Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
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| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:43:02 +0000 |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FS_v.html Sun Jan 03 14:43:02 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,13616 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FS.v" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55.html"></a> + <h2 id="FS.v-p0.1">TREATISE ON HABITS IN PARTICULAR (QQ[55]-89) GOOD HABITS, i.e. VIRTUES (QQ[55]-70)</h2> + <div id="FS_Q55" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS.v.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q55-p0.1">OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q55-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q55-p2"> We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since habits, as we have said ( + <a id="FS_Q55-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A3.html">Q[54], A[3]</a>), are divided into good and bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of other matters + connected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins. + Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division + of virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55-p3"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q55-p4"> (1) Whether human virtue is a habit?</p> + <p id="FS_Q55-p5"> (2) Whether it is an operative habit?</p> + <p id="FS_Q55-p6"> (3) Whether it is a good habit?</p> + <p id="FS_Q55-p7"> (4) Of the definition of virtue.</p> + <div id="FS_Q55_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q55_A1-p0.1">Whether human virtue is a habit?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For virtue is "the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit + of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore + virtue is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix; cf. De Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that "virtue is good use of free-will." + But use of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions: otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But + we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "virtue is the order of love," and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that "the ordering + which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what we ought to use." Now order, or ordering, + denominates either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers. Neither + therefore are human virtues habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science and virtue are habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But + the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p9"> Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And + therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not + determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of + habits, as is clear from what we have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q55_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a> ). Therefore human virtues + are habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: + for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which + we believe. When therefore we say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken for the object of virtue. For the furthest + point to which a power can reach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a + man can carry a hundredweight and not more, his virtue [*In English we should say 'strength,' which is the original signification + of the Latin 'virtus': thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to indicate its 'strength'] is put at a hundredweight, + and not at sixty. But the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the same sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to which + virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free-will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We are said to merit by something in two ways. First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus + we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run + by the motive power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us love + is set in order by virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we + have said. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p15"></p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A1-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q55_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q55_A2-p0.1">Whether human virtue is an operative habit?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health + and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither + is virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in reference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from + the Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always, while some have a virtue to be not always, but at some + definite time. Now as natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational beings. Therefore also human virtue + is referred not only to act, but also to being. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best." + Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3" target="asv">Eccl. 3</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.6" target="asv">6</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Eccl.14" target="asv">14</a>) to Whom the soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in reference + to God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not, + therefore, an operative habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that "virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies some perfection of power, as we have said above + <a id="FS_Q55_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Wherefore, since power [*The one Latin word 'potentia' is rendered 'potentiality' in the first case, and 'power' in the + second] is of two kinds, namely, power in reference to being, and power in reference to act; the perfection of each of these + is called virtue. But power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is + potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything + acts in so far as it is in act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p7"> Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common + with other animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to the soul and body: and only those forces + which are proper to the soul, namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human virtue, of which we are + speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human + virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative + habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue + is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding + disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so + far as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, + and to that which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, + which are suitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which + are proper to man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have + said above ( + <a id="FS_Q55_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in + an operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q55_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q55_A3-p0.1">Whether human virtue is a good habit?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. + But there is a virtue even of sin; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.56" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:56</a>: "The virtue [Douay: 'strength'] of sin is the Law." Therefore virtue is not always a good habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not only referred to good, but also to evil: according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.5" target="asv">Is. 5</a>: "Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness." Therefore virtue also is referred to good and + evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.9" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:9</a>): "Virtue [Douay: 'power'] is made perfect in infirmity." But infirmity is an evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only + to good, but also to evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good": and the Philosopher says + (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above + <a id="FS_Q55_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, virtue implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now + the limit of any power must needs be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Hom. ii) that every + evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore human virtue + which is an operative habit, is a + good habit, productive of good works. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be perfect, so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect thief or + robber; and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. v, text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is + applied to evil things: so that the "virtue" of sin is said to be law, in so far as occasionally sin is aggravated through + the law, so as to attain to the limit of its possibility. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists in a falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens that, together + with this falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in + direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But the perfection of that power, since it is compatible + with a falling away from reason, cannot be called a human virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect, according as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness of + the body and of the lower powers. And therefore human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be "made perfect in + infirmity," not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the lower powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q55_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q55_A4-p0.1">Whether virtue is suitably defined?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, + by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us." For virtue is man's goodness, + since virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is + therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a "good quality." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than + quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore "good" should not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference + of quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): "When we come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the + field, it is something appertaining to the mind." But there are virtues even of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. iii, 10). Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. + It is therefore unsuitable to put "righteous" in the definition of virtue, when we say that virtue is that "by which we live + righteously." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, + that "pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them." It is untrue, therefore, "that no one can make bad use of + virtue." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.11" target="asv"> Jn. 15:11</a>: "He shall do greater things than these," says [*Tract. xxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.11" target="asv">Ap. 11</a>]: "He who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee." It is therefore unsuitable to say that "God works + virtue in us, without us." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, + 19. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of anything is + gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, + as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the + genus of virtue, and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable if for + "quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p10"> Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which" + it is concerned, and matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, + and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here + we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is + mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p11"> The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always + referred to evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred + both to the true and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good: and so the distinction of + virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live + righteously": and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, + "of which no one makes bad use." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p12"> Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words + "which God works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, + whether acquired or infused. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is first seized by the intellect is being: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and consequently + as gone, and as good, which are convertible with being. Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and + that oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness + and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with + the notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, + not as if they themselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct + goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something + is good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends + further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of + the soul is to be in accord with reason." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13). + And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the + proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q[60], A[2]; + <a id="FS_Q55_A4-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q58_A8.html">SS, Q[58], A[8]</a>). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated + above (Q[19], A[4]), is common to all virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or + by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the + words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without + action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p19"></p> + <p id="FS_Q55_A4-p20"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS.v.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q56" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q56-p0.1">OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q56-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q56-p2"> We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q56-p3"> (1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?</p> + <p id="FS_Q56-p4"> (2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers?</p> + <p id="FS_Q56-p5"> (3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?</p> + <p id="FS_Q56-p6"> (4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject of virtue?</p> + <p id="FS_Q56-p7"> (5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue?</p> + <p id="FS_Q56-p8"> (6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?</p> + <div id="FS_Q56_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q56_A1-p0.1">Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtue + is that by which we live righteously." But we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue + is not a power, but in the essence of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." + But as work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong + to the power, any more than to the essence of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, power is in the second species of quality. But virtue is a quality, as we have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q56_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">Q[55], A[4]</a>): and quality is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "Virtue is the limit of power" (De Coelo ii). But the limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in a + power of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of + virtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects. Secondly, from the fact that virtue + is an operative habit, as we have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q56_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>): for all operation proceeds from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is + best: for + the best is the end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's + power. Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "To live" may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it belongs + to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of existence in the living thing. But sometimes "to live" is taken for + the operation of the living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously, inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous + actions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good is either the end, or something referred to the end. And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the work, + this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work, and consequently, to the power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One accident is said to be the subject of another, not as though one accident could uphold another; but because one accident + inheres to substance by means of another, as color to the body by means of the surface; so that surface is said to be the + subject of color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q56_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q56_A2-p0.1">Whether one virtue can be in several powers?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers. For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various + way from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as directing, from the will as moving, and from the motive + power as executing. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that three things are required for virtue, namely: "to know, to will, and to + work steadfastly." But "to know" belongs to the intellect, and "to will" belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several + powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is in the reason since it is "the right reason of things to be done" (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is also in + the will: for it cannot exist together with a perverse will (Ethic. vi, 12). Therefore one virtue can be in two powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue cannot + be in several powers of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected in two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way + it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, + while diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof: and so wherever there is diversity of powers, there is + diversity of habits; but not vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in two or + more, not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus one virtue can belong to several powers, so that it is in + one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition, in so far as one power is moved + by another, and one power receives from another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in the same degree; but only from different points of view, and in various + degrees. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To know" is a condition required for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral virtue + is essentially in the appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall see further + on + <a id="FS_Q56_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html">(A[3];</a> Q[57], A[4]). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q56_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q56_A3-p0.1">Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of virtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is + love. But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the appetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what has been said above ( + <a id="FS_Q56_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>). Now good is not the object of the intellect, but of the appetitive power. Therefore the subject of virtue is not the intellect, + but the appetitive power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, virtue is that "which makes its possessor good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6). But the habit which perfects + the intellect does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said to be a good man on account of his science or his + art. Therefore the intellect is not the subject of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The mind is chiefly called the intellect. But the subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the definition, above given, + of virtue ( + <a id="FS_Q56_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore the intellect is the subject of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q56_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>), a virtue is a habit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good act in two ways. First, in so far as by + the habit a man acquires an aptness to a good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to speak correctly. + But grammar does not make a man always speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make a solecism: + and the case is the same + with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that aptness: + for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p7"> And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of + what it is actually: therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is said simply to do good, and to be good; for instance, + because he is just, or temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since virtue is that "which makes + its possessor good, and his work good likewise," these latter habits are called virtuous simply: because they + make the work to be actually good, and the subject good simply. But the first kind of habits are not called virtues simply: + because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they make their possessor good simply. + For through being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not simply, but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian + or a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often divided against virtue; while at other times they are + called virtues (Ethic. vi, 2). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p8"> Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical + intellect, but also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) holds that + science, wisdom and understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues. But the subject of a habit which is called a virtue + simply, can only be the will, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will. And the reason of this is, + that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational, as we have said above (Q[9], A[1]; + Q[17], AA[1],5; + <a id="FS_Q56_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A4.html">FP, Q[82], A[4]</a>): and therefore if man do well actually, this is because he has a good will. Therefore the virtue which makes a man to do + well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do well, must be either in the will itself; or in some power as moved + by the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p9"> Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are the other powers: for a man considers something actually, + because he wills to do so. And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can be the subject of + virtue absolutely so called. And in this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the subject of Faith: for the intellect + is moved by the command of the will to assent to what is of faith: for "no man believeth, unless he will" + [*Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan.]. But the practical intellect is the subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right + reason of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason + of things to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to which man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will, just + as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the active intellect. And therefore + as the subject of science, which is the right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in its relation to + the active intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of Augustine is to be understood of virtue simply so called: not that every virtue is love simply: but that it + depends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will, whose first movement consists in love, as we have said above + (Q[25], AA[1],2,3; Q[27], A[4]; + <a id="FS_Q56_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html">FP, Q[20], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good of each thing is its end: and therefore, as truth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act + of the intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative + or practical, is a virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers virtue simply so called. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q56_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q56_A4-p0.1">Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subject of virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common to + us and dumb animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for this reason it is called human virtue. + It is therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are parts of the sensitive + appetite, as we have said in the + <a id="FS_Q56_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man's + body: for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q56_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7" target="asv">Rom. 7</a>): "I know that good does not dwell in my flesh." Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body + is ruled by the soul: wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a man make good use of his body: "For instance, if my + coachman, through obedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving; this is all due to me." But just as + the soul rules the body, so also does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. Therefore that the + irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due to the rational powers. Now "virtue is that by which + we live rightly," as we have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q56_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but only in the rational powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "the principal act of moral virtue is choice" (Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible + powers, but of the rational power, as we have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q56_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A2.html">Q[13], A[2]</a>). Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but in the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and temperance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, + 10) says that "these virtues belong to the irrational part of the soul." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of + the sensitive appetite: and in this way they are not competent to be the subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be considered + as participating in the reason, from the fact that they have a natural aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible or + concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue: for, in so far as it participates in + the reason, it is the principle of a human act. And to these powers we must needs assign virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p8"> For it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers. Because an act, which proceeds from + one power according as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect, unless both powers be well disposed to the act: for + instance, the act of a craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his instrument be well disposed to act. + Therefore in the matter of the operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as they are moved + by reason, there must needs be some habit perfecting in respect of acting well, not only the reason, but also the irascible + and concupiscible powers. And since the good disposition of the power which moves through being moved, depends on its conformity + with the power that moves it: therefore the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing else but + a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and + dumb animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation, and are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man. + And in this way they can be the subject of human virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of virtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, inasmuch as being + moved by reason, we "yield our members to serve justice"; so also, the irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed, + have not the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the "fomes": whereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason, + the good of reason is begotten in them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and concupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the body + obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those things in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul: + whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the "soul rules the body with a despotic command" as the master rules his slave: + wherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to the soul. For this + reason virtue is not in the body, but in the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly; + on the contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason, whence the Philosopher + says (Polit. i, 3) that the "reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a political command" such as that by which + free men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their own. And for this reason also must there be some virtues in + the irascible and concupiscible powers, by which these powers are well disposed to act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In choice there are two things, namely, the intention of the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the preferential + choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 2,5). But that the irascible and concupiscible + powers have a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the soul, is due to the good disposition of these powers. + And therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with the passions are + in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but prudence is in the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A4-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q56_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q56_A5-p0.1">Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension are the subject of virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension. For the sensitive appetite + can be the subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason. But the interior sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason: + for the powers of imagination, of cogitation, and of memory [*Cf. + <a id="FS_Q56_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A4.html">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>] act at the command of reason. Therefore in these powers there can be virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the rational appetite, which is the will, can be hindered or helped in its act, by the sensitive appetite, so + also can the intellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers mentioned above. As, therefore, there can be virtue in + the interior powers of appetite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of apprehension. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent. Rhetor. ii) says that memory is a part. Therefore also in the + power of memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in the other interior sensitive powers of apprehension. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All virtues are either intellectual or moral (Ethic. ii, 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the appetite; while the intellectual + virtues are in the intellect or reason, as is clear from Ethic. vi, 1. Therefore there is no virtue in the interior sensitive + powers of apprehension. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension there are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what the + Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), that "in remembering one thing after another, we become used to it; and use is a second + nature." Now a habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is like unto nature. Wherefore Tully says + of virtue in his Rhetoric that "it is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Yet, + in man, that which he acquires by use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of apprehension, is not a habit properly so + called, but something annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q56_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A4.html">Q[50], A[4]</a>, ad 3). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p7"> Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never + happens that anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that power which consummates the good act. But the + knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for such powers prepare the way to the intellective + knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues, by which we know truth: these + are rather in the intellect or reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive appetite is related to the will, which is the rational appetite, through being moved by it. And therefore the + act of the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite: and for this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject + of virtue. Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the intellect rather through moving it; for the reason + that the phantasms are related to the intellective soul, as colors to sight + (De Anima iii, text. 18). And therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect; and for this reason the cognoscitive + virtues are in the intellect itself, or the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p9"> And thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is of a genus, as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but one of + the conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a fashion, it is after the manner of an integral part. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q56_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q56_A6-p0.1">Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not the subject of virtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a power + by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the reason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the + Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason. And to this good every virtue is + ordered, since everything naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as Tully says in his + Rhetoric, is a "habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore the will is not the subject of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (Ethic. i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the + intellect and reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in the irascible and concupiscible powers which + are rational by participation. Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect + of some human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in respect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there + will be no virtue in any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore + the will cannot be the subject of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Greater perfection is required in the mover than in the moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible powers. + Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the irascible and concupiscible powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the habit perfects the power in reference to act, then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well, which + habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper nature does not suffice for the purpose. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p7"> Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object. Since, therefore, as we have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q56_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), the object of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will, in respect of this the will does not need a virtue + perfecting it. But if man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species, + such as Divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as + regards the individual, such as the good of one's neighbor, then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues as + those which direct man's affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and such like. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection is true of those virtues which are ordained to the willer's own good; such as temperance and fortitude, which + are concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is clear from what we have said ( + <a id="FS_Q56_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A6.html">Q[35], A[6]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are rational by participation but "the appetitive power altogether," i.e. + in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). Now the will is included in the appetitive power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the + will must be a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on ( + <a id="FS_Q56_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">Q[62], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these cases + there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need + exists only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q56_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q57" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q57-p0.1">OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q57-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q57-p2"> We now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological + virtues. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57-p3"> (1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?</p> + <p id="FS_Q57-p4"> (2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding?</p> + <p id="FS_Q57-p5"> (3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue?</p> + <p id="FS_Q57-p6"> (4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art?</p> + <p id="FS_Q57-p7"> (5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?</p> + <p id="FS_Q57-p8"> (6) Whether "eubulia," "synesis" and "gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence?</p> + <div id="FS_Q57_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q57_A1-p0.1">Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have + said above ( + <a id="FS_Q57_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>). But speculative habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e. operative matter. Therefore + the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made happy or blessed: for "happiness is the reward of virtue" (Ethic. + i, 9). Now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human goods, by which man acquires happiness, but rather + things pertaining to nature or to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not subalternate, + as the Philosopher proves in Topic. iv. Therefore speculative habits are not virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The speculative habits alone consider necessary things which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. + vi, 1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise + than they are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>), a habit, as we have already observed ( + <a id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html">Q[56], A[3]</a>), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, + it confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above stated ( + <a id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>), belongs to those habits alone which affect the + appetitive part of the soul: since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective + uses. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p7"> Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only + the intellective part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration + of truth (since this is the good work of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the second way, as though they + conferred the right use of a power or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does + not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has + scientific knowledge: that he make use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue + which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits. And in this way too there + can be merit in the acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus Gregory says (Moral. vi) that the + "contemplative life has greater merit than the active life." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior. Accordingly the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with the speculative + faculty, is concerned with exterior work, to which the speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior + act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it is an operative habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative virtues + are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, in so far as the word "whereby" indicates the efficient + cause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the supreme object of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is said to + be about its acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those + things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because + they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contemplation of truth, as we have already stated ( + <a id="FS_Q57_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q57_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q57_A2-p0.1">Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. + Because a species is a kind of science, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science + among the intellectual virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of + these objects, as we have already explained ( + <a id="FS_Q57_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A3.html">FP, Q[77], A[3]</a>). Therefore diversity of habits is taken, not from their material objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now + the principle of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the conclusion is known. Therefore the understanding of + principles + should not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of conclusions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason + employs the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it employs the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science, + which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual virtue, so also should opinion be. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As already stated + <a id="FS_Q57_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth: + for this is its good work. Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration---as known in itself, and as known through another. + What is known in itself, is as a "principle," and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that perfects + the intellect for the consideration + of such truth is called "understanding," which is the habit of principles. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p7"> On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the + reason's inquiry, and is as a "term." This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus; + secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since "things that are knowable last from our standpoint, + are knowable first and chiefly in their nature" (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence that which is last with + respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is "wisdom," which + considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in order, + because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes. But in regard to that which + is last in this or that genus of knowable matter, it is "science" which perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the + different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas there is but one wisdom. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions + from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, + not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or + power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object: thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color, + and light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, + the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the + conclusion being considered at all. Again they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can + be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the + conclusions also: while to consider the principles in themselves belongs to understanding. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p10"> Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues are distinct, not as being on a par with one another, + but in a certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than another; for + instance, the rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetal. For it is thus that + science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as + obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions + of science, and of the principles on which they are based. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q57_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4), a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth, + and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the truth and never + tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in Ethic. vi, 3, they + are not intellectual + virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q57_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q57_A3-p0.1">Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that "no one makes bad + use of virtue." But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore + art is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But "there is a virtue of art," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore + art is not a virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are + speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,4) says that art is a virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues, + which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Art is nothing else but "the right reason about certain works to be made." And yet the good of these things depends, not + on man's appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way, but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as + such, is commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work. Art, therefore, properly + speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the speculative + habits: since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human + appetite may be affected towards that object. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his + appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry: even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we + have observed. And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither + art nor speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the property of a virtue that perfects + the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When anyone endowed with an art produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary to the + art: even as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto. + Wherefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this + reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect + virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well; for which purpose something further is requisite: although + there cannot be a good use without the art. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for + this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires + a moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or + the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like works of the speculative reason, are, by + a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained + to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the + body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber]. On the other hand, those sciences + which are not ordained to any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, + does it follow that the notion of art is more applicable to them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q57_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q57_A4-p0.1">Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But diversity + of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since there are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore + prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned a virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prudence has more in common with art than the speculative habits have; for they are both "about contingent matters + that may be otherwise than they are" (Ethic. vi, 4,5). Now some speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, + should prudence be called an art. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to prudence, "to be of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also, + as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of warfare, of seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct + from art. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art (Ethic. vi, 5). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above + <a id="FS_Q57_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[56], A[3]) that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring aptness for a good work: while some habits + are virtues, not only through conferring aptness for a good work, but also through conferring the use. But art confers the + mere aptness for good work; since it does not regard the appetite; whereas + prudence confers not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the + rectitude thereof. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p7"> The reason for this difference is that art is the "right reason of things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right reason + of things to be done." Now "making" and "doing" differ, as stated in Metaph. ix, text. 16, in that "making" is an action passing + into outward matter, e.g. "to build," "to saw," and so forth; whereas "doing" is an action abiding in the agent, e.g. "to + see," "to will," and the like. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like human actions, + consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art does to outward making: since each is the perfect reason about the things + with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters, depend on the principles from which + reason argues; just as we have said above (A[2], ad 2) that science depends on and presupposes understanding, which is the + habit of principles. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are in speculative matters, as stated in Ethic. vii, + 8. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with + regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of a moral virtue, + which rectifies the appetite. On the other hand the good things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good + of those things themselves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that more + praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence + to sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art. Accordingly it is + evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue. But + prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is a distinct kind of virtue, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for they are + both in the thinking part of the soul, and about things that may be otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues, + then art has more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear from what has been said. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there + is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in + matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply + prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q57_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q57_A5-p0.1">Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which + it is the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in respect of which we judge of a man's life: for prudence + is the right reason about these things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is not necessary in things that are made, save + in order that they be made, but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore is prudence + necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that he may become + virtuous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "It is by prudence that we are of good counsel," as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. But man can act not only from his own, + but also from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need prudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough + that he follow the counsels of prudent men. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem + to be the case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to be done; since human actions + are about things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q57_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore it seems that prudence + should not be reckoned an intellectual virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for human life, when it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q57_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>) of Divine Wisdom: "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have + nothing more profitable in life." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, + it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from + impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, + the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably + directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the + end. And to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because + counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue + is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this + virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good of an art is to be found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason about things + to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the thing + made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the + good of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its + perfection: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q57_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Consequently art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good. Rather would it + be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g. that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were + proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the + craftsman + needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas prudence + is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as + regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; + and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Ethic. vi, 2, truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth of + the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly + in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent + things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary + things. On the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This conformity + has no place in necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will; but only in contingent matters which can be effected + by us, whether they be matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters + that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to be made, and + prudence, as regards things to be done. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q57_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q57_A6-p0.1">Whether "eubulia, synesis, and gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence? [*{euboulia, synesis, gnome}]</h4> + <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "{euboulia, synesis}, and {gnome}" are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For "{euboulia}" + is "a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it "belongs to prudence to take good counsel," as stated (Ethic. + vi, 9). Therefore "{euboulia}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is prudence itself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to the higher to judge the lower. The highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is + judgment. Now "{synesis}" enables us to judge well. Therefore "{synesis}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather + is a principal virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel. + But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel. Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there + is no need, besides "{synesis}" of the virtue of "{gnome}." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of + the present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. "caution, docility," + and the like. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to prudence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now + there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the + third, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel + is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, in so far + as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that + in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue + which perfects the command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. + "{eustochia}," which perfects counsel; and "{synesis}" and "{gnome}," which are parts of prudence in relation to judgment, + and of + whose distinction we shall speak further on (ad 3). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it + perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. "{euboulia}." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Judgment about what is to be done is directed to something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a man's + judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded + aright in the point of what has to be done. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: + because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence + only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there are two virtues for good judgment: because difference is + based not on common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative + matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce + judgment, differ according to their different objects. "{Synesis}" and "{gnome}" differ in respect of the different rules + on which judgment is based: for "{synesis}" judges of actions according to the common law; while "{gnome}" bases its judgment + on the natural law, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on ( + <a id="FS_Q57_A6-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q51_A4.html">SS, Q[51], A[4]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but + are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective + parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion, + potential parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as + secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them later (SS, Q[48], seqq.). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q57_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q56_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q58" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q58-p0.1">OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q58-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q58-p2"> We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their + distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues + and the others. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58-p3"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q58-p4"> (1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?</p> + <p id="FS_Q58-p5"> (2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?</p> + <p id="FS_Q58-p6"> (3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue?</p> + <p id="FS_Q58-p7"> (4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?</p> + <p id="FS_Q58-p8"> (5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral virtue?</p> + <div id="FS_Q58_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q58_A1-p0.1">Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. Because moral virtue is so called from the Latin "mos," i.e. custom. Now, + we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral virtue is "a habit of choosing the rational mean." But every virtue + is a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following + the rational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on ( + <a id="FS_Q58_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html">Q[64], AA[1]</a>,2,3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit like a second nature, in accord with reason." But since + every human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with reason: since man's good "consists in that which agrees + with his reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13): "When we speak of a man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that + he is gentle or sober." Accordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated + above ( + <a id="FS_Q58_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html">Q[57], A[2]</a>). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word "mos"; for thus we shall be able + to discover what a "moral" virtue is. Now "mos" has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.1" target="asv">Acts 15:1</a>): "Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you cannot be saved." Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural + inclination to do some particular action, in which + sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.1.2" target="asv">2 Macc. 1:2</a>) that "rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [*Leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them": + and the word is used in the same sense in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.7" target="asv">Ps. 67:7</a>, where we read: "Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a house." For both these significations there is but one + word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word "ethos" is written sometimes + with a long, and sometimes a short "e". + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p7"> Now "moral" virtue is so called from "mos" in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. + And the other meaning of "mos," i.e. "custom," is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination + similar to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose + function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above ( + <a id="FS_Q58_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], + A[1] + </a>). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes "mos" in the sense of "custom." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part + of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty ( + <a id="FS_Q58_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>). Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that habit alone which perfects + the appetitive faculty: although the acts of other habits also may be a matter + of choice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Nature is the principle of movement" (Phys. ii, text. 3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the + appetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which + are in the appetitive faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q58_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q58_A2-p0.1">Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) "that virtue + is the art of right conduct." But art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some authors put science in the definition of virtues: thus some define perseverance as a "science or habit regarding + those things to which we should hold or not hold"; and holiness as "a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his + duty to God." Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual + virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that "virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason." But this belongs to the + intellectual virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the + definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed + by reason as a prudent man would appoint it." Now this right reason that fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual + virtue, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from + intellectual. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in Ethic. i, 13 that "there are two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason + somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of + the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. + Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "the soul rules the body like a despot," i.e. + as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate + to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since + virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that + there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of + prudence," as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; + and that every one who sins, does so through ignorance. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p8"> Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain + power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic + power," whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition. Hence Augustine says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a> (Serm. 8) that "sometimes we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, or follows not at all," in so + far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And + in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not + sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p9"> Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of + intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs + from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the principle of human + acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in + conformity with reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine usually applies the term "art" to any form of right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right + reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that "virtue + is the art of right conduct," this applies to prudence essentially; but to other virtues, by participation, for as much as + they are directed by prudence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we + have said about art (ad 1). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p12"> The same applies to the Third Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, + but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction + of prudence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q58_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q58_A3-p0.1">Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between + moral and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (Ethic. vi, 3,5); and again is placed by + all among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further on ( + <a id="FS_Q58_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A1.html">Q[61], A[1]</a>). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral, as though there + were no mean between them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral + virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue + is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz. + science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q58_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html">Q[57], AA[2]</a> ,3,5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue. + Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human + actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in De + Anima iii, text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if + it perfects man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it + will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that + every human virtue is either intellectual or moral. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with + the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q58_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html">Q[57], A[4]</a>). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Contingency and perseverance are not perfections of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound + in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making + it conformable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are, however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the + passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since + intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the + end, so that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the ends, on which it builds its argument: and this + is wanting in the continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles be perfect, unless + each principle be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the principal agent employing + an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive faculty, + which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action + will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be a virtue. And for this reason, contingency, desisting + from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the + Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1,9). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q58_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q58_A4-p0.1">Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is + "a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Now though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves + it, there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of + knowledge. Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining + him to consent to his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous + and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason. Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural + inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without intellectual virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues." + But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q58_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A5.html">Q[57], A[5]</a>). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding + and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now + in order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done + by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with + reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot + do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as + stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q58_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A5.html">Q[57], AA[5]</a>,6). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: and consequently neither can there be without understanding. + For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident + principles both in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far + as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, + which is the right reason about things to be done. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity + require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires + that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things + which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, + through lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.16" target="asv"> Mat. 10:16</a>: "Be ye therefore prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents, and simple as doves." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger + this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice + of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, + and the more grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be + not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to right reason," in so far as it inclines man to that which + is, according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli.]; but also it needs to be "joined with + right reason," as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q58_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q58_A5-p0.1">Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on + the perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which + is a perfection of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be + without it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper + matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the moral virtue, although of all the intellectual virtues, + it seems most akin to the moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having + the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue. + Now it is contrary to prudence "to sin willingly" (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the + right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also in particular); about which things actions + are. Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular cases, + it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of + action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; + or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For + it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a + particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire + seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding + or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be + rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, + whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the + virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently + the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing + about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles + is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does, + when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. + Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the impediment + of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q58_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q59" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q59-p0.1">OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q59-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q59-p2"> We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another. And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, + differ accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different + kinds of moral virtue in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59-p3"> (1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?</p> + <p id="FS_Q59-p4"> (2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?</p> + <p id="FS_Q59-p5"> (3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?</p> + <p id="FS_Q59-p6"> (4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion?</p> + <p id="FS_Q59-p7"> (5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?</p> + <div id="FS_Q59_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q59_A1-p0.1">Whether moral virtue is a passion?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is + a mean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, + such as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another's ills, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q59_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A8.html">Q[35], A[8]</a>). Now "Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue," as Augustine states in De Civ. Dei ix, 5. Therefore + a passion may be a moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are neither virtues nor vices." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive + appetite, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q59_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>): whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit. + Secondly, because passions are not in themselves good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to reason: + wherefore the passions, + considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with reason. Now + nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q59_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because, granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the movement + of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity + with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite, + inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit + of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes + the mean between passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds, it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean + sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act + of virtue; in so far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue, in so far as "that movement of the soul is obedient to reason"; viz. + "when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven," as Augustine says + (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders + pity, in this sense, from being a virtue. The same applies to similar passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q59_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q59_A2-p0.1">Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion. For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that "a gentle man is one who + is not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not give way." The same applies to all the moral virtues. + Therefore all moral virtues are without passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as health is to the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17: wherefore "virtue + is a kind of health of the soul," as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But the soul's passions are "the soul's diseases," as + he says in the same book. