act;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q124-p6"> (4) The pain of martyrdom;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q124-p7"> (5) Its cause.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q124_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q124_A1-p0.1">Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that martyrdom is not an act of virtue. For all acts of virtue are voluntary. But martyrdom is sometimes not voluntary,
+                     as in the case of the Innocents who were slain for Christ's sake, and of whom Hillary says (Super Matth. i) that "they attained
+                     the ripe age of eternity through the glory of martyrdom." Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. Now it is unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q124_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q64_A5.html">Q[64], A[5]</a>), and yet martyrdom is achieved by so doing: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "during persecution certain holy women,
+                     in order to escape from those who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into a river, and so ended their lives, and
+                     their martyrdom is honored in the Catholic Church with most solemn veneration."
+                     Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do an act of virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court martyrdom, rather
+                     would it seem to be presumptuous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The reward of beatitude is not due save to acts of virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.10" target="asv">Mat. 5:10</a>): "Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." Therefore martyrdom
+                     is an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q124_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A1.html">Q[123], AA[1]</a>,3), it belongs to virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. Now the good of reason consists in the truth as its proper
+                     object, and in justice as its proper effect, as shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q124_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q109_A1.html">Q[109], AA[1]</a>,2;
+                     <a id="SS_Q124_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A12.html"> Q[123], A[12]</a>). And martyrdom consists essentially in standing firmly to truth and justice against the assaults of persecution. Hence it
+                     is evident
+                     that martyrdom is an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that in the case of the Innocents the use of their free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they suffered
+                     martyrdom even voluntarily. Since, however, Scripture contains no proof of this, it is better to say that these babes in being
+                     slain obtained by God's grace the glory of martyrdom which others acquire by their own will. For the shedding of one's blood
+                     for Christ's sake takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore just as in the case
+                     of baptized children the merit of Christ is conducive to the acquisition of glory through the baptismal grace, so in those
+                     who were slain for Christ's sake the merit of Christ's martyrdom is conducive to the acquisition of the martyr's palm. Hence
+                     Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (De Diversis lxvi), as though he were addressing them: "A man that does not believe
+                     that children are benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt of your being crowned in suffering for Christ. You were not
+                     old enough to believe in Christ's future sufferings, but you had a body wherein you could endure suffering of Christ Who was
+                     to suffer."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "possibly the Church was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine authority thus
+                     to honor the memory of those holy women [*Cf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q124_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q64_A1.html"> Q[64], A[1]</a>, ad 2]."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now it has been stated (
+                     <a id="SS_Q124_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q108_A1.html">FS, Q[108], A[1]</a>, ad 4) that some of the precepts of the Divine Law are to be understood in reference to the preparation of the mind, in the
+                     sense that man ought to be prepared to do such and such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same way certain things belong
+                     to an act of virtue as regards the preparation of the mind, so that in such and such a case
+                     a man should act according to reason. And this observation would seem very much to the point in the case of martyrdom, which
+                     consists in the right endurance of sufferings unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an occasion of acting unjustly:
+                     yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to endure it in moderation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q124_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q124_A2-p0.1">Whether martyrdom is an act of fortitude?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that martyrdom is not an act of fortitude. For the Greek {martyr} signifies a witness. Now witness is borne to the
+                     faith of Christ. according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.1.8" target="asv"> Acts 1:8, </a> "You shall be witnesses unto Me," etc. and Maximus says in a sermon: "The mother of martyrs is the Catholic faith which those
+                     glorious warriors have sealed with their blood." Therefore martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the virtue which inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and without which
+                     the act avails nothing. Now charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom: Thus Maximus says in a sermon: "The charity of Christ
+                     is victorious in His martyrs." Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act of martyrdom, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.13" target="asv"> Jn. 15:13, </a> "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for
+                     his friends." Moreover without charity martyrdom avails nothing, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:3, </a> "If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore martyrdom is an act
+                     of charity rather than of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says in a sermon on St. Cyprian: "It is easy to honor a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a great
+                     thing to imitate his faith and patience." Now that which calls chiefly for praise in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which
+                     it is the act. Therefore martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "Blessed martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you? Most valiant warriors, how
+                     shall I find words to proclaim the strength of your courage?" Now a person is praised on account of the virtue whose act he
+                     performs. Therefore martyrdom is an act of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q124_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A1.html">Q[123], A[1]</a>, seqq.), it belongs to fortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially against dangers, and chiefly against
+                     dangers of death, and most of all against those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in martyrdom man is firmly strengthened
+                     in the good of virtue, since he cleaves to faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening danger of death, the imminence
+                     of which is moreover due to
+                     a kind of particular contest with his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a sermon (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "The crowd of
+                     onlookers wondered to see an unearthly battle, and Christ's servants fighting erect, undaunted in speech, with souls unmoved,
+                     and strength divine." Wherefore it is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude; for which reason the Church reads in
+                     the office of Martyrs: They "became valiant in battle" [*
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.34" target="asv">Heb. 11:34</a>].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Two things must be considered in the act of fortitude. one is the good wherein the brave man is strengthened, and this is
+                     the end of fortitude; the other is the firmness itself, whereby a man does not yield to the contraries that hinder him from
+                     achieving that good, and in this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as civic fortitude strengthens a man's mind in
+                     human justice, for the safeguarding of which he braves the danger of death, so
+                     gratuitous fortitude strengthens man's soul in the good of Divine justice, which is "through faith in Christ Jesus," according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.22" target="asv"> Rom. 3:22.</a> Thus martyrdom is related to faith as the end in which one is strengthened, but to fortitude as the eliciting habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, as its first and chief motive cause, being the virtue commanding it, whereas
+                     fortitude inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause, being the virtue that elicits it. Hence martyrdom is an act of
+                     charity as commanding, and of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it manifests both virtues. It is due to charity
+                     that it is meritorious, like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails
+                     not without charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q124_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A6.html">Q[123], A[6]</a>), the chief act of fortitude is endurance: to this and not to its secondary act, which is aggression, martyrdom belongs.
+                     And since patience serves fortitude on the part of its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is that martyrs are also praised
+                     for their patience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q124_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q124_A3-p0.1">Whether martyrdom is an act of the greatest perfection?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection. For seemingly that which is a matter of counsel and not
+                     of precept pertains to perfection, because, to wit, it is not necessary for salvation. But it would seem that martyrdom is
+                     necessary for salvation, since the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.10" target="asv">Rom. 10:10</a>), "With the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation," and it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.16" target="asv">1 Jn.
+                        3:16
+                     </a>), that "we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." Therefore martyrdom does not pertain to perfection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it seems to point to greater perfection that a man give his soul to God, which is done by obedience, than that he
+                     give God his body, which is done by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is preferable to all sacrifices."
+                     Therefore martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it would seem better to do good to others than to maintain oneself in good, since the "good of the nation is better
+                     than the good of the individual," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now he that suffers martyrdom profits himself
+                     alone, whereas he that teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of teaching and guiding subjects is more perfect than
+                     the act of martyrdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi) prefers martyrdom to virginity which pertains to perfection. Therefore martyrdom seems
+                     to belong to perfection in the highest degree.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of an act of virtue in two ways. First, with regard to the species of that act, as compared to the virtue proximately
+                     eliciting it. In this way martyrdom, which consists in the due endurance of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous
+                     acts, because endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only in so far as it is directed to some good consisting
+                     in an act of virtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of virtue
+                     being the end is better.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p7"> A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with its first motive cause, which is the love of charity,
+                     and it is in this respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life, since, as the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.14" target="asv">Col. 3:14</a>), that "charity . . . is the bond of perfection." Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof of the perfection
+                     of charity: since a man's love for a thing is proved to be so much the greater, according as
+                     that which he despises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which he chooses to suffer for its sake is more odious. But
+                     it is evident that of all the goods of the present life man loves life itself most, and on the other hand he hates death more
+                     than anything, especially when it is accompanied by the pains of bodily torment, "from fear of which even dumb animals refrain
+                     from the greatest pleasures," as Augustine observes (QQ[83], qu. 36). And from this point of view it is clear that
+                     martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts in respect of its genus, as being the sign of the greatest charity, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.15.13" target="asv"> Jn. 15:13</a>: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is no act of perfection, which is a matter of counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of precept, as being necessary
+                     for salvation. Thus Augustine declares (De Adult. Conjug. xiii) that a man is under the obligation of observing continency,
+                     through the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary to the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it
+                     be necessary for salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary
+                     for salvation to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many holy martyrs who through zeal for the faith or brotherly love gave
+                     themselves up to martyrdom of their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be understood as referring to the preparation
+                     of the mind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of obedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we read of Christ (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.8" target="asv">Phil. 2:8</a>) that He became "obedient unto death." Hence it is evident that martyrdom is of itself more perfect than obedience considered
+                     absolutely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers martyrdom according to the proper species of its act, whence it derives no excellence over all other
+                     virtuous acts; thus neither is fortitude more excellent than all virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q124_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q124_A4-p0.1">Whether death is essential to martyrdom?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that death is not essential to martyrdom. For Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption (Epist. ad Paul. et Eustoch.):
+                     "I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace": and Gregory
+                     says (Hom. iii in Evang.): "Although persecution has ceased to offer the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without
+                     its martyrdom, since even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet
+                     do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit." Therefore there can be martyrdom without suffering death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we read of certain women as commended for despising life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh:
+                     wherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity is preferable to the life of the body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh
+                     has been forfeited or has been threatened in confession of the Christian faith, as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore
+                     it seems that the name of martyr should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the integrity
+                     of the flesh for the sake of Christ's faith, rather than if she were to forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also
+                     Lucy said: "If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity will gain me a twofold crown."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But it belongs to fortitude to brave not only death but also other hardships,
+                     as Augustine declares (Music. vi). Now there are many other hardships besides death, which one may suffer for Christ's faith,
+                     namely imprisonment, exile, being stripped of one's goods, as mentioned in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.34" target="asv"> Heb. 10:34, </a> for which reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint Marcellus, notwithstanding that he died in prison.
+                     Therefore it is not essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated above (A[2], ad 1; A[3]). Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death.
+                     Therefore it is before death; and consequently death is not essential to martyrdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that "in dying for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in living
+                     without faith."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p7"> I answer that As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q124_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q124_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, a martyr is so called as being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise things visible for the sake
+                     of things invisible, as stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11" target="asv">Heb. 11</a>. Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to the faith in showing by deed that he despises all things
+                     present, in order to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains the life of the body he does not show by
+                     deed that he
+                     despises all things relating to the body. For men are wont to despise both their kindred and all they possess, and even to
+                     suffer bodily pain, rather than lose life. Hence Satan testified against Job (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A4-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Job.2.4" target="asv">Job 2:4</a>): "Skin for skin, and all that a man hath he will give for his soul" [Douay: 'life'] i.e. for the life of his body. Therefore
+                     the perfect notion of martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The authorities quoted, and the like that one may meet with, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh, or is condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it
+                     is not evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the Christian faith, or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore
+                     in the sight of men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and consequently this is not martyrdom properly speaking.
+                     In the sight of God, however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed worthy
+                     of a reward, as Lucy said.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q124_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A4.html">Q[123], AA[4]</a>,5), fortitude regards danger of death chiefly, and other dangers consequently; wherefore a person is not called a martyr
+                     merely for suffering imprisonment, or exile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except in so far as these result in death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in the voluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person willingly
+                     suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however, that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for
+                     Christ's sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued
+                     until death ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this
+                     state, and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q124_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q124_A5-p0.1">Whether faith alone is the cause of martyrdom?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.4.15" target="asv">1 Pet. 4:15,16</a>): "Let none of you suffer as a murderer, or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter of other men's things. But if as a Christian,
+                     let him not be ashamed, but let him glorify God in this name." Now a man is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith
+                     of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ gives the glory of martyrdom to those who suffer.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a martyr is a kind of witness. But witness is borne to the truth alone. Now one is not called a martyr for bearing
+                     witness to any truth, but only for witnessing to the Divine truth, otherwise a man would be a martyr if he were to die for
+                     confessing a truth of geometry or some other speculative science, which seems ridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause
+                     of martyrdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most account which are directed to the common good, since "the good of
+                     the nation is better than the good of the individual," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good
+                     were the cause of martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be martyrs who die for the defense of their country.
+                     Yet this is not consistent with Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyrdom of
+                     those who die in a just war. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.10" target="asv">Mat. 5:10</a>): "Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake," which pertains to martyrdom, according to a gloss, as well
+                     as Jerome's commentary on this passage. Now not only faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice. Therefore other
+                     virtues can be the cause of martyrdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q124_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q124_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, martyrs are so called as being witnesses, because by suffering in body unto death they bear witness to the truth; not indeed
+                     to any truth, but to the truth which is in accordance with godliness, and was made known to us by Christ: wherefore Christ's
+                     martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the truth of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p7"> But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, but also outward profession, which is expressed not only by words,
+                     whereby one confesses the faith, but also by deeds, whereby a person shows that he has faith, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.18" target="asv"> James 2:18, </a> "I will show thee, by works, my faith." Hence it is written of certain people (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A5-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Titus.1.16" target="asv">Titus 1:16</a>): "They profess that they know God but in their works they deny Him." Thus all virtuous deeds, inasmuch as
+                     they are referred to God, are professions of the faith whereby we come to know that God requires these works of us, and rewards
+                     us for them: and in this way they can be the cause of martyrdom. For this reason the Church celebrates the martyrdom of Blessed
+                     John the Baptist, who suffered death, not for refusing to deny the faith, but for reproving adultery.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A Christian is one who is Christ's. Now a person is said to be Christ's, not only through having faith in Christ, but also
+                     because he is actuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of Christ, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.9" target="asv">Rom. 8:9</a>, "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His"; and again because in imitation of Christ he is dead to sins,
+                     according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q124_A5-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.24" target="asv"> Gal. 5:24, </a> "They that are Christ's have crucified their flesh with the vices and
+                     concupiscences." Hence to suffer as a Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the faith, which is done by words,
+                     but also to suffer for doing any good work, or for avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because this all comes under the head
+                     of witnessing to the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of other sciences has no connection with the worship of the Godhead: hence it is not called truth according to
+                     godliness, and consequently the confession thereof cannot be said to be the direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie
+                     is a sin, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q124_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q110_A3.html">Q[110], AA[3]</a>,4), avoidance of a lie, to whatever truth it may be contrary, may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a lie is a sin against
+                     the Divine
+                     Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good of one's country is paramount among human goods: yet the Divine good, which is the proper cause of martyrdom, is
+                     of more account than human good. Nevertheless, since human good may become Divine, for instance when it is referred to God,
+                     it follows that any human good in so far as it is referred to God, may be the cause of martyrdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q124_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q123_A12.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q125" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q125-p0.1">OF FEAR* (FOUR ARTICLES) [*St. Thomas calls this vice indifferently 'fear' or 'timidity.' The translation requires one to
+                  adhere to these terms on account of the connection with the passion of fear. Otherwise 'cowardice' would be a better rendering.]
+               </h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q125-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q125-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: (1) Fear; (2) Fearlessness; (3) Daring.</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q125-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q125-p4"> (1) Whether fear is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q125-p5"> (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q125-p6"> (3) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q125-p7"> (4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q125_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q125_A1-p0.1">Whether fear is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a passion, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q125_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">FS, Q[23], A[4]</a>; Q[42]). Now we are neither praised nor blamed for passions, as stated in Ethic. ii. Since then every sin is blameworthy,
+                     it seems that fear is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a sin: since the "law of the Lord is unspotted" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.8" target="asv">Ps. 18:8</a>). Yet fear is commanded in God's law, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.5" target="asv">Eph. 6:5</a>): "Servants, be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling." Therefore fear is
+                     not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for sin is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii).
+                     Now fear is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "a man would be insane or insensible to pain,
+                     if nothing, not even earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear." Therefore fear is not a sin. .
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.28" target="asv">Mat. 10:28</a>): "Fear ye not them that kill the body," and it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.2.6" target="asv">Ezech. 2:6</a>): "Fear not, neither be thou afraid of their words."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A human act is said to be a sin on account of its being inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order, as
+                     stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q125_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q109_A2.html">Q[109], A[2]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q125_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q114_A1.html"> Q[114], A[1]</a>). Now this due order requires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason. And reason dictates that certain things
+                     should be shunned and some sought after. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to be shunned more than
+                     others; and among things to be sought after, that some are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a good
+                     is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be shunned. The result is that reason dictates that certain goods
+                     are to be sought after more than certain evils are to be avoided. Accordingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates
+                     that we should endure rather than forfeit others that we should rather seek for, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other
+                     hand, when the appetite fears so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned, the appetite is neither inordinate nor sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance in general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or
+                     evil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the Philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor
+                     blame, because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate
+                     or inordinate manner.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in accordance with reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be lacking
+                     in the service they owe their masters.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason dictates that we should shun the evils that we cannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us nothing. Hence
+                     there is no sin in fearing them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q125_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q125_A2-p0.1">Whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q125_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A4.html">Q[123], AA[4]</a>,5). But the sin of fear is not always connected with dangers of death, for a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.127.1" target="asv"> Ps. 127:1, </a> "Blessed are all they that fear the Lord," says that "it is human fear whereby we dread to suffer carnal dangers, or to lose
+                     worldly goods." Again a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A2-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.27.44" target="asv"> Mat. 27:44,
+                        
+                     </a>"He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame word," says that "evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of pain, and
+                     fear of contempt." Therefore the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now sometimes
+                     a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or shame. Thus Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order
+                     not to be Caesar's slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead
+                     of being opposed thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is opposed not to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Q[20], A[1];
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q125_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A4.html">FS, Q[40], A[4]</a>). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that timidity is opposed to fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[19], A[3]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q125_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q43_A1.html">FS, Q[43], A[1]</a>), all fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary to something he loves. Now love is not confined to
+                     any particular kind of virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every virtue, since every virtuous man loves the good
+                     proper to his virtue; while inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate love gives use to inordinate desire.
+                     Hence in like
+                     manner inordinate fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss
+                     of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest fear of all is that which has the danger of death for its object, as we find proved
+                     in Ethic. iii, 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards dangers of death. For this
+                     reason timidity is said to be antonomastically* opposed to fortitude. [*Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we
+                     substitute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so timidity, which is inordinate fear
+                     of any evil, is employed to denote inordinate fear of the danger of death.]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in its generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference to the end, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q125_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">FS, Q[1], A[3]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q125_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">FS, Q[18], A[6]</a>): and it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a good. But a man who exposes himself
+                     to danger of death in order to escape from slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is contrary to fortitude. Hence
+                     the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), that "to die
+                     in order to escape poverty, lust, or something disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun hardships
+                     is a mark of effeminacy."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q125_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q45_A2.html">FS, Q[45], A[2]</a>), fear is the beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring. Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring
+                     in moderation presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some kind of fear. It does not follow, however,
+                     that any kind of despair results from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same kind. Now the despair that is
+                     opposed to hope is
+                     referred to another kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to fortitude regards dangers of death.
+                     Hence the argument does not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q125_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q125_A3-p0.1">Whether fear is a mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q125_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html">FS, Q[23], A[1]</a>), fear is in the irascible faculty which is a part of the sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the sensuality,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q125_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A4.html">FS, Q[74], A[4]</a>). Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God. But fear does not this, for a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Judg.7.3" target="asv"> Judges 7:3, </a> "Whosoever is fearful," etc., says that "a man is fearful when he trembles at the very thought of conflict; yet he is not
+                     so wholly terrified at heart, but that he can rally and take courage." Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection but also from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a
+                     precept, but only from perfection; for a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.8" target="asv"> Dt. 20:8, </a> "What man is there that is fearful and fainthearted?" says: "We learn from this that no man can take up the profession of
+                     contemplation or spiritual warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches." Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due: and yet this is due to the fearful, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q125_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.8" target="asv"> Apoc. 21:8, </a> "But the fearful and unbelieving and the abominable," etc., "shall have their portion in the pool burning with fire and brimstone
+                     which is the second death." Therefore fear is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q125_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q125_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, fear is a sin through being inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be shunned according to reason.
+                     Now sometimes this inordinateness of fear is confined to the sensitive appetites, without the accession of the rational appetite's
+                     consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but only a venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches to the rational
+                     appetite which is called the
+                     will, which deliberately shuns something against the dictate of reason: and this inordinateness of fear is sometimes a mortal,
+                     sometimes a venial sin. For if a man through fear of the danger of death or of any other temporal evil is so disposed as to
+                     do what is forbidden, or to omit what is commanded by the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin: otherwise it is a venial
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers fear as confined to the sensuality.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This gloss also can be understood as referring to the fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may
+                     reply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes his courage beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal
+                     sin, it may happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus
+                     sometimes a man sins mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside
+                     from accomplishing what he purposed doing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man aside from a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a precept, but
+                     for the perfection of a counsel. Such like fear is not a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin,
+                     for instance when one has a reasonable cause for fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q125_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q125_A4-p0.1">Whether fear excuses from sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear is a sin, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q125_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q125_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But sin does not excuse from sin, rather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all would this be true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a
+                     courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse, because, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does
+                     not seem to be an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or spiritual. Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because instead
+                     of inducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of temporal evil does not excuse from sin, because according to
+                     the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), "one should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor anything that is not a result of one's own
+                     wickedness." Therefore it seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in the Decretals (I, Q[1], Cap. Constat.): "A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by heretics,
+                     has an ostensible excuse."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q125_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q125_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, fear is sinful in so far as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain evils to be shunned rather
+                     than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges to be more
+                     avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than the loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin
+                     if through fear of death he were to promise
+                     or give something to a robber, and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners, rather than to the good to whom
+                     he should give in preference. On the other hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according to reason are less
+                     to be avoided, and so incur evils which according to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from sin,
+                     because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the soul are more to be feared than the evils of the body. and
+                     evils of the body more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to incur evils of the soul, namely sins, in order
+                     to avoid evils of the body, such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as loss of money; or if one were to
+                     endure evils of the body in order to avoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet one's sin would be
+                     extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear is less voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a certain
+                     necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) says that these things that are done through fear
+                     are not simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness, but in the point of its involuntariness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet the shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object of
+                     fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to the opinion of Stoics, who held temporal goods not to be man's goods, it follows in consequence that temporal
+                     evils are not man's evils, and that therefore they are nowise to be feared. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these
+                     temporal things are goods of the least account, and this was also the opinion of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries
+                     are indeed to be feared; but not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce
+                     that which is good according to virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q125_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q124_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q126" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q126-p0.1">OF FEARLESSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q126-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q126-p2"> We must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q126-p3"> (1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q126-p4"> (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q126_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q126_A1-p0.1">Whether fearlessness is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which is reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is written
+                     in praise of the just man (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.28.1" target="asv">Prov. 28:1</a>): "The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread." Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is so fearful as death, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.28" target="asv"> Mat. 10:28, </a> "Fear ye not them that kill the body," etc., nor anything that can be inflicted by man, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.51.12" target="asv"> Is. 51:12, </a> "Who art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man?" Therefore it is not a sin to be fearless.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fear is born of love, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q126_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q125_A2.html">Q[125], A[2]</a>). Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to love nothing earthly, since according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "the
+                     love of God to the abasement of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city." Therefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear
+                     nothing earthly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of the unjust judge (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.2" target="asv">Lk. 18:2</a>) that "he feared not God nor regarded man."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear whereby
+                     one dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of temporal goods. And every man has it instilled in him by nature
+                     to love his own life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in due measure, that is, to love these things not as placing
+                     his end therein, but as things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence it is
+                     contrary to the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, to fall short of loving them in due measure. Nevertheless, one never
+                     lapses entirely from this love: since what is natural cannot be wholly lost: for which reason the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.29" target="asv">Eph. 5:29</a>): "No man ever hated his own flesh." Wherefore even those that slay themselves do so from love of their own flesh, which
+                     they desire to free from present stress. Hence it may happen that a man fears death and other temporal evils
+                     less than he ought, for the reason that he loves them* less than he ought. [*Viz. the contrary goods. One would expect 'se'
+                     instead of 'ea.' We should then read: For the reason that he loves himself less than he ought.] But that he fear none of these
+                     things cannot result from an entire lack of love, but only from the fact that he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted
+                     by the evils contrary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the result of pride of soul presuming on self and despising
+                     others, according to the saying of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Job.41.24" target="asv"> Job 41:24,25</a>: "He [Vulg.: 'who'] was made to fear no one, he beholdeth every high thing": and sometimes it happens through a defect in
+                     the reason; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that the "Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear nothing." [*"A man
+                     would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were nothing that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at
+                     sea, as is said to be the case with the Celts."] It is
+                     therefore evident that fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from lack of love, pride of soul, or dullness of understanding:
+                     yet the latter is excused from sin if it be invincible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The just man is praised for being without fear that withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for it is
+                     written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.28" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:28</a>): "He that is without fear cannot be justified."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Death and whatever else can be inflicted by mortal man are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice: but they
+                     are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as regards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in
+                     others. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.16" target="asv">Prov. 14:16</a>): "A wise man feareth and declineth from evil."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us from loving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be feared;
+                     wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q126_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.34.16" target="asv">Ecclus. 34:16</a>): "He that feareth the Lord shall tremble at nothing." But temporal goods are not to be despised, in so far as they are helping
+                     us instrumentally to attain those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q126_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q126_A2-p0.1">Whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude. For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is
+                     hindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is both brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness
+                     is not opposed to fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of due love, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack
+                     of due love is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly to prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness
+                     is not opposed to fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the one side. Since then
+                     fortitude has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the other, it seems that fearlessness is not opposed thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons fearlessness to be opposed to fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q126_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html">Q[123], A[3]</a>), fortitude is concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral virtue observes the rational mean in the matter about which
+                     it is concerned. Hence it belongs to fortitude that man should moderate his fear according to reason, namely that he should
+                     fear what he ought, and when he ought, and so forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either by excess or by deficiency.
+                     Wherefore just as timidity is
+                     opposed to fortitude by excess of fear, in so far as a man fears what he ought not, and as he ought not, so too fearlessness
+                     is opposed thereto by deficiency of fear, in so far as a man fears not what he ought to fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of fortitude is to endure death without fear, and to be aggressive, not anyhow, but according to reason: this the
+                     fearless man does not do.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts the mean of fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude directly. But in
+                     respect of its causes nothing hinders it from being opposed to other virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude by excess of daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear. Fortitude imposes
+                     the mean on each passion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in its having different extremes in different respects.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q126_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q125_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q127" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q127-p0.1">OF DARING [*Excessive daring or foolhardiness] (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q127-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q127-p2"> We must now consider daring; and under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q127-p3"> (1) Whether daring is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q127-p4"> (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q127_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q127_A1-p0.1">Whether daring is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q127_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.39.21" target="asv">Job 39:21</a>) concerning the horse, by which according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi) the godly preacher is denoted, that "he goeth forth boldly
+                     to meet armed men [*Vulg.: 'he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth to meet armed men']." But no vice redounds to a man's praise.
+                     Therefore it is not a sin to be daring.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9), "one should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has been counseled."
+                     But daring helps this quickness in doing. Therefore daring is not sinful but praiseworthy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, daring is a passion caused by hope, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q127_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q45_A2.html">FS, Q[45], A[2]</a>) when we were treating of the passions. But hope is accounted not a sin but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring be
+                     accounted a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q127_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.8.18" target="asv">Ecclus. 8:18</a>): "Go not on the way with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils." Now no man's fellowship is to be avoided save
+                     on account of sin. Therefore daring is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Daring, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q127_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html">FS, Q[23], A[1]</a>; Q[55]), is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes moderated according to reason, and sometimes it lacks moderation, either
+                     by excess or by deficiency, and on this account the passion is sinful. Again, the names of the passions are sometimes employed
+                     in the sense of excess, thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, in which case it is sinful, and in the
+                     same way daring as
+                     implying excess is accounted a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The daring spoken of there is that which is moderated by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel, which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking
+                     counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act rashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q127_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A3.html">Q[58], A[3]</a>). Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far praiseworthy as it is directed by reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some virtues, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4,5,6). Hence the names
+                     of certain passions have to be applied to certain vices and virtues: and in order to designate vices we employ especially
+                     the names of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the case of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and
+                     love have a good for this object, and so we use them rather to designate virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q127_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q128.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q127_A2-p0.1">Whether daring is opposed to fortitude?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For excess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind. But presumption
+                     pertains to pride which is opposed to humility. Therefore daring is opposed to humility rather than to fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, daring does not seem to call for blame, except in so far as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts
+                     himself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with daring, or exposes to danger. But this seemingly pertains
+                     to injustice. Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to fortitude but to justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fortitude is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q127_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html">Q[123], A[3]</a>). Now since timidity is opposed to fortitude in respect of an excess of fear, there is another vice opposed to timidity in
+                     respect of a lack of fear. If then, daring is opposed to fortitude, in the point of excessive daring, there will likewise
+                     be a vice opposed to it in the point of deficient daring. But there is no such vice. Therefore neither
+                     should daring be accounted a vice in opposition to fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher in both the Second and Third Books of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q127_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q126_A2.html">Q[126], A[2]</a>), it belongs to a moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Wherefore every vice
+                     that denotes lack of moderation in the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue, as immoderate to moderate. Now
+                     daring, in so far as it denotes a vice, implies excess of passion, and this excess goes by the name of daring. Wherefore it
+                     is evident that it is opposed to the
+                     virtue of fortitude which is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q127_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q122_A3.html">Q[122], A[3]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Opposition between vice and virtue does not depend chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's very species. Wherefore
+                     it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the same virtue as presumption which is its cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the direct opposition of a vice does not depend on its cause, so neither does it depend on its effect. Now the harm
+                     done by daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition of daring depend on this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movement of daring consists in a man taking the offensive against that which is in opposition to him: and nature inclines
+                     him to do this except in so far as such inclination is hindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the
+                     vice which exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only timidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great
+                     a lack of timidity, for as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), "the daring are
+                     precipitate and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is present," namely through fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q127_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q128.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q126_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q128" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q128_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q128-p0.1">OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE (ONE ARTICLE)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q128-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q128-p2"> We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall
+                  treat of each part.
+               </p>
+               <div id="SS_Q128_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q128.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q128_A1-p0.1">Whether the parts of fortitude are suitably assigned?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to fortitude,
+                     namely "magnificence," "confidence," "patience," and "perseverance." Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality; since
+                     both are concerned about money, and "a magnificent man must needs be liberal," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2).
+                     But liberality is a part of justice, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q128_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q117_A5.html">Q[117],
+                        A[5]
+                     </a>). Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue
+                     by itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply
+                     any relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to fortitude.
+                     Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is
+                     required in every virtue: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q128_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.13" target="asv">Mat. 24:13</a>): "He that shall persevere to the end he shall be saved." Therefore perseverance should not be accounted a part of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of fortitude, namely "magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence,
+                     constancy, forbearance, stability." Andronicus also reckons seven virtues annexed to fortitude, and these are, "courage, strength
+                     of will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence." Therefore it seems that Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude
+                     is incomplete.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of fortitude. The first is "civic" fortitude, which produces brave deeds
+                     through fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is "military" fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike
+                     art or experience; the third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth
+                     is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome; the
+                     fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are
+                     not comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q128_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q48.html">Q[48])</a>, a virtue can have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot
+                     have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special
+                     matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p10"> However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it: integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence
+                     of which is requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because what fortitude practices in face of the greatest
+                     hardships, namely dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain minor hardships and these virtues
+                     are annexed to fortitude as secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q128_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html">Q[123], AA[3]</a>,6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance. Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The
+                     first regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind ready for aggression. In this respect Tully mentions
+                     "confidence," of which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "with this the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great
+                     and honorable undertakings." The second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and
+                     consists in not failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect Tully mentions "magnificence," which
+                     he describes as being "the discussion and administration," i.e. accomplishment "of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain
+                     broad and noble purpose of mind," so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be confined
+                     to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because without
+                     them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues
+                     specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as secondary virtues to principal: thus "magnificence" is referred
+                     by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great expenses, and "magnanimity," which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors.
+                     Again, two things are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the mind be not broken by
+                     sorrow, and fall away from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In this respect he mentions "patience,"
+                     which he describes as "the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit."
+                     The other is that by the prolonged suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q128_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.3" target="asv"> Heb. 12:3, </a> "That you be not wearied, fainting in your minds." In this respect he mentions "perseverance,"
+                     which accordingly he describes as "the fixed and continued persistence in a well considered purpose." If these two be confined
+                     to the proper matter of fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be referred to any kind of hardship
+                     they will be virtues distinct from fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which
+                     is the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by fortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a theological virtue, as stated above (Q[17], A[5]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q128_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">FS, Q[62], A[3]</a>). But by confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in himself, yet under God withal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To venture on anything great seems to involve danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although
+                     magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or venturing on any other great things, they have a certain
+                     connection with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other
+                     hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death,
+                     it is an integral part thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is reckoned
+                     a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the Article.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by Tully, namely "confidence, magnificence, forbearance," which he puts in
+                     the place of patience, and "firmness," which he substitutes for perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely "magnanimity"
+                     and "security," are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because
+                     confidence denotes a man's hope for great things: and hope for anything
+                     presupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q128_A1-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A2.html">FS, Q[40], A[2]</a>) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped for.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p17"> A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the
+                     thing hoped for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one, for one's own part, would hope
+                     for something, but hope is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat contrary to hope, as stated
+                     above, (
+                     <a id="SS_Q128_A1-p17.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A4.html">FS, Q[40], A[4]</a>, ad 1). Hence Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He
+                     adds a third, namely constancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnificence one needs
+                     to have a constant mind. For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in accomplishing great things, but
+                     also in discussing them generously in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may be called persevering
+                     through not desisting on account of delays, and constant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p18"> Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions
+                     "perseverance" and "magnificence," and with Macrobius, "magnanimity." "Strength of will" is the same as patience or forbearance,
+                     for he says that "strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be attempted, and to endure what
+                     reason says should be endured"---i.e. good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines it as
+                     "strength of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose." Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says that
+                     "manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue." Besides magnificence he mentions {andragathia}, i.e. manly
+                     goodness which we may render "strenuousness." For magnificence consists not only in being constant in the accomplishment of
+                     great deeds, which belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence and solicitude to that accomplishment,
+                     and
+                     this belongs to {andragathia}, strenuousness: wherefore he says that {andragathia} is the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks
+                     out profitable works.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p19"> Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the four principal parts mentioned by Tully.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p20">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude,
+                     they differ as to motive, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q128_A1-p20.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A1.html">Q[123], A[1]</a>, ad 2); wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p21"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q128_A1-p22"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q128.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q127_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q128_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q129" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q128_A1.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q129-p0.1">OF MAGNANIMITY* (EIGHT ARTICLES) [*Not in the ordinary restricted sense but as explained by the author]</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q129-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q129-p2"> We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including, however, the other parts under those mentioned by Tully,
+                  with the exception of confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity, of which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall
+                  consider (1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence; (3) Patience; (4) Perseverance. As regards the first we shall treat (1) of magnanimity;
+                  (2) of its contrary vices. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q129-p3"> (1) Whether magnanimity is about honors?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q129-p4"> (2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q129-p5"> (3) Whether it is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q129-p6"> (4) Whether it is a special virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q129-p7"> (5) Whether it is a part of fortitude?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q129-p8"> (6) Of its relation to confidence;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q129-p9"> (7) Of its relation to assurance;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q129-p10"> (8) Of its relation to goods of fortune.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q129_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A1-p0.1">Whether magnanimity is about honors?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows, since
+                     "magnanimity" signifies greatness of mind, and "mind" denotes the irascible part, as appears from De Anima iii, 42, where
+                     the Philosopher says that "in the sensitive appetite are desire and mind," i.e. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But
+                     honor is a concupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it seems that
+                     magnanimity is not about honors.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about operations,
+                     for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows that it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore
+                     magnanimity is not about honors.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because
+                     he tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring honors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity
+                     is not about honors.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "magnanimity is about honor and dishonor."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to two
+                     things, first to the matter about which is the field of its activity, secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right
+                     use of such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly
+                     because he is minded to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in two ways: in
+                     one way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may be called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use
+                     of some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great
+                     when it consists in the best use of the greatest thing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p7"> The things which come into man's use are external things, and among these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is
+                     the most akin to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q129_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], AA[1]</a>,2); and because it is offered to God and to the best; and again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame,
+                     men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be magnanimous in respect of things that are great
+                     absolutely and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore
+                     that magnanimity is about honors.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Good and evil absolutely considered regard the concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is added,
+                     they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity regards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something
+                     great or difficult.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation, yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a difficult
+                     good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the passions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope: even
+                     so, we have stated (
+                     <a id="SS_Q129_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A4.html">Q[123], AA[4]</a>,5) with regard to fortitude that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of fear and daring.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have
+                     too great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this
+                     would be deserving of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving
+                     of honor, yet not so as to think much of the honor accorded by man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q129_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A2-p0.1">Whether magnanimity is essentially about great honors?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated
+                     above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q129_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about
+                     either great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great honor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor,
+                     and consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is not only about great honors.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that magnanimity is about great honors.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p6"> I answer that According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand
+                     the perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that power, as stated in De Coelo i, 116. Now the perfection
+                     of a power is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such operations as are great or difficult: for every
+                     power, however imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it is essential to a virtue to
+                     be about the difficult and the good, as stated in Ethic. ii, 3.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p7"> Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act of virtue may be considered from two points of view.
+                     First, from the point of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and establish the rational means in some particular
+                     matter: and this difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The other difficulty is
+                     on the part of the matter, which may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which
+                     moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions,
+                     because the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p8"> Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly
+                     in some cases from the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are the objects of the passions. The passions
+                     themselves have no great power of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite, which is the seat of
+                     the passions, is naturally subject to reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions regard
+                     only that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence
+                     of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On the other hand, some passions have great power
+                     of resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that are the objects of those passions: such are the love
+                     or desire of money or of honor. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that which is
+                     greatest in those passions, but also about that which is ordinary or little: because things external, though they be little,
+                     are very desirable, as being necessary for human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two virtues, one
+                     about ordinary or little sums of money, namely liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely "magnificence."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p9"> In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated
+                     by its extremes, which are {philotimia}, i.e. love of honor, and {aphilotimia}, i.e. without love of honor: for sometimes
+                     a man is commended for loving honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both these things may be
+                     done in moderation. But with regard to great honors there is "magnanimity." Wherefore we must conclude that the
+                     proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous man tends to such things as are deserving of honor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Great and little are accidental to honor considered in itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason,
+                     the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is much more difficult to observe it in great than in little
+                     honors.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In anger and other matters only that which is greatest presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any
+                     need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are things existing outside the soul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that makes good use of great things is much more able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous man
+                     looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit,
+                     man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honors, because
+                     he does not deem them above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as
+                     are ordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor, but despises it, since he recognizes that he does
+                     not deserve it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q129_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A3-p0.1">Whether magnanimity is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every moral virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean
+                     but the greater extreme: because the "magnanimous man deems himself worthy of the greatest things" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore
+                     magnanimity is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q129_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>). But one may have a virtue without having magnanimity: since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whosoever is worthy
+                     of little things and deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, but he is not magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not
+                     a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Virtue is a good quality of the mind," as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q129_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">FS, Q[55], A[4]</a>). But magnanimity implies certain dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of "a magnanimous man
+                     that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his utterance calm." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But magnanimity is opposed to humility, since "the magnanimous deems himself
+                     worthy of great things, and despises others," according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For,
+                     in the first place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is remiss and slow of action; thirdly, he employs
+                     irony [*Cf. Q[113]] towards many; fourthly, he is unable to associate with others; fifthly, because he holds to the barren
+                     things rather than to those that are fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in praise of certain men (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.15.18" target="asv">2 Macc. 15:18</a>): "Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas' companions, and the greatness of courage [animi magnitudinem] with which they fought
+                     for their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword." Now, only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity
+                     which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good.
+                     Now among external human things honors take precedence of all others, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q129_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html">(A[1];</a> 
+                     <a id="SS_Q129_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q11_A2.html">FS, Q[11], A[2]</a>, OBJ[3]). Therefore magnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), "the magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes," in so far as he tends
+                     to what is greatest, "but in the matter of becomingness, he follows the mean," because he tends to the greatest things according
+                     to reason, for "he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth" (Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass his deserts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the acts
+                     of all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming to every virtuous man, but only to great men. on the
+                     other hand, as regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all virtues are connected together, since their
+                     habits reside together in the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition
+                     thereto. Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby
+                     he is disposed to practice that act if it were competent to him according to his state.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movements of the body are differentiated according to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it
+                     happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results
+                     from a man being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish, whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great
+                     things; these are few and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow
+                     movement. Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who are quick to quarrel about anything, and this
+                     becomes not the magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these dispositions of bodily movements are competent
+                     to the magnanimous man according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are naturally disposed to magnanimity these
+                     conditions are found naturally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is in man something great which he possesses through the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him
+                     through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of
+                     the gifts he holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of
+                     virtue; and the same is to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or
+                     external fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency,
+                     and magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from God's gifts: since he does not think so much of
+                     others as to do anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and esteem them better than ourselves, in
+                     so far as we see some of God's gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.14.4" target="asv">Ps. 14:4</a>): "In his sight a
+                     vile person is contemned [*Douay: 'The malignant is brought to nothing, but he glorifieth,' etc.]," which indicates the contempt
+                     of magnanimity, "but he honoreth them that fear the Lord," which points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore
+                     evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one another, although they seem to tend in contrary directions,
+                     because they proceed according to different considerations.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> These properties in so far as they belong to a magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in the
+                     first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful of those from whom he has received favors, this points to
+                     the fact that he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he repay them with yet greater favor; this belongs
+                     to the perfection of gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the
+                     acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking
+                     in doing what becomes him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of works, but only with great works, such as
+                     are becoming to him. He is also said, in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to truth, and so as either to say
+                     of himself vile things that are not true, or deny of himself great things that are true, but because he does not disclose
+                     all
+                     his greatness, especially to the large number of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
+                     3), "it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle
+                     class." In the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with others: this means that he is not at home with others
+                     than his friends: because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness of mind. But he associates
+                     with all, both great and little, according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said, fifthly, that he prefers
+                     to have barren things, not indeed any, but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to the useful, as
+                     being greater: since the useful is sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q129_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A4-p0.1">Whether magnanimity is a special virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher
+                     states (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whatever is great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a special
+                     virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to any special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed
+                     to the magnanimous man. For it is stated in Ethic. iv, 3 that "it belongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof" (which
+                     is an act of prudence), "nor to act unjustly" (which is an act of justice), "that he is ready to do favors" (which is an act
+                     of charity), "that he gives his services readily" (which is an act of liberality), that "he
+                     is truthful" (which is an act of truthfulness), and that "he is not given to complaining" (which is an act of patience). Therefore
+                     magnanimity is not a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul, according to the saying of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.61.10" target="asv"> Is. 61:10, </a> "He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation," and afterwards he adds, "and as a bride adorned with her jewels." But
+                     magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it from the other virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[123], A[2]), it belongs to a special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate matter. Now
+                     magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a determinate matter, namely honors, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q129_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2): and honor, considered in itself, is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p7"> Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q129_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], A[1]</a>, ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it regards all the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a great
+                     deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he
+                     tends to what is worthy of great honors.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence,
+                     and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore
+                     he shows himself ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other virtues. on the other hand, it is a proof
+                     of defect, that a man thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for
+                     their sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the truth indicates a defect,
+                     since it seems to be the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes a defect, because by so doing the
+                     mind seems to give way to external evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids under a special aspect,
+                     inasmuch as they are contrary to his excellence or greatness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment
+                     results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in Ethic.
+                     iv, 3.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q129_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A5-p0.1">Whether magnanimity is a part of fortitude?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be
+                     the same as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "If magnanimity, which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul,
+                     thou shalt live in great assurance": and Tully says (De Offic. i): "If a man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving,
+                     and far removed from deception." Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a magnanimous man is not {philokindynos}, that is, a lover of danger. But
+                     it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to
+                     be called a part thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared
+                     or dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore
+                     it is not a part thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnanimity as a part of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q129_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">FS, Q[61], A[3]</a>), a principal virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of virtue in a principal matter. Now one of the
+                     general modes of virtue is firmness of mind, because "a firm standing is necessary in every virtue," according to Ethic. ii.
+                     And this is chiefly commended in those virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most difficult to preserve
+                     firmness. Wherefore the more
+                     difficult it is to stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the virtue which makes the mind firm in
+                     that matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p7"> Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining
+                     the greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves his life above all things, so does he
+                     fly from dangers of death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity agrees with fortitude in confirming
+                     the mind about some difficult matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind about a
+                     matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto
+                     as secondary to principal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1,3), "to lack evil is looked upon as a good," wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous
+                     evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to
+                     fortitude, and the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity may be considered as identical. Since, however,
+                     there is a difference as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the
+                     aforesaid, it follows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue
+                     from fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks
+                     "many" the same as "great." This is contrary to the nature of a magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger
+                     for the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that are truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready
+                     to expose himself to danger, since he does something great in the act of
+                     fortitude, even as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous man is
+                     not {mikrokindynos}, i.e. endangering himself for small things, but {megalokindynos}, i.e. endangering himself for great things.
+                     And Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers like a rash man, nor fearest
+                     them like a coward. For nothing makes the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer an
+                     evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be desired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far,
+                     to wit, as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires it. Now that which is so essentially is always of more
+                     account than that which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things
+                     is always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good things. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence
+                     of the virtue of magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil, evil is of more import in this particular
+                     respect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q129_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A6-p0.1">Whether confidence belongs to magnanimity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity. For a man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in another,
+                     according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:4,5, </a> "Such confidence we have, through Christ towards God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves."
+                     But this seems inconsistent with the idea of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.12.2" target="asv">Is. 12:2</a>, "I will deal confidently and will not fear." But to be without fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also
+                     belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward is due to confidence, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.3.6" target="asv"> Heb. 3:6, </a> where it is said that we are the house of Christ, "if we hold fast the confidence and glory of hope unto the end." Therefore
+                     confidence is a virtue distinct from magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius enumerates it with magnanimity
+                     (In Somn. Scip. i).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question (ad 6)
+                     and in the prologue to this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Confidence takes its name from "fides" [faith]: and it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But confidence
+                     belongs to hope, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Job.11.18" target="asv"> Job 11:18, </a> "Thou shalt have confidence, hope being set before thee." Wherefore confidence apparently denotes chiefly that a man derives
+                     hope through believing the word of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong opinion, and
+                     since one may come to have
+                     a strong opinion about something, not only on account of another's statement, but also on account of something we observe
+                     in another, it follows that confidence may denote the hope of having something, which hope we conceive through observing something
+                     either in oneself---for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man is confident that he will live long. or in another,
+                     for instance, through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful, a man is confident that he will
+                     receive help from him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p7"> Now it has been stated above (A[1], ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since
+                     confidence denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which gives one a strong opinion that one will
+                     obtain a certain good, it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to the "magnanimous to need nothing," for need is a mark of the deficient.
+                     But this is to be understood according to the mode of a man, hence he adds "or scarcely anything." For it surpasses man to
+                     need nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance, secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally
+                     a social animal, for he is sufficient by himself to provide for his own life.
+                     Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in others, for it is also a
+                     point of excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his
+                     own ability goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q129_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html">FS, Q[23], A[2]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q129_A6-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A4.html">FS, Q[40], A[4]</a>), when we were treating of the passions, hope is directly opposed to despair, because the latter is about the same object,
+                     namely good. But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because the latter's object is evil. Now confidence
+                     denotes a certain strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is. Since, however,
+                     fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it follows that
+                     confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude. Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to fortitude,
+                     it follows in consequence that confidence pertains to fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now
+                     the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that
+                     draws it to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may
+                     denote the conditions of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the parts
+                     of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified with magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral
+                     part, as stated in the preceding Question.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q129_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A7-p0.1">Whether security belongs to magnanimity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity. For security, as stated above (Q[128], ad 6), denotes freedom from
+                     the disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively. Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude.
+                     But fortitude does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is said to be secure because he is without care." But this seems to be contrary
+                     to virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.15" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:15, </a> "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God." Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great
+                     things in all the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is accounted the reward of virtue, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q129_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.11.14" target="asv"> Job 11:14,18, </a> "If thou wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being buried thou shalt sleep secure." Therefore
+                     security does not belong to magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to magnanimity to give
+                     way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune." But a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs
+                     to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a man take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears.
+                     Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect
+                     freedom of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity,
+                     so fear directly regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to
+                     magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p7"> It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when
+                     we were treating of the passion (
+                     <a id="SS_Q129_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q45_A2.html">FS, Q[45], A[2]</a>). Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so security belongs indirectly
+                     to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes despair.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness
+                     of mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not fear:
+                     in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and participation of, future happiness, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q129_A7-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A3.html">FS, Q[5], AA[3]</a>,7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's
+                     reward.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A7-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q129_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q129_A8-p0.1">Whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi): "virtue
+                     suffices for itself." Now magnanimity takes every virtue great, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do
+                     not conduce to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of
+                     fortune: for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists of two things," that "a great soul is commended
+                     for despising external things." Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that "it belongs to a great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart
+                     from his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man." And Aristotle says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a magnanimous man does
+                     not grieve at misfortune." Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of fortune, for every one grieves at the loss
+                     of what is helpful to him. Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to
+                     magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "good fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q129_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, magnanimity regards two things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great as its end. Now goods of
+                     fortune conduce to both these things. For since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also by the
+                     multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those who possess
+                     goods of fortune. Likewise goods of
+                     fortune are useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches, power
+                     and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order
+                     to act more expeditiously.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming
+                     for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it. Wherefore,
+                     since the magnanimous man does not think much of external goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by
+                     them if he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q129_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q128_A1.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q130" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q130-p0.1">OF PRESUMPTION (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q130-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q130-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the first place, those that are opposed thereto by excess.
+                  These are three, namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we shall consider pusillanimity which is opposed
+                  to it by way of deficiency. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q130-p3"> (1) Whether presumption is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q130-p4"> (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q130_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q130_A1-p0.1">Whether presumption is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle says: "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulg.:
+                     'and stretching forth'] myself to those that are before." But it seems to savor of presumption that one should tend to what
+                     is above oneself. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) "we should not listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because
+                     we are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should relish those that make us immortal": and (Metaph. i) "that
+                     man should pursue divine things as far as possible." Now divine and immortal things are seemingly far above man. Since then
+                     presumption consists essentially in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that
+                     presumption is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q130_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:5</a>): "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." If then presumption, by which one strives
+                     at that for which one is not sufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of anything good: which is
+                     absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q130_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.37.3" target="asv">Ecclus. 37:3</a>): "O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?" and a gloss answers: "From a creature's evil will." Now all that comes of the
+                     root of an evil will is a sin. Therefore presumption is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by the Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is
+                     done in accordance with human reason in opposition to the order established in general throughout natural things is vicious
+                     and sinful. Now it is established throughout all natural things, that every action is commensurate with the power of the agent,
+                     nor does any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is vicious and
+                     sinful, as being contrary to the natural order, that any one should assume to do what is above his power: and this is what
+                     is meant by presumption, as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that presumption is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders that which is above the active power of a natural thing, and yet not above the passive power of that same
+                     thing: thus the air is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can be so changed as to obtain the action and movement
+                     of fire, which surpass the active power of air. Thus too it would be sinful and presumptuous for a man while in a state of
+                     imperfect virtue to attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to
+                     perfect virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to advance towards perfect virtue. In this way
+                     the Apostle stretched himself forth to the things that were before him, namely continually advancing forward.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Divine and immortal things surpass man according to the order of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely
+                     the intellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things. In this respect the Philosopher says that "man ought
+                     to pursue immortal and divine things," not that he should do what it becomes God to do, but that he should be united to Him
+                     in intellect and will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "what we can do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense." Hence
+                     since we can think and do good by the help of God, this is not altogether above our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous
+                     for a man to attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without
+                     confidence in God's assistance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q130_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q130_A2-p0.1">Whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against
+                     the Holy Ghost, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q130_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q130_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q21_A1.html"> Q[21], A[1]</a>). But the sin against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to charity. Neither therefore is presumption opposed
+                     to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous
+                     even if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed
+                     to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as little things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3),
+                     "on account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong others, because they deem external goods as something great."
+                     Therefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but only by deficiency.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that the "vain man," i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a presumptuous
+                     man, "is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q130_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A3.html">Q[129], A[3]</a>, ad 1), magnanimity observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it tends, but in proportion to our own
+                     ability: for it does not tend to anything greater than is becoming to us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p7"> Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short
+                     of him: but he does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous man does not exceed his. It is in this
+                     way that presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine justice
+                     through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit,
+                     as it implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless,
+                     in so far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own
+                     ability, it can be opposed to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man presumptuous
+                     for going beyond his powers in something small. If, however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is
+                     not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary honor, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q130_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A2.html">Q[129], A[2]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No one attempts what is above his ability, except in so far as he deems his ability greater than it is. In this one may err
+                     in two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he has greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he
+                     has. Secondly, as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and worthy of great things, by reason of something
+                     that does not make him so, for instance by reason of riches or goods of
+                     fortune. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "those who have these things without virtue, neither justly deem themselves
+                     worthy of great things, nor are rightly called magnanimous."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p11"> Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply
+                     as in the case of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has exceeded his power; while sometimes it is something
+                     great, not simply, but only in the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes, despising and wronging others. This savors
+                     of an excess of magnanimity, not in any truth, but in people's opinion. Hence Seneca says (De Quat.
+                     Virtut.) that "when magnanimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man high-handed, proud, haughty restless, and bent on excelling
+                     in all things, whether in words or in deeds, without any considerations of virtue." Thus it is evident that the presumptuous
+                     man sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in reality, although in appearance he surpasses him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q130_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q129_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q131" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q131_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q131-p0.1">OF AMBITION (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q131-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q131-p2"> We must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q131-p3"> (1) Whether it is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q131-p4"> (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q131_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q131_A1-p0.1">Whether ambition is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition denotes the desire of honor. Now honor is in itself a good thing, and the
+                     greatest of external goods: wherefore those who care not for honor are reproved. Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is
+                     it something deserving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably desired.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to him as a reward. Now honor is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher
+                     states (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, 14). Therefore ambition of honor is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which heartens a man to do good and disheartens him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honor heartens men to
+                     do good and to avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "with the bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor,
+                     and the brave in honor": and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "honor fosters the arts." Therefore ambition is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q131_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:5</a>) that "charity is not ambitious, seeketh not her own." Now nothing is contrary to charity, except sin. Therefore ambition
+                     is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q131_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], AA[1]</a>,2), honor denotes reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence. Now two things have to be considered with regard
+                     to man's honor. The first is that a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for this is, as it were, something
+                     Divine in him, wherefore on this count honor is due principally, not to him but to God. The second point that calls for observation
+                     is that the thing in
+                     which man excels is given to him by God, that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a man ought so far to be pleased that
+                     others bear witness to his excellence, as this enables him to profit others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p7"> Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways. First, when a man desires recognition of an excellence which he
+                     has not: this is to desire more than his share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires honor for himself without referring
+                     it to God. Thirdly, when a man's appetite rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of others. Since then
+                     ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is evident that it is always a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The desire for good should be regulated according to reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. In this way it
+                     is sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason. Now those are reproved who care not for honor in accordance
+                     with reason's dictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Honor is not the reward of virtue, as regards the virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward: since
+                     the reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue. But it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others,
+                     who have nothing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; which honor derives greatness from the very fact that
+                     it bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward,
+                     as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as some are heartened to do good and disheartened from doing evil, by the desire of honor, if this be desired in due
+                     measure; so, if it be desired inordinately, it may become to man an occasion of doing many evil things, as when a man cares
+                     not by what means he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that "the good as well as the wicked covet honors for
+                     themselves, but the one," i.e. the good, "go about it in the right way," whereas "the
+                     other," i.e. the wicked, "through lack of the good arts, make use of deceit and falsehood." Yet they who, merely for the sake
+                     of honor, either do good or avoid evil, are not virtuous, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that
+                     they who do brave things for the sake of honor are not truly brave.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q131_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q131_A2-p0.1">Whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one
+                     side. Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q131_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q130_A2.html">Q[130], A[2]</a>). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by excess.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, magnanimity is about honors; whereas ambition seems to regard positions of dignity: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q131_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.4.7" target="asv">2 Macc. 4:7</a>) that "Jason ambitiously sought the high priesthood." Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, ambition seems to regard outward show: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q131_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.25.27" target="asv">Acts 25:27</a>) that "Agrippa and Berenice . . . with great pomp [ambitione]. . . had entered into the hall of audience" [*'Praetorium.'
+                     The Vulgate has 'auditorium,' but the meaning is the same], and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q131_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiChr.16.14" target="asv">2 Para. 16:14</a>) that when Asa died they "burned spices and . . . ointments over his body" with very great pomp [ambitione]. But magnanimity
+                     is not about outward show. Therefore
+                     ambition is not opposed to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (De Offic. i) that "the more a man exceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires himself alone to dominate others."
+                     But this pertains to ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an excess of magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q131_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q131_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, ambition signifies inordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about honors and makes use of them in a becoming manner.