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is passion compatible with virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this: + for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence": and Sallust says (Catilin.) that + "when they," i.e. the soul's passions, "interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp the truth." Therefore passion is incompatible + with moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but + if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy." But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral + virtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the + soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be reduced to the mean. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p7"> This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, + through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided + into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of + the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the + soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being, + as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason. These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose + deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus + Gellius [*Noct. Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in our power to call up the visions + of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, + so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow," in so far as "these passions forestall the use of reason + without his approving of such things or consenting thereto." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p8"> Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them + deliberately; as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can + be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "some describe + virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should + be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and + time." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own mind, + but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the + Philosopher rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not freedom from passion. It may be said, however, + that when he says "a gentle man is not passionate," we are to understand this of + inordinate passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This and all similar arguments which Tully brings forward in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take the passions in the execution of reason's + command. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and + the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution + of reason's command. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q59_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q59_A3-p0.1">Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv"> Wis. 8:7</a>: "She," i.e. Divine wisdom, "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." Now the "conversation" of wisdom + "hath no bitterness," as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is + incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc. Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue, + which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in Him, for He said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.38" target="asv">Mat. 26:38</a>): "My soul is sorrowful even unto death." Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are three {eupatheiai}, i.e. + "three good passions," in place of the three disturbances: viz. instead of covetousness, "desire"; instead of mirth, "joy"; + instead of fear, "caution." But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for + two reasons. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p7"> First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they + thought that, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so man's only evil is vice, which cannot + be in a virtuous man. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever conduces to preserve + the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently + the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous + man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8</a>: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in + a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to + + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:10</a>: "The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily + sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions are when + moderated by reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p8"> Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even + as pleasure is about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire + to have good that one possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the mind resulting from sorrow for a + present evil, is altogether contrary to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is + unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected + by reason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according + as reason dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be conformed to reason, as stated above (A[1], ad + 2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher + says (Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the + sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p9"> Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices + in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom. + Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to the + present state of life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q59_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q59_A4-p0.1">Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue + is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html"> Q[31], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A1.html"> Q[35], AA[1]</a>, 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. + i, 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q59_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some + are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about + the passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by + reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject + to reason's direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations + of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a + passion, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q59_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting + from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, + after the words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about actions and passions; now every action and passion is followed by pleasure + or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows," viz. as + about something that results from virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where + there are no passions, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q59_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q59_A5-p0.1">Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion. For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the + passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the + passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) they are called "passions of sins." Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does + all things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot + be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue + is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, + which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reason for this is that otherwise + it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: + whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make + them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to + their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p7"> Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue + is justice: because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act + of justice; at least in the will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased through the perfection of + justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the + higher, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q59_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A7.html">Q[17], A[7]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q59_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q24_A3.html"> Q[24], A[3]</a>). Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good of anything depends on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as + there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is altogether without passion, as it is without a body: + whereas the good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the body's help. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q59_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q58_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q60" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q60-p0.1">HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q60-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q60-p2"> We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q60-p3"> (1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?</p> + <p id="FS_Q60-p4"> (2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct from those which are about passions?</p> + <p id="FS_Q60-p5"> (3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?</p> + <p id="FS_Q60-p6"> (4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?</p> + <p id="FS_Q60-p7"> (5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?</p> + <div id="FS_Q60_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q60_A1-p0.1">Whether there is only one moral virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which + is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral + virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence. Therefore there is also but one + moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now + the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, + seemingly, there is but one moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q60_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">Q[1], A[3]</a>). Now there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite + in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above (Q[56], A[2]). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive + part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q60_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q80_A2.html">FP, Q[80], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q60_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q60_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A1.html">Q[58], AA[1]</a>,2,3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences + of their objects, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q60_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">Q[54], A[2]</a>). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the + agent. But we must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold + relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that + form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive + a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, + the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with + non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received into matter are + not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance, + we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various + adaptability of matter. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is + commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational, + not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong + to various species, according to their various relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of + various species and are not one only. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind + of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of + the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing + power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the + various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be + infinite in number, are not infinite in species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q60_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q60_A2-p0.1">Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are about passions?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which are about operations and those which are about passions. + For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of + pleasure or sorrow." Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q60_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">Q[31], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q60_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A1.html"> Q[35], A[1]</a>). Therefore the same virtue which is about passions is also about + operations, since it is an operative habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions are principles of external action. If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a + consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues are about both passions and operations. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appetite + are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also about passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic. + ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has + some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow which are passions, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q60_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q59_A4.html">Q[59], A[4]</a>, ad 1). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p7"> Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those + moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions. The reason for this is that + good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected + towards them: viz. in so far as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In + operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, + and all such operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to another. For this reason justice and its + parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only + on commensuration with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected + to + them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the + passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p8"> It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some + inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the external act is destroyed: + while some other virtue is destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure. Thus when through anger, + one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the + immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other + two consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, + in others, about passions, for the reason given above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q60_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q60_A3-p0.1">Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems + to belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about operations. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the + other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says + (Ethic. v, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue + which directs a man's actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does + not cause a diversity of moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there are various moral virtues about various operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity + of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, + and again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there are not different virtues about different operations. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both of which are about operations. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something + due to another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The reason for this is that in external operations, + the order of reason is established, as we have stated + <a id="FS_Q60_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness of the thing itself; from + which + becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice + that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of justice. + But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, + in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a + contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various virtues: + e.g. "Religion" whereby we pay our debt to God; "Piety," whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; "Gratitude," + whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But + the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special + virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That justice which seeks the common good is another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an individual: + wherefore common right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs + man to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the common good is a general virtue through its act + of command: since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the + common good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue + does not differ, save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that is active + of itself, and a virtue that is active through the command of another virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is the same kind of due in all the operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the same virtue + of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative + justice; but about this we shall inquire later on ( + <a id="FS_Q60_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q61_A1.html">SS, Q[61], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q60_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q60_A4-p0.1">Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different passions. For there is but one habit about things + that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of sciences. But the passions all concur in one + source, viz. love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q60_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html">Q[25], AA[1]</a>,2,4; + <a id="FS_Q60_A4-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q27_A4.html"> Q[27], A[4]</a>). Therefore there is but one moral + virtue about all the passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if there were different moral virtues about different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral virtues + as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, + about fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is no need for different moral virtues about + different passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different species, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q60_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there are not different moral virtues about + different passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power + as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q60_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p7"> On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, + because some passions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About + such passions as are thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral virtue consists + in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural + order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g. between black and white. Secondly, because there are different passions + contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that + which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral + virtues, because their movements follow one another in a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the + attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure; + and it is the same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the + other hand, the irascible passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different things: for daring and fear are + about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary + which + has wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues about such like passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible + passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope and despair; meekness, about anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the passions concur in one common principle and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not suffice + for the unity of moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as in the natural order the same principle causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in + the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, + like a second nature, consents to reason's dictates. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those three passions are directed to the same object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same + virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q60_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q60_A5-p0.1">Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects + of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according + to the objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue + of justice. Therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ + according to the objects of those passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate + habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral + virtue: so that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the same applies to the other passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less + pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful + objects, and the same applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according to the objects of the passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But there are various virtues about the desires for good things: + thus temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] about pleasures in games. Therefore + there should be different virtues about fears of evils. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about pleasures of the table, and "eutrapelia" about pleasures in games. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite. + Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their + relation to the appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite, + cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason, + they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite. + Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions, without causing diversity of virtues, + as when one virtue is about several passions, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q60_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A4.html">(A[4])</a>; and again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference of passions, since several + virtues are directed about one + passion, e.g. pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p8"> And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong to diverse virtues, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q60_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A4.html">(A[4])</a>; therefore a difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always causes a specific difference of virtues---for + instance the difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good and difficult to obtain. Moreover + since the reason rules man's lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to + outward things; hence, one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, + and again, according as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason, and consequently + is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues. Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and pleasure, + may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed + to man's good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's good in relation to other men. And every such difference, + being differently related to reason, differentiates virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p9"> Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep + of human life either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse, it + will belong to the virtue of "temperance." As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not intense, and so do not + present much difficulty to the reason: hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like art, is + about difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p10"> On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money + and honor; the former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body, while the latter is based on the apprehension + of the mind. These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern the concupiscible faculty, or + as being difficult to obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction, + however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far + as he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money considered as a good absolutely, + as an object of desire, pleasure, or love, there is "liberality": but if we consider this good as difficult to get, and as + being the object of our hope, there is "magnificence" [*{megaloprepeia}]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken + absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called "philotimia" [*{philotimia}], i.e. "love of honor": while if we + consider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have "magnanimity." Wherefore liberality and "philotimia" + seem to be in the concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p11"> As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object + of the concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards another either in some serious + matter, in actions, to wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz. that are done for mere pleasure, + and which do not stand in the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards + another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs + to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls "friendship" [*{philia}], and may be rendered "affability." Secondly, one + man behaves towards another by being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv, + 7) he calls "truthfulness" [*{aletheia}]. For frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters than + play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] (Ethic. + iv, 8). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p12"> It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance, + liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which + differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add "justice," which is about operations, there + will be eleven in all. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific + passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as virtues are, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> More and less do not cause a difference of species, unless they bear different relations to reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Good is a more potent mover than evil: because evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states (Div. + Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there being, + seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion. Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of + anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the + other hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that particular kind of passion. + Consequently there are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p17"></p> + <p id="FS_Q60_A5-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q59_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q61" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q61-p0.1">OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q61-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q61-p2"> We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q61-p3"> (1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?</p> + <p id="FS_Q61-p4"> (2) Of their number;</p> + <p id="FS_Q61-p5"> (3) Which are they?</p> + <p id="FS_Q61-p6"> (4) Whether they differ from one another?</p> + <p id="FS_Q61-p7"> (5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?</p> + <div id="FS_Q61_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q61_A1-p0.1">Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a division + are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not principal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite + members of the division of the genus "virtue." Therefore none of them should be called principal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end is principal as compared to the means. But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues + are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is essentially so is principal in comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual + virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, + as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q61_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html">Q[58] , A[3]</a>). Therefore the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor in spirit" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv">Lk. 6:20</a>) says: "We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude." But these are moral + virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q61_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html">Q[56], A[3]</a>), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only + confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one + that answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not + require rectitude of the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed to be + done. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which imply rectitude + of the appetite are called principal virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues, + for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q61_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A4.html">Q[57], A[4]</a>). Consequently, + those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic idea; + although considered in their nature as things, one species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of + other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to + another, nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of + the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance principally in relation to accident. Such is the division + of virtue into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The theological virtues are above man, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q61_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html">Q[58], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, but "super-human" or godlike virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they + do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q61_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q61_A2-p0.1">Whether there are four cardinal virtues?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, + as is clear from what has been said above ( + <a id="FS_Q61_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A4.html">Q[58], A[4]</a>). But that which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, + and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not + to rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more principal virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of good works is built on four virtues." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and + either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p7"> For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is considered in two + ways. First, as existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal virtue, called "Prudence." Secondly, according + as the reason puts its order into something else; either into operations, and then we have "Justice"; or into passions, and + then we need two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their + thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions inciting to something against reason, and then the passions + need a curb, which we call "Temperance." Secondly, by the passions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. + through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and + to this end there is "Fortitude." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p8"> In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue + we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational + by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty, subject of "Temperance," and + the irascible faculty, subject of "Fortitude." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as + to the formal principle. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q61_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q61_A3-p0.1">Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that other virtues should be called principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the principal + in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more + than any be called a principal virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for + Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that "he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as one who carries straw against + the wind." Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal. But this applies to patience, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.4" target="asv"> James 1:4</a>: "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q61_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as we understand it now. + These principles are found chiefly in certain acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is found + chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its judgment, as stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined + by reason and put into our operations as + something right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis of + equality. The good of curbing the passions is found chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the + pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found + chiefly in perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p7"> Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways. First, in respect of their common formal principles. In + this way they are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance, + any virtue that causes good in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good of + right and due in operation, be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called + temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy + doctors, as also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this way the other virtues are contained under + them. Wherefore all the objections fail. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p8"> Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective + matter, and thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal in comparison with the + other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue + which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the + pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail: + because the other virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called principal by reason of their matter, as + stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p9"></p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A3-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q61_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q61_A4-p0.1">Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another? </h4> + <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1): + "There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; + no sound fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without prudence, fortitude and temperance." + But this would not be so, if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the + different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, among things distinct from one another the function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of temperance + is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic. xxxvi): "Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself, + and is not weakened and bent by any enticement." And of temperance he says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the + manner and order in all things that we decide to do and say." Therefore it seems that + these virtues are not distinct from one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should + have knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and + act with firmness and steadfastness." But the first of these seems to belong to prudence which is rectitude of reason in things + to be done; the second, i.e. choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his + passions on the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man should act for the sake of a due end, + implies a certain rectitude, which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and steadfastness, belongs + to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct from + one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he + applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same four virtues are distinct from one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q61_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, these four virtues are understood differently by various writers. For some take them as signifying certain general conditions + of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discretion in + any actions or matters whatever; justice, a certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any matters; + temperance, a disposition of the mind, + moderating any passions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is + strengthened for that which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by any operations. + To distinguish these four virtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct virtuous + habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a "habit," should be accompanied by a + certain firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as + it is a "virtue," it is directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to justice. + Again, owing to the fact that it is a "moral virtue" partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things, and + does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion, + which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially + to reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a kind of application (of reason) to passions + or operations. According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct from the other three virtues: but these + would not be distinct from one another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit, and virtue, and + moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p7"> Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according as they have their special determinate matter; each + of its own matter, in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken + as stated above + <a id="FS_Q61_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. In this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues qualify + one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are directed + by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest, for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what + is less difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures + of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his + daring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate. + Again, temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose + mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to + remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be + unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered + by toil." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p9"> From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps + the mind unbent by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote certain general conditions + of virtue, or in the sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These four general conditions of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may, however, + be appropriated to them, in the way above stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q61_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q61_A5-p0.1">Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, + and social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the "exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God." + Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God." + Therefore these virtues cannot be exemplar. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in + a soul that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows + nothing about the passions; it does not have to conquer them." Now it was stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q61_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q59_A5.html">Q[59], A[5]</a>) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions. Therefore there is no such thing as + "perfect" virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human + affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God." But it seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): + "I reckon that it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he despises what most men admire, viz. + power and office." Therefore there are no "perfecting" virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good + of their country and for the safety of the city." But it is only legal justice that is directed to the common weal, as the + Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The four + kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social* virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes + purgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect [*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues + of the clean soul] virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'" [*Cf. + Chrysostom's fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not + shut up his good deeds within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of + the truth, lives for the common weal."] + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something + is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just + as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus + we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called + prudence; while temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to + reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus + states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p8"> Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in + him according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves + himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p9"> But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in + Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us---for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.48" target="asv">Mat. 5:48</a>), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine. Now these + virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are + virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called "perfecting" virtues. + Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts + of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul + from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted + consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine + similitude: these are called the "perfect virtues." Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temperance knows + no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by + an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of + perfection. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying + and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of those + who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the + social virtues check the passions," i.e. they bring them to the relative mean; "the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, + "uproot them"; "the third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while + it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind," viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said + that here he is speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: + "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; + as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when + such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority." This agrees with + what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a hollowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. + If no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid + on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service + of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as + we understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards + the household, or even towards one individual. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p14"></p> + <p id="FS_Q61_A5-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q62" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q62-p0.1">OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q62-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q62-p2"> We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q62-p3"> (1) Whether there are any theological virtues?</p> + <p id="FS_Q62-p4"> (2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?</p> + <p id="FS_Q62-p5"> (3) How many, and which are they?</p> + <p id="FS_Q62-p6"> (4) Of their order.</p> + <div id="FS_Q62_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q62_A1-p0.1">Whether there are any theological virtues?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition + of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature." But that which + is Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q62_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A5.html">Q[61], A[5]</a>), which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of + all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore + there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and + charity: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.2.8" target="asv">Ecclus. 2:8, </a> seqq.): "Ye that fear the Lord believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him." Therefore faith, hope, and + charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they are theological virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above ( + <a id="FS_Q62_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A7.html">Q[5], A[7]</a>). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q62_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html">Q[5], A[5]</a>). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The + other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a + kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers of the + Divine nature." And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him + to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man + to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed + to his + connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called + "theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they + are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained + in Holy Writ. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass + the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, + man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of + the Nature of which he is made a partaker. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us virtuous, + and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to + nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object + of supernatural happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q62_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q62_A2-p0.1">Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological + virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now + the virtues which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues which perfect the appetitive part, + are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and + intellectual virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which + directs us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological + virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is charity, + which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> That which is above man's nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are + above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q62_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html">Q[58], A[3]</a>). Therefore they are distinct from one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q62_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">Q[54], A[2]</a>, ad 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object + of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other + hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological + virtues are specifically + distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the theological + virtues, supernaturally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they + are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they + surpass human reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, + this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly + so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; + and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]; + Q[28], A[6], ad 2; Q[41], A[2], ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other + virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (Q[65], + AA[2],5; + <a id="FS_Q62_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A7.html">SS, Q[23], A[7]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q62_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q62_A3-p0.1">Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological virtues?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological + virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among + the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the understanding of principles. Therefore + there should be but one theological virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among + the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned + among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned + as theological virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God. Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective + part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, + the other, the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q62_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed + to his connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so + far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are + reason's starting-point, both in + speculative and in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined + by reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p7"> But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for + them that love Him." Consequently in respect of both the above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural + to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which + are + held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will is directed to + this end, both as to that end as something attainable---and this pertains to hope---and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby + the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end---and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is moved and + tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition + to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention + of the end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is insufficient in either of these respects, + for the will to be directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there + was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence faith + and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which + are above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion to man, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.25" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:25</a>: "The weakness of God is stronger than men." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there must + needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q62_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q62_A4-p0.1">Whether faith precedes hope, and hope charity?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes + that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Being rooted and founded in charity." Therefore charity precedes the others. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): "A man cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and + loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping." Therefore it seems that faith precedes charity, and charity hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it + is a passion, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q62_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle enumerates them thus ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes + form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: + because habits are all infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving, + unless that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith + that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love. Hence in the order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity. + In like manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able + to obtain some good through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the very reason + that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so that in the order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards + their respective acts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p7"> But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope: because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and + receive from charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch + as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on ( + <a id="FS_Q62_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q23_A8.html">SS, Q[23], A[8]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs + to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not + already possessed, but which he hopes to possess. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q62_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A7.html">Q[40], A[7]</a>), in treating of the passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz. the good hoped for. With regard + to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also regards the person + from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though afterwards + hope is increased by love. + Because from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love him: and from the fact + that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q62_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q61_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q63" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q63-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q63-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q63-p2"> We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q63-p3"> (1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?</p> + <p id="FS_Q63-p4"> (2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?</p> + <p id="FS_Q63-p5"> (3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?</p> + <p id="FS_Q63-p6"> (4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as infused virtue?</p> + <div id="FS_Q63_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q63_A1-p0.1">Whether virtue is in us by nature? </h4> + <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "Virtues are natural to us and + are equally in all of us." And Antony says in his sermon to the monks: "If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if + it follow nature it is virtuous." Moreover, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.23" target="asv"> Mat. 4:23, </a> "Jesus went about," etc., says: "He taught them natural virtues, i.e. chastity, justice, humility, which man possesses naturally." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason, as was clearly shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q63_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">Q[55], A[4]</a>, ad 2). But that which accords with reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man's nature. Therefore virtue is in + man by nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.31.18" target="asv">Job 31:18</a>): "From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my mother's womb." Therefore virtue is in man by nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts remain, + as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> With regard to corporeal forms, it has been maintained by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for instance, + who upheld the theory of "latent forms" [*Anaxagoras; Cf. + <a id="FS_Q63_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q45_A8.html">FP, Q[45], A[8]</a>; Q[65], A[4]]. Others held that forms are entirely from without, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated + from some separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that they are partly from within, in so far as they + pre-exist potentially in matter; and partly from without, in so far as they are brought into act by the agent. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p7"> In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that they are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences + would pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed + down by the body, are removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being polished. This was the opinion of + the Platonists. Others said that they are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the active + intellect, as Avicenna maintained. Others said that sciences and virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted + to them, but not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p8"> To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in which something is said to be natural to a man; one is + according to his specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And, since each thing derives its species + from its form, and its individuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his rational soul, while his matter is his + body, whatever belongs to him in respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific + nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of + his individual nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his body, considered as part of his species, is to be + referred, in a way, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p9"> In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's + reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the + nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance + with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in + the body, some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain + parts of the body, according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts, + and, in consequence, the rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In this way one man has a natural + aptitude for science, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual and moral + virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one, while + the perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in respect of the + various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue's action, and according to various circumstances. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p10"> It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to + perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p11"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by + nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the sense that, owing to the natural disposition + which the body has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another for some other virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q63_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q63_A2-p0.1">Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi + cvi.] commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv"> Rom. 14:23, </a> "All that is not of faith is sin," says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is no good without the Sovereign + Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people." Now faith cannot be acquired + by means of works, but is + caused in us by God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv"> Eph. 2:8</a>: "By grace you are saved through faith." Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.21" target="asv"> Wis. 8:21</a>: "I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it." Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us + by habituation, but only by the gift of God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause. + Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much more, + therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We have spoken above ( + <a id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], AA[2]</a>,3) in a general way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a special way of this matter in relation + to virtue, we must take note that, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4), man's virtue perfects him in relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in "mode, species, and order," as + Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in "number, weight, and + measure," as expressed in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv"> Wis. 11:21, </a> man's good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], AA[3]</a>,4), viz. human reason and Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever + is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p7"> It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by + human acts: inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established. On the other + hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, + the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in + giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, "which God works in us without us" (Super + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a>, Serm. xxvi). It is also of these virtues that the First Objection holds good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But actual + sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue; because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as + stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q63_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A3.html">Q[49], A[3]</a>): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary + to a habit. Wherefore, though + man cannot avoid mortal sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue, + whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason. There are also certain + mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological virtues, + which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, will be more fully explained later ( + <a id="FS_Q63_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A4.html">Q[109], A[4]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q63_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[51], A[1]), certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. These principles are more excellent + than the virtues acquired through them: thus the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the science + of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which results + through the appetite partaking + of reason, which rectification belongs to moral virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher principles, + can cause acquired human virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q63_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q63_A3-p0.1">Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself, + save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), + "it is God's rule to bring about extremes through the mean." Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our + acts, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q63_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it is not reasonable that + they should be caused in us by infusion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works than in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to + direct us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices: much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our + souls, according to a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1" target="asv">Heb. 1</a> [*Cf. Jerome on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.1.15" target="asv"> Gal. 1: 15,16</a>]. Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>): "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired + by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as above stated + <a id="FS_Q63_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[51], A[1]): instead of which natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to + a supernatural end, as stated (Q[62], A[1]). Wherefore we need to receive from God other + habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the + moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological + virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately. But + the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in + addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q63_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q63_A4-p0.1">Whether virtue by habituation belongs to the same species as infused virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues, + according to what has been said + <a id="FS_Q63_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but + by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires + of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a + creature. But the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the + man born blind, as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to + the same species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition + of infused virtue contains the words, "which God works in us without us," as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q63_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The first, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">Q[54], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A2.html"> Q[56], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A1.html"> Q[60], A[1]</a>), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as + in that virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence + of touch. The + formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material element is something + on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according + to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to Divine rule. For instance, + in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, + nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to "chastise his body, and bring it into + subjection" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.27" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:27</a>), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; + and the same applies to the other virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p7"> The other specific differences among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed: for a man's health and a + horse's are not of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective healths are + directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are + well directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men + behave well in respect of their being "fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household [Douay: 'domestics'] of God" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.19" target="asv">Eph. 2:19</a>), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, + as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore + their respective acts are not identical. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it + was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired + by acts. But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q63_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q62_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q64" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q64-p0.1">OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q64-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q64-p2"> We must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality + of virtues, (4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64-p3"> (1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean?</p> + <p id="FS_Q64-p4"> (2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational mean?</p> + <p id="FS_Q64-p5"> (3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?</p> + <p id="FS_Q64-p6"> (4) Whether the theological virtues do?</p> + <div id="FS_Q64_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q64_A1-p0.1">Whether moral virtues observe the mean?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme. + Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Coelo i that "virtue is the limit of power." Therefore + moral virtue does not observe the mean. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors, + and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2,3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the + contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme; + thus virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give + all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is + not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As already explained ( + <a id="FS_Q64_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], A[3]</a>), the nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive + part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive movement in respect of appetible + objects is the reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule: thus the + good things made by art is + that they follow the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure. + Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in all things + ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason. Now it + is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral + virtue observes the mean. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If therefore + we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which is has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, + viz. conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz. deformity. But if we consider moral + virtue in respect of its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes + the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue, as to its essence, is a + mean state," in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: "but it is an extreme in reference to the 'best' + and the 'excellent,'" viz. as to its conformity with reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In actions and passions the mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from being + extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through + being in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity + of the respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and + a maximum: but if we consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances, then it has the character of a mean: since + these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, i.e. "where" it is right, "when" it is right, and + for an "end" that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum "when" it is not right, or "where" it is not + right, or for an undue "end"; and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto "where" one ought, and "when" one + aught. + This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity, + but the mean in the right mode of his action." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and poverty + from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e. according to God's word, and for the sake of eternal life. But + if this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superstition, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if + it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a + vice by deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or poverty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q64_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q64_A2-p0.1">Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, or the rational mean?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists + in its observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8, is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral + virtue is a real mean. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather + a mean between operations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean + of justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The rational mean can be understood in two ways. First, according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason, as + though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in this sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason, + but the act of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean. Secondly, the mean of reason may be + considered as that which the reason puts into some particular matter. In this sense every + mean of moral virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated + <a id="FS_Q64_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity with right reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p7"> But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real mean: in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real + mean, for instance, in justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean is not the real mean, but is considered in + relation to us: and such is the mean in all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that justice is about operations, + which deal with external things, wherein the right has to be established simply and absolutely, as stated above + ( + <a id="FS_Q64_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A2.html">Q[60], A[2]</a>): wherefore the rational mean in justice is the same as the real mean, in so far, to wit as justice gives to each one his + due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with interior passions wherein the right cannot be established + in the same way, since men are variously situated in relation to their passions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be established + in the passions, with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the + passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the very + act of reason, while the third argues from the mean of justice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p9"></p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A2-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q64_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q64_A3-p0.1">Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by conforming + to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore + the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual virtue: for it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6, that "virtue observes + the mean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint it." If therefore intellectual virtue also observe the mean, + this mean will have to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would be an indefinite series of virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. x, text. 22,23). But there + seems to be no contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves, as they are in the intellect, are not in opposition + to one another, but are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick. Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual + virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet there is a mean in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue observes + the mean. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The good of anything consists in its observing the mean, by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may + happen to be excessive or deficient, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q64_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as stated above (Q[56], A[3]). Hence the good of an + intellectual virtue consists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a measure. Now the good of intellectual + virtue is + the true; in the case of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely (Ethic. vi, 2); in the case of practical virtue, + it is the true in conformity with a right appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p7"> Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely, is measured by things; since things are the measure + of our intellect, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5; because there is truth in what we think or say, according as the thing + is so or not. Accordingly the good of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by way of conformity with + things themselves, in so far as the intellect expresses them as being what they are, or as not being what they are + not: and it is in this that the nature of truth consists. There will be excess if something false is affirmed, as though something + were, which in reality it is not: and there will be deficiency if something is falsely denied, and declared not to be, whereas + in reality it is. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p8"> The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider it in relation to things, is by way of that which is measured; + so that both in practical and in speculative intellectual virtues, the mean consists in conformity with things. But if we + consider it in relation to the appetite, it has the character of a rule and measure. Consequently the rectitude of reason + is the mean of moral virtue, and also the mean of prudence---of prudence as ruling and measuring, of moral virtue, as + ruled and measured by that mean. In like manner the difference between excess and deficiency is to be applied in both cases. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as stated, and they observe the mean according as they conform to that measure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is no need for an indefinite series of virtues: because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another + kind of virtue, but things themselves. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The things themselves that are contrary have no contrariety in the mind, because one is the reason for knowing the other: + nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as stated at the end + of Peri Hermenias. For though "to be" and "not to be" are not in contrary, but in contradictory opposition to one another, + so long as we consider their signification in things themselves, for on the one hand we + have "being" and on the other we have simply "non-being"; yet if we refer them to the act of the mind, there is something + positive in both cases. Hence "to be" and "not to be" are contradictory: but the opinion stating that "good is good" is contrary + to the opinion stating that "good is not good": and between two such contraries intellectual virtue observes the mean. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q64_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q64_A4-p0.1">Whether the theological virtues observe the mean?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean. For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean. + Now the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore much more does theological virtue observe the mean. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite being ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists + in the intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue perfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q64_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore theological virtue also observes the mean. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean between despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course + between contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii): thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, + we observe the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the existence of two persons and two natures, and the + heresy of Eutyches, who held to one person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue + observes the mean. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by excess + against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q64_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.43.33" target="asv">Ecclus. 43:33</a>): "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He is above all praise." Therefore theological virtue does not observe + the mean. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q64_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the mean of virtue depends on conformity with virtue's rule or measure, in so far as one may exceed or fall short of that + rule. Now the measure of theological virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and thus the measure + and rule of theological virtue is God Himself: because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, according to + His goodness; hope, according to the + immensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human power: so that never can we love God as + much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore can there be excess in + such things. Accordingly the good of such virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases the more we approach to the summit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p7"> The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as + much as we ought, yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to the measure of our condition. + Consequently it is possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in reference to us. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded: + whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered in itself, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the + theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure. Wherefore the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope observes the mean between presumption and despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be presumptuous, + through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which + according to his condition he might hope for. But there can be no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is + infinite. In like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary + heresies, not by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe too much; but in so far as human opinion + itself takes a middle position between contrary opinions, as was explained above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q64_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q63_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q65" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q65-p0.1">OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q65-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q65-p2"> We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q65-p3"> (1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?</p> + <p id="FS_Q65-p4"> (2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity?</p> + <p id="FS_Q65-p5"> (3) Whether charity can be without them?</p> + <p id="FS_Q65-p6"> (4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity?</p> + <p id="FS_Q65-p7"> (5) Whether charity can be without them?</p> + <div id="FS_Q65_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q65_A1-p0.1">Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the + exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising + himself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence + or magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that "a poor man cannot be magnificent," and yet he may have other + virtues; and (Ethic. iv) that "he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous." + Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective + part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since we may have one science, without having another. Neither, + therefore, are the moral virtues connected with one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this can only be because they are united together in prudence. But + this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one may be prudent about things to be done in + relation to one virtue, without being prudent in those that concern another virtue: even as one may have the art of making + certain things, without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right reason about + things to be done. Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Lk. 6:20</a>: "The virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several": and Augustine says (De + Trin. vi, 4) that "the virtues that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one another": and Gregory says (Moral. + xxii, 1) that "one virtue without the other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect": and Cicero says (Quaest. + Tusc. ii): "If you confess to not having + one particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at all." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or + fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or + by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since we find men who, by natural temperament + or by being accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in + doing deeds of chastity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p8"> But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, + we must say that they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this two reasons are given, corresponding + to the different ways of assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q65_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A3.html">Q[61], AA[3]</a>,4), some distinguish them according to certain general properties of the virtues: for instance, by + saying that discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, + in whatever matter we consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the connection is evident: for strength + of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so forth. This, too, is + the reason assigned for the connection by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "a virtue cannot be perfect" as a virtue, + "if + isolated from the others: for there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude": and he continues to + speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf. + <a id="FS_Q65_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A4.html"> Q[61], A[4]</a>, OBJ[1]). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p9"> Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the + reason for their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q65_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A4.html">Q[58], A[4]</a>), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective + habit. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, + but also correct choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands + in those things that are directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues: since + prudence is "right reason about things to be done," and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to be done, to + which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the + understanding of the principles, so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows clearly + that the moral virtues are connected with one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be + done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. + And if he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if + he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to + another, for instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a + certain habit of restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the absence of prudence, which + is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete character of virtue, + if prudence be lacking. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p11"> But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; + and since it does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues, it is possible for a man to have + the other moral virtues, without actually having the habits of these virtues---provided we speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, + when once a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality. Because + when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of + money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: even as a geometrician, by dint of little study, + acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of having + a thing when we are on the point of having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): "That which + is + scarcely lacking is not lacking at all." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p12"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various + sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about + passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial + passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure + and sorrow. In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the passions. + Hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p14"> Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend + on the understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal + principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do not depend on the conclusions, which are + the objects of the other intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, because the + appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason the appetite, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q65_A1-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q65_A1-p14.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A5.html"> Q[58], A[5]</a>, ad 1). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as the principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not the + principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in + another, yet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong + about the principle, "A whole is greater than its part," he cannot acquire the + science of geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his conclusion. Moreover, things "done" are related + to one another, but not things "made," as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of prudence in one department of things + to be done, would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not occur in things to be made. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p16"></p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A1-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q65_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q65_A2-p0.1">Whether moral virtues can be without charity?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity. For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii, that "every + virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad." But "charity can be in none except the good," as stated in the same + book. Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, whereas charity cannot be had + otherwise than by infusion, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5</a>: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is possible to have + the other virtues without charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; + indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.19" target="asv"> Eph. 3:19</a>: "The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with charity, and + can be without it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.14" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:14</a>): "He that loveth not, abideth in death." Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since it is "by them" that + "we lead a good life," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). Therefore they cannot be without the love of charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[63], A[2]), it is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce + good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can + be without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a + supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot + be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated + above + <a id="FS_Q65_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[58], AA[4],5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, + because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now + for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be well disposed + towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which is + the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle, + that "contradictories cannot both be true at the same time." It is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be + without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p7"> It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues + simply: since they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues + in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action, + but not in respect of the last end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] on + the words, "All that is not of faith is sin" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv">Rom. 14:23</a>), says: "He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, "it makes its possessor + good," and consequently cannot be in the wicked. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of acquired virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all the + infused moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q65_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q65_A3-p0.1">Whether charity can be without moral virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is + superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4, </a> seqq.: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Therefore it seems that if one has charity, other virtues are superfluous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for + their own sake: hence "pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now many have charity, being free from + mortal sin, and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing to them for their own sake, + but only for the sake of charity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says + (on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.10" target="asv"> Lk. 17:10</a>) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have. + Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.8" target="asv">Rom. 13:8</a>): "He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law." Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having all + the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue, as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that + has charity, has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (Epis. clxvii) [*Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi + de Temp.] that charity contains all the cardinal virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works + of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain + works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the + actions that their souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as + it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the + moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind + of good work. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p7"> It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also on account of charity: + and, again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower + power: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well + disposed. Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him + well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is + referred to the end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those things that + are referred to the end. Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently + feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a + habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of + moral virtue experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary + dispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the + repeated acts by which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, + for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q65_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q65_A4-p0.1">Whether faith and hope can be without charity?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be + more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore + can faith and hope be without charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "no man believes unwillingly" as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection + thereof, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q65_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore faith cannot be without charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "there can be no hope without love." But love is charity: for it is of this + love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.2" target="asv"> Mat. 1:2 </a>says that "faith begets hope, and hope, charity." Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore + faith can be without hope; and hope, without charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete + virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing + a perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done + is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit that + is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does + is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result + of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p7"> Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue + without charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to believe is to assent to someone of one's own + free will: to will not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is the outcome of charity which + perfects the will: since every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De + Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be + without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act + is perfect, if it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future bliss through + merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is + possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues + properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we + should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves + the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not + depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they are not virtues without charity, + as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this + is not without charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q65_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q65_A5-p0.1">Whether charity can be without faith and hope?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love + God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." Now the root is sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without + faith and hope, and the other virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, + as we shall explain further on ( + <a id="FS_Q65_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q7_A3.html">TP, Q[7], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>): "Without faith it is impossible to please God"; and this evidently belongs most to charity, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.17" target="asv"> Prov. 8:17</a>: "I love them that love me." Again, it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A4.html">Q[62], A[4]</a>). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain + mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident + from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him," and from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:9, </a> where it is written: "God is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the + fellowship of His Son." Now this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun + here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and + hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility + of their fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as + to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite + impossible without faith and hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object + we are directed by faith and hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are + the precursors of charity, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q65_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A4.html">Q[62], A[4]</a>), and so charity is impossible without them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had manifest + vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [*See above + <a id="FS_Q65_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q4_A3.html">, Q[4], A[3]</a>]: so that in Him was perfect charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q65_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q64_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q66" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q66-p0.1">OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q66-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q66-p2"> We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q66-p3"> (1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?</p> + <p id="FS_Q66-p4"> (2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal?</p> + <p id="FS_Q66-p5"> (3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue;</p> + <p id="FS_Q66-p6"> (4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another;</p> + <p id="FS_Q66-p7"> (5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another;</p> + <p id="FS_Q66-p8"> (6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.</p> + <div id="FS_Q66_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q66_A1-p0.1">Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.16" target="asv">Apoc. 21:16</a>) that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues. Therefore all virtues + are equal; and consequently one cannot be greater than another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in + a maximum, for virtue is "the limit of power," as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. + Arb. ii, 19) that "virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to evil purpose." Therefore it seems that one virtue + cannot be greater or less than another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God + Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater than another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and + increase: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv">Mat. 5:20</a>): "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven": + and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.5" target="asv">Prov. 15:5</a>): "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength [virtus]." Therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater or + less than another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying + to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always + more excellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most excellent. Now it is clear from + what has been said ( + <a id="FS_Q66_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html">Q[18], A[5]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q66_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html"> Q[61], + A[2] + </a>) that the cause and root of human good is the reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the + other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power, in so far as it partakes of reason. And among these, one is better + than another, according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Consequently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining + moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance, which is in the + concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p7"> The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of the same species. In this way, according to what was + said above ( + <a id="FS_Q66_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">Q[52], A[1]</a> ), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself; + secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it in itself, we shall call it greater or little, + according to the things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a + virtue, e.g. temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But this does not apply to science and art: + for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius + states in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; because the nature + of virtue consists in a maximum. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p8"> If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to different + times, or in different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue which is defined + by right reason; and this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition, or a more discerning + judgment of reason, or again a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one "according to the measure of + the giving of Christ," as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.9" target="asv"> Eph. 4:9.</a> And here the Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed + to virtue. Because the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were + an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. + Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached more nearly + and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen when several arches aim at a fixed target. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we + shall see further on + <a id="FS_Q66_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This "limit" which belongs to virtue, can have the character of something "more" or "less" good, in the ways explained above: + since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God does not work by necessity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various measures + of virtue, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.7" target="asv"> Eph. 4:7</a>: "To every one of you [Vulg.: 'us'] is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q66_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q66_A2-p0.1">Whether all the virtues that are together in one man, are equal?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all equally intense. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:7</a>): "Everyone hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that." Now one gift would not be more + proper than another to a man, if God infused all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore it seems that the virtues are + not all equal in one and the same man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another + in one virtue, would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly not the case: since various saints are specially praised + for different virtues; e.g. Abraham for faith ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4" target="asv">Rom. 4</a>), Moses for his meekness ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Num.7.3" target="asv">Num. 7:3</a>), Job for his patience ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Tob.2.12" target="asv">Tob. 2:12</a>). This is why of each Confessor the Church sings: + "There was not found his like in keeping the law of the most High," [*See Lesson in the Mass Statuit (Dominican Missal)], + since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one's pleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows + that a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of another. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in + one and the same man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance," and so on. + Now it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were equal. Therefore all virtues are equal in one man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above + <a id="FS_Q66_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the comparative greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to their specific nature: and in + this way there is no doubt that in a man one virtue is greater than another, for example, charity, than faith and hope. Secondly, + it may be taken as referring to the degree of participation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes intense or remiss + in its subject. In this sense all + the virtues in one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so far as their growth in man is equal: thus the fingers + are unequal in size, but equal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p7"> Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues + is their connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q66_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">Q[65], A[1]</a>) that a twofold connection of virtues may be assigned. The first is according to the opinion of those who understood these + four virtues to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found together with the other in any matter. In this + way + virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to this kind + of equality (De Trin. vi, 4) when he says: "If you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that one is more prudent than + the other; it follows that the fortitude of the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in fortitude, + since the former's fortitude is more prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all + in + the same way." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p8"> The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their own proper + respective matters ( + <a id="FS_Q66_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">Q[65] , AA[1]</a>,2). In this way the connection among moral virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and + not from the inclination, which is on the part of the subject, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q66_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">Q[65], A[1]</a>). Accordingly the nature of the equality among virtues can + also be considered on the part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues: for in one and the + same man, so long as his reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined according to right + reason in each matter of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p9"> But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz. the inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier + to perform the act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this either from nature, or from habituation, or again + by the grace of God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all + of them equal in the one same subject. We might also say that it refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of + which one man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on account of his greater abundance of prudence, + or also of charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness + for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p12"> This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q66_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q66_A3-p0.1">Whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting, + is better. Now the moral virtues are "more lasting even than the sciences" (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and, + moreover, they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable to the intellectual virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is defined as "that which makes its possessor good." Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, + and art in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual + virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But according to Ethic. vi, 12, "moral virtue gives right intention of + the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means." Therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which + is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the essentially + rational part, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Now rational by essence is more excellent than rational by participation. Therefore + intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something + from being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches," and yet not better relatively, i.e. "for one who is in want" [*Aristotle, + Topic. iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes + its species from its object, as explained above ( + <a id="FS_Q66_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">Q[54], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q66_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A1.html"> Q[60], A[1]</a>). Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object. Now it is evident that the + object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: since the reason apprehends things in the universal, + while the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular. Consequently, speaking simply, + the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, + which perfect the appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p7"> But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to + move the other powers to act, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q66_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>), is more excellent. And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the perfection of a power, + it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though the intellectual virtues + are more excellent + habits, simply speaking. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining to the + life of the community. Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting + than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of action. That the moral virtues are more necessary + for human life, proves that they are more excellent, not simply, but relatively. + Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they are not referred to something else, as a useful + thing is referred to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that happiness + which consists in the knowledge of truth, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q66_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A6.html">Q[3], A[6]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason why man is said to be good simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, is because + the appetite moves the other powers to their acts, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q66_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html">Q[56], A[3]</a>). Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of each + moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling + of prudence, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6; vi, 13. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q66_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q66_A4-p0.1">Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what + is due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than + justice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in which it is most perfect. Now, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.4" target="asv"> Jam. 1:4, </a> "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than justice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue," as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice. + Therefore it is greater than justice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is the most excellent of the virtues." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A virtue considered in its species may be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater simply, + whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q66_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by + considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the rational appetite, + as stated above (Q[8], A[1]; Q[26], A[1]): its object or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order + not only in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence "justice is the most excellent of virtues" (Ethic. v, 1). Among + the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the appetitive movement is subjected + to reason, so much the more does the rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief of all is + life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters + of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the passions, but is subordinate to justice. + Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that "those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue + is a power of doing good. Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others; because the former," i.e. + fortitude, "is useful in war, and the latter," i.e. justice, "both in war and in peace." After fortitude comes temperance, + which subjects the appetite to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one species, + viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called principal virtues, in excellence + also. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p7"> A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is + more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance in so far + as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of being. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice, for "a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his + own" (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice, which discerns between "meum" and "tuum": whereas + justice can be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than liberality, as being more universal, and as being + its foundation: while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and + an addition to justice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Patience is said to have "a perfect work," by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also + excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; + but also inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is more perfect and excellent through plucking + up the root in this matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues + simply. Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence + whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as their ornament, + so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q66_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q66_A5-p0.1">Whether wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one + commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2 that political science, which belongs to + prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each individual should + devote himself, and to what extent." Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that + prudence is greater than wisdom. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect thing + to that which is best," as stated in Phys. vii, text. 17. Now prudence is "right reason about things to be done," whereby + man is brought to happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness. Therefore prudence + is a greater virtue than wisdom. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, + which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by + Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.26.26" target="asv"> Job 26:26</a>: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." Therefore science is a greater virtue than + wisdom. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable + principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater + virtue than wisdom. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is "the head" among "the intellectual virtues." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q66_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of + all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning of the + Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects; + hence it is that wisdom exercises + judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of them all. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater + virtue than wisdom, "unless," as stated in Ethic. vi, 7, "man were the greatest thing in the world." Wherefore we must say, + as stated in the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa: because "the spiritual man + judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. + 2:15 + </a>). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed + to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom; + for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme + Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness + in the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its principal object, which is God, + it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future + happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), "one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher + object, or because it is more certain." Hence if the objects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which + possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better object, is preferable to that + which is more certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the + Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that "it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial beings, though + it be based on weak and probable reasoning"; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that "it is better to know a little about sublime + things, than much about mean things." Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, is beyond the reach of man, + especially in this life, so as to be his possession: for this "belongs to God alone" (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this + little knowledge about God which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is + a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and + non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles + are constituted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the proper + effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, + not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating + them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q66_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q66_A6-p0.1">Whether charity is the greatest of the theological virtues?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while + hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral + virtue. Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above ( + <a id="FS_Q66_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A3.html">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one. Now hope results from something added + to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward + to the beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.3" target="asv"> Mat. 1:3 </a>says that "faith begets hope, and hope charity." Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q66_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three theological virtues look at + God as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater + object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than + the others. Because the others, in their + very nature, imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. + But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, + the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>): "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because + the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things + beneath man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected + by the known being in the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being + drawn to the beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man: since a thing is contained according + to the mode of the container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man. Secondly, because prudence moderates the + appetitive movements pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement tending to God, + which movement belongs to the theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appetitive movement towards its + object surpasses human knowledge, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.19" target="asv"> Eph. 3:19</a>: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires + good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led + by hope, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q66_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A4.html">Q[62], A[4]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more + noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in + the sense, to wit, that one is a disposition to the other. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q66_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q65_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q67" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q67-p0.1">OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q67-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q67-p2"> We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q67-p3"> (1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?</p> + <p id="FS_Q67-p4"> (2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain?</p> + <p id="FS_Q67-p5"> (3) Whether faith remains?</p> + <p id="FS_Q67-p6"> (4) Whether hope remains?</p> + <p id="FS_Q67-p7"> (5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope?</p> + <p id="FS_Q67-p8"> (6) Whether charity remains?</p> + <div id="FS_Q67_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q67_A1-p0.1">Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues doe not remain after this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv"> Mat. 22:30.</a> But it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels [*"Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy of the gods" + (Ethic. x, 8)], as stated in Ethic. x, 8. Therefore neither in man will there be moral virtues after this life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But the active life does not remain after this life: for Gregory says + (Moral. iv, 18): "The works of the active life pass away from the body." Therefore moral virtues do not remain after this + life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states + (Ethic. iii, 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, when the body is corrupted: since they are acts of bodily + organs. Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.15" target="asv">Wis. 1:15</a>) that "justice is perpetual and immortal." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as Augustine + says (De Trin. xiv, 9), "in the other life men are made happy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is + better or more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all others." Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain + in the future life, but after a different manner. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p7"> In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues there is a formal element, and a quasi-material element. + The material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the passions and operations according + to a certain mode: and since this mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely this order of reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p8"> Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life, as regards their material element. For + in the future life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food and sex; nor fear and daring about dangers + of death; nor distributions and commutations of things employed in this present life. But, as regards the formal element, + they will remain most perfect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one's reason will have most + perfect rectitude in regard to things concerning him in respect of that state of life: and his appetitive power will be moved + entirely according to the order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9) + that "prudence will be there without any danger of error; fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance, + without the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere + to + Him most steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no imperfection." As to justice, it is yet more evident + what will be its act in that life, viz. "to be subject to God": because even in this life subjection to a superior is part + of justice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as regards + "commutations and distributions"; of fortitude, as to "matters of terror and danger"; of temperance, in respect of "lewd desires." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p10"> The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern the active life, belong to the material element of + the virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a twofold state after this life; one before the resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from the body; + the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be reunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational + powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they now are. Hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible, + and temperance in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will be + perfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state preceding the resurrection, the irrational parts will not be in the + soul actually, but only radically in its essence, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q67_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A8.html">FP, Q[77], A[8]</a>. Wherefore neither will these virtues be actually, but only in their root, i.e. in the reason and will, wherein are certain + nurseries of these virtues, as stated above (Q[63], A[1]). Justice, however, will remain because it is in the will. Hence + of justice it is + specially said that it is "perpetual and immortal"; both by reason of its subject, since the will is incorruptible; and because + its act will not change, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q67_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q67_A2-p0.1">Whether the intellectual virtues remain after this life?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8,9</a>) that "knowledge shall be destroyed," and he states the reason to be because "we know in part." Now just as the knowledge + of science is in part, i.e. imperfect; so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues, as long as this life lasts. + Therefore all the intellectual virtues will cease after this life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that since science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is + not easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness. But no bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore + science and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so that it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be + no act of the intellect after this life, since "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30); + and, after this life, the phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the body. Therefore the intellectual + virtues do not remain after this life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The knowledge of what is universal and necessary is more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now the + knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this life; for instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.25" target="asv"> Lk. 16:25</a>: "Son, remember that thou didst receive good things in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things." Much more, therefore, + does the knowledge of universal and + necessary things remain, which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the + <a id="FS_Q67_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A6.html">FP, Q[79], A[6]</a> some have held that the intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect except when it actually understands; + and that so long as actual consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts + of bodily organs, viz. in the powers of imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the body is corrupted: and consequently, + according to this opinion, + neither science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after this life when once the body is corrupted. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p7"> But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (De Anima iii, text. 8) that "the possible intellect is + in act when it is identified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in potentiality to consider it actually." + It is also contrary to reason, because intelligible species are contained by the "possible" intellect immovably, according + to the mode of their container. Hence the "possible" intellect is called "the abode of the species" (De Anima + iii) because it preserves the intelligible species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p8"> And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this life, by applying the intelligible species to them as + stated in the + <a id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html">FP, Q[85], A[1]</a>, ad 5, cease as soon as the body is corrupted. Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned, which are the quasi-material + element in the intellectual virtues, these latter cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the intelligible species, + which are in the + "possible" intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi-formal element of the intellectual virtues. + Therefore these remain after this life, as regards their formal element, just as we have stated concerning the moral virtues + + <a id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q67_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as referring to the material element in science, and to the mode of understanding; + because, to it, neither do the phantasms remain, when the body is destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the + phantasms. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its material element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible species, + which are in the "possible" intellect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the + <a id="FS_Q67_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A1.html">FP, Q[89], A[1]</a> the separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than by turning to the phantasms. Consequently science remains, yet + not as to the same mode of operation; as we have stated concerning the moral virtues + <a id="FS_Q67_A2-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q67_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q67_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q67_A3-p0.1">Whether faith remains after this life?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith remains after this life. Because faith is more excellent than science. Now science remains after + this life, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q67_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q67_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore faith remains also. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:11</a>): "Other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus," i.e. faith in Jesus Christ. Now if the + foundation is removed, that which is built upon it remains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not after this life, no other + virtue remains. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory differ as perfect from imperfect. Now imperfect knowledge is compatible + with perfect knowledge: thus in an angel there can be "evening" and "morning" knowledge [*Cf. + <a id="FS_Q67_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A6.html">FP, Q[58], A[6]</a>]; and a man can have science through a demonstrative syllogism, together with opinion through a probable syllogism, about + one same conclusion. Therefore after this life faith also is compatible with + the knowledge of glory. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6,7</a>): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not by sight." But those who are in glory + are not absent from the Lord, but present to Him. Therefore after this life faith does not remain in the life of glory. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Opposition is of itself the proper cause of one thing being excluded from another, in so far, to wit, as wherever two things + are opposite to one another, we find opposition of affirmation and negation. Now in some things we find opposition in respect + of contrary forms; thus in colors we find white and black. In others we find opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection: + wherefore in alterations, more and less are considered to be contraries, as when + a thing from being less hot is made more hot (Phys. v, text. 19). And since perfect and imperfect are opposite to one another, + it is impossible for perfection and imperfection to affect the same thing at the same time. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p7"> Now we must take note that sometimes imperfection belongs to a thing's very nature, and belongs to its species: even as lack + of reason belongs to the very specific nature of a horse and an ox. And since a thing, so long as it remains the same identically, + cannot pass from one species to another, it follows that if such an imperfection be removed, the species of that thing is + changed: even as it would no longer be an ox or a horse, were it to be rational. Sometimes, however, the + imperfection does not belong to the specific nature, but is accidental to the individual by reason of something else; even + as sometimes lack of reason is accidental to a man, because he is asleep, or because he is drunk, or for some like reason; + and it is evident, that if such an imperfection be removed, the thing remains substantially. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p8"> Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: for it is included in its definition; faith + being defined as "the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Where is faith? Believing without seeing." But it is an imperfect knowledge + that is of things unapparent or unseen. Consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of + faith: therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain identically the same. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p9"> But we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect knowledge: for there is nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect + knowledge from being sometimes with perfect knowledge. Accordingly we must observe that knowledge can be imperfect in three + ways: first, on the part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of the medium; thirdly, on the part of the subject. + The difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge on the part of the knowable object is seen in the + "morning" and "evening" knowledge of the angels: for the "morning" knowledge is about things according to the being which + they have in the Word, while the "evening" knowledge is about things according as they have being in their own natures, which + being is imperfect in comparison with the First Being. On the part of the medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge are exemplified + in the knowledge of a conclusion through a demonstrative medium, and through a probable medium. On the part of the + subject the difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge applies to opinion, faith, and science. For it is essential to opinion + that we assent to one of two opposite assertions with fear of the other, so that our adhesion is not firm: to science it is + essential to have firm adhesion with intellectual vision, for science possesses certitude which results from the understanding + of principles: while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses opinion in so far as its adhesion is firm, but falls + short of science in so far as it lacks vision. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p10"> Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the same respect; yet the things which differ as perfect + and imperfect can be together in the same respect in one and the same other thing. Accordingly, knowledge which is perfect + on the part of the object is quite incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object; but they are compatible with + one another in respect of the same medium or the same subject: for nothing hinders a man from having at one and + the same time, through one and the same medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge about two things, one perfect, the other imperfect, + e.g. about health and sickness, good and evil. In like manner knowledge that is perfect on the part of the medium is incompatible + with imperfect knowledge through one and the same medium: but nothing hinders them being about the same subject or in the + same subject: for one man can know the same conclusions through a probable and through a demonstrative medium. + Again, knowledge that is perfect on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect knowledge in the same subject. + Now faith, of its very nature, contains an imperfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the believer sees not what he + believes: whereas bliss, of its very nature, implies perfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the Blessed see that + which makes them happy, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q67_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>). Hence it is manifest that faith and bliss are + incompatible in one and the same subject. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Faith is more excellent than science, on the part of the object, because its object is the First Truth. Yet science has a + more perfect mode of knowing its object, which is not incompatible with vision which is the perfection of happiness, as the + mode of faith is incompatible. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge: consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will + be perfected also. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p13"> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p14"></p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A3-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q67_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q67_A4-p0.1">Whether hope remains after death, in the state of glory?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope remains after death, in the state of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent + manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). + Much more then does hope remain. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever---in + the lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can remain. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now in the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory + of the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the + soul, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:29</a>: "They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that drink me, shall yet thirst," and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.12" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:12</a>: "On Whom the angels desire to look." Therefore it seems that + there can be hope in the Blessed after this life is past. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>): "What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" But the Blessed see that which is the object of hope, viz. God. Therefore they + do not hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q67_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q67_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, that which, in its very nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the opposite perfection in that + subject. Thus it is evident that movement of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is "the act of + that which is in potentiality as such" (Phys. iii): so that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement + ceases; for a thing does not continue to + become white, when once it is made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not possessed, as is clear from + what we have said above about the passion of hope (Q[40], AA[1],2). Therefore when we possess that which we hope for, viz. + the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object, which is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with + the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do not + remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something + which is in our actual possession. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state further on ( + <a id="FS_Q67_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q19_A2.html">SS, Q[19], A[2]</a>). Servile fear regards punishment, and will be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer be possibility + of being punished. Filial fear has two acts: one is an act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains: the + other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards this act, it does not remain. + Because separation from God is in the nature of an evil: and no evil will be feared there, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.1.33" target="asv"> Prov. 1:33</a>: "He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils." Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated + above (Q[23], A[2]; Q[40], A[1] ), and therefore the fear which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there + can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed. Because in the lost there will be a + succession of punishments, so that the notion of something future remains there, which is the object of fear: but the glory + of the saints has no succession, by reason of its being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither past + nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speaking, neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Q[42], + A[2]), fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no such hope. Consequently neither will there be fear + in + them; except speaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is called fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the + reason already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them because they never weary, and for the same reason + desire is said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there can be desire in the souls of the saints, + but not hope, properly speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object + is God, and not a created good; nor in its general signification. Because the object of hope is something difficult, as stated + above ( + <a id="FS_Q67_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html">Q[40], A[1]</a>): while a good whose unerring cause we already possess, is not compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money + is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once. In like manner those who have the glory of the soul are + not, properly speaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to + desire it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q67_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q67_A5-p0.1">Whether anything of faith or hope remains in glory?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that something of faith and hope remains in glory. For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there + remains what is common; thus it is stated in De Causis that "if you take away rational, there remains living, and when you + remove living, there remains being." Now in faith there is something that it has in common with beatitude, viz. knowledge: + and there is something proper to it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner. + Therefore, the darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith still remains. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.17" target="asv"> Eph. 1:17,18</a>: "The eyes of your heart enlightened . . . in the knowledge of God"; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the light + of glory, of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>): "In Thy light we shall see light." Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light supervenes: for a candle is not + extinguished when the sun's rays appear. Therefore it + seems that the light of faith itself remains with the light of glory. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through the withdrawal of its matter: for a man may retain the habit of + liberality, though he have lost his money: yet he cannot exercise the act. Now the object of faith is the First Truth as unseen. + Therefore when this ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still remain. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is either withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since therefore faith does + not remain entirely, but is taken away as stated above + <a id="FS_Q67_A5-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q67_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, it seems that it is withdrawn entirely. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that hope is taken away entirely: but that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its obscurity, and remains + in part, viz. as to the substance of its knowledge. And if this be understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically + but generically, it is absolutely true; since faith is of the same genus, viz. knowledge, as the beatific vision. On the other + hand, hope is not of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is compared to + the enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in the term of movement. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p7"> But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith remains identically the same, this is absolutely impossible. + Because when you remove a specific difference, the substance of the genus does not remain identically the same: thus if you + remove the difference constituting whiteness, the substance of color does not remain identically the same, as though the identical + color were at one time whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that genus is not + related to difference as matter to form, so that the substance of the genus remains identically the same, when the difference + is removed, as the substance of matter remains identically the same, when the form is changed: for genus and difference are + not the parts of a species, else they would not be predicated of the species. But even as the species denotes the whole, i.e. + the compound of matter and form in material things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus; the genus denotes the + whole by signifying that which is material; the difference, by signifying that which is formal; the species, by signifying + both. Thus, in man, the sensitive nature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and animal is predicated of that which has + a sensitive nature, rational of that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that which has both. So that the one same + whole is denoted by these three, but not under the same aspect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p8"> It is therefore evident that, since the signification of the difference is confined to the genus if the difference be removed, + the substance of the genus cannot remain the same: for the same animal nature does not remain, if another kind of soul constitute + the animal. Hence it is impossible for the identical knowledge, which was previously obscure, to become clear vision. It is + therefore evident that, in heaven, nothing remains of faith, either identically or specifically the + same, but only generically. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If "rational" be withdrawn, the remaining "living" thing is the same, not identically, but generically, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The imperfection of candlelight is not opposed to the perfection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject: + whereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another and regard the same subject. Consequently + they are incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the air. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that loses his money does not therefore lose the possibility of having money, and therefore it is reasonable for the habit + of liberality to remain. But in the state of glory not only is the object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, + but even its possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss: and so such a habit would remain to no purpose. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q67_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q67_A6-p0.1">Whether charity remains after this life, in glory?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity does not remain after this life, in glory. Because according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10, </a> "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part," i.e. that which is imperfect, "shall be done away." Now the + charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of glory is attained. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits and acts are differentiated by their objects. But the object of love is good apprehended. Since therefore + the apprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of the life to come, it seems that charity is not the same + in both cases. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things of the same kind can advance from imperfection to perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of the + wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven, however much it be increased. Therefore it seems that the + charity of the wayfarer does not remain in heaven. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8</a>): "Charity never falleth away." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q67_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q67_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, when the imperfection of a thing does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to hinder the identical thing + passing from imperfection to perfection, even as man is perfected by growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now charity is love, + the nature of which does not include imperfection, since it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed, either + seen or not seen. Therefore charity is + not done away by the perfection of glory, but remains identically the same. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The imperfection of charity is accidental to it; because imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now although + that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the substance remains. Hence the imperfection of charity being done away, + charity itself is not done away. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of charity is not knowledge itself; if it were, the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the charity + of heaven: its object is the thing known, which remains the same, viz. God Himself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason why charity of the wayfarer cannot attain to the perfection of the charity of heaven, is a difference on the part + of the cause: for vision is a cause of love, as stated in Ethic. ix, 5: and the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly + we love Him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q67_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q66_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q68" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q68-p0.1">OF THE GIFTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q68-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68-p2"> We now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q68-p3"> (1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?</p> + <p id="FS_Q68-p4"> (2) Of the necessity of the Gifts?</p> + <p id="FS_Q68-p5"> (3) Whether the Gifts are habits?</p> + <p id="FS_Q68-p6"> (4) Which, and how many are they?</p> + <p id="FS_Q68-p7"> (5) Whether the Gifts are connected?</p> + <p id="FS_Q68-p8"> (6) Whether they remain in heaven?</p> + <p id="FS_Q68-p9"> (7) Of their comparison with one another;</p> + <p id="FS_Q68-p10"> (8) Of their comparison with the virtues.</p> + <div id="FS_Q68_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q68_A1-p0.1">Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. For Gregory commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.1.2" target="asv"> Job 1:2, </a> "There were born to him seven sons," says (Moral. i, 12): "Seven sons were born to us, when through the conception of heavenly + thought, the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost take birth in us": and he quotes the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3</a>: "And the Spirit . . . of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc. where the seven gifts of + the Holy Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.45" target="asv"> Mat. 12:45, </a> "Then he goeth and taketh with him seven other spirits," etc., says (De Quaest. Evang. i, qu. 8): "The seven vices are opposed + to the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost," i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues, commonly + so called. Therefore the gifts do not differ from the virtues commonly so called. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things whose definitions are the same, are themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts; + for each gift is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good life," etc. [*Cf. + <a id="FS_Q68_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html"> Q[55], A[4]</a>]. Likewise the definition of a gift can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is "an unreturnable giving," according to + the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the virtues and gifts do not differ from one + another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues: for, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q68_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A2.html">Q[57], A[2]</a>), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety to a kind of justice, + and fortitude is a moral virtue. Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts, which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three + theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's three daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same + seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the four corners of the house. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition between + them. Because the word "virtue" conveys the notion that it perfects man in relation to well-doing, while the word "gift" refers + to the cause from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect + another in well-doing: especially as we have already stated ( + <a id="FS_Q68_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A3.html">Q[63], + A[3] + </a>) that some virtues are infused into us by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently + some have held that the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But there remains no less a difficulty for them + to solve; for they must explain why some virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear, + for instance, that are not reckoned virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p8"> Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as being distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned + a suitable reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would apply either to all the virtues, and to none of the + gifts, or vice versa. For, seeing that of the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding + and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz. fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the gifts perfect the + free-will according as it is a faculty of the reason, while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the will: since they observed + only two virtues in the reason or intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others being in the appetitive power or the affections. + If this distinction were true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p9"> Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with + prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it against every kind of temptation by His + sevenfold gift," said that the virtues are given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we may resist temptation. + But neither is this distinction sufficient. Because the virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the + sins that are contrary to the virtues; for everything naturally resists its contrary: which is especially clear with regard + to charity, of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Song.8.7" target="asv">Cant 8:7</a>): "Many waters cannot quench charity." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p10"> Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as having been in Christ, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3, </a> said that the virtues are given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in order to conform us to Christ, chiefly + with regard to His Passion, for it was then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. Yet neither does this appear + to be a satisfactory distinction. Because Our Lord Himself wished us to be conformed to Him, chiefly + in humility and meekness, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.29" target="asv"> Mat. 11:29</a>: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart," and in charity, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.3" href="./asv.html#John.15.12" target="asv"> Jn. 15:12</a>: "Love one another, as I have loved you." Moreover, these virtues were especially resplendent in Christ's Passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p11"> Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses + itself, for we find there that the term employed is "spirit" rather than "gift." For thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2,3</a>): "The spirit . . . of wisdom and of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc.: from which words we are clearly given + to understand that these seven are there set down as being in us by Divine inspiration. Now + inspiration denotes motion from without. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle of movement, one within + him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic to him, viz. God, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q68_A1-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A4.html">Q[9], AA[4]</a>,6): moreover the Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. vii, 8). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p12"> Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists + in a disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover. Hence the more exalted the mover, the more perfect + must be the disposition whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we see that a disciple needs a more perfect + disposition in order to receive a higher teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that human virtues + perfect man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions. Consequently + man needs yet higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only + because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.50.5" target="asv"> Is. 50:5</a>: "The Lord . . . hath opened my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back." Even the + Philosopher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem., vii, 8) that for those who are moved by Divine instinct, there + is no need to take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they are moved by a + principle higher than human reason. This then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher + than acts of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and above + the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the + Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of "heroic" or "divine virtue [*{arete heroike + kai theia}]," in respect of which some men are called "divine." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are opposed + to the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct. For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason, + whose light flows from God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This definition applies to virtue taken in its general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished + from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we lead a good life" as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured + by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation + to His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the + promptings of God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift, according + as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same applies to the other virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p17"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A1-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q68_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q68_A2-p0.1">Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing + the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing + the ordinary standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under the precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the + gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now + man's behavior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues; and his behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. + Therefore gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost gives wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel + against rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance, piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against + pride." But a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary + to man for salvation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since + of wisdom it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.28" target="asv">Wis. 7:28</a>): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom"; and of fear ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.28" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:28</a>): "He that is without fear cannot be justified." Therefore the other gifts that are placed between these are also necessary + for salvation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q68_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings of God. Wherefore in those + matters where the prompting of reason is not sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost, there is, + in consequence, need for a gift. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p7"> Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; + secondly, with a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q68_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html">Q[62], A[1]</a>). And, though this latter perfection is greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner + than the latter: because man has the former in his full possession, whereas he possesses the latter + imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything that has a nature or a form or a virtue + perfectly, can of itself work according to them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly in every + nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, + unless it be moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly, can shine by itself; whereas the moon which has + the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art perfectly, can + work by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions + from him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p8"> Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's connatural end, man can work through the judgment + of his reason. If, however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special promptings from God, this will be + out of God's superabundant goodness: hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the acquired moral virtues, + had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason + moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does + not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.14" target="asv">Rom. 8:14</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.17" target="asv">17</a>: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs also": and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.142.10" target="asv"> Ps. 142:10</a>: "Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land," because, to wit, none can receive the inheritance of that + land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it + is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the commandments), + but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man being moved by a higher principle. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the theological and moral virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual need + of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for the reason already given. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does + not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in + the objection. God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly, + ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the + gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given as remedies to these defects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q68_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q68_A3-p0.1">Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined + as "a quality difficult to remove," as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts + of the Holy Ghost rest in Him, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3</a>: "He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth"; on which words Gregory + comments as + follows (Moral. ii, 27): "The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful; but, in a singular way, He dwells always in the Mediator." + Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according as he is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q68_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). But in so far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected + by a habit is befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a + habit: for "the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," as Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, + therefore, are the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His disciples ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.17" target="asv">Jn. 14:17</a>): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you." Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His gifts + abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but abiding habits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q68_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost. Now it is evident from + what has been already said (Q[56], A[4]; Q[58], A[2]), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it + partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason. Accordingly + the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as + compared with the Holy Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in comparison with the reason, are related + to the appetitive power. Now the moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are disposed to obey reason promptly. + Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by saying that "by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the Holy + Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts." Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated + above + <a id="FS_Q68_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever abides in holy men. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds, in the case of an instrument which has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is + not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has + a free-will. Therefore he needs a habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence the + comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q68_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q68_A4-p0.1">Whether the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are suitably enumerated?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down corresponding + to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing + is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to + justice, viz. piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz. the gift of + fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore + justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is + moved by God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues, should have been included. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions condivided + with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the other three. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding; counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore, + some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably + enumerated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Holy Writ ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2,3</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q68_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, the gifts are habits perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues + perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be moved + by the command of reason, so it is natural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior + power. Therefore whatever powers in man + can be the principles of human actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues; and such powers are the + reason and appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p9"> Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery + of truth), and judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the speculative reason is perfected + by "understanding"; the practical reason, by "counsel." In order to judge aright, the speculative reason is perfected by "wisdom"; + the practical reason by "knowledge." The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's relations to + another, is perfected by "piety"; in matters touching himself, it is perfected by "fortitude" against the fear of dangers; + and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by "fear," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.27" target="asv"> Prov. 15:27</a>: "By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil," and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.120" target="asv"> Ps. 118:120</a>: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid of Thy judgments." Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all + those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and + moral, extend. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such matters, but + to external things that can be made, since art is the right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made + (Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, + Who is the principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when He + moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to temperance: for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking, + to restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift of fear, to + withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the name + of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship + of God is also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for + God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost, unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not moved + by the craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is + by faith, hope and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore + all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, as being derived therefrom. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love, hope and joy have good for their object. Now God is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions are transferred + to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to + God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does + not give its name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws + us from evil, for higher motives than moral virtue does. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their + directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear. + Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p15"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A4-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q68_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q68_A5-p0.1">Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:8</a>): "To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same + Spirit." Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are + given to divers men, and are not connected together in the same man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith." But some + of the gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected + together in one and the same man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom "is of small account if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless + if it be not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude + is very weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is + very useless if it lack the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it + has these virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action": from which it seems that it is possible to + have one gift without another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons, + that by turns they fed one another." Now the sons of Job, of whom he is speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore + the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The true answer to this question is easily gathered from what has been already set down. For it has been stated + <a id="FS_Q68_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A3.html">(A[3])</a> that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as regards the governance of reason, so all the powers + of the soul are disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5</a>: "The charity of God is + poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, + just as the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: + so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one possess without charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the knowledge + of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense + that the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and + the "word" of knowledge. They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the + Holy Ghost: and thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human mind, rendering it amenable to the + promptings of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that these gifts are in + all who are possessed of charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is referring + to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For it + is one thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; + and another, to know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it + against the ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper name of knowledge." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by + another, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q68_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">Q[65], A[1]</a>); so Gregory wishes to prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that one cannot be perfect without + the other. Hence he had already observed that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless one virtue lend + its support to + another." We are therefore not to understand that one gift can be without another; but that if understanding were without + wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q68_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q68_A6-p0.1">Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of + His sevenfold gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all temptations." Now there will be no temptations in heaven, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.9" target="asv"> Is. 11:9</a>: "They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy mountain." Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in + heaven. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q68_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. But habits are of no use, where their acts are impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for Gregory + says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates the truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly + . . . fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy," all of + which are incompatible with the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state of glory. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative life, e.g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the active life, + e.g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with this as Gregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of + the Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city of God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly + river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who, proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more + abundantly in those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly virtue." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may + be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human + mind amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in heaven, where God will be "all in all" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:28</a>), and man entirely subject unto Him. Secondly, they may + be considered as regards the matter about which their operations are: and thus, in the present life they have an operation + about a matter, in respect of which they will have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they will not + remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal virtues ( + <a id="FS_Q68_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q67_A1.html">Q[67], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they + afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected + in good by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in + the future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things"; of which two, + hope passes, and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates the truths heard, refreshing the heart and + enlightening its darkness," of which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach + no more every man . . . his brother" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.3" target="asv">Jer. 31:3,4</a>); but the enlightening of the mind remains. Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being impetuous," which is necessary + in the present life; and also that "it makes the mind full of reason," which is necessary even in the future state. Of fortitude + he says that it "fears not adversity," which is necessary in the present life; and further, that it "sets before us the viands + of confidence," which remains also in the + future life. With regard to knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that "she overcomes the void of ignorance," which refers + to the present state. When, however, he adds "in the womb of the mind," this may refer figuratively to the fulness of knowledge, + which belongs to the future state. Of piety he says that "it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy." These words + taken literally refer only to the present state: yet the inward regard for our neighbor, signified by "the inmost + heart," belongs also to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy. Of fear he say + that "it oppresses the mind, lest it pride itself in present things," which refers to the present state, and that "it strengthens + it with the meat of hope for the future," which also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may also refer to + the future state, as regards being "strengthened" for things we hope are here, and obtain there. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the gifts as to their matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active life; + but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of + heavenly bliss. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q68_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q68_A7-p0.1">Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, + that which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is + written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.12" target="asv">Dt. 10:12</a>): "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?" and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.6" target="asv">Malachi 1:6</a>): "If . . . I be a master, where is My + fear?" Therefore it seems that fear, which is mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:8</a>): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable to all things." Now a common good is preferable to particular goods. Therefore + piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be the most excellent gift. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry. + Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it is set down as being below it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power + than the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence. + Therefore the gifts are not set down in their order of dignity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: "It seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which Isaias + speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we read in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.3" target="asv"> Mat. 5:3</a>]: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz. in Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here, + with the lower gifts." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways: first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding + from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to their matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts + simply, they follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with another; because the gifts perfect man for + all the acts of the soul's powers, even as the virtues do, as stated above + + <a id="FS_Q68_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Hence, as the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative + are preferable to the active, viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet so that wisdom stands before + understanding, and understanding before science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the gifts, wisdom, + understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent than piety, fortitude, and + fear; and among the latter, piety excels fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and fortitude + temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel + are concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of + the gifts corresponds with the order in which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and understanding are given the preference + to the others, their excellence is considered simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are preferred to knowledge and + piety, it is considered with regard to their matter. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the + Lord is the beginning of wisdom" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.10" target="asv">Ps. 110:10</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.16" target="asv"> Ecclus. 1:16</a>), and not as though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of generation, man departs from evil on + account of fear ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.16" target="asv">Prov. 16:16</a>), before doing good works, and which result from the other + gifts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not compared with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of which + he had said it "is profitable to little." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter: + for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in relation + to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. + But on the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive power to the executive, and so is knowledge + united to piety: because counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of + difficulty, while knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel together with fortitude, by reason + of their matter, are given the preference to knowledge and piety. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A7-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q68_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q68_A8-p0.1">Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of + charity: "No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from + the children of eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but, without charity, they avail nothing." + But charity is a virtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy + Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; + for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, + fortitude, temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues" [viz. the gifts], so "as against folly + to bestow wisdom; against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against + fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of heart, piety; against piety, fear." Therefore the virtues + are more excellent than the gifts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the virtues cannot be used to evil purpose." But it is possible to make + evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; + or understanding, while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it multiplies itself, grow into confusion; + that fortitude, while it gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while + it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from the right line, may become distorted; and + lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair." Therefore the virtues are more excellent than + the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (OBJ 2), so + that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the gifts are more excellent than the virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q68_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A3.html">Q[58], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q68_A8-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html"> Q[62], A[1]</a>), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues + are those whereby man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected; and + the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other hand the gifts of + the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p7"> Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, + in the same way as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, the moving principle + of the moral virtues. Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and control them, so + the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory + says (Moral. i, 12) that "the seven sons," i.e. the seven gifts, "never attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all + they do be done in faith, hope, and charity." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p8"> But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. + Because the gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either + the reason itself, or the other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more exalted the mover, the more + excellent the disposition whereby the thing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect + than the virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two ways in which one thing precedes another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God precedes + love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. + The other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one's neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: + and in this way moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, + through being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which "dealeth + not perversely" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A8-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4</a>). Consequently wisdom and understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as they are gifts of the Holy + Ghost. But, lest they depart from the perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory means to say. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q68_A8-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q67_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q69" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q69-p0.1">OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q69-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q69-p2"> We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q69-p3"> (1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?</p> + <p id="FS_Q69-p4"> (2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?</p> + <p id="FS_Q69-p5"> (3) Of the number of the beatitudes;</p> + <p id="FS_Q69-p6"> (4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.</p> + <div id="FS_Q69_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q69_A1-p0.1">Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns + the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts of the Holy Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Luke 6:20, </a> seqq., ascribes the beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from + the virtues and gifts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the reason and the eternal law, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q21_A1.html"> Q[21], A[1]</a>). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy + Ghost, as is clear from what has been said ( + <a id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">Q[68], AA[1]</a>,3, seqq.). Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of + the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the beatitudes + do not differ from the virtues and gifts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. poverty, mourning, and peace. + Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html">Q[2], A[7]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html"> Q[3], A[1]</a>), happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore + the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are full of hope"; and the Apostle says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>): "We are saved by hope." Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved + towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action. And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy + end by works of virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal happiness, for which our reason is + not sufficient, since we need to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may obey and follow + him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts, not as habit, but as act from habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts are more + excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q69_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A8.html">Q[68], A[8]</a>). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas + Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples on the mountain, and so to those who were more + perfect, ascribes them to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument proves that no other habits, besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these might + seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts, because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues + perfect him, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q69_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A2.html">Q[68], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q69_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q69_A2-p0.1">Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because + they hope for a reward, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q69_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now the object of hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to come. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to the beatitudes, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.25" target="asv"> Lk. 6:25, </a> where we read: "Woe to you that are filled; for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and weep." + Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because frequently men are not punished in this life, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.21.13" target="asv"> Job 21:13</a>: "They spend their days in wealth." Therefore neither do the rewards of the beatitudes + refer to this life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De + Civ. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.16.15" target="asv"> Ps. 16:15</a>: "I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall appear." Again, it is only in the future life that we shall + see God, and that our Divine sonship will be made + manifest, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>: "We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall + be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is." Therefore these rewards refer to the future life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "These promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been + fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised + to us after this life." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that all + these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present + life; and Chrysostom in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to the future, and some to the present life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p7"> In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by + reason of our having a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; and this is by way of merit; secondly, by a + kind of imperfect inchoation of future happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope that the tree + will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs of the fruit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p8"> Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to + happiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards, may be either perfect happiness, so as to + refer to the future life, or some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have attained perfection, in which + case they refer to the present life. Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues and + gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope regards future happiness as the last end: yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to that + end, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.27.7" target="asv"> Ps. 27:7</a>: "In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have been helped." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo temporal punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence + Augustine says (Confess. i): "Thou hast decreed, and it is so, Lord---that the disordered mind should be its own punishment." + The Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that "their soul is divided against itself . . . one part pulls this + way, another that"; and afterwards he concludes, saying: "If wickedness makes a + man so miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice." In like manner, although, on the other hand, the good sometimes + do not receive material rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in this life, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.29" target="asv"> Mat. 19:29, </a> and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.10.30" target="asv"> Mk. 10:30</a>: "Ye shall receive a hundred times as much" even "in this time." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All these rewards will be fully consummated in the life to come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in this + life. Because the "kingdom of heaven," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv; *Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 1), can denote + the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as "the spirit" begins to reign in men. The "possession" of the land denotes the + well-ordered affections of the soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation + of the eternal inheritance, signified by "the land." They are "comforted" in this life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is + called the "Paraclete," i.e. the Comforter. They "have their fill," even in this life, of that food of which Our Lord said + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.34" target="asv">Jn. 4:34</a>): "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me." Again, in this life, men "obtain" God's "Mercy." Again, the eye being + cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, "see God." Likewise, in this life, those + who are the "peacemakers" of their own movements, approach to likeness to God, and are called "the children of God." Nevertheless + these things will be more perfectly fulfilled in heaven. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q69_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q69_A3-p0.1">Whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above + (A[1], ad 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and understanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is + assigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters connected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes + are insufficiently enumerated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e.g. knowledge + and counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the + beatitudes are insufficiently indicated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the executive gifts connected with the active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety + seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes + are insufficiently enumerated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ. Thus, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.17" target="asv">Job 5:17</a>): "Blessed is the man whom God correcteth"; and (Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the + ungodly"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.13" target="asv">Prov. 3:13</a>): "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom." Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned. For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes + are indicated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Matthew 5</a> are too many. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to consist + in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative + life [*See Q[3]]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations to future beatitude, by hoping for which + we are said to be happy. Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, + is an obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative + happiness, if perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is a beginning thereof. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p9"> And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life + of pleasure consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods, whether riches or honors; from which man is + withdrawn---by a virtue so that he uses them in moderation---and by a gift, in a more excellent way, so that he despises them + altogether. Hence the first beatitude is: "Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the + contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following + the bent of one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the irascible passions man is withdrawn---by + a virtue, so that they are kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason---and by a gift, in a more excellent manner, + so that man, according to God's will, is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is: "Blessed are + the meek." From following the concupiscible passions, man is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in moderation---and + by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice + of sorrow [*Cf. + <a id="FS_Q69_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A3.html"> Q[35], A[3]</a>]; hence the third beatitude is: "Blessed are they that mourn." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p10"> Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor, either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. + To the former we are disposed---by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty to our neighbor, which pertains to justice---and + by a gift, so that we do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry + and thirsty man eats and drinks with eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "Blessed are + they that hunger and thirst after justice." With regard to spontaneous favors we are perfected---by a virtue, so that we give + where reason dictates we should give, e.g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains to the virtue of liberality--and + by a gift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous bounty: + hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.12" target="asv">Lk. 14:12,13</a>): "When thou makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, + nor thy brethren," etc . . . "but . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc.; which, properly, is to have mercy: hence the fifth + beatitude is: "Blessed are the merciful." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p11"> Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore + they are included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the effects of the active life, which dispose man + for the contemplative life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active life, as regards those virtues and + gifts whereby man is perfected in himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by the + passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean of heart." But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man + is perfected in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.32.17" target="asv"> Is. 32:17</a>: "The work of justice shall be peace": hence the seventh beatitude is "Blessed are the peacemakers." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The acts of the gifts which belong to the active life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining to + the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason given above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift + of understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive "children of God," corresponds to the gift of wisdom. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things pertaining to the active life, knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of operation, as even + the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include + the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g. to + counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but, on the + other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts have the direction, as, e.g. mourning in respect of knowledge, + and mercy in respect of counsel. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the first + five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed + among the executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects + man in his relations to others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.22" target="asv"> + Lk. 6:22 + </a>: "It is the business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation," fortitude being about the irascible passions: + poverty and mourning to the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of the world. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p15"> Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. + Because the principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, + whereby man knows his failings and those of worldly things, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.18" target="asv"> Eccles. 1:18</a>: "He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]." The principal motive for hungering after the works of + justice is fortitude of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.4.24" target="asv">Dan. 4:24</a>: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the king [Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities + with works of mercy to the poor." It is thus that Augustine assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because + they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life. Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man whom + the Lord correcteth," we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we read, "Blessed is the man that hath not walked + in the counsel of the ungodly," we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we + read, "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom," this must be referred to the reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies + to all others that can be adduced. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that a man is + confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence + the eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to the multitude ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.17" target="asv">Lk. 6:17</a>). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than pleasure, + temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. + The first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by saying: "Blessed are ye poor." The + second is that man be well off as to his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying in the second place: + "Blessed are ye that hunger." The third is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts aside + by saying: "Blessed are ye that weep now." The fourth is the outward favor of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly: + "Blessed shall you be, when men shall hate you." And as Ambrose says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Lk. 6:20, </a> "poverty corresponds + to temperance, which is unmoved by delights; hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through compassion + gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p19"></p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A3-p20"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q69_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q69_A4-p0.1">Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal + life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward, both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the + same ground it should have been assigned to all. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas + the rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of + heaven." Therefore these rewards are unsuitably enumerated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these rewards. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of happiness + indicated above + <a id="FS_Q69_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q69_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. For the first three beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual happiness consists: which + happiness man desires by seeking the object of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in temporal + and perishable things. Wherefore the + rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness. For men + seek in external things, viz. riches and honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied in the kingdom + of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of heaven + to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain + security for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living, whereby + the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of the present life, in the lusts + and pleasures of the world. Hence Our Lord promises comfort to those that mourn. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p7"> Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are the works of virtues directing man in his relations + to his neighbor: from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns + to these beatitudes rewards in correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For there are some who recede + from acts of justice, and instead of rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may + abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, + again, recede from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that + they should obtain mercy, and be delivered from all misery. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p8"> The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude: hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence + with the dispositions included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see clearly: hence the clean of heart + are promised that they shall see God. Again, to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to be a follower + of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship, + consisting in perfect union with God through consummate wisdom. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), all these rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human intellect + cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion + to the merits to which those rewards are assigned. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes. Hence + it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other rewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according + to Ambrose (Super Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but + to those who suffer persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the + glory of the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply + to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in + the kingdom than to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, + it is more to have one's fill than simply to be comforted, because fulness implies + abundance of comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more than he merited or was able to desire. And + yet more is it to see God, even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees the king's countenance. + Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king's son. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q69_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q68_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q70" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q70-p0.1">OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q70-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q70-p2"> We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q70-p3"> (1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?</p> + <p id="FS_Q70-p4"> (2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes?</p> + <p id="FS_Q70-p5"> (3) Of their number?</p> + <p id="FS_Q70-p6"> (4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.</p> + <div id="FS_Q70_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q70_A1-p0.1">Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p0.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5" target="asv">Gal. 5</a>) are acts? + </h4> + <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost, enumerated by the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22,23</a>), are not acts. For that which bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely. But our + actions bear fruit: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.3.15" target="asv">Wis. 3:15</a>): "The fruit of good labor is glorious," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#John.4.36" target="asv">Jn. 4:36</a>): "He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting." + Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy [*'Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the English + 'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing in them." But our will should not rest in our actions for their + own sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity. + Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q70_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A1.html">Q[55], A[1]</a>). Therefore the fruits are not actions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.33" target="asv">Mat. 12:33</a>): "By the fruit the tree is known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain the passage. Therefore + human actions are called fruits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the + product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree + that produces it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in spiritual matters, we may take the word + "fruit" in two ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that + which he produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p7"> Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, + and yet these are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which man intends to derive from the field + and from the tree. In this sense man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p8"> If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then human actions are called fruits: because operation is the + second act of the operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man's operation proceeds from man in virtue + of his reason, it is said to be the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a higher power, which is + the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine + seed, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.9" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:9</a>): "Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since fruit is something last and final, nothing hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate + to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as + they are referred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called flowers: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.23" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:23</a>): "My flowers are the fruits of honor and riches." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will is said to delight in a thing for its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the expression + "for the sake of" be taken to designate the final cause; and in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except + the last end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in this way, a man may delight in anything that is delightful + by reason of its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health, + for its own sake, as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something tasty; and in a nasty medicine, + nowise for its own sake, but only for the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that man must delight in God for + His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent goodness + which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits because "they + refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Faith is to + believe what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "Charity is the movement of the soul in loving God and our + neighbor." It is thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q70_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q70_A2-p0.1">Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated + above ( + <a id="FS_Q70_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html">Q[69], A[1]</a>, ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are fruits + of the Holy Ghost. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the + present life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with + future beatitude. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above + ( + <a id="FS_Q70_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q70_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q4_A1.html"> Q[4], A[1]</a>). Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Things divided into different species, differ from one another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts, + as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit. Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and delightful; + whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not + vice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights: whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, + and which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to + the virtues, as already stated ( + <a id="FS_Q70_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q69_A1.html">Q[69], A[1]</a>, ad 1). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits, but not that all the fruits are beatitudes. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other hand + the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q70_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q70_A3-p0.1">Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22,23</a>). Because, elsewhere, he says that there is only one fruit of the present life; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.22" target="asv"> Rom. 6:22</a>: "You have your fruit unto sanctification." Moreover it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.9" target="asv">Is. 27:9</a>): "This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken away." Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated (A[1] ). But Our Lord mentions ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.23" target="asv">Mat. 13:23</a>) a threefold fruit as growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. "hundredfold, sixtyfold," and "thirtyfold." Therefore + one should not reckon twelve fruits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits mentioned + by the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply a painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but + rather something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are enumerated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated + <a id="FS_Q70_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q70_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that all the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the + acts of wisdom, and of many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are insufficiently enumerated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the Apostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the twelve + fruits of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.2" target="asv">Apoc. 22:2</a>): "On both sides of the river was the tree bearing twelve fruits." Since, however, a fruit is something that proceeds from + a source as from a seed or root, the difference between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways in which the Holy + Ghost proceeds in us: + which process consists in this, that the mind of man is set in order, first of all, in regard to itself; secondly, in regard + to things that are near it; thirdly, in regard to things that are below it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p7"> Accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has a good disposition towards good things and towards + evil things. Now the first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by love, which is the first of our emotions + and the root of them all, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q27_A4.html">Q[27], A[4]</a>). Wherefore among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, we reckon "charity," wherein the Holy Ghost is given in a special manner, + as in His own likeness, + since He Himself is love. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." The necessary result of the love + of charity is joy: because every lover rejoices at being united to the beloved. Now charity has always actual presence in + God Whom it loves, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.3" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in Him": wherefore the sequel of charity is "joy." Now the perfection + of joy + is peace in two respects. First, as regards freedom from outward disturbance; for it is impossible to rejoice perfectly in + the beloved good, if one is disturbed in the enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's heart is perfectly set at peace in one + object, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.165" target="asv">Ps. 118:165</a>): "Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there is no stumbling-block," because, to wit, external + things do not disturb them in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm of the restless desire: for he does not + perfectly rejoice, who is not satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two things, namely, that we be + not disturbed by external things, and that our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity and joy, "peace" + is given the third place. In evil things the mind has a good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being + disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to "patience"; secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are + delayed; which belongs to "long suffering," since "to lack good is a kind of evil" (Ethic. v, 3). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p8"> Man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this + belongs "goodness." Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this belongs "benignity," for the benign are those + in whom the salutary flame [bonus ignis] of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to their neighbor. Thirdly, as to his + suffering with equanimity the evils his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs "meekness," which curbs anger. + Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or + deceit. To this pertains "faith," if we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we take it for the faith whereby we believe in + God, then man is directed thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect and, consequently, all that + is his, to God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p9"> Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards external action, by "modesty," whereby we observe + the "mode" in all our words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by "contingency" and "chastity": whether these two differ + because chastity withdraws man from unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful desires: or because the continent man is + subject to concupiscence, but is not led away; whereas the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away from + them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by which also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there in + the singular, on account of its being generically one, though divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits do not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various degrees + of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus contingency of the married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; + the contingency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency, by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other + ways in which holy men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the + three degrees of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of anything is considered with respect to + its beginning, its middle, and its end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact of not being disturbed by painful things is something to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the foundation, + it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: "Faith, + which is certainly about the unseen." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv"> Gal. 5:22,23, </a> "the Apostle had no intention of teaching us how many [either works of the flesh, or fruits of the Spirit] there are; but + to show how the former should be avoided, and the latter sought after." Hence either more or fewer fruits might have been + mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of fittingness, in + so far as all the virtues and + gifts must needs direct the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of wisdom and of any gifts directing + to good, are reduced to charity, joy and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others, is that these imply either + enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils, which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p14"></p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A3-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q70_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q70_A4-p0.1">Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv">Gal. 5:19, </a> seqq.). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the works of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits + of the Spirit are not contrary to them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore + the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication, uncleanness, + and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the flesh are not opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary + to the works of the flesh. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.17" target="asv">Gal. 5:17</a>) that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the fruits + of the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the works of the flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind + to that which is in accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses reason: whereas the fleshly, viz. the sensitive, + appetite draws man to sensible goods which are beneath him. Wherefore, since upward and + downward are contrary movements in the physical order, so in human actions the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits + of the Spirit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p7"> Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be considered singly, each according to its specific nature. And + in this they are not of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated above (A[3], ad 4), the Apostle did not intend + to enumerate all the works, whether spiritual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, Augustine, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv"> Gal. 5:22,23, </a> contrasts the fruits with the carnal works, each to each. Thus "to fornication, which + is the love of satisfying lust outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul is wedded to God: wherein + also is true chastity. By uncleanness we must understand whatever disturbances arise from fornication: and to these the joy + of tranquillity is opposed. Idolatry, by reason of which war was waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against + witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels, there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils + inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell; while kindness helps us to cure those evils; and goodness, to forgive them. + In contrast to heresy there is faith; to envy, mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, contingency." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which proceeds from a tree against the tree's nature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And since + works of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are contrary to nature, therefore it is that works of virtue + are called fruits, but not so works of vice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many vices + are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p10"> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q70_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q69_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q71" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q71-p0.1">EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q71-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q71-p2">OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES (SIX ARTICLES)</p> + <p id="FS_Q71-p3"> We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered + in themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; + (6) the effect of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71-p4"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q71-p5"> (1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue?</p> + <p id="FS_Q71-p6"> (2) Whether vice is contrary to nature?