+                     Wherefore it is evident that ambition is opposed to magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as its end, in so far as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man attempts
+                     in proportion to his ability. In this way presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man attempts
+                     great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that magnanimity regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it makes right
+                     use: and in this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess. Nor is
+                     it impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various respects.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Honor is due to those who are in a position of dignity, on account of a certain excellence of their estate: and accordingly
+                     inordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to ambition. For if a man were to have an inordinate desire for a position
+                     of dignity, not for the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use of a dignity exceeding his ability, he would not be
+                     ambitious but presumptuous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The very solemnity of outward worship is a kind of honor, wherefore in such cases honor is wont to be shown. This is signified
+                     by the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q131_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.2" target="asv"> James 2:2,3</a>: "If there shall come into your assembly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel . . . and you . . . shall say to him:
+                     Sit thou here well," etc. Wherefore ambition does not regard outward worship, except in so far as this is a kind of honor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q131_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q131_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q130_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q131_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q132" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q131_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q132-p0.1">OF VAINGLORY (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q132-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q132-p2"> We must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q132-p3"> (1) Whether desire of glory is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q132-p4"> (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q132-p5"> (3) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q132-p6"> (4) Whether it is a capital vice?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q132-p7"> (5) Of its daughters.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q132_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q132_A1-p0.1">Whether the desire of glory is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. For no one sins in being likened to God: in fact we are commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.1" target="asv">Eph. 5:1</a>): "Be ye . . . followers of God, as most dear children." Now by seeking glory man seems to imitate God, Who seeks glory from
+                     men: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.43.6" target="asv">Is. 43:6,7</a>): "Bring My sons from afar, and My daughters from the ends of the earth. And every one that calleth on My name, I have created
+                     him
+                     for My glory." Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which incites a mar to do good is apparently not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For
+                     Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "glory inflames every man to strive his utmost": and in Holy Writ glory is promised for
+                     good works, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.7" target="asv"> Rom. 2:7</a>: "To them, indeed, who according to patience in good work . . . glory and honor" [*Vulg.: 'Who will render to every man according
+                     to his works, to them indeed who
+                     . . . seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life.']. Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that glory is "consistent good report about a person, together with praise": and
+                     this comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii), viz. that glory is, "as it were, clear knowledge with
+                     praise." Now it is no sin to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to call for praise, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.41.15" target="asv"> Ecclus. 41:15, </a> "Take care of a good name," and
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.17" target="asv"> Rom. 12:17,
+                        
+                     </a>"Providing good things not only in the sight of God, but also in the sight of all men." Therefore the desire of vainglory
+                     is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v): "He is better advised who acknowledges that even the love of praise is sinful."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Glory signifies a certain clarity, wherefore Augustine says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.) that to be "glorified is the
+                     same as to be clarified." Now clarity and comeliness imply a certain display: wherefore the word glory properly denotes the
+                     display of something as regards its seeming comely in the sight of men, whether it be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since,
+                     however, that which is clear simply can be seen by many, and by those who are far away, it
+                     follows that the word glory properly denotes that somebody's good is known and approved by many, according to the saying of
+                     Sallust (Catilin.) [*The quotation is from Livy: Hist., Lib. XXII C, 39]: "I must not boast while I am addressing one man."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p7"> But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only consists in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge
+                     of few, or of one, or of oneself alone, as when one considers one's own good as being worthy of praise. Now it is not a sin
+                     to know and approve one's own good: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:12</a>): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God that we may know the things that are
+                     given us from God."
+                     Likewise it is not a sin to be willing to approve one's own good works: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.16" target="asv">Mat. 5:16</a>): "Let your light shine before men." Hence the desire for glory does not, of itself, denote a sin: but the desire for empty
+                     or vain glory denotes a sin: for it is sinful to desire anything vain, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.3" target="asv"> Ps. 4:3, </a> "Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p8"> Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the thing for which one seeks glory: as when a man seeks
+                     glory for that which is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for something frail and perishable: secondly, on
+                     the part of him from whom he seeks glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain: thirdly, on the part of the man
+                     himself who seeks glory, for that he does not refer the desire of his own glory to a due end, such as God's honor,
+                     or the spiritual welfare of his neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.13.13" target="asv"> Jn. 13:13, </a> "You call Me Master and Lord; and you say well" (Tract. lviii in Joan.): "Self-complacency is fraught with danger of one
+                     who has to beware of pride. But He Who is above all, however much He may praise Himself, does not uplift Himself. For knowledge
+                     of God is our need, not His: nor does any man know Him unless he be taught of Him Who knows." It is therefore evident that
+                     God seeks glory, not for His
+                     own sake, but for ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the good of others, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.16" target="asv"> Mat. 5:16, </a> "That they may see your good works, and glorify your Father Who is in heaven."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which we receive from God is not vain but true glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good works,
+                     and of which it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.10.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 10:17,18</a>): "He that glorieth let him glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is approved, but he whom God commendeth."
+                     It is true that some are heartened to do works of virtue, through desire for human glory, as also through the desire for other
+                     earthly goods. Yet
+                     he is not truly virtuous who does virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei v).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is requisite for man's perfection that he should know himself; but not that he should be known by others, wherefore it
+                     is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be desired as being useful for something, either in order that God may be
+                     glorified by men, or that men may become better by reason of the good they know to be in another man, or in order that man,
+                     knowing by the testimony of others' praise the good which is in him, may himself
+                     strive to persevere therein and to become better. In this sense it is praiseworthy that a man should "take care of his good
+                     name," and that he should "provide good things in the sight of God and men": but not that he should take an empty pleasure
+                     in human praise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q132_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q132_A2-p0.1">Whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. For, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q132_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q132_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, vainglory consists in glorying in things that are not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and perishable things,
+                     which pertains to covetousness; or in the testimony of men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to imprudence. Now
+                     these vices are not contrary to magnanimity. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with
+                     vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q132_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q130_A2.html">Q[130], A[2]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q132_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q131_A2.html"> Q[131], A[2]</a>): and these differ from vainglory. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.3" target="asv"> Phil. 2:3, </a> "Let nothing be done through contention, neither by vainglory," says: "Some among them were given to dissension and restlessness,
+                     contending with one another for the sake of vainglory." But contention [*Cf. Q[38]] is not opposed to magnanimity. Neither
+                     therefore is vainglory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading, "Magnanimity consists in two things: We should beware of the desire for glory,
+                     since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should ever strive to keep untrammeled." Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q132_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], A[1]</a>, ad 3), glory is an effect of honor and praise: because from the fact that a man is praised, or shown any kind of reverence,
+                     he acquires charity in the knowledge of others. And since magnanimity is about honor, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q132_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html">Q[129], AA[1]</a>,2), it follows that it also is about glory: seeing that as a man uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory in moderation.
+                     Wherefore
+                     inordinate desire of glory is directly opposed to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To think so much of little things as to glory in them is itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it is said of the magnanimous
+                     man (Ethic. iv) that honor is of little account to him. In like manner he thinks little of other things that are sought for
+                     honor's sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent with magnanimity to glory in things that are not; wherefore
+                     it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that he cares more for truth
+                     than for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man to glory in the testimony of human praise, as though
+                     he deemed this something great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv), that he cares not to be praised.
+                     And so, when a man looks upon little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from being contrary to magnanimity,
+                     as well as to other virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He that is desirous of vainglory does in truth fall short of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the magnanimous
+                     man thinks little of, as stated in the preceding Reply. But if we consider his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous
+                     man by way of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something great in his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess
+                     of his deserts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q132_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q127_A2.html">Q[127], A[2]</a>, ad 2), the opposition of vices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless contention, if done intentionally, is opposed
+                     to magnanimity: since no one contends save for what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the
+                     magnanimous man is not contentious, because nothing is great in his estimation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q132_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q132_A3-p0.1">Whether vainglory is a mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. For nothing precludes the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vainglory precludes
+                     the eternal reward: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.1" target="asv">Mat. 6:1</a>): "Take heed, that you do not give justice before men, to be seen by them: otherwise you shall not have a reward of your
+                     Father Who is in heaven." Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever appropriates to himself that which is proper to God, sins mortally. Now by desiring vainglory, a man appropriates
+                     to himself that which is proper to God. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.42.8" target="asv">Is. 42:8</a>): "I will not give My glory to another," and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.17" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:17</a>): "To . . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it be most dangerous and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this kind, because a gloss
+                     of Augustine on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.2.4" target="asv">1 Thess. 2:4, </a> "God, Who proveth our hearts," says: "Unless a man war against the love of human glory he does not perceive its baneful power,
+                     for though it be easy for anyone not to desire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to take pleasure
+                     in it, when it is given." Chrysostom
+                     also says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that "vainglory enters secretly, and robs us insensibly of all our inward possessions." Therefore
+                     vainglory is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "while other vices find
+                     their abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory finds a place even in the servants of Christ." Yet in the latter there
+                     is no mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q132_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A12.html">Q[24], A[12]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q132_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q110_A4.html"> Q[110], A[4]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q132_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q112_A2.html"> Q[112], A[2]</a> ), a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity. Now the sin of vainglory, considered in itself, does not seem to be
+                     contrary to charity as regards the love of one's neighbor: yet as regards the love of God it may be contrary to charity in
+                     two ways. In one way, by reason of the matter about which one glories: for
+                     instance when one glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe God, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.2" target="asv"> Ezech. 28:2, </a> "Thy heart is lifted up, and Thou hast said: I am God," and 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p6.5" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:7, </a> "What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received
+                     it?" Or again when a man prefers to God the temporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p6.6" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.23" target="asv">Jer. 9:23,24</a>): "Let
+                     not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in
+                     his riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Or again when a man prefers the
+                     testimony of man to God's; thus it is written in reproval of certain people (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p6.7" href="./asv.html#John.12.43" target="asv">Jn. 12:43</a>): "For they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p7"> In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, on the part of the one who glories, in that he refers his intention
+                     to glory as his last end: so that he directs even virtuous deeds thereto, and, in order to obtain it, forbears not from doing
+                     even that which is against God. In this way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 14) that "this vice,"
+                     namely the love of human praise, "is so hostile to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory more than it
+                     fears or loves God, that our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q132_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.44" target="asv">Jn. 5:44</a>): How can you believe, who receive glory one from another, and the glory which is from God alone, you do not seek?"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p8"> If, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain, be not inconsistent with charity, neither as regards the matter
+                     gloried in, nor as to the intention of him that seeks glory, it is not a mortal but a venial sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No man, by sinning, merits eternal life: wherefore a virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal life, if it be done for
+                     the sake of vainglory, even though that vainglory be not a mortal sin. On the other hand when a man loses the eternal reward
+                     simply through vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act, vainglory is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not every man that is desirous of vainglory, desires the excellence which belongs to God alone. For the glory due to God
+                     alone differs from the glory due to a virtuous or rich man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin, not only on account of its gravity, but also because it is a disposition to grave
+                     sins, in so far as it renders man presumptuous and too self-confident: and so it gradually disposes a man to lose his inward
+                     goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q132_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q132_A4-p0.1">Whether vainglory is a capital vice?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that vainglory is not a capital vice. For a vice that always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital.
+                     But vainglory always arises from pride. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, honor would seem to take precedence of glory, for this is its effect. Now ambition which is inordinate desire of
+                     honor is not a capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a capital vice has a certain prominence. But vainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a sin, because it
+                     is not always a mortal sin, nor considered as an appetible good, since human glory is apparently a frail thing, and is something
+                     outside man himself. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers vainglory among the seven capital vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For some reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place vainglory
+                     among the capital vices. Gregory, however (Moral. xxxi), reckons pride to be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which
+                     is the immediate offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice: and not without reason. For pride, as we shall state
+                     farther on (
+                     <a id="SS_Q132_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q152_A1.html">Q[152], AA[1]</a>,2), denotes inordinate desire of
+                     excellence. But whatever good one may desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence therefrom: wherefore the end
+                     of every vice is directed to the end of pride, so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over the other vices,
+                     and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources of vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods that are the
+                     means whereby man acquires honor, glory seems to be the most conducive to that effect, inasmuch as it denotes the
+                     manifestation of a man's goodness: since good is naturally loved and honored by all. Wherefore, just as by the glory which
+                     is in God's sight man acquires honor in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in the sight of man he acquires excellence
+                     in human things. Hence on account of its close connection with excellence, which men desire above all, it follows that it
+                     is most desirable. And since many vices arise from the inordinate desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital
+                     vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not impossible for a capital vice to arise from pride, since as stated above (in the body of the Article and 
+                     <a id="SS_Q132_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html">FS, Q[84], A[2]</a>) pride is the queen and mother of all the vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Praise and honor, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q132_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q132_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, stand in relation to glory as the causes from which it proceeds, so that glory is compared to them as their end. For the
+                     reason why a man loves to be honored and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain renown in the knowledge of
+                     others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Vainglory stands prominent under the aspect of desirability, for the reason given above, and this suffices for it to be reckoned
+                     a capital vice. Nor is it always necessary for a capital vice to be a mortal sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin,
+                     inasmuch as venial sin can dispose man thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q132_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q132_A5-p0.1">Whether the daughters of vainglory are suitably reckoned to be disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy,
+                     discord, and love of novelties?
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably reckoned to be "disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention,
+                     obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity [*Praesumptio novitatum, literally 'presumption of novelties']." For according to Gregory
+                     (Moral. xxiii) boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride. Now pride does not arise from vainglory, rather is it
+                     the other way about, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi). Therefore boastfulness should not be
+                     reckoned among the daughters of vainglory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contention and discord seem to be the outcome chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with vainglory.
+                     Therefore it seems that they are not the daughters of vainglory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that vainglory is always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i.e. mercy.
+                     And yet this is nothing new, for it is an established custom among men. Therefore eccentricity should not be specially reckoned
+                     as a daughter of vainglory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi), who there assigns the above daughters to vainglory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[34], A[5]; Q[35], A[4]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q132_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html">FS, Q[84], AA[3]</a>,4), the vices which by their very nature are such as to be directed to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its
+                     daughters. Now the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own excellence, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q132_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q132_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,4): and to this end a man may tend in two ways. In one way directly, either by words, and this is boasting, or by deeds,
+                     and
+                     then if they be true and call for astonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont to wonder at most; but if they
+                     be false, it is hypocrisy. In another way a man strives to make known his excellence by showing that he is not inferior to
+                     another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the intellect, and thus we have "obstinacy," by which a man is too much
+                     attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is better. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have
+                     "discord," whereby a man is unwilling to give up his own will, and agree with others. Thirdly, as regards "speech," and then
+                     we have "contention," whereby a man quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly as regards deeds, and this is "disobedience,"
+                     whereby a man refuses to carry out the command of his superiors.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q132_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q112_A1.html">Q[112], A[1]</a>, ad 2), boasting is reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior cause, which is arrogance: but outward boasting, according
+                     to Ethic. iv, is directed sometimes to gain, but more often to glory and honor, and thus it is the result of vainglory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anger is not the cause of discord and contention, except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a man thinks it a glorious
+                     thing for him not to yield to the will and words of others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Vainglory is reproved in connection with almsdeeds on account of the lack of charity apparent in one who prefers vainglory
+                     to the good of his neighbor, seeing that he does the latter for the sake of the former. But a man is not reproved for presuming
+                     to give alms as though this were something novel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q132_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q131_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q133" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q133-p0.1">OF PUSILLANIMITY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q133-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q133-p2"> We must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q133-p3"> (1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q133-p4"> (2) To what virtue is it opposed?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q133_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q133_A1-p0.1">Whether pusillanimity is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a fainthearted
+                     man is not evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet
+                     does not deem himself worthy of them." Now no one is worthy of great goods except the virtuous, since as the Philosopher again
+                     says (Ethic. iv, 3), "none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor." Therefore the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently
+                     pusillanimity is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Pride is the beginning of all sin" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>). But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud man sets himself above what he is, while the fainthearted
+                     man withdraws from the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he who deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted."
+                     Now sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for instance, Moses and Jeremias, who were worthy of the
+                     office God chose them for, which they both humbly declined (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.11" target="asv">Ex. 3:11</a>;
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.1.6" target="asv"> Jer. 1:6</a>). Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.21" target="asv">Col. 3:21</a>): "Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged." Therefore pusillanimity is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a natural
+                     inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with its power: as is evident in all natural things, whether animate
+                     or inanimate. Now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is proportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he
+                     can, so pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his power,
+                     by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto. Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it
+                     is that the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received from his master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted
+                     fear, was punished by his master (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25" target="asv">Mat. 25</a>; 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.19" target="asv">Lk. 19</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their neighbor: and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil, because
+                     he injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what might be profitable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i)
+                     that if "they who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate
+                     to the good they might have done had they been less retiring."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit from sinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and with
+                     loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a man, by reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy
+                     of doing certain great things that are worthy of great honor, and yet through not trying to make use of his virtue, he sins
+                     sometimes venially, sometimes mortally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p10"> Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great things in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability
+                     which he derives either from a good natural disposition, or from science, or from external fortune, and if he fails to use
+                     those things for virtue, he becomes guilty of pusillanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result of pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion, whereby
+                     he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he is competent. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.26.16" target="asv">Prov. 26:16</a>): "The sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences." For nothing hinders him from depreciating
+                     himself in some things, and having a high opinion of himself in others.
+                     Wherefore Gregory says (Pastoral. i) of Moses that "perchance he would have been proud, had he undertaken the leadership of
+                     a numerous people without misgiving: and again he would have been proud, had he refused to obey the command of his Creator."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the office to which they were appointed by God, but their worthiness was of Divine grace:
+                     yet they, considering the insufficiency of their own weakness, demurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into
+                     pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q133_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q133_A2-p0.1">Whether pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity? </h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. For the Philosopher says (Ethic., 3) that "the fainthearted man
+                     knows not himself: for he would desire the good things, of which he is worthy, if he knew himself." Now ignorance of self
+                     seems opposed to prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to prudence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who through pusillanimity refused to make use of the money. Moreover
+                     the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be slothful. Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is
+                     an act of prudence, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q133_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q47_A9.html">Q[47], A[9]</a>). Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed from inordinate fear: hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.35.4" target="asv">Is. 35:4</a>): "Say to the fainthearted: Take courage and fear not." It also seems to proceed from inordinate anger, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Col.3.21" target="asv"> Col. 3:21, </a> "Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged." Now inordinate fear is opposed to fortitude,
+                     and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to
+                     magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the vice that is in opposition to a particular virtue is the more grievous according as it is more unlike that virtue.
+                     Now pusillanimity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption is. Therefore if pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity, it
+                     follows that it is a more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary to the saying of 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q133_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.37.3" target="asv"> Ecclus. 37:3, </a> "O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?" Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed
+                     to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as greatness and littleness of soul, as their very names denote. Now great and little
+                     are opposites. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Pusillanimity may be considered in three ways. First, in itself; and thus it is evident that by its very nature it is opposed
+                     to magnanimity, from which it differs as great and little differ in connection with the same subject. For just as the magnanimous
+                     man tends to great things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of
+                     soul. Secondly, it may be considered in reference to its cause, which on the part
+                     of the intellect is ignorance of one's own qualification, and on the part of the appetite is the fear of failure in what one
+                     falsely deems to exceed one's ability. Thirdly, it may be considered in reference to its effect, which is to shrink from the
+                     great things of which one is worthy. But, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q133_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q132_A2.html">Q[132], A[2]</a>, ad 3), opposition between vice and virtue depends rather on their respective species than on their cause or effect. Hence
+                     pusillanimity is directly
+                     opposed to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers pusillanimity as proceeding from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said properly that it
+                     is opposed to prudence, even in respect of its cause: because ignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but
+                     from laziness in considering one's own ability, according to Ethic. iv, 3, or in accomplishing what is within one's power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers pusillanimity from the point of view of its effect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the point of view of cause. Nor is the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the dangers
+                     of death: wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint that pusillanimity is opposed to fortitude. As regards anger,
+                     if we consider it under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity,
+                     which disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, however,
+                     we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries inflicted whereby the soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened,
+                     it conduces to pusillanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to its proper species pusillanimity is a graver sin than presumption, since thereby a man withdraws from good things,
+                     which is a very great evil according to Ethic. iv. Presumption, however, is stated to be "wicked" on account of pride whence
+                     it proceeds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q133_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q132_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q134" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q134-p0.1">OF MAGNIFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q134-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q134-p2"> We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q134-p3"> (1) Whether magnificence is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q134-p4"> (2) Whether it is a special virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q134-p5"> (3) What is its matter?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q134-p6"> (4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q134_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q134_A1-p0.1">Whether magnificence is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q134_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence: because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "not every
+                     liberal man is magnificent." Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to Ethic. ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean,
+                     for it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now "great" and "little" are opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which
+                     is "equal," as stated in Metaph. x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination, but on the contrary perfects it, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q134_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q108_A2.html">Q[108], A[2]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q134_A1-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q117_A1.html"> Q[117], A[1]</a>, OBJ[1]). Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the "magnificent man is not lavish towards himself": and this is
+                     opposed to the natural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) "act is right reason about things to be made." Now magnificence is about
+                     things to be made, as its very name denotes [*Magnificence= magna facere---i.e. to make great things]. Therefore it is an
+                     act rather than a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Human virtue is a participation of Divine power. But magnificence [virtutis] belongs to Divine power, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q134_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.47.35" target="asv"> Ps. 47:35</a>: "His magnificence and His power is in the clouds." Therefore magnificence is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to De Coelo i, 16, "we speak of virtue in relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power," not as regards the
+                     limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do
+                     something great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes
+                     a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent deeds.
+                     Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence, either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto,
+                     as explained above (Q[129], A[3], ad 2), as also (
+                     <a id="SS_Q134_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>) when we were treating of the connection of virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is true that magnificence observes the extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes the mean,
+                     if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity (
+                     <a id="SS_Q134_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A3.html">Q[129], A[3]</a>, ad 1).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to magnificence to do something great. But that which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that
+                     which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend
+                     principally to be lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but because to do so is not something great.
+                     Yet if anything regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man
+                     accomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are done once, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are
+                     of a lasting nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a suitable dwelling, as stated in Ethic.
+                     iv.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) "there must needs be a virtue of act," i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the appetite is
+                     inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q134_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q134_A2-p0.1">Whether magnificence is a special virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But
+                     it may belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be great: as in the case of one who has a great virtue of
+                     temperance, for he does a great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a special virtue, but denotes a perfect
+                     degree of any virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same as that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to
+                     something great, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q134_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A1.html">Q[129], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore it belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore magnificence is not a special virtue distinct
+                     from magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q134_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.11" target="asv">Ex. 15:11</a>): "Magnificent [Douay: 'glorious'] in holiness," and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q134_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.95.6" target="asv">Ps. 95:6</a>): "Holiness and magnificence [Douay: 'Majesty'] in His sanctuary." Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q134_A2-p4.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q81_A8.html">Q[81], A[8]</a>). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion. Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the
+                     others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher reckons it with other special virtues (Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It belongs to magnificence to do [facere] something great, as its name implies [magnificence= magna facere---i.e. to make
+                     great things]. Now "facere" may be taken in two ways, in a strict sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly "facere" means to
+                     work something in external matter, for instance to make a house, or something of the kind; in a broad sense "facere" is employed
+                     to denote any action, whether it passes into external matter, as to burn or cut, or
+                     remain in the agent, as to understand or will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p7"> Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something great, the doing [factio] being understood in the strict
+                     sense, it is then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in the use of which it is possible to consider a
+                     special aspect of goodness, namely that the work produced [factum] by the act is something great, namely in quantity, value,
+                     or dignity, and this is what magnificence does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p8"> If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing something great, the doing [facere] being understood in a broad
+                     sense, it is not a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs to every perfect virtue to do something great in the genus of that virtue, if "doing" [facere] be taken in the
+                     broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is proper to magnificence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to something great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either by making
+                     [faciendo], or by any kind of action, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole
+                     aspect of great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do something great, direct their principal intention,
+                     not to something great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and the
+                     greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p11"> On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something great, "doing" [facere] being taken in the strict
+                     sense, but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "magnificence
+                     is the discussing and administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind, discussion"
+                     referring to the inward intention, and "administration" to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just as
+                     magnanimity intends something great in every matter, it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that can be
+                     produced in external matter [factibili].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intention of magnificence is the production of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no end
+                     of human works is so great as the honor of God: wherefore magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine
+                     honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the most commendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine
+                     sacrifices": and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this reason
+                     magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect is directed to religion or holiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q134_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q134_A3-p0.1">Whether the matter of magnificence is great expenditure?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But
+                     liberality is about expenditure, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q134_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q117_A2.html">Q[117], A[2]</a>). Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "every magnificent man is liberal" (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure.
+                     Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but about gifts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing
+                     an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of
+                     magnificence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since "the virtues
+                     do not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for themselves," as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi).
+                     Therefore magnificence is not about great expenditure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions in money, but
+                     only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in scale." Therefore it is only about great expenditure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q134_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q134_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it belongs to magnificence to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work, proportionate expenditure
+                     is necessary, for great works cannot be produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to spend much
+                     in order that some great work may be accomplished in becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a
+                     magnificent man will produce a more
+                     magnificent work with equal," i.e. proportionate, "expenditure." Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of money; and a man
+                     may be hindered from making that outlay if he love money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to be both
+                     this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to produce a great work, and also the very money which he employs
+                     in going to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which love the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered
+                     from
+                     spending much.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q134_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A2.html">Q[129], A[2]</a>), those virtues that are about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing
+                     about which the virtue is concerned, and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that same thing. Hence the
+                     need for two virtues, concerned about money and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in general, and
+                     magnificence, which regards
+                     that which is great in the use of money.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man, inasmuch
+                     as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expenditure),
+                     the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent
+                     man in relation to some great work which has to be produced, and
+                     this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather
+                     under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order
+                     to do something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he brings to effect what the whole state is striving
+                     for.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man
+                     may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor
+                     man cannot accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to
+                     do so in things that are great by comparison to some particular work; which, though
+                     little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little and great are relative terms,
+                     as the Philosopher says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q134_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q134_A4-p0.1">Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q134_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q134_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice. Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with expenditure,
+                     which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the magnificent man is like the man of science." Now science has more
+                     in common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not agree
+                     with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal
+                     virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p7"> In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things are necessary, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q134_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q80.html">Q[80])</a>. The one is that the secondary virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby.
+                     Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and difficult, so also does
+                     magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence
+                     falls short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens
+                     the person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from the dispossession of one's
+                     property, which is of much less account than danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence regard
+                     sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul, albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure
+                     in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal
+                     man from giving and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the
+                     other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity
+                     does, but in a determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible
+                     part.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although magnificence does not agree with fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter: since it
+                     tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of
+                     fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Magnificence directs the use of art to something great, as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the reason.
+                     Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in
+                     hand. This is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those things, since if he did not take careful thought,
+                     he would incur the risk of a great loss.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q134_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q133_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q135" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q135_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q135-p0.1">OF MEANNESS* (TWO ARTICLES) [*"Parvificentia," or doing mean things, just as "magnificentia" is doing great things.]</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q135-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q135-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q135-p3"> (1) Whether meanness is a vice?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q135-p4"> (2) Of the vice opposed to it.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q135_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q135_A1-p0.1">Whether meanness is a vice?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore
+                     both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But magnificence is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue
+                     rather than a vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "careful reckoning is mean." But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy,
+                     since man's good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a mean man is loth to spend money." But this belongs to covetousness or
+                     illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a special vice opposed to magnificence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q135_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">FS, Q[1], A[3]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q135_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">FS, Q[18], A[6]</a>), moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many cases they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a
+                     man is said to be mean [parvificus] because he intends to do something little [parvum]. Now according to the Philosopher (De
+                     Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a mean man intends to do
+                     something little, this must be understood in relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in two ways:
+                     in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in another as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man intends
+                     principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he intends the greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so
+                     that he may produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4) that "the magnificent man with equal
+                     expenditure will produce a more magnificent result." On the other hand, the mean man intends principally to spend little,
+                     wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "he seeks how he may spend least." As a result of this he intends to produce
+                     a little work, that is, he does not shrink from producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore the Philosopher
+                     says that "the mean man after going to great expense forfeits the good" of the magnificent work, "for the trifle" that he
+                     is unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to observe the proportion that reason demands between
+                     expenditure and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence
+                     it is manifest that meanness is a vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue moderates little things, according to the rule of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the
+                     Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but for declining from the rule of reason in moderating
+                     great or little things: hence meanness is a vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes us take counsel": wherefore a mean man is careful in his reckonings, because
+                     he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods, even in things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but
+                     sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes
+                     use of his reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the magnificent man has this in common with the liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with pleasure,
+                     so too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that
+                     illiberality regards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment:
+                     wherefore meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says
+                     (Ethic. iv, 2) that "although meanness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither do
+                     they harm one's neighbor, nor are they very disgraceful."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q135_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q135_A2-p0.1">Whether there is a vice opposed to meanness?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but
+                     a virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q135_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q135_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness, it would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend much,
+                     where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought to spend much, according to Ethic. iv, 2, and thus they have
+                     something of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q135_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q135_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now those who spend excessively, do so in order to make a show of their wealth, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2. But this belongs
+                     to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated above (Q[131], A[2] ). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of the Philosopher who (Ethic. ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two opposite vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Great is opposed to little. Also little and great are relative terms, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q135_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q135_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now just as expenditure may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in comparison with the work in that
+                     it exceeds the proportion which reason requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest that the vice
+                     of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe
+                     due proportion between his expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it, whereby a man exceeds this same proportion,
+                     by spending more than is proportionate to his work. This vice is called in Greek {banausia}, so called from the Greek {baunos},
+                     because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes everything. It is also called {apyrokalia}, i.e. lacking good fire, since
+                     like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called "consumptio" [waste].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Magnificence is so called from the great work done, but not from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for this belongs
+                     to the vice which is opposed to meanness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice
+                     of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value of the work, by spending much where it behooved
+                     to spend little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great work, which the magnificent man intends principally,
+                     in so far as when it behooves to spend much, it spends little or nothing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very species of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, whereas meanness
+                     falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders this from being directed to the end of another vice, such as vainglory or any other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q135_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q135_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q134_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q135_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q136" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q135_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q136-p0.1">OF PATIENCE (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q136-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q136-p2"> We must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q136-p3"> (1) Whether patience is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q136-p4"> (2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q136-p5"> (3) Whether it can be had without grace?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q136-p6"> (4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q136-p7"> (5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q136_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q136_A1-p0.1">Whether patience is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet
+                     patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.49.10" target="asv"> Is. 49:10 </a>and 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.7.16" target="asv"> Apoc. 7:16, </a> "They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the heat nor the sun strike them." Therefore patience is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since virtue it is "that makes its possessor good." Yet patience is sometimes
+                     found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many evils patiently that they may amass money, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.5.16" target="asv"> Eccles. 5:16, </a> "All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in misery and in sorrow." Therefore patience is not
+                     a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q136_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q70_A1.html">FS, Q[70], A[1]</a>, ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the fruits (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22</a>). Therefore patience is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Patientia i): "The virtue of the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we even
+                     preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q136_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A1.html">Q[123], A[1]</a>), the moral virtues are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of reason against the impulse of the passions.
+                     Now among the passions sorrow is strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:10, </a> "The sorrow of the world worketh death," and
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.25" target="asv"> Ecclus. 30:25, </a> "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it." Hence the necessity
+                     for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this patience does. Wherefore
+                     Augustine says (De Patientia ii): "A man's patience it is whereby he bears evil with an equal mind," i.e. without being disturbed
+                     by sorrow, "lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better things." It is therefore evident
+                     that patience is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to the
+                     goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but they will remain in their relation to the end, which will
+                     be in heaven. Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling and other matters pertaining to the present
+                     life, but it will remain in the point of being subject to God. In like manner the act
+                     of patience, in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying the goods to which we had aspired by suffering.
+                     Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv) that "patience itself will not be in heaven, since there is no need for it except where
+                     evils have to be borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) "properly speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without inflicting
+                     them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those who bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither
+                     marvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may marvel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to
+                     call them patient."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q136_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q11_A1.html">FS, Q[11], A[1]</a>), the very notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure in themselves, as stated in Ethic. i, 8.
+                     Now the names of the virtues are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue. but as to the
+                     pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from being overcome
+                     by sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q136_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q136_A2-p0.1">Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now "patience
+                     hath a perfect work" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.4" target="asv">James 1:4</a>). Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.21.19" target="asv">Lk. 21:19</a>): "In your patience you shall possess your souls." Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory
+                     (Hom. xxxv in Evang.) "patience is the root and safeguard of all the virtues." Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is not reckoned among the four virtues which Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call principal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For it is virtue that "makes its possessor good, and renders the latter's
+                     work good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater
+                     according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues which are effective of good, incline
+                     a man more directly to good than those which are a check on the things which lead man away
+                     from good: and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good
+                     (thus faith, hope, and charity /are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a check on things that
+                     withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death,
+                     about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any
+                     kind
+                     of hardship, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not
+                     only of the theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in good, but also of fortitude and
+                     temperance which withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by
+                     patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust
+                     injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle is the most perfect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p8"> Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect, that it is more perfect simply.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes
+                     by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the soul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but
+                     merely because it removes their obstacles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q136_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q136_A3-p0.1">Whether it is possible to have patience without grace?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it is possible to have patience without grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it
+                     possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for
+                     the sake of evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and without the help of grace; for Augustine says
+                     (De Patientia iii) that "men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they
+                     love sinfully." Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good,
+                     and this is to be truly patient.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens
+                     are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be
+                     truly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help of grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is quite evident that some go through much trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health
+                     of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure
+                     many evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.61.6" target="asv">Ps. 61:6</a>): "From Him," i.e. from God, "is my patience."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly undertakes
+                     to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which gives pleasure." The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are
+                     of themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the
+                     sake of an end. Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to
+                     endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now
+                     the fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred
+                     to charity, which loves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4, </a> "Charity is patient."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p7"> But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through grace, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5, </a> "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is clearly impossible
+                     to have patience without the help of grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination
+                     of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which
+                     the concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance
+                     with reason: and yet it is this that pertains to true patience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good of a social virtue [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q136_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A5.html">FS, Q[61], A[5]</a>] is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace,
+                     yet not without the help of God's grace [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q136_A3-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A2.html">FS, Q[109], A[2]</a>]. On the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the
+                     comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even the endurance of those evils which a man bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man naturally
+                     has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural
+                     love.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q136_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q136_A4-p0.1">Whether patience is a part of fortitude?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same
+                     as fortitude: because, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q136_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A6.html">Q[123], A[6]</a>), the proper act of fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the Liber Sententiarum
+                     Prosperi [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang.] that "patience consists in enduring evils inflicted by
+                     others." Therefore
+                     patience is not a part of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q136_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A3.html">Q[123], A[3]</a>), and thus it is in the irascible. But patience seems to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in the concupiscible.
+                     Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without
+                     patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently, but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore
+                     patience is not a part of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For it belongs
+                     to patience "to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by others," as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang.). Now
+                     of those evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to endure are those that are connected with the danger
+                     of death, and about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in
+                     this matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore
+                     patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience brave (Sent. 811).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of death:
+                     whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not failing
+                     through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet
+                     fortitude is chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow,
+                     for a man is said to be patient, not because he does not fly, but because he
+                     behaves in a praiseworthy manner by suffering [patiendo] things which hurt him here and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately
+                     saddened by them. Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the concupiscible faculty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p9"> Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the
+                     subject, but the matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance, although both are in
+                     the concupiscible, because temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of touch, such as arise through
+                     abstinence from pleasures of food and sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other
+                     persons. Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to
+                     patience that a man forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, however great they be.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may
+                     patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is
+                     it inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom
+                     [*Homily v. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]
+                     says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.10" target="asv"> Mat. 4:10, </a> "Begone Satan," that "it is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most
+                     wicked": and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that "the precepts of patience are not opposed to the
+                     good of the commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our enemies." But in so far as patience regards
+                     all kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q136_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q136_A5-p0.1">Whether patience is the same as longanimity? [*Longsuffering. It is necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the
+                     comparison with magnanimity.]
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For Augustine says (De Patientia i) that "we speak of patience in God,
+                     not as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked, that they may be converted." Wherefore it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.5.4" target="asv">Ecclus. 5:4</a>): "The Most High is a patient rewarder." Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay:
+                     for one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured, so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score
+                     of place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of time, in so far as a person waits for a long time, is
+                     not distinct from patience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom. ii] on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.4" target="asv"> Rom. 2:4, </a> "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and patience, and longsuffering?" says: "It seems that longanimity differs
+                     from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather than of set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while
+                     those who take a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something
+                     a long way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good, rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have
+                     evil as their object, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common with magnanimity than with patience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p7"> Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures
+                     certain evils for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, endurance is easier: whereas if it be delayed a long
+                     time, it is more difficult. Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a nature to cause sorrow, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q136_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.12" target="asv"> Prov. 13:12, </a> "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Hence there may be
+                     patience in bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly longanimity and constancy are both comprised
+                     under patience, in so far as both the delay of the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the toil which man endures
+                     in persistently accomplishing a good work (which regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect of grievous evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p8"> For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience, says that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance
+                     of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." By saying "arduous" he refers to constancy in good; when
+                     he says "difficult" he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and by adding "continued"
+                     or "long lasting," he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something in common with patience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which is a long way off as to place, though distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that which
+                     is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails. Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty
+                     save in the point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time coming to us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p11"> We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the reason for the difference assigned by this gloss is that
+                     it is hard to bear with those who sin through weakness, merely because they persist a long time in evil, wherefore it is said
+                     that they are borne with longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to be unendurable; for which reason
+                     those who sin through pride are stated to be borne with patience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q136_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q135_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q137" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q137-p0.1">OF PERSEVERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q137-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q137-p2"> We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q137-p3"> (1) Whether perseverance is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q137-p4"> (2) Whether it is a part of fortitude?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q137-p5"> (3) Of its relation to constancy;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q137-p6"> (4) Whether it needs the help of grace?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q137_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q137_A1-p0.1">Whether perseverance is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater than
+                     perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "by virtue man lives aright," according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority
+                     (De Persever. i), no one can be said to have perseverance while living, unless he persevere until death. Therefore perseverance
+                     is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in Ethic.
+                     ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "perseverance is the fixed
+                     and continued persistence in a well-considered purpose." Therefore perseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of
+                     every virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Andronicus [*Chrysippus: in De Affect.] says that "perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand, and
+                     those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are indifferent." Now a habit that directs us to do something
+                     well, or to omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), "virtue is about the difficult and the good"; and so where there is a special
+                     kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts.
+                     First, from the act's very species, which is considered in respect of the proper object of that act: secondly, from the length
+                     of time, since to persist long in something difficult involves a special
+                     difficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is accomplished belongs to a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p7"> Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch
+                     (which is of itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring in connection with dangers of death (which
+                     also is something difficult in itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in enduring delays in the above
+                     or other virtuous deeds, so far as necessity requires.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as it is found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to endure
+                     long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not
+                     endured for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is not on this account that perseverance has its
+                     chief title to praise. Among other evils foremost are those which are opposed to
+                     pleasures of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life: such are the lack of food and the like, which
+                     at times call for long endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long time for one who grieves not much
+                     at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate man, in whom these passions are not violent.
+                     But they are most difficult to bear for one who is strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect virtue
+                     that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be taken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something
+                     imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of difficult
+                     good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue: for even if it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he persists
+                     in the more perfect good. Wherefore such like perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue derives perfection from the
+                     aspect of good rather than from the aspect of difficulty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same name: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): "Faith is to believe without
+                     seeing." Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence
+                     without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish
+                     it, for instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete
+                     it. Accordingly we must reply that the term "perseverance" is sometimes used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere,
+                     sometimes for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of perseverance chooses to persevere and begins
+                     to carry out his choice by persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not persisting to the end. Now the end
+                     is twofold: one is the end of the work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it belongs to perseverance
+                     to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, for instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and the magnificent
+                     man until his work be accomplished. There are, however, some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of life,
+                     such as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end of the entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which
+                     are the principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until the end of life. It is in this sense that
+                     Augustine speaks of perseverance as denoting the consummate act of perseverance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue in two ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to that
+                     virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end, belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which
+                     intends this as its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit to its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence
+                     is consequent upon every virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a "quality difficult to
+                     change."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q137_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q137_A2-p0.1">Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), "perseverance
+                     is about pains of touch." But these belong to temperance. Therefore perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply
+                     moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with
+                     reason. Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore
+                     perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance
+                     is not a part of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance as a part of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[123], A[2]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q137_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">FS, Q[61], AA[3]</a>,4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch
+                     as it practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this
+                     it has been stated (Q[123], A[2]) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it observes firmness in matters wherein it
+                     is most difficult
+                     to stand firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity that every virtue which has a title to praise
+                     for the firm endurance of something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue. Now the endurance
+                     of difficulty arising from delay in accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor is this so difficult
+                     as to endure dangers of death. Therefore perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The annexing of secondary to principal virtues depends not only on the matter [*Cf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q137_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q136_A4.html"> Q[136], A[4]</a>, ad 2], but also on the mode, because in everything form is of more account than matter. Wherefore although, as to matter,
+                     perseverance seems to have more in common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more in common with fortitude,
+                     in the point of standing firm against the difficulty arising from length of
+                     time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks (Ethic. vii, 4,7) does not moderate any passions, but consists merely in
+                     a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, considered as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of
+                     weariness or failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is in the irascible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the end, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q137_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.13" target="asv">Mat. 24:13</a>, "He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved." Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance for it to
+                     be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q137_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q137_A3-p0.1">Whether constancy pertains to perseverance?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that constancy does not pertain to perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q137_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q137_A5.html">Q[137], A[5]</a>): and patience differs from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "virtue is about the difficult and the good." Now it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but
+                     only in great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of unchangeableness.
+                     Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) condivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance, as
+                     stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q137_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q128_A6.html">Q[128] , A[6]</a>). Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> One is said to be constant because one stands to a thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as appears
+                     from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy belongs to perseverance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to
+                     those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly
+                     in good, against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly
+                     in good against difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence
+                     perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude, because the difficulty arising from continuance of action
+                     is more intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external obstacles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> External obstacles to persistence in good are especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q137_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q136_A1.html">Q[136], A[1]</a>). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those things which occasion difficulty.
+                     Now the end is of most account: wherefore constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is more difficult to persist in great deeds: yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any length
+                     of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which
+                     perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as it has something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the point
+                     of their difference, as stated in the Article.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q137_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q137_A4-p0.1">Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? [*Cf. FS, Q[109], A[10]]</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that perseverance does not need the help of grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q137_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q137_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue
+                     suffices for perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gift of Christ's grace is greater than the harm brought upon us by Adam, as appears from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q137_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.15" target="asv"> Rom. 5:15, </a> seqq. Now "before sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what he had received," as Augustine says (De
+                     Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ, persevere without the help
+                     of a further grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than deeds of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q137_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.5.7" target="asv">Wis. 5:7</a>): "We . . . have walked through hard ways." Now some persevere in sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man
+                     can also persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Persev. i): "We hold that perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in Christ."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 2; A[2], ad 3), perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of perseverance,
+                     considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the gift of habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, it may
+                     be taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until death: and in this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also
+                     the gratuitous help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q137_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A10.html">FS, Q[109], A[10]</a>), when we were treating of grace. Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, which changeableness is
+                     not taken away from it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present life, it is not in the power of the free-will, albeit
+                     repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its power to choose this: for it is often in our power to
+                     choose yet not to accomplish.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a habit is
+                     a thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who has the habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), "it was given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to persevere
+                     of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace
+                     of Christ, the predestined receive not only the possibility of persevering, but perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man
+                     whom no man threatened, of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening God,
+                     forfeited so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas these, although the world rage against their
+                     constancy, have persevered in faith."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by falling
+                     into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God's grace. On
+                     the other hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering in good, because he is able, by himself, to sin:
+                     wherefore he needs the help of grace for that end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q137_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q136_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q138" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q138-p0.1">OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q138-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q138-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q138-p3"> (1) Of effeminacy;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q138-p4"> (2) Of pertinacity.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q138_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q138_A1-p0.1">Whether effeminacy* is opposed to perseverance? [*Mollities, literally 'softness']</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance. For a gloss on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q138_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:9,10, </a> "Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind," expounds the text thus: "Effeminate---i.e. obscene, given to
+                     unnatural vice." But this is opposed to chastity. Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "delicacy is a kind of effeminacy." But to be delicate seems akin to intemperance.
+                     Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but to temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the man who is fond of amusement is effeminate." Now immoderate fondness
+                     of amusement is opposed to {eutrapelia}, which is the virtue about pleasures of play, as stated in Ethic. iv, 8. Therefore
+                     effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the persevering man is opposed to the effeminate."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q138_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q137_A1.html">Q[137], AA[1]</a>,2), perseverance is deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on account of long endurance of difficulties
+                     and toils: and it is directly opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on account of difficulties
+                     which he cannot endure. This is what we understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be "soft" if it readily yields
+                     to the touch. Now a thing
+                     is not declared to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not
+                     said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, if a
+                     person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them."
+                     Now it is evident that fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i) under
+                     the
+                     heading "True magnanimity consists of two things: It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down by fear, to be defeated
+                     by lust, or who has proved himself unbeaten by toil, to yield to pleasure." Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger motive
+                     of attraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive of withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation.
+                     Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), properly speaking an effeminate man is one who withdraws from good
+                     on
+                     account of sorrow caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one way, by custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more
+                     difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering
+                     through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are compared to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore
+                     those who are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being
+                     womanish themselves, as it were.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the delicate
+                     are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q138_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.28.56" target="asv">Dt. 28:56</a>): "The tender and delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her foot for . . . softness [Douay: 'niceness']."
+                     Thus delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy
+                     regards lack of pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for instance toil or the like.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In play two things may be considered. In the first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of play is opposed
+                     to {eutrapelia}. Secondly, we may consider the relaxation or rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs
+                     to effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs thereto to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q138_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q138_A2-p0.1">Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises from vainglory.
+                     But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q138_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q132_A2.html">Q[132], A[2]</a>). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so either by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess:
+                     because the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) "they
+                     rejoice when they prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected." And if it be opposed by deficiency, it will be the
+                     same as effeminacy, which is clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to
+                     perseverance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the persevering man persists in good against sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against pleasures,
+                     the brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But pertinacity is over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity
+                     is not opposed to perseverance more than to other virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity is to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition is
+                     opposed to religion, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q138_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q92_A1.html">Q[92], A[1]</a>). Therefore pertinacity is opposed to perseverance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Isidore says (Etym. x) "a person is said to be pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious." "Pervicacious"
+                     has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man "perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients called
+                     'vicia' what we call victory." These the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) calls {ischyrognomones}, that is "head-strong," or {idiognomones},
+                     that is "self-opinionated," because they abide by their opinions more
+                     than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is
+                     clear that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy
+                     for falling short of it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why a man is too persistent in his own opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own excellence:
+                     wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause. Now it has been stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q138_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q127_A2.html">Q[127], A[2]</a>, ad 1;
+                     <a id="SS_Q138_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q133_A2.html"> Q[133], A[2]</a>), that opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on their species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting inordinately in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a certain pleasure
+                     in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man. Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it
+                     too much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or effeminate man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the other virtues persist against the onslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in the same
+                     way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to praise seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity
+                     is directly opposed to perseverance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q138_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q137_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q139" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q139-p0.1">OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q139-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q139-p2"> We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two
+                  points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q139-p3"> (1) Whether fortitude is a gift?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q139-p4"> (2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q139_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q139_A1-p0.1">Whether fortitude is a gift?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should
+                     not be reckoned a gift.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the acts of the gift remain in heaven, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q139_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A6.html">FS, Q[68], A[6]</a>). But the act of fortitude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "fortitude encourages the fainthearted
+                     against hardships, which will be altogether absent from heaven." Therefore fortitude is not a gift.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly
+                     pleasures of the passing show." Now noisome pleasures and delights are the concern of temperance rather than of fortitude.
+                     Therefore it seems that fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the Holy Ghost (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q139_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated above (Q[123], A[2]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q139_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">FS, Q[61], A[3]</a>): and this firmness of mind is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with regard to goods or evils
+                     that are difficult. Now man, according to his proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these respects,
+                     so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous
+                     work, or in enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated above (Q[123],
+                     A[2]).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p7"> Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that he may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid
+                     whatever perils may threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a man's power to attain the end of his
+                     work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy Ghost works this in man,
+                     by bringing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils. A
+                     certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense
+                     that fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q139_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">FS, Q[68], AA[1]</a>,2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give confidence
+                     of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fortitude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the
+                     end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from toil and evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch
+                     as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which
+                     seems to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q139_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q139_A2-p0.1">Whether the fourth beatitude: "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," corresponds to the gift of fortitude?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the gift
+                     of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and
+                     thirsting after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude corresponds to the gift of piety rather than
+                     to the gift of fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift
+                     of wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q139_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q45.html">Q[45])</a>. Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude, according to Ethic. i, 8.
+                     Now the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore neither does any beatitude correspond to it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true
+                     goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must toil."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q139_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q121_A2.html">Q[121], A[2]</a>), Augustine makes the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which they are set forth, observing at
+                     the same time a certain fittingness between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning the hunger and thirst
+                     for justice, to the fourth gift, namely fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p7"> Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A[1] ), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is
+                     very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation of works of justice, but furthermore
+                     to do them with an unsatiable desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, which is
+                     related to all virtuous deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is
+                     a gift.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as stated above (Q[23], A[8], ad 3; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q139_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html">FS, Q[68], A[4]</a>, ad 3). Hence whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two of the fruits which correspond sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which regards the enduring
+                     of evils: and longanimity, which may regard the long delay and accomplishment of goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q139_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q138_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q140" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q140-p0.1">OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q140-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q140-p2"> We must next consider the precepts of fortitude:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q140-p3"> (1) The precepts of fortitude itself;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q140-p4"> (2) The precepts of its parts.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q140_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q140_A1-p0.1">Whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the
+                     Old Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q140_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.20" target="asv">Dt. 20</a>). Therefore precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but
+                     not vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as stated above (Q[123], A[2]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q140_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html">FS, Q[61], A[2]</a>). Now the precepts are directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be proportionate to them. Therefore
+                     the precepts of fortitude should have been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief precepts of the
+                     Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in various
+                     ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so that even in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others
+                     of kingdoms, and others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of the Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: wherefore
+                     the Divine Law contains precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues, with a
+                     view to directing the mind to God. For this reason it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q140_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.3" target="asv">Dt. 20:3,4</a>): "Fear ye them not: because the Lord your God is in the midst of you, and will fight for you against your enemies."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p7"> As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and among them we find precepts of fortitude according to the
+                     requirements of those goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Old Testament contained temporal promises, while the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal, according
+                     to Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily
+                     contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession
+                     of eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q140_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.12" target="asv"> Mat. 11:12,
+                        
+                     </a>"The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away." Hence Peter commands (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q140_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.5.8" target="asv">1 Pet. 5:8,9</a>): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye, strong in faith,"
+                     as also 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q140_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.7" target="asv"> James 4:7</a>: "Resist the devil, and he will fly from you." Since, however, men while tending to spiritual goods may be withdrawn from
+                     them by corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had to be given even in the New Law, that they
+                     might bravely endure temporal evils, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q140_A1-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.28" target="asv">Mat. 10:28</a>, "Fear ye not them that kill the body."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The law gives general directions in its precepts. But the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like the
+                     things to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the precepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q140_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q122_A1.html">Q[122], A[1]</a>), the precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles, which need to be known to all from the outset.
+                     Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which the notion of duty is manifest,
+                     and not about acts of fortitude, because it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear dangers of death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q140_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q140_A2-p0.1">Whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the precept of the parts of fortitude are unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and perseverance
+                     are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence, magnanimity, and confidence, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q140_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q128.html">Q[128])</a>. Now we find precepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance. Therefore there should also have been precepts
+                     of magnificence and magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is the guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.
+                     xxxv). Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore patience should not have been commanded merely, as Augustine
+                     says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the mind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q140_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q128.html">Q[128];</a>
+                     <a id="SS_Q140_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q136_A4.html"> Q[136], A[4]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q140_A2-p4.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q137_A2.html"> Q[137], A[2]</a>). Now the precepts of fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the precepts
+                     of patience and perseverance should have been negative and not affirmative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p5"> The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given by Holy Writ.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such things as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright man
+                     needs not only the principal virtues, but also the secondary and annexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts
+                     not only about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of the secondary and annexed virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the genus of fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of greatness
+                     which they regard in their respective matters. Now things pertaining to excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather
+                     than under precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of counsels, rather than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity.
+                     On the other hand, the hardships and toils of the present life
+                     pertain to patience and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them, but on account of the very nature
+                     of those virtues. Hence the need of precepts of patience and perseverance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q140_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>), although affirmative precepts are always binding, they are not binding for always, but according to place and time. Wherefore
+                     just as the affirmative precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to the preparedness of the mind, in the sense
+                     that man be prepared to fulfil them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be understood in the same way.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fortitude, as distinct from patience and perseverance, is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed with caution;
+                     nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in particular. On the other hand, patience and perseverance are about
+                     minor hardships and toils, wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially in general, what is to be done in such
+                     cases.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q140_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q139_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q141" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q141-p0.1">OF TEMPERANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q141-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q141-p2"> In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself; (2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance
+                  we must consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q141-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q141-p4"> (1) Whether temperance is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q141-p5"> (2) Whether it is a special virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q141-p6"> (3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q141-p7"> (4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q141-p8"> (5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a kind of touch?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q141-p9"> (6) What is the rule of temperance?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q141-p10"> (7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q141-p11"> (8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues ?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q141_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A1-p0.1">Whether temperance is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue goes against the inclination of nature, since "there is in us a natural
+                     aptitude for virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Now temperance withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines, according
+                     to Ethic. ii, 3,8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>). But some people have temperance without having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet covetous
+                     or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as appears from what we have said above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html">FS, Q[68], A[4]</a>). But seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have been already ascribed to the other virtues (QQ[8],9,19,45,52,
+                     71,139). Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): "Temperance is the name of a virtue."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">FS, Q[55], A[3]</a>), it is essential to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius
+                     states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with reason. Now temperance
+                     evidently inclines man to this, since its very name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes. Therefore temperance
+                     is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to
+                     him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that those pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance
+                     with reason. From such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore
+                     it is clear that temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature,
+                     but is in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The temperance which fulfils the conditions of perfect virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all who are
+                     in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being subject to the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is
+                     a virtue, though they do acts of temperance from a certain natural disposition, in so far as certain imperfect virtues are
+                     either natural to man, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html">FS, Q[63], A[1]</a>), or
+                     acquired by habituation, which virtues, through lack of prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear, whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q141_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.120" target="asv">Ps. 118:120</a>: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear." The gift of fear has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending, and in
+                     this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A1-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A9.html">Q[19], A[9]</a>, ad 1). But it may have for its secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid
+                     offending God. Now man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those things which are most seductive,
+                     and these are the matter of temperance: wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q141_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A2-p0.1">Whether temperance is a special virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to temperance
+                     to preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption for God's sake." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance
+                     is not a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we observe and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul." But this
+                     is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just
+                     is beautiful." Now the beautiful is considered as proper to temperance, according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic.
+                     i, 27). Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is customary in human speech to employ a common term in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things
+                     to which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is
+                     the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly
+                     the word "temperance" has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its common
+                     signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a general virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain
+                     temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human operations and passions: and this is common to every moral virtue.
+                     Yet there is a logical difference between temperance and fortitude, even if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance
+                     withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or
+                     withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p7"> On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive
+                     to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a special matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law. Wherefore
+                     integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can, like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense,
+                     and secondly in a sense of excellence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The things about which temperance is concerned have a most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are natural
+                     to man, as we shall state further on (
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">AA[4]</a>,5). Hence tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, although it is a common property of all the
+                     virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First,
+                     in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what
+                     we understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds
+                     us, hold the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his animal
+                     nature, as we shall state further on (
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">AA[4]</a>,5; Q[142], A[4]), wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In consequence beauty is a foremost attribute
+                     of temperance which above all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad
+                     sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute of temperance: for Isidore
+                     says (Etym. x): "An honest man is one who has no
+                     defilement, for honesty means an honorable state." This is most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that
+                     bring most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q[142], A[4]).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q141_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A3-p0.1">Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that "temperance
+                     is reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust and other wanton emotions of the mind." Now all the passions of the soul are
+                     called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Virtue is about the difficult and the good" [*Ethic. ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear, especially
+                     with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires and pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and
+                     dangers, according to Augustine (QQ[83], qu. 36). Therefore it seems that the virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires
+                     and pleasures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) "the grace of moderation belongs to temperance": and Tully says (De Offic.
+                     ii, 27) that "it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the mind and to enforce moderation." Now moderation
+                     is needed, not only in desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever pertains to the exterior. Therefore temperance
+                     is not only about desires and pleasures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym.) [*The words quoted do not occur in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii, and De
+                     Different. ii, 39]: that "it is temperance whereby lust and desire are kept under control."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[123], A[12]; Q[136], A[1]), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the passions
+                     that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's passions is twofold, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html">FS, Q[23], A[2]</a>), when we were treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive appetite pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other
+                     whereby it flies from sensible and bodily evils.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p7"> The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible
+                     and bodily goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason, but are subject to it as instruments which
+                     reason employs in order to attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing to the fact that the sensitive
+                     appetite fails to tend towards them in accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral
+                     virtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p8"> On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason,
+                     not through being immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when a man flies from sensible and bodily evils,
+                     which sometimes accompany the good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of reason. Hence it belongs to moral
+                     virtue to make man while flying from evil to remain firm in the good of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p9"> Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion,
+                     viz. fear, which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with daring, which attacks the objects of fear in the
+                     hope of attaining some good, so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly concerned with those passions
+                     that tend towards sensible goods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows that arise
+                     from the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring presupposes objects of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the
+                     absence of the aforesaid pleasures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html">FS, Q[23], AA[1]</a>,2; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A3-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html">FS, Q[25], A[1]</a>), when we were treating of the passions, those passions which pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions pertaining
+                     to the pursuit of good; and the passions of the irascible presuppose the passions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance
+                     directly moderates the passions of the concupiscible which tend towards good, as a consequence,
+                     it moderates all the other passions, inasmuch as moderation of the passions that precede results in moderation of the passions
+                     that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the
+                     things he desires.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards the object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to
+                     temperance. on the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of
+                     mind, which fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and fortitude about fears.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> External acts proceed from the internal passions of the soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of the
+                     internal passions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q141_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A4-p0.1">Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures of touch?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix)
+                     that "the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which draw us to the things which withdraw us from the
+                     laws of God and from the fruit of His goodness"; and a little further on he adds that "it is the duty of temperance to spurn
+                     all bodily allurements and popular praise." Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only by
+                     the desire for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the other senses, for these, too, belong to the
+                     bodily allurements, and again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q141_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>). "Desire [*'Cupiditas,' which is the Douay version following the Greek {philargyria} renders 'desire of money'] is the root
+                     of all evils." Therefore temperance is not only about desires of pleasures of touch.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is
+                     temperate, but he is not magnificent." Now honors, whether small or great, of which he is speaking there, are an object of
+                     pleasure, not of touch, but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only about desires for pleasures of touch.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect.
+                     Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus. Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures of the body, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A5.html">FS, Q[31], A[5]</a>) in the treatise on the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the state of virtue through desire for spiritual
+                     pleasures, for instance, through curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man knowledge, saying (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q141_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.5" target="asv">Gn. 3:5</a>): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil." Therefore
+                     temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures
+                     of touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the
+                     proper matter of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, temperance is about desires and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and daring. Now fortitude is about
+                     fear and daring with respect to the greatest evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of death. Wherefore
+                     in like manner temperance must needs be about desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a natural
+                     operation, it is so much the greater
+                     according as it results from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural operations are those which preserve
+                     the nature of the individual by means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union of the sexes. Hence temperance
+                     is properly about pleasures of meat and drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the sense of touch. Wherefore
+                     it follows that temperance is about pleasures of touch.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but as
+                     concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and this is a general condition of every virtue. However,
+                     we may also reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can he control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs
+                     chiefly and properly to temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and
+                     secondarily other pleasures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which is proportionate
+                     to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The pleasures of the other senses play a different part in man and in other animals. For in other animals pleasures do not
+                     result from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch: thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear
+                     its voice, in relation to his food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the other senses, not only for this reason,
+                     but also on account of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore temperance
+                     is about the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to pleasures of touch, not principally but consequently: while in
+                     so far as the sensible objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their becomingness, as when a man is pleased
+                     at a well-harmonized sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature. Hence these passions are not
+                     of such importance that temperance can be referred to them antonomastically.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the senses,
+                     and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded
+                     by moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they
+                     need no control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a
+                     hindrance to another greater and more binding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of nature, and consequently it does not follow that temperance is about
+                     all pleasures of touch.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A4-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q141_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A5-p0.1">Whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink,
+                     which are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which regard the touch. But according to what has been said
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, temperance is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human life. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper
+                     to the taste rather than about those proper to the touch.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, temperance is about the passions rather than about things themselves. Now, according to De Anima ii, 3, "the touch
+                     is the sense of food," as regards the very substance of the food, whereas "savor" which is the proper object of the taste,
+                     is "the pleasing quality of the food." Therefore temperance is about the taste rather than about the touch.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Ethic. vii, 4,7: "temperance and intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and
+                     incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy," to which delicacy pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in
+                     savors which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "seemingly temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do with the
+                     taste."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, temperance is about the greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human life either in the species or
+                     in the individual. In these matters certain things are to be considered as principal and others as secondary. The principal
+                     thing is the use itself of the necessary means, of the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the species, or of food
+                     and drink which are necessary for the
+                     preservation of the individual: while the very use of these necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p7"> In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the use more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in
+                     woman, and a pleasing savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the pleasure of touch, that results
+                     essentially from the use of these necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the touch. Secondarily, however,
+                     temperance and intemperance are about pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible objects
+                     of these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things that have relation to the touch. But since the taste
+                     is more akin to the touch than the other senses are, it follows that temperance is more about the taste than about the other
+                     senses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The use of food and the pleasure that essentially results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says (De
+                     Anima ii, 3) that "touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or cold, wet or dry." To the taste belongs the discernment
+                     of savors, which make the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its being suitable for nourishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The pleasure resulting from savor is additional, so to speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the
+                     use of food and drink.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Delicacy regards principally the substance of the food, but secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in which
+                     it is served.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q141_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A6-p0.1">Whether the rule of temperance depends on the need of the present life?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not regulated
+                     according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the soul, it is above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of temperance
+                     does not depend on the needs of the body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the needs of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin against
+                     temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required by nature, which is content with very little. But this would
+                     seem unreasonable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no
+                     sin in using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for the sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore
+                     the need of the body is not the rule of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): "In both Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule forbidding him
+                     to love the things of this life, or to deem any of them desirable for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself of
+                     those things with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a lover, in so far as they are requisite for the needs of
+                     this life and of his station."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[109], A[2]; Q[123], A[12]), the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason: because "man's good is to
+                     be in accord with reason," as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is that by which it directs
+                     certain things towards their end, and the good of reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of end,
+                     and the end is the rule of whatever is
+                     directed to the end. Now all the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed to some necessity of this life
+                     as to their end. Wherefore temperance takes the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects of which it makes
+                     use, and uses them only for as much as the need of this life requires.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above, the need of this life is regarded as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed that sometimes
+                     the end of the worker differs from the end of the work, thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes
+                     the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of
+                     the thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is
+                     useful for life is subordinate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The need of human life may be taken in two ways. First, it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term "necessary"
+                     to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something
+                     without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not only the former of these needs, but also the latter.
+                     Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man desires
+                     pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound condition of body." Other things that are not necessary
+                     for this purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to health and a sound condition of body; and these
+                     temperance makes not use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But others are not a hindrance to those
+                     things, and these temperance uses moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in keeping with those among
+                     whom
+                     one dwells. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) says that the "temperate man also desires other pleasant things," those
+                     namely that are not necessary for health or a sound condition of body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to these things."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need according to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the requirements
+                     of the body, but also on the requirements of external things, such as riches and station, and more still on the requirements
+                     of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided
+                     that not only they be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily condition,
+                     but also that they be not inconsistent with good," i.e. good conduct, nor "beyond his substance," i.e. his means. And Augustine
+                     says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi) that the "temperate man considers the need" not only "of this life" but also "of his station."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q141_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A7-p0.1">Whether temperance is a cardinal virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue. For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is
+                     about those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated
+                     in Ethic. iii, 10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it to control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to
+                     be more impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q141_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.4" target="asv">Prov. 27:4</a>): "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth; and who can bear the violence [impetum] of one provoked?" Therefore
+                     meekness is a principal virtue rather than temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence of desire and concupiscence, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A7-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A4.html">FS, Q[25], A[4]</a>). But humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore, seemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than
+                     temperance which controls concupiscence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory reckons temperance among the principal virtues (Moral. ii, 49).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[123], A[11]; Q[61], A[3]), a principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost claim
+                     to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which
+                     is requisite in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, both
+                     because these pleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain from
+                     them, and to control the desire for them, and because their objects are more necessary to the present life, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q141_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. For this reason temperance is reckoned a principal or cardinal virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The longer the range of its operation, the greater is the agent's power [virtus] shown to be: wherefore the very fact that
+                     the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power.
+                     This is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident, for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes, although its
+                     impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause,
+                     wherefore it is more lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a more principal virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of hope is higher than the object of desire, wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the irascible.
+                     But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appetite with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore
+                     temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A7-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q141_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q141_A8-p0.1">Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and
+                     seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and the regard for what is beautiful." Now virtue deserves
+                     praise for being honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest of the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the virtue. Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of
+                     touch than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance
+                     is a greater virtue than justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of
+                     death which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these occur every day; so that temperance is in more general
+                     use than fortitude. Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the "greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for which reason
+                     we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the good of the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual,"
+                     wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the
+                     many more than temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man and another, while fortitude regards dangers
+                     of battle which are endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the
+                     desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues
+                     than temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance, not on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance,
+                     but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and
+                     the lower animals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since virtue is about the difficult and the good, the excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good,
+                     wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein temperance excels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which is general because it regards the many conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is general
+                     because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former way, temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply,
+                     although in some respects temperance may be described as greater not only than fortitude but also than justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q141_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q140_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q142" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q142-p0.1">OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q142-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q142-p2"> We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q142-p3"> (1) Whether insensibility is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q142-p4"> (2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q142-p5"> (3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q142-p6"> (4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q142_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q142_A1-p0.1">Whether insensibility is a vice?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that insensibility is not a vice. For those are called insensible who are deficient with regard to pleasures
+                     of touch. Now seemingly it is praiseworthy and virtuous to be altogether deficient in such matters: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.2" target="asv">Dan. 10:2,3</a>): "In those days Daniel mourned the days of three weeks, I ate no desirable bread, and neither flesh nor wine entered my
+                     mouth, neither was I anointed with ointment." Therefore
+                     insensibility is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "man's good is to be in accord with reason," according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now abstinence from all pleasures
+                     of touch is most conducive to man's progress in the good of reason: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.1.17" target="asv">Dan. 1:17</a>) that "to the children" who took pulse for their food (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.1.12" target="asv">Dan. 1:12</a>), "God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book and wisdom." Therefore insensibility, which rejects these pleasures
+                     altogether, is not sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is a very effective means of avoiding sin would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy
+                     in avoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to insensibility. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that "if
+                     we deny ourselves pleasures we are less liable to sin." Therefore there is nothing vicious in insensibility.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the Philosopher
+                     (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11). Therefore insensibility is a vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious. Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that are necessary
+                     for man's life. Wherefore the natural order requires that man should make use of these pleasures, in so far as they are necessary
+                     for man's well-being, as regards the preservation either of the individual or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were
+                     to reject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are necessary for
+                     nature's preservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the order of nature. And this pertains to the vice of insensibility.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p7"> It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and even necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from
+                     such pleasures as result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's health, certain persons refrain from pleasures
+                     of meat, drink, and sex; as also for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes and soldiers have to deny themselves
+                     many pleasures, in order to fulfil their respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to
+                     recover health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures, as a kind of diet, and those who are desirous of giving
+                     themselves up to contemplation and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal things. Nor do any of these things pertain
+                     to the vice of insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through any horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some praiseworthy
+                     end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights of contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the
+                     text goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately afterwards.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since man cannot use his reason without his sensitive powers. which need a bodily organ. as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q142_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">FP, Q[84], AA[7]</a>,8, man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use his reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that
+                     afford pleasure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if he abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using
+                     pleasures of the body will be greater or less, according as
+                     man needs more or less the powers of his body in accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore it is commendable for those who
+                     undertake the duty of giving themselves to contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual good, by a kind of spiritual
+                     procreation, as it were, to abstain from many pleasures, but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily occupations and
+                     carnal procreation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned, not altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity requires.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q142_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q142_A2-p0.1">Whether intemperance is a childish sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin. For Jerome in commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.3" target="asv"> Mat. 18:3, </a> "Unless you be converted, and become as little children," says that "a child persists not in anger, is unmindful of injuries,
+                     takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful woman," all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore intemperance is not a
+                     childish sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, children have none but natural desires. Now "in respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance," according to
+                     the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, children should be fostered and nourished: whereas concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is concerned,
+                     are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.5" target="asv"> Col. 3:5, </a> "Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are . . . concupiscence" [*Vulg.: 'your members which are upon the earth,
+                     fornication . . . concupiscence'], etc. Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "we apply the term intemperance* to childish faults." [*{Akolasia} which Aristotle
+                     refers to {kolazo} to punish, so that its original sense would be 'impunity' or 'unrestraint.']
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to be childish for two reasons. First, because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does not mean
+                     that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense. Secondly. by way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of
+                     intemperance are said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is one of unchecked concupiscence, which is likened to a
+                     child in three ways. First, as rewards that which they both desire, for like a child
+                     concupiscence desires something disgraceful. This is because in human affairs a thing is beautiful according as it harmonizes
+                     with reason. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) under the heading "Comeliness is twofold," that "the beautiful is that
+                     which is in keeping with man's excellence in so far as his nature differs from other animals." Now a child does not attend
+                     to the order of reason; and in like manner "concupiscence does not listen to reason," according to Ethic. vii, 6. Secondly,
+                     they are alike as to the result. For a child, if left to his own will, becomes more self-willed: hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.8" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:8</a>): "A horse not broken becometh stubborn, and a child left to himself will become headstrong." So, too, concupiscence, if
+                     indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 5): "Lust served became a custom, and custom not resisted
+                     became necessity." Thirdly, as to the remedy which is applied to both. For a child is corrected by
+                     being restrained; hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.23.13" target="asv">Prov. 23:13,14</a>): "Withhold not correction from a child . . . Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul from Hell." In like manner
+                     by resisting concupiscence we moderate it according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates this when he says (Music.
+                     vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to spiritual things, and remain fixed "thereon, the impulse of custom," i.e. carnal
+                     concupiscence, "is broken, and being suppressed is gradually weakened:
+                     for it was stronger when we followed it, and though not wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it." Hence
+                     the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "as a child ought to live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the
+                     concupiscible to accord with reason."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes the term "childish" as denoting what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the sin of
+                     intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A desire may be said to be natural in two ways. First, with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance are
+                     about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and sex, which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly,
+                     a desire may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing that nature requires for its own preservation; and
+                     in this way it does not happen often that one sins in the matter of natural
+                     desires, for nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no sin in desiring this, save only where it is
+                     desired in excess as to quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to natural desires, according to
+                     the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p9"> There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and these are certain incentives to desire devised by human
+                     curiosity [*Cf. Q[167]], such as the nice [curiosa] preparation of food, or the adornment of women. And though children do
+                     not affect these things much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason given above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which regards nature should be nourished and fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason in
+                     them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q142_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q142_A3-p0.1">Whether cowardice* is a greater vice than intemperance? [*Cf. Q[125]]</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to the
+                     good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a more excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q142_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q142_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[141], A[8]). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher
+                     says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable, if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures
+                     or pains." Now seemingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other passions; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3,
+                     that "it is more difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which
+                     would seem to be stronger than fear." Therefore intemperance, which is overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice,
+                     which is overcome by fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires
+                     to be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death, which pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more
+                     grievous sin than intemperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice." Therefore it
+                     is more sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> one may be compared with another in two ways. First, with regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man
+                     who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than cowardice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p7"> First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death, to avoid which the principal motive is the necessity
+                     of preserving life. On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire of which is not so necessary for the preservation
+                     of life, because, as stated above (A[2], ad 2), intemperance is more about certain annexed pleasures or desires than about
+                     natural desires or pleasures. Now the more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin.
+                     Wherefore intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the part of the object or motive matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p8"> In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a
+                     man is, the more grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who are demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially
+                     in dangers of death, stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive of intemperance. Secondly, because the more
+                     voluntary a sin the graver it is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than cowardice has,
+                     and this for two reasons. The first is because actions done through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external
+                     agent, so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure
+                     are simply voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an intemperate man are more voluntary individually and less
+                     voluntary generically. For no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is enticed by individual pleasures which make
+                     of him an intemperate man. Hence the most effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell on the consideration of singulars.
+                     It is the other way about in matters relating to cowardice: because the particular action that imposes itself on a man is
+                     less voluntary, for instance to cast aside his shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more voluntary, for instance
+                     to save himself by flight. Now that which is more voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes
+                     place, is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply more voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly,
+                     because it is easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since pleasures of food and sex, which are the
+                     matter of intemperance, are of everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by frequent practice in their
+                     regard to become temperate; whereas dangers of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for man to encounter
+                     them frequently in order to cease being a coward.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The excellence of fortitude in comparison with temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard to the
+                     end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is directed to the common good more than temperance is. And from this
+                     point of view cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance, since by cowardice some people forsake the defense of
+                     the common good. Secondly, with regard to the difficulty, because it is more difficult
+                     to endure dangers of death than to refrain from any pleasures whatever: and from this point of view there is no need for cowardice
+                     to take precedence of intemperance. For just as it is a greater strength that does not succumb to a stronger force, so on
+                     the other hand to be overcome by a stronger force is proof of a lesser vice, and to succumb to a weaker force, is the proof
+                     of a greater vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which one shuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures whatever
+                     of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers
+                     of death, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex: although the latter is more difficult to resist than anger,
+                     sorrow, and fear, occasioned by certain other evils.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a general than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such cases we have
+                     the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q142_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q143.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q142_A4-p0.1">Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of sins?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so is disgrace due to sin.
+                     Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance: for instance murder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is
+                     not the most disgraceful of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those sins which are the more common are seemingly less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now sins
+                     of intemperance are most common, because they are about things connected with the common use of human life, and in which many
+                     happen to sin. Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most disgraceful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) temperance and intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain
+                     desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and pleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease
+                     as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory. Now honor is due to excellence, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q142_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], A[1]</a>), and glory denotes clarity (
+                     <a id="SS_Q142_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], A[1]</a>, ad 3). Accordingly intemperance is most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is most repugnant to human excellence,
+                     since it is about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q142_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A2.html">Q[141], AA[2]</a>,3).
+                     Wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q142_A4-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.48.21" target="asv">Ps. 48:21</a>): "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them." Secondly,
+                     because it is most repugnant to man's clarity or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of intemperance dim
+                     the light of reason from which all the clarity and beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as being
+                     most slavish.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Gregory says [*Moral. xxxiii. 12], "the sins of the flesh," which are comprised under the head of intemperance, although
+                     less culpable, are more disgraceful. The reason is that culpability is measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while
+                     disgrace regards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the unbecomingness of the sin in respect of the sinner.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The commonness of a sin diminishes the shamefulness and disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as regards the nature
+                     of the vices themselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When we say that intemperance is most disgraceful, we mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely, that are connected
+                     with human passions which to a certain extent are in conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode of
+                     human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices are apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by
+                     way of excess: for instance, if a man delight in eating human flesh, or in
+                     committing the unnatural vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q142_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q143.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q141_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q143" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q143_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q143-p0.1">OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q143-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q143-p2"> We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q143_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q143.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q143_A1-p0.1">Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to
+                     be "continence, mildness, and modesty." For continence is reckoned to be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance
+                     is comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q143_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">Q[141], A[4]</a>). Therefore mildness is not a part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q143_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.4.5" target="asv">Phil. 4:5</a>): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Now external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q143_A1-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A8.html">Q[58], A[8]</a>). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty,
+                     shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness, sobriety, purity." Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus]
+                     that "the companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity, refinement, method, contentment." [*'Per-se-sufficientiam'
+                     which could be rendered 'self-sufficiency,' but for the fact that
+                     this is taken in a bad sense. See
+                     <a id="SS_Q143_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q169_A1.html"> Q[169], A[1]</a>.] Therefore it seems that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (QQ[48],128), a cardinal virtue may have three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and potential.
+                     The integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the concurrence of which are necessary for virtue: and in this respect there
+                     are two integral parts of temperance, "shamefacedness," whereby one recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance,
+                     and "honesty," whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q143_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A2.html">Q[141], A[2]</a>, ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance excel others
+                     in disgrace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p7"> The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of a virtue have to be differentiated according to the
+                     difference of matter or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two kinds. For some are directed
+                     to nourishment: and in these as regards meat, there is "abstinence," and as regards drink properly there is "sobriety." Other
+                     pleasures are directed to the power of procreation, and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the act
+                     itself of procreation, there is "chastity," and as to the pleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing,
+                     touching, or fondling, we have "purity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p8"> The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the mode
+                     in some principal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs
+                     to temperance to moderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore any virtue that is effective
+                     of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards something, may be
+                     reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p9"> This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the soul; secondly, in the outward movements and actions of
+                     the body; thirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains,
+                     we find in the soul three movements towards a particular object. In the first place there is the movement of the will when
+                     stirred by the impulse of passion: and this movement is restrained by "continence," the effect of which is that,
+                     although a man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to them. Another inward movement towards something
+                     is the movement of hope, and of the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by "humility." The third movement
+                     is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and this is restrained by "meekness" or "mildness."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p10"> With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint is the effect of "modesty," which, according to Andronicus,
+                     has three parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what not to do, and to observe the right order,
+                     and to persevere in what we do: this he assigns to "method." The second is that a man observe decorum in what he does, and
+                     this he ascribes to "refinement." The third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse between
+                     a man and his friends, and this is called "gravity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p11"> With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this
+                     Macrobius assigns "lowliness," and Andronicus "contentment"; secondly, we must not be too nice in our requirements, and to
+                     this Macrobius ascribes "moderation," Andronicus "simplicity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is true that continence differs from virtue, just as imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on (
+                     <a id="SS_Q143_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q165_A1.html">Q[165], A[1]</a>); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has something in common with temperance both as to matter, since
+                     it is about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of
+                     temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of temperance not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the
+                     mode of restraint and moderation as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the matter of external action justice considers what is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain
+                     moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to the moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the
+                     moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q143_A1-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q143.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q142_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q143_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q144" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q143_A1.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q144-p0.1">OF SHAMEFACEDNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q144-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q144-p2"> We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in the first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness
+                  and honesty. With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q144-p3"> (1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q144-p4"> (2) What is its object?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q144-p5"> (3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q144-p6"> (4) What kind of people are ashamed?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q144_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q144_A1-p0.1">Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is proper to a virtue "to observe the mean as fixed by reason": this is
+                     clear from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6. Now shamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher
+                     observes (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy.
+                     But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is
+                     it a part of justice. since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas justice is not about the passions; nor again
+                     is it a part of fortitude, because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and aggressive,
+                     while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is about
+                     desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide
+                     Orth. ii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of
+                     honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness is the companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse
+                     to wantonness, a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the support of what is honest, a seeker after
+                     the beautiful." Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain vices are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate
+                     prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, "like acts beget like habits," according to Ethic. ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore
+                     from many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i,
+                     12). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that shamefacedness is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in
+                     Phys. vii, 17,18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of
+                     virtue. Now shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the fear of something base, namely of that which
+                     is disgraceful. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "shamefacedness is fear of a
+                     base action." Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q144_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html">FS, Q[40], A[1]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q144_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A2.html">FS, Q[41], A[2]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q144_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A3.html">FS, Q[42], A[3]</a>), when we were treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does not apprehend that which would
+                     be disgraceful and base to do, as being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to avoid; nor does he
+                     actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue,
+                     since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p9"> Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this
+                     way /shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue's
+                     definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be "an elective habit," that is to say, operating from choice.
+                     Now shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion.
+                     Hence it falls short of the notion of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and disgrace. Now it has been stated (
+                     <a id="SS_Q144_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q142_A4.html">Q[142], A[4]</a>) that the vice of intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness pertains more to temperance than to
+                     any other virtue, by reason of its motive cause, which is a base action though not according to the species of the passion,
+                     namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as the vices opposed to other virtues are
+                     base and disgraceful, shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of
+                     honesty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow that
+                     whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence
+                     shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the object
+                     of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a
+                     man would be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of shamefacedness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A1-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q144_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q144_A2-p0.1">Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shamefacedness
+                     is fear of disgrace." Now sometimes those who do nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q144_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.8" target="asv"> Ps. 67:8, </a> "For thy sake I have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face." Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful
+                     action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance
+                     when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most beautiful according to Ethic. i, 8. Yet sometimes people are ashamed
+                     to do virtuous deeds, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q144_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.9.26" target="asv"> Lk. 9:26, </a> "He that shall be ashamed of Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed," etc. Therefore shamefacedness is not
+                     about a disgraceful action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a disgraceful action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the action
+                     the more ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser sins, while he glories in those which are most
+                     grievous, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q144_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.51.3" target="asv"> Ps. 51:3, </a> "Why dost thou glory in malice?" Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that "shamefacedness is fear of
+                     doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q144_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A2.html">FS, Q[41], A[2]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q144_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A3.html">FS, Q[42], A[3]</a>), when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid.
+                     Now disgrace is twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the deformity of a voluntary act: and this,
+                     properly speaking, has not the character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone does not
+                     appear to be arduous and above man's ability: wherefore it is not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the Philosopher
+                     says (Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p8"> The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in the reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity
+                     of glory consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the character of an arduous evil, just as honor has
+                     the character of an arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first and foremost reproach or ignominy.
+                     And since reproach is properly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that shamefacedness
+                     regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "a man is less ashamed of those
+                     defects which are not the result of any fault of his own."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p9"> Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man refrains from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another
+                     way a man while doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear of reproach. In the former case, according to
+                     Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person "blushing," in the latter we say that he is "ashamed."
+                     Hence he says that "the man who is ashamed acts in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due to sin which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
+                     6) that "a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the cause." Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which
+                     he is subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv,
+                     3). Thus we find it said of the apostles (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q144_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.41" target="asv">Acts 5:41</a>) that "they
+                     (the apostles) went from the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the
+                     name of Jesus." It is owing to imperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the reproaches which he suffers on
+                     account of virtue, since the more virtuous a man is, the more he despises external things, whether good or evil. Wherefore
+                     it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q144_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.51.7" target="asv">Is. 51:7</a>): "Fear ye not the reproach of men."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q144_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q63_A3.html">Q[63], A[3]</a>), though honor is not really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain excellence: and the same applies to reproach,
+                     for though it is properly due to sin alone, yet, at least in man's opinion, it regards any kind of defect. Hence a man is
+                     ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and the like.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as such. Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either because
+                     he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical
+                     for doing virtuous deeds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful, either because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in comparison
+                     with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain abundance of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice
+                     than of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance of power. The same applies to other sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q144_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q144_A3-p0.1">Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in Rhet.
+                     ii, 6 that "men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire approbation." Now men desire this especially from people
+                     of the better sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely
+                     connected with him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those
+                     whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to Rhet. ii, 6, "a man does not forbid his neighbor what he
+                     does himself." Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most closely connected with him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men take more shame from those who retail their information to many, such
+                     as jokers and fable-tellers." But those who are more closely connected with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should
+                     not take shame chiefly from them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done
+                     nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first time; by those whose friends they wish to become." Now these
+                     are less closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by those who are more closely united to him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that "man is made most ashamed by those who are to be continually with him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor denotes attestation to someone's excellence, especially the excellence
+                     which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of which is shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person's defect,
+                     especially that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person's attestation is considered to be, the more does he
+                     make another person ashamed. Now a person's attestation may be considered as being more
+                     weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or because of its effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person's
+                     attestations for two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of his judgement, as in the case of wise and virtuous men,
+                     by whom man is more desirous of being honored and by whom he is brought to a greater sense of shame. Hence children and the
+                     lower animals inspire no one with shame, by reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on account of his knowledge of the
+                     matter
+                     attested, because "everyone judges well of what is known to him" [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we are more liable to be made
+                     ashamed by persons connected with us, since they are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers and persons entirely
+                     unknown to us, who are ignorant of what we do, inspire us with no shame at all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p8"> An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are
+                     more desirous of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are more liable to be made ashamed by those who are
+                     able to do them some harm. And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons connected with us make us more ashamed,
+                     since we are to be continually in their society, as though this entailed a continual harm to us: whereas the harm
+                     that comes from strangers and passersby ceases almost at once.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> People of the better sort make us ashamed for the same reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because just
+                     as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since they have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their
+                     judgments hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom we live is more cogent since they know more
+                     about our concerns in detail.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We fear not the attestation of those who are connected with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that they
+                     look upon our defect as disgraceful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm they do by making many think ill of us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make us more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to
+                     wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition
+                     seems greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in one whom he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the
+                     more disgraceful. The reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom we
+                     ask something for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be, is that we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed
+                     in our request, or by failing to become their friends.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q144_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q144_A4-p0.1">Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness
+                     are not ashamed, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q144_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.3.3" target="asv"> Jer. 3:3, </a> "Thou hadst a harlot's forehead, thou wouldst not blush." Therefore those who are virtuous are more inclined to be ashamed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil": and this
+                     happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, shamefacedness is "fear of disgrace" [*Ethic. iv, 9]. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance
+                     if they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly. Therefore a virtuous man can be ashamed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q144_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q143.html">Q[143])</a>. Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is
+                     also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a "virtuous man is not shamefaced."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q144_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q144_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2) shamefacedness is fear of some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not feared: first, because it is
+                     not reckoned an evil; secondly because one reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult to avoid.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p8"> Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First, because the things that should make him ashamed are not
+                     deemed by him to be disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are without shame, for instead of disapproving
+                     of their sins, they boast of them. Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to themselves, or as easy to avoid.
+                     In this way the old and the virtuous are not shamefaced. Yet they are so disposed, that if there were anything
+                     disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shame is in the virtuous
+                     hypothetically."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst men through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average
+                     men it is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and yet are not altogether free from evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only vice, but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q144_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.5.22" target="asv">1 Thess. 5:22, </a> "From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves." The Philosopher, too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should
+                     avoid "not only what is really evil, but also those things that are regarded as evil."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 1) the virtuous man despises ignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve, wherefore
+                     he is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as though it entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it: wherefore
+                     Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness lays the first foundation of temperance," by inspiring man with the horror
+                     of whatever is disgraceful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q144_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q143_A1.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q145" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q145-p0.1">OF HONESTY* (FOUR ARTICLES) [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point
+                  of view of decorum.]
+               </h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q145-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q145-p2"> We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q145-p3"> (1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q145-p4"> (2) Its relation with the beautiful [*As honesty here denotes moral goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty];</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q145-p5"> (3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q145-p6"> (4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q145_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q145_A1-p0.1">Whether honesty is the same as virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that "the honest is what is
+                     desired for its own sake." Now virtue is desired, not for its own sake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher
+                     says (Ethic. i, 9) that "happiness is the reward and the end of virtue." Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) "honesty means an honorable state." Now honor is due to many things besides virtue,
+                     since "it is praise that is the proper due of virtue" (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "principal part of virtue is the interior choice," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems
+                     to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.40" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:40, </a> "Let all things be done decently [honeste] and according to order" among you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth. According to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.11.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 11:14, </a> "good things and evil, life and death [poverty and riches] are from God" [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine
+                     edition. For riches the Vulgate has 'honestas']. But virtue does not consist in external wealth. Therefore honesty is not
+                     the same as virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides honesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also divided.
+                     Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Isidore says (Etym. x) "honesty means an honorable state," wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through being worthy
+                     of honor. Now honor, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q145_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q144_A2.html">Q[144], A[2]</a>, ad 2), is due to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according to his virtue, as stated in Phys. vii,
+                     17. Therefore, properly speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of those things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for their
+                     own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such as happiness which is the last end; while some are desired,
+                     not only for their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in themselves, even if no further good accrued to
+                     us through them, but also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are
+                     conducive to some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable for their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De
+                     Invent. Rhet. ii, 52) that "some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by their own worth, such as virtue, truth,
+                     knowledge." And this suffices to give a thing the character of honest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some of the things which are honored besides virtue are more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and such like
+                     things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue which we practice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim
+                     to the name of honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, in so far as they are a help to the practice of
+                     virtue, such as rank, power, and riches [*Ethic. i, 8]. For as the Philosopher says
+                     (Ethic. iv, 3) that these things "are honored by some people, but in truth it is only the good man who is worthy of honor."
+                     Now a man is good in respect of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the latter is desirable for the sake
+                     of something else, while honor is due to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the character of honesty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As we have stated honest denotes that to which honor is due. Now honor is an attestation to someone's excellence, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q145_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], AA[1]</a>,2). But one attests only to what one knows; and the internal choice is not made known save by external actions. Wherefore
+                     external conduct has the character of honesty, in so far as it reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists
+                     radically in the internal choice, but
+                     its expression lies in the external conduct.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is because the excellence of wealth is commonly regarded as making a man deserving of honor, that sometimes the name of
+                     honesty is given to external prosperity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q145_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q145_A2-p0.1">Whether the honest is the same as the beautiful?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the honest is not the same as the beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite, since
+                     the honest is "what is desirable for its own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. But the beautiful regards rather the
+                     faculty of vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the same as the honest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beauty requires a certain clarity, which is characteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honor. Since then
+                     honor and glory differ, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q145_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], A[1]</a>, ad 3), it seems also that the honest and the beautiful differ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, honesty is the same as virtue, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q145_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.16.15" target="asv">Ezech. 16:15</a>): "Trusting in thy beauty thou playest the harlot because of thy renown." Therefore the honest is not the same as the beautiful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.23" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:23,24</a>): "Those that are our uncomely [inhonesta] parts, have more abundant comeliness [honestatem], but our comely [honesta] parts
+                     have no need." Now by uncomely parts he means the baser members, and by comely parts the beautiful members. Therefore the
+                     honest and the beautiful are apparently the same.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity
+                     and due proportion. For he states that God is said to be beautiful, as being "the cause of the harmony and clarity of the
+                     universe." Hence the beauty of the body consists in a man having his bodily limbs well proportioned, together with a certain
+                     clarity of color. In like manner spiritual beauty consists in a man's conduct or actions
+                     being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason. Now this is what is meant by honesty, which we have
+                     stated 
+                     <a id="SS_Q145_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html">(A[1])</a> to be the same as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates according to reason all that is connected with man. Wherefore "honesty
+                     is the same as spiritual beauty." Hence Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 30): "By honesty I mean intelligible beauty, which we
+                     properly designate as spiritual," and further on he adds that "many things are
+                     beautiful to the eye, which it would be hardly proper to call honest."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object that moves the appetite is an apprehended good. Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon as it is apprehended,
+                     it is taken to be something becoming and good. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the beautiful and the good are beloved
+                     by all." Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it implies spiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this reason Tully
+                     says (De Offic. i, 5): "Thou perceivest the form and the features, so to
+                     speak, of honesty; and were it to be seen with the eye, would, as Plato declares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q145_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q103_A1.html">Q[103], A[1]</a>, ad 3), glory is the effect of honor: because through being honored or praised, a person acquires clarity in the eyes of
+                     others. Wherefore, just as the same thing makes a man honorable and glorious, so is the same thing honest and beautiful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument applies to the beauty of the body: although it might be replied that to be proud of one's honesty is to play
+                     the harlot because of one's spiritual beauty, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.17" target="asv"> Ezech. 28:17, </a> "Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast lost thy wisdom in thy beauty."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q145_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q145_A3-p0.1">Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the honest does not differ from the useful and the pleasant. For the honest is "what is desirable for
+                     its own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired for its own sake, for "it seems ridiculous to ask
+                     a man why he wishes to be pleased," as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore the honest does not differ from the
+                     pleasant.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful good: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): "There is a thing
+                     that attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility":
+                     and "that is money." Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.11.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 11:14</a>): "Poverty and riches [honestas] are from God," and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.2" target="asv">Ecclus. 13:2</a>): "He shall
+                     take a burden upon him that hath fellowship with one more honorable," i.e. richer, "than himself." Therefore the honest differs
+                     not from the useful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can be useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement
+                     (De Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Q[83], qu. 30): "The honest is that which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies reference to
+                     something else."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The honest concurs in the same subject with the useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as stated
+                     above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q145_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it has a certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever is regulated
+                     in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man. Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is
+                     becoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is
+                     naturally pleasing to man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue (Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is
+                     pleasing is honest, since a thing may be becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason. A pleasing thing of
+                     this kind is beside man's reason which perfects his nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is referred to
+                     something else as its end namely happiness. Accordingly the honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p7"> Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest as having a certain excellence deserving of honor on
+                     account of its spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest to desire, and useful, as referred to something
+                     else. The pleasant, however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since whatever is useful and honest is
+                     pleasing in some respect, whereas the converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired for its own sake by the rational appetite. which tends to that which is in
+                     accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Riches are denominated honesty according of the opinion of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to be
+                     the instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (A[1], ad 2).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing incompatible with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that
+                     it is contrary to man's last end, which is a good in accordance with reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect,
+                     with regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say that every useful thing as such may be classed among those that
+                     are honest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q145_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q145_A4-p0.1">Whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and
+                     whole in respect of one same thing. Now "temperance is a part of honesty," according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore
+                     honesty is not a part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Esdra 3:21</a>) that "wine . . . makes all thoughts honest." But the use of wine, especially in excess, in which sense the passage quoted
+                     should seemingly be taken, pertains to intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor. Now "it is the just and the brave who receive most honor," according
+                     to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore
+                     Eleazar said as related in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.6.28" target="asv">2 Macc. 6:28</a>: "I suffer an honorable [honesta] death, for the most venerable and most holy laws."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i] reckons honesty a part of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as pertaining
+                     especially to temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q145_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, honesty is a kind of spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful: and opposites are most manifest
+                     of one another. Wherefore seemingly honesty belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels that which is most disgraceful
+                     and unbecoming to man, namely animal lusts. Hence by its very name temperance is most significative of the good of reason
+                     to which it belongs to moderate and
+                     temper evil desires. Accordingly honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is reckoned as a part thereof,
+                     not as a subjective part, nor as an annexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition attaching thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Temperance is accounted a subjective part of honesty taken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is reckoned a
+                     part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man is intoxicated, "the wine makes his thoughts honest" according to his own reckoning because he deems himself great
+                     and deserving of honor [*Cf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q145_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q148_A6.html"> Q[148], A[6]</a>].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude than to temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good: yet
+                     greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it holds in check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated
+                     above. Thus honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule given by the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q145_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.23" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:23</a>) when he says that "our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness,"
+                     which, namely, destroys whatever is uncomely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q145_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q144_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q146" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q146_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q146-p0.1">OF ABSTINENCE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q146-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q146-p2"> We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those which are about pleasures of food; secondly, those
+                  which are about pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence, which is about meat and drink, and sobriety,
+                  which is specifically about drink.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q146-p3"> With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered: (1) Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its
+                  opposite vice which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q146-p4"> (1) Whether abstinence is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q146-p5"> (2) Whether it is a special virtue?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q146_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q146_A1-p0.1">Whether abstinence is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q146_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.20" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:20</a>): "The kingdom of God is not in speech but in power [virtute]." Now the kingdom of God does not consist in abstinence, for
+                     the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q146_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.17" target="asv">Rom. 14:17</a>): "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink," where a gloss [*Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11] observes that "justice
+                     consists neither in abstaining nor in eating." Therefore abstinence
+                     is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing himself to God: "This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to
+                     take food as physic." Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art to regulate medicine. Therefore, in like manner,
+                     to regulate one's food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every virtue "observes the mean," as stated in Ethic. ii, 6,7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean
+                     but to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no virtue excludes another virtue. But abstinence excludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "impatience
+                     not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer's mind from its peaceful seclusion." Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "sometimes
+                     the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer," so that abstinence excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not
+                     a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q146_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.5" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:5,6</a>): "Join with your faith virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge abstinence"; where abstinence is numbered among
+                     other virtues. Therefore abstinence is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of food. Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as denoting
+                     retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it signifies neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something indifferent.
+                     Secondly, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and then it signifies either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is
+                     the meaning of Peter's words quoted above, where he says that we ought "to join
+                     abstinence with knowledge," namely that in abstaining from food a man should act with due regard for those among whom he lives,
+                     for his own person, and for the requirements of health.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The use of and abstinence from food, considered in themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle says
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q146_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:8</a>): "Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if we eat not [*Vulg.: 'Neither if we eat . . . nor if we eat not'], shall
+                     we have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more," i.e. spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of
+                     God, in so far as they are done reasonably through
+                     faith and love of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The regulation of food, in the point of quantity and quality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of the
+                     body: but in the point of internal affections with regard to the good of reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine
+                     says (QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11): "It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or how much food a man takes, so long as he
+                     does it with due regard for the people among whom he lives, for his own person, and for
+                     the requirements of his health: but it matters how readily and uncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or
+                     necessity to abstain."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures which are too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fortitude to strengthen
+                     the soul against fears that deter it from the good of reason. Wherefore, just as fortitude is commended on account of a certain
+                     excess, from which all the parts of fortitude take their name, so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from which
+                     all its parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, since it is a part
+                     of temperance, is named from deficiency, and yet it observes the mean, in so far as it is in accord with right reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those vices result from abstinence in so far as it is not in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one abstain
+                     as one ought, i.e. with gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e. for God's glory and not one's own.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q146_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q146_A2-p0.1">Whether abstinence is a special virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue. For every virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not
+                     praiseworthy by itself; for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "the virtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the
+                     other virtues." Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Pet. xlii) that "the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any creature
+                     of God is evil, but merely in order to chastise the body." Now this belongs to chastity, as its very name denotes. Therefore
+                     abstinence is not a special virtue distinct from chastity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as man should be content with moderate meat, so should he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q146_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:8, </a> "Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should be [Vulg.: 'are'] content." Now there is no special virtue
+                     in being content with moderate clothes. Neither, therefore, is there in abstinence which moderates food.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons abstinence as a special part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q146_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q136_A1.html">Q[136], A[1]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q146_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A3.html"> Q[141], A[3]</a>) moral virtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the passions: hence whenever we find a special motive
+                     why a passion departs from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue. Now pleasures of the table are of a nature
+                     to withdraw man from the good of reason, both because they are so great, and because food is necessary to man who needs
+                     it for the maintenance of life, which he desires above all other things. Therefore abstinence is a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtues are of necessity connected together, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q146_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>). Wherefore one virtue receives help and commendation from another, as justice from fortitude. Accordingly in this way the
+                     virtue of abstinence receives commendation on account of the other virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not only against the allurements of lust, but also against those of gluttony:
+                     since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the onslaughts of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields
+                     to them. Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue through being a help to chastity, since one virtue helps
+                     another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The use of clothing was devised by art, whereas the use of food is from nature. Hence it is more necessary to have a special
+                     virtue for the moderation of food than for the moderation of clothing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q146_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q146_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q145_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q146_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q147" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q146_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q147-p0.1">OF FASTING (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q147-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q147-p2"> We must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q147-p3"> (1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q147-p4"> (2) Of what virtue is it the act?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q147-p5"> (3) Whether it is a matter of precept?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q147-p6"> (4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q147-p7"> (5) The time of fasting;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q147-p8"> (6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q147-p9"> (7) The hour of eating for those who fast;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q147-p10"> (8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q147_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A1-p0.1">Whether fasting is an act of virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fasting is not an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is acceptable to God. But fasting is not always
+                     acceptable to God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.58.3" target="asv"> Is. 58:3, </a> "Why have we fasted and Thou hast not regarded?" Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no act of virtue forsakes the mean of virtue. Now fasting forsakes the mean of virtue, which in the virtue of abstinence
+                     takes account of the necessity of supplying the needs of nature, whereas by fasting something is retrenched therefrom: else
+                     those who do not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is competent to all, both good and evil, is not an act of virtue. Now such is fasting, since every one
+                     is fasting before eating. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned together with other virtuous acts (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:5,6</a>) where the Apostle says: "In fasting, in knowledge, in chastity, etc. [Vulg.: 'in chastity, in knowledge']."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> An act is virtuous through being directed by reason to some virtuous [honestum] [*Cf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q147_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html"> Q[145], A[1]</a>] good. Now this is consistent with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold purpose. First, in order to bridle
+                     the lusts of the flesh, wherefore the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:5,6</a>): "In fasting, in chastity," since fasting is the guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome [*Contra Jov. ii.] "Venus
+                     is
+                     cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not there," that is to say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and drink. Secondly, we have
+                     recourse to fasting in order that the mind may arise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly things: hence it is related
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Dan.10" target="asv">Dan. 10</a>) of Daniel that he received a revelation from God after fasting for three weeks. Thirdly, in order to satisfy for sins: wherefore
+                     it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Joel.2.12" target="asv">Joel 2:12</a>): "Be converted to Me with all your heart, in fasting and in
+                     weeping and in mourning." The same is declared by Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et Jejun. [*Serm. lxxii (ccxxx, de Tempore)]):
+                     "Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the mind, subjects one's flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite and humble, scatters
+                     the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire of lust, kindles the true light of chastity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An act that is virtuous generically may be rendered vicious by its connection with certain circumstances. Hence the text
+                     goes on to say: "Behold in the day of your fast your own will is founded," and a little further on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.58.4" target="asv">Is. 58:4</a>): "You fast for debates and strife and strike with the fist wickedly." These words are expounded by Gregory (Pastor. iii,
+                     19) as follows: "The will indicates joy and the fist anger. In vain then is the
+                     flesh restrained if the mind allowed to drift to inordinate movements be wrecked by vice." And Augustine says (in the same
+                     sermon) that "fasting loves not many words, deems wealth superfluous, scorns pride, commends humility, helps man to perceive
+                     what is frail and paltry."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The mean of virtue is measured not according to quantity but according to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Now reason
+                     judges it expedient, on account of some special motive, for a man to take less food than would be becoming to him under ordinary
+                     circumstances, for instance in order to avoid sickness, or in order to perform certain bodily works with greater ease: and
+                     much more does reason direct this to the avoidance of spiritual evils and the
+                     pursuit of spiritual goods. Yet reason does not retrench so much from one's food as to refuse nature its necessary support:
+                     thus Jerome says:* "It matters not whether thou art a long or a short time in destroying thyself, since to afflict the body
+                     immoderately, whether by excessive lack of nourishment, or by eating or sleeping too little, is to offer a sacrifice of stolen
+                     goods." [*The quotation is from the Corpus of Canon Law (Cap. Non mediocriter, De Consecrationibus, dist. 5). Gratian there
+                     ascribes the quotation to St. Jerome, but it is not to be found in the saint's works.] In like manner right reason does not
+                     retrench so much from a man's food as to render him incapable of fulfilling his duty. Hence Jerome says (in the same reference)
+                     "Rational man forfeits his dignity, if he sets fasting before chastity, or night-watchings before the well-being of his senses."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fasting of nature, in respect of which a man is said to be fasting until he partakes of food, consists in a pure negation,
+                     wherefore it cannot be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is only the fasting of one who abstains in some measure from food for
+                     a reasonable purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting [jejunium jejunii] [*Literally the 'fast of fasting']: while
+                     the latter is called the faster's fast, because he fasts for a purpose.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q147_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A2-p0.1">Whether fasting is an act of abstinence?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fasting is not an act of abstinence. For Jerome [*The quotation is from the Ordinary Gloss, where the
+                     reference is lacking] commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.17.20" target="asv"> Mat. 17:20, </a> "This kind of devil" says: "To fast is to abstain not only from food but also from all manner of lusts." Now this belongs
+                     to every virtue. Therefore fasting is not exclusively an act of abstinence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says in a Lenten Homily (xvi in Evang.) that "the Lenten fast is a tithe of the whole year." Now paying
+                     tithes is an act of religion, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q147_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q87_A1.html">Q[87], A[1]</a>). Therefore fasting is an act of religion and not of abstinence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, abstinence is a part of temperance, as stated above (QQ[143],146, A[1], ad 3). Now temperance is condivided with
+                     fortitude, to which it belongs to endure hardships, and this seems very applicable to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an
+                     act of abstinence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "fasting is frugality of fare and abstinence from food."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Habit and act have the same matter. Wherefore every virtuous act about some particular matter belongs to the virtue that
+                     appoints the mean in that matter. Now fasting is concerned with food, wherein the mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore
+                     it is evident that fasting is an act of abstinence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Properly speaking fasting consists in abstaining from food, but speaking metaphorically it denotes abstinence from anything
+                     harmful, and such especially is sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p8"> We may also reply that even properly speaking fasting is abstinence from all manner of lust, since, as stated above (A[1],
+                     ad 1), an act ceases to be virtuous by the conjunction of any vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing prevents the act of one virtue belonging to another virtue, in so far as it is directed to the end of that virtue,
+                     as explained above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q147_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>, ad 2;
+                     <a id="SS_Q147_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q85_A3.html"> Q[85], A[3]</a>). Accordingly there is no reason why fasting should not be an act of religion, or of chastity, or of any other virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to fortitude as a special virtue, to endure, not any kind of hardship, but only those connected with the danger
+                     of death. To endure hardships resulting from privation of pleasure of touch, belongs to temperance and its parts: and such
+                     are the hardships of fasting.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q147_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A3-p0.1">Whether fasting is a matter of precept?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fasting is not a matter of precept. For precepts are not given about works of supererogation which are
+                     a matter of counsel. Now fasting is a work of supererogation: else it would have to be equally observed at all places and
+                     times. Therefore fasting is not a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever infringes a precept commits a mortal sin. Therefore if fasting were a matter of precept, all who do not
+                     fast would sin mortally, and a widespreading snare would be laid for men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 17) that "the Wisdom of God having taken human nature, and called us to a state of
+                     freedom, instituted a few most salutary sacraments whereby the community of the Christian people, that is, of the free multitude,
+                     should be bound together in subjection to one God." Now the liberty of the Christian people seems to be hindered by a great
+                     number of observances no less than by a great number of sacraments. For Augustine says
+                     (Ad inquis. Januar., Ep. lv) that "whereas God in His mercy wished our religion to be distinguished by its freedom and the
+                     evidence and small number of its solemn sacraments, some people render it oppressive with slavish burdens." Therefore it seems
+                     that the Church should not have made fasting a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi) speaking of fasting says: "Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands
+                     of the elders as though they were laws of the apostles." Therefore fasting is a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as it belongs to the secular authority to make legal precepts which apply the natural law to matters of common weal
+                     in temporal affairs, so it belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to prescribe by statute those things that concern the common
+                     weal of the faithful in spiritual goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p7"> Now it has been stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q147_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q147_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that fasting is useful as atoning for and preventing sin, and as raising the mind to spiritual things. And everyone is bound
+                     by the natural dictate of reason to practice fasting as far as it is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore fasting in general
+                     is a matter of precept of the natural law, while the fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and profitable to
+                     the Christian people, is a matter of precept
+                     of positive law established by ecclesiastical authority: the latter is the Church fast, the former is the fast prescribed
+                     by nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fasting considered in itself denotes something not eligible but penal: yet it becomes eligible in so far as it is useful
+                     to some end. Wherefore considered absolutely it is not binding under precept, but it is binding under precept to each one
+                     that stands in need of such a remedy. And since men, for the most part, need this remedy, both because "in many things we
+                     all offend" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.3.2" target="asv">James 3:2</a>), and because "the flesh lusteth against the
+                     spirit" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.17" target="asv">Gal. 5:17</a>), it was fitting that the Church should appoint certain fasts to be kept by all in common. In doing this the Church does
+                     not make a precept of a matter of supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is of general obligation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those commandments which are given under the form of a general precept, do not bind all persons in the same way, but subject
+                     to the requirements of the end intended by the lawgiver. It will be a mortal sin to disobey a commandment through contempt
+                     of the lawgiver's authority, or to disobey it in such a way as to frustrate the end intended by him: but it is not a mortal
+                     sin if one fails to keep a commandment, when there is a reasonable motive, and
+                     especially if the lawgiver would not insist on its observance if he were present. Hence it is that not all, who do not keep
+                     the fasts of the Church, sin mortally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine is speaking there of those things "that are neither contained in the authorities of Holy Scripture, nor found among
+                     the ordinances of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church." On the other hand, the fasts
+                     that are of obligation are appointed by the councils of bishops and are sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church.
+                     Nor are they opposed to the freedom of the faithful, rather are they of use in
+                     hindering the slavery of sin, which is opposed to spiritual freedom, of which it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.13" target="asv">Gal. 5:13</a>): "You, brethren, have been called unto liberty; only make not liberty an occasion to the flesh."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q147_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A4-p0.1">Whether all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church. For the commandments of the Church are binding even as
+                     the commandments of God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.16" target="asv"> Lk. 10:16, </a> "He that heareth you heareth Me." Now all are bound to keep the commandments of God. Therefore in like manner all are bound
+                     to keep the fasts appointed by the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, children especially are seemingly not exempt from fasting, on account of their age: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Joel.2.15" target="asv">Joel 2:15</a>): "Sanctify a fast," and further on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Joel.2.16" target="asv">Joel 2:16</a>): "Gather together the little ones, and them that suck the breasts." Much more therefore are all others bound to keen the
+                     fasts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, spiritual things should be preferred to temporal, and necessary things to those that are not necessary. Now bodily
+                     works are directed to temporal gain; and pilgrimages, though directed to spiritual things, are not a matter of necessity.
+                     Therefore, since fasting is directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary thing by the commandment of the Church,
+                     it seems that the fasts of the Church ought not to be omitted on account of a pilgrimage, or
+                     bodily works.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is better to do a thing willingly than through necessity, as stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.9.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 9:7.</a> Now the poor are wont to fast through necessity, owing to lack of food. Much more therefore ought they to fast willingly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It seems that no righteous man is bound to fast. For the commandments of the Church are not binding in opposition to Christ's
+                     teaching. But our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.5.34" target="asv">Lk. 5:34</a>) that "the children of the bridegroom cannot fast whilst the bridegroom is with them [*Vulg.: 'Can you make the children
+                     of the bridegroom fast, whilst the bridegroom is with them?']." Now He is with all the righteous by dwelling in them in a
+                     special manner [*Cf.
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q147_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q8_A3.html">FP, Q[8], A[3]</a>], wherefore our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.28.20" target="asv">Mat. 28:20</a>): "Behold I am with you . . . even to the consummation of the world." Therefore the righteous are not bound by the commandment
+                     of the Church to fast.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q147_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">FS, Q[90], A[2]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q147_A4-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q98_A2.html">FS, Q[98], AA[2]</a>,6), general precepts are framed according to the requirements of the many. Wherefore in making such precepts the lawgiver
+                     considers what happens generally and for the most part, and he does not intend the precept to be binding on a person in whom
+                     for some special reason there is something incompatible with observance of the precept. Yet discretion must be
+                     brought to bear on the point. For if the reason be evident, it is lawful for a man to use his own judgment in omitting to
+                     fulfil the precept, especially if custom be in his favor, or if it be difficult for him to have recourse to superior authority.
+                     on the other hand, if the reason be doubtful, one should have recourse to the superior who has power to grant a dispensation
+                     in such cases. And this must be done in the fasts appointed by the Church, to which all are bound in general, unless there
+                     be some special obstacle to this observance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The commandments of God are precepts of the natural law, which are, of themselves, necessary for salvation. But the commandments
+                     of the Church are about matters which are necessary for salvation, not of themselves, but only through the ordinance of the
+                     Church. Hence there may be certain obstacles on account of which certain persons are not bound to keep the fasts in question.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In children there is a most evident reason for not fasting, both on account of their natural weakness, owing to which they
+                     need to take food frequently, and not much at a time, and because they need much nourishment owing to the demands of growth,
+                     which results from the residuum of nourishment. Wherefore as long as the stage of growth lasts, which as a rule lasts until
+                     they have completed the third period of seven years, they are not bound to keep the
+                     Church fasts: and yet it is fitting that even during that time they should exercise themselves in fasting, more or less, in
+                     accordance with their age. Nevertheless when some great calamity threatens, even children are commanded to fast, in sign of
+                     more severe penance, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Jonah.3.7" target="asv"> Jonah 3:7, </a> "Let neither men nor beasts . . . taste anything . . . nor drink water."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Apparently a distinction should be made with regard to pilgrims and working people. For if the pilgrimage or laborious work
+                     can be conveniently deferred or lessened without detriment to the bodily health and such external conditions as are necessary
+                     for the upkeep of bodily or spiritual life, there is no reason for omitting the fasts of the Church. But if one be under the
+                     necessity of starting on the pilgrimage at once, and of making long stages, or
+                     of doing much work, either for one's bodily livelihood, or for some need of the spiritual life, and it be impossible at the
+                     same time to keep the fasts of the Church, one is not bound to fast: because in ordering fasts the Church would not seem to
+                     have intended to prevent other pious and more necessary undertakings. Nevertheless, in such cases one ought seemingly, to
+                     seek the superior's dispensation; except perhaps when the above course is recognized by custom, since when superiors are silent
+                     they would seem to consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those poor who can provide themselves with sufficient for one meal are not excused, on account of poverty, from keeping the
+                     fasts of the Church. On the other hand, those would seem to be exempt who beg their food piecemeal, since they are unable
+                     at any one time to have a sufficiency of food.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> This saying of our Lord may be expounded in three ways. First, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxx in Matth.), who says that
+                     "the disciples, who are called children of the bridegroom, were as yet of a weakly disposition, wherefore they are compared
+                     to an old garment." Hence while Christ was with them in body they were to be fostered with kindness rather than drilled with
+                     the harshness of fasting. According to this interpretation, it is fitting that
+                     dispensations should be granted to the imperfect and to beginners, rather than to the elders and the perfect, according to
+                     a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.130.2" target="asv"> Ps. 130:2, </a> "As a child that is weaned is towards his mother." Secondly, we may say with Jerome [*Bede, Comment. in Luc. v] that our
+                     Lord is speaking here of the fasts of the observances of the Old Law. Wherefore our Lord means to say that the apostles were
+                     not to be held back by the old observances, since they were to be filled with the
+                     newness of grace. Thirdly, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27), who states that fasting is of two kinds. one
+                     pertains to those who are humbled by disquietude, and this is not befitting perfect men, for they are called "children of
+                     the bridegroom"; hence when we read in Luke: "The children of the bridegroom cannot fast [*Hom. xiii, in Matth.]," we read
+                     in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A4-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.9.15" target="asv"> Mat. 9:15</a>: "The children of the bridegroom cannot mourn [*Vulg.: 'Can the children of the bridegroom
+                     mourn?']." The other pertains to the mind that rejoices in adhering to spiritual things: and this fasting is befitting the
+                     perfect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q147_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A5-p0.1">Whether the times for the Church fast are fittingly ascribed?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the times for the Church fast are unfittingly appointed. For we read (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4" target="asv">Mat. 4</a>) that Christ began to fast immediately after being baptized. Now we ought to imitate Christ, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.16" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:16</a>, "Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ." Therefore we ought to fast immediately after the Epiphany when Christ's
+                     baptism is celebrated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is unlawful in the New Law to observe the ceremonies of the Old Law. Now it belongs to the solemnities of the
+                     Old Law to fast in certain particular months: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.8.19" target="asv">Zech. 8:19</a>): "The fast of the fourth month and the fast of the fifth, and the fast of the seventh, and the fast of the tenth shall be
+                     to the house of Judah, joy and gladness and great solemnities." Therefore the fast of certain months, which are called
+                     Ember days, are unfittingly kept in the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27), just as there is a fast "of sorrow," so is there a fast "of
+                     joy." Now it is most becoming that the faithful should rejoice spiritually in Christ's Resurrection. Therefore during the
+                     five weeks which the Church solemnizes on account of Christ's Resurrection, and on Sundays which commemorate the Resurrection,
+                     fasts ought to be appointed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the general custom of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q147_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q147_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3), fasting is directed to two things, the deletion of sin, and the raising of the mind to heavenly things. Wherefore fasting
+                     ought to be appointed specially for those times, when it behooves man to be cleansed from sin, and the minds of the faithful
+                     to be raised to God by devotion: and these things are particularly requisite before the feast of Easter, when sins are loosed
+                     by baptism, which is solemnly
+                     conferred on Easter-eve, on which day our Lord's burial is commemorated, because "we are buried together with Christ by baptism
+                     unto death" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.4" target="asv">Rom. 6:4</a>). Moreover at the Easter festival the mind of man ought to be devoutly raised to the glory of eternity, which Christ restored
+                     by rising from the dead, and so the Church ordered a fast to be observed immediately before the Paschal feast; and for the
+                     same reason, on the eve of the chief festivals, because it is then that one
+                     ought to make ready to keep the coming feast devoutly. Again it is the custom in the Church for Holy orders to be conferred
+                     every quarter of the year (in sign whereof our Lord fed four thousand men with seven loaves, which signify the New Testament
+                     year as Jerome says [*Comment. in Marc. viii]): and then both the ordainer, and the candidates for ordination, and even the
+                     whole people, for whose good they are ordained, need to fast in order to make themselves ready for the ordination. Hence it
+                     is
+                     related (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.12" target="asv">Lk. 6:12</a>) that before choosing His disciples our Lord "went out into a mountain to pray": and Ambrose [*Exposit. in Luc.] commenting
+                     on these words says: "What shouldst thou do, when thou desirest to undertake some pious work, since Christ prayed before sending
+                     His apostles?"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p7"> With regard to the forty day's fast, according to Gregory (Hom. xvi in Evang.) there are three reasons for the number. First,
+                     "because the power of the Decalogue is accomplished in the four books of the Holy Gospels: since forty is the product of ten
+                     multiplied by four." Or "because we are composed of four elements in this mortal body through whose lusts we transgress the
+                     Lord's commandments which are delivered to us in the Decalogue. Wherefore it is fitting we should punish
+                     that same body forty times. or, because, just as under the Law it was commanded that tithes should be paid of things, so we
+                     strive to pay God a tithe of days, for since a year is composed of three hundred and sixty-six days, by punishing ourselves
+                     for thirty-six days" (namely, the fasting days during the six weeks of Lent) "we pay God a tithe of our year." According to
+                     Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 16) a fourth reason may be added. For the Creator is the "Trinity," Father, Son, and Holy
+                     Ghost: while the number "three" refers to the invisible creature, since we are commanded to love God, with our whole heart,
+                     with our whole soul, and with our whole mind: and the number "four" refers to the visible creature, by reason of heat, cold,
+                     wet and dry. Thus the number "ten" [*Ten is the sum of three, three, and four] signifies all things, and if this be multiplied
+                     by four which refers to the body whereby we make use of things, we have the number forty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p8"> Each fast of the Ember days is composed of three days, on account of the number of months in each season: or on account of
+                     the number of Holy orders which are conferred at these times.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Christ needed not baptism for His own sake, but in order to commend baptism to us. Wherefore it was competent for Him to
+                     fast, not before, but after His baptism, in order to invite us to fast before our baptism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Church keeps the Ember fasts, neither at the very same time as the Jews, nor for the same reasons. For they fasted in
+                     July, which is the fourth month from April (which they count as the first), because it was then that Moses coming down from
+                     Mount Sinai broke the tables of the Law (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32" target="asv">Ex. 32</a>), and that, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.39.2" target="asv"> Jer. 39:2, </a> "the walls of the city were first broken through." In the fifth month, which we call August, they fasted
+                     because they were commanded not to go up on to the mountain, when the people had rebelled on account of the spies (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Num.14" target="asv">Num. 14</a>): also in this month the temple of Jerusalem was burnt down by Nabuchodonosor (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p10.4" href="./asv.html#Jer.52" target="asv">Jer. 52</a>) and afterwards by Titus. In the seventh month which we call October, Godolias was slain, and the remnants of the people
+                     were dispersed (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A5-p10.5" href="./asv.html#Jer.51" target="asv">Jer. 51</a>). In the tenth month, which we call January, the people who were with Ezechiel in captivity heard of the destruction of the
+                     temple (Ezech.
+                     4).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "fasting of joy" proceeds from the instigation of the Holy Ghost Who is the Spirit of liberty, wherefore this fasting
+                     should not be a matter of precept. Accordingly the fasts appointed by the commandment of the Church are rather "fasts of sorrow"
+                     which are inconsistent with days of joy. For this reason fasting is not ordered by the Church during the whole of the Paschal
+                     season, nor on Sundays: and if anyone were to fast at these times in
+                     contradiction to the custom of Christian people, which as Augustine declares (Ep. xxxvi) "is to be considered as law," or
+                     even through some erroneous opinion (thus the Manichees fast, because they deem such fasting to be of obligation)---he would
+                     not be free from sin. Nevertheless fasting considered in itself is commendable at all times; thus Jerome wrote (Ad Lucin.,
+                     Ep. lxxi): "Would that we might fast always."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q147_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A6-p0.1">Whether it is requisite for fasting that one eat but once?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not requisite for fasting that one eat but once. For, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q147_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q147_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, which observes due quantity of food not less than the number of meals. Now
+                     the quantity of food is not limited for those who fast. Therefore neither should the number of meals be limited.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Just as man is nourished by meat, so is he by drink: wherefore drink breaks the fast, and for this reason we cannot
+                     receive the Eucharist after drinking. Now we are not forbidden to drink at various hours of the day. Therefore those who fast
+                     should not be forbidden to eat several times.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, digestives are a kind of food: and yet many take them on fasting days after eating. Therefore it is not essential
+                     to fasting to take only one meal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the common custom of the Christian people.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Fasting is instituted by the Church in order to bridle concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard nature. Now only one meal is
+                     seemingly sufficient for this purpose, since thereby man is able to satisfy nature; and yet he withdraws something from concupiscence
+                     by minimizing the number of meals. Therefore it is appointed by the Church, in her moderation, that those who fast should
+                     take one meal in the day.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It was not possible to fix the same quantity of food for all, on account of the various bodily temperaments, the result being
+                     that one person needs more, and another less food: whereas, for the most part, all are able to satisfy nature by only one
+                     meal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fasting is of two kinds [*Cf. A[1], ad 3]. One is the natural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eucharist. This
+                     is broken by any kind of drink, even of water, after which it is not lawful to receive the Eucharist. The fast of the Church
+                     is another kind and is called the "fasting of the faster," and this is not broken save by such things as the Church intended
+                     to forbid in instituting the fast. Now the Church does not intend to command
+                     abstinence from drink, for this is taken more for bodily refreshment, and digestion of the food consumed, although it nourishes
+                     somewhat. It is, however, possible to sin and lose the merit of fasting, by partaking of too much drink: as also by eating
+                     immoderately at one meal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although digestives nourish somewhat they are not taken chiefly for nourishment, but for digestion. Hence one does not break
+                     one's fast by taking them or any other medicines, unless one were to take digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great
+                     quantity and by way of food.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q147_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A7-p0.1">Whether the ninth hour is suitably fixed for the faster's meal?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ninth hour is not suitably fixed for the faster's meal. For the state of the New Law is more perfect
+                     than the state of the Old Law. Now in the Old Testament they fasted until evening, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.23.32" target="asv">Lev. 23:32</a>): "It is a sabbath . . . you shall afflict your souls," and then the text continues: "From evening until evening you shall
+                     celebrate your sabbaths." Much more therefore under the New Testament should the
+                     fast be ordered until the evening.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the fast ordered by the Church is binding on all. But all are not able to know exactly the ninth hour. Therefore
+                     it seems that the fixing of the ninth hour should not form part of the commandment to fast.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q147_A7-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q147_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Now the mean of moral virtue does not apply in the same way to all, since what is much for one is little for another, as
+                     stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Therefore the ninth hour should not be fixed for those who fast.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Council of Chalons [*The quotation is from the Capitularies (Cap. 39) of Theodulf, bishop of Orleans (760-821) and is
+                     said to be found in the Corpus Juris, Cap. Solent, dist. 1, De Consecratione] says: "During Lent those are by no means to
+                     be credited with fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of Vespers," which in the Lenten season is said after
+                     the ninth hour. Therefore we ought to fast until the ninth hour.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q147_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q147_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3,5), fasting is directed to the deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it ought to add something to the common custom, yet
+                     so as not to be a heavy burden to nature. Now the right and common custom is for men to eat about the sixth hour: both because
+                     digestion is seemingly finished (the natural heat being withdrawn inwardly at night-time on account of the surrounding cold
+                     of the night), and the humor spread
+                     about through the limbs (to which result the heat of the day conduces until the sun has reached its zenith), and again because
+                     it is then chiefly that the nature of the human body needs assistance against the external heat that is in the air, lest the
+                     humors be parched within. Hence, in order that those who fast may feel some pain in satisfaction for their sins, the ninth
+                     hour is suitably fixed for their meal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p7"> Moreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of Christ's Passion, which was brought to a close at the ninth hour, when "bowing
+                     His head, He gave up the ghost" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.19.30" target="asv">Jn. 19:30</a>): because those who fast by punishing their flesh, are conformed to the Passion of Christ, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A7-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.24" target="asv"> Gal. 5:24, </a> "They that are Christ's, have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The state of the Old Testament is compared to the night, while the state of the New Testament is compared to the day, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.12" target="asv"> Rom. 13:12, </a> "The night is passed and the day is at hand." Therefore in the Old Testament they fasted until night, but not in the New
+                     Testament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fasting requires a fixed hour based, not on a strict calculation, but on a rough estimate: for it suffices that it be about
+                     the ninth hour, and this is easy for anyone to ascertain.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A little more or a little less cannot do much harm. Now it is not a long space of time from the sixth hour at which men for
+                     the most part are wont to eat, until the ninth hour, which is fixed for those who fast. Wherefore the fixing of such a time
+                     cannot do much harm to anyone, whatever his circumstances may be. If however this were to prove a heavy burden to a man on
+                     account of sickness, age, or some similar reason, he should be dispensed from
+                     fasting, or be allowed to forestall the hour by a little.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A7-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q147_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q147_A8-p0.1">Whether it is fitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unfitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods. For it has
+                     been stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q147_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q147_A6.html">(A[6])</a> that fasting was instituted as a curb on the concupiscence of the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by drinking wine more
+                     than by eating flesh; according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A8-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.20.1" target="asv"> Prov. 20:1, </a> "Wine is a luxurious thing," and 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q147_A8-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.18" target="asv"> Eph. 5:18, </a> "Be not drunk with wine, wherein
+                     is luxury." Since then those who fast are not forbidden to drink wine, it seems that they should not be forbidden to eat flesh
+                     meat.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some fish are as delectable to eat as the flesh of certain animals. Now "concupiscence is desire of the delectable,"
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q147_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q30_A1.html">FS, Q[30], A[1]</a>). Therefore since fasting which was instituted in order to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the eating of fish, neither
+                     should it exclude the eating of flesh meat.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, on certain fasting days people make use of eggs and cheese. Therefore one can likewise make use of them during the
+                     Lenten fast.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the common custom of the faithful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q147_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q147_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, fasting was instituted by the Church in order to bridle the concupiscences of the flesh, which regard pleasures of touch
+                     in connection with food and sex. Wherefore the Church forbade those who fast to partake of those foods which both afford most
+                     pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very great incentive to lust. Such are the flesh of animals that take their rest
+                     on the earth, and of those that breathe
+                     the air and their products, such as milk from those that walk on the earth, and eggs from birds. For, since such like animals
+                     are more like man in body, they afford greater pleasure as food, and greater nourishment to the human body, so that from their
+                     consumption there results a greater surplus available for seminal matter, which when abundant becomes a great incentive to
+                     lust. Hence the Church has bidden those who fast to abstain especially from these foods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Three things concur in the act of procreation, namely, heat, spirit [*Cf. P. I., Q. 118, A[1], ad 3], and humor. Wine and
+                     other things that heat the body conduce especially to heat: flatulent foods seemingly cooperate in the production of the vital
+                     spirit: but it is chiefly the use of flesh meat which is most productive of nourishment, that conduces to the production of
+                     humor. Now the alteration occasioned by heat, and the increase in vital spirits
+                     are of short duration, whereas the substance of the humor remains a long time. Hence those who fast are forbidden the use
+                     of flesh meat rather than of wine or vegetables which are flatulent foods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the institution of fasting, the Church takes account of the more common occurrences. Now, generally speaking, eating flesh
+                     meat affords more pleasure than eating fish, although this is not always the case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast
+                     to eat flesh meat, rather than to eat fish.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eggs and milk foods are forbidden to those who fast, for as much as they originate from animals that provide us with flesh:
+                     wherefore the prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of the prohibition of eggs and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast
+                     is the most solemn of all, both because it is kept in imitation of Christ, and because it disposes us to celebrate devoutly
+                     the mysteries of our redemption. For this reason the eating of flesh meat is
+                     forbidden in every fast, while the Lenten fast lays a general prohibition even on eggs and milk foods. As to the use of the
+                     latter things in other fasts the custom varies among different people, and each person is bound to conform to that custom
+                     which is in vogue with those among whom he is dwelling. Hence Jerome says [*Augustine, De Lib. Arb. iii, 18; cf. De Nat. et
+                     Grat. lxvii]: "Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as though they were the
+                     laws
+                     of the apostles."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q147_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q146_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q148" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q148-p0.1">OF GLUTTONY (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q148-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q148-p2"> We must now consider gluttony. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q148-p3"> (1) Whether gluttony is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q148-p4"> (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q148-p5"> (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q148-p6"> (4) Its species;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q148-p7"> (5) Whether it is a capital sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q148-p8"> (6) Its daughters.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q148_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q148_A1-p0.1">Whether gluttony is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that gluttony is not a sin. For our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.11" target="asv">Mat. 15:11</a>): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man." Now gluttony regards food which goes into a man. Therefore, since
+                     every sin defiles a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid" [*Ep. lxxi, ad Lucin.]. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and man cannot
+                     avoid this, for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "Since in eating pleasure and necessity go together, we fail to discern between
+                     the call of necessity and the seduction of pleasure," and Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): "Who is it, Lord, that does not
+                     eat a little more than necessary?" Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in every kind of sin the first movement is a sin. But the first movement in taking food is not a sin, else hunger
+                     and thirst would be sinful. Therefore gluttony is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) that "unless we first tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous appetite, we
+                     have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual combat." But man's inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and drinking, but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be inordinate through
+                     leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of moral virtue consists: and a thing is said to be a sin through being contrary
+                     to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which goes into man by way of food, by reason of its substance and nature, does not defile a man spiritually. But the
+                     Jews, against whom our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees deemed certain foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their
+                     signification, but by reason of their nature [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q148_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A6.html">FS, Q[102], A[6]</a>, ad 1]. It is the inordinate desire of food that defiles a man spiritually.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above, the vice of gluttony does not regard the substance of food, but in the desire thereof not being regulated
+                     by reason. Wherefore if a man exceed in quantity of food, not from desire of food, but through deeming it necessary to him,
+                     this pertains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It is a case of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds
+                     the measure in eating, from a desire for the pleasures of the palate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The appetite is twofold. There is the natural appetite, which belongs to the powers of the vegetal soul. In these powers
+                     virtue and vice are impossible, since they cannot be subject to reason; wherefore the appetitive power is differentiated from
+                     the powers of secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and thirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another,
+                     the sensitive appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this appetite that
+                     the vice of gluttony consists. Hence the first movement of gluttony denotes inordinateness in the sensitive appetite, and
+                     this is not without sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q148_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q148_A2-p0.1">Whether gluttony is a mortal sin? </h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that gluttony is not a mortal sin. For every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Decalogue: and this,
+                     apparently, does not apply to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q148_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q132_A3.html">Q[132], A[3]</a>). But gluttony is not opposed to charity, neither as regards the love of God, nor as regards the love of one's neighbor.
+                     Therefore gluttony is never a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Cf. Append. to St. Augustine's works: Serm. civ (xli, de sanctis)]: "Whenever
+                     a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins." But this pertains
+                     to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is accounted among the lesser, that is to say venial, sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "As long as the vice of gluttony has a hold on a man, all that he has done
+                     valiantly is forfeited by him: and as long as the belly is unrestrained, all virtue comes to naught." But virtue is not done
+                     away save by mortal sin. Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q148_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q148_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the vice of gluttony properly consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now the order of reason in regulating the concupiscence
+                     may be considered from two points of view. First, with regard to things directed to the end, inasmuch as they may be incommensurate
+                     and consequently improportionate to the end; secondly, with regard to the end itself, inasmuch as concupiscence turns man
+                     away from his due end.
+                     Accordingly, if the inordinate concupiscence in gluttony be found to turn man away from the last end, gluttony will be a mortal
+                     sin. This is the case when he adheres to the pleasure of gluttony as his end, for the sake of which he contemns God, being
+                     ready to disobey God's commandments, in order to obtain those pleasures. On the other hand, if the inordinate concupiscence
+                     in the vice of gluttony be found to affect only such things as are directed to the end, for instance when a man has too
+                     great a desire for the pleasures of the palate, yet would not for their sake do anything contrary to God's law, it is a venial
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The vice of gluttony becomes a mortal sin by turning man away from his last end: and accordingly, by a kind of reduction,
+                     it is opposed to the precept of hallowing the sabbath, which commands us to rest in our last end. For mortal sins are not
+                     all directly opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which contain injustice: because the precepts of the
+                     Decalogue pertain specially to justice and its parts, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q148_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q122_A1.html">Q[122], A[1]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In so far as it turns man away from his last end, gluttony is opposed to the love of God, who is to be loved, as our last
+                     end, above all things: and only in this respect is gluttony a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This saying of Augustine refers to gluttony as denoting inordinate concupiscence merely in regard of things directed to the
+                     end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Gluttony is said to bring virtue to naught, not so much on its own account, as on account of the vices which arise from it.
+                     For Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19): "When the belly is distended by gluttony, the virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q148_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q148_A3-p0.1">Whether gluttony is the greatest of sins?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that gluttony is the greatest of sins. For the grievousness of a sin is measured by the grievousness of the
+                     punishment. Now the sin of gluttony is most grievously punished, for Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in Matth.]: "Gluttony turned
+                     Adam out of Paradise, gluttony it was that drew down the deluge at the time of Noah." According to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.16.49" target="asv"> Ezech. 16:49, </a> "This was the iniquity of Sodom, thy sister . . . fulness of bread," etc.
+                     Therefore the sin of gluttony is the greatest of all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every genus the cause is the most powerful. Now gluttony is apparently the cause of other sins, for a gloss on
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.135.10" target="asv">Ps. 135:10</a>, "Who smote Egypt with their first-born," says: "Lust, concupiscence, pride are the first-born of gluttony." Therefore gluttony
+                     is the greatest of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man should love himself in the first place after God, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q148_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A4.html">Q[25], A[4]</a>). Now man, by the vice of gluttony, inflicts an injury on himself: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.37.34" target="asv">Ecclus. 37:34</a>): "By surfeiting many have perished." Therefore gluttony is the greatest of sins, at least excepting those that are against
+                     God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The sins of the flesh, among which gluttony is reckoned, are less culpable according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The gravity of a sin may be measured in three ways. First and foremost it depends on the matter in which the sin is committed:
+                     and in this way sins committed in connection with Divine things are the greatest. From this point of view gluttony is not
+                     the greatest sin, for it is about matters connected with the nourishment of the body. Secondly, the gravity of a sin depends
+                     on the person who sins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony is diminished
+                     rather than aggravated, both on account of the necessity of taking food, and on account of the difficulty of proper discretion
+                     and moderation in such matters. Thirdly, from the point of view of the result that follows, and in this way gluttony has a
+                     certain gravity, inasmuch as certain sins are occasioned thereby.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These punishments are to be referred to the vices that resulted from gluttony, or to the root from which gluttony sprang,
+                     rather than to gluttony itself. For the first man was expelled from Paradise on account of pride, from which he went on to
+                     an act of gluttony: while the deluge and the punishment of the people of Sodom were inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection argues from the standpoint of the sins that result from gluttony. Nor is a cause necessarily more powerful,
+                     unless it be a direct cause: and gluttony is not the direct cause but the accidental cause, as it were, and the occasion of
+                     other vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The glutton intends, not the harm to his body, but the pleasure of eating: and if injury results to his body, this is accidental.
+                     Hence this does not directly affect the gravity of gluttony, the guilt of which is nevertheless aggravated, if a man incur
+                     some bodily injury through taking too much food.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q148_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q148_A4-p0.1">Whether the species of gluttony are fittingly distinguished?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the species of gluttony are unfittingly distinguished by Gregory who says (Moral. xxx, 18): "The vice of gluttony
+                     tempts us in five ways. Sometimes it forestalls the hour of need; sometimes it seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the
+                     food to be daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of refreshment by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the very
+                     heat of an immoderate appetite"---which are contained in the following verse:
+                     "Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p3"> For the above are distinguished according to diversity of circumstance. Now circumstances, being the accidents of an act,
+                     do not differentiate its species. Therefore the species of gluttony are not distinguished according to the aforesaid.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as time is a circumstance, so is place. If then gluttony admits of one species in respect of time, it seems that
+                     there should likewise be others in respect of place and other circumstances.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as temperance observes due circumstances, so do the other moral virtues. Now the species of the vices opposed
+                     to the other moral virtues are not distinguished according to various circumstances. Neither, therefore, are the species of
+                     gluttony distinguished thus.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Gregory quoted above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q148_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q148_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, gluttony denotes inordinate concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered in eating, namely the food we eat,
+                     and the eating thereof. Accordingly, the inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to the
+                     food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance or species of food a man seeks "sumptuous"---i.e. costly food; as regards
+                     its quality, he seeks food prepared too
+                     nicely---i.e. "daintily"; and as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating "too much."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p8"> Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper
+                     time for eating, which is to eat "hastily," or one fails to observe the due manner of eating, by eating "greedily."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p9"> Isidore [*De Summo Bon. ii, 42] comprises the first and second under one heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in
+                     "what" he eats, or in "how much," "how" or "when he eats."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The corruption of various circumstances causes the various species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by reason
+                     of which the species of moral things are differentiated. For in him that seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by
+                     the very species of the food; in him that forestalls the time concupiscence is disordered through impatience of delay, and
+                     so forth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Place and other circumstances include no special motive connected with eating, that can cause a different species of gluttony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In all other vices, whenever different circumstances correspond to different motives, the difference of circumstances argues
+                     a specific difference of vice: but this does not apply to all circumstances, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q148_A4-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A9.html">FS, Q[72], A[9]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q148_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q148_A5-p0.1">Whether gluttony is a capital vice?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that gluttony is not a capital vice. For capital vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause,
+                     other vices originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has not the aspect of end, since it is sought, not for its
+                     own sake, but for the body's nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a capital vice would seem to have a certain pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony, which,
+                     in respect of its genus, is apparently the least of sins, seeing that it is most akin to what is in respect of its genus,
+                     is apparently the least gluttony is not a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin results from a man forsaking the food of virtue on account of something useful to the present life, or pleasing
+                     to the senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of utility, there is but one capital vice, namely covetousness. Therefore,
+                     seemingly, there would be but one capital vice in respect of pleasures: and this is lust, which is a greater vice than gluttony,
+                     and is about greater pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons gluttony among the capital vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q148_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html">FS, Q[84], A[3]</a>), a capital vice denotes one from which, considered as final cause, i.e. as having a most desirable end, other vices originate:
+                     wherefore through desiring that end men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered most desirable through having
+                     one of the conditions of happiness which is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to happiness, according
+                     to Ethic. i, 8; x, 3,7,8.
+                     Therefore the vice of gluttony, being about pleasures of touch which stand foremost among other pleasures, is fittingly reckoned
+                     among the capital vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is true that food itself is directed to something as its end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of life, is most
+                     desirable and whereas life cannot be sustained without food, it follows that food too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all
+                     the toil of man's life is directed thereto, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.6.7" target="asv"> Eccles. 6:7, </a> "All the labor of man is for his mouth." Yet gluttony seems to be about pleasures of food rather than about food
+                     itself; wherefore, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), "with such food as is good for the worthless body, men desire
+                     to be fed," wherein namely the pleasure consists, "rather than to be filled: since the whole end of that desire is this---not
+                     to thirst and not to hunger."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the conversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the aversion.
+                     Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has the most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself: and consequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital vices,
+                     namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is useful is desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something
+                     else: wherefore seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of desirability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in
+                     respect of such things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q148_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q148_A6-p0.1">Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to gluttony?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to gluttony, to wit, "unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness, loquaciousness,
+                     and dullness of mind as regards the understanding." For unseemly joy results from every sin, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv"> Prov. 2:14, </a> "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things." Likewise dullness of mind is associated with
+                     every sin, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv"> Prov. 14:22, </a> "They err
+                     that work evil." Therefore they are unfittingly reckoned to be daughters of gluttony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result of gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.28.8" target="asv"> Is. 28:8, </a> "All tables were full of vomit and filth." But this seems to be not a sin but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is
+                     a matter of counsel, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.31.25" target="asv"> Ecclus. 31:25, </a> "If thou hast been forced to eat much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee." Therefore it should
+                     not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reckons scurrility as a daughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the
+                     daughters of gluttony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to gluttony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q148_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q148_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2,3), gluttony consists properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore those vices are reckoned among
+                     the daughters of gluttony, which are the results of eating and drinking immoderately. These may be accounted for either on
+                     the part of the soul or on the part of the body. on the part of the soul these results are of four kinds. First, as regards
+                     the reason, whose keenness is dulled by
+                     immoderate meat and drink, and in this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony, "dullness of sense in the understanding,"
+                     on account of the fumes of food disturbing the brain. Even so, on the other hand, abstinence conduces to the penetrating power
+                     of wisdom, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.2.3" target="asv"> Eccles. 2:3, </a> "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind in wisdom." Secondly, as regards the. appetite,
+                     which is disordered in many ways by immoderation in eating
+                     and drinking, as though reason were fast asleep at the helm, and in this respect "unseemly joy" is reckoned, because all the
+                     other inordinate passions are directed to joy or sorrow, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. To this we must refer the saying of 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p6.3" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Esdra 3:20, </a> that "wine . . . gives every one a confident and joyful mind." Thirdly, as regards inordinate words, and thus we have "loquaciousness,"
+                     because as Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), "unless gluttons were carried away by
+                     immoderate speech, that rich man who is stated to have feasted sumptuously every day would not have been so tortured in his
+                     tongue." Fourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in this way we have "scurrility," i.e. a kind of levity resulting from
+                     lack of reason, which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but also to restrain outward behavior. Hence a gloss on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.4" target="asv">Eph. 5:4</a>, "Or foolish talking or scurrility," says that "fools call this geniality---i.e. jocularity, because it is wont to raise
+                     a
+                     laugh." Both of these, however, may be referred to the words which may happen to be sinful, either by reason of excess which
+                     belongs to "loquaciousness," or by reason of unbecomingness, which belongs to "scurrility."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p7"> On the part of the body, mention is made of "uncleanness," which may refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind
+                     of superfluities, or especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q148_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.3" target="asv"> Eph. 5:3, </a> "But fornication and all uncleanness," says: "That is, any kind of incontinence that has reference to lust."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Joy in the act or end of sin results from every sin, especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random riotous
+                     joy which is described as "unseemly" arises chiefly from immoderate partaking of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that
+                     dullness of sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin, whereas dullness of sense in speculative matters arises
+                     chiefly from gluttony, for the reason given above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it does one good to vomit after eating too much, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by immoderate
+                     meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting as a remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and not from the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may be
+                     referred to either vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q148_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q147_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q149" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q149-p0.1">OF SOBRIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q149-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q149-p2"> We must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q149-p3"> (1) What is the matter of sobriety?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q149-p4"> (2) Whether it is a special virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q149-p5"> (3) Whether the use of wine is lawful?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q149-p6"> (4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q149_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q149_A1-p0.1">Whether drink is the matter of sobriety?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that drink is not the matter proper to sobriety. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.3" target="asv">Rom. 12:3</a>): "Not to be more wise than it behooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety." Therefore sobriety is also about wisdom,
+                     and not only about drink.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concerning the wisdom of God, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>) that "she teacheth sobriety [Douay: 'temperance'], and prudence, and justice, and fortitude," where sobriety stands for
+                     temperance. Now temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and sexual matters. Therefore sobriety is not only
+                     about drink.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sobriety would seem to take its name from "measure" [*'Bria,' a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini's
+                     Lexicon]. Now we ought to be guided by the measure in all things appertaining to us: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.2.12" target="asv">Titus 2:12</a>): "We should live soberly and justly and godly," where a gloss remarks: "Soberly, in ourselves"; and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.9" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:9</a>): "Women . . . in decent apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and
+                     sobriety." Consequently it would seem that sobriety regards not only the interior man, but also things appertaining to external
+                     apparel. Therefore drink is not the matter proper to sobriety.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.31.32" target="asv">Ecclus. 31:32</a>): "Wine taken with sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou shalt be sober."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> When a virtue is denominated from some condition common to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that in which
+                     it is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that condition of virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and
+                     temperance about pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from "measure," for a man is said to be sober because he
+                     observes the "bria," i.e. the measure. Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to that
+                     matter wherein /the observance of the measure is most deserving of praise. Such matter is the drinking of intoxicants, because
+                     the measured use thereof is most profitable, while immoderate excess therein is most harmful, since it hinders the use of
+                     reason even more than excessive eating. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.31.37" target="asv">Ecclus. 31:37,38</a>): "Sober drinking is health to soul and body; wine drunken with excess raiseth quarrels, and wrath and many ruins." For this
+                     reason sobriety is
+                     especially concerned with drink, not any kind of drink, but that which by reason of its volatility is liable to disturb the
+                     brain, such as wine and all intoxicants. Nevertheless, sobriety may be employed in a general sense so as to apply to any matter,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q149_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q123_A2.html">Q[123], A[2]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q149_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A2.html"> Q[141], A[2]</a>) with regard to fortitude and temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to his body, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is
+                     said to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its delight, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.22.5" target="asv"> Ps. 22:5, </a> "My chalice which inebriateth me, how goodly is it!" Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in speaking of the contemplation
+                     of wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All the things that belong properly to temperance are necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful. Wherefore
+                     it behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This is the business of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used
+                     to designate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially
+                     concerned with drink.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although a measure is needful in all things, sobriety is not properly employed in connection with all things, but only in
+                     those wherein there is most need for a measure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q149_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q149_A2-p0.1">Whether sobriety is by itself a special virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now
+                     there is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety, which is about drink, a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of touch as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to
+                     make food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment. Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not
+                     a. special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment, drink is distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats
+                     and of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue, seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding
+                     to each different kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it would seem that sobriety is not a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius [*In Somno Scip. i, 8] reckons sobriety to be a special part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q149_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q146_A2.html">Q[146], A[2]</a>), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against those things which may hinder it. Hence wherever we
+                     find a special hindrance to reason, there must needs be a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating drink is a special
+                     kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch as it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to remove this
+                     hindrance to reason a special virtue,
+                     which is sobriety, is requisite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Meat and drink are alike capable of hindering the good of reason, by embroiling the reason with immoderate pleasure: and
+                     in this respect abstinence is about both meat and drink alike. But intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated
+                     above, wherefore it requires a special virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The virtue of abstinence is about meat and drink, considered, not as food but as a hindrance to reason. Hence it does not
+                     follow that special kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds of food.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In all intoxicating drinks there is one kind of hindrance to the use of reason: so that the difference of drinks bears an
+                     accidental relation to virtue. Hence this difference does not call for a difference of virtue. The same applies to the difference
+                     of meats.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q149_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q149_A3-p0.1">Whether the use of wine is altogether unlawful?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the use of wine is altogether unlawful. For without wisdom, a man cannot be in the state of salvation:
+                     since it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.28" target="asv">Wis. 7:28</a>): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom," and further on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.19" target="asv">Wis. 9:19</a>): "By wisdom they were healed, whosoever have pleased Thee, O Lord, from the beginning." Now the use of wine is a hindrance
+                     to wisdom, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A3-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Eccl.2.3" target="asv">Eccles. 2:3</a>):
+                     "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom." Therefore wine-drinking is altogether
+                     unlawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.21" target="asv">Rom. 14:21</a>): "It is good not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is offended or scandalized, or made
+                     weak." Now it is sinful to forsake the good of virtue, as likewise to scandalize one's brethren. Therefore it is unlawful
+                     to make use of wine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i] that "after the deluge wine and flesh were sanctioned: but Christ came in the last
+                     of the ages and brought back the end into line with the beginning." Therefore it seems unlawful to use wine under the Christian
+                     law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.23" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:23</a>): "Do not still drink water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake, and thy frequent infirmities"; and it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.31.36" target="asv">Ecclus. 31:36</a>): "Wine drunken with moderation is the joy of the soul and the heart."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> No meat or drink, considered in itself, is unlawful, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.11" target="asv"> Mat. 15:11, </a> "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man." Wherefore it is not unlawful to drink wine as such. Yet it may become
+                     unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a circumstance on the part of the drinker, either because he is easily the
+                     worse for taking wine, or because he is bound by a vow not to drink wine: sometimes it results from the mode of
+                     drinking, because to wit he exceeds the measure in drinking: and sometimes it is on account of others who would be scandalized
+                     thereby.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man may have wisdom in two ways. First, in a general way, according as it is sufficient for salvation: and in this way
+                     it is required, in order to have wisdom, not that a man abstain altogether from wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate
+                     use. Secondly, a man may have wisdom in some degree of perfection: and in this way, in order to receive wisdom perfectly,
+                     it is requisite for certain persons that they abstain altogether from wine, and this
+                     depends on circumstances of certain persons and places.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Apostle does not declare simply that it is good to abstain from wine, but that it is good in the case where this would
+                     give scandal to certain people.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ withdraws us from some things as being altogether unlawful, and from others as being obstacles to perfection. It is
+                     in the latter way that he withdraws some from the use of wine, that they may aim at perfection, even as from riches and the
+                     like.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q149_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q149_A4-p0.1">Whether sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing. For old age gives a man a certain standing;
+                     wherefore honor and reverence are due to the old, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.32" target="asv"> Lev. 19:32, </a> "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man." Now the Apostle declares that old men especially should
+                     be exhorted to sobriety, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Titus.2.2" target="asv"> Titus 2:2, </a> "That the aged man be sober." Therefore sobriety
+                     is most requisite in persons of standing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a bishop has the highest degree in the Church: and the Apostle commands him to be sober, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.3.2" target="asv">1 Tim. 3:2, </a> "It behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless, the husband of one wife, sober, prudent," etc. Therefore sobriety is chiefly
+                     required in persons of high standing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sobriety denotes abstinence from wine. Now wine is forbidden to kings, who hold the highest place in human affairs:
+                     while it is allowed to those who are in a state of affliction, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.31.4" target="asv">Prov. 31:4</a>, "Give not wine to kings," and further on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.31.6" target="asv">Prov. 31:6</a>), "Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to them that are grieved in mind." Therefore sobriety is more requisite
+                     in persons of standing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.3.11" target="asv">1 Tim. 3:11</a>): "The women in like manner, chaste . . . sober," etc., and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q149_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Titus.2.6" target="asv">Titus 2:6</a>) "Young men in like manner exhort that they be sober."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue includes relationship to two things, to the contrary vices which it removes, and to the end to which it leads. Accordingly
+                     a particular virtue is more requisite in certain persons for two reasons. First, because they are more prone to the concupiscences
+                     which need to be restrained by virtue, and to the vices which are removed by virtue. In this respect, sobriety is most requisite
+                     in the young and in women, because concupiscence of pleasure thrives in
+                     the young on account of the heat of youth, while in women there is not sufficient strength of mind to resist concupiscence.
+                     Hence, according to Valerius Maximus [*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1] among the ancient Romans women drank no wine. Secondly, sobriety
+                     is more requisite in certain persons, as being more necessary for the operations proper to them. Now immoderate use of wine
+                     is a notable obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore sobriety is specially prescribed to the old, in whom reason should
+                     be vigorous in instructing others: to bishops and all ministers of the Church, who should fulfil their spiritual duties with
+                     a devout mind; and to kings, who should rule their subjects with wisdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p7"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q149_A4-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q148_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q150" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q150-p0.1">OF DRUNKENNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q150-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q150-p2"> We must now consider drunkenness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q150-p3"> (1) Whether drunkenness is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q150-p4"> (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q150-p5"> (3) Whether it is the most grievous sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q150-p6"> (4) Whether it excuses from sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q150-p7"></p>
+               <div id="SS_Q150_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q150_A1-p0.1">Whether drunkenness is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that drunkenness is not a sin. For every sin has a corresponding contrary sin, thus timidity is opposed to
+                     daring, and presumption to pusillanimity. But no sin is opposed to drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is voluntary [*Augustine, De Vera Relig. xiv]. But no man wishes to be drunk, since no man wishes to be
+                     deprived of the use of reason. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever causes another to sin, sins himself. Therefore, if drunkenness were a sin, it would follow that it is a
+                     sin to ask a man to drink that which makes him drunk, which would seem very hard.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every sin calls for correction. But correction is not applied to drunkards: for Gregory [*Cf. Canon Denique, dist.
+                     4 where Gratian refers to a letter of St. Gregory to St. Augustine of Canterbury] says that "we must forbear with their ways,
+                     lest they become worse if they be compelled to give up the habit." Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q150_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.13" target="asv">Rom. 13:13</a>): "Not in rioting and drunkenness."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Drunkenness may be understood in two ways. First, it may signify the defect itself of a man resulting from his drinking much
+                     wine, the consequence being that he loses the use of reason. In this sense drunkenness denotes not a sin, but a penal defect
+                     resulting from a fault. Secondly, drunkenness may denote the act by which a man incurs this defect. This act may cause drunkenness
+                     in two ways. In one way, through the wine being too strong, without the drinker
+                     being cognizant of this: and in this way too, drunkenness may occur without sin, especially if it is not through his negligence,
+                     and thus we believe that Noah was made drunk as related in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q150_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.9" target="asv">Gn. 9</a>. In another way drunkenness may result from inordinate concupiscence and use of wine: in this way it is accounted a sin,
+                     and is comprised under gluttony as a species under its genus. For gluttony is divided into "surfeiting [Douay:,'rioting']
+                     and drunkenness," which are forbidden by the Apostle
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q150_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.13" target="asv">Rom. 13:13</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11), insensibility which is opposed to temperance "is not very common," so that like
+                     its species which are opposed to the species of intemperance it has no name. Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed;
+                     and yet if a man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of molesting nature grievously, he would not be free from
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection regards the resulting defect which is involuntary: whereas immoderate use of wine is voluntary, and it is
+                     in this that the sin consists.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even as he that is drunk is excused if he knows not the strength of the wine, so too is he that invites another to drink
+                     excused from sin, if he be unaware that the drinker is the kind of person to be made drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance
+                     be lacking neither is excused from sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes the correction of a sinner is to be foregone, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q150_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A6.html">Q[33], A[6]</a>). Hence Augustine says in a letter (Ad Aurel. Episc. Ep. xxii), "Meseems, such things are cured not by bitterness, severity,
+                     harshness, but by teaching rather than commanding, by advice rather than threats. Such is the course to be followed with the
+                     majority of sinners: few are they whose sins should be treated with severity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q150_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q150_A2-p0.1">Whether drunkenness is a mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that drunkenness is not a mortal sin. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the Appendix
+                     to St. Augustine's works] that "drunkenness if indulged in assiduously, is a mortal sin." Now assiduity denotes a circumstance
+                     which does not change the species of a sin; so that it cannot aggravate a sin infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial
+                     sin, as shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q150_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A5.html">FS, Q[88], A[5]</a>). Therefore if drunkenness
+                     /is not a mortal sin for some other reason, neither is it for this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to St. Augustine's works]: "Whenever a man takes more meat and drink
+                     than is necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins." Now the lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness,
+                     which is caused by immoderate drink, is a venial sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no mortal sin should be committed on the score of medicine. Now some drink too much at the advice of the physician,
+                     that they may be purged by vomiting; and from this excessive drink drunkenness ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> We read in the Canons of the apostles (Can. xli, xlii): "A bishop, priest or deacon who is given to drunkenness or gambling,
+                     or incites others thereto, must either cease or be deposed; a subdeacon, reader or precentor who does these things must either
+                     give them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the laity." Now such punishments are not inflicted save for mortal
+                     sins. Therefore drunkenness is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The sin of drunkenness, as stated in the foregoing Article, consists in the immoderate use and concupiscence of wine. Now
+                     this may happen to a man in three ways. First, so that he knows not the drink to be immoderate and intoxicating: and then
+                     drunkenness may be without sin, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q150_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q150_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Secondly, so that he perceives the drink to be immoderate, but without knowing it to be intoxicating, and then drunkenness
+                     may involve a
+                     venial sin. Thirdly, it may happen that a man is well aware that the drink is immoderate and intoxicating, and yet he would
+                     rather be drunk than abstain from drink. Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, because morals take their species not
+                     from things that occur accidentally and beside the intention, but from that which is directly intended. In this way drunkenness
+                     is a mortal sin, because then a man willingly and knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs
+                     virtuous deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally by running the risk of falling into sin. For Ambrose says (De Patriarch.
+                     [*De Abraham i.]): "We learn that we should shun drunkenness, which prevents us from avoiding grievous sins. For the things
+                     we avoid when sober, we unknowingly commit through drunkenness." Therefore drunkenness, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Assiduity makes drunkenness a mortal sin, not on account of the mere repetition of the act, but because it is impossible
+                     for a man to become drunk assiduously, without exposing himself to drunkenness knowingly and willingly, since he has many
+                     times experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to drunkenness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To take more meat or drink than is necessary belongs to the vice of gluttony, which is not always a mortal sin: but knowingly
+                     to take too much drink to the point of being drunk, is a mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): "Drunkenness is
+                     far from me: Thou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me. But full feeding sometimes hath crept upon Thy servant."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q150_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A6.html">Q[141], A[6]</a>), meat and drink should be moderate in accordance with the demands of the body's health. Wherefore, just as it happens sometimes
+                     that the meat and drink which are moderate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so too it may happen conversely,
+                     that what is excessive for a healthy man is moderate for one that is ailing. In this way when a man eats or drinks much at
+                     the physician's advice
+                     in order to provoke vomiting, he is not to be deemed to have taken excessive meat or drink. There is, however, no need for
+                     intoxicating drink in order to procure vomiting, since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: wherefore this is no sufficient
+                     cause for excusing a man from drunkenness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q150_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q150_A3-p0.1">Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that drunkenness is the gravest of sins. For Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Matth.) that "nothing gains the
+                     devil's favor so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the vices." And it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv,
+                     can. Ante omnia): "Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by the clergy, for it foments and fosters all the
+                     vices."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, from the very fact that a thing excludes the good of reason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of drunkenness.
+                     Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of its punishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely;
+                     for Ambrose says [*De Elia et de Jejunio v] that "there would be no slavery, were there no drunkards." Therefore drunkenness
+                     is the greatest of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), spiritual vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one of the carnal
+                     vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to be evil because it removes a good. Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver the evil.
+                     Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a human good. Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are graver
+                     than the sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the good of human reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man is most prone to sins of intemperance, because such like concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us, and for this
+                     reason these sins are said to find greatest favor with the devil, not for being graver than other sins, but because they occur
+                     more frequently among men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in one way by that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which takes
+                     away the use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has more the character of an evil, than that which takes away
+                     the use of reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas
+                     the goods of virtue, which are taken away by things that are contrary to reason,
+                     are always good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Drunkenness was the occasional cause of slavery, in so far as Cham brought the curse of slavery on to his descendants, for
+                     having laughed at his father when the latter was made drunk. But slavery was not the direct punishment of drunkenness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q150_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q150_A4-p0.1">Whether drunkenness excuses from sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that drunkenness does not excuse from sin. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "the drunkard deserves
+                     double punishment." Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of excusing from it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one sin does not excuse another, but increases it. Now drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is not an excuse for sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that just as man's reason is tied by drunkenness, so is it by concupiscence.
+                     But concupiscence is not an excuse for sin: neither therefore is drunkenness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 43), Lot was to be excused from incest on account of drunkenness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things are to be observed in drunkenness, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q150_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q150_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, namely the resulting defect and the preceding act. on the part of the resulting defect whereby the use of reason is fettered,
+                     drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, in so far as it causes an act to be involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of
+                     the preceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because, if the drunkenness that results from that act be
+                     without sin, the subsequent sin is entirely excused from fault, as perhaps in the case of Lot. If, however, the preceding
+                     act was sinful, the person is not altogether excused from the subsequent sin, because the latter is rendered voluntary through
+                     the voluntariness of the preceding act, inasmuch as it was through doing something unlawful that he fell into the subsequent
+                     sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is diminished, even as the character of voluntariness is diminished. Wherefore Augustine
+                     says (Contra Faust. xxii, 44) that "Lot's guilt is to be measured, not by the incest, but by his drunkenness."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher does not say that the drunkard deserves more severe punishment, but that he deserves double punishment for
+                     his twofold sin. Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the law of a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii,
+                     9, ordered "those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely punished than if they had been sober, because they do
+                     wrong in more ways than one." In this, as Aristotle observes (Polit. ii, 9), "he seems
+                     to have considered the advantage," namely of the prevention of wrong, "rather than the leniency which one should have for
+                     drunkards," seeing that they are not in possession of their faculties.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, not in the point of its being itself a sin, but in the point of the defect that results
+                     from it, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Concupiscence does not altogether fetter the reason, as drunkenness does, unless perchance it be so vehement as to make a
+                     man insane. Yet the passion of concupiscence diminishes sin, because it is less grievous to sin through weakness than through
+                     malice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q150_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q149_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q151" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q151-p0.1">OF CHASTITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q151-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q151-p2"> We must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of chastity: (2) virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust,
+                  which is the contrary vice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q151-p3"> (1) Whether chastity is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q151-p4"> (2) Whether it is a general virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q151-p5"> (3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q151-p6"> (4) Of its relation to purity.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q151_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q151_A1-p0.1">Whether chastity is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that chastity is not a virtue. For here we are treating of virtues of the soul. But chastity, seemingly, belongs
+                     to the body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in a certain way as regards the use of certain parts of
+                     the body. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is "a voluntary habit," as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can
+                     be taken away by force from a woman to whom violence is done. Therefore it seems that chastity is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But chastity is reckoned among the fruits (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q151_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.23" target="asv">Gal. 5:23</a>). Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Decem Chord. [*Serm. ix de Tempore]): "Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in virtue, since chastity
+                     is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of lust, while thou wishest thy wife to be victorious."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason "chastises" concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the Philosopher
+                     states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q151_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html">FS, Q[64], A[1]</a>). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its subject, though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity that
+                     a man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the judgment of his reason and the choice of his will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), "so long as her mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy even
+                     in body, not even the violence of another's lust can deprive her body of its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering
+                     continency." He also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "in the mind there is a virtue which is the companion of fortitude, whereby
+                     it is resolved to suffer any evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "it is impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is it possible
+                     to be just unless one live by faith." Whence he argues that in unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other virtue,
+                     because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as he adds (Contra Julian. iv, 3) "virtues are distinguished from
+                     vices not by their functions," i.e. their acts, "but by their ends."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Chastity is a virtue in so far as it works in accordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it is reckoned
+                     among the fruits.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q151_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q151_A2-p0.1">Whether chastity is a general virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that chastity is a general virtue. For Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that "chastity of the mind is the well-ordered
+                     movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to the greater things." But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore chastity
+                     is a general virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Chastity" takes its name from "chastisement" [*Cf. A[1] ]. Now every movement of the appetitive part should be
+                     chastised by reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some movement of the appetite, it seems that every moral virtue
+                     is chastity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, chastity is opposed to fornication. But fornication seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q151_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.27" target="asv">Ps. 72:27</a>): "Thou shalt destroy [Vulg.: 'hast destroyed'] all them that go awhoring from [Douay: 'are disloyal to'] Thee." Therefore
+                     chastity is a general virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons it to be a part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The word "chastity" is employed in two ways. First, properly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter, namely
+                     the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures. Secondly, the word "chastity" is employed metaphorically: for just as a
+                     mingling of bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper matter of chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so
+                     too the spiritual union of the mind with certain things conduces to a pleasure which is the
+                     matter of a spiritual chastity metaphorically speaking, as well as of a spiritual fornication likewise metaphorically so called.
+                     For if the human mind delight in the spiritual union with that to which it behooves it to be united, namely God, and refrains
+                     from delighting in union with other things against the requirements of the order established by God, this may be called a
+                     spiritual chastity, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q151_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.11.2" target="asv">2 Cor. 11:2, </a> "I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present
+                     you as a chaste virgin to Christ." If, on the other hand, the mind be united to any other things whatsoever, against the prescription
+                     of the Divine order, it will be called spiritual fornication, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q151_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.3.1" target="asv">Jer. 3:1</a>, "But thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers." Taking chastity in this sense, it is a general virtue, because every
+                     virtue withdraws the human mind from delighting in a union with unlawful things. Nevertheless, the essence of this chastity
+                     consists principally in charity and
+                     the other theological virtues, whereby the human mind is united to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes chastity in the metaphorical sense.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q151_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q151_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[142], A[2]), the concupiscence of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a child, because the desire of pleasure
+                     is connatural to us, especially of pleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of nature. Hence it is that if
+                     the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered by consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a child left
+                     to his own will. Wherefore the
+                     concupiscence of these pleasures stands in very great need of being chastised: and consequently chastity is applied antonomastically
+                     to such like concupiscences, even as fortitude is about those matters wherein we stand in the greatest need of strength of
+                     mind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers spiritual fornication metaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity, as stated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q151_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q151_A3-p0.1">Whether chastity is a distinct virtue from abstinence?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same, one
+                     virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the same sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of
+                     the palate which are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are the matter of chastity, pertain to the touch,
+                     it seems that chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices of intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now "chastity"
+                     takes its name from "chastisement" of the contrary vices. Since then certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that
+                     abstinence is chastity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern of temperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which
+                     are the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures,
+                     which are the matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. cxlvii ad Amand. Cf. Gratian, Dist. xliv.], commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q151_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.1.7" target="asv"> Titus 1:7, </a> "Not given to wine, no striker," etc.: "The belly and
+                     the organs of generation are neighbors, that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their complicity in vice." Therefore
+                     abstinence and chastity are not distinct virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q151_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:5,6</a>) reckons "chastity" together with "fastings" which pertain to abstinence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q151_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">Q[141], A[4]</a>), temperance is properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that where there are different kinds of pleasure,
+                     there are different virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate to the actions whose perfections they
+                     are, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4,5: and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food whereby the nature of the
+                     individual is maintained
+                     differ generically from actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the nature of the species is preserved.
+                     Therefore chastity, which is about venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which is about pleasures of the
+                     palate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch, not as regards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of touch. which
+                     judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but as regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in
+                     Ethic. iii, 10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in character. Wherefore there must needs be different
+                     virtues, though they regard the one sense.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and therefore
+                     they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, since if one consent to them this increases the force of concupiscence
+                     and weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly
+                     mind from its heights as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts
+                     which belong to the married state."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain to the maintenance of man's nature, except in so far as they are directed
+                     to pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But
+                     the pleasures of the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal pleasures, are essentially directed to the preservation
+                     of man's life: wherefore by their very nature they have a special virtue, although this
+                     virtue which is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as its end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q151_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q151_A4-p0.1">Whether purity belongs especially to chastity?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that purity does not belong especially to chastity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity is
+                     a virtue of the soul." Therefore it is not something belonging to chastity, but is of itself a virtue distinct from chastity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "pudicitia" [purity] is derived from "pudor," which is equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene [*De
+                     Fide Orth. ii, 15], is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to all sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to
+                     chastity than to the other virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "every kind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach." Now it would
+                     seem to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach. Therefore purity belongs to all the parts of temperance,
+                     and not especially to chastity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Perseverantia xx): "We must give praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none but a
+                     lawful use the organs intended for procreation." Now the use of these organs is the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity
+                     belongs properly to chastity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (OBJ[2]), "pudicitia" [purity] takes its name from "pudor," which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs
+                     be properly about the things of which man is most ashamed. Now men are most ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks
+                     (De Civ. Dei xiv, 18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by the honesty [*Cf. Q[145]] of marriage, is
+                     not devoid of shame: and this because the movement of the organs of generation is not
+                     subject to the command of reason, as are the movements of the other external members. Now man is ashamed not only of this
+                     sexual union but also of all the signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6). Consequently purity regards venereal
+                     matters properly, and especially the signs thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And since the latter are more
+                     wont to be observed, purity regards rather these external signs, while chastity regards rather sexual union. Therefore
+                     purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct therefrom, but as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Nevertheless
+                     the one is sometimes used to designate the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is here speaking of purity as designating chastity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although every vice has a certain disgrace, the vices of intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q151_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q142_A4.html">Q[142], A[4]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q151_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Among the vices of intemperance, venereal sins are most deserving of reproach, both on account of the insubordination of
+                     the genital organs, and because by these sins especially, the reason is absorbed.
+                  </p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q150_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q152" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q152-p0.1">OF VIRGINITY (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q152-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q152-p2"> We must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q152-p3"> (1) In what does virginity consist?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q152-p4"> (2) Whether it is lawful?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q152-p5"> (3) Whether it is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q152-p6"> (4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q152-p7"> (5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q152_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q152_A1-p0.1">Whether virginity consists in integrity of the flesh?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virginity does not consist in integrity of the flesh. For Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup.) [*The quotation
+                     is from De Sancta Virgin. xiii] that "virginity is the continual meditation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh." But meditation
+                     does not concern the flesh. Therefore virginity is not situated in the flesh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virginity denotes a kind of purity. Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity dwells in the soul." Therefore
+                     virginity is not incorruption of the flesh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the integrity of the flesh would seem to consist in the seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken
+                     without loss of virginity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "those organs may be injured through being wounded
+                     by mischance. Physicians, too, sometimes do for the sake of health that which makes one shudder to see: and a midwife has
+                     been known to destroy by touch the proof of virginity that she sought." And he adds: "Nobody, I
+                     think, would be so foolish as to deem this maiden to have forfeited even bodily sanctity, though she lost the integrity of
+                     that organ." Therefore virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in resolution of the semen: and this may take place without copulation,
+                     whether one be asleep or awake. Yet seemingly virginity is not lost without copulation: for Augustine says (De Virgin. xiii)
+                     that "virginal integrity and holy continency that refrains from all sexual intercourse is the portion of angels." Therefore
+                     virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "virginity is continence whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and observed
+                     in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Virginity takes its name apparently from "viror" [freshness], and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining its
+                     freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so too, virginity denotes that the person possessed thereof is
+                     unseared by the heat of concupiscence which is experienced in achieving the greatest bodily pleasure which is that of sexual
+                     intercourse. Hence, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 5) that "virginal chastity is integrity free
+                     of pollution."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p8"> Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The first is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of
+                     the seal of virginity. The second is the link between that which concerns the soul and that which concerns the body, and this
+                     is the resolution of the semen, causing sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the part of the soul, namely the purpose
+                     of attaining this pleasure. Of these three the first is accidental to the moral act, which as such must be
+                     considered in reference to the soul. The second stands in the relation of matter to the moral act, since the sensible passions
+                     are the matters of moral acts. But the third stands in the position of form and complement, because the essence of morality
+                     is perfected in that which concerns the reason. Since then virginity consists in freedom from the aforesaid corruption, it
+                     follows that the integrity of the bodily organ is accidental to virginity; while freedom from pleasure in resolution of the
+                     semen is related thereto materially; and the purpose of perpetually abstaining from this pleasure is the formal and completive
+                     element in virginity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This definition of Augustine's expresses directly that which is formal in virginity. For "meditation" denotes reason's purpose;
+                     and the addition "perpetual" does not imply that a virgin must always retain this meditation actually, but that she should
+                     bear in mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The material element is expressed indirectly by the words "on incorruption
+                     in a corruptible body." This is added to show the difficulty of
+                     virginity: for if the flesh were incorruptible, it would not be difficult to maintain a perpetual meditation on incorruption.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is true that purity, as to its essence, is in the soul; but as to its matter, it is in the body: and it is the same with
+                     virginity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "although virginity resides in the flesh," and for this reason
+                     is a bodily quality, "yet it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency fosters and preserves."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above, the integrity of a bodily organ is accidental to virginity, in so far as a person, through purposely abstaining
+                     from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily organ. Hence if the organ lose its integrity by chance in some other
+                     way, this is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of a hand or foot.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may arise in two ways. If this be the result of the mind's purpose, it destroys
+                     virginity, whether copulation takes place or not. Augustine, however, mentions copulation, because such like resolution is
+                     the ordinary and natural result thereof. In another way this may happen beside the purpose of the mind, either during sleep,
+                     or through violence and without the mind's consent, although the flesh derives
+                     pleasure from it, or again through weakness of nature, as in the case of those who are subject to a flow of semen. In such
+                     cases virginity is not forfeit, because such like pollution is not the result of impurity which excludes virginity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q152_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q152_A2-p0.1">Whether virginity is unlawful?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just
+                     as the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.16" target="asv"> Gn. 2:16, </a> "Of every tree" that is in "paradise, thou shalt eat," indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation
+                     of the individual, so also the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.28" target="asv"> Gn. 1:28, </a> "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth," express a precept of the natural law, in reference to
+                     the preservation of the species. Therefore just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food, as this would be to act counter
+                     to the good of the individual, so too it is a sin to abstain altogether from the act of procreation, for this is to act against
+                     the good of the species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is apparently sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue,
+                     since it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2), that "he who revels in every pleasure,
+                     and abstains from not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from all is loutish and insensible." Therefore virginity
+                     is something sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in olden times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius
+                     Maximus asserts [*Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9]. Hence according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) Plato "is said to have sacrificed
+                     to nature, in order that he might atone for his perpetual continency as though it were a sin." Therefore virginity is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But virginity is a matter of direct counsel: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.25" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:25</a>): "Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel." Therefore virginity is not an unlawful thing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In human acts, those are sinful which are against right reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an end
+                     should be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again, man's good is threefold as stated in Ethic. i, 8; one consisting
+                     in external things, for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily goods; the third, consisting in the goods of the soul
+                     among which the goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the
+                     active life, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our Lord declared (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.42" target="asv">Lk. 10:42</a>), "Mary hath chosen the better part." Of these goods those that are external are directed to those which belong to the body,
+                     and those which belong to the body are directed to those which belong to the soul; and furthermore those which belong to the
+                     active life are directed to those which belong to the life of contemplation. Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use
+                     external goods in a measure
+                     proportionate to the body, and in like manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from possessing certain things
+                     (which otherwise it were good for him to possess), for the sake of his body's good, or of the contemplation of truth, this
+                     is not sinful, but in accord /with right reason. In like manner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more freely
+                     to give himself to the contemplation of truth, this is in accordance with the rectitude of reason. Now holy virginity refrains
+                     from all venereal pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine contemplation: for the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.34" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:34</a>): "The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may be holy in both body and in spirit.
+                     But she that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband." Therefore it follows that virginity
+                     instead of being sinful is worthy of praise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A precept implies a duty, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q152_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q122_A1.html">Q[122], A[1]</a>). Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the duty that has to be fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind cannot
+                     be set aside without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is
+                     not binding on each one of the multitude. For the multitude has many obligations which cannot be discharged by the individual;
+                     but are fulfilled by one person doing this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of natural law which binds man
+                     to eat must needs be fulfilled by each individual, otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the precept
+                     of procreation regards the whole multitude of men, which needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance spiritually.
+                     Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human multitude, if some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while
+                     others abstaining from this betake themselves to the contemplation of Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole
+                     human race. Thus too in an army, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and others fight with the sword: yet
+                     all these things are necessary for the multitude, although they cannot be done by one person.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The person who, beside the dictate of right reason, abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for pleasure
+                     as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal:
+                     and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated above. Now the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to
+                     quantity but to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore it is said
+                     of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that "in point of quantity he goes to the extreme, but in point of becomingness he follows
+                     the mean."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Laws are framed according to what occurs more frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone refrained from
+                     all venereal pleasure through love of the contemplation of truth: as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence it was not
+                     through thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, but "because he yielded to the false opinion of his fellow countrymen,"
+                     as Augustine remarks (De Vera Relig. iii).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q152_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q152_A3-p0.1">Whether virginity is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For "no virtue is in us by nature," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1).
+                     Now virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q152_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">FS, Q[65], A[1]</a>). Yet some have other virtues without having virginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom without virtue, no
+                     one could go there without virginity, which would involve the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But virginity is not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. xxii
+                     ad Eustoch.]: "Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the virgin after her downfall." Therefore seemingly virginity
+                     is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is lost without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not
+                     a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and conjugal purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity
+                     is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): "Love of virginity moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we
+                     should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q152_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q152_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the formal and completive element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal pleasure, which purpose is rendered
+                     praiseworthy by its end, in so far, to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine things: while the material
+                     element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest that where
+                     a good action has a special matter
+                     through having a special excellence, there is a special kind of virtue: for example, magnificence which is about great expenditure
+                     is for this reason a special virtue distinct from liberality, which is about all uses of money in general. Now to keep oneself
+                     free from the experience of venereal pleasure has an excellence of its own deserving of greater praise than keeping oneself
+                     free from inordinate venereal pleasure. Wherefore virginity is a special virtue being related to chastity as
+                     magnificence to liberality.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Men have from their birth that which is material in virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal experience.
+                     But they have not that which is formal in virginity, namely the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God's sake, which
+                     purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin. xi): "Nor do we praise virgins for being
+                     virgins, but, because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy
+                     continency."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtues are connected together by reason of that which is formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q152_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A3.html">Q[129], A[3]</a>, ad 2), but not by reason of that which is material in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from providing the matter
+                     of one virtue, and not the matter of another virtue: thus a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of magnificence.
+                     It is in this way that one who
+                     has the other virtues lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the flesh: nevertheless he can have
+                     that which is formal in virginity, his mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding this same integrity
+                     of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so: even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the purpose
+                     of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a position to do so: or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in mind
+                     as to
+                     purpose bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which preparedness of the mind no man can be virtuous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards that which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material therein.
+                     For if a magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he does not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner
+                     a person who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of virginity but the purpose of virginity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p12"> As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ,
+                     which we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something else which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit,
+                     that one who has experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that experience. For God cannot make that which is done
+                     not to have been done, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q152_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A4.html">FP, Q[25] , A[4]</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose, confirmed by vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says (De Virgin.
+                     viii) that "by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and
+                     flesh." Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely because it abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence attaches
+                     to it above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however, adds something to chastity in general; but it does not attain
+                     to that which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire freedom from venereal pleasure; virginity alone achieves this. Wherefore
+                     virginity alone is accounted a virtue above chastity, even as magnificence is
+                     reckoned above liberality.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A3-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q152_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q152_A4-p0.1">Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than marriage. For Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): "Continence was
+                     equally meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who begot children." Now a greater virtue has greater merit.
+                     Therefore virginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his virtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence,
+                     it would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than any married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity
+                     is not preferable to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the common good takes precedence of the private good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is
+                     directed to the common good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is to a man's wellbeing, such is sexual
+                     intercourse to the welfare of the human race." On the other hand, virginity is ordered to the individual good, namely in order
+                     to avoid what the Apostle calls the "tribulation of the flesh," to which married people are
+                     subject (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:28</a>). Therefore virginity is not greater than conjugal continence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): "Both solid reason and the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage sinful,
+                     nor is it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or even to that of widowhood."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the error of Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to marriage.
+                     This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ Who both chose a virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a virgin,
+                     and by the teaching of the Apostle who (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 7</a>) counsels virginity as the greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both because a Divine good takes precedence of a human
+                     good, and because the good of the
+                     soul is preferable to the good of the body, and again because the good of the contemplative life is better than that of the
+                     active life. Now virginity is directed to the good of the soul in respect of the contemplative life, which consists in thinking
+                     "on the things of God" [Vulg.: 'the Lord'], whereas marriage is directed to the good of the body, namely the bodily increase
+                     of the human race, and belongs to the active life, since the man and woman who embrace the married life have to think "on
+                     the things of the world," as the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.34" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:34</a>). Without doubt therefore virginity is preferable to conjugal continence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Merit is measured not only by the kind of action, but still more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so disposed,
+                     that he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in keeping with the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal
+                     continence was equally meritorious with the virginal continence of John, as regards the essential reward, but not as regards
+                     the accidental reward. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that both
+                     "the celibacy of John and the marriage of Abraham fought Christ's battle in keeping with the difference of the times: but
+                     John was continent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only in habit."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Though virginity is better than conjugal continence, a married person may be better than a virgin for two reasons. First,
+                     on the part of chastity itself; if to wit, the married person is more prepared in mind to observe virginity, if it should
+                     be expedient, than the one who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xxii) charges the virgin to say: "I
+                     am no better than Abraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity
+                     of marriage." Further on he gives the reason for this: "For what I do now, he would have done better, if it were fitting for
+                     him to do it then; and what they did I would even do now if it behooved me now to do it." Secondly, because perhaps the person
+                     who is not a virgin has some more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. xliv): "Whence does a virgin know
+                     the things that belong to the Lord, however solicitous she be about them, if perchance on account of some mental fault she
+                     be not yet ripe for martyrdom, whereas this woman to whom she delighted in preferring herself is already able to drink the
+                     chalice of the Lord?"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The common good takes precedence of the private good, if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good is
+                     better generically. It is thus that the virginity that is consecrated to God is preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence Augustine
+                     says (De Virgin. ix): "It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the flesh, even of those women who in these times seek
+                     naught else from marriage but children in order to make them servants of
+                     Christ, cannot compensate for lost virginity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q152_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q152_A5-p0.1">Whether virginity is the greatest of virtues?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virginity is the greatest of virtues. For Cyprian says (De Virgin. [*De Habitu Virg.]): "We address ourselves
+                     now to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, but no less exalted is their vocation. They are a flower of the Church's sowing,
+                     the pride and ornament of spiritual grace, the most honored portion of Christ's flock."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a greater reward is due to the greater virtue. Now the greatest reward is due to virginity, namely the hundredfold
+                     fruit, according to a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.23" target="asv"> Mat. 13:23.</a> Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more a virtue conforms us to Christ, the greater it is. Now virginity above all conforms us to Christ; for it
+                     is declared in the
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.14.4" target="asv"> Apocalypse 14:4 </a>that virgins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth," and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q152_A5-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.14.3" target="asv">Apoc. 14:3</a>) that they sing "a new canticle," which "no" other "man" could say. Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): "No one, methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom," and (De Virgin. xlv): "The
+                     authority of the Church informs the faithful in no uncertain manner, so that they know in what place the martyrs and the holy
+                     virgins who have departed this life are commemorated in the Sacrament of the Altar." By this we are given to understand that
+                     martyrdom, and also the monastic state, are preferable to virginity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in some particular genus: and thus virginity is most excellent, namely in
+                     the genus of chastity, since it surpasses the chastity both of widowhood and of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed
+                     to chastity antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is ascribed to chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin.
+                     i, 7): "Can anyone esteem any beauty greater than a virgin's, since she is beloved of her
+                     King, approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord, consecrated to her God?" Secondly, a thing may be most excellent simply,
+                     and in this way virginity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the end always excels that which is directed to
+                     the end; and the more effectively a thing is directed to the end, the better it is. Now the end which renders virginity praiseworthy
+                     is that one may have leisure for Divine things, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q152_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q152_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Wherefore the
+                     theological virtues as well as the virtue of religion, the acts of which consist in being occupied about Divine things, are
+                     preferable to virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more mightily in order to cleave to God---since for this end they hold their
+                     own life in contempt; and those who dwell in monasteries---since for this end they give up their own will and all that they
+                     may possess---than virgins who renounce venereal pleasure for that same purpose. Therefore virginity is not simply the
+                     greatest of virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virgins are "the more honored portion of Christ's flock," and "their glory more sublime" in comparison with widows and married
+                     women.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to virginity, according to Jerome [*Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.], on account of its superiority
+                     to widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed, and to marriage, to which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But according
+                     to Augustine (De QQ. Evang. i, 9), "the hundredfold fruit is given to martyrs, the sixtyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold
+                     to married persons." Wherefore it does not follow that virginity is simply
+                     the greatest of virtues, but only in comparison with other degrees of chastity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virgins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth," because they imitate Christ, by integrity not only of the mind but also
+                     of the flesh, as Augustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore they follow the Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that
+                     they follow more closely, because other virtues make us cleave to God more closely by imitation of the mind. The "new hymn"
+                     which virgins alone sing, is their joy at having preserved integrity of the
+                     flesh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q152_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q151_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q153" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q153-p0.1">OF LUST (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q153-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q153-p2"> We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity: (1) Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first
+                  head there are five points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q153-p3"> (1) What is the matter of lust?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q153-p4"> (2) Whether all copulation is unlawful?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q153-p5"> (3) Whether lust is a mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q153-p6"> (4) Whether lust is a capital vice?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q153-p7"> (5) Concerning its daughters.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q153_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q153_A1-p0.1">Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the matter of lust is not only venereal desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that
+                     "lust affects to be called surfeit and abundance." But surfeit regards meat and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore
+                     lust is not properly about venereal desires and pleasures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.20.1" target="asv">Prov. 20:1</a>): "Wine is a lustful [Douay: 'luxurious'] thing." Now wine is connected with pleasure of meat and drink. Therefore these
+                     would seem to be the matter of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, lust is defined "as the desire of wanton pleasure" [*Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton pleasure
+                     regards not only venereal matters but also many others. Therefore lust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii [*Written by St. Augustine]): "He that soweth in the flesh, of the flesh shall
+                     reap corruption." Now the sowing of the flesh refers to venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Isidore says (Etym. x), "a lustful man is one who is debauched with pleasures." Now venereal pleasures above all debauch
+                     a man's mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with such like pleasures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is referred
+                     to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc
+                     in a man's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv"> Gal. 5:19 </a>says "lust is any kind of surfeit."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the sense in which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because the
+                     use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the name of lust has a special application to venereal pleasures, to which
+                     also wantonness is specially applicable, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. xiv, 15,16).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q153_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q153_A2-p0.1">Whether no venereal act can be without sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin. For nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal
+                     act is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly
+                     mind from its height as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts." Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by "excess" and "deficiency"
+                     as stated in Ethic. ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that "it is
+                     incompatible with the act of understanding," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vi
+                     in Num.; Cf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] states, rendered the hearts of the
+                     prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy. Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without
+                     which no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): "This is a sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no sin
+                     is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, nor a commandment": and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse
+                     between the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every venereal act is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything
+                     to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a
+                     fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the
+                     preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good, so, too, is the
+                     preservation of the nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the preservation
+                     of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence Augustine
+                     says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is to a man's well being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human
+                     race." Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be taken in due manner and order, as required for
+                     the welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided they be performed in due manner and
+                     order, in keeping with the end of human procreation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways. First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this nothing
+                     but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the perfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered
+                     by that which is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual intercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from
+                     the height, i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug.
+                     viii): "Just as that was good which Martha did when busy about serving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing
+                     the word of God: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna's conjugal chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and
+                     much more that of the Virgin Mary."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (Q[152], A[2], ad 2; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q153_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q64_A2.html">FS, Q[64], A[2]</a>), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure
+                     attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned
+                     with the amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this depends on the disposition of the body; what matters
+                     is how much the interior appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary to
+                     virtue, from the fact that the free act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with the aforesaid pleasure.
+                     For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in accordance with
+                     reason, else it would be against virtue for a person to set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are
+                     not subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for
+                     rebelling against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), "the child, shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which
+                     is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin." Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a
+                     sin, but that it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q153_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q153_A3-p0.1">Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be a sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which
+                     is the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. i, 18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission
+                     of other superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his
+                     own, except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in venereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly, no vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now wine is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the Apostle
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.18" target="asv">Eph. 5:18</a>), "Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust [Douay: 'luxury']." Therefore lust is forbidden.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p6"> Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh:
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv"> Gal. 5:19</a> [Douay: 'luxury'].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves one to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more
+                     sinful it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is
+                     most necessary for the common good, namely the preservation of the human race. Wherefore there is the greatest necessity for
+                     observing the order of reason in this matter: so that if anything be done in this connection
+                     against the dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists essentially in exceeding the order and mode
+                     of reason in the matter of venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says in the same book (De Gener. Anim. i, 18), "the semen is a surplus that is needed." For it is said
+                     to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of the nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the
+                     generative power. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not to be needed, so that it matters not how they
+                     are emitted, provided one observe the decencies of social life. It is different with
+                     the emission of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the end for which it is needed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.20" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:20</a>) in speaking against lust, "You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body." Wherefore by inordinately
+                     using the body through lust a man wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine says (De Decem. Chord. 10
+                     [*Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.)]): "God Who thus governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this order and commandment,
+                     lest unlawful pleasures
+                     should destroy His temple which thou hast begun to be."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The opposite of lust is not found in many, since men are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised under
+                     insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for sexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q153_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q153_A4-p0.1">Whether lust is a capital vice?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is apparently the same as "uncleanness," according to a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.3" target="asv"> Eph. 5:3 </a>(Cf. 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.21" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:21</a>). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "as pride of mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind
+                     safeguard the chastity of the flesh." Now it is seemingly contrary to the nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice.
+                     Therefore lust is not a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, lust is caused by despair, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.19" target="asv"> Eph. 4:19, </a> "Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness." But despair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted
+                     a daughter of sloth, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q153_A4-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q35_A4.html">Q[35], A[4]</a>, ad 2). Much less, therefore, is lust a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the capital vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[148], A[5]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q153_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html">FS, Q[84], AA[3]</a>,4), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many
+                     sins, all of which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which
+                     is very great. Wherefore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive appetite, both on account of the intensity
+                     of the
+                     pleasure, and because such like concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is evident that lust is a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q153_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q148_A6.html">Q[148], A[6]</a>), according to some, the uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a certain uncleanness of the body, and thus
+                     the objection is not to the point. If, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it is caused by gluttony
+                     materially---in so far as gluttony provides the bodily matter of lust---and not under the aspect of final cause, in which
+                     respect chiefly the
+                     capital vices are said to be the cause of others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q153_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q132_A4.html">Q[132], A[4]</a>, ad 1), when we were treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of all sins, so that even the capital vices
+                     originate therefrom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures chiefly through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by despair,
+                     so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly
+                     necessary for a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q153_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q153_A5-p0.1">Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy,
+                     rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence or despair of a future world." For mental blindness,
+                     thoughtlessness and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every sin, even as prudence is in every virtue.
+                     Therefore they should not be reckoned especially as daughters of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated above (Q[128], ad 6;
+                     <a id="SS_Q153_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q137_A3.html"> Q[137], A[3]</a>). But lust is contrary, not to fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is the origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28).
+                     Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four, namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking."
+                     There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and disordered
+                     in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently
+                     intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher
+                     powers, namely the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p8"> Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good,
+                     and this act is hindered by lust, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.56" target="asv"> Dan. 13:56, </a> "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart." In this respect we have "blindness of mind." The second act
+                     is counsel about what is to be done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the concupiscence of lust. Hence
+                     Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc.
+                     1), speaking of lecherous love: "This thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation, thou canst not control it by counseling."
+                     In this respect there is "rashness," which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q153_A5-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q53_A3.html">Q[53], A[3]</a>). The third act is judgment about the things to be done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the lustful
+                     old men (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A5-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.9" target="asv">Dan. 13:9</a>): "They perverted their own mind . . . that they might not . . . remember just
+                     judgments." In this respect there is "thoughtlessness." The fourth act is the reason's command about the thing to be done,
+                     and this also is impeded by lust, in so far as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered from doing what
+                     his reason ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy" must be referred.] [*The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine
+                     edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man who declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little
+                     false tear will undo those words."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p9"> On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One is the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love,"
+                     which regards the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand there is "hatred of God," by reason of
+                     His forbidding the desired pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to the end. With regard to this there
+                     is "love of this world," whose pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is "despair
+                     of a future world," because through being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since
+                     they are distasteful to him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices opposed
+                     to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal species of intemperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from pleasures
+                     pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q153_A5-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q143.html">Q[143])</a>. Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first named inconstancy
+                     arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles a man's heart and renders it effeminate,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A5-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.4.11" target="asv"> Osee 4:11, </a> "Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay: 'understanding']." Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii)
+                     that "the less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death." Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly
+                     stated, for the daughters of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q153_A5-p11.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q35_A4.html"> Q[35], A[4]</a>, ad 2;
+                     <a id="SS_Q153_A5-p11.4" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q118_A8.html"> Q[118], A[8]</a>, ad 1;
+                     <a id="SS_Q153_A5-p11.5" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q148_A6.html"> Q[148],
+                        A[6]
+                     </a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires for himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the special point
+                     of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a daughter of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold
+                     inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer "obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of
+                     the heart the mouth speaketh" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q153_A5-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.34" target="asv">Mat. 12:34</a>), the lustful man, whose heart is full of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly, on account of
+                     the cause: for, since lust
+                     causes thoughtlessness and rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or giving a thought to his words.
+                     which are described as "scurrilous." Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks pleasure, he directs
+                     his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to "wanton words." Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by his words,
+                     for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a man's sentiments, and so he gives way "to foolish talking," for
+                     instance, by expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to anything else.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q153_A5-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q152_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q154" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q154-p0.1">OF THE PARTS OF LUST (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q154-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q154-p2"> We must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are twelve points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q154-p3"> (1) Into what parts is lust divided?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q154-p4"> (2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q154-p5"> (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q154-p6"> (4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like seduction?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q154-p7"> (5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q154-p8"> (6) Of seduction;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q154-p9"> (7) Of rape;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q154-p10"> (8) Of adultery;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q154-p11"> (9) Of incest;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q154-p12"> (10) Of sacrilege;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q154-p13"> (11) Of the sin against nature;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q154-p14"> (12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q154_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A1-p0.1">Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned to lust, namely, "simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction,
+                     rape, and the unnatural vice." For diversity of matter does not diversify the species. Now the aforesaid division is made
+                     with regard to diversity of matter, according as the woman with whom a man has intercourse is married or a virgin, or of some
+                     other condition. Therefore it seems that the species of lust are diversified in this way.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery does
+                     not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man having intercourse with one who is another's, so that he commits
+                     an injustice. Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with a woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen
+                     that a man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow. Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust,
+                     even as adultery is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another woman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter
+                     sin is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among the species thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.21" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:21</a>): "Lest again, when I come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them /that sinned before, and have not done penance
+                     for the uncleanness and fornication and lasciviousness that they have committed." Therefore it seems that also uncleanness
+                     and lasciviousness should be reckoned species of lust, as well as fornication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among its parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it
+                     is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv">Gal. 5:19</a>): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: 'luxury']." Therefore
+                     it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p8">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals 36, qu. i [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p9"> I answer that As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q153_A3.html">Q[153], A[3]</a>), the sin of lust consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right reason. This may happen in two ways.
+                     First, in respect of the matter wherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due matter, other due circumstances
+                     are not observed. And since a circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is derived from its object
+                     which is also its matter, it
+                     follows that the species of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p10"> Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways. First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the
+                     venereal act. In this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the "vice against nature," which attaches to every
+                     venereal act from which generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing and advancement of the child when born,
+                     there is "simple fornication," which is the union of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman. Secondly,
+                     the matter wherein the venereal act is consummated may be discordant with right reason in relation to other persons; and this
+                     in two ways. First, with regard to the woman, with whom a man has connection, by reason of due honor not being paid to her;
+                     and thus there is "incest," which consists in the misuse of a woman who is related by consanguinity or affinity. Secondly,
+                     with regard to the person under whose authority the woman is placed: and if she be under the authority of a husband, it is
+                     "adultery," if under the authority of her father, it is "seduction," in the absence of violence, and "rape" if violence be
+                     employed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p11"> These species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than of the man, because in the venereal act the woman is
+                     passive and is by way of matter, whereas the man is by way of agent; and it has been stated above (OBJ[1]) that the aforesaid
+                     species are assigned with regard to a difference of matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected with a formal difference of object, which difference results from different
+                     modes of opposition to right reason, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A1-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A7.html">FS, Q[18], A[7]</a>), nothing hinders the deformities of different vices concurring in the one act, and in this way adultery is comprised under
+                     lust and injustice. Nor is this deformity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the lust that obeys concupiscence
+                     so far as to lead to injustice, is thereby shown to be more grievous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a spiritual marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the violation
+                     of such a woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner, the other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced
+                     to other species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected with undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not constitute
+                     the species of a moral act, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A1-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">FS, Q[18], A[2]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As a gloss says on this passage, "uncleanness" stands for lust against nature, while "lasciviousness" is a man's abuse of
+                     boys, wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also reply that "lasciviousness" relates to certain acts circumstantial
+                     to the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> According to a gloss on this passage "lust" there signifies any kind of excess.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p18"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A1-p19"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q154_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A2-p0.1">Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal sin. For things that come under the same head would seem to be on a
+                     par with one another. Now fornication comes under the same head as things that are not mortal sins: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.29" target="asv">Acts 15:29</a>): "That you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." But
+                     there is not mortal sin in these observances, according to
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4, </a> "Nothing is rejected that is received with thanksgiving." Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a Divine precept. But the Lord commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.1.2" target="asv">Osee 1:2</a>): "Go take thee a wife of fornications, and have of her children of fornications." Therefore fornication is not a mortal
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in Holy Writ without disapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without disapprobation
+                     by Holy Writ in connection with the patriarchs. Thus we read (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.16.4" target="asv">Gn. 16:4</a>) that Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and further on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.30.5" target="asv">Gn. 30:5</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.30.9" target="asv">9</a>) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the handmaids of his wives; and again (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p4.4" href="./asv.html#Gen.38.18" target="asv">Gn. 38:18</a>) that Juda was with Thamar whom he
+                     thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But simple fornication is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the
+                     love of God, since it is not a sin directly against. God, nor as regards the love of our neighbor, since thereby no one is
+                     injured. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition. But simple fornication has not this result: because a gloss of Ambrose
+                     [*The quotation is from the Gloss of Peter Lombard, who refers it to St. Ambrose: whereas it is from Hilary the deacon] on
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:8, </a> "Godliness is profitable to all things," says: "The whole of Christian teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness: if a
+                     man conforms to this, even though he gives way to the
+                     inconstancy of the flesh, doubtless he will be punished, but he will not perish." Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that "what food is to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse
+                     to the welfare of the human race." But inordinate use of food is not always a mortal sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate
+                     sexual intercourse; and this would seem to apply especially to simple fornication, which is the least grievous of the aforesaid
+                     species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p8">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.4.13" target="asv">Tob. 4:13</a>): "Take heed to keep thyself . . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know a crime." Now crime denotes
+                     a mortal sin. Therefore fornication and all intercourse with other than one's wife is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p9"> Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God's kingdom. But fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the
+                     Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.21" target="asv">Gal. 5:21</a>), who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices, adds: "They who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of
+                     God." Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p10"> Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can. Praedicandum): "They should know that the same penance is to be
+                     enjoined for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilful murder and other criminal offenses." Therefore simple fornication
+                     is a criminal or mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p11">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to be a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. in
+                     Deut., qu. 37] on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.17" target="asv"> Dt. 23:17, </a> says: "This is a prohibition against going with whores, whose vileness is venial." For instead of "venial" it should be "venal,"
+                     since such is the wanton's trade. In order to make this evident, we must take note that every sin committed directly against
+                     human life is a mortal sin. Now
+                     simple fornication implies an inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the offspring to be born of this union. For
+                     we find in all animals where the upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and female, that these come together
+                     not indeterminately, but the male with a certain female, whether one or several; such is the case with all birds: while, on
+                     the other hand, among those animals, where the female alone suffices for the offspring's upbringing, the union is indeterminate,
+                     as
+                     in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the mother's
+                     care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his father as guide and guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods
+                     both internal and external. Hence human nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the sexes and demands that a man should
+                     be united to a determinate woman and should abide with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in
+                     the human race the male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of
+                     the child: and this certainly would cease if the union of sexes were indeterminate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p12"> This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which for the above reason is said to belong to the natural
+                     law. Since, however, the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the whole human race, and common goods depend
+                     on the law for their determination, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">FS, Q[90], A[2]</a>), it follows that this union of man and woman, which is called matrimony, is determined by some law. What this
+                     determination is for us will be stated in the Third Part of this work (XP, Q[50], seqq.), where we shall treat of the sacrament
+                     of matrimony. Wherefore, since fornication is an indeterminate union of the sexes, as something incompatible with matrimony,
+                     it is opposed to the good of the child's upbringing, and consequently it is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p13"> Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by fornication, make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the
+                     child: because a matter that comes under the determination of the law is judged according to what happens in general, and
+                     not according to what may happen in a particular case.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these things, not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because the
+                     matters mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute between Jews and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing
+                     unanimously. For among the Gentiles, fornication was not deemed unlawful, on account of the corruption of natural reason:
+                     whereas the Jews, taught by the Divine law, considered it to be unlawful. The other
+                     things mentioned were loathsome to the Jews through custom introduced by the law into their daily life. Hence the Apostles
+                     forbade these things to the Gentiles, not as though they were unlawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to the
+                     Jews, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q103_A4.html">FS, Q[103], A[4]</a>, ad 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is contrary to right reason. Now man's reason is right, in so far as it is ruled
+                     by the Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that which a man does by God's will and in obedience to His command,
+                     is not contrary to right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general order of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously
+                     by the Divine power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary
+                     to the usual course of nature. Therefore just as Abraham did not sin in being willing to slay his innocent son, because he
+                     obeyed God, although considered in itself it was contrary to right human reason in general, so, too, Osee sinned not in committing
+                     fornication by God's command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called fornication, though it be so called in reference
+                     to the general course of things. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "When God commands a thing to be done against
+                     the customs or agreement of any people, though it were never done by them heretofore, it is to be done"; and afterwards he
+                     adds: "For as among the powers of human society, the greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser, so must God
+                     in preference to all."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens with no purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we treat
+                     of matrimony (
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A2-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A5.html">XP, Q[65], A[5]</a>, ad 2). As to Juda there is no need to excuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our neighbor, because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born, as
+                     we have shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a manner disadvantageous to the future child.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A person, who, while given to works of piety, yields to the inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, in so far
+                     as these works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and because by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy;
+                     but not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal inconstancy impenitent until death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p19">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> One copulation may result in the begetting of a man, wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the future
+                     child, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not only as to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other
+                     hand, one meal does not hinder the good of a man's whole life, wherefore the act of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason
+                     of its genus. It would, however, be a mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to partake
+                     of a food which would alter the whole condition of his life, as was the case with Adam.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p20"> Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised under lust, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous
+                     pleasure is a lesser sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p21"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A2-p22"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q154_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A3-p0.1">Whether fornication is the most grievous of sins?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of sins. For seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it proceeds
+                     from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is in fornication, for a gloss on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:9 </a>says that the "flame of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust." Therefore it seems that fornication is the gravest of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a sin is the more grievous that is committed against a person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more
+                     grievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger. Now according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:18, </a> "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body," which is most intimately connected with a man. Therefore it
+                     seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greater a good is, the graver would seem to be the sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is seemingly
+                     opposed to the good of the whole human race, as appears from what was said in the foregoing Article. It is also against Christ,
+                     according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:15, </a> "Shall I . . . take the members of Christ, and make them the members of a harlot?" Therefore fornication is the most grievous
+                     of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) that the sins of the flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways, first with regard to the sin in itself, secondly with regard to some accident.
+                     The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin itself, by reason of its species, which is determined according to
+                     the good to which that sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the good of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a
+                     graver sin, as to its species, than those sins which are contrary to external goods,
+                     such as theft and the like; while it is less grievous than those which are directly against God, and sins that are injurious
+                     to the life of one already born, such as murder.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that which is in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure that
+                     is in the sensitive appetite, lessens sin, because a sin is the less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse
+                     of a greater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure is in fornication. Hence Augustine says (De Agone
+                     Christiano [*Serm. ccxciii; ccl de Temp.; see Appendix to St. Augustine's works])
+                     that of all a Christian's conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of chastity; wherein the fight is a daily one, but
+                     victory rare: and Isidore declares (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "mankind is subjected to the devil by carnal lust more than
+                     by anything else," because, to wit, the vehemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fornicator is said to sin against his own body, not merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in the
+                     flesh, which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts against the good of his own body by an undue resolution
+                     and defilement thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does it follow from this that fornication is the most grievous
+                     sin, because in man reason is of greater value than the body, wherefore if there
+                     be a sin more opposed to reason, it will be more grievous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of the human race, in so far as it is prejudicial to the individual begetting
+                     of the one man that may be born. Now one who is already an actual member of the human species attains to the perfection of
+                     the species more than one who is a man potentially, and from this point of view murder is a more grievous sin than fornication
+                     and every kind of lust, through being more opposed to the good of the human
+                     species. Again, a Divine good is greater than the good of the human race: and therefore those sins also that are against God
+                     are more grievous. Moreover, fornication is a sin against God, not directly as though the fornicator intended to offend God,
+                     but consequently, in the same way as all mortal sins. And just as the members of our body are Christ's members, so too, our
+                     spirit is one with Christ, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.17" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:17, </a> "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit."
+                     Wherefore also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q154_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A4-p0.1">Whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and kisses. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.3" target="asv">Eph. 5:3</a>): "Fornication and all uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among you, as becometh saints," then
+                     he adds: "Or obscenity" (which a gloss refers to "kissing and fondling"), "or foolish talking" (as "soft speeches"), "or scurrility"
+                     (which "fools call geniality---i.e. jocularity"), and afterwards he continues (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.5" target="asv">Eph.
+                        5:5
+                     </a>): "For know ye this and understand that no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person (which is the serving of idols), hath
+                     inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God," thus making no further mention of obscenity, as neither of foolish talking
+                     or scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being prejudicial to the good of the future child's begetting and upbringing.
+                     But these are not affected by kisses and touches or blandishments. Therefore there is no mortal sin in these.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things that are mortal sins in themselves can never be good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done
+                     sometimes without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in themselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a kiss. But according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.28" target="asv"> Mat. 5:28, </a> "Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart." Much more therefore
+                     are lustful kisses and other like things mortal sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p6"> Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. lxii), "By their very intercourse, their blandishments, their converse,
+                     their embraces, those who are associated in a sleep that knows neither honor nor shame, acknowledge their disgrace and crime."
+                     Therefore by doing these things a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to be a mortal works. /sin in two ways. First, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress,
+                     or touch does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is possible to do such things without lustful pleasure,
+                     either as being the custom of one's country, or on account of some obligation or reasonable cause. Secondly, a thing is said
+                     to be a mortal sin by reason of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to lead someone
+                     into heresy, sins mortally on account of his corrupt intention. Now it has been stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A8.html">FS, Q[74], A[8]</a>), that it is a mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but also to the delectation of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication
+                     is a mortal sin, and much more so the other kinds of lust, it follows that in such like sins not only consent to the act but
+                     also consent to the pleasure is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and caresses are done for this
+                     delectation, it follows that they are mortal sins, and only in this way are they said to be lustful. Therefore in so far as
+                     they are lustful, they are mortal sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle makes no further mention of these three because they are not sinful except as directed to those that he had mentioned
+                     before.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although kisses and touches do not by their very nature hinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from lust, which
+                     is the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are mortally sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that such things are not mortal sins in their species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q154_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A5-p0.1">Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a sin. For the same things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit
+                     while he sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep obtained the gift of wisdom from the Lord (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 3:2, </a> Par. 1). Therefore a man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal pollution would seem to be a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man has the use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently
+                     discuss matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one thing, or dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while
+                     asleep, so that nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a sin, seeing that it is a sin according to its genus.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who cannot act according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep,
+                     is instructed and reproved by God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.33.15" target="asv"> Job 33:15,16, </a> "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of men [*Vulg.: 'When deep sleep falleth upon men.'
+                     St. Thomas is apparently quoting from memory, as the passage is given correctly above
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A5-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q95_A6.html">, Q[95], A[6]</a>, OBJ[1]] . . .
+                     Then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn." Therefore a man, while asleep,
+                     can act according to or against his reason, and this is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems that nocturnal pollution
+                     is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15): "When the same image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to the
+                     mind of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish the imaginary from the real union of bodies, the flesh is
+                     at once moved, with the result that usually follows such motions; and yet there is as little sin in this as there is in speaking
+                     and therefore thinking about such things while one is awake."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways. First, in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For every
+                     sin depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first movement of the sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except in
+                     so far as it can be suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of reason's judgment, there is no sin in it. Now during
+                     sleep reason has not a free judgment. For there is no one who while sleeping does not regard
+                     some of the images formed by his imagination as though they were real, as stated above in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A8.html">FP, Q[84], A[8]</a>, ad 2. Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is deprived of reason's judgment, is not imputed to him as a sin, as
+                     neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p7"> Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause.
+                     For when there is excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is disintegrated either through overheating of the
+                     body or some other disturbance, the sleeper dreams things that are connected with the discharge of this excessive or disintegrated
+                     humor: the same thing happens when nature is cumbered with other superfluities, so that phantasms
+                     relating to the discharge of those superfluities are formed in the imagination. Accordingly if this excess of humor be due
+                     to a sinful cause (for instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal pollution has the character of sin from its cause:
+                     whereas if the excess or disintegration of these superfluities be not due to a sinful cause, nocturnal pollution is not sinful,
+                     neither in itself nor in its cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p8"> A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and the inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper
+                     on account of some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was awake, is sometimes purely speculative, for
+                     instance when one thinks about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while sometimes it is accompanied by a
+                     certain emotion either of concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt to arise from
+                     thinking about carnal sins with concupiscence for such pleasures, because this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul,
+                     so that the sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent to acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher
+                     says (Ethic. i, 13) that "in so far as certain movements in some degree pass" from the waking state to the state of sleep,
+                     "the dreams of good men are better than those of any other people": and Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15) that
+                     "even during sleep, the soul may have conspicuous merit on account of its good disposition." Thus it is evident that nocturnal
+                     pollution may be sinful on the part of its cause. on the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal pollution ensues after thoughts
+                     about carnal acts, though they were speculative, or accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful, neither in itself
+                     nor in its cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p9"> The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the work of a devil the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed
+                     so as to induce the aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous sin, namely the neglect to guard against
+                     the wiles of the devil. Hence the words of the hymn at even: "Our enemy repress, that so our bodies no uncleanness know" [*Translation
+                     W. K. Blount].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p10"> On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man's part, and through the wickedness of the devil alone. Thus we
+                     read in the Collationes Patrum (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to suffer from nocturnal pollution on festivals,
+                     and that the devil brought this about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion. Hence it is manifest that nocturnal
+                     pollution is never a sin, but is sometimes the result of a previous sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from God while he was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It
+                     is for this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to God (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A5-p11.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 3:10</a>), as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The use of reason is more or less hindered in sleep, according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less overcome by
+                     sleep, on account of the violence or attenuation of the evaporations. Nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to
+                     be unable to elicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A5-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A8.html">FP, Q[84], A[8]</a>, ad 2. Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason's apprehension is not hindered during sleep to the same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by reason
+                     turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of human thought. Hence nothing hinders man's reason during sleep
+                     from apprehending anew something arising out of the traces left by his previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him, or
+                     again through Divine revelation, or the interference of a good or bad angel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A5-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q154_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A6-p0.1">Whether seduction should be reckoned a species of lust?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust. For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a
+                     virgin, according to the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1) [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]. But this may occur between an unmarried
+                     man and an unmarried woman, which pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust, distinct
+                     from fornication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i, 4]): "Let no man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is adultery."
+                     Now a species is not contained under another that is differentiated in opposition to it. Therefore since adultery is a species
+                     of lust, it seems that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to do a person an injury would seem to pertain to injustice rather than to lust. Now the seducer does an injury
+                     to another, namely the violated maiden's father, who "can take the injury as personal to himself" [*Gratian, ad can. Lex illa],
+                     and sue the seducer for damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Seduction consists properly in the venereal act whereby a virgin is violated. Therefore, since lust is properly about venereal
+                     actions, it would seem that seduction is a species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> When the matter of a vice has a special deformity, we must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice. Now lust is
+                     a sin concerned with venereal matter, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q153_A1.html">Q[153], A[1]</a>). And a special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin who is under her father's care: both on the part of the maid,
+                     who through being violated without any previous compact of marriage is both hindered from contracting a lawful marriage
+                     and is put on the road to a wanton life from which she was withheld lest she should lose the seal of virginity: and on the
+                     part of the father, who is her guardian, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.42.11" target="asv">Ecclus. 42:11</a>, "Keep a sure watch over a shameless daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a laughing-stock to thy enemies." Therefore
+                     it is evident that seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, while still under the guardianship of her parents,
+                     is a determinate species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although a virgin is free from the bond of marriage, she is not free from her father's power. Moreover, the seal of virginity
+                     is a special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication, in that it should be removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is
+                     not simple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots, women, namely, who are no longer virgins, as a gloss
+                     observes on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12" target="asv">2 Cor. 12</a>:, "And have not done penance for the uncleanness and
+                     fornication," etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense, as applicable in a general way to any sin of lust. Wherefore seduction, in
+                     the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a married man and any woman other than his wife. This is clear from his
+                     adding: "Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not." In this sense, too, we are to understand the words
+                     of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Num.5.13" target="asv"> Num. 5:13</a>: "If [Vulg.: 'But'] the adultery is secret, and
+                     cannot be provided by witnesses, because she was not found in adultery [stupro]."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater deformity through being united to another sin. Now the sin of lust obtains a
+                     greater deformity from the sin of injustice, because the concupiscence would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it refrains
+                     not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an injustice. In fact a twofold injustice attaches to it. One is on the
+                     part of the virgin, who, though not violated by force, is nevertheless seduced,
+                     and thus the seducer is bound to compensation. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.16" target="asv">Ex. 22:16,17</a>): "If a man seduce a virgin not yet espoused, and lie with her, he shall endow her and have her to wife. If the maid's father
+                     will not give her to him, he shall give money according to the dowry, which virgins are wont to receive." The other injury
+                     is done to the maid's father: wherefore the seducer is bound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A6-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.28" target="asv">Dt.
+                        22:28,29
+                     </a>): "If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, who is not espoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the matter come to judgment:
+                     he that lay with her shall give to the father of the maid fifty sicles of silver, and shall have her to wife, and because
+                     he hath humbled her, he may not put her away all the days of his life": and this, lest he should prove to have married her
+                     in mockery, as Augustine observes. [*QQ. in Dt., qu. xxxiv.]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q154_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A7-p0.1">Whether rape is a species of lust, distinct from seduction?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that rape is not a species of lust, distinct from seduction. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 26) that "seduction
+                     [stuprum], or rape, properly speaking, is unlawful intercourse, and takes its name from its causing corruption: wherefore
+                     he that is guilty of rape is a seducer." Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a species of lust distinct from
+                     seduction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, rape, apparently, implies violence. For it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex
+                     illa]) that "rape is committed when a maid is taken away by force from her father's house that after being violated she may
+                     be taken to wife." But the employment of force is accidental to lust, for this essentially regards the pleasure of intercourse.
+                     Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sin of lust is curbed by marriage: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:2</a>): "For fear of fornication, let every man have his own wife." Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it was
+                     enacted in the council of Meaux: "We decree that those who are guilty of rape, or of abducting or seducing women, should not
+                     have those women in marriage, although they should have subsequently married them with the consent of their parents."
+                     Therefore rape is not a determinate species of lust distinct from seduction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a man may have knowledge of his newly married wife without committing a sin of lust. Yet he may commit rape if he
+                     take her away by force from her parents' house, and have carnal knowledge of her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a
+                     determinate species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as Isidore states (Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin of lust. Therefore rape
+                     is a species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a species of lust: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes
+                     there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p8"> They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate a virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards
+                     the virgin and towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to the virgin, for instance if she allows herself
+                     to be taken away by force from her father's house. Again, the force employed in rape differs in another way, because sometimes
+                     a maid is taken away by force from her parents' house, and is forcibly violated: while sometimes, though
+                     taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated, but of her own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act of
+                     marriage: for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is employed. There is rape without seduction if a man abduct
+                     a widow or one who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says [*Ep. v ad Caesarium; Cf. can. Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2], "We abhor
+                     abductors whether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness of their crime."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p9"> There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force, violates a virgin unlawfully.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one is sometimes used to signify the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The employment of force would seem to arise from the greatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not fear
+                     to endanger himself by offering violence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to be judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For
+                     one who is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed, who has a right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas
+                     one that is not promised to another must first of all be restored to her father's care, and then the abductor may lawfully
+                     marry her with her parents' consent. Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since
+                     whosoever steals a thing he is bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not dissolve a marriage already contracted, although
+                     it is an impediment to its being contracted. As to the decree of the council in question, it was made in abhorrence of this
+                     crime, and has been abrogated. Wherefore Jerome [*The quotation is from Can. Tria. xxxvi, qu. 2] declares the contrary: "Three
+                     kinds of lawful marriage," says he, "are mentioned in Holy Writ. The first is that of a chaste maiden given away
+                     lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The second is when a man finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal knowledge
+                     of her. If the father be willing, the man shall endow her according to the father's estimate, and shall pay the price of her
+                     purity [*Cf.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A7-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.23" target="asv"> Dt. 22:23-29</a>]. The third is, when the maiden is taken away from such a man, and is given to another at the father's will."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p13"> We may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to others in marriage, especially if the betrothal be expressed
+                     by words in the present tense.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The man who is just married has, in virtue of the betrothal, a certain right in her: wherefore, although he sins by using
+                     violence, he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence Pope Gelasius says [*Can. Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; xxxvi, qu. 1]: "This
+                     law of bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when a maiden, with regard to whose marriage nothing had so far been decided,
+                     was taken away by force."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A7-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q154_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A8-p0.1">Whether adultery is determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species. For adultery takes its
+                     name from a man having intercourse "with a woman who is not his own [ad alteram]," according to a gloss [*St. Augustine: Serm.
+                     li, 13 de Divers. lxiii] on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.14" target="asv"> Ex. 20:14.</a> Now a woman who is not one's own may be of various conditions, namely either a virgin, or under her father's care, or a harlot,
+                     or of any other
+                     description. Therefore it seems that adultery is not a species of lust distinct from the others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i]: "It matters not for what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the
+                     Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is an adulterer," and in like manner one who is over enamored
+                     of any woman. Now every kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore adultery is in every kind of lust: and consequently
+                     it should not be reckoned a species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there would seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there
+                     is the same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either case a woman is violated who is under another person's
+                     authority. Therefore adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Pope Leo [*St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf. Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5] says that "adultery is
+                     sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of the marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one's
+                     own lust, or with the consent of the other party." Now this implies a special deformity of lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate
+                     species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Adultery, as its name implies, "is access to another's marriage-bed [ad alienum torum]" [*Cf. Append. Gratian, ad can. Ille
+                     autem. xxxii, qu. 1]. By so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offense against chastity and the good of human procreation.
+                     First, by accession to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage, which is contrary to the good of the upbringing of his
+                     own children. Secondly, by accession to a woman who is united to another in marriage, and
+                     thus he hinders the good of another's children. The same applies to the married woman who is corrupted by adultery. Wherefore
+                     it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.23.32" target="asv">Ecclus. 23:32,33</a>): "Every woman . . . that leaveth her husband . . . shall be guilty of sin. For first she hath been unfaithful to the law
+                     of the Most High" (since there it is commanded: "Thou shalt not commit adultery"); "and secondly, she hath offended against
+                     her husband," by making it uncertain that the children are his: "thirdly,
+                     she hath fornicated in adultery, and hath gotten children of another man," which is contrary to the good of her offspring.
+                     The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins, while the two others belong especially to the deformity of adultery.
+                     Hence it is manifest that adultery is a determinate species of lust, through having a special deformity in venereal acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If a married man has intercourse with another woman, his sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus it is
+                     always adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of marriage, or with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse;
+                     and thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man has intercourse with another's wife; and sometimes it has the character
+                     of seduction, or of some other sin, according to various conditions
+                     affecting the woman with whom he has intercourse: and it has been stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q154_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that the species of lust correspond to the various conditions of women.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of human offspring, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q154_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But adultery is specially opposed to matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage faith which is due between husband
+                     and wife. And since the man who is too ardent a lover of his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if he use her indecently,
+                     although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense be called an adulterer; and even more so
+                     than he that is too ardent a lover of another woman.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The wife is under her husband's authority, as united to him in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father's authority,
+                     as one who is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin of adultery is contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and
+                     the sin of seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned to differ specifically. Of other matters concerning adultery
+                     we shall speak in the Third Part [*
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A8-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A3.html">XP,
+                        Q[59], A[3]
+                     </a>; XP, QQ[60],62], when we treat of matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q154_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A9-p0.1">Whether incest is a determinate species of lust?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that incest is not a determinate species of lust. For incest [*'Incestus' is equivalent to 'in-castus = 'unchaste']
+                     takes its name from being a privation of chastity. But all kinds of lust are opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that
+                     incest is not a species of lust, but is lust itself in general.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Cf. Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "incest is intercourse between
+                     a man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity." Now affinity differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one
+                     but several species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a deformity, does not constitute a determinate species of vice. But intercourse
+                     between those who are related by consanguinity or affinity does not, of itself, contain any deformity, else it would never
+                     have been lawful. Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The species of lust are distinguished according to the various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful intercourse.
+                     Now incest implies a special condition on the part of the woman, because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by
+                     consanguinity or affinity as stated (OBJ[2]). Therefore incest is a determinate species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q154_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,6) wherever we find something incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there must needs be a determinate species
+                     of lust. Now sexual intercourse with women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to venereal union on three counts.
+                     First, because man naturally owes a certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood relations, who are descended
+                     in near degree from the same
+                     parents: so much so indeed that among the ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates [*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1], it was not deemed
+                     right for a son to bathe with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now from what has been said (Q[142], A[4]:
+                     Q[151], A[4]), it is evident that in venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent with respect, wherefore men
+                     are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is unseemly that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse. This reason seems
+                     to be indicated (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A9-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.7" target="asv">Lev. 18:7</a>) where we read: "She is thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness," and the same is expressed further on with regard
+                     to others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p7"> The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not
+                     debarred from venereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very frequent and thus men's minds would be enervated
+                     by lust. Hence in the Old Law [*
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18" target="asv">Lev. 18</a>] the prohibition was apparently directed specially to those persons who must needs live together.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p8"> The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife,
+                     all his wife's relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, as though they were of the same blood as himself.
+                     Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16): "The demands of charity are most perfectly satisfied by men uniting together
+                     in the bonds that the various ties of friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and
+                     becoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships in one, but each should have one."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p9"> Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is natural that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred,
+                     if to this be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse, his love would be too ardent and would become a
+                     very great incentive to lust: and this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that incest is a determinate species of
+                     lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Unlawful intercourse between persons related to one another would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of the
+                     opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of love, as stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse
+                     between such persons is called "incest" antonomastically.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Persons are related by affinity through one who is related by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the other,
+                     consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of unbecomingness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is something essentially unbecoming and contrary to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related by
+                     blood, for instance between parents and children who are directly and immediately related to one another, since children naturally
+                     owe their parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a horse (De Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother by mistake
+                     and threw itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done,
+                     because some animals even have a natural respect for those that have begotten them. There is not the same essential unbecomingness
+                     attaching to other persons who are related to one another not directly but through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness
+                     or unbecomingness varies according to custom, and human or Divine law: because, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A9-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q154_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, sexual intercourse, being directed to the common good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De
+                     Civ. Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation
+                     when religion forbade it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A9-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q154_A10" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A11.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A10-p0.1">Whether sacrilege can be a species of lust?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of lust. For the same species is not contained under different genera that
+                     are not subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species of irreligion, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A10-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q99_A2.html">Q[99], A[2]</a>). Therefore sacrilege cannot be reckoned a species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]), do not place sacrilege among other sins which are
+                     reckoned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be done by the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege
+                     is not reckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice. Therefore neither should it be reckoned a species of
+                     lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that "if it is wicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one's earthly bounds, how much
+                     more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds of morals!" Now to go beyond one's earthly bounds in sacred
+                     matters is a sin of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal
+                     desire in sacred matters. But venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege
+                     is a species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A10-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">FS, Q[18], AA[6]</a>,7), the act of a virtue or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or vice, assumes the latter's species: thus,
+                     theft committed for the sake of adultery, passes into the species of adultery. Now it is evident that as Augustine states
+                     (De Virgin. 8), the observance of chastity, by being directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of religion, as in the
+                     case of those who vow and keep
+                     chastity. Wherefore it is manifest that lust also, by violating something pertaining to the worship of God, belongs to the
+                     species of sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may be accounted a species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Lust, by being directed to another vice as its end, becomes a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be also
+                     a species of irreligion, as of a higher genus.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The enumeration referred to, includes those sins which are species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a species
+                     of lust in so far as it is directed to another vice as its end, and may coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful
+                     intercourse between persons mutually united by spiritual relationship, is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Intercourse
+                     with a virgin consecrated to God, inasmuch as she is the spouse of
+                     Christ, is sacrilege resembling adultery. If the maiden be under her father's authority, it will be spiritual seduction; and
+                     if force be employed it will be spiritual rape, which kind of rape even the civil law punishes more severely than others.
+                     Thus the Emperor Justinian says [*Cod. i, iii de Episc. et Cler. 5]: "If any man dare, I will not say to rape, but even to
+                     tempt a consecrated virgin with a view to marriage, he shall be liable to capital punishment."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing. Now a consecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired for
+                     sexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired for possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege
+                     may also come under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an injury be done to a consecrated person. Again, one
+                     may commit a sacrilege by partaking gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless,
+                     sacrilege is ascribed more specially to lust which is opposed to chastity for the observance of which certain persons are
+                     specially consecrated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A10-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A11.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q154_A11" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A12.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A11-p0.1">Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species of lust. For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the
+                     enumeration given above (A[1], OBJ[1]). Therefore it is not a species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is comprised under vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under vice,
+                     but under bestiality, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, lust regards acts directed to human generation, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A11-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q153_A2.html">Q[153], A[2]</a>): Whereas the unnatural vice concerns acts from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species
+                     of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned together with the other species of lust (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.21" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:21</a>) where we read: "And have not done penance for the uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness," where a gloss says:
+                     "Lasciviousness, i.e., unnatural lust."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q154_A6.html">AA[6]</a>,9) wherever there occurs a special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered unbecoming, there is a determinate
+                     species of lust. This may occur in two ways: First, through being contrary to right reason, and this is common to all lustful
+                     vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the human race:
+                     and this is called "the unnatural
+                     vice." This may happen in several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any copulation, for the sake of venereal pleasure:
+                     this pertains to the sin of "uncleanness" which some call "effeminacy." Secondly, by copulation with a thing of undue species,
+                     and this is called "bestiality." Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male with male, or female with female, as the Apostle
+                     states (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A11-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.27" target="asv">Rom. 1:27</a>): and this is called the "vice of sodomy." Fourthly, by not observing the
+                     natural manner of copulation, either as to undue means, or as to other monstrous and bestial manners of copulation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There we enumerated the species of lust that are not contrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is opposed to human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the virtue,
+                     and therefore is reducible to the same genus.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The lustful man intends not human generation but venereal pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts from
+                     which human generation follows: and it is that which is sought in the unnatural vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A11-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A12.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q154_A12" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q154_A12-p0.1">Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the unnatural vice is not the greatest sin among the species of lust. For the more a sin is contrary to
+                     charity the graver it is. Now adultery, seduction and rape which are injurious to our neighbor are seemingly more contrary
+                     to the love of our neighbor, than unnatural sins, by which no other person is injured. Therefore the unnatural sin is not
+                     the greatest among the species of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sins committed against God would seem to be the most grievous. Now sacrilege is committed directly against God,
+                     since it is injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous according as we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin
+                     is committed. Now the order of charity requires that a man love more those persons who are united to him---and such are those
+                     whom he defiles by incest---than persons who are not connected with him, and whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural
+                     vice. Therefore incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more it is against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the sin
+                     of uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature, since it would seem especially in accord with nature
+                     that agent and patient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow that uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural
+                     vices. But this is not true. Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among
+                     sins of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De adult. conjug. [*The quotation is from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. Augustine, De Bono Conjugali,
+                     viii.]) that "of all these," namely the sins belonging to lust, "that which is against nature is the worst."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are
+                     those things that are according to nature, because reason presupposes things as determined by nature, before disposing of
+                     other things according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just
+                     as in speculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that which is about things
+                     the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on man, so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act against
+                     things as determined by nature. Therefore, since by the unnatural vices man transgresses that which has been determined by
+                     nature with regard to the use of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter this sin is gravest of all. After it comes
+                     incest, which, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q154_A12-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q154_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, is contrary to the natural respect which we owe persons related
+                     to us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p8"> With regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression merely of that which is determined by right reason, on
+                     the presupposition, however, of natural principles. Now it is more against reason to make use of the venereal act not only
+                     with prejudice to the future offspring, but also so as to injure another person besides. Wherefore simple fornication, which
+                     is committed without injustice to another person, is the least grave among the species of lust. Then, it is a
+                     greater injustice to have intercourse with a woman who is subject to another's authority as regards the act of generation,
+                     than as regards merely her guardianship. Wherefore adultery is more grievous than seduction. And both of these are aggravated
+                     by the use of violence. Hence rape of a virgin is graver than seduction, and rape of a wife than adultery. And all these are
+                     aggravated by coming under the head of sacrilege, as stated above (A[10], ad 2).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary
+                     to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says
+                     (Confess. iii, 8): "Those foul offenses that are against nature should be everywhere and at all times detested and punished,
+                     such as were those of the people of Sodom, which should all nations commit,
+                     they should all stand guilty of the same crime, by the law of God which hath not so made men that they should so abuse one
+                     another. For even that very intercourse which should be between God and us is violated, when that same nature, of which He
+                     is the Author, is polluted by the perversity of lust."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Vices against nature are also against God, as stated above (ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity of sacrilege,
+                     as the order impressed on human nature is prior to and more firm than any subsequently established order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The nature of the species is more intimately united to each individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins against
+                     the specific nature are more grievous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a thing than on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins against
+                     nature, the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness, which consists in the mere omission of copulation with another.
+                     While the most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the due species is not observed. Hence a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q154_A12-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.37.2" target="asv"> Gn. 37:2, </a> "He accused his brethren of a most wicked crime," says that
+                     "they copulated with cattle." After this comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right sex is not observed. Lastly comes
+                     the sin of not observing the right manner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the "vas" than if it
+                     affects the manner of copulation in respect of other circumstances.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q154_A12-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q153_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q155" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A12.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q155-p0.1">OF CONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q155-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q155-p2"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q155-p3"> We must next consider the potential parts of temperance: (1) continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head
+                  we must consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence there are four points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q155-p4"> (1) Whether continence is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q155-p5"> (2) What is its matter?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q155-p6"> (3) What is its subject?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q155-p7"> (4) Of its comparison with temperance.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q155_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q155_A1-p0.1">Whether continence is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For species and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division. But
+                     continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1,9). Therefore continence is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19), "a virtue is a thing that
+                     no one makes ill use of." Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for instance, if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself
+                     from doing it. Therefore continence is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is lawful, but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q155_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.23" target="asv"> Gal. 5:23, </a> "Faith, modesty," etc., says that by continence a man refrains even from things that are lawful. Therefore continence is
+                     not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a virtue. Now such is continence, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that "continence
+                     is a habit unconquered by pleasure." Therefore continence is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The word "continence" is taken by various people in two ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from all
+                     venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q155_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.23" target="asv">Gal. 5:23</a>). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the first place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies
+                     to continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q155_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q152_A3.html">Q[152], A[3]</a> ) to be a virtue. Others,
+                     however, understand continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires, which in him are vehement. In this sense
+                     the Philosopher takes continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also it is used in the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. xii,
+                     10,11). In this way continence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so far, to wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition
+                     to the passions, lest it be led astray by them: yet it does not attain to the perfect nature of a moral virtue, by
+                     which even the sensitive appetite is subject to reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in the sensitive
+                     appetite. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "continence is not a virtue but a mixture," inasmuch as it has something
+                     of virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p7"> If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher includes continence in the same division with virtue in so far as the former falls short of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Properly speaking, man is that which is according to reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds [tenet se] to
+                     that which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself. Now whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according
+                     to reason. Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to that which is in accord with right reason, and not to
+                     that which is in accord with perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to
+                     right reason, even as good desires are opposed to perverse reason. Wherefore he is properly and truly continent who holds
+                     to right reason, by abstaining from evil desires, and not he who holds to perverse reason, by abstaining from good desires:
+                     indeed, the latter should rather be said to be obstinate in evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The gloss quoted takes continence in the first sense, as denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from unlawful
+                     goods, but also from certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in order to give its whole attention to the more perfect
+                     goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q155_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q155_A2-p0.1">Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are not the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46): "General
+                     decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is virtuous is restrained* in its every action." [*"Continentem"
+                     according to St. Thomas' reading; St. Ambrose wrote "concinentem = harmonious"].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for the good of right reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Now other
+                     passions lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence than the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the
+                     fear of mortal dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him behave like a madman, as Seneca remarks [*De Ira
+                     i, 1]. Therefore continence does not properly regard the desires for pleasures of touch.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): "It is continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel."
+                     Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q155_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10, </a> "Cupidity [Douay: 'The desire of money'] ({philargyria}), is the root of all evils." Therefore continence is not properly
+                     about the desires for pleasures of touch
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal matters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied
+                     only to the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of touch is not its proper matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but bestial, both as regards food---for instance, the pleasure of eating
+                     human flesh; and as regards venereal matters---for instance the abuse of animals or boys. But continence is not about such
+                     like things, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of continence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "continence and incontinence are about the same things as temperance and intemperance."
+                     Now temperance and intemperance are about the desires for pleasures of touch, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q155_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">Q[141], A[4]</a>). Therefore continence and incontinence are also about that same matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain curbing, in so far as a man contains himself from following his passions.
+                     Hence continence is properly said in reference to those passions which urge a man towards the pursuit of something, wherein
+                     it is praiseworthy that reason should withhold man from pursuing: whereas it is not properly about those passions, such as
+                     fear and the like, which denote some kind of withdrawal: since in these it is praiseworthy to
+                     remain firm in pursuing what reason dictates, as stated above (Q[123], AA[3],4). Now it is to be observed that natural inclinations
+                     are the principles of all supervening inclinations, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q155_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A2.html">FP, Q[60], A[2]</a>). Wherefore the more they follow the inclination of nature, the more strongly do the passions urge to the pursuance of an
+                     object. Now nature inclines chiefly to those things that are necessary to it, whether for the maintenance of the individual,
+                     such as
+                     food, or for the maintenance of the species, such as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain to the touch. Therefore
+                     continence and incontinence refer properly to desires for pleasures of touch.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as temperance may be used in a general sense in connection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter wherein
+                     it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult
+                     to contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a general sense and relatively may be applied to any
+                     other matter: and in this sense Ambrose speaks of continence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Properly speaking we do not speak of continence in relation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude implies.
+                     As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the pursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of
+                     the soul---in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured him---rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a
+                     man may be said to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> External goods, such as honors, riches and the like, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of choice
+                     in themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak
+                     of a person as being continent or incontinent, not simply, but relatively, by adding that they are continent or incontinent
+                     in regard to wealth, or honor and so forth. Hence Tully either understood
+                     continence in a general sense, as including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a restricted sense as denoting
+                     desire for pleasures of touch.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Venereal pleasures are more vehement than pleasures of the palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence and incontinence
+                     in reference to venereal matters rather than in reference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are applicable
+                     to both.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Continence is a good of the human reason: wherefore it regards those passions which can be connatural to man. Hence the Philosopher
+                     says (Ethic. vii, 5) that "if a man were to lay hold of a child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural passion
+                     whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be continent [*See A[4]], not absolutely, but relatively."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q155_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q155_A3-p0.1">Whether the subject of continence is the concupiscible power?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the subject of continence is the concupiscible power. For the subject of a virtue should be proportionate
+                     to the virtue's matter. Now the matter of continence, as stated 
+                     <a id="SS_Q155_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q155_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, is desires for the pleasures of touch, which pertain to the concupiscible power. Therefore continence is in the concupiscible
+                     power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Opposites are referred to one same thing" [*Categ. viii]. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose passions
+                     overcome reason, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that "incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupiscible, by
+                     following which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to reason." Therefore continence is likewise in the concupiscible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the subject of a human virtue is either the reason, or the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the
+                     concupiscible and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason, for then it would be an intellectual virtue; nor is
+                     it in the will, since continence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor again is it in the irascible, because
+                     it is not properly about the passions of the irascible, as stated above (A[2], ad 2). Therefore
+                     it follows that it is in the concupiscible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every virtue residing in a certain power removes the evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil act
+                     of the concupiscible: since "the continent man has evil desires," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore
+                     continence is not in the concupiscible power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that subject have a different disposition from that which it has while subjected
+                     to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent,
+                     since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires. Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible
+                     as its subject. Again the reason has the same disposition in both, since
+                     both the continent and the incontinent have right reason, and each of them, while undisturbed by passion, purposes not to
+                     follow his unlawful desires. Now the primary difference between them is to be found in their choice: since the continent man,
+                     though subject to vehement desires, chooses not to follow them, because of his reason; whereas the incontinent man chooses
+                     to follow them, although his reason forbids. Hence continence must needs reside in that power of the soul, whose act it is
+                     to
+                     choose; and that is the will, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q155_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A1.html">FS, Q[13], A[1]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Continence has for its matter the desires for pleasures of touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance which
+                     is in the concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist them. For this reason it must be in another power, since
+                     resistance is of one thing against another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will stands between reason and the concupiscible, and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is moved by the
+                     reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupiscible. Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its
+                     first mover, and incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both belong immediately to the will as their proper subject.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the passions are not in the will as their subject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus it is
+                     that the will of the continent man resists desires.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q155_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q155_A4-p0.1">Whether continence is better than temperance?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that continence is better than temperance. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q155_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.26.20" target="asv">Ecclus. 26:20</a>): "No price is worthy of a continent soul." Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the greater the virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater reward;
+                     for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q155_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.5" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:5</a>): "He . . . is not crowned, except he strive lawfully," and the continent man, since he is subject to vehement evil desires,
+                     strives more than the temperate man, in whom these things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater virtue than
+                     temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will is a more excellent power than the concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is
+                     in the concupiscible, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q155_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q155_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore continence is a greater virtue than temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to a principal
+                     virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q155_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q155_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, continence has a twofold signification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal pleasures; and if continence be
+                     taken in this sense, it is greater than temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what we said above (Q[152],
+                     A[5]) concerning the preeminence of virginity over chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be taken
+                     as denoting the resistance of the reason
+                     to evil desires when they are vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far greater than continence, because the
+                     good of a virtue derives its praise from that which is in accord with reason. Now the good of reason flourishes more in the
+                     temperate man than in the continent man, because in the former even the sensitive appetite is obedient to reason, being tamed
+                     by reason so to speak, whereas in the continent man the sensitive appetite strongly resists reason by its evil desires. Hence
+                     continence is compared to temperance, as the imperfect to the perfect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted may be understood in two ways. First in reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence
+                     from all things venereal: and thus it means that "no price is worthy of a continent soul," in the genus of chastity the fruitfulness
+                     of the flesh is the purpose of marriage is equalled to the continence of virginity or of widowhood, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q155_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q152_A4.html">Q[152], AA[4]</a>,5). Secondly it may be understood in
+                     reference to the general sense in which continence denotes any abstinence from things unlawful: and thus it means that "no
+                     price is worthy of a continent soul," because its value is not measured with gold or silver, which are appreciable according
+                     to weight.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The strength or weakness of concupiscence may proceed from two causes. For sometimes it is owing to a bodily cause: because
+                     some people by their natural temperament are more prone to concupiscence than others; and again opportunities for pleasure
+                     which inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for others. Such like weakness of concupiscence diminishes
+                     merit, whereas strength of concupiscence increases it. on the other hand,
+                     weakness or strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spiritual cause, for instance the vehemence of charity, or
+                     the strength of reason, as in the case of a temperate man. In this way weakness of concupiscence, by reason of its cause,
+                     increases merit, whereas strength of concupiscence diminishes it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will is more akin to the reason than the concupiscible power is. Wherefore the good of reason---on account of which virtue
+                     is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to the will but also to the concupiscible power, as happens in the temperate
+                     man---is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the will, as in the case of one who is continent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q155_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q154_A12.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q156" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q156-p0.1">OF INCONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q156-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q156-p2"> We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q156-p3"> (1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q156-p4"> (2) Whether incontinence is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q156-p5"> (3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q156-p6"> (4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in desire?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q156_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q156_A1-p0.1">Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but
+                     from the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women
+                     are not described either as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result from the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from
+                     the bodily temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is especially people of a quick or choleric and
+                     atrabilious temper whose incontinence is one of unbridled desire." Therefore incontinence regards the body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because "the flesh
+                     lusteth against the spirit," and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul. Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for we ascribe
+                     neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly
+                     on the part of the soul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part
+                     of the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions
+                     can arise in the sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet these passions, however vehement they be, are
+                     not the sufficient cause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so
+                     long as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions. If, however, the passions gain such strength
+                     as to take away the use of reason altogether---as in the case of those who become insane through the vehemence of their passions---the
+                     essential conditions of continence or incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the judgment of reason, which
+                     the continent man follows and the incontinent forsakes. From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is
+                     on the part of the soul, which fails to resist a passion by the reason. This happens in two ways, according to the Philosopher
+                     (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when the soul yields to the passions, before the reason has given its counsel; and this is called
+                     "unbridled incontinence" or "impetuosity": secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been counselled, through holding
+                     weakly to reason's judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is called "weakness." Hence it is manifest that incontinence
+                     pertains chiefly to the soul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The human soul is the form of the body, and has certain powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these organs
+                     conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of
+                     the intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from the senses, and the will is urged by passions of the
+                     sensitive appetite. Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak
+                     temperament, the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds to it weakly; although in /rare cases
+                     the opposite occurs, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q156_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.31.10" target="asv"> Prov. 31:10, </a> "Who shall find a valiant woman?" And since small and weak things "are accounted as though they were not" [*Aristotle, Phys.
+                     ii, 5] the Philosopher speaks of women as though they had not the firm judgment of reason, although the contrary happens in
+                     some women. Hence he states that "we do not describe women
+                     as being continent, because they are vacillating" through being unstable of reason, and "are easily led" so that they follow
+                     their passions readily.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man at once follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the impulse
+                     of passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious persons [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q156_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A5.html">FS, Q[46], A[5]</a>], or from its vehemence, as in the melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most vehemently aroused. Even
+                     so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand to that which is counselled, because he
+                     holds to it in weakly fashion by reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with regard to woman (ad 1).
+                     This is also the case with phlegmatic temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are due to the fact
+                     that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain negligence
+                     of the spirit in not resisting strongly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q156_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q156_A2-p0.1">Whether incontinence is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "No man sins in what he cannot
+                     avoid." Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q156_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.21" target="asv"> Wis. 8:21, </a> "I know [Vulg.: 'knew'] that I could not . . . be continent, except God gave it." Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore
+                     incontinence is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for Dionysius
+                     says (Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul, through incontinence of divine love, exclaimed: I live, now not I" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q156_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.20" target="asv">Gal. 2:20</a>). Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is numbered together with other sins (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q156_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.3.3" target="asv">2 Tim. 3:3</a>) where it is written: "Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful," etc. Therefore incontinence is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus incontinence
+                     is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence (
+                     <a id="SS_Q156_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q155_A2.html">Q[155], A[2]</a> ). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first, because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in
+                     accord with reason; secondly, because he plunges into
+                     shameful pleasures. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "incontinence is censurable not only because it is wrong"---that
+                     is, by straying from reason---"but also because it is wicked"---that is, by following evil desires. Secondly, incontinence
+                     about a matter is considered, properly---inasmuch as it is a straying from reason---but not simply; for instance when a man
+                     does not observe the mode of reason in his desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in themselves.
+                     About such things there is incontinence, not simply but relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q156_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q155_A2.html">Q[155], A[2]</a>, ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from the fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails
+                     to observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of themselves desirable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p7"> Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but metaphorically. for instance about the desires for
+                     things of which one cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may be said to be incontinent in these matters
+                     metaphorically, because just as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even so is a man entirely led by his
+                     good desire which is in accord with reason. Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the perfection
+                     of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God's help, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q156_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.5" target="asv"> Jn. 15:5</a>: "Without Me you can do nothing." Wherefore the fact that man needs God's help in order to be continent, does not show incontinence
+                     to be no sin, for, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, "what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way, ourselves."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through
+                     a certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his
+                     reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not properly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q156_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q156_A3-p0.1">Whether the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against
+                     his conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q156_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47, </a> "That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Now the incontinent
+                     man would seem to act against his conscience more than the intemperate because, according to Ethic. vii, 3, the incontinent
+                     man,
+                     though knowing how wicked are the things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion, whereas the intemperate man judges
+                     what he desires to be good. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most
+                     grave, are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence would appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance.
+                     For a person's sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows
+                     he is doing wrong, and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the
+                     intemperate man that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be admonished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent
+                     man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate,
+                     since the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which the intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the
+                     incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12,13) that "impenitence is a sin against
+                     the Holy Ghost." Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) "the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for
+                     he holds on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined to repentance." Therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely
+                     than the incontinent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to Augustine [*De Duab. Anim. x, xi] sin is chiefly an act of the will, because "by the will we sin and live aright"
+                     [*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the
+                     intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom:
+                     whereas in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a passion. And
+                     since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is "a disposition difficult to remove," the result is that the incontinent man
+                     repents at once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so the intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned,
+                     because the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit. Wherefore in reference to such persons it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q156_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv">Prov. 2:14</a>) that "they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things." Hence it follows that "the
+                     intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent," as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 7).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the ignorance,
+                     the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance
+                     in the reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and then such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver
+                     the sin, because the inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be
+                     greater. Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man, ignorance arises from the appetite being inclined to something,
+                     either by passion, as in the incontinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus
+                     in the intemperate than in the incontinent. In one respect as regards duration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance
+                     lasts only while the passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas
+                     the ignorance of the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is likened
+                     to phthisis or any chronic disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect the ignorance of the intemperate
+                     man is greater as regards the thing ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some particular detail of choice
+                     (in so far as he deems that he must choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man's ignorance is
+                     about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing good, in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed.
+                     Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7,8) that "the incontinent man is better than the intemperate, because he retains
+                     the best principle [*{To beltiston, e arche}, 'the best thing, i.e. the principle']," to wit, the right estimate of the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches concupiscence,
+                     besides the application of the external remedy of admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his desires,
+                     so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q156_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q142_A2.html">Q[142], A[2]</a> ). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his curing is more difficult, for two
+                     reasons. The first is on the part of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end, which holds the same
+                     position as the principle in demonstrations. Now it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to the principle;
+                     and it is the same in practical matters with one who errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part of the inclination
+                     of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this proceeds from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the
+                     inclination of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily suppressed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained
+                     above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he
+                     does not sin except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man sins even through slight concupiscence and
+                     sometimes forestalls it. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more
+                     the intemperate man, "because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with calm," i.e. slight desire. "For what would he
+                     have done if he had desired it with passion?"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q156_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q156_A4-p0.1">Whether the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to resist
+                     the passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): "It is not wonderful,
+                     indeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains." Now, "as Heraclitus says,
+                     it is more difficult to resist desire than anger" [*Ethic. ii. 3]. Therefore
+                     incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence of anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion be so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as
+                     in the case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment
+                     of reason, than one who is incontinent in desire: since "anger listens to reason somewhat, but desire does not" as the Philosopher
+                     states (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent
+                     in desire.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is. Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since
+                     it leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire
+                     leads. Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of desire."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The sin of incontinence may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall of
+                     reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than incontinence of anger, because the movement of desire is more inordinate
+                     than the movement of anger. There are four reasons for this, and the Philosopher indicates them, Ethic. vii, 6: First, because
+                     the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since the angry man tends to
+                     avenge the injury done to him, and reason dictates this in a certain degree. Yet he does not tend thereto perfectly, because
+                     he does not intend the due mode of vengeance. on the other hand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with sense
+                     and nowise in accord with reason. Secondly, because the movement of anger results more from the bodily temperament owing to
+                     the quickness of the movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one who by bodily temperament is disposed to anger is
+                     more readily angry than one who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent: wherefore also it happens more
+                     often that the children of those who are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the children of those
+                     who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence. Now that which results from the natural disposition
+                     of the body is deemed more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because anger seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain
+                     to
+                     disguise itself and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject to concupiscence works with pleasure, whereas
+                     the angry man works as though forced by a certain previous displeasure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p7"> Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to the evil into which one falls through forsaking reason;
+                     and thus incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because it leads to things that are harmful to one's
+                     neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for the moment it
+                     is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its impetuousness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because nowise
+                     does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it is more disgraceful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers incontinence with regard to its result.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q156_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q155_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q157" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q157-p0.1">OF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q157-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q157-p2"> We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices. Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points
+                  of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q157-p3"> (1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q157-p4"> (2) Whether each of them is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q157-p5"> (3) Whether each is a part of temperance?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q157-p6"> (4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q157_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q157_A1-p0.1">Whether clemency and meekness are absolutely the same?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher
+                     (Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is "desire of vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2]. Since, then, clemency "is leniency of a superior
+                     in inflicting punishment on an inferior," as Seneca states (De Clementia ii, 3), and vengeance is taken by means of punishment,
+                     it would seem that clemency and meekness are the same.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that "clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when
+                     unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person," so that apparently clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep.
+                     ccxi], hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and clemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness
+                     are absolutely the same.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same vice is not opposed to different virtues. But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and
+                     clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are absolutely the same.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca (OBJ[1] ) "clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior": whereas
+                     meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each to everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely
+                     the same.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Ethic. ii, 3, a moral virtue is "about passions and actions." Now internal passions are principles of external
+                     actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore virtues that moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards
+                     the same effect as virtues that moderate actions, although they differ specifically. Thus it belongs properly to justice to
+                     restrain man from theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire of money,
+                     which is restrained by liberality; so that liberality concurs with justice towards the effect, which is abstention from theft.
+                     This applies to the case in point; because through the passion of anger a man is provoked to inflict a too severe punishment,
+                     while it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment, and this might be prevented by excessive anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p7"> Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet
+                     they differ from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment, while meekness properly mitigates the passion
+                     of anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Meekness regards properly the desire itself of vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is applied
+                     externally for the purpose of vengeance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man's affections incline to the moderation of things that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from one man
+                     loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter's punishment in itself, but only as directed to something else, for
+                     instance justice, or the correction of the person punished. Hence love makes one quick to mitigate punishment ---and this
+                     pertains to clemency---while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this reason
+                     Tully says that "the mind provoked to hatred" that is to punish too severely, "is restrained by clemency," from inflicting
+                     too severe a punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred but punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the passion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly concerned
+                     with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those
+                     are called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in punishing." Those who delight in a man's punishment
+                     for its own sake may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human
+                     feeling that leads one man to love another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q157_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q157_A2-p0.1">Whether both clemency and meekness are virtues?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these
+                     are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect" [*Ethic. ii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain
+                     decrease; for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases anger. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, meekness or mildness is included (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.4" target="asv">Mat. 5:4</a>) among the beatitudes, and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.23" target="asv">Gal. 5:23</a>) among the fruits. Now the virtues differ from the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not comprised under virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): "Every good man is conspicuous for his clemency and meekness." Now it is virtue properly
+                     that belongs to a good man, since "virtue it is that makes its possessor good, and renders his works good also" (Ethic. ii,
+                     6). Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The nature of moral virtue consists in the subjection of appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13).
+                     Now this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For clemency, in mitigating punishment, "is guided by reason," according
+                     to Seneca (De Clementia ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates anger according to right reason, as stated in Ethic. iv,
+                     5. Wherefore it is manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the external
+                     infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external
+                     punishing, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q157_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Yet they are not really opposed to one another, since they are both according to right reason. For severity is inflexible
+                     in the infliction of
+                     punishment when right reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also according to right reason, when and where
+                     this is requisite. Wherefore they are not opposed to one another as they are not about the same thing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), "the habit that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is
+                     denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the name of meekness." For the virtue is more akin to diminution
+                     than to excess, because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for injuries done to him, than to be lacking in that
+                     desire, since "scarcely anyone belittles an injury done to himself," as Sallust
+                     observes [*Cf. Q[120]]. As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not in respect of that which is according to right reason,
+                     but as regards that which is according to common law, which is the object of legal justice: yet on account of some particular
+                     consideration, it mitigates the punishment, deciding, as it were, that a man is not to be punished any further. Hence Seneca
+                     says (De Clementia ii, 1): "Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those whom she sets free are declared immune from
+                     all further punishment; and remission of punishment due amounts to a pardon." Wherefore it is clear that clemency is related
+                     to severity as equity [the Greek 'epieikeia' [*Cf. Q[120]]] to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as regards the infliction
+                     of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet clemency differs from equity, as we shall state further on (A[3], ad 1).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the fruits are delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being
+                     reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q157_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q157_A3-p0.1">Whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts of temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="SS_Q157_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which pertains to justice, as stated above (Q[120], A[2]). Therefore
+                     seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences; whereas meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger
+                     and vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): "A man may be said to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty." Now
+                     this is opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness
+                     are parts of prudence rather than of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge." Tully
+                     also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so far as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode whence
+                     the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the mode and name of justice consist in a certain "equality," those
+                     of fortitude in a certain "strength of mind," those of temperance in a certain "restraint," inasmuch as it restrains the most
+                     vehement concupiscences of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness likewise
+                     consist in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates punishment, while meekness represses anger, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q157_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as principal virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be
+                     parts thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Two points must be considered in the mitigation of punishment. one is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance with
+                     the lawgiver's intention, although not according to the letter of the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The
+                     other point is a certain moderation of a man's inward disposition, so that he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment.
+                     This belongs properly to clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii,
+                     3) that "it is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge." This moderation of soul comes from a certain
+                     sweetness of disposition, whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful to another. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia
+                     ii, 3) that "clemency is a certain smoothness of the soul"; for, on the other hand, there would seem to be a certain roughness
+                     of soul in one who fears not to pain others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The annexation of secondary to principal virtues depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form of
+                     the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency agree with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they
+                     agree not in matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Unsoundness" is corruption of "soundness." Now just as soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition
+                     due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind lapsing from the disposition due to the human species.
+                     This occurs both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of reason, and in respect of the appetitive power,
+                     as when a man loses that humane feeling whereby "every man is naturally friendly
+                     towards all other men" (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But
+                     that a man who takes pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind, is because he seems on this account
+                     to be devoid of the humane feeling which gives rise to clemency.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q157_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q157_A4-p0.1">Whether clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because it directs
+                     man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God. Now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it
+                     is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.21" target="asv">James 1:21</a>): "With meekness receive the ingrafted word," and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.5.13" target="asv">Ecclus. 5:13</a>): "Be meek to hear the word" of God. Again, Dionysius says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.)
+                     that "Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition on account of his great meekness." Therefore meekness is the greatest
+                     of virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear
+                     to be most acceptable to God. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.34" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:34,35</a>): "That which is agreeable" to God is "faith and meekness"; wherefore Christ expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.29" target="asv">Mat. 11:29</a>), where He says: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart"; and Hilary declares
+                     [*Comment. in Matth. iv, 3] that "Christ dwells in us by our meekness of soul." Again, it is most acceptable to men; wherefore
+                     it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.3.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 3:19</a>): "My son, do thy works in meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men": for which reason it is also declared
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p3.4" href="./asv.html#Prov.20.28" target="asv">Prov. 20:28</a>) that the King's "throne is strengthened by clemency." Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest of virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that "the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil,
+                     but overcome evil by good." Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety which would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because
+                     a gloss of Ambrose [*Hilary the deacon] on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:8, </a> "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable to all things," observes that "piety is the sum total of the Christian religion."
+                     Therefore
+                     meekness and clemency are the greatest virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but are annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing prevents certain virtues from being greatest, not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a particular genus.
+                     It is impossible for clemency or meekness to be absolutely the greatest virtues, since they owe their praise to the fact that
+                     they withdraw a man from evil, by mitigating anger or punishment. Now it is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil.
+                     Wherefore those virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise prudence and justice, which
+                     direct one to good simply, are absolutely greater virtues than clemency and meekness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p7"> Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil
+                     inclinations. For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on account of its impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man's
+                     free judgment of truth: wherefore meekness above all makes a man self-possessed. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q157_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.31" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:31</a>): "My son, keep thy soul in meekness." Yet the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch are more
+                     shameful, and harass more incessantly, for which reason temperance is more rightly reckoned as a principal virtue. as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q157_A4-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A7.html">Q[141], A[7]</a>, ad 2). As to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity, the greatest of
+                     the virtues, since thereby we do good towards our neighbor, and hinder his evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes man
+                     self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above; secondly, because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict
+                     the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): "To
+                     be meek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it condemn
+                     our evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know better and have a clearer insight of the truth."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God and men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the virtues,
+                     towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor's evils.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and clemency by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our
+                     neighbor's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For piety relieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a superior,
+                     for instance God or one's parents: mercy relieves a neighbor's evil, because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as
+                     one looks upon it as affecting oneself, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q157_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q30_A2.html">Q[30], A[2]</a>): and this results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for the same things: meekness does this, by removing
+                     anger that urges to vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far as it judges equitable that a person
+                     be no further punished.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q157_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q156_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q158" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q158-p0.1">OF ANGER (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q158-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q158-p2"> We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed to meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency.
+                  Concerning anger there are eight points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q158-p3"> (1) Whether it is lawful to be angry?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q158-p4"> (2) Whether anger is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q158-p5"> (3) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q158-p6"> (4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q158-p7"> (5) Of its species;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q158-p8"> (6) Whether anger is a capital vice?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q158-p9"> (7) Of its daughters;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q158-p10"> (8) Whether it has a contrary vice?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q158_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A1-p0.1">Whether it is lawful to be angry?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For Jerome in his exposition on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv"> Mat. 5:22, </a> "Whosoever is angry with his brother," etc. says: "Some codices add 'without cause.' However, in the genuine codices the
+                     sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbidden altogether." Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "The soul's evil is to be without reason." Now anger is always without reason:
+                     for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger does not listen perfectly to reason"; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45)
+                     that "when anger sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends it by its riot"; and Cassian says (De Inst.
+                     Caenob. viii, 6): "From whatever cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds
+                     the eye of the mind." Therefore it is always evil to be angry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is "desire for vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2] according to a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.17" target="asv"> Lev. 19:17, </a> "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart." Now it would seem unlawful to desire vengeance, since this should be left
+                     to God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.35" target="asv"> Dt. 32:35, </a> "Revenge is Mine." Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always an evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since
+                     God judges with tranquillity according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.12.18" target="asv"> Wis. 12:18.</a> Therefore to be angry is always an evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He that is angry without cause,
+                     shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless,
+                     judgments unstable, crimes unchecked." Therefore to be angry is not always an evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking anger is a passion of the sensitive appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="SS_Q158_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A1.html">FS, Q[46], A[1]</a>) when we were treating of the passions. Now with regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may be
+                     found in them in two ways. First by reason of the passion's very species, which is derived from the passion's object. Thus
+                     envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil,
+                     since it is displeasure at another's good, and such displeasure is in itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher
+                     remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention of envy denotes something evil." Now this does not apply to anger, which is the
+                     desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly, evil is found in a passion in respect of the
+                     passion's quantity, that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one
+                     is
+                     angry, more or less than right reason demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one's anger is deserving
+                     of praise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they deemed
+                     anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q158_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q24_A2.html">FS, Q[24], A[2]</a> ) when we were treating of the passions. It is in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger whereby
+                     one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing him a wrong.---But, according to the
+                     Peripatetics, to whose opinion Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions of the soul are movements
+                     of the sensitive appetite, whether they be moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not always evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First, antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude,
+                     and has therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appetite is directed
+                     against vice and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is called "zealous anger." Wherefore Gregory says (Moral.
+                     v, 45): "We must beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it
+                     overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead of following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid,
+                     to obey." This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason in the execution of the act, does not destroy
+                     the rectitude of reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "zealous anger troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful
+                     anger blinds it." Nor is it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted in the execution of what
+                     reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in its act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done, while
+                     having to act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire
+                     vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it
+                     is moved thereto by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with the order of judgment, it is God's work, since
+                     he who has power to punish "is God's minister," as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.4" target="asv"> Rom.
+                        13:4.
+                     </a>
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> We can and ought to be like to God in the desire for good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our
+                     desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory
+                     says (Moral. v, 45) that "anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it bows to the command of reason."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q158_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A2-p0.1">Whether anger is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by sinning. But "we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither
+                     do we incur blame thereby," as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Consequently no passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q158_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A1.html">FS, Q[46], A[1]</a>) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but
+                     to a person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine asserts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger,
+                     for a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.5" target="asv"> Ps. 4:5, </a> "Be ye angry and sin not," says: "The movement of anger is not in our power." Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. vii,
+                     6) that "the angry man acts with displeasure." Now displeasure is contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene [*De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30]. But it is not contrary to man's nature
+                     to be angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible; wherefore Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton.
+                     Monach.] that "to be angry is the property of man." Therefore it is not a sin to be angry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.31" target="asv">Eph. 4:31</a>): "Let all indignation and anger [*Vulg.: 'Anger and indignation'] . . . be put away from you."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Anger, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q158_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q158_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is properly the name of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so far as it is regulated by reason, whereas
+                     it is evil if it set the order of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may be considered in relation
+                     to two things. First, in relation to the appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore if one desire
+                     revenge to be taken in
+                     accordance with the order of reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called "zealous anger" [*Cf. Greg., Moral.
+                     v, 45]. On the other hand, if one desire the taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of reason, for
+                     instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order
+                     prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire
+                     of
+                     anger will be sinful, and this is called sinful anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p8"> Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the
+                     movement of anger should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor externally; and if this condition be disregarded,
+                     anger will not lack sin, even though just vengeance be desired.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since passion may be either regulated or not regulated by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely does not
+                     include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and
+                     deserving of praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason, it may be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore
+                     the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "it is he who is angry in a certain way,
+                     that is praised or blamed."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appetite turns
+                     as to a mutable good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is master of his actions through the judgment of his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that judgment,
+                     it is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole, i.e. so that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check
+                     each one, if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger is not in man's power, to the extent namely that
+                     no such movement arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not
+                     entirely sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the Philosopher that "the angry man acts with displeasure," means that
+                     he is displeased, not with his being angry, but with the injury which he deems done to himself: and through this displeasure
+                     he is moved to seek vengeance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The irascible power in man is naturally subject to his reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is in
+                     accord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is contrary to man's nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q158_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A3-p0.1">Whether all anger is a mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all anger is a mortal sin. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.2" target="asv">Job 5:2</a>): "Anger killeth the foolish man [*Vulg.: 'Anger indeed killeth the foolish']," and he speaks of the spiritual killing, whence
+                     mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal condemnation. Now anger deserves eternal condemnation; for our Lord
+                     said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv">Mat. 5:22</a>): "Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment": and a gloss on this passage says that "the three
+                     things mentioned there, namely judgment, council, and hell-fire, signify in a pointed manner different abodes in the state
+                     of eternal damnation corresponding to various sins."
+                     Therefore anger is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatsoever is contrary to charity is a mortal sin. Now anger is of itself contrary to charity, as Jerome declares
+                     in his commentary on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv"> Mat. 5:22, </a> "Whosoever is angry with his brother," etc. where he says that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor. Therefore anger
+                     is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.5" target="asv"> Ps. 4:5, </a> "Be ye angry and sin not," says: "Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful in two ways, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q158_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q158_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. First, on the part of the appetible object, as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger is a mortal sin in the point
+                     of its genus, because it is contrary to charity and justice. Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a venial sin by
+                     reason of the imperfection of the act. This imperfection is considered either in relation to the
+                     subject desirous of vengeance, as when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment of his reason; or in relation to the
+                     desired object, as when one desires to be avenged in a trifling matter, which should be deemed of no account, so that even
+                     if one proceeded to action, it would not be a mortal sin, for instance by pulling a child slightly by the hair, or by some
+                     other like action. Secondly, the movement of anger may be inordinate in the mode of being angry, for instance, if one be too
+                     fiercely angry inwardly, or if one exceed in the outward signs of anger. In this way anger is not a mortal sin in the point
+                     of its genus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin, for instance if through the fierceness of his anger a man fall away from
+                     the love of God and his neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It does not follow from the passage quoted that all anger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually by
+                     anger, because, through not checking the movement of anger by their reason, they fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming
+                     God or by doing injury to their neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition to the words of the Law: "Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the
+                     judgment" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.21" target="asv">Mat. 5:21</a>). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of the movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave injury of
+                     his neighbor: and should the consent of reason be given to this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the case where anger is contrary to charity, it is a mortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we have
+                     said.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q158_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A4-p0.1">Whether anger is the most grievous sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlviii in Joan.] that "nothing is more repulsive
+                     than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a ruthless* face, and most of all than a cruel soul." [*'Severo'. The
+                     correct text is 'Si vero.' The translation would then run thus . . . 'and nothing uglier.' And if his 'face is ugly, how much
+                     uglier is his soul!']. Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would seem to be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing
+                     is said to be evil because it hurts." Now anger is most hurtful, because it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master
+                     of himself; for Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan.) that "anger differs in no way from madness; it is a demon while it
+                     lasts, indeed more troublesome than one harassed by a demon." Therefore anger is the most
+                     grievous sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, inward movements are judged according to their outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most
+                     grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the beam; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest anger grow into hatred
+                     and a mote become a beam." Therefore anger is not the most grievous sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q158_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q158_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), the inordinateness of anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an undue object, and with regard
+                     to an undue mode of being angry. As to the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the least of sins, for
+                     anger desires the evil of punishment for some person, under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the part of the
+                     evil which it desires the sin of anger
+                     agrees with those sins which desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred; but while hatred desires absolutely
+                     another's evil as such, and the envious man desires another's evil through desire of his own glory, the angry man desires
+                     another's evil under the aspect of just revenge. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is more grievous than envy, and envy
+                     than anger: since it is worse to desire evil as an evil, than as a good; and to desire evil as an external good such as honor
+                     or
+                     glory, than under the aspect of the rectitude of justice. On the part of the good, under the aspect of which the angry man
+                     desires an evil, anger concurs with the sin of concupiscence that tends to a good. In this respect again, absolutely speaking.
+                     the sin of anger is apparently less grievous than that of concupiscence, according as the good of justice, which the angry
+                     man desires, is better than the pleasurable or useful good which is desired by the subject of concupiscence. Wherefore the
+                     Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "the incontinent in desire is more disgraceful than the incontinent in anger."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p7"> On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence
+                     on account of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.4" target="asv"> Prov. 27:4, </a> "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth: and who can bear the violence of one provoked?" Hence Gregory says
+                     (Moral. v, 45): "The heart goaded by the pricks of anger is convulsed, the body trembles, the tongue entangles itself, the
+                     face is inflamed, the eyes are enraged and fail utterly to recognize those whom we know: the tongue makes sounds indeed, but
+                     there is no sense in its utterance."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of the outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers the inordinate movement of anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Murder results from hatred and envy no less than from anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the aspect
+                     of justice, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q158_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A5-p0.1">Whether the Philosopher suitably assigns the species of anger?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some
+                     angry persons are "choleric," some "sullen," and some "ill-tempered" or "stern." According to him, a person is said to be
+                     "sullen" whose anger "is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time." But this apparently pertains to the circumstance
+                     of time. Therefore it seems that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of
+                     the other circumstances.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "ill-tempered" or "stern" persons "are those whose anger is not appeased without revenge,
+                     or punishment." Now this also pertains to the unquenchableness of anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is the same
+                     as bitterness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv">Mat. 5:22</a>): "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca,
+                     shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say" to his brother, "Thou fool." But these degrees are not referable
+                     to the aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of anger is not fitting.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi] says "there are three species of irascibility," namely, "the anger which is
+                     called wrath [*'Fellea,' i.e. like gall. But in 
+                     <a id="SS_Q158_A5-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A8.html">FS, Q[46], A[8]</a>, St. Thomas quoting the same authority has {Cholos} which we render 'wrath']," and "ill-will" which is a disease of the mind,
+                     and "rancour." Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid. For "wrath" he describes as "having beginning
+                     and movement," and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to "choleric" persons: "ill-will" he describes as "an anger
+                     that endures and grows old," and this the Philosopher ascribes to "sullenness"; while he describes "rancour" as "reckoning
+                     the time for vengeance," which tallies with the Philosopher's description of the "ill-tempered." The same division is given
+                     by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to the passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated when
+                     treating of the passions (
+                     <a id="SS_Q158_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A8.html">FS, Q[46], A[8]</a>) how it is to be applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene
+                     had in view. Here, however, we have to take the distinction of these species in its application to the sin of anger, and as
+                     set down by the
+                     Philosopher.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p7"> For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and
+                     this regards "choleric" persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight cause. Secondly, in relation to the duration
+                     of anger, for that anger endures too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because the cause of anger, to wit,
+                     the inflicted injury, remains too long in a man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a lasting
+                     displeasure, wherefore he is "grievous" and "sullen" to himself. In another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which
+                     a man seeks with a stubborn desire: this applies to "ill-tempered" or "stern" people, who do not put aside their anger until
+                     they have inflicted punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger, or his pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration in
+                     the aforesaid species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both "sullen" and "ill-tempered" people have a long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a "sullen" person has an
+                     abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into
+                     the outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except
+                     his displeasure wear away with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the
+                     anger of "ill-tempered" persons is long-lasting on account of their intense desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out
+                     with time, and can be quelled only by revenge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not refer to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course of
+                     the human act [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q158_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A8.html">FS, Q[46], A[8]</a>, OBJ[3]]. For the first degree is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever is angry with his brother."
+                     The second degree is when the anger is manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into effect; and in reference
+                     to this He says:
+                     "Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca!" which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is when the sin conceived inwardly
+                     breaks out into effect. Now the effect of anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge; and the least of hurts is that
+                     which is done by a mere word; wherefore in reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou fool!" Consequently
+                     it is clear that the second adds to the first, and the third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal
+                     sin, in the case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A[3], ad 2), much more so are the others. Wherefore some kind of
+                     condemnation is assigned as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case "judgment" is assigned, and this is the least
+                     severe, for as Augustine says [*Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9], "where judgment is to be delivered, there is an opportunity for
+                     defense": in the second case "council" is assigned, "whereby the judges deliberate together on the punishment to be
+                     inflicted": to the third case is assigned "hell-fire," i.e. "decisive condemnation."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q158_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A6-p0.1">Whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among the capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice
+                     known by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.29.22" target="asv"> Prov. 29:22, </a> "An angry [Douay: 'passionate'] man provoketh quarrels," says: "Anger is the door to all vices: if it be closed, peace is
+                     ensured within to all the virtues; if it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime." Now no capital vice is the origin
+                     of all sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places anger among the capital vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q158_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html">FS, Q[84], A[3]</a>,4), a capital vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two reasons for which many vices can arise
+                     from anger. The first is on the part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability, in so far as revenge is desired
+                     under the aspect of just or honest*, which is attractive by its excellence, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q158_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q158_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. [*Honesty must be taken
+                     here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. Q[145], A[1]]. The second
+                     is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates the mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident
+                     that anger is a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the most part, the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results from
+                     an injury inflicted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (Q[118], A[7]; Q[148], A[5]; Q[153], A[4]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q158_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A4.html">FS, Q[84], A[4]</a>), it belongs to the notion of a capital vice to have a most desirable end, so that many sins are committed through the desire
+                     thereof. Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of good, has a more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter
+                     desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is more a capital vice than hatred is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Anger is stated to be the door to the vices accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the judgment
+                     of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is, however, directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called
+                     its daughters.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q158_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A7-p0.1">Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to anger, namely "quarreling, swelling of the mind, contumely,
+                     clamor, indignation and blasphemy." For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] to be a daughter of pride.
+                     Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters
+                     of anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "a swollen mind" would seem to be the same as pride. Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but "the mother of
+                     all vices," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of the mind should not be reckoned among the daughters
+                     of anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. one is on the
+                     part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems unworthy [indignum] of acting thus towards him, and this is
+                     called "indignation." The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in so far as he devises various means of vengeance,
+                     and with such like thoughts fills his mind, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Job.15.2" target="asv"> Job 15:2,
+                        
+                     </a>"Will a wise man . . . fill his stomach with burning heat?" And thus we have "swelling of the mind."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p7"> Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man
+                     manifests his anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (A[5], ad 3) of the man who says to his brother, "Raca": and
+                     this refers to "clamor," which denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is when a man breaks out into injurious
+                     words, and if these be against God, it is "blasphemy," if against one's neighbor, it is "contumely."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p8"> Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus anger gives rise to "quarrels," by which we are to understand
+                     all manner of injuries inflicted on one's neighbor through anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up against God: since,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 10:14, </a> "the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God," i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him is the first part of
+                     pride [*Cf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q158_A7-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A7.html"> Q[162], A[7]</a>, ad 2]; and this gives rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out through a
+                     disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely displeasure,
+                     even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure. Now through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes
+                     to hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from sloth rather than from anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to take vengeance;
+                     and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A7-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q158_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q158_A8-p0.1">Whether there is a vice opposed to anger resulting from lack of anger?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there. is not a vice opposed to anger, resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God.
+                     Now by being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who judges "with tranquillity" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q158_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.12.18" target="asv">Wis. 12:18</a>). Therefore seemingly it is not a vice to be altogether without anger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether useless. But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca
+                     proves in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it seems that lack of anger is not a vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "man's evil is to be without reason." Now the judgment of reason remains
+                     unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of anger amounts to a vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He who is not angry,
+                     whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites
+                     not only the wicked but even the good to do wrong."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not through
+                     passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which
+                     anger is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth., in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St.
+                     John Chrysostom): "Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment. For
+                     anger, properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion": and when a man is angry with reason, his anger is no longer from
+                     passion: wherefore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger is taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite,
+                     which is with passion resulting from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in man, to the movement
+                     of his will, since the lower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless there be an obstacle.
+                     Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, unless the movement of the will be altogether
+                     lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the passion of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed
+                     to punishment by the judgment of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He that is entirely without anger when he ought to be angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's punishing
+                     by judgment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The passion of anger, like all other movements of the sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more prompt
+                     execution [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q158_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q24_A3.html">FS, Q[24], A[3]</a>] of reason's dictate: else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas "nature does nothing without purpose"
+                     [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also of
+                     the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause
+                     is removed, so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q158_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q157_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q159" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q159_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q159-p0.1">OF CRUELTY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q159-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q159-p2"> We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q159-p3"> (1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q159-p4"> (2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q159_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q159_A1-p0.1">Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency. For Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are said to be cruel
+                     who exceed in punishing," which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance.
+                     Therefore apparently cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q159_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.6.23" target="asv">Jer. 6:23</a>): "They are cruel, and will have no mercy"; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now mercy is not the same as clemency,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q159_A1-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A4.html">Q[157], A[4]</a>, ad 3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of punishment, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q159_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A1.html">Q[157], A[1]</a>): whereas cruelty applies to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q159_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.11.17" target="asv"> Prov. 11:17, </a> "But he that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred." Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "the opposite of clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness of heart in
+                     exacting punishment."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Cruelty apparently takes its name from "cruditas" [rawness]. Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to have
+                     an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and bitter taste. Now it has been stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q159_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html">Q[157], A[3]</a>, ad 1; A[4], ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment.
+                     Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate punishment according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which inclines one to
+                     this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing, as regards the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards
+                     the hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment, belongs to cruelty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both shun and recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For it belongs
+                     to mercy [*Cf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q159_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q30_A1.html"> Q[30], A[1]</a>] to relieve another's unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to mitigate another's unhappiness
+                     by the cessation of punishment. And since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more directly opposed to clemency
+                     than to mercy; yet on
+                     account of the mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for mercilessness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of beneficence
+                     is in itself a punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q159_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q160.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q159_A2-p0.1">Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue.
+                     Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess. Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty
+                     are the same.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "severity is as it were savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without attending
+                     to piety": so that savagery would seem to exclude that mitigation of punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by
+                     piety. Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (A[1], ad 1). Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by way of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency,
+                     which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining
+                     to deficiency is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission or laxity. For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): "Let there
+                     be love, but not that which enervates, let there be severity, but without fury, let
+                     there be zeal without unseemly savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency." Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "a man who is angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is not
+                     said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> "Savagery" and "brutality" take their names from a likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For animals
+                     of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not for some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs
+                     to reason alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies to those who in inflicting punishment have not
+                     in view a default of the person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a
+                     man's torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial,
+                     and resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature, as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand,
+                     cruelty not only regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty differs
+                     from savagery or brutality, as human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But savagery
+                     or brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue,
+                     which the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or "god-like," which according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts
+                     of the Holy Ghost. Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to
+                     the gift of piety.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A severe man is not said to be simply savage, because this implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as regards the truth,"
+                     on account of some likeness to savagery which is not inclined to mitigate punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished on account
+                     of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other hand, cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission
+                     of punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q159_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q159_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q160.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q158_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q159_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q160" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q159_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q160_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q160-p0.1">OF MODESTY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q160-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q160-p2"> We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of its species. Under the first head there are two points
+                  of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q160-p3"> (1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q160-p4"> (2) What is the matter of modesty?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q160_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q160.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q160_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q160_A1-p0.1">Whether modesty is a part of temperance?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance. For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every
+                     virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and "good," according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), "consists in mode, species,
+                     and order." Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be reckoned a part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its
+                     name. Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of our neighbor, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q160_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.24" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:24,25, </a> "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the
+                     truth." Now admonishing wrong-doers is an act of justice or of charity, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q160_A1-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A1.html">Q[33], A[1]</a>). Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as a part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q160_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A4.html">Q[141], A[4]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q160_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html"> Q[157], A[3]</a>), temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is most difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of
+                     pleasures of touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of very great moment, there must needs be another
+                     virtue about matters of lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by the virtues with regard
+                     to everything: thus it was stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q160_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q134_A3.html">Q[134], A[3]</a>, ad 1), that while magnificence is about great expenditure, there is need in addition for liberality, which is concerned
+                     with ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult.
+                     This virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its principal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a name is common to many it is sometimes appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of angel is
+                     appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, mode which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially
+                     appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some things need tempering on account of their strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in all things:
+                     wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong passions, and modesty about weaker passions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Modesty is to be taken there for the general moderation which is necessary in all virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q160.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q160_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q160_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q160_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q160_A2-p0.1">Whether modesty is only about outward actions?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that modesty is only about outward actions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to other
+                     persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q160_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.4.5" target="asv">Phil. 4:5</a>): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the virtues that are about the passions are distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is
+                     seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it will not be concerned with inward passions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one same virtue is both about things pertaining to the appetite---which is proper to the moral virtues---and
+                     about things pertaining to knowledge---which is proper to the intellectual virtues---and again about things pertaining to
+                     the irascible and concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it cannot be about all these things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> In all these things it is necessary to observe the "mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all of
+                     them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q160_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q160_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, modesty differs from temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint is most difficult, while modesty
+                     moderates those that present less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various opinions about modesty. For wherever they
+                     found a special kind of good or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the province of modesty, which they
+                     confined to lesser matters. Now it
+                     is clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a special difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance
+                     from modesty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p7"> In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation
+                     of punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters
+                     that require moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. one is the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this
+                     is moderated by "humility." The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is
+                     moderated by "studiousness" which is opposed to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which require to
+                     be done becomingly and honestly [*Cf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q160_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html"> Q[145], A[1]</a>], whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in dress and the like.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p8"> To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed certain special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus]
+                     mentions "meekness, simplicity, humility," and other kindred virtues, of which we have spoken above (Q[143]); while Aristotle
+                     (Ethic. ii, 7) assigned {eutrapelia} to pleasures in games, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q160_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html">FS, Q[60], A[5]</a>). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully; and in this way modesty regards not only outward but
+                     also inward actions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals. Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain
+                     outward signs.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Various virtues assigned by various authorities are comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from regarding
+                     matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not so great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there
+                     is between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which is about passions, because in actions and passions that
+                     present no great difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part
+                     of moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of moderation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p11"> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q160_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q160_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q159_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q160_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q161" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q160_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q161-p0.1">OF HUMILITY (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q161-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q161-p2"> We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite,
+                  Curiosity; (3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as affecting outward attire.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q161-p3"> Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q161-p4"> (1) Whether humility is a virtue?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q161-p5"> (2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q161-p6"> (3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q161-p7"> (4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q161-p8"> (5) Of its comparison with the other virtues;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q161-p9"> (6) Of the degrees of humility.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q161_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q161_A1-p0.1">Whether humility is a virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue conveys the notion of a penal evil, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.104.18" target="asv"> Ps. 104:18, </a> "They humbled his feet in fetters." Therefore humility is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now humility seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.23" target="asv">Ecclus. 19:23</a>): "There is one that humbleth himself wickedly." Therefore humility is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But humility is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims
+                     at great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem that humility is not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, virtue is "the disposition of that which is perfect" (Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the
+                     imperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is
+                     not a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions, according to Ethic. ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the
+                     Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore
+                     it would seem not to be a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Origen commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.1.48" target="asv"> Lk. 1:48, </a> "He hath regarded the humility of His handmaid," says (Hom. viii in Luc.): "One of the virtues, humility, is particularly
+                     commended in Holy Writ; for our Saviour said: 'Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.'"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q161_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html">FS, Q[23], A[2]</a>) when we were treating of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive to the appetite, namely the aspect of
+                     good, and likewise something repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In respect of the former there
+                     arises the movement of hope, and in respect of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q161_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html">FS, Q[61], A[2]</a>)
+                     that for those appetitive movements which are a kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a moderating and restraining
+                     moral virtue, while for those which are a kind of recoil, there is need, on the part of the appetite, of a moral virtue to
+                     strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold virtue is necessary with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper and
+                     restrain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and this belongs to the virtue of humility: and another to
+                     strengthen the mind against despair, and urge it on to the pursuit of great things according to right reason; and this is
+                     magnanimity. Therefore it is evident that humility is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Isidore observes (Etym. x), "a humble man is so called because he is, as it were, 'humo acclinis'" [*Literally, 'bent
+                     to the ground'], i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This may happen in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for
+                     instance when one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment. Secondly, through an intrinsic principle: and
+                     this may be done sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own
+                     failings, assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus Abraham said to the Lord (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.18.27" target="asv">Gn. 18:27</a>), "I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes." In this way humility is a virtue. Sometimes, however, this may
+                     be ill-done, for instance when man, "not understanding his honor, compares himself to senseless beasts, and becomes like to
+                     them" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.48.13" target="asv">Ps. 48:13</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as it is a virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest
+                     place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs and pretense: wherefore this is "false humility," of which Augustine
+                     says in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is "grievous pride," since to wit, it would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes,
+                     however, this is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way,
+                     properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does not consist externals, but chiefly in the inward choice
+                     of the mind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at great things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to great
+                     things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this,
+                     that each is according to right reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature nor in
+                     respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To Him humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but
+                     only as regards His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be perfect in a restricted sense, for instance in respect
+                     of its nature or state or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in
+                     comparison with God his perfection is found wanting, according to the word of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.17" target="asv"> Is. 40:17, </a> "All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all." In this way humility may be competent to every man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another is defined
+                     according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is a matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special
+                     virtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q161_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q161_A2-p0.1">Whether humility has to do with the appetite?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite but the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride.
+                     Now pride concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 22) that "pride, when it extends outwardly
+                     to the body, is first of all shown in the eyes": wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.130.1" target="asv">Ps. 130:1</a>), "Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty." Now eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. Therefore it
+                     would seem that humility is chiefly concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks little of oneself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "almost the whole of Christian teaching is humility." Consequently nothing
+                     contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things,
+                     according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:31</a>, "Be zealous for the better gifts." Therefore it belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things but the
+                     estimate thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain excessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive
+                     withdrawal: thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the
+                     soul against the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore if humility were to curb the desire of
+                     great things, it would follow that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is
+                     evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire but with the estimate of great things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Andronicus [*De Affectibus] assigns humility to outward show; for he says that humility is "the habit of avoiding
+                     excessive expenditure and parade." Therefore it is not concerned with the movement of the appetite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]) that "the humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of the Lord,
+                     rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners." But choice concerns the appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite
+                     rather than with the estimative power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q161_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it belongs properly to humility, that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that which is above him. For this
+                     purpose he must know his disproportion to that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own deficiency belongs
+                     to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite. Nevertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself; and consequently
+                     it must be said that humility, properly
+                     speaking, moderates the movement of the appetite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it excludes respect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are especially
+                     wont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare themselves with others. But it does not follow from this that humility
+                     is essentially concerned with knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is contrary to humility to aim at greater things through confiding in one's own powers: but to aim at greater things through
+                     confidence in God's help, is not contrary to humility; especially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is
+                     one exalted in God's sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): "It is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another
+                     to raise oneself up against God. He that abases himself before Him, him He
+                     raiseth up; he that raises himself up against Him, him He casteth down."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In fortitude there is the same reason for restraining daring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since the reason
+                     in both cases is that man should set the good of reason before dangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous
+                     hope which pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for strengthening the soul against despair. Because the reason
+                     for strengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one's proper good
+                     lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good which was competent to him; while the chief reason for suppressing
+                     presumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent
+                     to him according to the position in which God has placed him. Wherefore humility would seem to denote in the first place man's
+                     subjection to God; and for this reason Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) ascribes humility, which he understands by
+                     poverty of spirit, to the gift of fear whereby man reveres God. Hence it follows that the relation of fortitude to daring
+                     differs from that of humility to hope. Because fortitude uses daring more than it suppresses it: so that excess of daring
+                     is more like fortitude than lack of daring is. On the other hand, humility suppresses hope or confidence in self more than
+                     it uses it; wherefore excessive self-confidence is more opposed to humility than lack of confidence is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont to be done with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility. Accordingly
+                     humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals, as signs of the inward movement of the appetite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q161_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q161_A3-p0.1">Whether one ought, by humility, to subject oneself to all men?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one ought not, by humility, to subject oneself to all men. For, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), humility
+                     consists chiefly in man's subjection to God. Now one ought not to offer to a man that which is due to God, as is the case
+                     with all acts of religious worship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not to subject oneself to man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gratia xxxiv): "Humility should take the part of truth, not of falsehood." Now some men
+                     are of the highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves to their inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by
+                     humility, to subject oneself to all men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further no one ought to do that which conduces to the detriment of another's spiritual welfare. But if a man subject himself
+                     to another by humility, this is detrimental to the person to whom he subjects himself; for the latter might wax proud, or
+                     despise the other. Hence Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest through excessive humility the superior lose his authority."
+                     Therefore a man ought not, by humility, to subject himself to all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.3" target="asv">Phil. 2:3</a>): "In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We may consider two things in man, namely that which is God's, and that which is man's. Whatever pertains to defect is man's:
+                     but whatever pertains to man's welfare and perfection is God's, according to the saying of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.13.9" target="asv"> Osee 13:9, </a> "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me." Now humility, as stated above (A[1], ad 5; A[2], ad 3), properly
+                     regards the reverence whereby man is subject to God. Wherefore every man, in respect of
+                     that which is his own, ought to subject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that which the latter has of God's: but humility
+                     does not require a man to subject what he has of God's to that which may seem to be God's in another. For those who have a
+                     share of God's gifts know that they have them, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:12</a>: "That we may know the things that are given us from God." Wherefore without prejudice to humility they may set the gifts
+                     they have received from God
+                     above those that others appear to have received from Him; thus the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.5" target="asv">Eph. 3:5</a>): "(The mystery of Christ) was not known to the sons of men as it is now revealed to His holy apostles." In like manner.
+                     humility does not require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that which his neighbor has of man's: otherwise
+                     each one would have to esteem himself a greater sinner than anyone else: whereas the Apostle says without prejudice to humility
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.15" target="asv">Gal.
+                        2:15
+                     </a>): "We by nature are Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners." Nevertheless a man may esteem his neighbor to have some good
+                     which he lacks himself, or himself to have some evil which another has not: by reason of which, he may subject himself to
+                     him with humility.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We must not only revere God in Himself, but also that which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of reverence
+                     as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with humility to all our neighbors for God's sake, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.13" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:13, </a> "Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's sake"; but to God alone do we owe the worship of latria.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If we set what our neighbor has of God's above that which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a gloss
+                     [*St. Augustine, QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 71] on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.3" target="asv"> Phil. 2:3, </a> "Esteem others better than themselves," says: "We must not esteem by pretending to esteem; but we should in truth think it
+                     possible for another person to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we are, although our own
+                     good whereby
+                     we are apparently better than he, be not hidden."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly in the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul, may
+                     subject himself to another, without giving the other man an occasion of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine
+                     means in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "With fear, the superior should prostrate himself at your feet in the sight of God." On the
+                     other hand, due moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even
+                     as of other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If, however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom
+                     an occasion of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with humility; since he does not give scandal, although others
+                     take it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q161_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q161_A4-p0.1">Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one
+                     is subject to God, as stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q161_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Now it belongs to a theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility should be reckoned a theological virtue
+                     rather than a part of temperance or modesty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed
+                     to it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a
+                     part, not of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q161_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q129_A5.html">Q[129], A[5]</a>). Therefore it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): "If thou wilt hear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the philosophers,
+                     know that humility which God regards is the same as what they called {metriotes}, i.e. measure or moderation." Now this evidently
+                     pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a part of modesty or temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q161_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q137_A2.html">Q[137], A[2]</a>, ad 1;
+                     <a id="SS_Q161_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html"> Q[157], A[3]</a>, ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the
+                     mode of temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or suppression of the impetuosity of a passion.
+                     Hence whatever virtues restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of the emotions, are
+                     reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress the movement
+                     of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part
+                     of temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a man who aims at small things in proportion to his
+                     mode is not magnanimous but "temperate," and such a man we may call humble. Moreover, for the reason given above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q161_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q160_A2.html">Q[160], A[2]</a>), among the various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is comprised is modesty as understood by Tully (De
+                     Invent. Rhet. ii, 54), inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A4-p6.4" href="./asv.html#iPet.3.4" target="asv">1 Pet. 3:4</a>): "In the incorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The theological virtues, whose object is our last end, which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the causes
+                     of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused by reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part
+                     of modesty or temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by reason of a sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q161_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q137_A2.html">Q[137], A[2]</a>, ad 1;
+                     <a id="SS_Q161_A4-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q157_A3.html"> Q[157], A[3]</a>, ad 2). Consequently, although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned as a part of modesty or temperance
+                     by reason of its mode.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter, they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned
+                     a part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q161_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q161_A5-p0.1">Whether humility is the greatest of the virtues?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that humility is the greatest of the virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the
+                     publican (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18" target="asv">Lk. 18</a>), says [*Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi.] that "if humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it overtakes
+                     the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the
+                     angels by the judgment seat of God." Hence it is clear that humility is
+                     set above justice. Now justice is either the most exalted of all the virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher
+                     (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. [*S. 10, C[1]]): "Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality?
+                     Attend first of all to the foundation of humility." Now this would seem to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue.
+                     Therefore apparently it is greater than the other virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater reward. Now the greatest reward is due to humility, since "he that humbleth
+                     himself shall be exalted" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.11" target="asv">Lk. 14:11</a>). Therefore humility is the greatest of virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 16), "Christ's whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through
+                     the human nature which He assumed." Now He especially proposed His humility for our example, saying (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.29" target="asv">Mat. 11:29</a>): "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart." Moreover, Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 1) that the "lesson proposed
+                     to us in the mystery of our redemption is the humility of God." Therefore humility would
+                     seem to be the greatest of virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Charity is set above all the virtues, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.14" target="asv">Col. 3:14</a>, "Above all . . . things have charity." Therefore humility is not the greatest of virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The good of human virtue pertains to the order of reason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end: wherefore
+                     the theological virtues are the greatest because they have the last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered
+                     in reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance, as to its essence, is in the reason itself from which
+                     it issues, but by participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and
+                     this ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice. Now humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance
+                     of all kinds and in all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some special matter. Therefore after the theological
+                     virtues, after the intellectual virtues which regard the reason itself, and after justice, especially legal justice, humility
+                     stands before all others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Humility is not set before justice, but before that justice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue; even
+                     so, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is said of the publican (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.14" target="asv">Lk. 18:14</a>) that through the merit of his humility "he went down into his house justified." Hence Chrysostom says [*De incompr. Nat.
+                     Dei, Hom. v]: "Bring me a pair of two-horse chariots: in the one harness pride with justice,
+                     in the other sin with humility: and you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not by its own strength, but by that of
+                     humility: while you will see the other pair beaten, not by the weakness of justice, but by the weight and size of pride."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is, by reason of a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that which
+                     is the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the foundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building.
+                     Now the virtues are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two
+                     ways. First by way of removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first
+                     place, inasmuch as it expels pride, which "God resisteth," and makes man submissive and ever open to receive the influx of
+                     Divine grace. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.6" target="asv">James 4:6</a>): "God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble." In this sense humility is said to be the foundation of the spiritual
+                     edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among virtues directly, because it is the first step towards God. Now the first step towards
+                     God is by faith, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv"> Heb. 11:6,
+                        
+                     </a>"He that cometh to God must believe." In this sense faith is the foundation in a more excellent way than humility.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To him that despises earthly things, heavenly things are promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who despise
+                     earthly riches, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.19" target="asv"> Mat. 6:19,20, </a> "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth . . . but lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven." Likewise heavenly consolations
+                     are promised to those who despise worldly joys, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.5" target="asv"> Mat. 4:5, </a> "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be
+                     comforted." In the same way spiritual uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone merits it, but because it
+                     is proper to it to despise earthly uplifting. Wherefore Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]): "Think not that he who
+                     humbles himself remains for ever abased, for it is written: 'He shall be exalted.' And do not imagine that his exaltation
+                     in men's eyes is effected by bodily uplifting."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility to us, was because it especially removes the obstacle to man's spiritual
+                     welfare consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and spiritual things, in which he is hindered by striving to become great in
+                     earthly things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spiritual welfare, showed by giving an example of humility,
+                     that outward exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility is, as it were, a
+                     disposition to man's untrammeled access to spiritual and divine goods. Accordingly as perfection is greater than disposition,
+                     so charity, and other virtues whereby man approaches God directly, are greater than humility.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q161_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q161_A6-p0.1">Whether twelve degrees of humility are fittingly distinguished in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the twelve degrees of humility that are set down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict [*St. Thomas gives
+                     these degrees in the reverse order to that followed by St. Benedict] are unfittingly distinguished. The first is to be "humble
+                     not only in heart, but also to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the ground"; the second is "to speak few
+                     and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice"; the third is "not to be easily moved, and
+                     disposed to laughter"; the fourth is "to maintain silence until one is asked"; the fifth is "to do nothing but to what one
+                     is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery"; the sixth is "to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all"; the seventh
+                     is "to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes"; the eighth is "to confess one's sin"; the ninth is "to
+                     embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances"; the tenth is "to subject oneself to a superior";
+                     the
+                     eleventh is "not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires"; the twelfth is "to fear God and to be always mindful of everything
+                     that God has commanded." For among these there are some things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obedience and patience.
+                     Again there are some that seem to involve a false opinion---and this is inconsistent with any virtue---namely to declare oneself
+                     more despicable than all men, and to confess and believe oneself to be in all ways worthless and unprofitable.
+                     Therefore these are unfittingly placed among the degrees of humility.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, humility proceeds from within to externals, as do other virtues. Therefore in the aforesaid degrees, those which
+                     concern outward actions are unfittingly placed before those which pertain to inward actions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Anselm (De Simil. ci, seqq.) gives seven degrees of humility, the first of which is "to acknowledge oneself contemptible";
+                     the second, "to grieve for this"; the third, "to confess it"; the fourth, "to convince others of this, that is to wish them
+                     to believe it"; the fifth, "to bear patiently that this be said of us"; the sixth, "to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt";
+                     the seventh, "to love being thus treated." Therefore the aforesaid degrees
+                     would seem to be too numerous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.3.15" target="asv"> Mat. 3:15 </a>says: "Perfect humility has three degrees. The first is to subject ourselves to those who are above us, and not to set ourselves
+                     above our equals: this is sufficient. The second is to submit to our equals, and not to set ourselves before our inferiors;
+                     this is called abundant humility. The third degree is to subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is perfect righteousness."
+                     Therefore the aforesaid degrees
+                     would seem to be too numerous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): "The measure of humility is apportioned to each one according to his rank. It
+                     is imperiled by pride, for the greater a man is the more liable is he to be entrapped." Now the measure of a man's greatness
+                     cannot be fixed according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it would seem that it is not possible to assign the aforesaid
+                     degrees to humility.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q161_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A2.html">(A[2])</a> humility has essentially to do with the appetite, in so far as a man restrains the impetuosity of his soul, from tending
+                     inordinately to great things: yet its rule is in the cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be above what
+                     we are. Also, the principle and origin of both these things is the reverence we bear to God. Now the inward disposition of
+                     humility leads to certain outward signs in
+                     words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that which is hidden within, as happens also with the other virtues. For "a man
+                     is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, by his countenance" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A6-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.26" target="asv">Ecclus. 19:26</a>). Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of humility include something regarding the root of humility, namely the twelfth degree,
+                     "that a man fear God and bear all His commandments in mind."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p8"> Again, they include certain things with regard to the appetite, lest one aim inordinately at one's own excellence. This is
+                     done in three ways. First, by not following one's own will, and this pertains to the eleventh degree; secondly, by regulating
+                     it according to one's superior judgment, and this applies to the tenth degree; thirdly, by not being deterred from this on
+                     account of the difficulties and hardships that come in our way, and this belongs to the ninth degree.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p9"> Certain things also are included referring to the estimate a man forms in acknowledging his own deficiency, and this in three
+                     ways. First by acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings; this belongs to the eighth degree: secondly, by deeming oneself
+                     incapable of great things, and this pertains to the seventh degree: thirdly, that in this respect one should put others before
+                     oneself, and this belongs to the sixth degree.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p10"> Again, some things are included that refer to outward signs. One of these regards deeds, namely that in one's work one should
+                     not depart from the ordinary way; this applies to the fifth degree. Two others have reference to words, namely that one should
+                     not be in a hurry to speak, which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not immoderate in speech, which refers to
+                     the second. The others have to do with outward gestures, for instance in restraining haughty looks, which
+                     regards the first, and in outwardly checking laughter and other signs of senseless mirth, and this belongs to the third degree.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and avow oneself the most despicable of men, as regards the hidden faults which
+                     we acknowledge in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God which others have. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. lii): "Bethink
+                     you that some persons are in some hidden way better than you, although outwardly you are better than they." Again, without
+                     falsehood one may avow and believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in
+                     respect of one's own capability, so as to refer all one's sufficiency to God, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A6-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:5, </a> "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God." And there is
+                     nothing unbecoming in ascribing to humility those things that pertain to other virtues, since, just as one vice arises from
+                     another, so, by a natural sequence, the act of one virtue proceeds from the act of another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man arrives at humility in two ways. First and chiefly by a gift of grace, and in this way the inner man precedes the outward
+                     man. The other way is by human effort, whereby he first of all restrains the outward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking
+                     out the inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees of humility are here enumerated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the degrees mentioned by Anselm are reducible to knowledge, avowal, and desire of one's own abasement. For the first
+                     degree belongs to the knowledge of one's own deficiency; but since it would be wrong for one to love one's own failings, this
+                     is excluded by the second degree. The third and fourth degrees regard the avowal of one's own deficiency; namely that not
+                     merely one simply assert one's failing, but that one convince another of it. The other
+                     three degrees have to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward excellence, but outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity,
+                     whether it consist of words or deeds. For as Gregory says (Regist. ii, 10, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q161_A6-p13.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 36</a>), "there is nothing great in being humble towards those who treat us with regard, for even worldly people do this: but we
+                     should especially be humble towards those who make us suffer," and this belongs to the fifth and sixth degrees: or the appetite
+                     may even go so far as lovingly to
+                     embrace external abasement, and this pertains to the seventh degree; so that all these degrees are comprised under the sixth
+                     and seventh mentioned above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> These degrees refer, not to the thing itself, namely the nature of humility, but to the degrees among men, who are either
+                     of higher or lower or of equal degree.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> This argument also considers the degrees of humility not according to the nature of the thing, in respect of which the aforesaid
+                     degrees are assigned, but according to the various conditions of men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q161_A6-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q160_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q162" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q162-p0.1">OF PRIDE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q162-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q162-p2"> We must next consider pride, and (1) pride in general; (2) the first man's sin, which we hold to have been pride. Under the
+                  first head there are eight points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q162-p3"> (1) Whether pride is a sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q162-p4"> (2) Whether it is a special vice?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q162-p5"> (3) Wherein does it reside as in its subject?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q162-p6"> (4) Of its species;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q162-p7"> (5) Whether it is a mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q162-p8"> (6) Whether it is the most grievous of all sins?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q162-p9"> (7) Of its relation to other sins;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q162-p10"> (8) Whether it should be reckoned a capital vice?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q162_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A1-p0.1">Whether pride is a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not a sin. For no sin is the object of God's promise. For God's promises refer to what He will
+                     do; and He is not the author of sin. Now pride is numbered among the Divine promises: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.60.15" target="asv">Is. 60:15</a>): "I will make thee to be an everlasting pride [Douay: 'glory'], a joy unto generation and generation." Therefore pride is
+                     not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is not a sin to wish to be like unto God: for every creature has a natural desire for this; and especially does
+                     this become the rational creature which is made to God's image and likeness. Now it is said in Prosper's Lib. Sent. 294, that
+                     "pride is love of one's own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who is supremely excellent." Hence Augustine says (Confess.
+                     ii, 6): "Pride imitates exaltedness; whereas Thou alone art God exalted over all."
+                     Therefore pride is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a sin is opposed not only to a virtue but also to a contrary vice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But
+                     no vice is found to be opposed to pride. Therefore pride is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.4.14" target="asv">Tob. 4:14</a>): "Never suffer pride to reign in thy mind or in thy words."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Pride [superbia] is so called because a man thereby aims higher [supra] than he is; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x): "A
+                     man is said to be proud, because he wishes to appear above (super) what he really is"; for he who wishes to overstep beyond
+                     what he is, is proud. Now right reason requires that every man's will should tend to that which is proportionate to him. Therefore
+                     it is evident that pride denotes something opposed to right reason, and this shows it
+                     to have the character of sin, because according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 4), "the soul's evil is to be opposed to reason."
+                     Therefore it is evident that pride is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pride [superbia] may be understood in two ways. First, as overpassing [supergreditur] the rule of reason, and in this sense
+                     we say that it is a sin. Secondly, it may simply denominate "super-abundance"; in which sense any super-abundant thing may
+                     be called pride: and it is thus that God promises pride as significant of super-abundant good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on
+                     the same passage (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.61.6" target="asv">Is. 61:6</a>) says that "there is a good and an
+                     evil pride"; or "a sinful pride which God resists, and a pride that denotes the glory which He bestows."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p8"> It may also be replied that pride there signifies abundance of those things in which men may take pride.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason has the direction of those things for which man has a natural appetite; so that if the appetite wander from the rule
+                     of reason, whether by excess or by default, it will be sinful, as is the case with the appetite for food which man desires
+                     naturally. Now pride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
+                     13) that pride is the "desire for inordinate exaltation": and hence it is that, as he
+                     asserts (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13; xix, 12), "pride imitates God inordinately: for it hath equality of fellowship under Him, and
+                     wishes to usurp Hi. dominion over our fellow-creatures."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pride is directly opposed to the virtue of humility, which, in a way, is concerned about the same matter as magnanimity,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A1.html">Q[161], A[1]</a>, ad 3). Hence the vice opposed to pride by default is akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which is opposed by default to magnanimity.
+                     For just as it belongs to magnanimity to urge the mind to great things against despair, so it belongs to humility to withdraw
+                     the mind from the
+                     inordinate desire of great things against presumption. Now pusillanimity, if we take it for a deficiency in pursuing great
+                     things, is properly opposed to magnanimity by default; but if we take it for the mind's attachment to things beneath what
+                     is becoming to a man, it is opposed to humility by default; since each proceeds from a smallness of mind. In the same way,
+                     on the other hand, pride may be opposed by excess, both to magnanimity and humility, from different points of view: to humility,
+                     inasmuch as it scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch as it tends to great things inordinately. Since, however, pride
+                     implies a certain elation, it is more directly opposed to humility, even as pusillanimity, which denotes littleness of soul
+                     in tending towards great things, is more directly opposed to magnanimity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q162_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A2-p0.1">Whether pride is a special sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not a special sin. For Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "you will find no sin that
+                     is not labelled pride"; and Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. iii, 2) that "without pride no sin is, or was, or ever will be
+                     possible." Therefore pride is a general sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.33.17" target="asv"> Job 33:17, </a> "That He may withdraw man from wickedness [*Vulg.: 'From the things that he is doing, and may deliver him from pride'],"
+                     says that "a man prides himself when he transgresses His commandments by sin." Now according to Ambrose [*De Parad. viii],
+                     "every sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin is
+                     pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. But pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says (Moral.
+                     xxxiv, 23): "Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one virtue; it raises itself up against all the powers of
+                     the soul, and like an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body"; and Isidore says (Etym. [*De Summo Bono
+                     ii, 38]) that it is "the downfall of all virtues." Therefore pride is not a special
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every special sin has a special matter. Now pride has a general matter, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that
+                     "one man is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is elated by mean and earthly things, another by sublime and
+                     heavenly virtues." Therefore pride is not a special but a general sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix): "If he look into the question carefully, he will find that, according to God's law,
+                     pride is a very different sin from other vices." Now the genus is not different from its species. Therefore pride is not a
+                     general but a special sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The sin of pride may be considered in two ways. First with regard to its proper species, which it has under the aspect of
+                     its proper object. In this way pride is a special sin, because it has a special object: for it is inordinate desire of one's
+                     own excellence, as stated (A[1], ad 2). Secondly, it may be considered as having a certain influence towards other sins. In
+                     this way it has somewhat of a generic character, inasmuch as all sins may arise from pride,
+                     in two ways. First directly, through other sins being directed to the end of pride which is one's own excellence, to which
+                     may be directed anything that is inordinately desired. Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it were, that is by removing
+                     an obstacle, since pride makes a man despise the Divine law which hinders him from sinning, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.2.20" target="asv"> Jer. 2:20, </a> "Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p8"> It must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride admits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride
+                     sometimes, but it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For though one may break the commandments of
+                     the Law by any kind of sin, through contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always break the Divine commandments
+                     through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance. and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason Augustine
+                     says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "many things are done amiss which are not done through pride."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words are introduced by Augustine into his book De Nat. et Grat., not as being his own, but as those of someone with
+                     whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the assertion, and shows that not all sins are committed through pride.
+                     We might, however, reply that these authorities must be understood as referring to the outward effect of pride, namely the
+                     breaking of the commandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act
+                     of pride, namely contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed, not always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance,
+                     sometimes through weakness, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but not affectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays his father, is a parricide
+                     effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend it. Accordingly he who breaks God's commandment is said to pride
+                     himself against God, effectively always, but not always affectively.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. In one way by direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not corrupt every
+                     virtue, but only humility; even as every special sin destroys the special virtue opposed to it, by acting counter thereto.
+                     In another way a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: and thus pride destroys every virtue, in so far
+                     as it finds an occasion of pride in every virtue, just as in everything else
+                     pertaining to excellence. Hence it does not follow that it is a general sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Pride regards a special aspect in its object, which aspect may be found in various matters: for it is inordinate love of
+                     one's excellence, and excellence may be found in various things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q162_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A3-p0.1">Whether the subject of pride is the irascible faculty?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the subject of pride is not the irascible faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17): "A swollen mind
+                     is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light." Now the knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible
+                     but to the rational faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that "the proud observe other people's conduct not so as to set themselves beneath
+                     them with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with pride": wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue
+                     observation. Now observation pertains not to the irascible but to the rational faculty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further. pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it consists
+                     essentially in the contempt of God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 10:14, </a> "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God." Now the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appetite,
+                     cannot extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot be in the irascible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as stated in Prosper's Liber Sententiarum, sent. 294, "Pride is love of one's own excellence." But love is not in
+                     the irascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the gift of fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the irascible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act cannot be
+                     other than the object of the power, which is the subject of both. Now the proper object of pride is something difficult, for
+                     pride is the desire of one's own excellence, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways.
+                     First in a strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even as anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of
+                     the sensitive appetite. Secondly, the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to belong also to the intellective
+                     appetite, to which also anger is sometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the angels, not as a passion,
+                     but as denoting the sentence of justice pronouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood in this broad sense is
+                     not distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated above in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A4.html">FP, Q[59], A[4]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A3-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A5.html">FS, Q[82], A[5]</a>, ad 1 and 2.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p8"> Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, were merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive
+                     appetite might tend, pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of the sensitive appetite. But since the difficult
+                     thing which pride has in view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say that the subject of pride
+                     is the irascible not only strictly so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider
+                     acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appetite. Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause. For the
+                     proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.25" target="asv"> Mat. 11:25, </a> "Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent," i.e. from the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes,
+                     "and hast revealed them to little ones," i.e. to the humble.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p10"> Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.6.34" target="asv">Ecclus. 6:34</a>): "If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive instruction." The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is
+                     directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth;
+                     thus Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that "the proud, although certain hidden truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot
+                     realize
+                     their sweetness: and if they know of them they cannot relish them." Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A3-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.11.2" target="asv">Prov. 11:2</a>): "Where humility is there also is wisdom."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A2.html">Q[161], AA[2]</a>, 6), humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem. Now pride does not observe this rule
+                     of right reason, for he esteems himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate desire for his own excellence,
+                     since a man is ready to believe what he desires very much, the result being that his appetite is borne towards things higher
+                     than what become
+                     him. Consequently whatsoever things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to pride: and one of those is the observing
+                     of other people's failings, just as, on the other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17), "holy men, by a like observation
+                     of other people's virtues, set others above themselves." Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in the rational faculty,
+                     but that one of its causes is in the reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general signification,
+                     as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), "love precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause," wherefore
+                     it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It is in this sense that pride is said to be "love of one's own excellence,"
+                     inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his superiority over others, and this belongs properly to pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q162_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A4-p0.1">Whether the four species of pride are fittingly assigned by Gregory?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly assigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): "There are four
+                     marks by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself; either when they think that their good is from themselves,
+                     or if they believe it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their own merits; or when they boast of having what
+                     they have not, or despise others and wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what they
+                     have." For pride is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue from faith. Now it pertains to unbelief,
+                     if a man deem that he has not received his good from God, or that he has the good of grace through his own merits. Therefore
+                     this should not be reckoned a species of pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species of different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>;
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A4-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q112.html"> Q[112])</a>. Therefore it should not be accounted a species of pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride, which are not mentioned here. For Jerome [*Reference unknown] says
+                     that "nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful": and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that "it
+                     belongs to pride to excuse oneself of a sin one has committed." Again, presumption whereby one aims at having what is above
+                     one, would seem to have much to do with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not
+                     sufficiently account for the different species of pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm [*Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq.] divides the uplifting of pride,
+                     saying that there is "pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of deed." Bernard [*De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq.] also
+                     reckons twelve degrees of pride, namely "curiosity, frivolity of mind, senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance,
+                     presumption, defense of one's sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful
+                     habit." Now these apparently are not comprised under the species mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to
+                     be assigned unfittingly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The authority of Gregory suffices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2,3), pride denotes immoderate desire of one's own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is not in accord with right reason.
+                     Now it must be observed that all excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be considered in three ways. First,
+                     in itself. For it is evident that the greater the good that one has, the greater the excellence that one derives from it.
+                     Hence when a man ascribes to himself a
+                     good greater than what he has, it follows that his appetite tends to his own excellence in a measure exceeding his competency:
+                     and thus we have the third species of pride, namely "boasting of having what one has not."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p8"> Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to
+                     have it of another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another as though he had it of himself, the result
+                     is that his appetite is borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of one's own good in two ways, efficiently
+                     and meritoriously: and thus we have the first two species of pride, namely "when a man thinks he has from
+                     himself that which he has from God," or "when he believes that which he has received from above to be due to his own merits."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p9"> Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it, in so far as a man obtains greater excellence through
+                     possessing some good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his appetite is borne inordinately towards
+                     his own excellence: and thus we have the fourth species of pride, which is "when a man despises others and wishes to be singularly
+                     conspicuous."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways. First, universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is destroyed
+                     by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice, and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication,
+                     judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were
+                     he to say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question in
+                     point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that there is a good which is not from God, or that grace is given
+                     to men for their merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and not to unbelief, through inordinate desire of
+                     one's own excellence, to boast of one's goods as though one had them of oneself, or of one's own merits.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as regards the outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what he has
+                     not: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned by Gregory to be a species of pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he has from another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to ingratitude.
+                     To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to the third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the
+                     good of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is above one, would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth
+                     species, which consists in wishing to be preferred to others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in thought,
+                     then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p14"> The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we
+                     have spoken above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A4-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A6.html">Q[161], A[6]</a>). For the first degree of humility is to "be humble in heart, and to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the
+                     ground": and to this is opposed "curiosity," which consists in looking around in all directions curiously and inordinately.
+                     The second degree of humility is "to speak few and
+                     sensible words, and not to be loud of voice": to this is opposed "frivolity of mind," by which a man is proud of speech. The
+                     third degree of humility is "not to be easily moved and disposed to laughter," to which is opposed "senseless mirth." The
+                     fourth degree of humility is "to maintain silence until one is asked," to which is opposed "boasting". The fifth degree of
+                     humility is "to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery," to which is opposed "singularity,"
+                     whereby a man wishes to seem more holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is "to believe and acknowledge oneself viler
+                     than all," to which is opposed "arrogance," whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh degree of humility is "to
+                     think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes," to which is opposed "presumption," whereby a man thinks himself
+                     capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of humility is "to confess one's sins," to which is opposed "defense
+                     of one's sins." The ninth degree is "to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances," to which
+                     is opposed "deceitful confession," whereby a man being unwilling to be punished for his sins confesses them deceitfully. The
+                     tenth degree of humility is "obedience," to which is opposed "rebelliousness." The eleventh degree of humility is "not to
+                     delight in fulfilling one's own desires"; to this is opposed "license," whereby a man delights in doing freely whatever he
+                     will.
+                     The last degree of humility is "fear of God": to this is opposed "the habit of sinning," which implies contempt of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p15"> In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated, but also certain things that precede and follow them,
+                     as we have stated above with regard to humility (
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A4-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A6.html">Q[161], A[6]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A4-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q162_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A5-p0.1">Whether pride is a mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin. For a gloss on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.7.4" target="asv">Ps. 7:4</a>, "O Lord my God, if I have done this thing," says: "Namely, the universal sin which is pride." Therefore if pride were a
+                     mortal sin, so would every sin be.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But pride is apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love
+                     of God, nor as to the love of one's neighbor, because the excellence which, by pride, one desires inordinately, is not always
+                     opposed to God's honor, or our neighbor's good. Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride is not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom,
+                     for as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23), "sometimes a man is elated by sublime and heavenly virtues." Therefore pride is not
+                     a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "pride is a most evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the elect."
+                     But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins. Therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly regards the subjection of man to God, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A1.html">Q[161], A[1]</a>, ad 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in so far as a man raises himself above that which is appointed
+                     to him according to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.10.13" target="asv">2 Cor. 10:13</a>), "But we will not glory beyond our measure; but according to the measure
+                     of the rule which God hath measured to us." Wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:14</a>): "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God" because, to wit, the root of pride is found to consist in man
+                     not being, in some way, subject to God and His rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is of its very nature
+                     a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away from God: and consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin. Nevertheless
+                     just as in other sins
+                     which are mortal by their genus (for instance fornication and adultery) there are certain motions that are venial by reason
+                     of their imperfection (through forestalling the judgment of reason, and being without its consent), so too in the matter of
+                     pride it happens that certain motions of pride are venial sins, when reason does not consent to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A2.html">(A[2])</a> pride is a general sin, not by its essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all sins may have their origin in pride.
+                     Hence it does not follow that all sins are mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we have stated to be a
+                     mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pride is always contrary to the love of God, inasmuch as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule as he
+                     ought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor; when, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his
+                     neighbor: and this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has established order among men, so that one ought to
+                     be subject to another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct cause, but as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a virtue
+                     an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from being the accidental cause of another, as stated in Phys. viii,
+                     1. Hence some are even proud of their humility.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q162_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A6-p0.1">Whether pride is the most grievous of sins?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of sins. For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it
+                     would seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "Other sins find their
+                     vent in the accomplishment of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy them." Therefore pride is not
+                     the most grievous of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "The greater evil is opposed to the greater good," as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to
+                     which pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q61_A5.html">Q[61], A[5]</a>). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues, such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth,
+                     are more grievous sins than pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser evil. But pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.28" target="asv"> Rom. 1:28, </a> where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men of science were delivered "to a reprobate sense, to do those
+                     things which are not convenient." Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.51" target="asv"> Ps. 118:51, </a> "The proud did iniquitously," says: "The greatest sin in man is pride."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to a mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion from
+                     the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and complement. Now on the part of the conversion, there is no reason
+                     for pride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride covets inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible
+                     with the good of virtue. But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme gravity,
+                     because in other sins man turns away from God, either through ignorance or through weakness, or through desire for any other
+                     good whatever; whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply through being unwilling to be subject to God and His rule. Hence
+                     Boethius [*Cf. Cassian, de Caenob. Inst. xii, 7] says that "while all vices flee from God, pride alone withstands God"; for
+                     which reason it is specially stated (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.6" target="asv">James 4:6</a>) that "God resisteth the proud." Wherefore aversion
+                     from God and His commandments, which is a consequence as it were in other sins, belongs to pride by its very nature, for its
+                     act is the contempt of God. And since that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always of greater weight than that which
+                     belongs to it through something else, it follows that pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because it exceeds
+                     in aversion which is the formal complement of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First, on account of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in its
+                     onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and "still more difficult is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its connaturality,"
+                     as stated in Ethic. ii, 3,9. A difficulty of this kind in avoiding sin diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man sins
+                     the more grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous temptation,
+                     as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 12,15).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p8"> Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since
+                     it takes occasion even from good deeds, as stated (A[5], ad 3). Hence Augustine says pointedly that it "lies in wait for good
+                     deeds"; and it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.141.4" target="asv">Ps. 141:4</a>): "In the way wherein I walked, the proud [*Cf.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.139.6" target="asv"> Ps. 139:6, </a> 'The proud have hidden a net for me.'] [Vulg.: 'they'] have hidden a snare for me." Hence no
+                     very great gravity attaches to the movement of pride while creeping in secretly, and before it is discovered by the judgment
+                     of reason: but once discovered by reason, it is easily avoided, both by considering one's own infirmity, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.9" target="asv"> Ecclus. 10:9, </a> "Why is earth and ashes proud?" and by considering God's greatness, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Job.15.13" target="asv"> Job 15:13, </a> "Why doth thy spirit swell against God?" as well as by considering the imperfection of the goods on which
+                     man prides himself, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p8.5" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.6" target="asv"> Is. 40:6, </a> "All flesh is grass, and all the glory thereof as the flower of the field"; and farther on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A6-p8.6" href="./asv.html#Isa.64.6" target="asv">Is. 64:6</a>), "all our justices" are become "like the rag of a menstruous woman."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Opposition between a vice and a virtue is inferred from the object, which is considered on the part of conversion. In this
+                     way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins, as neither has humility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the greatest
+                     on the part of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other sins. For unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud
+                     contempt, is rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of ignorance
+                     or weakness. The same applies to despair and the like.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more evident
+                     absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh,
+                     which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that "pride is the
+                     worst of all vices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest
+                     and foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous deeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. on the other
+                     hand, carnal lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a shameful nature: and yet, under God's dispensation,
+                     it is less grievous than pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels it not, falls into the lusts of the flesh,
+                     that being thus humbled he may rise from his abasement."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p11"> From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows
+                     the patient to contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be more grievous by the very fact that,
+                     as a remedy, God allows men to fall into other sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A6-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q162_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A7-p0.1">Whether pride is the first sin of all?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all. For the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not
+                     accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done "amiss
+                     which are not done with pride." Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:14</a>) that the "beginning of . . . pride is to fall off from God." Therefore falling away from God precedes pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to the order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of
+                     all virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.3.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 3:13</a>): "Evil men and seducers shall grow worse and worse"; so that apparently man's beginning of wickedness is not the greatest
+                     of sins. But pride is the greatest of sins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is not the first sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality. Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "pride apes fortitude
+                     and daring." Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The first thing in every genus is that which is essential. Now it has been stated above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A6.html">(A[6])</a> that aversion from God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride essentially, and to other sins, consequently.
+                     Hence it is that pride fulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is "the beginning of all sins," as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A7-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html">FS, Q[84], A[2]</a>), when we were treating of the causes of sin on the part
+                     of the aversion which is the chief part of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pride is said to be "the beginning of all sin," not as though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of sin
+                     is naturally liable to arise from pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To fall off from God is said to be the beginning of pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being
+                     the first part of pride. For it has been said above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A7-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A5.html">(A[5])</a> that pride regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence it scorns to be subject to a creature for
+                     God's sake.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no need for the order of virtues to be the same as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that which
+                     is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore as faith is the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last
+                     of sins, to which sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A7-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.136.7" target="asv"> Ps. 136:7, </a> "Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof," says that "by heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse
+                     into unbelief," and the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A7-p11.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.19" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:19</a>) that "some rejecting a good conscience have made shipwreck concerning the faith."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins because that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence pride
+                     is the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to pride there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed
+                     through ignorance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered
+                     more grievous. And as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the
+                     withdrawal from sin, a gloss on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q162_A7-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.13" target="asv"> Ps. 18:13, </a> "I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin," says: "Namely from the sin of pride, which is the last in those who return to
+                     God, and the first in those who withdraw from God."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The Philosopher associates pride with feigned fortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man thinks he
+                     is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be daring or brave.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A7-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q162_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q162_A8-p0.1">Whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital vice, since Isidore [*Comment. in Deut. xvi] and Cassian [*De Inst.
+                     Caenob. v, 1: Collat. v, 2] number pride among the capital vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since both covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice.
+                     Therefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "pride begets envy, nor is it ever without this companion." Now envy is
+                     reckoned a capital vice, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A8-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q36_A4.html">Q[36], A[4]</a>). Much more therefore is pride a capital vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not include pride among the capital vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q162_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,5, ad 1) pride may be considered in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin; secondly, as having a general influence
+                     towards all sins. Now the capital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many kinds of sin arise. Wherefore
+                     some, considering pride in the light of a special sin, numbered it together with the other capital vices. But Gregory, taking
+                     into consideration its general
+                     influence towards all vices, as explained above (A[2], OBJ[3]), did not place it among the capital vices, but held it to be
+                     the "queen and mother of all the vices." Hence he says (Moral. xxxi, 45): "Pride, the queen of vices, when it has vanquished
+                     and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that they may despoil
+                     it and produce vices of all kinds."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the cause thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while vainglory covets
+                     the outward show of excellence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that envy, which is a capital vice, arises from pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but that it
+                     is still more principal than the capital vices themselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q162_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q161_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q163" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q163-p0.1">OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q163-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q163-p2"> We must now consider the first man's sin which was pride: and (1) his sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby
+                  he was led to sin.
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q163-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q163-p4"> (1) Whether pride was the first man's first sin?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q163-p5"> (2) What the first man coveted by sinning?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q163-p6"> (3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q163-p7"> (4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q163_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q163_A1-p0.1">Whether pride was the first man's first sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride was not the first man's first sin. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.19" target="asv">Rom. 5:19</a>) that "by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners." Now the first man's first sin is the one by which all men
+                     were made sinners in the point of original sin. Therefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man's first sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Ambrose says, commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.4.3" target="asv"> Lk. 4:3, </a> "And the devil said to Him," that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same order as in overcoming the first man. Now
+                     Christ was first tempted to gluttony, as appears from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.3" target="asv"> Mat. 4:3, </a> where it was said to Him: "If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread." Therefore the first man's
+                     first sin was not pride but gluttony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man sinned at the devil's suggestion. Now the devil in tempting man promised him knowledge (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.5" target="asv">Gn. 3:5</a>). Therefore inordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which pertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity,
+                     and not pride, was the first sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xi] on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:14</a>, "The woman being seduced was in the transgression," says: "The Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded
+                     to accept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them to touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched
+                     it, they would be like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them the godhead . . ." Now it pertains to unbelief
+                     to believe such a
+                     thing. Therefore man's first sin was unbelief and not pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." Now man's first sin is the beginning of all sin, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv"> Rom. 5:12, </a> "By one man sin entered into this world." Therefore man's first sin was pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is first
+                     found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward movement of the soul before being in the outward act of the
+                     body; since, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the body is not forfeited so long as the sanctity of the
+                     soul remains. Also, among the inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the end before
+                     being moved towards that which is desired for the sake of the end; and consequently man's first sin was where it was possible
+                     for his appetite to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so appointed in the state of innocence, that there was no
+                     rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the first inordinateness in the human appetite
+                     to result from his coveting a sensible good, to which the concupiscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason. It
+                     remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the human appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some spiritual
+                     good. Now he would not have coveted it inordinately, by desiring it according to his measure as established by the Divine
+                     rule. Hence it follows that man's first sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his measure: and this pertains
+                     to pride. Therefore it is evident that man's first sin was pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man's disobedience to the Divine command was not willed by man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one presuppose
+                     inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he willed it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he
+                     coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his disobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with
+                     the statement of Augustine, who says (Ad Oros [*Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4]) that
+                     "man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent's prompting, and scorned God's commands."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first parents. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.6" target="asv">Gn. 3:6</a>): "The woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she took of the fruit
+                     thereof, and did eat." Yet the very goodness and beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but the persuasive
+                     words of the serpent, who said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.5" target="asv">Gn. 3:5</a>): "Your eyes shall be opened and you
+                     shall be as Gods": and it was by coveting this that the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony resulted from the
+                     sin of pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The desire for knowledge resulted in our first parents from their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent began
+                     by saying: "You shall be as Gods," and added: "Knowing good and evil."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30), "the woman had not believed the serpent's statement that they were debarred
+                     by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not already filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud
+                     self-presumption." This does not mean that pride preceded the promptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had
+                     spoken his words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being that she
+                     believed the demon to have spoken truly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q163_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q163_A2-p0.1">Whether the first man's pride consisted in his coveting God's likeness?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man's pride did not consist in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting
+                     that which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness is competent to man according to his nature: for
+                     it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>): "Let us make man to our image and likeness." Therefore he did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this
+                     was the serpent's suggestion: "You shall be as Gods knowing good and evil." Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man,
+                     according to the saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: "All men naturally desire knowledge."
+                     Therefore he did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first man was endowed with wisdom, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.5" target="asv"> Ecclus. 17:5, </a> "He filled them with the knowledge of understanding." Since then every sin consists in a deliberate act of the appetite,
+                     namely choice, it would seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. But it is impossible for man
+                     to be like God, according to the saying of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.11" target="asv"> Ex. 15:11, </a> "Who is
+                     like to Thee among the strong, O Lord?" Therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.68.5" target="asv"> Ps. 68:5</a> [*Enarr. in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.68" target="asv">Ps. 68</a>], "Then did I restore [Douay: 'pay'] that which I took not away," says: "Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they
+                     lost happiness."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute equality [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q163_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q93_A1.html">FP, Q[93], A[1]</a>]: and such a likeness to God our first parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not conceivable to the mind,
+                     especially of a wise man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p7"> The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates
+                     somewhat of God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "The same things are like and unlike
+                     to God; like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike, according as an effect falls short of its
+                     cause." Now every good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p8"> Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it
+                     follows that he coveted God's likeness inordinately.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p9"> It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so
+                     far as the rational creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be considered in reference to three things. First, as
+                     to natural being: and this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation, both on man---of whom it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>) that God made man "to His image and likeness"---and on the angel, of whom it is
+                     written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.12" target="asv">Ezech. 28:12</a>): "Thou wast the seal of resemblance." Secondly, as to knowledge: and this likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation,
+                     wherefore immediately after the words just quoted, "Thou wast the seal of resemblance," we read: "Full of wisdom." But the
+                     first man, at his creation, had not yet received this likeness actually but only in potentiality. Thirdly, as to the power
+                     of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness actually at the very
+                     outset of his creation, because to each there remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p10"> Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted God's likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned
+                     by coveting a likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God's likeness as regards "knowledge of good
+                     and evil," according to the serpent's instigation, namely that by his own natural power he might decide what was good, and
+                     what was evil for him to do; or again that he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him.
+                     Secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as regards his own power of operation, namely that by his own natural power
+                     he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman's mind was filled with
+                     love of her own power." On the other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God's likeness, as regards power. Wherefore Augustine
+                     says (De Vera Relig. 13) that "he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God's." Nevertheless both coveted somewhat to
+                     be
+                     equal to God, in so far as each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the Divine rule.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man did not sin by coveting this, as stated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that is, above
+                     one's measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.70.18" target="asv"> Ps. 70:18, </a> "O God, who is like Thee?" says: "He who desires to be of himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God.
+                     Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man who refused to be, as a servant, bound by His
+                     command."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the likeness of equality.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q163_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q163_A3-p0.1">Whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15):
+                     "Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid sin." Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid
+                     sin, because they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore the sin of our first parents was more grievous than
+                     other sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin of our first parents was most severely punished, since by it "death
+                     entered into this world," as the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>). Therefore that sin was more grievous than other sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the greatest (Metaph. ii, 4 [*Ed. Diel. i, 1]). Now the sin of our first parents
+                     was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Origen says [*Peri Archon i, 3]: "I think that a man who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall suddenly:
+                     this can happen only by degrees and little by little." Now our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade.
+                     Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin. one results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that adultery
+                     is a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity of sin results from some circumstance of place, person, or time.
+                     The former gravity is more essential to sin and is of greater moment: hence a sin is said to be grave in respect of this gravity
+                     rather than of the other. Accordingly we must say that the first man's sin was not
+                     graver than all other sins of men, as regards the species of the sin. For though pride, of its genus, has a certain pre-eminence
+                     over other sins, yet the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God is greater than the pride whereby one covets God's likeness
+                     inordinately, such as the pride of our first parents, as stated 
+                     <a id="SS_Q163_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q163_A2.html">(A[2])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p7"> But if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their
+                     state. We must accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively but not simply.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the gravity of sin as resulting from the person of the sinner.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The severity of the punishment awarded to that first sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its species
+                     but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed the innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence
+                     brought disorder upon the whole human nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Where things are directly subordinate, the first must needs be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one follows
+                     from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that the first sin is the greatest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q163_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q163_A4-p0.1">Whether Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:14</a>): "Adam was not seduced, but the woman being seduced was in the transgression": and so it would seem that the woman sinned
+                     through ignorance, but the man through assured knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47,48, </a> "That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not according to his will,
+                     shall be beaten with many stripes: but he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes."
+                     Therefore Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Decem Chordis 3 [*Serm. ix; xcvi de Temp.]): "If the man is the head, he should live better,
+                     and give an example of good deeds to his wife, that she may imitate him." Now he who ought to do better, sins more grievously,
+                     if he commit a sin. Therefore Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost would seem to be the most grievous. Now Adam, apparently, sinned against the Holy
+                     Ghost, because while sinning he relied on God's mercy [*Cf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q163_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q21_A2.html"> Q[21], A[2]</a>, OBJ[3]. St. Thomas is evidently alluding to the words of Peter Lombard quoted there], and this pertains to the sin of presumption.
+                     Therefore it seems that Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Punishment corresponds to guilt. Now the woman was more grievously punished than the man, as appears from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q163_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3" target="asv">Gn. 3</a>. Therefore she sinned more grievously than the man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated 
+                     <a id="SS_Q163_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q163_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, the gravity of a sin depends on the species rather than on a circumstance of that sin. Accordingly we must assert that,
+                     if we consider the condition attaching to these persons, the man's sin is the more grievous, because he was more perfect than
+                     the woman.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p7"> As regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is considered to be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Augustine
+                     says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 35): "Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of sex, though parity of pride."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p8"> But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned more grievously, for three reasons. First, because she was more puffed
+                     up than the man. For the woman believed in the serpent's persuasive words, namely that God had forbidden them to eat of the
+                     tree, lest they should become like to Him; so that in wishing to attain to God's likeness by eating of the forbidden fruit,
+                     her pride rose to the height of desiring to obtain something against God's will. On the other hand, the man
+                     did not believe this to be true; wherefore he did not wish to attain to God's likeness against God's will: but his pride consisted
+                     in wishing to attain thereto by his own power. Secondly, the woman not only herself sinned, but suggested sin to the man;
+                     wherefore she sinned against both God and her neighbor. Thirdly, the man's sin was diminished by the fact that, as Augustine
+                     says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 42), "he consented to the sin out of a certain friendly good-will, on account of which a man
+                     sometimes will offend God rather than make an enemy of his friend. That he ought not to have done so is shown by the just
+                     issue of the Divine sentence."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p9"> It is therefore evident that the woman's sin was more grievous than the man's.</p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The woman was deceived because she was first of all puffed up with pride. Wherefore her ignorance did not excuse, but aggravated
+                     her sin, in so far as it was the cause of her being puffed up with still greater pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers the circumstance of personal condition, on account of which the man's sin was more grievous than
+                     the woman's.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The man's reliance on God's mercy did not reach to contempt of God's justice, wherein consists the sin against the Holy Ghost,
+                     but as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi [*De Civ. Dei xiv, 11]), it was due to the fact that, "having had no experience of
+                     God's severity, he thought the sin to be venial," i.e. easily forgiven [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q163_A4-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q89_A3.html">FS, Q[89], A[3]</a>, ad 1].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q163_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q162_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q164" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q164-p0.1">OF THE PUNISHMENTS OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q164-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q164-p2"> We must now consider the punishments of the first sin; and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Death, which
+                  is the common punishment; (2) the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis.
+               </p>
+               <div id="SS_Q164_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q164_A1-p0.1">Whether death is the punishment of our first parents' sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that death is not the punishment of our first parents' sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called
+                     a punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature but vitiates it. Now death is natural to man: and this is evident
+                     both from the fact that his body is composed of contraries, and because "mortal" is included in the definition of man. Therefore
+                     death is not a punishment of our first parents' sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, death and other bodily defects are similarly found in man as well as in other animals, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.19" target="asv"> Eccles. 3:19, </a> "The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both equal." But in dumb animals death is not a punishment
+                     of sin. Therefore neither is it so in men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sin of our first parents was the sin of particular individuals: whereas death affects the entire human nature.
+                     Therefore it would seem that it is not a punishment of our first parents' sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all are equally descended from our first parents. Therefore if death were the punishment of our first parents' sin,
+                     it would follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure. But this is clearly untrue, since some die sooner, and some
+                     more painfully, than others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the evil of punishment is from God, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q164_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A6.html">FP, Q[48], A[6]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q164_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q49_A2.html">FP, Q[49], A[2]</a>). But death, apparently, is not from God: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>): "God made not death." Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, seemingly, punishments are not meritorious, since merit is comprised under good, and punishment under evil. Now
+                     death is sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr's death. Therefore it would seem that death is not a punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, punishment would seem to be painful. But death apparently cannot be painful, since man does not feel it when he
+                     is dead, and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death is not a punishment of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, if death were a punishment of sin, it would have followed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first parents
+                     lived a long time after their sin (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.5.5" target="asv">Gn. 5:5</a>). Therefore, seemingly, death is not a punishment of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p10">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p11">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> If any one, on account of his fault, be deprived of a favor bestowed on him the privation of that favor is a punishment of
+                     that fault. Now as we stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q164_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html">FP, Q[95], A[1]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q164_A1-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>, God bestowed this favor on man, in his primitive state, that as long as his mind was subject to God, the lower powers of
+                     his soul would be subject to his rational mind, and his body to his soul. But inasmuch as through
+                     sin man's mind withdrew from subjection to God, the result was that neither were his lower powers wholly subject to his reason,
+                     whence there followed so great a rebellion of the carnal appetite against the reason: nor was the body wholly subject to the
+                     soul; whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life and soundness of body depend on the body being subject to the
+                     soul, as the perfectible is subject to its perfection. Consequently, on the other hand, death, sickness, and all defects of
+                     the body are due to the lack of the body's subjection to the soul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p12"> It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appetite against the spirit is a punishment of our first parents'
+                     sin, so also are death and all defects of the body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds from the principles of nature. Now the essential principles of nature are form
+                     and matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is, of itself, immortal: wherefore death is not natural to man on
+                     the part of his form. The matter of man is a body such as is composed of contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary
+                     consequence, and in this respect death is natural to man. Now this condition attached
+                     to the nature of the human body results from a natural necessity, since it was necessary for the human body to be the organ
+                     of touch, and consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this was impossible, were it not composed of contraries, as
+                     the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 11). On the other hand, this condition is not attached to the adaptability of matter
+                     to form because, if it were possible, since the form is incorruptible, its matter should rather be incorruptible. In the same
+                     way
+                     a saw needs to be of iron, this being suitable to its form and action, so that its hardness may make it fit for cutting. But
+                     that it be liable to rust is a necessary result of such a matter and is not according to the agent's choice; for, if the craftsman
+                     were able, of the iron he would make a saw that would not rust. Now God Who is the author of man is all-powerful, wherefore
+                     when He first made man, He conferred on him the favor of being exempt from the necessity resulting from such a matter:
+                     which favor, however, was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents. Accordingly death is both natural on account of
+                     a condition attaching to matter, and penal on account of the loss of the Divine favor preserving man from death [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q164_A1-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A6.html">FS, Q[85], A[6]</a>].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This likeness of man to other animals regards a condition attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of contraries.
+                     But it does not regard the form, for man's soul is immortal, whereas the souls of dumb animals are mortal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our first parents were made by God not only as particular individuals, but also as principles of the whole human nature to
+                     be transmitted by them to their posterity, together with the Divine favor preserving them from death. Hence through their
+                     sin the entire human nature, being deprived of that favor in their posterity, incurred death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by way of a punishment appointed by a judge: and such a defect should be equal in
+                     those to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is that which results accidentally from this punishment; for instance,
+                     that one who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed, should fall down in the road. Such a defect is not
+                     proportionate to the sin, nor does a human judge take it into account, since he
+                     cannot foresee chance happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for the first sin and proportionately corresponding
+                     thereto, was the withdrawal of the Divine favor whereby the rectitude and integrity of human nature was maintained. But the
+                     defects resulting from this withdrawal are death and other penalties of the present life. Wherefore these punishments need
+                     not be equal in those to whom the first sin equally appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all future events, Divine
+                     providence has so disposed that these penalties are apportioned in different ways to various people. This is not on account
+                     of any merits or demerits previous to this life, as Origen held [*Peri Archon ii, 9]: for this is contrary to the words of
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A1-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.11" target="asv"> Rom. 9:11, </a> "When they . . . had not done any good or evil"; and also contrary to statements made in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q164_A1-p16.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q90_A4.html">FP, Q[90], A[4]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q164_A1-p16.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A3.html">FP, Q[118], A[3]</a>, namely that the soul is not created
+                     before the body: but either in punishment of their parents' sins, inasmuch as the child is something belonging to the father,
+                     wherefore parents are often punished in their children; or again it is for a remedy intended for the spiritual welfare of
+                     the person who suffers these penalties, to wit that he may thus be turned away from his sins, or lest he take pride in his
+                     virtues, and that he may be crowned for his patience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Death may be considered in two ways. First, as an evil of human nature, and thus it is not of God, but is a defect befalling
+                     man through his fault. Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely as being a just punishment, and thus it is from God.
+                     Wherefore Augustine says (Retract. i, 21) that God is not the author of death, except in so far as it is a punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 5), "just as the wicked abuse not only evil but also good things, so do the righteous
+                     make good use not only of good but also of evil things. Hence it is that both evil men make evil use of the law, though the
+                     law is good, while good men die well, although death is an evil." Wherefore inasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their
+                     death is to them meritorious.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p19">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> Death may be considered in two ways. First, as the privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt, since it is the privation
+                     of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of sense but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as denoting
+                     the corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may speak of corruption even as of generation in two ways: in
+                     one way as being the term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which
+                     life departs, death is said to be present. In this way also death has no pain of sense. In another way corruption may be taken
+                     as including the previous alteration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in motion towards death; just as a thing is
+                     said to be engendered, while in motion towards the state of having been engendered: and thus death may be painful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p20">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. [*De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. i, 16. Cf. Gen. ad lit. ii. 32]), "although our first parents
+                     lived thereafter many years, they began to die on the day when they heard the death-decree, condemning them to decline to
+                     old age."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p21"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A1-p22"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q164_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q164_A2-p0.1">Whether the particular punishments of our first parents are suitably appointed in Scripture?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the particular punishments of our first parents are unsuitably appointed in Scripture. For that which
+                     would have occurred even without sin should not be described as a punishment for sin. Now seemingly there would have been
+                     "pain in child-bearing," even had there been no sin: for the disposition of the female sex is such that offspring cannot be
+                     born without pain to the bearer. Likewise the "subjection of woman to man" results from the
+                     perfection of the male, and the imperfection of the female sex. Again it belongs to the nature of the earth "to bring forth
+                     thorns and thistles," and this would have occurred even had there been no sin. Therefore these are unsuitable punishments
+                     of the first sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which pertains to a person's dignity does not, seemingly, pertain to his punishment. But the "multiplying of
+                     conceptions" pertains to a woman's dignity. Therefore it should not be described as the woman's punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the punishment of our first parents' sin is transmitted to all, as we have stated with regard to death 
+                     <a id="SS_Q164_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q164_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But all "women's conceptions" are not "multiplied," nor does "every man eat bread in the sweat of his face." Therefore these
+                     are not suitable punishments of the first sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the place of paradise was made for man. Now nothing in the order of things should be without purpose. Therefore
+                     it would seem that the exclusion of man from paradise was not a suitable punishment of man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, this place of the earthly paradise is said to be naturally inaccessible. Therefore it was useless to put other obstacles
+                     in the way lest man should return thither, to wit the cherubim, and the "flaming sword turning every way."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, immediately after his sin man was subject to the necessity of dying, so that he could not be restored to immortality
+                     by the beneficial tree of life. Therefore it was useless to forbid him to eat of the tree of life, as instanced by the words
+                     of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.22" target="asv"> Gn. 3:22</a>: "See, lest perhaps he . . . take . . . of the tree of life . . . and live for ever."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, to mock the unhappy seems inconsistent with mercy and clemency, which are most of all ascribed to God in Scripture,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.144.9" target="asv"> Ps. 144:9, </a> "His tender mercies are over all His works." Therefore God is unbecomingly described as mocking our first parents, already
+                     reduced through sin to unhappy straits, in the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.22" target="asv"> Gn. 3:22, </a> "Behold Adam is become as one of Us, knowing good and evil."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, clothes are necessary to man, like food, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:8, </a> "Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we are content." Therefore just as food was appointed to our first
+                     parents before their sin, so also should clothing have been ascribed to them. Therefore after their sin it was unsuitable
+                     to say that God made for them garments of skin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, the punishment inflicted for a sin should outweigh in evil the gain realized through the sin: else the punishment
+                     would not deter one from sinning. Now through sin our first parents gained in this, that their eyes were opened, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.7" target="asv"> Gn. 3:7.</a> But this outweighs in good all the penal evils which are stated to have resulted from sin. Therefore the punishments resulting
+                     from our first parents' sin are unsuitably described.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p11">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> These punishments were appointed by God, Who does all things, "in number, weight, and measure [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast ordered
+                     all things in measure, and number, and weight.']" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p12">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the foregoing Article, on account of their sin, our first parents were deprived of the Divine favor, whereby
+                     the integrity of human nature was maintained in them, and by the withdrawal of this favor human nature incurred penal defects.
+                     Hence they were punished in two ways. In the first place by being deprived of that which was befitting the state of integrity,
+                     namely the place of the earthly paradise: and this is indicated (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.23" target="asv">Gn.
+                        3:23
+                     </a>) where it is stated that "God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure." And since he was unable, of himself, to return to
+                     that state of original innocence, it was fitting that obstacles should be placed against his recovering those things that
+                     were befitting his original state, namely food (lest he should take of the tree of life) and place; for "God placed before
+                     . . . paradise . . . Cherubim, and a flaming sword." Secondly, they were punished by having appointed to them
+                     things befitting a nature bereft of the aforesaid favor: and this as regards both the body and the soul. With regard to the
+                     body, to which pertains the distinction of sex, one punishment was appointed to the woman and another to the man. To the woman
+                     punishment was appointed in respect of two things on account of which she is united to the man; and these are the begetting
+                     of children, and community of works pertaining to family life. As regards the begetting of children, she was punished in two
+                     ways: first in the weariness to which she is subject while carrying the child after conception, and this is indicated in the
+                     words (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.16" target="asv">Gn. 3:16</a>), "I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions"; secondly, in the pain which she suffers in giving birth, and this is
+                     indicated by the words (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p12.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.16" target="asv">Gn. 3:16</a>), "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth." As regards family life she was punished by being subjected to her husband's authority,
+                     and this is conveyed in the words
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p12.4" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.16" target="asv">Gn. 3:16</a>), "Thou shalt be under thy husband's power."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p13"> Now, just as it belongs to the woman to be subject to her husband in matters relating to the family life, so it belongs to
+                     the husband to provide the necessaries of that life. In this respect he was punished in three ways. First, by the barrenness
+                     of the earth, in the words (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.17" target="asv">Gn. 3:17</a>), "Cursed is the earth in thy work." Secondly, by the cares of his toil, without which he does not win the fruits of the
+                     earth; hence the words (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.17" target="asv">Gn. 3:17</a>), "With labor and toil
+                     shalt thou eat thereof all the days of thy life." Thirdly, by the obstacles encountered by the tillers of the soil, wherefore
+                     it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p13.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.18" target="asv">Gn. 3:18</a>), "Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p14"> Likewise a triple punishment is ascribed to them on the part of the soul. First, by reason of the confusion they experienced
+                     at the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit; hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.7" target="asv">Gn. 3:7</a>): "The eyes of them both were opened; and . . . they perceived themselves to be naked." Secondly, by the reproach for their
+                     sin, indicated by the words (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.22" target="asv">Gn. 3:22</a>), "Behold Adam is become as one of Us." Thirdly, by the reminder of their
+                     coming death, when it was said to him (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p14.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.19" target="asv">Gn. 3:19</a>): "Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return." To this also pertains that God made them garments of skin, as a sign of
+                     their mortality.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the state of innocence child-bearing would have been painless: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Just as, in
+                     giving birth, the mother would then be relieved not by groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity, so in bearing
+                     and conceiving the union of both sexes would be one not of lustful desire but of deliberate action" [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q164_A2-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q98_A2.html">FP, Q[98], A[2]</a>].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p16"> The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as inflicted in punishment of the woman, not as to his headship
+                     (since even before sin the man was the "head" and governor "of the woman"), but as to her having now to obey her husband's
+                     will even against her own.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p17"> If man had not sinned, the earth would have brought forth thorns and thistles to be the food of animals, but not to punish
+                     man, because their growth would bring no labor or punishment for the tiller of the soil, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii,
+                     18). Alcuin [*Interrog. et Resp. in Gen. lxxix], however, holds that, before sin, the earth brought forth no thorns and thistles,
+                     whatever: but the former opinion is the better.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The multiplying of her conceptions was appointed as a punishment to the woman, not on account of the begetting of children,
+                     for this would have been the same even before sin, but on account of the numerous sufferings to which the woman is subject,
+                     through carrying her offspring after conception. Hence it is expressly stated: "I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p19">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These punishments affect all somewhat. For any woman who conceives must needs suffer sorrows and bring forth her child with
+                     pain: except the Blessed Virgin, who "conceived without corruption, and bore without pain" [*St. Bernard, Serm. in Dom. inf.
+                     oct. Assum. B. V. M.], because her conceiving was not according to the law of nature, transmitted from our first parents.
+                     And if a woman neither conceives nor bears, she suffers from the defect of
+                     barrenness, which outweighs the aforesaid punishments. Likewise whoever tills the soil must needs eat his bread in the sweat
+                     of his brow: while those who do not themselves work on the land, are busied with other labors, for "man is born to labor"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p19.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.7" target="asv">Job 5:7</a>): and thus they eat the bread for which others have labored in the sweat of their brow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p20">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the place of the earthly paradise avails not man for his use, it avails him for a lesson; because he knows himself
+                     deprived of that place on account of sin, and because by the things that have a bodily existence in that paradise, he is instructed
+                     in things pertaining to the heavenly paradise, the way to which is prepared for man by Christ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p21">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Apart from the mysteries of the spiritual interpretation, this place would seem to be inaccessible, chiefly on account of
+                     the extreme heat in the middle zone by reason of the nighness of the sun. This is denoted by the "flaming sword," which is
+                     described as "turning every way," as being appropriate to the circular movement that causes this heat. And since the movements
+                     of corporal creatures are set in order through the ministry of the angels,
+                     according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4), it was fitting that, besides the sword turning every way, there should be cherubim
+                     "to keep the way of the tree of life." Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 40): "It is to be believed that even in the
+                     visible paradise this was done by heavenly powers indeed, so that there was a fiery guard set there by the ministry of angels."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p22">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> After sin, if man had ate of the tree of life, he would not thereby have recovered immortality, but by means of that beneficial
+                     food he might have prolonged his life. Hence in the words "And live for ever," "for ever" signifies "for a long time." For
+                     it was not expedient for man to remain longer in the unhappiness of this life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p23">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 39), "these words of God are not so much a mockery of our first parents as a deterrent
+                     to others, for whose benefit these things are written, lest they be proud likewise, because Adam not only failed to become
+                     that which he coveted to be, but did not keep that to which he was made."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p24">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Clothing is necessary to man in his present state of unhappiness for two reasons. First, to supply a deficiency in respect
+                     of external harm caused by, for instance, extreme heat or cold. Secondly, to hide his ignominy and to cover the shame of those
+                     members wherein the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is most manifest. Now these two motives do not apply to the
+                     primitive state. because then man's body could not be hurt by any outward thing, as
+                     stated in the 
+                     <a id="SS_Q164_A2-p24.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A2.html">FP, Q[97], A[2]</a>, nor was there in man's body anything shameful that would bring confusion on him. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q164_A2-p24.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.23" target="asv">Gn. 2:23</a>): "And they were both naked, to wit Adam and his wife, and were not ashamed." The same cannot be said of food, which is necessary
+                     to entertain the natural heat, and to sustain the body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p25">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 31), "We must not imagine that our first parents were created with their eyes closed,
+                     especially since it is stated that the woman saw that the tree was fair, and good to eat. Accordingly the eyes of both were
+                     opened so that they saw and thought on things which had not occurred to their minds before, this was a mutual concupiscence
+                     such as they had not hitherto."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p26"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q164_A2-p27"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q163_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q165" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q165-p0.1">OF OUR FIRST PARENTS' TEMPTATION (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q165-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q165-p2"> We must now consider our first parents' temptation, concerning which there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q165-p3"> (1) Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q165-p4"> (2) Of the manner and order of that temptation.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q165_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q165_A1-p0.1">Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it was not fitting for man to be tempted by the devil. For the same final punishment is appointed to the
+                     angels' sin and to man's, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q165_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.41" target="asv"> Mat. 25:41, </a> "Go [Vulg.: 'Depart from Me'] you cursed into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels." Now the
+                     angels' first sin did not follow a temptation from without. Therefore neither should man's first sin have resulted from an
+                     outward temptation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God, Who foreknows the future, knew that through the demon's temptation man would fall into sin, and thus He knew
+                     full well that it was not expedient for man to be tempted. Therefore it would seem unfitting for God to allow him to be tempted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems to savor of punishment that anyone should have an assailant, just as on the other hand the cessation of
+                     an assault is akin to a reward. Now punishment should not precede fault. Therefore it was unfitting for man to be tempted
+                     before he sinned.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q165_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.34.11" target="asv">Ecclus. 34:11</a>): "He that hath not been tempted [Douay: 'tried'], what manner of things doth he know?"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> God's wisdom "orders all things sweetly" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q165_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv">Wis. 8:1</a>), inasmuch as His providence appoints to each one that which is befitting it according to its nature. For as Dionysius says
+                     (Div. Nom. iv), "it belongs to providence not to destroy, but to maintain, nature." Now it is a condition attaching to human
+                     nature that one creature can be helped or impeded by another. Wherefore it was fitting that God should both allow man in the
+                     state of
+                     innocence to be tempted by evil angels, and should cause him to be helped by good angels. And by a special favor of grace,
+                     it was granted him that no creature outside himself could harm him against his own will, whereby he was able even to resist
+                     the temptation of the demon.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Above the human nature there is another that admits of the possibility of the evil of fault: but there is not above the angelic
+                     nature. Now only one that is already become evil through sin can tempt by leading another into evil. Hence it was fitting
+                     that by an evil angel man should be tempted to sin, even as according to the order of nature he is moved forward to perfection
+                     by means of a good angel. An angel could be perfected in good by something
+                     above him, namely by God, but he could not thus be led into sin, because according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q165_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.13" target="asv"> James 1:13, </a> "God is not a tempter of evils."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as God knew that man, through being tempted, would fall into sin, so too He knew that man was able, by his free will,
+                     to resist the tempter. Now the condition attaching to man's nature required that he should be left to his own will, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q165_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv"> Ecclus. 15:14, </a> "God left" man "in the hand of his own counsel." Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 4): "It seems to me that man would
+                     have had no prospect of any special praise,
+                     if he were able to lead a good life simply because there was none to persuade him to lead an evil life; since both by nature
+                     he had the power, and in his power he had the will, not to consent to the persuader."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An assault is penal if it be difficult to resist it: but, in the state of innocence, man was able, without any difficulty,
+                     to resist temptation. Consequently the tempter's assault was not a punishment to man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q165_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q165_A2-p0.1">Whether the manner and order of the first temptation was fitting?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the manner and order of the first temptation was not fitting. For just as in the order of nature the angel
+                     was above man, so was the man above the woman. Now sin came upon man through an angel: therefore in like manner it should
+                     have come upon the woman through the man; in other words the woman should have been tempted by the man, and not the other
+                     way about.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the temptation of our first parents was by suggestion. Now the devil is able to make suggestions to man without
+                     making use of an outward sensible creature. Since then our first parents were endowed with a spiritual mind, and adhered less
+                     to sensible than to intelligible things, it would have been more fitting for man to be tempted with a merely spiritual, instead
+                     of an outward, temptation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one cannot fittingly suggest an evil except through some apparent good. But many other animals have a greater appearance
+                     of good than the serpent has. Therefore man was unfittingly tempted by the devil through a serpent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the serpent is an irrational animal. Now wisdom, speech, and punishment are not befitting an irrational animal.
+                     Therefore the serpent is unfittingly described (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q165_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.1" target="asv">Gn. 3:1</a>) as "more subtle than any of the beasts of the earth," or as "the most prudent of all beasts" according to another version
+                     [*The Septuagint]: and likewise is unfittingly stated to have spoken to the woman, and to have been punished by God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> That which is first in any genus should be proportionate to all that follow it in that genus. Now in every kind of sin we
+                     find the same order as in the first temptation. For, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12), it begins with the concupiscence
+                     of sin in the sensuality, signified by the serpent; extends to the lower reason, by pleasure, signified by the woman; and
+                     reaches to the higher reason by consent in the sin, signified by the man. Therefore the
+                     order of the first temptation was fitting.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Man is composed of a twofold nature, intellective and sensitive. Hence the devil, in tempting man, made use of a twofold
+                     incentive to sin: one on the part of the intellect, by promising the Divine likeness through the acquisition of knowledge
+                     which man naturally desires to have; the other on the part of sense. This he did by having recourse to those sensible things,
+                     which are most akin to man, partly by tempting the man through the woman who was akin to him
+                     in the same species; partly by tempting the woman through the serpent, who was akin to them in the same genus; partly by suggesting
+                     to them to eat of the forbidden fruit, which was akin to them in the proximate genus.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the act of tempting the devil was by way of principal agent; whereas the woman was employed as an instrument of temptation
+                     in bringing about the downfall of the man, both because the woman was weaker than the man, and consequently more liable to
+                     be deceived, and because, on account of her union with man, the devil was able to deceive the man especially through her.
+                     Now there is no parity between principal agent and instrument, because the principal
+                     agent must exceed in power, which is not requisite in the instrumental agent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A suggestion whereby the devil suggests something to man spiritually, shows the devil to have more power against man than
+                     outward suggestion has, since by an inward suggestion, at least, man's imagination is changed by the devil [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="SS_Q165_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q91_A3.html">FP, Q[91], A[3]</a>]; whereas by an outward suggestion, a change is wrought merely on an outward creature. Now the devil had a minimum of power
+                     against man before sin, wherefore he was unable to
+                     tempt him by inward suggestion, but only by outward suggestion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 3), "we are not to suppose that the devil chose the serpent as his means of temptation;
+                     but as he was possessed of the lust of deceit, he could only do so by the animal he was allowed to use for that purpose."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29), "the serpent is described as most prudent or subtle, on account of the cunning
+                     of the devil, who wrought his wiles in it: thus, we speak of a prudent or cunning tongue, because it is the instrument of
+                     a prudent or cunning man in advising something prudently or cunningly. Nor indeed (Gen. ad lit. xi, 28) did the serpent understand
+                     the sounds which were conveyed through it to the woman; nor again are we to
+                     believe that its soul was changed into a rational nature, since not even men, who are rational by nature, know what they say
+                     when a demon speaks in them. Accordingly (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29) the serpent spoke to man, even as the ass on which Balaam sat
+                     spoke to him, except that the former was the work of a devil, whereas the latter was the work of an angel. Hence (Gen. ad
+                     lit. xi, 36) the serpent was not asked why it had done this, because it had not done this in its own nature, but the devil
+                     in
+                     it, who was already condemned to everlasting fire on account of his sin: and the words addressed to the serpent were directed
+                     to him who wrought through the serpent."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p12"> Moreover, as again Augustine says (Super Gen. contra Manich. ii, 17,18), "his, that is, the devil's, punishment mentioned
+                     here is that for which we must be on our guard against him, not that which is reserved till the last judgment. For when it
+                     was said to him: 'Thou art cursed among all cattle and beasts of the earth,' the cattle are set above him, not in power, but
+                     in the preservation of their nature, since the cattle lost no heavenly bliss, seeing that they never had it, but
+                     they continue to live in the nature which they received." It is also said to him: "'Upon thy breast and belly shalt thou creep,'"
+                     according to another version [*The Septuagint] "Here the breast signifies pride, because it is there that the impulse of the
+                     soul dominates, while the belly denotes carnal desire, because this part of the body is softest to the touch: and on these
+                     he creeps to those whom he wishes to deceive." The words, "'Earth shalt thou eat all the days of thy life' may be
+                     understood in two ways. Either 'Those shall belong to thee, whom thou shalt deceive by earthly lust,' namely sinners who are
+                     signified under the name of earth, or a third kind of temptation, namely curiosity, is signified by these words: for to eat
+                     earth is to look into things deep and dark." The putting of enmities between him and the woman "means that we cannot be tempted
+                     by the devil, except through that part of the soul which bears or reflects the likeness of a woman. The seed of the devil
+                     is the temptation to evil, the seed of the woman is the fruit of good works, whereby the temptation to evil is resisted. Wherefore
+                     the serpent lies in wait for the woman's heel, that if at any time she fall away towards what is unlawful, pleasure may seize
+                     hold of her: and she watches his head that she may shut him out at the very outset of the evil temptation."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q165_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q164_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q166" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q166-p0.1">OF STUDIOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q166-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q166-p2"> We must next consider studiousness and its opposite, curiosity. Concerning studiousness there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q166-p3"> (1) What is the matter of studiousness?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q166-p4"> (2) Whether it is a part of temperance?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q166_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q166_A1-p0.1">Whether the proper matter of studiousness is knowledge?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that knowledge is not the proper matter of studiousness. For a person is said to be studious because he applies
+                     study to certain things. Now a man ought to apply study to every matter, in order to do aright what has to be done. Therefore
+                     seemingly knowledge is not the special matter of studiousness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, studiousness is opposed to curiosity. Now curiosity, which is derived from "cura" [care], may also refer to elegance
+                     of apparel and other such things, which regard the body; wherefore the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q166_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.14" target="asv">Rom. 13:14</a>): "Make not provision [curam] for the flesh in its concupiscences."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q166_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.6.13" target="asv">Jer. 6:13</a>): "From the least of them even to the greatest, all study [Douay: 'are given to'] covetousness." Now covetousness is not
+                     properly about knowledge, but rather about the possession of wealth, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q166_A1-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q118_A2.html">Q[118], A[2]</a>). Therefore studiousness, which is derived from "study," is not properly about knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q166_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.11" target="asv">Prov. 27:11</a>): "Study wisdom, my son, and make my heart joyful, that thou mayest give an answer to him that reproacheth." Now study, which
+                     is commended as a virtue, is the same as that to which the Law urges. Therefore studiousness is properly about "knowledge."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking, study denotes keen application of the mind to something. Now the mind is not applied to a thing except
+                     by knowing that thing. Wherefore the mind's application to knowledge precedes its application to those things to which man
+                     is directed by his knowledge. Hence study regards knowledge in the first place, and as a result it regards any other things
+                     the working of which requires to be directed by knowledge. Now the virtues lay claim to that
+                     matter about which they are first and foremost; thus fortitude is concerned about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures
+                     of touch. Therefore studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing can be done aright as regards other matters, except in so far as is previously directed by the knowing reason. Hence
+                     studiousness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a prior regard for knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man's mind is drawn, on account of his affections, towards the things for which he has an affection, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q166_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.21" target="asv"> Mat. 6:21, </a> "Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also." And since man has special affection for those things which foster the flesh,
+                     it follows that man's thoughts are concerned about things that foster his flesh, so that man seeks to know how he may best
+                     sustain his body. Accordingly curiosity is accounted to be
+                     about things pertaining to the body by reason of things pertaining to knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Covetousness craves the acquisition of gain, and for this it is very necessary to be skilled in earthly things. Accordingly
+                     studiousness is ascribed to things pertaining to covetousness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q166_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q166_A2-p0.1">Whether studiousness is a part of temperance?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that studiousness is not a part of temperance. For a man is said to be studious by reason of his studiousness.
+                     Now all virtuous persons without exception are called studious according to the Philosopher, who frequently employs the term
+                     "studious" ({spoudaios}) in this sense (Ethic. ix, 4,8,9). [*In the same sense Aristotle says in Ethic. iii, 2, that "every
+                     vicious person is ignorant of what he ought to do."] Therefore studiousness is a general
+                     virtue, and not a part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, studiousness, as stated 
+                     <a id="SS_Q166_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q166_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, pertains to knowledge. But knowledge has no connection with the moral virtues which are in the appetitive part of the soul,
+                     and pertains rather to the intellectual virtues which are in the cognitive part: wherefore solicitude is an act of prudence
+                     as stated above (Q[47], A[9]). Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a virtue that is ascribed as part of a principal virtue resembles the latter as to mode. Now studiousness does not
+                     resemble temperance as to mode, because temperance takes its name from being a kind of restraint, wherefore it is more opposed
+                     to the vice that is in excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from being the application of the mind to something, so
+                     that it would seem to be opposed to the vice that is in default, namely, neglect of study,
+                     rather than to the vice which is in excess, namely curiosity. wherefore, on account of its resemblance to the latter, Isidore
+                     says (Etym. x) that "a studious man is one who is curious to study." Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Morib. 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q166_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.21" target="asv">Eccl. 21</a>): "We are forbidden to be curious: and this is a great gift that temperance bestows." Now curiosity is prevented by moderate
+                     studiousness. Therefore studiousness is a part of temperance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q166_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q141_A3.html">Q[141], AA[3]</a>,4,5), it belongs to temperance to moderate the movement of the appetite, lest it tend excessively to that which is desired
+                     naturally. Now just as in respect of his corporeal nature man naturally desires the pleasures of food and sex, so, in respect
+                     of his soul, he naturally desires to know something; thus the Philosopher observes at the beginning of his Metaphysics i,
+                     1: "All men have a natural desire
+                     for knowledge."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p7"> The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of studiousness; wherefore it follows that studiousness is a potential
+                     part of temperance, as a subordinate virtue annexed to a principal virtue. Moreover, it is comprised under modesty for the
+                     reason given above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q166_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q160_A2.html">Q[160], A[2]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence is the complement of all the moral virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Consequently, in so far as the knowledge
+                     of prudence pertains to all the virtues, the term "studiousness," which properly regards knowledge, is applied to all the
+                     virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the appetitive power, which moves all the powers, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q166_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">FS, Q[9], A[1]</a>). Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is connected with the act of knowledge itself; and this good pertains to
+                     the intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true estimate about each thing. The other good pertains to the act
+                     of the appetitive power, and consists in man's appetite
+                     being directed aright in applying the cognitive power in this or that way to this or that thing. And this belongs to the virtue
+                     of seriousness. Wherefore it is reckoned among the moral virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 93) in order to be virtuous we must avoid those things to which we are most naturally
+                     inclined. Hence it is that, since nature inclines us. chiefly to fear dangers of death, and to seek pleasures of the flesh,
+                     fortitude is chiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint
+                     from pleasures of the flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has contrary
+                     inclinations. For on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of things; and so it behooves him to exercise
+                     a praiseworthy restraint on this desire, lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the part of his bodily nature, man
+                     is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination studiousness is a kind
+                     of restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination, this virtue
+                     derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name. The
+                     former is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness
+                     is directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly,
+                     as by that which removes an obstacle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q166_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q165_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q167" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q167-p0.1">OF CURIOSITY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q167-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q167-p2"> We must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q167-p3"> (1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q167-p4"> (2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q167_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q167_A1-p0.1">Whether curiosity can be about intellective knowledge?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6),
+                     there can be no mean and extremes in things which are essentially good. Now intellective knowledge is essentially good: because
+                     man's perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being reduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge
+                     of truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the good of the human soul is to
+                     be in accordance with reason," whose perfection consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about
+                     intellective knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge
+                     is from God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.1" target="asv"> Ecclus. 1:1, </a> "All wisdom is from the Lord God," and 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.17" target="asv">Wis. 7:17</a>, "He hath given me the true knowledge of things that are, to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of
+                     the elements," etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to God, since "all things are naked and open
+                     to His eyes" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.4.13" target="asv">Heb. 4:13</a>), and "the Lord is a God of all knowledge" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p3.4" href="./asv.html#iKgs.2.3" target="asv">1 Kings 2:3</a>). Therefore however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good. Now the desire of good is not sinful. Therefore
+                     the vice of curiosity cannot be about the intellective knowledge of truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical
+                     sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them: for Jerome says (Super
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.1.8" target="asv"> Daniel 1:8</a>): "Those who refused to partake of the king's meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had considered the wisdom
+                     and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful, would never have consented to learn that
+                     which was unlawful": and Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that "if the philosophers made any true statements, we
+                     must claim them for our own use, as from unjust possessors." Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge cannot be sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome [*Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17] says: "Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the dialectic
+                     art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?"
+                     Now vanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore curiosity about intellective sciences may be sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q167_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q166_A2.html">Q[166], A[2]</a>, ad 2) studiousness is directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study in the pursuit of knowledge.
+                     Now we must judge differently of the knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit of the knowledge
+                     of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some result,
+                     either because one takes pride in
+                     knowing the truth, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:1, </a> "Knowledge puffeth up," or because one uses the knowledge of truth in order to sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p7"> On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by
+                     his study to the knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for instance those who study to know the truth
+                     that they may take pride in their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.21" target="asv">Eccl. 21</a>): "Some there are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of the majesty of that nature which ever remains
+                     the same, imagine they are
+                     doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness they explore the whole mass of this body which we call the
+                     world. So great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in the very heavens about which they argue." In
+                     like manner, those who study to learn something in order to sin are engaged in a sinful study, according to the saying of
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.9.5" target="asv"> Jer. 9:5, </a> "They have taught their tongue to speak lies, they have labored to commit iniquity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p8"> Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study directed to the learning of truth being itself inordinate;
+                     and this in four ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable study from a study that is an obligation incumbent
+                     on him; hence Jerome says [*Epist. xxi ad Damas]: "We see priests forsaking the gospels and the prophets, reading stage-plays,
+                     and singing the love songs of pastoral idylls." Secondly, when a man studies to learn of one, by whom it is
+                     unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who seek to know the future through the demons. This is superstitious curiosity,
+                     of which Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 4): "Maybe, the philosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity
+                     in seeking knowledge from the demons."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p9"> Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures, without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the
+                     knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that "in studying creatures, we must not be moved by empty and
+                     perishable curiosity; but we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p10"> Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall
+                     into error: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.3.22" target="asv">Ecclus. 3:22</a>): "Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . . and in many of His
+                     works be not curious," and further on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.3.26" target="asv">Ecclus. 3:26</a>), "For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath detained their minds in
+                     vanity."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man's good consists in the knowledge of truth; yet man's sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth, but
+                     in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7,8). Hence there may be sin in the
+                     knowledge of certain truths, in so far as the desire of such knowledge is not directed in due manner to the knowledge of the
+                     sovereign truth, wherein supreme happiness consists.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although this argument shows that the knowledge of truth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing the
+                     knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the knowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good
+                     should be regulated in due manner.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired through
+                     God revealing it to them, as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv"> Rom. 1:19.</a> Since, however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the faith, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A1-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Col.2.8" target="asv">Col. 2:8</a>): "Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men . . . and not according
+                     to
+                     Christ": and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad Polycarp.) of certain philosophers that "they make an unholy use of divine things
+                     against that which is divine, and by divine wisdom strive to destroy the worship of God."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q167_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q167_A2-p0.1">Whether the vice of curiosity is about sensitive knowledge?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about sensitive knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense
+                     of sight, so too are some things known by the senses of touch and taste. Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and
+                     taste is not curiosity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the vice of curiosity about things known by the
+                     sight.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, curiosity would seem to refer to watching games; wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, 8) that when "a fall occurred
+                     in the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly, and overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes." But
+                     it does not seem to be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on account of the representation, wherein man takes
+                     a natural delight, as the Philosopher states (Poet. vi). Therefore the vice of curiosity
+                     is not about the knowledge of sensible objects.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire into our neighbor's actions, as Bede observes [*Comment. in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>]. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of others, because according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.12" target="asv"> Ecclus. 17:12, </a> God "gave to every one of them commandment concerning his neighbor." Therefore the vice of curiosity does not regard the
+                     knowledge of such like particular sensible objects.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that "concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious." Now according to Bede (Comment. in
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>) "concupiscence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the discovery
+                     and dispraise of our neighbor's faults," and all these are particular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the
+                     eves is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life, which are
+                     members of the same division (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>), it seems that the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two things. For in the first place, both in man and in other animals, it
+                     is directed to the upkeep of the body, because by knowledge of this kind, man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them,
+                     and seek those things that are necessary for the body's sustenance. In the second place, it is directed in a manner special
+                     to man, to intellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly to employ
+                     study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be sinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not directed
+                     to something useful, but turns man away from some useful consideration. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), "I go no more
+                     to see a dog coursing a hare in the circus; but in the open country, if I happen to be passing, that coursing haply will distract
+                     me from some weighty thought, and draw me after it . . . and unless Thou, having made me see my weakness, didst
+                     speedily admonish me, I become foolishly dull." Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is directed to something harmful,
+                     as looking on a woman is directed to lust: even so the busy inquiry into other people's actions is directed to detraction.
+                     on the other hand, if one be ordinately intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity of sustaining
+                     nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is
+                     virtuous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising from the use of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures arising
+                     from the knowledge acquired through all the senses. According to Augustine (Confess. x, 35) "it is called concupiscence of
+                     the eyes" because "the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge, so that all sensible things are said to be
+                     seen," and as he says further on: "By this it may more evidently be discerned
+                     wherein pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant,
+                     savory, soft; but curiosity, for trial's sake, seeketh even the contraries of these, not for the sake of suffering annoyance,
+                     but out of the lust of experiment and knowledge."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it renders a man prone to the vices of lust and cruelty on account of things he sees represented.
+                     Hence Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.] that such sights make men adulterers and shameless.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One may watch other people's actions or inquire into them, with a good intent, either for one's own good---that is in order
+                     to be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our neighbor---or for our neighbor's good---that is in order to correct him,
+                     if he do anything wrong, according to the rule of charity and the duty of one's position. This is praiseworthy, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.24" target="asv"> Heb. 10:24, </a> "Consider one another to provoke unto charity
+                     and to good works." But to observe our neighbor's faults with the intention of looking down upon them, or of detracting them,
+                     or even with no further purpose than that of disturbing them, is sinful: hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q167_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.24.15" target="asv">Prov. 24:15</a>), "Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q167_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q166_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q168" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q168-p0.1">OF MODESTY AS CONSISTING IN THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q168-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q168-p2"> We must next consider modesty as consisting in the outward movements of the body, and under this head there are four points
+                  of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="SS_Q168-p3"> (1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in the outward movements of the body that are done seriously?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q168-p4"> (2) Whether there can be a virtue about playful actions?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q168-p5"> (3) Of the sin consisting in excess of play;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q168-p6"> (4) Of the sin consisting in lack of play.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q168_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q168_A1-p0.1">Whether any virtue regards the outward movements of the body?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no virtue regards the outward movements of the body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual beauty
+                     of the soul, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.44.14" target="asv"> Ps. 44:14, </a> "All the glory of the king's daughter is within," and a gloss adds, "namely, in the conscience." Now the movements of the
+                     body are not within, but without. Therefore there can be no virtue about them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Virtues are not in us by nature," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward bodily movements are in
+                     man by nature, since it is by nature that some are quick, and some slow of movement, and the same applies to other differences
+                     of outward movements. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of this kind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every moral virtue is either about actions directed to another person, as justice, or about passions, as temperance
+                     and fortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not directed to another person, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue
+                     is connected with them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, study should be applied to all works of virtue, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q168_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q166_A1.html">Q[166], A[1]</a>, OBJ[1]; A[2], ad 1). Now it is censurable to apply study to the ordering of one's outward movements: for Ambrose says (De
+                     Offic. i, 18): "A becoming gait is one that reflects the carriage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the foot-print
+                     of tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor affectation, but natural and artless movement."
+                     Therefore seemingly there is no virtue about the style of outward movements.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The beauty of honesty [*Cf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q168_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q145_A1.html"> Q[145], A[1]</a>] pertains to virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to the beauty of honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i,
+                     18): "The sound of the voice and the gesture of the body are distasteful to me, whether they be unduly soft and nerveless,
+                     or coarse and boorish. Let nature be our model; her reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of honesty." Therefore
+                     there is a virtue about
+                     the style of outward movement.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to man being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward movements
+                     of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members are set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident
+                     that there is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these movements.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p8"> Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold standpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the
+                     person; secondly, in respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or place. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic.
+                     i, 18): "Beauty of conduct consists in becoming behavior towards others, according to their sex and person," and this regards
+                     the first. As to the second, he adds: "This is the best way to order our behavior, this is the polish becoming
+                     to every action."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p9"> Hence Andronicus [*De Affectibus] ascribes two things to these outward movements: namely "taste" [ornatus] which regards
+                     what is becoming to the person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of what is becoming in movement and behavior; and
+                     "methodicalness" [bona ordinatio] which regards what is becoming to the business in hand, and to one's surroundings, wherefore
+                     he calls it "the practical knowledge of separation," i.e. of the distinction of "acts."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Outward movements are signs of the inward disposition, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.27" target="asv"> Ecclus. 19:27, </a> "The attire of the body, and the laughter of the teeth, and the gait of the man, show what he is"; and Ambrose says (De Offic.
+                     i, 18) that "the habit of mind is seen in the gesture of the body," and that "the body's movement is an index of the soul."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is from natural disposition that a man is inclined to this or that style of outward movement, nevertheless what
+                     is lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let nature guide the
+                     movement: and if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the defect."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated (ad 1) outward movements are indications of the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the
+                     soul. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that "from these things," i.e. the outward movements, "the man that lies hidden
+                     in our hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful, or impure, or on the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free
+                     from blemish." It is moreover from our outward movements that other men form
+                     their judgment about us, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.26" target="asv"> Ecclus. 19:26, </a> "A man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his countenance." Hence moderation of outward
+                     movements is directed somewhat to other persons, according to the saying of Augustine in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "In all your
+                     movements, let nothing be done to offend the eye of another, but only that which is becoming to the holiness of your state."
+                     Wherefore the moderation of outward movements may
+                     be reduced to two virtues, which the Philosopher mentions in Ethic. iv, 6,7. For, in so far as by outward movements we are
+                     directed to other persons, the moderation of our outward movements belongs to "friendliness or affability" [*Cf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q168_A1-p12.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q114_A1.html"> Q[114], A[1]</a>]. This regards pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds in reference to others with whom a man comes in contact.
+                     And, in so far as outward movements are signs of our inward disposition, their moderation belongs
+                     to the virtue of truthfulness [*Cf. Q[9]], whereby a man, by word and deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is censurable to study the style of one's outward movements, by having recourse to pretense in them, so that they do not
+                     agree with one's inward disposition. Nevertheless it behooves one to study them, so that if they be in any way inordinate,
+                     this may be corrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let them be without artifice, but not without correction."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q168_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q168_A2-p0.1">Whether there can be a virtue about games?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): "Our Lord said: 'Woe to you
+                     who laugh, for you shall weep.' Wherefore I consider that all, and not only excessive, games should be avoided." Now that
+                     which can be done virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be a virtue about games.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us," as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q168_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">FS, Q[55], A[4]</a>). Now Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.]: "It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun. Listen to what happened
+                     to those who played: 'The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play.'" Therefore there can be no virtue about
+                     games.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6) that "playful actions are not directed to something else." But it is a requisite
+                     of virtue that the agent in choosing should "direct his action to something else," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4).
+                     Therefore there can be no virtue about games.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): "I pray thee, spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax the high
+                     pressure of his attention to work." Now this relaxation of the mind from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore
+                     it becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at times. Moreover the Philosopher [*Ethic. ii, 7; iv,
+                     8] assigns to games the virtue of {eutrapelia}, which we may call "pleasantness."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as man needs bodily rest for the body's refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is finite
+                     and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it with his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed
+                     amount of work. Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain work, he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all
+                     the more since when the soul works, the body is at work likewise, in so far as the intellective
+                     soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs. Now sensible goods are connatural to man, and therefore, when the
+                     soul arises above sensibles, through being intent on the operations of reason, there results in consequence a certain weariness
+                     of soul, whether the operations with which it is occupied be those of the practical or of the speculative reason. Yet this
+                     weariness is greater if the soul be occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby it is raised higher above sensible
+                     things; although perhaps certain outward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor. In either case, however,
+                     one man is more soul-wearied than another, according as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now just as weariness
+                     of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so weariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and the
+                     soul's rest is pleasure, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q168_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">FS, Q[25], A[2]</a>; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q168_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">FS, Q[31],
+                        A[1]
+                     </a>, ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of soul must needs consist in the application of some pleasure, by slackening
+                     the tension of the reason's study. Thus in the Conferences of the Fathers xxiv, 21, it is related of Blessed John the Evangelist,
+                     that when some people were scandalized on finding him playing together with his disciples, he is said to have told one of
+                     them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And when the latter had done this several times, he asked him whether
+                     he could do it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it, the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John
+                     drew the inference that in like manner man's mind would break if its tension were never relaxed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p7"> Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence
+                     it is necessary at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the soul. This is in agreement with the
+                     statement of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8) that "in the intercourse of this life there is a kind of rest that is associated
+                     with games": and consequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p8"> Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points which require especial caution. The first and chief
+                     is that the pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious deeds or words. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic.
+                     i, 29) that "one kind of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene." Another thing to be observed is that one lose
+                     not the balance of one's mind altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): "We should beware lest, when
+                     we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony which is the concord of good works": and Tully says (De Offic. i,
+                     29), that, "just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute freedom in their games, but only that which is consistent with
+                     good behavior, so our very fun should reflect something of an upright mind." Thirdly, we must be careful, as in all other
+                     human actions, to conform ourselves to persons, time, and place, and take due account of other circumstances, so that our
+                     fun
+                     "befit the hour and the man," as Tully says (De Offic. i, 29).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p9"> Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore
+                     there can be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of wittiness ({eutrapelia}), and a man is said to be
+                     pleasant through having a happy turn* of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this
+                     virtue restrains a man from immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty. [*{Eutrapelia} is derived from
+                     {trepein} = 'to turn'].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above, fun should fit with business and persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that "when the audience
+                     is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with
+                     the gravity of the subject." Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with things of the greatest moment, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.6" target="asv"> Prov. 8:6, </a> "Hear, for I will speak of great things." Wherefore
+                     Ambrose does not altogether exclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he begins by saying: "Although
+                     jokes are at times fitting and pleasant, nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule; since how can we
+                     have recourse to things which are not to be found in Holy Writ?"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying of Chrysostom refers to the inordinate use of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of games their end;
+                     of whom it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.15.12" target="asv">Wis. 15:12</a>): "They have accounted our life a pastime." Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "We are so begotten by nature that
+                     we appear to be made not for play and fun, but rather for hardships, and for occupations of greater gravity and moment."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Playful actions themselves considered in their species are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such actions
+                     is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and accordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make
+                     use of fun. Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "It is indeed lawful to make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we
+                     have recourse to sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done our
+                     duty by grave and serious matters."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q168_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q168_A3-p0.1">Whether there can be sin in the excess of play?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be sin in the excess of play. For that which is an excuse for sin is not held to be sinful.
+                     Now play is sometimes an excuse for sin, for many things would be grave sins if they were done seriously, whereas if they
+                     be done in fun, are either no sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems that there is no sin in excessive play.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all other vices are reducible to the seven capital vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 17). But excess of play
+                     does not seem reducible to any of the capital vices. Therefore it would seem not to be a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, comedians especially would seem to exceed in play, since they direct their whole life to playing. Therefore if excess
+                     of play were a sin, all actors would be in a state of sin; moreover all those who employ them, as well as those who make them
+                     any payment, would sin as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem untrue; for it is related in the Lives of the Fathers
+                     (ii. 16; viii. 63) that is was revealed to the Blessed Paphnutius that a certain
+                     jester would be with him in the life to come.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.13" target="asv"> Prov. 14:13, </a> "Laughter shall be mingled with sorrow and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy," remarks: "A mourning that will last for
+                     ever." Now there is inordinate laughter and inordinate joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin therein, since
+                     mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In all things dirigible according to reason, the excessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which falls
+                     short of the rule of reason. Now it has been stated 
+                     <a id="SS_Q168_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q168_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to reason. Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond
+                     the rule of reason: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very species of the acts employed for the purpose
+                     of
+                     fun, and this kind of jesting, according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is stated to be "discourteous, insolent, scandalous,
+                     and obscene," when to wit a man, for the purpose of jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or such as are injurious to
+                     his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal sins. And thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p7"> Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack of due circumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue
+                     times or places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or persons. This may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the
+                     strong attachment to play, when a man prefers the pleasure he derives therefrom to the love of God, so as to be willing to
+                     disobey a commandment of God or of the Church rather than forego, such like amusements. Sometimes, however, it
+                     is a venial sin, for instance where a man is not so attached to amusement as to be willing for its sake to do anything in
+                     disobedience to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain things are sinful on account of the intention alone, because they are done in order to injure someone. Such an intention
+                     is excluded by their being done in fun, the intention of which is to please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from
+                     sin, or diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins according to their species, such as murder, fornication, and the like:
+                     and fun is no excuse for these; in fact they make fun scandalous and
+                     obscene.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Excessive play pertains to senseless mirth, which Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) calls a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it is
+                     written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.6" target="asv">Ex. 32:6</a>): "The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated 
+                     <a id="SS_Q168_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q168_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, play is necessary for the intercourse of human life. Now whatever is useful to human intercourse may have a lawful employment
+                     ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation of play-actors, the object of which is to cheer the heart of man, is not unlawful
+                     in itself; nor are they in a state of sin provided that their playing be moderated, namely that they use no unlawful words
+                     or deeds in order to amuse, and that
+                     they do not introduce play into undue matters and seasons. And although in human affairs, they have no other occupation in
+                     reference to other men, nevertheless in reference to themselves, and to God, they perform other actions both serious and virtuous,
+                     such as prayer and the moderation of their own passions and operations, while sometimes they give alms to the poor. Wherefore
+                     those who maintain them in moderation do not sin but act justly, by rewarding them for their services. on the other
+                     hand, if a man spends too much on such persons, or maintains those comedians who practice unlawful mirth, he sins as encouraging
+                     them in their sin. Hence Augustine says (Tract. c. in Joan.) that "to give one's property to comedians is a great sin, not
+                     a virtue"; unless by chance some play-actor were in extreme need, in which case one would have to assist him, for Ambrose
+                     says (De Offic. [*Quoted in Canon Pasce, dist. 86]): "Feed him that dies of hunger; for whenever thou canst save a man by
+                     feeding him, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q168_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q169.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q168_A4-p0.1">Whether there is a sin in lack of mirth?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no sin in lack of mirth. For no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of a
+                     penitent says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. 15) [*Spurious]: "Let him refrain from games and the sights of the world, if he wishes
+                     to obtain the grace of a full pardon." Therefore there is no sin in lack of mirth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no sin is included in the praise given to holy men. But some persons are praised for having refrained from mirth;
+                     for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q168_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.15.17" target="asv">Jer. 15:17</a>): "I sat not in the assembly of jesters," and (Tobias 3:17): "Never have I joined myself with them that play; neither have
+                     I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness." Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the virtues, and he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither gives
+                     nor receives the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the lack of mirth. Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous
+                     rather than sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8) reckons the lack of mirth to be a vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In human affairs whatever is against reason is a sin. Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others, by offering
+                     no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment. Wherefore Seneca [*Martin of Braga, Formula Vitae Honestae: cap.
+                     De Continentia] says (De Quat. Virt., cap. De Continentia): "Let your conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think
+                     you rude, or despise you as a cad." Now a man who is without mirth, not only is lacking
+                     in playful speech, but is also burdensome to others, since he is deaf to the moderate mirth of others. Consequently they are
+                     vicious, and are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 8).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p7"> Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and pleasures it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and
+                     rest are not in quest for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 6, it follows that "lack of
+                     mirth is less sinful than excess thereof." Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 10): "We should make few friends for the
+                     sake of pleasure, since but little sweetness suffices to season life, just as little salt suffices for our
+                     meat."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is called upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a vice in default, because
+                     this very diminishment of mirth in them is in accordance with reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Jeremias speaks there in accordance with the times, the state of which required that man should mourn; wherefore he adds:
+                     "I sat alone, because Thou hast filled me with threats." The words of Tobias 3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident
+                     from his adding: "Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Austerity, as a virtue, does not exclude all pleasures, but only such as are excessive and inordinate; wherefore it would
+                     seem to pertain to affability, which the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6) calls "friendliness," or {eutrapelia}, otherwise wittiness.
+                     Nevertheless he names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement with temperance, to which it belongs to restrain pleasure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q168_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q169.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q167_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q169" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q169_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q169-p0.1">OF MODESTY IN THE OUTWARD APPAREL (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q169-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q169-p2"> We must now consider modesty as connected with the outward apparel, and under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q169-p3"> (1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel?</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q169-p4"> (2) Whether women sin mortally by excessive adornment?</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q169_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q169.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q169_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q169_A1-p0.1">Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel. For outward adornment does not belong
+                     to us by nature, wherefore it varies according to different times and places. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii,
+                     12) that "among the ancient Romans it was scandalous for one to wear a cloak with sleeves and reaching to the ankles, whereas
+                     now it is scandalous for anyone hailing from a reputable place to be without them." Now
+                     according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1) there is in us a natural aptitude for the virtues. Therefore there is no virtue
+                     or vice about such things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if there were virtue and vice in connection with outward attire, excess in this matter would be sinful. Now excess
+                     in outward attire is not apparently sinful, since even the ministers of the altar use most precious vestments in the sacred
+                     ministry. Likewise it would seem not to be sinful to be lacking in this, for it is said in praise of certain people (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.37" target="asv">Heb. 11:37</a>): "They wandered about in sheepskins and in goatskins." Therefore
+                     it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in this matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every virtue is either theological, or moral, or intellectual. Now an intellectual virtue is not conversant with
+                     matter of this kind, since it is a perfection regarding the knowledge of truth. Nor is there a theological virtue connected
+                     therewith, since that has God for its object; nor are any of the moral virtues enumerated by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7),
+                     connected with it. Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection with
+                     this kind of attire.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Honesty [*Cf. Q[145]] pertains to virtue. Now a certain honesty is observed in the outward apparel; for Ambrose says (De
+                     Offic. i, 19): "The body should be bedecked naturally and without affectation, with simplicity, with negligence rather than
+                     nicety, not with costly and dazzling apparel, but with ordinary clothes, so that nothing be lacking to honesty and necessity,
+                     yet nothing be added to increase its beauty." Therefore there can be virtue and vice in
+                     the outward attire.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is not in the outward things themselves which man uses, that there is vice, but on the part of man who uses them immoderately.
+                     This lack of moderation occurs in two ways. First, in comparison with the customs of those among whom one lives; wherefore
+                     Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "Those offenses which are contrary to the customs of men, are to be avoided according to
+                     the customs generally prevailing, so that a thing agreed upon and confirmed by custom
+                     or law of any city or nation may not be violated at the lawless pleasure of any, whether citizen or foreigner. For any part,
+                     which harmonizeth not with its whole, is offensive." Secondly, the lack of moderation in the use of these things may arise
+                     from the inordinate attachment of the user, the result being that a man sometimes takes too much pleasure in using them, either
+                     in accordance with the custom of those among whom he dwells or contrary to such custom. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr.
+                     Christ. iii, 12): "We must avoid excessive pleasure in the use of things, for it leads not only wickedly to abuse the customs
+                     of those among whom we dwell, but frequently to exceed their bounds, so that, whereas it lay hidden, while under the restraint
+                     of established morality, it displays its deformity in a most lawless outbreak."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p7"> In point of excess, this inordinate attachment occurs in three ways. First when a man seeks glory from excessive attention
+                     to dress; in so far as dress and such like things are a kind of ornament. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xl in Ev.): "There are
+                     some who think that attention to finery and costly dress is no sin. Surely, if this were no fault, the word of God would not
+                     say so expressly that the rich man who was tortured in hell had been clothed in purple and fine linen. No one,
+                     forsooth, seeks costly apparel" (such, namely, as exceeds his estate) "save for vainglory." Secondly, when a man seeks sensuous
+                     pleasure from excessive attention to dress, in so far as dress is directed to the body's comfort. Thirdly, when a man is too
+                     solicitous [*Cf.
+                     <a id="SS_Q169_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q55_A6.html"> Q[55], A[6]</a>] in his attention to outward apparel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p8"> Accordingly Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons three virtues in connection with outward attire; namely "humility," which
+                     excludes the seeking of glory, wherefore he says that humility is "the habit of avoiding excessive expenditure and parade";
+                     "contentment" [*Cf. Q[143], OBJ[4]], which excludes the seeking of sensuous pleasure, wherefore he says that "contentedness
+                     is the habit that makes a man satisfied with what is suitable, and enables him to determine what is becoming in
+                     his manner of life" (according to the saying of the Apostle, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:8</a>): "Having food and wherewith to be covered, with these let us be content;"---and "simplicity," which excludes excessive solicitude
+                     about such things, wherefore he says that "simplicity is a habit that makes a man contented with what he has."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p9"> In the point of deficiency there may be inordinate attachment in two ways. First, through a man's neglect to give the requisite
+                     study or trouble to the use of outward apparel. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is a mark of effeminacy
+                     to let one's cloak trail on the ground to avoid the trouble of lifting it up." Secondly, by seeking glory from the very lack
+                     of attention to outward attire. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "not only
+                     the glare and pomp of outward things, but even dirt and the weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation, all the more
+                     dangerous as being a decoy under the guise of God's service"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "both excess and
+                     inordinate defect are a subject of ostentation."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although outward attire does not come from nature, it belongs to natural reason to moderate it; so that we are naturally
+                     inclined to be the recipients of the virtue that moderates outward raiment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who are placed in a position of dignity, or again the ministers of the altar, are attired in more costly apparel than
+                     others, not for the sake of their own glory, but to indicate the excellence of their office or of the Divine worship: wherefore
+                     this is not sinful in them. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): "Whoever uses outward things in such a way as
+                     to exceed the bounds observed by the good people among whom he dwells, either
+                     signifies something by so doing, or is guilty of sin, inasmuch as he uses these things for sensual pleasure or ostentation."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p12"> Likewise there may be sin on the part of deficiency: although it is not always a sin to wear coarser clothes than other people.
+                     For, if this be done through ostentation or pride, in order to set oneself above others, it is a sin of superstition; whereas,
+                     if this be done to tame the flesh, or to humble the spirit, it belongs to the virtue of temperance. Hence Augustine says (De
+                     Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): "Whoever uses transitory things with greater restraint than is customary with
+                     those among whom he dwells, is either temperate or superstitious." Especially, however, is the use of coarse raiment befitting
+                     to those who by word and example urge others to repentance, as did the prophets of whom the Apostle is speaking in the passage
+                     quoted. Wherefore a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.3.4" target="asv"> Mat. 3:4, </a> says: "He who preaches penance, wears the garb of penance."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This outward apparel is an indication of man's estate; wherefore excess, deficiency, and mean therein, are referable to the
+                     virtue of truthfulness, which the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) assigns to deeds and words, which are indications of something
+                     connected with man's estate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q169.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q169_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q169_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q169_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q170.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q169_A2-p0.1">Whether the adornment of women is devoid of mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal sin. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the Divine
+                     law is a mortal sin. Now the adornment of women is contrary to a precept of the Divine law; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.3.3" target="asv">1 Pet. 3:3</a>): "Whose," namely women's, "adorning, let it not be the outward plaiting of the hair, or the wearing of gold, or the putting
+                     on of apparel." Wherefore a gloss of Cyprian says: "Those who are clothed
+                     in silk and purple cannot sincerely put on Christ: those who are bedecked with gold and pearls and trinkets have forfeited
+                     the adornments of mind and body." Now this is not done without a mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women cannot be devoid
+                     of mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.): "I hold that not only virgins and widows, but also wives and all women without exception,
+                     should be admonished that nowise should they deface God's work and fabric, the clay that He has fashioned, with the aid of
+                     yellow pigments, black powders or rouge, or by applying any dye that alters the natural features." And afterwards he adds:
+                     "They lay hands on God, when they strive to reform what He has formed. This is an
+                     assault on the Divine handiwork, a distortion of the truth. Thou shalt not be able to see God, having no longer the eyes that
+                     God made, but those the devil has unmade; with him shalt thou burn on whose account thou art bedecked." But this is not due
+                     except to mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as it is unbecoming for a woman to wear man's clothes, so is it unbecoming for her to adorn herself inordinately.
+                     Now the former is a sin, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.5" target="asv">Dt. 22:5</a>): "A woman shall not be clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use woman's apparel." Therefore it seems that also
+                     the excessive adornment of women is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, If this were true it would seem that the makers of these means of adornment sin mortally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As regards the adornment of women, we must bear in mind the general statements made above 
+                     <a id="SS_Q169_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q169_A1.html">(A[1])</a> concerning outward apparel, and also something special, namely that a woman's apparel may incite men to lust, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.7.10" target="asv"> Prov. 7:10, </a> "Behold a woman meeteth him in harlot's attire, prepared to deceive souls."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p7"> Nevertheless a woman may use means to please her husband, lest through despising her he fall into adultery. Hence it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.34" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:34</a>) that the woman "that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband." Wherefore if a married
+                     woman adorn herself in order to please her husband she can do this without sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p8"> But those women who have no husband nor wish to have one, or who are in a state of life inconsistent with marriage, cannot
+                     without sin desire to give lustful pleasure to those men who see them, because this is to incite them to sin. And if indeed
+                     they adorn themselves with this intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally; whereas if they do so from frivolity,
+                     or from vanity for the sake of ostentation, it is not always mortal, but sometimes venial. And the same
+                     applies to men in this respect. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): "I do not wish you to be hasty in forbidding
+                     the wearing of gold or costly attire except in the case of those who being neither married nor wishful to marry, should think
+                     how they may please God: whereas the others think on the things of the world, either husbands how they may please their wives,
+                     or wives how they may please their husbands, except that it is unbecoming for women though married to uncover their hair,
+                     since the Apostle commands them to cover the head." Yet in this case some might be excused from sin, when they do this not
+                     through vanity but on account of some contrary custom: although such a custom is not to be commended.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As a gloss says on this passage, "The wives of those who were in distress despised their husbands, and decked themselves
+                     that they might please other men": and the Apostle forbids this. Cyprian is speaking in the same sense; yet he does not forbid
+                     married women to adorn themselves in order to please their husbands, lest the latter be afforded an occasion of sin with other
+                     women. Hence the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.9" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:9</a>): "Women . . . in
+                     ornate [Douay: 'decent'] apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, not with plaited hair, or gold, or pearls,
+                     or costly attire": whence we are given to understand that women are not forbidden to adorn themselves soberly and moderately
+                     but to do so excessively, shamelessly, and immodestly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Cyprian is speaking of women painting themselves: this is a kind of falsification, which cannot be devoid of sin. Wherefore
+                     Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): "To dye oneself with paints in order to have a rosier or a paler complexion is a lying
+                     counterfeit. I doubt whether even their husbands are willing to be deceived by it, by whom alone" (i.e. the husbands) "are
+                     they to be permitted, but not ordered, to adorn themselves." However, such
+                     painting does not always involve a mortal sin, but only when it is done for the sake of sensuous pleasure or in contempt of
+                     God, and it is to like cases that Cyprian refers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p11"> It must, however, be observed that it is one thing to counterfeit a beauty one has not, and another to hide a disfigurement
+                     arising from some cause such as sickness or the like. For this is lawful, since according to the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.23" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:23</a>), "such as we think to be the less honorable members of the body, about these we put more abundant honor."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the foregoing Article, outward apparel should be consistent with the estate of the person, according to the
+                     general custom. Hence it is in itself sinful for a woman to wear man's clothes, or vice versa; especially since this may be
+                     a cause of sensuous pleasure; and it is expressly forbidden in the Law (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q169_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22" target="asv">Dt. 22</a>) because the Gentiles used to practice this change of attire for the purpose of idolatrous superstition. Nevertheless this
+                     may be
+                     done sometimes without sin on account of some necessity, either in order to hide oneself from enemies, or through lack of
+                     other clothes, or for some similar motive.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the case of an art directed to the production of goods which men cannot use without sin, it follows that the workmen sin
+                     in making such things, as directly affording others an occasion of sin; for instance, if a man were to make idols or anything
+                     pertaining to idolatrous worship. But in the case of an art the products of which may be employed by man either for a good
+                     or for an evil use, such as swords, arrows, and the like, the practice of such an
+                     art is not sinful. These alone should be called arts; wherefore Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlix super Matth.]: "The name of art
+                     should be applied to those only which contribute towards and produce necessaries and mainstays of life." In the case of an
+                     art that produces things which for the most part some people put to an evil use, although such arts are not unlawful in themselves,
+                     nevertheless, according to the teaching of Plato, they should be extirpated from the State by the governing authority.
+                     Accordingly, since women may lawfully adorn themselves, whether to maintain the fitness of their estate, or even by adding
+                     something thereto, in order to please their husbands, it follows that those who make such means of adornment do not sin in
+                     the practice of their art, except perhaps by inventing means that are superfluous and fantastic. Hence Chrysostom says (Super
+                     Matth.) that "even the shoemakers' and clothiers' arts stand in need of restraint, for they have lent their art to lust, by
+                     abusing its needs, and debasing art by art."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q169_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q169_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q170.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q168_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q169_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="SS_Q170" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q169_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q170_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="SS_Q170-p0.1">OF THE PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="SS_Q170-p1"></p>
+               <p id="SS_Q170-p2"> We must next consider the precepts of temperance:</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q170-p3"> (1) The precepts of temperance itself;</p>
+               <p id="SS_Q170-p4"> (2) The precepts of its parts.</p>
+               <div id="SS_Q170_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q170.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q170_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q170_A1-p0.1">Whether the precepts of temperance are suitably given in the Divine law?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. Because fortitude is a greater virtue
+                     than temperance, as stated above (Q[123], A[12]; Q[141], A[8]; 
+                     <a id="SS_Q170_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A4.html">FS, Q[66], A[4]</a> ). Now there is no precept of fortitude among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the most important among the precepts
+                     of the Law. Therefore it was unfitting to include among the precepts of the decalogue the prohibition of
+                     adultery, which is contrary to temperance, as stated above (Q[154], AA[1],8).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, temperance is not only about venereal matters, but also about pleasures of meat and drink. Now the precepts of the
+                     decalogue include no prohibition of a vice pertaining to pleasures of meat and drink, or to any other species of lust. Neither,
+                     therefore, should they include a precept prohibiting adultery, which pertains to venereal pleasure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the lawgiver's intention inducement to virtue precedes the prohibition of vice, since vices are forbidden in
+                     order that obstacles to virtue may be removed. Now the precepts of the decalogue are the most important in the Divine law.
+                     Therefore the precepts of the decalogue should have included an affirmative precept directly prescribing the virtue of temperance,
+                     rather than a negative precept forbidding adultery which is directly opposed thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Scripture in the decalogue (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q170_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.14" target="asv">Ex. 20:14</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q170_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.17" target="asv">17</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q170_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>), "the end of the commandment is charity," which is enjoined upon us in the two precepts concerning the love of God and of
+                     our neighbor. Wherefore the decalogue contains those precepts which tend more directly to the love of God and of our neighbor.
+                     Now among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery would seem most of all opposed to the love of our neighbor, since thereby
+                     a man lays hold of another's
+                     property for his own use, by abusing his neighbor's wife. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue include a special prohibition
+                     of adultery, not only as committed in deed, but also as desired in thought.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Among the species of vices opposed to fortitude there is not one that is so directly opposed to the love of our neighbor
+                     as adultery, which is a species of lust that is opposed to temperance. And yet the vice of daring, which is opposed to fortitude,
+                     is wont to be sometimes the cause of murder, which is forbidden by one of the precepts of the decalogue: for it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q170_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.8.18" target="asv">Ecclus. 8:18</a>): "Go not on the way with a bold man lest he
+                     burden thee with his evils."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gluttony is not directly opposed to the love of our neighbor, as adultery is. Nor indeed is any other species of lust, for
+                     a father is not so wronged by the seduction of the virgin over whom he has no connubial right, as is the husband by the adultery
+                     of his wife, for he, not the wife herself, has power over her body [*
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q170_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:4</a>].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q170_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q122_A1.html">Q[122], AA[1]</a>,4) the precepts of the decalogue are universal principles of the Divine law; hence they need to be common precepts. Now it
+                     was not possible to give any common affirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice of temperance varies according
+                     to different times, as Augustine remarks (De Bono Conjug. xv, 7), and according to different human laws and customs.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q170.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q170_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="SS_Q170_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q170_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS.iv.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="SS_Q170_A2-p0.1">Whether the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are suitably given in the Divine law?</h4>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. For the precepts
+                     of the Decalogue, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), are certain universal principles of the whole Divine law. Now "pride is the
+                     beginning of all sin," according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="SS_Q170_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv"> Ecclus. 10:15.</a> Therefore among the precepts of the Decalogue there should have been one forbidding pride.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a place before all should have been given in the decalogue to those precepts by which men are especially induced
+                     to fulfil the Law, because these would seem to be the most important. Now since humility subjects man to God, it would seem
+                     most of all to dispose man to the fulfilment of the Divine law; wherefore obedience is accounted one of the degrees of humility,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q170_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q161_A6.html">Q[161], A[6]</a>); and the same apparently applies
+                     to meekness, the effect of which is that a man does not contradict the Divine Scriptures, as Augustine observes (De Doctr.
+                     Christ. ii, 7). Therefore it seems that the Decalogue should have contained precepts of humility and meekness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was stated in the foregoing Article that adultery is forbidden in the decalogue, because it is contrary to the
+                     love of our neighbor. But inordinateness of outward movements, which is contrary to modesty, is opposed to neighborly love:
+                     wherefore Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxii): "In all your movements let nothing be done to offend the eye of any person
+                     whatever." Therefore it seems that this kind of inordinateness should also have been
+                     forbidden by a precept of the Decalogue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> suffices the authority of Scripture.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The virtues annexed to temperance may be considered in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, in their effects. Considered
+                     in themselves they have no direct connection with the love of God or of our neighbor; rather do they regard a certain moderation
+                     of things pertaining to man himself. But considered in their effects, they may regard the love of God or of our neighbor:
+                     and in this respect the decalogue contains precepts that relate to the prohibition of
+                     the effects of the vices opposed to the parts of temperance. Thus the effect of anger, which is opposed to meekness, is sometimes
+                     that a man goes on to commit murder (and this is forbidden in the Decalogue), and sometimes that he refuses due honor to his
+                     parents, which may also be the result of pride, which leads many to transgress the precepts of the first table.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pride is the beginning of sin, but it lies hidden in the heart; and its inordinateness is not perceived by all in common.
+                     Hence there was no place for its prohibition among the precepts of the Decalogue, which are like first self-evident principles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those precepts which are essentially an inducement to the observance of the Law presuppose the Law to be already given, wherefore
+                     they cannot be first precepts of the Law so as to have a place in the Decalogue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Inordinate outward movement is not injurious to one's neighbor, if we consider the species of the act, as are murder, adultery,
+                     and theft, which are forbidden in the decalogue; but only as being signs of an inward inordinateness, as stated above (
+                     <a id="SS_Q170_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q168_A1.html">Q[168], A[1]</a>, ad 1,3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="SS_Q170_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.SS_Q170_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.SS.iv.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q169_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.SS_Q170_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <a href="summa.SS_Q122_A6.html"></a>
+            <a href="summa.SS_Q123.html"></a>
+         `
+     </div>
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