</p> + <p id="FS_Q71-p7"> (3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act?</p> + <p id="FS_Q71-p8"> (4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue?</p> + <p id="FS_Q71-p9"> (5) Whether every sin includes action?</p> + <p id="FS_Q71-p10"> (6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii): "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal + law." + </p> + <div id="FS_Q71_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q71_A1-p0.1">Whether vice is contrary to virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17. Now + sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice applies also to undue disposition + of bodily members or of any things whatever. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice + is not contrary to virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that "virtue is the soul's health." Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, + is opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil." But "virtue is a quality + which makes its subject good," as was shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q71_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A3.html">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in virtue---the essence of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue + we may consider something directly, and we may consider something consequently. Virtue implies "directly" a disposition whereby + the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that + "virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I + mean that which is disposed according to its nature." That which virtue implies "consequently" is that it is a kind of goodness: + because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. That to which virtue + is directed is a good act, as was shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q71_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A3.html">Q[56], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p7"> Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of these is "sin," which is opposed to virtue in respect + of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is + an ordinate and due act: in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary + of virtue is "malice": while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary + is "vice": because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine + says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural perfection may be called a vice." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the latter + is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly + as such. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The reason + for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act: so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce + a good work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "disease and sickness are vicious qualities," for in speaking of the body "he calls + it" disease "when the whole body is infected," for instance, with fever or the like; he calls it sickness "when the disease + is attended with weakness"; and vice "when the parts of the body are not well compacted together." And although at times there + may be disease in the body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden + complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; "yet, in the soul," as he says, "these two things + are indistinguishable, except in thought." For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, + he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since "a tree is known by its fruit," i.e. man by his works, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.33" target="asv"> Mat. 12:33.</a> But "vice of the soul," as Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "is a habit or affection of + the soul discordant and inconsistent with itself through life": and this is to be found even without disease and sickness, + e.g. when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even as virtue + extends to more things than health; for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice + is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or disease. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q71_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q71_A2-p0.1">Whether vice is contrary to nature?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q71_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above (Q[63], AA[1] ,2,3). Therefore vice is + not contrary to nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which is contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated + to upward movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice + is found in the greater number of men; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.13" target="asv">Mat. 7:13</a>): "Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat." Therefore vice is not contrary to + nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q71_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now sin is defined as "a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the Law of God," as Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). + But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q71_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, vice is contrary to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature, + as stated above + <a id="FS_Q71_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and for this reason is + that thing "vituperated," which word is derived from "vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p8"> But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man + derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, + contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man. + Now "man's good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius states + (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as + much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the virtues are not caused by nature as regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which accords + with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit in accord with reason, + like a second nature": and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that + vice is contrary to nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being against nature, in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to "being + from nature": and not in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to "being in accord with nature," in which latter sense + virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they incline us to that which is suitable to nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his + senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than + who follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than achieve its completion. Now the presence + of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his + sensitive nature against the order of his reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared + to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the + order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that "every + nature, as such, is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the + Divine art whereby it was made." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q71_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q71_A3-p0.1">Whether vice is worse than a vicious act?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, is worse than a sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better + it is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith. + Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one. But a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore + a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a habit produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their + badness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in goodness and in badness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious action + is worse than a vicious habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated + in Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do + evil, than to be able to do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in badness, habit stands midway between + power and act, so that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding + power in goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made clear from the fact that + a habit is not called good or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a habit is called good or + bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since "the + cause of a thing being such, is yet more so." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above another + simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses + it in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses + habit both in goodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more + lasting than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a nature such that it cannot always + be in action, and whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act simply excels in goodness and badness, but + habit excels in a certain respect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a certain respect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that habit precedes + act simply, both in goodness and in badness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Habit causes act by way of efficient causality: but act causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we consider + the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q71_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q71_A4-p0.1">Whether sin is compatible with virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same subject. + Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q71_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither, + therefore, can sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in voluntary matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in natural + things, except through some corruption of the natural power; thus monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in + the seed, as stated in Phys. ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters, except through the corruption of some virtue + in the soul: so that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2,3) that "virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary causes." Now one virtuous act + does not cause a virtue, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q71_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A3.html">Q[51], A[3]</a>): and, consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they can be together in the same subject. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit. Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of + a form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore + a natural form is incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible with the act of cooling, and lightness + with downward movement (except perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover): + whereas the habit that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but is used by man when he wills. + Consequently man, while possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a contrary act; and so a man having + a virtue may produce an act of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot corrupt virtue, if we compare + the act to the virtue itself as a habit: since, just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it destroyed by + one + act as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q71_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A2.html">Q[63], A[2]</a>, ad 2). But if we compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for some virtues to be destroyed + by one sinful act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues, as virtues; + and consequently, charity being banished by one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled "as + virtues." And I say on account of faith and hope, whose habits remain + unquickened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary + to charity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it expel the other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they are + not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p7"> Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but is consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin + is compatible with virtues, whether infused or acquired. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the act, but + not with the habit, of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts + of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On the + other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity; hence the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q71_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q71_A5-p0.1">Whether every sin includes an action?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. + Now there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can there be sin without action. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.]: So "true is it that every sin is voluntary, that, + unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now nothing can be voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every + sin implies an act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who + never does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; + and this is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.17" target="asv">James 4:17</a>): "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Now "not to do" does not imply an act. Therefore + sin can be without act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The reason for urging this question has reference to the sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For + some say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or exterior---interior, as when a man wills "not + to go to church," when he is bound to go---exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is bound to go to church (or + even before), occupies himself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a + way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible with this other, wills, consequently, + to go without this other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him, that what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that + which he is bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin + of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do is a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p7"> Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of omission we look merely at that in which the essence + of the sin consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act, as when a man wills "not to go to church": + while sometimes it will be without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at the time that he is bound + to go to church, does not think of going or not going to church. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p8"> If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission + must of necessity include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what we can do or not do: and that we + turn aside so as not to do what we can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either united with the omission + or preceding it. Now if this cause be not in man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone + omits going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful; + and such cause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least the interior act of the will: which + act sometimes bears directly on the omission, as when a man wills "not to go to church," because it is too much trouble; and + in this case this act, of its very nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of + itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears directly on something + else which hinders man from doing what he ought, whether this something else be united with the omission, as when a man wills + to play at the time he ought to go to church---or, precede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up late at night, the + result being that he does not go to church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to + the omission, since the omission follows outside the intention, and that which is outside the intention is said to be accidental + (Phys. ii, text. 49,50). Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding + the omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p9"> Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper to them, and not by that which is accidental: and + consequently it is truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial acts and occasions would be essential + to other actual sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> More things are required for good than for evil, since "good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results + from each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or + by his not doing what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there + can be no merit without act, whereas there can be sin without act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The term "voluntary" is applied not only to that on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which + we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far + as man has it in his power to will, and not to will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to act, + a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A5-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q71_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q71_A6-p0.1">Whether sin is fittingly defined as a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying: "Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law." Because + "Word," "deed," and "desire" imply an act; whereas not every sin implies an act, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q71_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Therefore this definition does not include every sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): "Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids." Now will is comprised + under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite. Therefore it was enough to say: "Sin is a desire contrary + to the eternal law," nor was there need to add "word" or "deed." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard + to the end as explained above ( + <a id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6; + <a id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A2.html"> Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference to the end, by saying that "sin is nothing else than to + neglect eternal things, and seek after temporal things": and again he + says (Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that "all human wickedness consists in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should + use." Now the definition is question contains no mention of aversion from our due end: therefore it is an insufficient definition + of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden, + but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained above + <a id="FS_Q71_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now man's evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to say that + sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above + <a id="FS_Q71_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary, as stated above + (Q[1], A[1]), whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being commanded by + the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its + due measure: and conformity of measure in a + thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will: + one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God's + reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the definition of sin; one, pertaining + to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says "word," "deed," or "desire"; + the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, "contrary to the eternal + law." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus: e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the + genus "relation," as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so "word" and "deed" denote equally what is said and what is + not said, what is done and what is not done. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it + is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance + of sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in defining sin to include something referring to external + action. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to + things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, "contrary to the eternal law," he includes aversion from the end + and all other forms of inordinateness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When it is said that not every sin is evil through being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive law. + If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily + in the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural + law, precisely because it is inordinate. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason. + Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being "contrary to the eternal law," more fittingly than with reference + to its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. + in matters of faith. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p14"></p> + <p id="FS_Q71_A6-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q70_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q72" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q72-p0.1">OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q72-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72-p2"> We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head there are nine points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q72-p3"> (1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?</p> + <p id="FS_Q72-p4"> (2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins;</p> + <p id="FS_Q72-p5"> (3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?</p> + <p id="FS_Q72-p6"> (4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?</p> + <p id="FS_Q72-p7"> (5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?</p> + <p id="FS_Q72-p8"> (6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?</p> + <p id="FS_Q72-p9"> (7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?</p> + <p id="FS_Q72-p10"> (8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?</p> + <p id="FS_Q72-p11"> (9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?</p> + <div id="FS_Q72_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q72_A1-p0.1">Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins do not differ in species, according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in relation, + chiefly, to their end, as shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">Q[71], A[1]</a>), it seems that sins should differ specifically according to their ends rather than according to their objects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil + in the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically according to their opposites rather than according to their + objects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sins differed specifically according to their objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with + diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral. + xxxiv, 18); and avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not differ in species according to their objects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's law." Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to their various + objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q72_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">Q[18], A[2]</a> ). Therefore sins, also differ in species according to their objects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q72_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">Q[71], A[6]</a>), two things concur in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness, which consists in departing from + God's law. Of these two, one is referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in such and such matter; + while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for "no one + acts intending evil," as Dionysius + declares (Div. Nom. iv). Now it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is essential and not from that + which is accidental: because what is accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ specifically on the + part of the voluntary acts rather than of the inordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species according + to their objects, as was proved above ( + <a id="FS_Q72_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">Q[18], A[2]</a>). Therefore it follows that sins are properly + distinguished in species by their objects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end: and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the + will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their + ends. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due order: hence sins differ specifically according to their objects + of their acts rather than according to their opposites, although, even if they were distinguished in reference to their opposite + virtues, it would come to the same: since virtues differ specifically according to their objects, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q72_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html">Q[60], A[5]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In various things, differing in species or genus, nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which + aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence in reference to various things; and avarice seeks + abundance of things adapted to human use. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q72_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q72_A2-p0.1">Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv">Gal. 5:19</a>): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts," etc. + from which it seems that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are called works of the flesh. Therefore + carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.13" target="asv"> Rom. 8:13</a>: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live." + Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not + be distinguished from spiritual sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or reason, is called the spirit, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.23" target="asv"> Eph. 4:23</a>: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind," where spirit stands for reason, according to a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed + in accordance with the flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, + as we shall state further on ( + <a id="FS_Q72_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A7.html">Q[74], A[7]</a>). + Therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual, and consequently they should not be distinguished from one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this, seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against + his own body. But, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:18</a>), "every sin that a man doth, is without the body: but he that committeth fornication, sinneth against his own body." Therefore + fornication would be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.3" target="asv">Eph. 5:3</a>) reckons covetousness with the carnal + sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that "of the seven capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q72_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, sins take their species from their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable good, for which man has + an inordinate desire, and the possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above (Q[31], A[3]), pleasure + is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in accordance with desire; + this can also be called spiritual + pleasure, e.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized + in bodily touch, and this can also be called carnal pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p8"> Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are called spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal + pleasure, are called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of the table; and lust, which consists in + sexual pleasures. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.1" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:1</a>): "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices are called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal pleasure; + but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says + (De Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p10"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are + named, is carnal pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the gloss says, "in the sin of fornication the soul is the body's slave in a special sense, because at the moment of sinning + it can think of nothing else": whereas the pleasure of gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It + may also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also, for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin + alone is man said specifically to sin against his body. While covetousness, + which is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, which is the unjust appropriation of another's wife. Again, + it may be said that the thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and in this respect covetousness + is numbered with the carnal sins: but the pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the spirit, wherefore Gregory + says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is a spiritual sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q72_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q72_A3-p0.1">Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence + it derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore + they differ specifically in reference to their causes. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like + its material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according to their objects, it seems that much more do they + differ in reference to their other causes. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.79.17" target="asv"> Ps. 79:17, </a> "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to fear inducing false humility, or to love enkindling + us to undue ardor." For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>) that "all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the concupiscence of the eyes, or [Vulg.: + 'and'] the pride of life." Now a thing is said to be in the world on + account of sin, in as much as the world denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in Joan.). Gregory, + too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins according to the seven capital vices. Now all these divisions refer to the causes + of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically according to the diversity of their causes. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> If this were the case all sins would belong to one species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>) that "pride is the beginning of all sin," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>) that "the desire of money is the root of all evils." Now it is evident that there are various species of sins. Therefore + sins do not differ specifically according to their different causes. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since there are four kinds of causes, they are attributed to various things in various ways. Because the "formal" and the + "material" cause regard properly the substance of a thing; and consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and + form, both in species and in genus. The "agent" and the "end" regard directly movement and operation: wherefore movements + and operations differ specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however, + because the natural active principles are always determined to the same acts; so that the different species of natural acts + are taken not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also from their active principles: thus + heating and cooling are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active principles in + voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently from one active or + motive principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft, + or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his care; and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue + ardor. Hence it is evident that sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or motive causes, but only + in respect of diversity in the final cause, which is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q72_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q72_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6) that human acts take their species from the end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The active principles in voluntary acts, not being determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human acts, + unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and + consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Objects, in relation to external acts, have the character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior act of + the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered + as the matter "about which," they have the character of term, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic. + x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so far as term has + the character of end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q72_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q72_A4-p0.1">Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and against one's neighbor?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that + which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against + God: for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's law," as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q72_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A6.html">Q[66], A[6]</a>). Therefore sin against God should not be reckoned a part of the division of + sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed + to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly + divided into these three. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, specification is not taken from things external. But God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are + not distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and + against his neighbor." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q72_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">Q[71], AA[1]</a>,6), sin is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in relation to the rule of reason, in so + far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another order is in relation to the rule + of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold + order would suffice. But since man is + naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2, hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed + in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever + things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things are comprised + under the order of God, which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone. Hence he + that sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In like manner, the + first order includes the third and surpasses it, because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor, + we need to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation + to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against + himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he + is said to sin against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things whereby man is directed to God, + his neighbor, and himself are diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their objects, according to which + the species of sins are diversified: and consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different species of sins: + because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from + what has been said ( + <a id="FS_Q72_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A1.html">Q[62], AA[1]</a>,2,3) that by the theological virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to himself; and by justice to his + neighbor. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order + to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When several things, of which one includes another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer, + not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers + and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in + respect of that in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the + numbers three and four. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although God and our neighbor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related + to it as to its object. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q72_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q72_A5-p0.1">Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when + sin is divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even + to the same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal + punishment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity + of the fault, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be." Therefore venial and mortal sins are + not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [*"Ex genere," genus in this case denoting the species], as murder + and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial + and mortal sins differ specifically. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward + is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their + ends, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Those things that constitute a species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as + the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In things that differ specifically we find a twofold difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to + be found save in different species, e.g. "rational" and "irrational," "animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is + consequent to specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to specific diversity, yet, in others, it + may be found within the same species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific + diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the one species of man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p7"> We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of + punishment, cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is accidental never constitutes a species; and + what is outside the agent's intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that punishment is outside the + intention of the sinner, wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it + is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to + the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the specific + diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p8"> Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes + the notion of sin. For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and another which, without destroying + the principle of order, implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus, in an animal's body, the frame + may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while, + on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now + the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable + principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away + from its last end, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without + turning away from God, there is venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the destruction + of the principle of life, is irreparable according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of + the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible + to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the + truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider + the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas + when a man sins without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, because the principle + of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to + deserve to be punished eternally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards what they "turn away from," not as regards what they "turn to," viz. + the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, + in the species "adultery" the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may + even be a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that + this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may + be found even in things of the same species, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtually; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on + the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q72_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q72_A6-p0.1">Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ specifically. For "offense" and "sin" are condivided with one another + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.1" target="asv">Eph. 2:1</a>), where it is written: "When you were dead in your offenses and sins," which words a gloss explains, saying: "'Offenses,' + by omitting to do what was commanded, and 'sins,' by doing what was forbidden." Whence it is evident that "offenses" here + denotes sins of omission; while "sin" denotes sins of + commission. Therefore they differ specifically, since they are contrasted with one another as different species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to sin to be against God's law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been + said ( + <a id="FS_Q72_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Now in God's law, the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts, + against which is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of omission and commission differ specifically. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species, + since negation has no species; for "there is neither species nor difference of non-being," as the Philosopher states (Phys. + iv, text. 67). Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Omission and commission are found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which + is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and + commission do not differ specifically. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold difference in sins; a material difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be observed + in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which + is also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one another in the material specific difference, which + are nevertheless formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed + to the one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing come under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves + differ specifically according to the natural species. Accordingly, if we refer to the material species in sins of omission + and commission, they differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and privation may have a species. + But if we refer to the formal species of sins of omission and commission, they do not differ specifically, because + they are directed to the same end, and proceed from the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both robs, + and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the glutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and omits the + prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins: for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner, + is its cause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head, that fire gives forth heat, and that it does not + give forth cold. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This division in respect of commission and omission, is not according to different formal species, but only according to + material species, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In God's law, the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue, + first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are + induced by the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but + to different degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not of necessity, opposed + to sins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from which it turns away, because in this respect it is + a negation or privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. Consequently sins do not differ specifically + according to the various precepts of the Law. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers the material diversity of sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking, + negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q72_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q72_A7-p0.1">Whether sins are fittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes + three stages of sin, of which the first is "when the carnal sense offers a bait," which is the sin of thought; the second + stage is reached "when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought"; and the third stage, "when consent is given to + the deed." Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to + reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of sin; the first of which is "a fault hidden in the heart"; the second, + "when it is done openly"; the third, "when it is formed into a habit"; and the fourth, "when man goes so far as to presume + on God's mercy or to give himself up to despair": where no distinction is made between sins of deed and sins of word, and + two other degrees of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ specifically. + Therefore they should not be condivided with one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome in commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.43.23" target="asv"> Ezech. 43:23</a>: "The human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when each has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ specifically: + secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is + the complete generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, + as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to the + generation of animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various + complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first + beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as + man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the + deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three + belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance, + is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; and the + same applies to lust and to any other sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided + into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas + Jerome (in commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.43.23" target="asv"> Ezech. 43:23</a>) distinguishes between them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is intended principally; while + in sins of deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is principally intended, and the outward manifestation + is by way of sequel. + Habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation + of a man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each + is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, + but only when there is a break in the movement. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q72_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q72_A8-p0.1">Whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect + of more and less. Now "more" and "less" do not diversify a species. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species + of sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to straying from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative + matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more + or less than the reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or less from the rectitude + of reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one species cannot be made out of two," as Porphyry declares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. Metaph. i]. Now excess and deficiency + are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and wasteful---illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality, + by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Contraries differ specifically, for "contrariety is a difference of form," as stated in Metaph. x, text. 13,14. Now vices + that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they + differ specifically. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> While there are two things in sin, viz. the act itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the order + of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's intention, + as stated above + <a id="FS_Q72_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, but one the contrary, from the act itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention is directed. Consequently + wherever we find a + different motive inclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now it is evident that the motive + for sinning, in sins by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins of deficiency; in fact, they are contrary + to one another, just as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of + insensibility is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary to one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although "more" and "less" do not cause diversity of species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in + so far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says + (Ethic. viii, 1) that "those who held that there are no different species of friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree, + were led by insufficient proof." In this way to exceed reason or to fall short + thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they result from different motives. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through + departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth, + wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside + the intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to + tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the "boaster," who exceeds + in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the "cheat," who tells less than the truth, in order to escape from paying his + debts. This also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf. + <a id="FS_Q72_A8-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q119_A1.html">SS, Q[119], A[1]</a>, ad 1] in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q72_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q72_A9-p0.1">Whether sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of different circumstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil + results from each single defect." Now individual defects are corruptions of individual circumstances. Therefore from the corruption + of each circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their species from circumstances, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q72_A9-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A10.html">Q[18], A[10]</a>). Therefore sins differ specifically according as different circumstances are corrupted. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony, according to the words contained in the following verse: + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p5"> 'Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.' Now these pertain to various circumstances, for "hastily" means sooner + than is right; "too much," more than is right, and so on with the others. Therefore the species of sin is diversified according + to the various circumstances. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that "every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not"; + and in like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the species of sins are not diversified in this respect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q72_A9-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, wherever there is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the motive for sinning is the + end and object of sin. Now it happens sometimes that although different circumstances are corrupted, there is but one motive: + thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so on + with the circumstances, since he does + this through an inordinate desire of hoarding money: and in such cases the corruption of different circumstances does not + diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one and the same species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p8"> Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises from different motives: for instance that a man eat + hastily, may be due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on account of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive + humors; and that he desire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; that he desire choice meats, is due + to his desire for pleasure in taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption of different circumstances + entails different species of sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, even + as other privations. But sin does not take its species from the privation or aversion, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q72_A9-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, but from turning to the object of the act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance never transfers an act from one species to another, save when there is another motive. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the various species of gluttony there are various motives, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q72_A9-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q73" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q73-p0.1">OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (TEN ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q73-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73-p2"> We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q73-p3"> (1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another?</p> + <p id="FS_Q73-p4"> (2) Whether all are equal?</p> + <p id="FS_Q73-p5"> (3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object?</p> + <p id="FS_Q73-p6"> (4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is opposed?</p> + <p id="FS_Q73-p7"> (5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins?</p> + <p id="FS_Q73-p8"> (6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes?</p> + <p id="FS_Q73-p9"> (7) Whether it depends on their circumstances?</p> + <p id="FS_Q73-p10"> (8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues?</p> + <p id="FS_Q73-p11"> (9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against?</p> + <p id="FS_Q73-p12"> (10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning?</p> + <div id="FS_Q73_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q73_A1-p0.1">Whether all sins are connected with one another?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.10" target="asv">James 2:10</a>): "Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all." Now to be guilty of transgressing + all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all sins, because, as Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), "sin is a transgression + of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of + all. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">Q[65], A[1]</a>). Therefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues. Therefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all + sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a principle in common, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">Q[65], AA[1]</a>,2). Now as the virtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love of God, which builds the city of God, + is the beginning and root of all the virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is the root of all sins, as + Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore all vices and sins are also connected + so that whoever has one, has them all. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Some vices are contrary to one another, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be together in the + same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The intention of the man who acts according to virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of the + sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule + of reason, wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the virtues are connected together + in the right reason of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html">Q[65], A[1]</a>). But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed + to tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner's intention is directed + when departing from reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact they are sometimes contrary to one + another. Since, therefore, vices and sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is + evident that, in respect of that which completes a sin's species, sins are not connected with one another. For sin does not + consist in passing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but rather in forsaking the + one for the many. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> James is speaking of sin, not as regards the thing to which it turns and which causes the distinction of sins, as stated + above ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html">Q[72] , A[1]</a>), but as regards that from which sin turns away, in as much as man, by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law. Now + all the commandments of the law are from one and the same, as he also says in the same passage, so that the same God is despised + in every sin; and in this sense he + says that whoever "offends in one point, is become guilty of all," for as much as, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt + of punishment through his contempt of God, which is the origin of all sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A4.html">Q[71], A[4]</a>), the opposite virtue is not banished by every act of sin; because venial sin does not destroy virtue; while mortal sin destroys + infused virtue, by turning man away from God. Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit of acquired virtue; + though if such acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed, the destruction + of which entails + the loss of prudence, since when man acts against any virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without which no moral virtue + is possible, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q58_A4.html">Q[58], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A1.html"> Q[65], A[1]</a>). Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so far + as they partake of prudence, yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous acts, which inclinations, however, are not virtues. + Nevertheless it + does not follow that for this reason man contracts all vices of sins---first, because several vices are opposed to one virtue, + so that a virtue can be destroyed by one of them, without the others being present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed + to virtue, as regards the virtue's inclination to act, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">Q[71], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations remain, it cannot be said that man has the opposite vices or sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The love of God is unitive, in as much as it draws man's affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which + flow from the love of God, are connected together. But self-love disunites man's affections among different things, in so + far as man loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins, + which arise from self-love, are not connected together. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q73_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q73_A2-p0.1">Whether all sins are equal?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one + and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things. + Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one + go a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less. Therefore all sins are equal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are + equal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said to Pilate ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.19.11" target="asv">Jn. 19:11</a>): "He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin," and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore + one sin is greater than another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal: from + which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the + pains of hell are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through + looking at sin on the side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure from + reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if + we consider the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For there is a simple and pure privation, + which consists, so to speak, in "being" corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and darkness is privation of light. Such + like privations do not admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence a man is not less dead + on + the first day after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and, + in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade + shutting out all the light. There is, however, another privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite + habit; it consists in "becoming" corrupted rather than in "being" corrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due + commensuration of the humors, yet so that something remains of that commensuration, else the animal would cease to live: and + the same applies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains or the contrary + habit. For it matters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration of humors + or members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in them the privation of the due commensuration of reason is such + as + not to destroy the order of reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. For the substance + of the act, or the affection of the agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of reason. Therefore it + matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of reason: and accordingly we must + say that sins are not all equal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To commit sin is lawful on account of some inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater inordinateness + are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure privation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to + its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the same species of virtue, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q66_A1.html">Q[66], AA[1]</a>,2). Moreover, even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices + or sins are not. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q73_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q73_A3-p0.1">Whether the gravity of sins varies according to their objects?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to + its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to + their various objects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice. Now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to + which it turns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that which it turns away from. Therefore the gravity of + sins does not vary according to their various objects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sins that have different objects are of different kinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one + another, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one sin is not graver than another by reason of the difference + of objects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Sins take their species from their objects, as was shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html">Q[72], A[1]</a>). But some sins are graver than others in respect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore the gravity + of sins varies according to their objects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html">Q[71], A[5]</a>), the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver than another: for just as the good of health consists + in a certain commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animal's nature, so the good of virtue consists in a certain + commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the higher the principle the disorder + of which + causes the disorder in the humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on the human body from the heart, + which is the principle of life, or from some neighboring part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must needs be so much the + graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters of action the reason + directs all things in view of the end: wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins in human acts, the graver the sin. + Now the object of an act is its end, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A3.html">Q[72], A[3]</a>, ad 2); and consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects. Thus it is clear that external things + are directed to man as their end, while man is further directed to God as his end. Wherefore a sin which is about the very + substance of man, e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g. theft; and graver still is a sin + committed directly against God, e.g. + unbelief, blasphemy, and the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin will be graver than another according as it + is about a higher or lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species from their objects, the difference of gravity + which is derived from the objects is first and foremost, as resulting from the species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the object is the matter about which an act is concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the intention + of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A3.html">Q[72], A[3]</a>, ad 2). Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A6.html">Q[72], A[6]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html"> Q[18], A[6]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that man turns unduly to some mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good, which + aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those + things to which man turns. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the objects of human acts are related to one another, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far as + they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all sins from being compared with one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q73_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q73_A4-p0.1">Whether the gravity of sins depends on the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed, + so that, to wit, the graver the sin is opposed to the greater virtue. For, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.5" target="asv"> Prov. 15:5, </a> "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength." Now, as Our Lord says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv">Mat. 5:20, </a> seqq.) abundant justice restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than murder, which less abundant justice + restrains. Therefore the least grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "virtue is about the difficult and the good": whence it seems to follow that the + greater virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, than in what + is less difficult. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>). Now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less grievous sin than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and hope. + Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10) that the "worst is opposed to the best." Now in morals the best is the greatest virtue; + and the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways: first, principally and directly; that sin, to with, which is about the same object: + because contraries are about the same thing. In this way, the more grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue: + because, just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object, so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both + sin and virtue take their species from the object, as shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html">Q[60], A[5]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q73_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html"> Q[72], A[1]</a>). Wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly opposed to the greatest virtue, as being furthest removed from it in + the same genus. Secondly, the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in respect of a certain extension of the virtue + in checking sin. For the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man from the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not + only from that sin, but also from whatever leads to it. + And thus it is evident that the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws man also from less grievous sins: even as the more + perfect health is, the more does it ward off even minor ailments. And in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the + greater virtue, on the part of the latter's effect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the opposition which consists in restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even minor + sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The greater virtue that is about a more difficult good is opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil. + For in each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will is shown to be more intent on good or evil, through not + being overcome by the difficulty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of God: hence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the hatred + of God, which is the most grievous of all sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q73_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q73_A5-p0.1">Whether carnal sins are of less guilt than spiritual sins?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt than spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft: + for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.30" target="asv">Prov. 6:30</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.32" target="asv">32</a>): "The fault is not so great when a man has stolen . . . but he that is an adulterer, for the folly of his heart shall destroy + his own soul." Now theft belongs to covetousness, which is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to lust, which is a carnal + sin. Therefore carnal sins are + of greater guilt than spiritual sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus [*The quotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31.] that "the devil + rejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry." But he rejoices more in the greater sin. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it + seems that the carnal sins are of most guilt. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic. vii, 6) that "it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger." But anger + is a spiritual sin, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17); while lust pertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more + grievous than spiritual sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 11) that carnal sins are of less guilt, but of more shame than spiritual sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt + than each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous + than carnal sins, other things being equal. Three reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the subject: + because spiritual sins belong to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and to + turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are consummated in the carnal pleasure of the appetite, to which it chiefly belongs + to turn to goods of the body; so that carnal sin, as such, denotes more a "turning to" something, and for that reason, implies + a closer cleaving; whereas spiritual sin denotes more a "turning from" something, whence the notion of guilt arises; and for + this reason it involves greater guilt. A second reason may be taken on the part of the person against whom sin is + committed: because carnal sin, as such, is against the sinner's own body, which he ought to love less, in the order of charity, + than God and his neighbor, against whom he commits spiritual sins, and consequently spiritual sins, as such, are of greater + guilt. A third reason may be taken from the motive, since the stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as we + shall state further on + <a id="FS_Q73_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. Now carnal sins have a stronger impulse, viz. our innate + concupiscence of the flesh. Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but also to the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under + the head of covetousness, as a gloss observes on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.5" target="asv"> Eph. 5:5.</a> "No fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person," etc.; so that adultery is so much more grievous than theft, as a man loves + his wife more than his chattels. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of lust, because it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with difficulty + be withdrawn from it. "For the desire of pleasure is insatiable," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher himself says (Ethic. vii, 6), the reason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger, + is that lust partakes less of reason; and in the same sense he says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "sins of intemperance are most worthy + of reproach, because they are about those pleasures which are common to us and irrational minds": hence, by these sins man + is, so to speak, brutalized; for which same reason Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, + 17) that they are more shameful. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q73_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q73_A6-p0.1">Whether the gravity of a sin depends on its cause?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on its cause. Because the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly + it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist; + for it denotes weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that is due to weakness is deemed less grievous. + Therefore sin does not derive its gravity from its cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin; wherefore a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.7" target="asv"> Rom. 7:7, </a> "For I had not known concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils." Now + the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome, the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished + by the greatness of its cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin. + Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: so much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether + excused from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased + by the greatness of its cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> If the cause be increased, the effect is increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous the sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, + and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its fruit, as a gloss observes on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv"> Mat. 7:18, </a> "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit": and the greater this cause is, the more grievous will the sin be, since the + greater the will to sin, the more grievously does man sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p7"> The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these + causes we must make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will: such + is the end, which is the proper object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more grievous, because a man sins + more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will + to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with + the judgment of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g. ignorance), or which weaken the free + movement of the will, (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its + voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause diminishes + the sin, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If concupiscence be understood to include the movement of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is + a greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater + concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins, + being stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous + temptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment + of reason, and the movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the graver the sin: because sometimes the movement + of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q73_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q73_A7-p0.1">Whether a circumstance aggravates a sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circumstance + does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil, + it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance nowise aggravates a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away (from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part of the + object to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin's malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin: for he who sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven + (Ethic. iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circumstance aggravated a sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin + more grievous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of virtue (Ethic. ii, 1,2), "it is natural for a thing to be increased by that + which causes it." Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs + from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his action. Wherefore it is evident that it + is natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in + three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication is the intercourse of + a man with one who is not his wife: but if to this be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin + is drawn to another kind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps another's property; and in this respect adultery is + a more grievous sin than fornication. Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus, but + only by multiplying the ratio of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give, + he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason + his sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox. + iii) that "in taking his father's life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who + educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his position in the republic." Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin + by adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance: thus, taking another's property constitutes the + sin of theft; but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another's property, the sin will be more grievous; + although in itself, to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A10.html">Q[18], A[10]</a>). Nevertheless a circumstance which does not give the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a thing + is weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is measured, + not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circumstance. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin's species; + because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate + a sin in relation to the malice of another circumstance. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason should direct the action not only as regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may + turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one + ought not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside + from the rule of reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man + ought to be united by right reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q73_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q73_A8-p0.1">Whether sin is aggravated by reason of its causing more harm?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent + to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A5.html">Q[20], A[5]</a>). Therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor. Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.35.6" target="asv">Job 35:6</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.35.8" target="asv">8</a>: "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee." + If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous + than sins against God or oneself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; + because the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man ought to despise his natural life lest he lose + the life of grace. Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace + by leading her into mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its + causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is + evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): "Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it diminishes + the integrity of nature." Now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as + it does more harm. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when + a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates + the sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin. Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; + for instance, when a man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he + knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case + again the quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will + being strongly inclined to sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another, a harm which he would not + wish simply. Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is connected with the sin + accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue, + a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follow directly + from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is directly + consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if a man is a notorious + fornicator, the result is that many are scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen + by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p7"> But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected + with the sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor does it correspond with the gravity + of the sin: for instance, if a man in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, this harm is directly + consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not + make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has + heard nothing about the pains of hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a sin of theft: but + his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a believer, + who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire + to + sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have already stated ( + <a id="FS_Q73_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A5.html">Q[20], A[5]</a>), in treating of the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action if foreseen and intended adds to the + goodness and malice of an act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is inordinateness + which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the + act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such + sins are the most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to + be found against which man commits against God, and in some which he commits against himself. Moreover we might say that although + no man can do God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things concerning Him, e.g. by destroying faith, + by outraging holy things, which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm on himself, + as in the case of suicide, though this be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery from some + anxiety. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument does not prove, for two reasons: first, because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors; + whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not to harm but pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and + sufficient cause of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient cause of another's spiritual death, because + no man dies spiritually except by sinning of his own will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A8-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q73_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q73_A9-p0.1">Whether a sin is aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this + were the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate + a sin: because a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the wrong done him, than others, who, through + being scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against + whom a sin is committed does not aggravate the sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin, + because, as Cicero says (Paradox. iii): "The man who kills his slave sins once: he that takes his father's life sins many + times." But the kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin, because every man is most akin to + himself; and yet it is less grievous to harm oneself than another, e.g. to kill one's own, than + another's horse, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore kinship of the person sinned against does not aggravate + the sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.7" target="asv"> Wis. 6:7</a>: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented," and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47</a>: "The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Therefore, in + like manner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of his position + and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a + poor man, since "there is no respect of persons with God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Col.3.25" target="asv">Col. 3:25</a>), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does + not aggravate the sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 19:14</a>): "They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets with the sword." Moreover much blame is attached to the sin + committed by a man against those who are akin to him, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Mic.7.6" target="asv"> Micah 7:6</a>: "the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her mother." Furthermore + sins committed against persons of rank are expressly condemned: thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Job.34.18" target="asv">Job 34:18</a>): "Who saith to the king: 'Thou art an apostate'; who calleth rulers ungodly." Therefore the condition of the person sinned + against aggravates the sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above + <a id="FS_Q73_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A3.html">(A[3])</a> that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more grave, as its + object is a more principal end. But the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his neighbor: for whatever + we do, it is on account of one of these that we do it; although one of them is subordinate + to the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in respect of the person sinned against, may be considered + on the part of these three. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p7"> First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as he is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that + an injury inflicted on such a person redounds on to God according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.2.8" target="asv"> Zech. 2:8</a>: "He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye." Wherefore a sin is the more grievous, according as it is committed + against a person more closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official station. On the part of man himself, + it is evident + that he sins all the more grievously, according as the person against whom he sins, is more united to him, either through + natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and, + for this very reason, sins all the more grievously, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.14.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 14:5</a>: "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" On the part of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously, according + as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin + committed against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous + than a sin committed against a private person; hence it is expressly prohibited ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.28" target="asv">Ex. 22:28</a>): "The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse." In like manner it would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence, + is all the more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would cause among many people. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that + the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for instance his + possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does it of his own will; but in those things + that are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury + on oneself: for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since, + however, things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the dominion of our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect + of injuries done to such like things, that it is less grievous to sin in their regard, unless indeed our neighbor be willing, + or give his approval. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no respect for persons if God punishes more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this is + done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A9-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q73_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q73_A10-p0.1">Whether the excellence of the person sinning aggravates the sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving + to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.25.13" target="asv"> Ecclus. 25:13</a>: "How great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord." Now the more a man + cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to him: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iiChr.30.18" target="asv">2 Paral. 30: 18,19</a>): "The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all + them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not + sanctified." Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "there is no respect of persons with God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.11" target="asv">Rom. 2:11</a>). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for one and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by + the excellence of the person sinning. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his + goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 18): "A sin is deemed so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more excellent + person." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares on account of the weakness of human nature: and such like sins are + less imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in checking those sins, which nevertheless human + weakness does not allow us to escape altogether. But there are other sins which proceed from deliberation: and these sins + are all the more imputed to man according as he is more excellent. Four reasons may be assigned + for this. First, because a more excellent person, e.g. one who excels in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin; + hence Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv">Lk. 12:47</a>) that the "servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Secondly, + on account of ingratitude, because every good in which a man excels, is a gift of God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins: + and in this respect any excellence, even in temporal goods, aggravates a + sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.7" target="asv"> Wis. 6:7</a>: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented." Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being specially inconsistent with the excellence + of the person sinning: for instance, if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he is set up as the guardian of justice, + or if a priest were to be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity. Fourthly, on account of the example or scandal; + because, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 2): "Sin becomes much more + scandalous, when the sinner is honored for his position": and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men are wont + to bear them with more indignation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted alludes to those things which are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their + sin, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q73_A10-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q72_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q74" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q74-p0.1">OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q74-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74-p2"> We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q74-p3"> (1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q74-p4"> (2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q74-p5"> (3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q74-p6"> (4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q74-p7"> (5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q74-p8"> (6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected in the higher reason?</p> + <p id="FS_Q74-p9"> (7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the higher reason?</p> + <p id="FS_Q74-p10"> (8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q74-p11"> (9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q74-p12"> (10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to its proper object?</p> + <div id="FS_Q74_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q74_A1-p0.1">Whether the will is a subject of sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will + and the intention." But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does + not sin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good, points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than + in the will. Therefore sin is nowise in the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient cause of sin: because "the efficient and the material cause + do not coincide" (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient cause of sin: because the first cause of sinning is the + will, as Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the subject of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will that we sin, and live righteously." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is an act, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">Q[71], AA[1]</a>,6). Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g. "to cut" and "to burn": and such acts have for their matter and subject, + the thing into which the action passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18) that "movement is the act of the + thing moved, caused by a mover." On the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the + agent, e.g. "to + desire" and "to know": and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin must + needs be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated + above ( + <a id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a> ; + <a id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html"> Q[18], A[6]</a>), it follows that the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the + principle of sins. Therefore it follows that + sin is in the will as its subject. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is said to be outside the will, because the will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is + an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense is in the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the defect in the apprehensive power were nowise subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in + the apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance is invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in + the apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also is deemed a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument applies to those efficient causes whose actions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves, + but move other things; the contrary of which is to be observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q74_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q74_A2-p0.1">Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin. For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that "no one sins except + by the will." Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and evil pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore + the will alone is the subject of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.], "so + true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now the acts of the other powers + are not voluntary, except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this suffice for them to be the subject + of sin, because then even the external members of the body, which are moved by the will, + would be a subject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are about one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are + the subject of virtues, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q74_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56.html">Q[56])</a>. Therefore the will is not the only subject of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above + <a id="FS_Q74_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, whatever is the a principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts are not only those which are elicited + by the will, but also those which are commanded by the will, as we stated above (Q[6], A[4]) in treating of voluntariness. + Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained + from their acts, by the will; and + these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to the same subject. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils, by + reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The members of the body are not principles but merely organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which moves + them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason + as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in Polit. i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the external + members are actions that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow + that is inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q74_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q74_A3-p0.1">Whether there can be sin in the sensuality?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions. + Now sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the sensuality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "no man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the movement + of the sensuality from being inordinate, since "the sensuality ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; + wherefore it is signified by the serpent," as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate movement + of the sensuality is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed to him as a sin. Now "that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which + we do with the deliberation of reason," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality, + which is without the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q74_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv">Rom. 7:19</a>): "The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": which words Augustine explains (Contra Julian. + iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensuality. + Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q74_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), sin may be found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the nature of sin. Now it is + evident that the act of the sensuality, or sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will. Wherefore it + follows that sin can be in the sensuality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although some of the powers of the sensitive part are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have + a certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as + we have the powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q74_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A4.html">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>. In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain + excellence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can be the principle of a voluntary + action, and, consequently, the subject of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The continual corruption of the sensuality is to be understood as referring to the "fomes," which is never completely destroyed + in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes, its effect remains. However, this corruption of the "fomes" + does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, for + instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his + thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements + of concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated + movement of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the aforesaid corruption: + but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does nothing + therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but + is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, + which is something imperfect in the genus of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q74_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q74_A4-p0.1">Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality. Because an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to + commit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality + can be a mortal sin, so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be in the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of + the irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Therefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about + the same subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial + sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), mortal sin can be there also. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): "The inordinate movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can even + be in those who are in a state of grace," in whom, however, mortal sin is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement + of the sensuality is not a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the body's life causes the body's death, so too a disorder which destroys + the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes spiritual death, which is mortal sin, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q74_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html">Q[72], A[5]</a>). Now it belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order anything to the end: and disorder in respect of + the end can only belong to the power whose function it is to + order others to the end. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its being + an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal + sin is imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it is an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an + act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice: + wherefore the act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an act of prudence, which + perfects the rational power; and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A disposition may be related in three ways to that to which it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the + same subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect science: sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the + same thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, + as in those things which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can + arrive at one through the other, e.g. goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science which is in the intellect. In + this way the venial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q74_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q74_A5-p0.1">Whether sin can be in the reason?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason + is not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot + be in the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q74_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no sin except about things which are under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not + among those things which are under our control: since by nature some are mentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore + no sin is in the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin is in the lower and in the higher reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we have clearly shown ( + <a id="FS_Q74_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2,3). Now reason has a twofold act: one is its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the act of knowing + the truth; the other is the act of reason as directing the other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the + reason. First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which error is imputed to the reason as a sin, when + it is in ignorance or error about what it is able and ought to know: secondly, when it either commands the inordinate movements + of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to check them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the defect in the proper act of the reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to the + case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a + sin, and excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen. If, however, the defect of reason be about + something which a man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, + and the defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other powers, is always + imputed to reason as a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its proper act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q74_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A1.html">Q[17], A[1]</a>), when we were treating of the acts of the will and reason, the will moves and precedes the reason, in one way, and the reason + moves and precedes the will in another: so that both the movement of the will can be called rational, and the act of the reason, + voluntary. Accordingly sin is found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the reason, or through the reason + being the + principle of the will's act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p9"> The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said (ad 1).</p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q74_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q74_A6-p0.1">Whether the sin of morose delectation is in the reason?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive + power, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q74_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">Q[31], A[1]</a>). But the appetitive power is distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore morose delectation is not + in the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object. + Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose + delectation is not in the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin 'mora'---delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time + is no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore morose delectation does not belong to the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "if the consent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of + the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit." Now "the woman" denotes + the lower reason, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated + <a id="FS_Q74_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, sin may be in the reason, not only in respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its directing human actions. + Now it is evident that reason directs not only external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the reason fails + in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. + Now it fails, in two ways, in directing + internal passions: first, when it commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately provokes himself to a + movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man, + having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell [immoratur] + upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in + accordance with what has been stated above + <a id="FS_Q74_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, viz. that actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their principles. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower + powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction + of reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells [immoratur] thereon, + and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched + the mind," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q74_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q74_A7-p0.1">Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, + as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q74_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q15_A1.html">Q[15], A[1]</a>): whereas the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, + 7). [*'Rationes aeternae,' cf. + <a id="FS_Q74_A7-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html">FP, Q[15], AA[2]</a>,[3] where as in similar passages 'ratio' has been rendered by the English 'type,' because St. Thomas was speaking of the + Divine 'idea' as the archetype of the creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified with the eternal + law, (cf. A[8], + OBJ[1]; A[9])]. But sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since man does not always think + about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as man can regulate his external actions according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures + or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as Augustine + states (De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds + to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, + he moves his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher + reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses, + so far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its consummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has + offered the forbidden fruit to her husband." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and delivers + its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now + we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see + that in speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by + referring it to the first principles; since, so long as there remains a yet higher principle, the question can yet be submitted + to it: wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that + human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the created things that man knows naturally; + and further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q74_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>). + Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment + is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced + on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts, the action itself comes last, + and the delectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent to an action + belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the lower + reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever + is subject to the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court, but not conversely. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging, + as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q74_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q15_A3.html">Q[15], A[3]</a>). Because the fact that the consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which + the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The higher reason is said to consent, from the very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine law, + whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it + neglects it by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always proceeds from the higher reason: because, + as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12), "the mind cannot effectively decide on the + commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to action, or of restraining + them from action, it become the servant or slave of the evil deed." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct + or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while + deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of this delectation: and then the consent + to the delectation belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the + eternal law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher + or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which + the higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly + by imputed to it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A7-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q74_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q74_A8-p0.1">Whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which + does not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently does not turn away from them. Now every mortal + sin consists in turning away from Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above ( + <a id="FS_Q74_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything being + such is yet more so," or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than + his consent. But delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin. Therefore neither is the consent to + the delectation a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice, according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states + (Ethic. x, 3,5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation + consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward + thought differs from the outward deed; and consequently there is a like difference + of consent on either hand. But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought: and therefore neither + is the consent to the delectation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found + also in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the act itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does + not, for this reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems not to sin mortally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation + resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from + the thought of fornication. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii). + Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by means of the Lord's Prayer: for he says (De Trin. + xii, 12) that "this sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed: wherefore we ought to ask pardon + for such thoughts also, and we should strike our breasts and say: 'Forgive us our + trespasses.'" Therefore consent to delectation is a venial sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine adds after a few words: "Man will be altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be forgiven + those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them." + But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to delectation is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There have been various opinions on this point, for some have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but only + a venial sin, while others have held it to be a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common and more probable. For we must + take note that since every delectation results from some action, as stated in Ethic. x, 4, and again, that since every delectation + may be compared to two things, viz. to the operation from which it results, and to + the object in which a person takes delight. Now it happens that an action, just as a thing, is an object of delectation, because + the action itself can be considered as a good and an end, in which the person who delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action + itself, which results in delectation, is the object of delectation, in so far as the appetitive power, to which it belongs + to take delight in anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a good: for instance, when a man thinks and + delights in his thought, in so far as his thought pleases him; while at other times the delight consequent to an action, e.g. + a thought, has for its object another action, as being the object of his thought; and then his thought proceeds from the inclination + of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to the action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of fornication, + may delight in either of two things: first, in the thought itself, secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the + delectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the appetite to the thought; and the thought itself is not + in itself a mortal sin; sometimes indeed it is only a venial sin, as when a man thinks of such a thing for no purpose; and + sometimes it is no sin at all, as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he may wish to preach or dispute + about it. Consequently such affection or delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a mortal sin in virtue + of + its genus, but is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all: wherefore neither is it a mortal sin to consent to such + a thought. In this sense the first opinion is true. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p10"> But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to this + act. Wherefore the fact that a man consents to such a delectation, amounts to nothing less than a consent to the inclination + of his appetite to fornication: for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with his appetite. Now it + is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself a mortal sin. + Wherefore such a consent to delectation in a mortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion maintains. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consent to delectation may be not only in the lower reason, but also in the higher reason, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q74_A8-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Nevertheless the lower reason may turn away from the eternal types, for, though it is not intent on them, as regulating + according to them, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on them, as being regulated according to them: + and by turning from them in this sense, it may sin mortally; since even + the acts of the lower powers and of the external members may be mortal sins, in so far as the direction of the higher reason + fails in directing them according to the eternal types. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is itself a venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to + take pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial sin. But delectation in the act itself of fornication is, + in its genus, a mortal sin: and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given, is accidental, viz. on account of the + incompleteness of the act: which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent + has been given, so that therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the delectation which has the thought for its object. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The delectation which has an external act for its object, cannot be without complacency in the external act as such, even + though there be no decision to fulfil it, on account of the prohibition of some higher authority: wherefore the act is inordinate, + and consequently the delectation will be inordinate also. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The consent to delectation, resulting from complacency in an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also: but not the + consent to delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of murder. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The Lord's Prayer is to be said in order that we may be preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p17"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A8-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q74_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q74_A9-p0.1">Whether there can be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers, i.e. as consenting to a + sinful act. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7) that the "higher reason is intent on considering and consulting the eternal + law." But mortal sin consists in turning away from the eternal law. Therefore it seems that there can be no other than mortal + sin in the higher reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher reason is the principle of the spiritual life, as the heart is of the body's life. But the diseases of + the heart are deadly. Therefore the sins of the higher reason are mortal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt. But it would seem impossible to commit even a venial + sin, deliberately, without contempt. Since then the consent of the higher reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration + of the eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, on account of the contempt of the Divine law. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q74_A9-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. But consent to an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial sin can be in the higher reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7), the higher reason "is intent on contemplating or consulting the eternal law"; it contemplates + it by considering its truth; it consults it by judging and directing other things according to it: and to this pertains the + fact that by deliberating through the eternal types, it consents to an act or dissents from it. Now it may happen that the + inordinateness of the act to which it consents, is not contrary to the eternal law, + in the same way as mortal sin is, because it does not imply aversion from the last end, but is beside that law, as an act + of venial sin is. Therefore when the higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin, it does not turn away from the eternal + law: wherefore it sins, not mortally, but venially. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Disease of the heart is twofold: one which is in the very substance of the heart, and affects its natural consistency, and + such a disease is always mortal: the other is a disease of the heart consisting in some disorder either of the movement or + of the parts surrounding the heart, and such a disease is not always mortal. In like manner there is mortal sin in the higher + reason whenever the order itself of the higher reason to its proper object which is + the eternal law, is destroyed; but when the disorder leaves this untouched, the sin is not mortal but venial. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the + Divine law. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A9-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q74_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q74_A10-p0.1">Whether venial sin can be in the higher reason as such?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of + a power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher + reason is the eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without mortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial + sin in the higher reason as such. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate + movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason + as such. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin, + through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; + just as when the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, considers that it is contrary to the law of God, + it sins more grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is contrary to + moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement + that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly + false. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a venial + sin in the higher reason as such. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason. + For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so + it does not regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself + a mortal sin; and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of + the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p7"> With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple "intuition," and "deliberation," in respect of which it again + consults the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of simple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about + Divine things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, + yet a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be contrary to the + law of God. Now it is possible for one of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other + aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God, is consulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, when + a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he had thus apprehended + it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine + law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements, + the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin + mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to the lower powers, it always sins mortally, in things + which are mortal sins in their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the incompleteness + of a sudden action, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In matters of action, the simple intuition of the principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as + well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions: + consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One and the same thing may be the subject of different considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus the existence + of God may be considered, either as possible to be known by the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, + which is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, + yet it is reducible to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that + which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into + the light of a higher consideration, as was explained above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q74_A10-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q73_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q75" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q75-p0.1">OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3> + <p id="FS_Q75-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q75-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in particular. Under the first head there are four points of + inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75-p3"> (1) Whether sin has a cause?</p> + <p id="FS_Q75-p4"> (2) Whether it has an internal cause?</p> + <p id="FS_Q75-p5"> (3) Whether it has an external cause?</p> + <p id="FS_Q75-p6"> (4) Whether one sin is the cause of another?</p> + <div id="FS_Q75_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q75_A1-p0.1">Whether sin has a cause?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the nature of evil, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q75_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">Q[71], A[6]</a>). But evil has no cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a cause is that from which something follows of necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for + every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, + for "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv">Mat. 7:18</a>). Likewise neither can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt + is the same as sin. Therefore sin has no cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.6" target="asv">Job 5:6</a>, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause." But sin is something done; since it a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the + law of God." Therefore sin has a cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, + so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause. Now two causes may + be assigned to a negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e. the negation of the cause itself, + is the cause of the negation in itself; since the result of the removing the cause is the + removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In the second place, the cause of an affirmation, + of which a negation is a sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by causing heat in virtue of + its principal tendency, consequently causes a privation of cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple negation. But, + since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought + naturally to have, such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought + to be in a thing, is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say that evil, + which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause + is reducible to the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental efficient cause, and + on + the part of the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act. + Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good, + causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order + in the act results from the lack of direction in the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the subject + of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this evil has a cause, has been explained. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not + impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, + on account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all things happen of necessity, as is proved in Metaph. + vi, text. 5. Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that + this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact + of not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of + guilt, before it is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of the first sin, but some good lacking + some other good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q75_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q75_A2-p0.1">Whether sin has an internal cause?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an internal + cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of + sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is within man is either natural or voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for + sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3; iv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate, + is already a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11; Retract. i, 9) that "the will is the cause of sin." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q75_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q75_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the direct cause of sin must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a twofold internal cause of human + acts, one remote, the other proximate. The proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will, in respect of + which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite. + For just as it is due to the judgment of + reason, that the will is moved to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of the senses that the + sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall explain + further on (Q[77], A[1]). Accordingly a double interior cause of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the part of the reason + and will; and the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p7"> But since we have said above (A[1], ad 3) that the cause of sin is some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, + viz. the rule of reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent good, appertains to the apprehension of the senses + and to the appetite; while the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is to consider this rule; and + the completeness of the voluntary sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the + conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is within a thing as its natural power, is always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal act of the + appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made + actual by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is + because a thing is proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is + inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so that the will produces the act of sin. Since therefore + the movements that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually sinning. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not true that all the internal acts belong to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the + will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which causes sin, as a power produces its act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which + sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being + unnatural from the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with his nature, ought to observe. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q75_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q75_A3-p0.1">Whether sin has an external cause?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are + within us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will. Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal + cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, + sin can arise from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements + to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed to him as a sin. Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.21.16" target="asv">Num. 21:16</a>): "Are not these they, that deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you transgress against the + Lord by the sin of Phogor?" Therefore something external can be a cause of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q75_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q75_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the internal cause of sin is both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as lacking the due rule, and the + appetite, as inclining to sin. Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the + will itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (Q[9], A[6]; Q[10], + A[4]), none can move the will inwardly + save God alone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (Q[79], A[1]). Hence it follows that nothing external + can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite, + as certain external sensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the reason, of necessity, in matters of action, + nor do things proposed externally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be disposed thereto + in a certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore something external + can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient completive + cause of sin being accomplished. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the very fact that the external motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that + it remains in our power to sin or not to sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause of + sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful + act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on + the act being voluntary and in our power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q75_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q75_A4-p0.1">Whether one sin is a cause of another?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another. For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with + one sin causing another. Because the end has the character of good; which is inconsistent with sin, which has the character + of evil. In like manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since "evil is not an efficient cause, but is weak and powerless," + as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause seems to have + no place except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a + formal cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing," as stated in Meteor. iv, 2 [*Cf. De Anima ii.]. But sin is essentially + something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus + we go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause of another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): "A sin is not quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of sin." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the + same way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one sin may be the cause of another in respect of + the four kinds of causes. First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, + as that which removes an impediment is called an indirect cause of movement: for when man, + by one sinful act, loses grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him from sin, he thereby falls into + another sin, so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the second. Directly, as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed + to commit more readily another like act: because acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after + the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares the + matter for strife, which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together. Thirdly, after the manner of a final cause, + one sin causes another, in so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a man is guilty + of simony for the end of ambition, or fornication for the purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form to moral matters, + as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q75_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q75_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6), it follows that one sin is + also the formal cause of another: because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft, the former is material + while the latter is formal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least + apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of + another sin. A sin has matter, not "of which" but "about which" it is: and it has its form from its end. Consequently one + sin can be the cause of another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated + above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act + it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so there is no need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin which is + not caused by another sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q75_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q74_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q76" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q76-p0.1">OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q76-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q76-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) + sins which are the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above + <a id="FS_Q76-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q76_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of + sin on the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; + thirdly, of malice, which is the cause of sin on the part of the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76-p3"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q76-p4"> (1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q76-p5"> (2) Whether ignorance is a sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q76-p6"> (3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether?</p> + <p id="FS_Q76-p7"> (4) Whether it diminishes sin?</p> + <div id="FS_Q76_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q76_A1-p0.1">Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin: because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is + a non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin being a "turning to" something, as was stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q76_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q75_A1.html">Q[75], A[1]</a>). Now ignorance seems to savor of "turning away" from something. Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the + good apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) "that some sin through ignorance." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a moving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one that + moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things. An indirect cause, is either one that + removes an impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in this way that ignorance can be the cause of a + sinful act; because it is a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act + of sin, in so far as it directs human acts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p7"> Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: + because in conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or + of choice, or an operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a singular + proposition. But a singular proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except through the medium of + a particular proposition: thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one's + father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle + which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not + every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful + act. Consequently if a man's will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, even though he + recognized his father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is concomitant with + the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not "through ignorance" but "in ignorance," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything: but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an impediment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, regards sin as turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this respect + of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in another, + the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing + is a man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q76_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q76_A2-p0.1">Whether ignorance is a sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is "a word, deed or desire contrary to God's law," as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q76_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html">Q[71], A[5]</a>). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment resulting + from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary, + it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will, rather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will + not be a sin, but rather a result of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain + in act. Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all its guilt being removed by repentance. Therefore + ignorance is not a sin, unless perchance it be original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual + in the one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be continually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance + would be a most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance deserves punishment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.38" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:38</a>: "If any man know not, he shall not be known." Therefore ignorance is a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge + about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). + On the other hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of knowledge of those things that one has a natural + aptitude to know. Some of these we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without + the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly. Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles + of faith, and the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know matters regarding his duty or state. + Meanwhile there are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to know them, such as + the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that whoever neglects + to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one + is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently + ignorance of such like things is called "invincible," because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason such like ignorance, + not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no + invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; + but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q76_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">Q[71], A[6]</a>, ad 1), when we say that sin is a "word, deed or desire," we include the opposite negations, by reason of which omissions + have the character of sin; so that negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the above definition of sin; + in so far as one omits to say what one ought, or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to acquire the + knowledge which we ought to + have. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although privation of grace is not a sin in itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it may have + the character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even here there is a difference, since man can acquire knowledge by + his acts, whereas grace is not acquired by acts, but by God's favor. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin consists not only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed, which is + commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the act of the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as + it is in some way voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of consideration is a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although when the guilt has passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of knowledge, + nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the ignorance is said to be a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Just as in other sins of omission, man sins actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, so is + it with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring + the knowledge that he ought to have. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q76_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q76_A3-p0.1">Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether. For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is voluntary. + Now ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q76_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A8.html">Q[6], A[8]</a>). Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown. + Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human acts. But what is accidental does not give the species. + Therefore nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed sinful or virtuous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which + perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that "some things done through ignorance are rightly reproved." Now those things alone + are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether + excuse from sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated ( + <a id="FS_Q76_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q76_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2) that ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge + were to hand, would be contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. If, however, the knowledge, which + is removed by ignorance, would not have prevented the act, on account of + the inclination of the will thereto, the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not willing, as stated + in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it does not make + the act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not cause, but follows or + accompanies the sinful act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p7"> On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses + from sin, because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin, and this for two reasons. + First, on the part of the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in so far as something is not known + to be a sin. Now it may happen that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which + circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge + is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man + (which suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father, (which is a circumstance constituting + another species of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike him back, and + that if he had known this, he would not have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though + this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has knowledge of the sin. + Secondly, this may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly, + as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when + a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For + such like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and able + to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely + involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance + excuses from sin altogether. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q76_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A8.html">Q[6], A[8]</a>). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his + sin is not accidental. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with madmen + and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q76_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q76_A4-p0.1">Whether ignorance diminishes a sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance + is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that "every evil man is ignorant." Therefore ignorance does + not diminish sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q76_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q76_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it does not diminish a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.4" target="asv"> Rom. 2:4, </a> "Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?" says: "Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not." + Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which + removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher + says (Ethic. iii, 5) that the "punishment is doubled for a drunken man." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven, diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.13" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:13</a>: "I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly." Therefore ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not + render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether + (through making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance + which is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, + neither diminishes nor increases the sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p8"> Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does + not excuse from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary, + as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more + voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the + hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being + committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, + the result being that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk + and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing is not + known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case + there is less contempt, and therefore less sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ignorance whereby "every evil man is ignorant," is not the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from + that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One sin is added to another makes more sins, but it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do + not coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same + gravity as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if committed by a man when sober, than if committed + by a man when drunk, although in the latter case there are two sins: because + drunkenness diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species + of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they + may be an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation of the spiritual edifice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The drunken man deserves a "double punishment" for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results + from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, + and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above (ad 2). It might also be said that the words + quoted refer to an ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered + drunkards to be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to the indulgence which the drunkard might + claim, but to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q76_A4-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q75_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q77" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q77-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q77-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be + a cause of sin: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77-p3"> (1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the will?</p> + <p id="FS_Q77-p4"> (2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge?</p> + <p id="FS_Q77-p5"> (3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?</p> + <p id="FS_Q77-p6"> (4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q77-p7"> (5) Of three causes mentioned in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>: "Concupiscence of the eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh," and "Pride of life." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77-p8"> (6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?</p> + <p id="FS_Q77-p9"> (7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?</p> + <p id="FS_Q77-p10"> (8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?</p> + <div id="FS_Q77_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q77_A1-p0.1">Whether the will is moved by a passion of the senstive appetite?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by + its object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of + the appetitive power in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object of the will is not a passion of the sensitive + appetite, but good defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive + appetite does not move the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational + appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. + 57) that "the rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another." + Therefore the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does + not use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite + is a material force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move + the intellective appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.56" target="asv">Dan. 13:56</a>): "Lust hath perverted thy heart." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways. + First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows + of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its + act, both because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the + contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several; and because, in the operations of + the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another. + In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of any passion whatever, + the proper movement of the rational appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p7"> Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and + apprehension of reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of + the estimative power, as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination + and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of + the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do + not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason + often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it also, since it has a + natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in + the judgment about the object of the will, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p10"> The Third Objection is solved in like manner.</p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q77_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q77_A2-p0.1">Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by + the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a + passion, which is weak and soon passes away. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which + is really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, + but not really, it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of + the reason. Therefore a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about + a particular matter---on the contrary, if a universal and a particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, + e.g. "Every man," and "Not every man." Now if two opinions contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as stated + in Peri Herm. ii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were + to pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who + knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear + from Poster. i, text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that "no fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition + to contain, for example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of + fornication." Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words express the thoughts of the mind." Now it often happens that + man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he + has knowledge, even in particular. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p7"> Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for + it to have universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin." Now the law + that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a passion, + it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion; wherefore + he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, + since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear + good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, + unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv">Prov. 14:22</a>): "They err that work evil." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p10"> Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, + according to the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47</a>: "The servant who knew that the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes," and of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.17" target="asv"> James 4:17</a>: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Consequently he was not altogether right, and + it is necessary, with the + Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction. Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge, + viz. universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, as + stated above (Q[76], A[1]). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, + and yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will + not to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known + habitually from not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general + but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does not seem difficult for + a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in particular what + he + knows habitually, may happen through mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not attend to the + consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually + what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity; + and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, in so far + as the passions hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of distraction, as explained + above + <a id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, + by way of bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; + even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body, + fetters the use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that sometimes, when the passions + are very intense, man loses the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through excess of love or + anger. It is in this way that passion draws the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge, + since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal + knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that something appears good in particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion: and yet this + particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at + the same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has + true habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a false opinion about a particular negative: + because an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to + draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws + his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, + two particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, e.g. + No fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and + hinders it from arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the passions lasts, the reason argues and + concludes under the second. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to judge, + his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do + so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in Ethic. vii, 3. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p16"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A2-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q77_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q77_A3-p0.1">Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of weakness?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sin committed through passion should not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement + of the sensitive appetite, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q77_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now vehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore a sin committed through passion, should + not be called a sin of weakness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.77.39" target="asv">Ps. 77:39</a>): "He remembered that they are flesh." Therefore sins of weakness should be those which result from bodily defects, rather + than those which are due to a passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will, + whether he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.7" target="asv">Gn. 4:7</a>: "Thy appetite shall be under thee [*Vulg.: 'The lust thereof shall be under thee.'], and thou shalt have dominion over it." + Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease. Therefore + a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of weakness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way + of likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body is said to be weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution + of its proper action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so that the humors and members of the human body cease to + be subject to its governing and motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when + it cannot do the work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see clearly, as the Philosopher states (De + Hist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account + of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply with the order + of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for + the reason is the ruling power of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by + any passion contrary to the order of reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid manner to the due + action of man, it is said to be a sin of weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the incontinent man to an + epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary to his intention. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger + the movement of passion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body may + have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q77_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of soul + is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the + passions of the soul arise in us through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is in the will's power to give or refuse its consent to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our + appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered in the way already explained + <a id="FS_Q77_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q77_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q77_A4-p0.1">Whether self-love is the source of every sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper + cause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.18" target="asv">Lev. 19:18</a>). Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.8" target="asv">Rom. 7:8</a>): "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence"; on which words a gloss says that "the + law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils," the reason for which is that concupiscence is the cause + of every sin. Now concupiscence is a distinct passion from love, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html"> Q[23], A[4]</a>). + Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine in commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.79.17" target="asv"> Ps. 79:17, </a> "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing + false humility." Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor. + Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "self-love, amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of Babylon." Now every + sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of every sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q77_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q75_A1.html">Q[75], A[1]</a>), the proper and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a mutable good; in which respect + every sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal good + inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him. Therefore + it is evident that inordinate love of + self is the cause of every sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate self-love, + leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) reckons to be the cause of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is said to love both the good he desires for himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is directed + to the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance + of evil: for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But + each of these is reduced to self-love, since it is through loving himself that man + either desires good things, or avoids evil things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix): wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems to be committed + through self-love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q77_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q77_A5-p0.1">Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life are fittingly described as causes of sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly described as + causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>), "covetousness [*Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of all evils." Now pride of life is not included in covetousness. + Therefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.56" target="asv"> Dan. 13:56</a>: "Beauty hath deceived thee." Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with concupiscence of the flesh. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q77_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q30_A2.html">Q[30], A[2]</a>). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore "concupiscence of + the hearing" and of the other senses should also have been mentioned. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance + of evil things, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). But nothing is mentioned here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the + causes of sin are insufficiently described. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>): "All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] pride of life." Now a thing is said to be "in + the world" by reason of sin: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.19" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:19</a>): "The whole world is seated in wickedness." Therefore these three are causes of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q77_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, inordinate self-love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of good: for a man desires good + for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways, + the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as + it is the object of the concupiscible part; + secondly, under the aspect of difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible part, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]). + Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated above (Q[30], A[3]). One is natural, and is directed to those things which sustain + the nature of the body, whether as regards the preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, or as regards + the preservation of the species, such as sexual matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is called + "concupiscence of the flesh." The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation + or pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar + mode of perception; such are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual concupiscence is called "concupiscence of the + eyes," whether this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote + curiosity according to Augustine's exposition (Confess. x); or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly + to the eyes, so as to denote covetousness, according to the explanation of others. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p8"> The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of life"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, + as we shall state further on (Q[84], A[2]; + <a id="FS_Q77_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q162_A1.html">SS, Q[162], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p9"> It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can be reduced to these three: since all the passions of + the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to the third, which is not divided + into two because all the irascible passions conform to spiritual concupiscence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Pride of life" is included in covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good. How + covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of "avarice," is the root of all sins, shall be explained further + on ( + <a id="FS_Q77_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html">Q[84], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean here the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but only for + such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in Metaph. i: and so its + name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm. + xxxiii). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q77_A5-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q77_A5-p13.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q39_A2.html"> Q[39], A[2]</a>); and so those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately + the avoidance of evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p14"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A5-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q77_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q77_A6-p0.1">Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing + causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause of sin, as stated + <a id="FS_Q77_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Therefore the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin, but increases it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases + merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil + passion also increases rather than diminishes a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels + the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore passion aggravates a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the + less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement + of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, + according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or will, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q77_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2; Q[10], A[3]); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the + higher powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a + passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p7"> Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so + far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control, through the reason and will: and + therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a passion, the more + is it voluntary and under our control. In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its + voluntariness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p8"> On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, + in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater the pleasure + or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, the greater the sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the part + of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his turning to something else---accidentally, i.e. beside his + intention. Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its direct cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A good passion consequent to the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well, + rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his + action. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the movement of the will incited by the passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own movement, + as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q77_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q77_A7-p0.1">Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether. For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin altogether. + But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes an act to be involuntary, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.17" target="asv"> Gal. 5:17</a>: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you would." Therefore passion excuses from + sin altogether. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a particular matter, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q77_A7-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[76], A[3]). But ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above (Q[6], A[8]). Therefore passion + excuses from sin altogether. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the + case of mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) speaks of the passions as "passions of sins," for no other reason than that they cause sin: which would not be the case + if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore passion does not excuse from sin altogether. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary. + Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; + otherwise, it does not excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be observed: first, that a thing may be + voluntary either "in itself," as when the will tends towards it directly; or "in its cause," + when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in + that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk. Secondly, we must observe that a thing + is said to be voluntary "directly" or "indirectly"; directly, if the will tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could + have prevented it, but did not. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p7"> Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason + altogether, as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a passion were voluntary from the + beginning, the act is reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to drunkenness. + If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause + fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely + excused from sin. Sometimes, however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether; and then reason + can drive the passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since the members + are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q77_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A9.html">Q[17], A[9]</a>): wherefore such a + passion does not excuse from sin altogether. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words, "So that you do not the things that you would" are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner movement + of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil, in which sense we are to understand the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv"> Rom. 7:19</a>: "The evil which I will not, that I do." Or again they may be referred to the will as preceding the passion, as is the case + with the incontinent, who act counter to their resolution on + account of their concupiscence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The particular ignorance which excuses altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to know even after + taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being + applied to a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive away, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about drunkenness, + which is a kind of bodily disease. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q77_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q77_A8-p0.1">Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now + sin committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for pardon [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through + passion is a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the + sensuality, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q77_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A4.html">Q[74], A[4]</a>). Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained above ( + <a id="FS_Q77_A8-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore + a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) that "the passions of the sins . . . work [Vulg.: 'did work'] in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now it is + proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be mortal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Mortal sin, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q77_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html">Q[72], A[5]</a>), consists in turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function + it is also to direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to be a mortal sin, + only when the deliberating reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden movements. Now when anyone + proceeds from passion to a + sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the deliberating reason can come to the rescue + here, since it can drive the passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated above: wherefore if it + does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are committed + through passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through its cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens + the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus + every sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon [veniam]. Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This + is the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection + regards the first kind. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which follows + accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A[6], ad 1): hence the argument does not prove. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Passion does not always hinder the act of reason altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its free-will, + so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer + either mortal or venial. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q77_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q76_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q78" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q78-p0.1">OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q78-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q78-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz. malice: and under this head there are four points of + inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78-p3"> (1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, i.e. purposely?</p> + <p id="FS_Q78-p4"> (2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?</p> + <p id="FS_Q78-p5"> (3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through habit?</p> + <p id="FS_Q78-p6"> (4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than through passion?</p> + <div id="FS_Q78_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q78_A1-p0.1">Whether anyone sins through certain malice?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain malice. + Now "every evil man is ignorant," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv">Prov. 14:22</a>): "They err that work evil." Therefore no one sins through certain malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "no one works intending evil." Now to sin through malice seems to denote the + intention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of "malitia" (malice) from "malum" (evil)] in sinning, because an act + is not denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore no one sins through malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely, + which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.27" target="asv">Job 34:27</a>): "[Who] as it were on purpose have revolted from God [Vulg.: 'Him'], and would not understand all His ways." Now to revolt + from God is to sin. Therefore some sin purposely or through certain malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due + to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. + Now the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore + even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when + anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, + so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out of order when it loves more + the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order + to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life + which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the + order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of + some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; + and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order + to + possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge that a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through ignorance: + sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through passion: + and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular + good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus that + a man is ignorant, when he sins through certain malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining + another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone would choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering + loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before + him to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's + anger, to being deprived of the pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The malice through which anyone sins, may be taken to denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher (Ethic. + v, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to + sin through malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also denote actual malice, whether by malice we + mean the choice itself of evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so + far as he sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent + fault, as when anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this imply that a thing is its own cause: for + the interior act is the cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not indefinitely, however, since we + can trace it back to some previous sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above ( + <a id="FS_Q78_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q75_A4.html">Q[75], A[4]</a>, ad 3). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q78_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q78_A2-p0.1">Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every one who sins through habit, sins through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain + malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters + an idle word. Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed through certain malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by which those habits were formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). But the acts + which precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice. Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed + through certain malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he is glad after having done it, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv"> Prov. 2:14</a>: "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things": and this, because it is pleasant to obtain what + we desire, and to do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who sin through habit, are sorrowful + after committing a sin: because "bad men," i.e. those who have a vicious + habit, "are full of remorse" (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A sin committed through certain malice is one that is done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to + which we are inclined by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with regard to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from + habit is committed through certain malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is a difference between a sin committed by one who has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not necessary + to use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person who has that habit. Hence habit is defined as being "something + we use when we will," as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q78_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html">Q[50], A[1]</a>). And thus, even as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act, because a bad habit + does not + corrupt reason altogether, something of which remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does some works which are + generically good; so too it may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from that habit, but through + the uprising of a passion, or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin through certain + malice: because to anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of something + lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to him, according as custom and habit are a second nature. Now the + very thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit, is something that excludes a spiritual good: the result being + that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he may obtain possession of what befits him in respect of that habit: and this is + to sin through certain malice. Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through certain malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not simply, + but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof is not a simple but a relative evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the acts from which those habits were formed: but they differ from them + as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that sins through habit is always glad for what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he is able + not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen + that while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the habit. And so it often happens that such a man + is sorry for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on + account of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q78_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q78_A3-p0.1">Whether one who sins through certain malice, sins through habit?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, sins through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that "an + unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it," i.e. through choice, "unless it be done through habit." Now to sin through + certain malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q78_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q78_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the habit of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that "a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little." + But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain + malice, not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But + by the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good. Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something + supervening, which is passion or habit. Now when a man sins through passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through + weakness, as stated ( + <a id="FS_Q78_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A3.html">Q[77], A[3]</a>). Therefore whenever anyone + sins through certain malice, he sins through habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The good habit stands in the same relation to the choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something evil. + But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue. + Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The will is related differently to good and to evil. Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the rational + good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, + to some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the + reason, as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the + impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion. Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain + malice; for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to evil of its own accord. This may + happen in two ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition, + some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will + tends, as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it. Moreover this corrupt + disposition is either a habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a man who + is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the will, of its own accord, + may tend to an evil, through the removal of some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not + through sin being in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope give place to despair, + or fear to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the bridle, as it were. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p7"> It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice, always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which, + however, is not always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins through certain malice, that he sins + through habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with + pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of reason, and this occurs only in one who has a habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this something + is not always a habit, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a habit or a passion, but at times is something else. Moreover, there + is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good + can be perfect without the evil of fault. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q78_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q78_A4-p0.1">Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance excuses + from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins + through passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the + Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false estimation of the + end, which is the principle in matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain malice, + than for one who sins through passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong + into sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which + is stronger than that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than to sin through passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil. + Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very reason deserves heavier punishment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.26" target="asv"> Job 34:26</a>: "He hath struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on purpose, have revolted from Him." Now punishment + is not increased except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being done on purpose, i.e. through certain + malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A sin committed through malice is more grievous than a sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because, + as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, + according as the movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is committed through malice, the movement of + sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is + committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated + by the very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much the more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is + diminished by being committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is stronger. Secondly, because the passion + which incites the will to sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon returns to his good intentions; + whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice, abides longer in + his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick + man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers + intermittently. Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is + the + principle in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion, + whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the passion, for the time being. Now + the worst of all defects is defect of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through malice is more grievous + than one committed through passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q78_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q76_A4.html">Q[76], A[4]</a>). Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined + from within. Hence the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while + choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced + through the passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand, he that sins through + certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained ( + <a id="FS_Q78_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q78_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin + "through" choosing. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q78_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q77_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q79" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q79-p0.1">OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q79-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q79-p2"> We must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part + of man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q79-p4"> (1) Whether God is a cause of sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q79-p5"> (2) Whether the act of sin is from God?</p> + <p id="FS_Q79-p6"> (3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?</p> + <p id="FS_Q79-p7"> (4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded or hardened?</p> + <div id="FS_Q79_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q79_A1-p0.1">Whether God is a cause of sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle says of certain ones ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.28" target="asv">Rom. 1:28</a>): "God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay: 'convenient']," and a gloss + comments on this by saying that "God works in men's hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good + or to evil." Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a will inclined to evil. Therefore + God is to man a cause of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.11" target="asv">Wis. 14:11</a>): "The creatures of God are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men." But a temptation usually denotes + a provocation to sin. Since therefore creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the + <a id="FS_Q79_A1-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A1.html">FP, Q[44], A[1]</a>, it seems that God is a cause of sin, by provoking man to sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause + of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not contrary to God's goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment; + since of this evil it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.45.7" target="asv">Is. 45:7</a>) that God creates evil, and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Amos.3.6" target="asv">Amos 3:6</a>): "Shall there be evil in the city which God [Vulg.: 'the Lord'] hath not done?" Therefore it is not incompatible with God's + goodness that He should cause the evil of fault. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou . . . hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." Now God hates sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.9" target="asv">Wis. 14:9</a>: "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful." Therefore God is not a cause of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of another's sin. First, directly, namely be inclining his or another's + will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely be not preventing someone from sinning. Hence ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.3.18" target="asv">Ezech. 3:18</a>) it is said to the watchman: "If thou say not to the wicked: 'Thou shalt surely die' [*Vulg.: "If, when I say to the wicked, + 'Thou shalt surely die,' thou declare it not to him."] . . . I will require his blood at thy + hand." Now God cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure from the + order which is to God as the end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end, as Dionysius + states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible that He should be either to Himself or to another the cause of departing from + the order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin + indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He + to give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom + and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is + not said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer while able and bound to + steer. It is therefore evident that God is nowise a cause of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is clear from the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense, it + follows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up + to a reprobate sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose + a person to danger if we do not protect him. The saying of Augustine (De Grat. et + Lib. Arb. xxi, whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that "God inclines men's wills to good and evil," is to be + understood as meaning that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so far as He does not hinder it, as stated + above. And yet even this is due as being deserved through a previous sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said the "creatures of God are turned 'to' an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men," the preposition + "to" does not denote causality but sequel [*This is made clear by the Douay Version: the Latin "factae sunt in abominationem" + admits of the translation "were made to be an abomination," which might imply causality.]; for God did not make the creatures + that they might be an evil to man; this was the result of man's folly, + wherefore the text goes on to say, "and a snare to the feet of the unwise," who, to wit, in their folly, use creatures for + a purpose other than that for which they were made. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The effect which proceeds from the middle cause, according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that first + cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced + to that first cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master's orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though + he were the cause thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits + against the commandment of God, is not attributed to God as being its cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Punishment is opposed to the good of the person punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is opposed + to the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison + between fault and punishment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q79_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q79_A2-p0.1">Whether the act of sin is from God?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "the act of sin is not + a thing." Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for "no one works, intending + evil," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is not a cause of sin, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q79_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q79_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their species, as was shown above (Q[18], AA[2],8). Now whatever is the cause + of a thing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If therefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the + cause of sin, which is false, as was proved above + <a id="FS_Q79_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q79_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now "the will of God is the cause of every movement," as Augustine declares + (De Trin. iii, 4,9). Therefore God's will is the cause of the act of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of + its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something + existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the + First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the + cause of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect + is from the created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this + defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg + as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly + God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this passage Augustine calls by the name of "thing," that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the + act of sin is not a thing. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced to man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to + Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this principally. Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is the + cause of the act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause + of the sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q79_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A1.html">Q[72], A[1]</a>), acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from some + object, to which that privation is united: and so this defect which consists in not being from God, belongs to the species + of the act consequently, and not as a specific difference. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q79_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q79_A3-p0.1">Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. + 3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. + Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): "God does not punish what He causes." Now God punishes the hardened + heart, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.3.27" target="asv"> Ecclus. 3:27</a>: "A hard heart shall fear evil at the last." Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice + of man, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.21" target="asv"> Wis. 2:21</a>: "For their own malice blinded them," and again, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:4</a>: "The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers": which causes seem to be opposed to God. Therefore God is + not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.10" target="asv">Is. 6:10</a>): "Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy," and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.18" target="asv"> Rom. 9:18</a>: "He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and + turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, + just as He is not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result of which is that the mind is not + enlightened by God to see aright, and man's heart is not softened to live aright; and as + regards this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p7"> Now we must consider that God is the universal cause of the enlightening of souls, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.9" target="asv"> Jn. 1:9</a>: "That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," even as the sun is the universal cause + of the enlightening of bodies, though not in the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, whereas God works + freely, through the order of His wisdom. Now although the sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all + bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as happens to a house whose window-shutters + are closed, although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it does not act of its own accord in + failing to light up the interior of the house; and the cause of this is the person who closed the shutters. On the other hand, + God, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being + withheld is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace. In this + way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness of ear, and hardness of heart. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p8"> These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, + and softens the affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in rendering service to the intellect, + viz. sight and hearing, of which the former assists "discovery," and the latter, "teaching," hence it is that spiritual "blindness" + corresponds to sight, "heaviness of the ears" to hearing, and "hardness of heart" to the affections. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect, they + make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he incurs them, even as other punishments. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil is + said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q79_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q79_A4-p0.1">Whether blindness and hardness of heart are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. + For Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that "as God is supremely good, He would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could + draw some good from every evil." Much more, therefore, does He direct to some good, the evil of which He Himself is the cause. + Now God is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart, as stated above + + <a id="FS_Q79_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q79_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>) that "God hath no pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly [*Vulg.: 'God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the + destruction of the living.']." Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not turn their blindness + to their profit: just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal the + invalid when he prescribes a bitter + medicine for him. Therefore God turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "God is not a respecter of persons" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv">Acts 10:34</a>). Now He directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the case of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not + to believe in Christ, and, through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized with compunction, and converted, + as related by Augustine (De Quaest. Evang. iii). Therefore God turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare of those who are + blinded. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.8" target="asv"> Rom. 3:8, </a> evil should not be done, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore God does not blind some for the sake of + their welfare. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has a twofold relation---to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner's damnation---to + another, by reason of God's mercy or providence, viz. that the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall + into sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii). + Therefore blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those who + are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God's mercy, temporary blindness is directed + medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are + blinded, but only to the predestinated, to whom "all things work together unto good" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). Therefore as regards some, blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their damnation; as Augustine + says + (De Quaest. Evang. iii). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every evil that God does, or permits to be done, is directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom the + evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole universe: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of + the martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good that + ensues from the loss. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That God directs the blindness of some to their spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of others + is directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He vouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, does not make God + a respecter of persons, as explained in the + <a id="FS_Q79_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A5.html">FP, Q[23], A[5]</a>, ad 3. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Evil of fault must not be done, that good may ensue; but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q79_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q78_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q80" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q80-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q80-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q80-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q80-p3"> (1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q80-p4"> (2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly?</p> + <p id="FS_Q80-p5"> (3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity?</p> + <p id="FS_Q80-p6"> (4) Whether all sins are due to the devil's suggestion?</p> + <div id="FS_Q80_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q80_A1-p0.1">Whether the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite. + Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that "the devil inspires his friends with evil desires"; and Bede, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.3" target="asv"> Acts 5:3, </a> says that the devil "draws the mind to evil desires"; and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil "fills + men's hearts with secret lusts." Therefore the devil is directly the + cause of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that "as God is the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil." + But God is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the Eudemein Ethics (vii, 18): "There must needs be some extrinsic principle + of human counsel." Now human counsel is not only about good things but also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man + to take good counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take evil counsel, and consequently is directly + the cause of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that "nothing else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his desire." Now + man does not become a slave to his desires, except through sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man's + own will alone. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an + action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action + is the will, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be directly the cause of sin, except that which can move + the will to act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p7"> Now the will, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A3.html">Q[9], AA[3]</a>,4,6), can be moved by two things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite: + secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will itself, or God, as was shown + above ( + <a id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A3.html">Q[9], AA[3]</a>,4,6). Now God cannot be the cause of sin, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q79_A1.html">Q[79], A[1]</a>). Therefore it follows that + in this respect, a man's will alone is directly the cause of his sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p8"> As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed + to the will: thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Secondly, he that proposes or offers this object. Thirdly, + he that persuades the will that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a fashion, offers the will + its proper object, which is a real or apparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible + things, which approach from without, move a man's will to sin. In the second and third ways, either the devil or a man may + incite to sin, either by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the reason. But in none of these three + ways can anything be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any object except the last end, + as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q80_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q10_A1.html">Q[10], AA[1]</a>,2). Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he that + proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin, + neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these, and other like authorities, if we meet with them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man + to affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him objects of appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This comparison is true in so far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the cause + of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of causation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly, + whereas the devil cannot move us in this way. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the universal principle of all inward movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel, + is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the object of appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q80_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q80_A2-p0.1">Whether the devil can induce man to sin, by internal instigations?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, by internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul + are vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal + soul, which are the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to evil through his internal movements. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the internal movements arise from the external senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God + alone to do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the + <a id="FS_Q80_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A4.html">FP, Q[110], A[4]</a>. Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man's internal movements, except in respect of things which are perceived + by the external senses. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with + either of these, because, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html">FP, Q[111], AA[2]</a>,3, ad 2, the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it seem possible for him to produce imaginary + species, since imaginary forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in sensible matter, which, nevertheless, + the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from what we have said in the + <a id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">FP, Q[110], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A2.html">FP, Q[111], AA[2]</a>,3, ad 2. Therefore the devil cannot through man's internal movements induce him to sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently false. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the will. + As regards the will, we have already stated + <a id="FS_Q80_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q80_A1.html">(A[1];</a> + <a id="FS_Q80_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q111_A1.html">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the + knowledge of truth, which the devil has no intention of doing in man's regard; rather does he + darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite. Consequently + the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can + induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the + sensitive appetite to some passion or other. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p7"> The reason of this is, that as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q80_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A3.html">FP, Q[110], A[3]</a>, the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all + those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the Divine power. + Now the representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno + et Vigil.) [*De Insomn. + iii, iv.] that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend + with it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible + species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were + being affected by them at the time." Hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or humors can be procured by the demons, + whether man sleep or wake: and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p8"> In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and + the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive + appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained, + before the apprehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn. + iii, iv), "lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved." It also happens, through the rousing + of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is + held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them, even as + external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal soul, that food may be more easily digested. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but according + to local movement, as explained above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p11"> Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.</p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q80_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q80_A3-p0.1">Whether the devil can induce man to sin of necessity?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said + of the devil ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.41.24" target="asv">Job 41:24</a>) that "there is no power on earth that can compare with him." Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the + earth. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented + to the imagination: because "all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima + iii, text. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man's imagination, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q80_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q80_A2.html">(A[2])</a>; and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12) that "this evil," of which, + to wit, the devil is the cause, "extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends + with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor." Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that "there is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit." Now the + devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the way explained above + <a id="FS_Q80_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q80_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.5.8" target="asv">1 Pet. 5:8</a>): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour." Now it would be useless to admonish + thus, if it were true that man were under the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce man to sin + of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p6"> Further, it is likewise written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.7" target="asv">Jam. 4:7</a>): "Be subject . . . to God, but resist the devil, and he will fly from you," which would be said neither rightly nor truly, + if the devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor + would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel to sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; + but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves + him to sin, except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether, by moving the imagination and the + sensitive appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being + thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered, + then, in so far as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q80_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A7.html">Q[77], A[7]</a>). It is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every power that is greater than man, can move man's will; God alone can do this, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q80_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A6.html">Q[9], A[6]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has the use + of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the exercise + of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the devil's power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q80_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q80_A4-p0.1">Whether all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "crowd + of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the devil, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.34" target="asv"> Jn. 8:34</a>: "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave [Douay: 'servant'] of sin." Now "by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is + the slave" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iiPet.2.19" target="asv">2 Pet. 2:19</a>). Therefore whoever commits a sin, has been overcome by the devil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore, + if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from any other, their sin would be irremediable: which + is clearly false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lxxxii): "Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a movement + of the free-will." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of + whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to sin: even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man + who dried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the direct cause of all the sins of men, as though + each were the result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2) from + the fact that even if the devil were no more, men would still have the desire for food, sexual pleasures and the like; which + desire might be inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter that is subject to the free-will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as regards their original cause, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man becomes another's slave not only by being overcome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously: it + is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the devil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The devil's sin was irremediable, not only because he sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was not already + prone to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin of man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q80_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q79_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q81" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q81-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q81-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q81-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while man, like the devil, is the cause of another's sin, + by outward suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of origin. Wherefore we must speak about original + sin, the consideration of which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its essence; (3) of its subject. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81-p3"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q81-p4"> (1) Whether man's first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his descendants?</p> + <p id="FS_Q81-p5"> (2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way + of origin? + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81-p6"> (3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of Adam by way of seminal generation?</p> + <p id="FS_Q81-p7"> (4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from some part of the human body?</p> + <p id="FS_Q81-p8"> (5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and not the man, had sinned?</p> + <div id="FS_Q81_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q81_A1-p0.1">Whether the first sin of our first parent is contracted by his descendants, by way of origin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore + no one contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin, unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not + pass from one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, + as was shown in the + <a id="FS_Q81_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A2.html">FP, Q[118], A[2]</a>. Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin, is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because + it lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more powerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united + to it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can + the semen infect the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "No one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who + are so through want of exercise and through carelessness." Now those are said to be "naturally ugly," who are so from their + origin. Therefore nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death." Nor can this be understood as denoting imitation or suggestion, + since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.24" target="asv">Wis. 2:24</a>): "By the envy of the devil, death came into this world." It follows therefore that through origin from the first man sin + entered into the world. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants, + by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, to show that they have to be washed + from some uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from Augustine in many of his books [*For + instance, Retract. i, 9; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra Julian. iii, 1; De Dono + Persev. xi, xii.] + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p9"> In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various + writers have gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject of sin is the rational soul, maintained + that the rational soul is transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to produce other infected souls. + Others, rejecting this as erroneous, endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be + transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted, from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted + from parent to child---thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of a gouty son, on account of some + seminal corruption, although this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportionate to the soul, and + since the soul's defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is + passed + on to the child, through the transmission of the semen, albeit the semen itself is not the subject of the guilt. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p10"> But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from + parent to child, and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence, on account of a defect in + the bodily habit, as in the case of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a defect by the way of origin + seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the + rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child's soul is not in its will, it would cease to + be a guilty stain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5), "no one reproaches a man + born blind; one rather takes pity on him." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p11"> Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch + as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members + of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that + "by sharing the same species, many men are one man." Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so + many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will + of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would + not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging + to man and moved by man's first moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is + voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate + from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first + parent to his descendants is called "original," just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called + "actual." And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except + inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for which reason it is called a "human sin"; so original sin is not the sin + of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is called the + "sin of nature," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.3" target="asv"> Eph. 2:3</a>: "We . . . were by nature children of wrath." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father, because he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he share + in his guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even + as actual sin is transmitted through being imitated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless + the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits + the human nature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which infects it: for he that is born is associated + with his first parent in his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature + from him by a kind of movement which is that of generation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the guilt is not actually in the semen, yet human nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The semen is the principle of generation, which is an act proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence the + soul is more infected by the semen, than by the flesh which is already perfect, and already affixed to a certain person. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A man is not blamed for that which he has from his origin, if we consider the man born, in himself. But it we consider him + as referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it: thus a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace, on + account of a crime committed by one of his forbears. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p17"></p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A1-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q81_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q81_A2-p0.1">Whether also other sins of the first parent or of nearer ancestors are transmitted to their descendants?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first parent or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants. + For punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished by the judgment of God for the sin of their immediate + parents, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv">Ex. 20:5</a>: "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation." + Furthermore, according to human law, the children of those + who are guilty of high treason are disinherited. Therefore the guilt of nearer ancestors is also transmitted to their descendants. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man can better transmit to another, that which he has of himself, than that which he has received from another: + thus fire heats better than hot water does. Now a man transmits to his children, by the way, of origin, the sin which he has + from Adam. Much more therefore should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of himself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the reason why we contract original sin from our first parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our + nature, which he corrupted. But we were likewise in our nearer ancestors, as in principles of our nature, which however it + be corrupt, can be corrupted yet more by sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.11" target="asv"> Apoc. 22:11</a>: "He that is filthy, let him be filthier still." Therefore children contract, by the way of origin, the sins of their nearer + ancestors, even as they contract the sin of their first parent. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Good is more self-diffusive than evil. But the merits of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants. Much + less therefore are their sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Augustine puts this question in the Enchiridion xlvi, xlvii, and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we look into the matter carefully + we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the nearer ancestors, or even any other but the first sin of our first + parent to be transmitted by way of origin. The reason is that a man begets his like in species but not in individual. Consequently + those things that pertain directly to the individual, such as personal actions and + matters affecting them, are not transmitted by parents to their children: for a grammarian does not transmit to his son the + knowledge of grammar that he has acquired by his own studies. On the other hand, those things that concern the nature of the + species, are transmitted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect of nature: thus a man with eyes begets a son + having eyes, unless nature fails. And if nature be strong, even certain accidents of the individual pertaining to natural + disposition, are transmitted to the children, e.g. fleetness of body, acuteness of intellect, and so forth; but nowise those + that are purely personal, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p7"> Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also something through the gift of grace, so may something belong + to the nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In + this way original justice, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q81_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q100_A1.html">FP, Q[100], A[1]</a>, was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first + sin. Wherefore as that + original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual + sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that + person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Augustine in his letter to Avitus [*Ep. ad Auxilium ccl.], children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment + on account of their parents, unless they share in their guilt, either in their origin, or by imitation, because every soul + is God's immediate property, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.4" target="asv"> Ezech. 18:4.</a> Sometimes, however, by Divine or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment on their parents' account, inasmuch as + the + child, as to its body, is part of its father. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man can more easily transmit that which he has of himself, provided it be transmissible. But the actual sins of our nearer + ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely personal, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The first sin infects nature with a human corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a corruption + pertaining only to the person. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q81_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q81_A3-p0.1">Whether the sin of the first parent is transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. Because death is a punishment + consequent upon original sin. But not all those, who are born of the seed of Adam, will die: since those who will be still + living at the coming of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may be gathered from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.14" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:14</a>: "We who are alive . . . unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have + slept." Therefore they do not contract original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now a man who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he + does not transmit it to his children. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as the Apostle declares ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.15" target="asv">Rom. 5:15, </a> seqq). But the gift of Christ is not transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "Death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Catholic Faith we must firmly believe that, Christ alone excepted, all men descended from Adam contract + original sin from him; else all would not need redemption [*Cf. Translator's note inserted before TP, Q[27]] which is through + Christ; and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered from what has been stated + <a id="FS_Q81_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, viz. that original sin, in virtue of the sin of our first parent, is transmitted to his + posterity, just as, from the soul's will, actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body, through their being moved + by the will. Now it is evident that actual sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn aptitude to be moved + by the will. Therefore original sin is transmitted to all those who are moved by Adam by the movement of generation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is held with greater probability and more commonly that all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will die, + and rise again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the TP ( + <a id="FS_Q81_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q78_A1.html">XP, Q[78], A[1]</a>, OBJ[1]). If, however, it be true, as others hold, that they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome mentions among others + in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection of the Body---Ep. cxix), then we must say in reply to the + objection, that although they are not to die, the debt of death is none the less in them, and that the punishment of death + will be remitted by God, since He can also forgive the punishment due for actual sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind. Nevertheless + original sin remains in its effect as regards the "fomes," which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the + body itself, in respect of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his power of generation. Consequently those who are baptized + transmit original sin: since they do not beget as being renewed in Baptism, + but as still retaining something of the oldness of the first sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are born of Adam corporally, so is the grace of Christ transmitted to all that + are begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this, not only unto the removal of sin of their first parent, but + also unto the removal of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q81_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q81_A4-p0.1">Whether original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.1" target="asv"> Gn. 4:1 </a>says that "Adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins, because they were not severed from him in the place of life, + before he sinned, but in the place of exile after he had sinned." But if a man were to be formed in the aforesaid manner, + his flesh would be severed in the place of exile. Therefore it would + contract original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being infected through the flesh. But man's flesh is entirely corrupted. + Therefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin, from whatever part of the flesh it was formed. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, original sin comes upon all from our first parent, in so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who + might be formed out of human flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore they would contract original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> They would not have been in Adam "according to seminal virtue," which alone is the cause of the transmission of original + sin, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. x, 18, seqq.). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q81_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3), original sin is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they are moved by him through generation, + even as the members are moved by the soul to actual sin. Now there is no movement to generation except by the active power + of generation: so that those alone contract original sin, who are descended from Adam through the active power of generation + originally derived from Adam, i.e. who + are descended from him through seminal power; for the seminal power is nothing else than the active power of generation. But + if anyone were to be formed by God out of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would not be derived from Adam. + Consequently he would not contract original sin: even as a hand would have no part in a human sin, if it were moved, not by + the man's will, but by some external power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adam was not in the place of exile until after his sin. Consequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but on account + of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to whom his active generation extends. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so far as it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he would have been in Adam, "by way of bodily substance" [*The expression is + St. Augustine's (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica + <a id="FS_Q81_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q31_A6.html">TP, Q[31], A[6]</a>, Reply to OBJ[1]], but not according to seminal virtue, as stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q81_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q81_A5-p0.1">Whether if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin. Because we contract + original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them, according to the word of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "In whom all have sinned." Now a man pre-exist in his mother as well as in his father. Therefore a man would have contracted + original sin from his mother's sin as well as from his father's. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is + "the mother" that "provides the matter in generation" as the Philosopher states (De Gener. Animal. ii, 1,4), when death and + liability to suffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments + of original sin. Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would + contract original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that "the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin," (of whom Christ was to be born + without original sin) "purifying her." But this purification would not have been necessary, if the infection of original sin + were not contracted from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is contracted from the mother: so that if Eve + had sinned, her children would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By one man sin entered into this world." Now if the woman would have transmitted original sin to her children, he should + have said that it entered by two, since both of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned first. + Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by the mother, but by the father. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The solution of this question is made clear by what has been said. For it has been stated + <a id="FS_Q81_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that original sin is transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the begetting of his children: wherefore + it has been said + <a id="FS_Q81_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A4.html">(A[4])</a> that if anyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not contract original sin. Now it is evident that + in the opinion of philosophers, the active + principle of generation is from the father, while the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin, is contracted, not + from the mother, but from the father: so that, accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would not contract + original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they would contract it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The child pre-exists in its father as in its active principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive principle. + Consequently the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would be immune from the sin, but would have been subject + to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary result of the matter which is provided by the + mother, not as punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems unreasonable. Because, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q81_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html">FP, Q[97], AA[1]</a>, 2, ad 4, immortality and impassibility, in the + original state, were a result, not of the condition of matter, but of original justice, whereby the body was subjected to + the soul, so long as the soul remained subject to God. Now privation of original justice is original sin. If, therefore, supposing + Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's sin; it is evident that + the children would not have been deprived of original justice: and consequently they would not have been liable to suffer + and subject to the necessity of dying. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This prevenient purification in the Blessed Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but because + it behooved the Mother of God "to shine with the greatest purity" [*Cf. Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii.]. For nothing is worthy + to receive God unless it be pure, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.92.5" target="asv"> Ps. 92:5</a>: "Holiness becometh Thy House, O Lord." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q81_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q80_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q82" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q82-p0.1">OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q82-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q82-p2"> We must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q82-p3"> (1) Whether original sin is a habit?</p> + <p id="FS_Q82-p4"> (2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man?</p> + <p id="FS_Q82-p5"> (3) Whether original sin is concupiscence?</p> + <p id="FS_Q82-p6"> (4) Whether original sin is equally in all?</p> + <div id="FS_Q82_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q82_A1-p0.1">Whether original sin is a habit?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De + Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation. But privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin + is not a habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of actual + sin has not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a man while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original + habit has the nature of a fault. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is + not preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of infants (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account of original sin little + children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore + original sin is a habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q49_A4.html">Q[49], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html"> Q[50], A[1]</a>), habit is twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an act: thus science and virtue are called habits. + In this way original sin is not a habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a complex nature, whereby that nature + is well or ill disposed to something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second nature, as in the case of + sickness or health. In this sense original sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the destruction + of the harmony which was essential to original justice, even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, + by reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to health. Hence it is that original sin is called the + "languor of nature" [*Cf. Augustine, In + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a>, serm. iii]. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly + something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original + justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but + a corrupt habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act: whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate disposition of + nature, and has the character of fault through being transmitted from our first parent, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q82_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html">Q[81], A[1]</a>). Now this inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas the inordinate disposition of an act is not: and + for this reason original sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin + cannot. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers the habit which inclines a power to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit. Nevertheless + a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal + of the obstacle, i.e. original justice, which hindered inordinate movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements + results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it necessary to says that + original sin is a habit "infused," or a habit "acquired" (except by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act): + but it is a habit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q82_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q82_A2-p0.1">Whether there are several original sins in one man?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are many original sins in one man. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.1.7" target="asv">Ps. 1:7</a>): "Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me." But the sin in which a man is conceived + is original sin. Therefore there are several original sins in man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one and the same habit does not incline its subject to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of + nature which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man, inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original + sin is not one habit; but several. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, + as shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q82_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74.html">Q[74])</a>. Since then one sin cannot be in different subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.29" target="asv">Jn. 1:29</a>): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world": and the reason for the employment of the singular + is that the "sin of the world" is original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original + sin. For it has been stated ( + <a id="FS_Q82_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A2.html">Q[81], A[2]</a>), that the first sin alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore in one man original sin is one + in number; and in all men, it is one in proportion, i.e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason may be taken + from the very essence of + original sin. Because in every inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while the unity of number is + derived from the subject. For example, take bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed from different causes, e.g. + from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in + number. Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin, is one only, viz. the privation of original + justice, removing the subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently original sin is specifically one, and, in one man, can + be only one in number; while, in different men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is numerically many. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The employment of the plural---"in sins"---may be explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of + the plural for the singular, e.g. "They are dead that sought the life of the child"; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually + pre-exist in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by the fact of there being many deformities + in the sin of our first parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so + forth; or by several parts of the soul being infected by original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Of itself and directly, i.e. by its own form, one habit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason + why it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i.e. by the removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed + body is destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner, when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, + the various powers of the soul have various opposite tendencies. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Original sin infects the different parts of the soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original justice + held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one + man, although the various parts of the body are affected. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q82_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q82_A3-p0.1">Whether original sin is concupiscence?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide + Orth. ii, 4,30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which + is a natural power. Therefore concupiscence is not original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, through original sin "the passions of sins" are in us, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>). Now there are several other passions besides concupiscence, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q82_A3-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are disordered, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[3]). But the intellect is + the highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7). Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than + concupiscence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is the guilt of original sin." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Everything takes its species from its form: and it has been stated + <a id="FS_Q82_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that the species of original sin is taken from its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be considered + in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be + considered with respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it. Now the whole order of original + justice consists in man's will being subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose function + it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated above (Q[9], A[1] ), so that the will being turned away from God, + all the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the privation of original justice, whereby the will was made + subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder of the soul's powers, is a kind of material + element in respect of original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning + inordinately to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence. Hence original sin + is concupiscence, materially, but privation of original justice, formally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since, in man, the concupiscible power is naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to man, + as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man, + contrary to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q82_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html">Q[25], A[1]</a>), all the irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding the principle place: and of these, concupiscence + is the most impetuous in moving, and is felt most, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q82_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>, ad 1). Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief passion, and as including all the others, + in a fashion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As, in good things, the intellect and reason stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul is found + to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q82_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">Q[77], AA[1]</a>,2; + <a id="FS_Q82_A3-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q80_A2.html"> Q[80], A[2]</a>). Hence original sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance is comprised among the material defects + of original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q82_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q82_A4-p0.1">Whether original sin is equally in all?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not equally in all. Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above + + <a id="FS_Q82_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence. Therefore original sin is not equally in all. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. + But sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to degrees. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that "lust transmits original sin to the child." But the act of generation + may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may be greater in one than in another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q82_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html">Q[81], A[1]</a>). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original sin is too. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two things in original sin: one is the privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this privation + to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin + has no degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and privations that remove something entirely, + such as death and darkness, cannot be more or less, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q82_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A2.html">Q[73], A[2]</a>). In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are related equally to the first principle of our + corrupt origin, from which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations cannot be more or less. Consequently + it is evident that original sin cannot be more in one than in another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Through the bond of original justice being broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain order, each + power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some + of the soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of the different bodily temperaments. Consequently + if one man is more prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to + original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, + left to themselves equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be caused + by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the + cause of original sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not the actual lust that transmits original sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust + in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive + appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice. This lust is equally in all. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q82_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q81_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q83" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q83-p0.1">OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q83-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q83-p2"> We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q83-p3"> (1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the soul?</p> + <p id="FS_Q83-p4"> (2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through its powers?</p> + <p id="FS_Q83-p5"> (3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of original sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q83-p6"> (4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible part, and the + sense of touch? + </p> + <div id="FS_Q83_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q83_A1-p0.1">Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind + arises from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the + flesh. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect: thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now + the soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather + than in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we contract original sin from our first parent, in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our + souls were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul, but in the flesh. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, + it would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus God would be the cause of sin, since He is the + author of the soul's creation and fusion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the rational + soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul, by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection + of original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is + not corrupted by the flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the + flesh. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of + virtue: for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.18" target="asv">Rom. 7:18</a>): "I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." Therefore the flesh cannot be + the subject of original sin, but only the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its subject. + Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power + of the semen that original sin together with human + nature is transmitted to the child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p9"> The reason for this is that, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q83_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html">Q[81], A[1]</a>), original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this posterity by a certain movement of generation, in + the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now in this transmission it is to be observed, + that whatever accrues from the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in any way share in that + guilt, either as its + subject or as its instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues + to the concupiscible faculty, and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are moved + by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the internal + members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the character of guilt. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p10"> Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever + accrues to the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, + has the character, not of guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of original sin, and not the + flesh. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already redeemed, + who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh." + Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin is caused by the semen as instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the instrumental + cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause: and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in + him it had the nature of actual sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle, but + as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce + the rational soul, but disposes the matter for it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The corruption of original sin is nowise caused by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation. + And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being + created. On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. + And so, with regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained + through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it is infused. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The common good takes precedence of private good. Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general order + of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the + more that the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its infusion into the body, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q83_A1-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q90_A4.html">FP, Q[90], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q83_A1-p15.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A3.html">FP, Q[118], A[3]</a>. + And it is better for the soul to be thus, according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can avoid damnation, + by means of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p16"></p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A1-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q83_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q83_A2-p0.1">Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt + to be the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not + as to its essence but only as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according to its essence, but only + according to the powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the + subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the soul, rather than in its essence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. + But original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is more in the powers than in the essence of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as stated ( + <a id="FS_Q83_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html">Q[82], A[3]</a>). But concupiscence is in the powers of the soul. Therefore original sin is also. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body, + in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q83_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A6.html">FP, Q[76], A[6]</a>. Therefore the soul is the subject of original sin chiefly in respect of its essence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the + motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows + that the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is evident that original sin is caused through our + origin. Consequently that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the + primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation, according as it is the form of + the body: and this belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the + <a id="FS_Q83_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A6.html">FP, Q[76], A[6]</a>. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence, is the primary subject of original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the motion of the will of an individual reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of the will + of the first generator, through the channel of generation, reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even original justice pertained radically to the essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to which + the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the + principles of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are the sins of the person. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is related to the soul as matter to form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless comes + first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper + accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison + fails. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds the position of matter and effect, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q83_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html">Q[82], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q83_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q83_A3-p0.1">Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin does not infect the will before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power + by whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to + the generative power more than to the others. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh + than the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers, which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin + is in them more than in the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin + infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all infect the intellect, as preceding the others. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Original justice has a prior relation to the will, because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg. + iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a prior relation to the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things must be considered in the infection of original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect + it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q83_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q83_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must + therefore regard first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a sin, and this is the will, as + stated + above (Q[74], AA[1],2). Therefore original sin regards first of all the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental generative power. + Consequently, it does not follow that the child's generative power is the subject of original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former + follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive + powers, are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, + the infection of original sin reaches it first. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the intellect, + in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q83_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q83_A4-p0.1">Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to + pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the + will. Therefore that power is most infected by original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot + obey reason, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is not the most infected by original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number + of things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected + than touch. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq., 24) that the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the + members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, + wherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive to concupiscence. Therefore the infection + of original sin regards these three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the + concupiscible faculty and the sense of touch. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious, which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject + to another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption + of original sin is transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q83_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A1.html">Q[81], A[1]</a>). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves + the generative power, in as much as it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch, which is the most + powerful object of the concupiscible faculty. Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by original + sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and infected. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q83_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q83_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. But in so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of original + sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power. + Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sight is not related to the act of generation except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible species + is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to + the touch rather than to the sight. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q83_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q82_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q84" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q84-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q84-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q84-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the cause of another. Under this head there are four points + of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84-p3"> (1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?</p> + <p id="FS_Q84-p4"> (2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q84-p5"> (3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides pride and covetousness?</p> + <p id="FS_Q84-p6"> (4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?</p> + <div id="FS_Q84_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q84_A1-p0.1">Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is + opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root + of all sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, + are not desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all + sins, but proceeds from some deeper root. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another name for covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires + money through ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it is not the root of all sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>): "The desire of money is the root of all evil." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to some, covetousness may be understood in different ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches: and + thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for any temporal good: and thus it is a genus comprising + all sins, because every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q84_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A2.html">Q[72], A[2]</a>). Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of a corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods + inordinately: and they say that in this sense covetousness is the root of all sins, comparing it to the root of a tree, which + draws its sustenance from earth, just as every sin grows out of the love of temporal things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p7"> Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain the mind of the Apostle when he states that covetousness is the + root of all sins. For in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they "will become rich, fall into temptation, + and into the snare of the devil . . . for covetousness is the root of all evils." Hence it is evident that he is speaking + of covetousness as denoting the inordinate desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that covetousness, as + denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, in likeness to the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to the + whole tree. For we see that by riches man acquires the means of committing any sin whatever, and of sating his desire for + any sin whatever, since money helps man to obtain all manner of temporal goods, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.10.19" target="asv"> Eccles. 10:19</a>: "All things obey money": so that in this desire for riches is the root of all sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source. For sin arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the desire + of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is called the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire + for the immutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love of God, is called the root of the virtues, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The desire of money is said to be the root of sins, not as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the last + end; but because they are much sought after as useful for any temporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than + a particular good, they move the appetite more than any individual goods, which along with many others can be procured by + means of money. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in natural things we do not ask what always happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that the nature + of corruptible things can be hindered, so as not always to act in the same way; so also in moral matters, we consider what + happens in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the reason that the will does not act of necessity. So + when we say that covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no + other evil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise therefrom, for the reason given. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q84_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q84_A2-p0.1">Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every sin. For the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning + of a sin seems to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is the root of every sin, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q84_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it is also the beginning of every sin, and not pride. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:14</a>): "The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God." But apostasy from God is a sin. Therefore + another sin is the beginning of pride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that which causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which, + according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore self-love and not pride, is the beginning + of every sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some say pride is to be taken in three ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire to excel; and thus it is a special sin. + Secondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not being subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it + is a generic sin. Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the corruption of nature; and in this sense + they say that it is the beginning of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness, + because covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good by which sin is, as it were, nourished and fostered, + for which reason covetousness is called the "root"; whereas pride regards sin as turning away from God, to Whose commandment + man refuses to be subject, for which reason it is called the "beginning," because the beginning of evil consists in turning + away from God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p7"> Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not explain the mind of the wise man who said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." For it is evident that he is speaking of pride as denoting inordinate desire to excel, + as is clear from what follows (verse 17): "God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes"; indeed this is the point of + nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore say that pride, even as denoting a special sin, is the + beginning of every sin. For we must take note that, in voluntary actions, such as sins, there is a twofold order, of intention, + and of execution. In the former order, the principle is the end, as we have stated many times before (Q[1], A[1], ad 1; Q[18], + A[7], ad 2; Q[15], A[1], ad 2; Q[25], A[2]). Now man's end in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through their means, he + may have some perfection and excellence. Therefore, from this point of view, pride, which is the desire to excel, is + said to be the "beginning" of every sin. On the other hand, in the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which + by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and such are riches; so that, + from this point of view, covetousness is said to be the "root" of all evils, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q84_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from the + fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things. + Wherefore, in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote the special sin, but rather that general condition of + every sin, consisting in its turning away from God. It may also be said that + apostasy from God is said to be the beginning of pride, because it is the first species of pride. For it is characteristic + of pride to be unwilling to be subject to any superior, and especially to God; the result being that a man is unduly lifted + up, in respect of the other species of pride. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to love oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself. Consequently + it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or self-love as the beginning of every evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q84_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q84_A3-p0.1">Whether any other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital. Because "the head seems to + be to an animal, what the root is to a plant," as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore + covetousness is called the "root of all evils," it seems that it alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from + the head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the character of head: so that no sins should be called + capital. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished + thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain special vices under the name of capital. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The word capital is derived from "caput" [a head]. Now the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body, which + is the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a head, and even + men who direct and govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital vice is so called, in the first place, from "head" + taken in the proper sense, and thus the name "capital" is given to a sin for which + capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in this sense that we are now speaking of capital sins, but in another sense, in + which the term "capital" is derived from head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of others. In this way a capital + vice is one from which other vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause, which origin is formal, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q84_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A6.html">Q[72], A[6]</a>). Wherefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also their director + and, in a way, their leader: because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander + in matters concerning the means. Hence Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares these capital vices to the "leaders of an army." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The term "capital" is taken from "caput" and applied to something connected with, or partaking of the head, as having some + property thereof, but not as being the head taken literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which have + the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the "root," and pride which is called the beginning, but + also those which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from God, for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to Augustine + (De Natura Boni iv), is "the privation of mode, species and order." But in so far as sin implies a turning to something, it + regards some good: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers capital sin as so called from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it here. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q84_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q84_A4-p0.1">Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony, + lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html">Q[61], A[2]</a>). Therefore there are only four principal or capital vices. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77.html">Q[77])</a>. But there are four principal passions of the soul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the above sins, + whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and + sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it should not be placed among the principal vices. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through ignorance, + or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g. steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently + enumerated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this kind of origin may take + place in two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for + one particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come + under the consideration of art, because man's + particular dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another: + and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration + of art. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p9"> Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; + and it is in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite + in two ways. First, directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek it, while evil, for the same reason, + moves the appetite to avoid it. Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: thus one + seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p10"> Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of + appetibility, merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and praise, and this good is sought inordinately + by "vainglory." Secondly, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation of the individual, e.g. + meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by "gluttony," or the preservation of the species, e.g. sexual + intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by "lust." Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which "covetousness" + is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p11"> Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now + in the first place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to which belongs excellence or renown, + which is desired by "pride" or "vainglory." Secondly, it implies satiety, which "covetousness" seeks in riches that give promise + thereof. Thirdly, it implies pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x, + 6,7,[8] and this "gluttony" and "lust" pursue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p12"> On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect + of one's own good, and thus we have "sloth," which is sadness about one's spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily + labor: or else it happens in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to "envy," which + is sadness about another's good as being a hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination + with a view to vengeance, it is "anger." Again, these same vices seek the contrary evils. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason, + or to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need + for the principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible + part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among + the capital sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A4.html">Q[25], A[4]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special + kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination against another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e. + of the right to vengeance. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the order of the end, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A2.html">(A[2])</a>: and it is in the same order that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore pride, like a universal + vice, is not counted along with the others, but is reckoned as the "queen of them all," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 27). + But covetousness is said to be the root from another point of view, as stated above + ( + <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p16.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> These vices are called capital because others, most frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from + arising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, + to which pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual goods on account of the attendant labor; for the + ignorance that can cause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q84_A4-p17.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q76_A2.html">Q[76], A[2]</a>). That a man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to ignorance, in so far as he knows not that evil should + not be done that good may come of it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p18"></p> + <p id="FS_Q84_A4-p19"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q83_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q85" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q85-p0.1">OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q85-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q85-p2"> We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the + debt of punishment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q85-p4"> (1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q85-p5"> (2) Whether it can be taken away altogether?</p> + <p id="FS_Q85-p6"> (3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is stricken in consequence of sin.</p> + <p id="FS_Q85-p7"> (4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q85-p8"> (5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q85-p9"> (6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man?</p> + <div id="FS_Q85_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q85_A1-p0.1">Whether sin diminishes the good of nature?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good + remains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of + human nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when that which follows is changed, that which precedes remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when + its accidents are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary + act, nature is not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now no agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although + it is possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin, + diminish the good of his nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that which is patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected + to an accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a + subject. Therefore sin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "A certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.30" target="asv">Lk. 10:30</a>), i.e. to the corruption of sin, was stripped of his gifts, and wounded in his nature," as Bede [*The quotation is from the + Glossa Ordinaria of Strabo] expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes the good of nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties + that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, + as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q85_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A1.html">Q[60], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q85_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html"> Q[63], A[1]</a>), this inclination to virtue is a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole of + human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p8"> Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was + entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz. the natural inclination to virtue, + is diminished by sin. Because human acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q85_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q50_A1.html">Q[50], A[1]</a>). Now from the very fact that thing becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the + other contrary must needs be diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact that a man sins, there + results a diminution of that good of nature, which is the inclination to virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of nature, which consists in "being, living and understanding," as anyone + may see who reads the context. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has an inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is not + changed in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is the inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed + to its term. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A voluntary action proceeds from various powers, active and passive. The result is that through voluntary actions something + is caused or taken away in the man who acts, as we have stated when treating of the production of habits ( + <a id="FS_Q85_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q51_A2.html">Q[51], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An accident does not act effectively on its subject, but it acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that whiteness + makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to hinder sin from diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as + sin is itself a diminution of the good of nature, through being an inordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness + of the agent, we must say that such like inordinateness is caused by the + fact that in the acts of the soul, there is an active, and a passive element: thus the sensible object moves the sensitive + appetite, and the sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q85_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A1.html">Q[77], AA[1]</a>, 2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not as though an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the object + acts on the power, and one power acts on another and puts it out of order. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q85_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q85_A2-p0.1">Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since + human nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore + the good of nature can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be entirely taken away. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and + all bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since therefore a part thereof can be taken away + by sin, it seems that the whole can also be taken away by sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in + some on account of sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can + take away the good of nature entirely. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that "evil does not exist except in some good." But the evil of sin cannot be in the good + of virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does + not destroy it entirely. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q85_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the good of nature, that is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the + very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is to act + virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be + capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible + for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p7"> Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made + use of the example of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely destroyed. For the Philosopher + says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity, it will at + last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If, + however, the subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the same quantity, it may go on indefinitely, + as, for instance, if a quantity be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be possible to go on thus indefinitely, + provided that what is subtracted in each case be less than what was subtracted before. But this does not apply to the question + at issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it + be a more grievous sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p8"> We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle + term between two others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and tends to the good of virtue, as to its + term and end. Consequently its diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its rood, secondly, on the + part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated + above + <a id="FS_Q85_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But it is diminished in the second way, in so far as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if it were + diminished in the first way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed. + Since, however, it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is place against its attaining its term, it is evident + that it can be diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely, + inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this + inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, + from the very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part of supervening clouds, + although it always remains rooted in the nature of the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection avails when diminution is made by subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and this + neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform: nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term, + in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one hand, and not on the other. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not + reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains + in the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced + to act, for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ + requisite for sight. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q85_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q85_A3-p0.1">Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent + upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as + appears from what has been said above ( + <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q76_A1.html">Q[76], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A3.html"> Q[77], AA[3]</a>,5; + <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q78_A1.html"> Q[78], A[1]</a>). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of + sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no place among the effects of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should + not be reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned a wound of nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it has been stated ( + <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A3.html">Q[77], A[3]</a>) that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a passion. Therefore it should not be + condivided with weakness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons "two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, + viz. ignorance and difficulty," from which arise "error and vexation," which four do not coincide with the four in question. + Therefore it seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not known]. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected + by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already + stated ( + <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q81_A2.html">Q[81], A[2]</a>); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed + to virtue; which destitution is + called a wounding of nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p9"> Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of virtue, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q61_A2.html">Q[61], A[2]</a>), viz. the reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, + the subject of temperance. Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; + in so far as the will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice; in + so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible + is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p10"> Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since + the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was explained above ( + <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html">AA[1]</a>, 2), these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in + practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult + and concupiscence more impetuous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, + is more easily inclined to sin again. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.8.21" target="asv"> Gn. 8:21</a>: "Man's senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil + from his youth.']. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q85_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html">Q[82], A[3]</a>, ad 1), concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so far as it is goes beyond the + bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called a weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs + the reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to fortitude which pertains to the irascible. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book of Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers, + viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the + good. "Error" and "vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects + of his concupiscence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p16"></p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A3-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q85_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q85_A4-p0.1">Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii) + that "where these three abound, the good is great; where they are less, there is less good; where they are not, there is no + good at all." But sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species and order. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the "privation of mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De + Natura Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, different effects result from different sins. Now since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding + privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species + and order is not the effect of each sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.6.3" target="asv"> Ps. 6:3, </a> "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the + <a id="FS_Q85_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html">FP, Q[5], A[5]</a>, mode, species and order are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon every being. Because every being + and every good as such depends on its form from which it derives its "species." Again, any kind of form, whether substantial + or accidental, of anything whatever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated in Metaph. viii, that "the forms + of things are like numbers," so that + a form has a certain "mode" corresponding to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has a relation of "order" to + something else. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p7"> Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there + is a good belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode, species and order, and is neither destroyed + nor diminished by sin. There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, species and order; and + this is diminished by sin, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q85_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html">AA[1]</a> ,2), but is not entirely destroyed. + Again, there is the good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin. + Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of + which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes + mode, species and order. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.</p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q85_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q85_A5-p0.1">Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now + these defects are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others, whereas original sin, from which especially these + defects seem to result, is equal in all, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q85_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A4.html">Q[82], A[4]</a>). Therefore death and suchlike defects are not the result of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism + or Penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt than original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of + the body by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does original sin. Therefore death and other bodily defects + are not the result of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>), "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One thing causes another in two ways: first, by reason of itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one thing + is the cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of the power of its nature or form, the result being that the + effect is directly intended by the cause. Consequently, as death and such like defects are beside the intention of the sinner, + it is evident that sin is not, of itself, the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one + thing is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an obstacle: thus it is stated in Phys. viii, text. 32, that "by + displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting thereon." In this way the sin of our first parent is the cause + of death and all such like defects in human nature, in so far as by the sin of our first parent original justice was taken + away, whereby not only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason, without any disorder + whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q85_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>. Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the + soul by the disorder among the powers, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q85_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A3.html">(A[3];</a> Q[82], A[3]), so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p7"> Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, + death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although the defects are not intended by the + sinner, nevertheless they are ordered according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as punishments. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Causes that produce their effects of themselves, if equal, produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or diminished, + the effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle being removed, do not point to equal effects. For supposing + a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, it does not follow that the movements of the stones resting on them will + be equal; but that one will move with greater velocity, which has the + greater weight according to the property of its nature, to which it is left when the obstacle to its falling is removed. Accordingly, + when original justice is removed, the nature of the human body is left to itself, so that according to diverse natural temperaments, + some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal in all. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.11" target="asv">Rom. 8:11</a>): "He . . . shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you": but each is done according + to the order of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should first of all be conformed to Christ's + sufferings, before attaining to the immortality and impassibility + of glory, which was begun in Him, and by Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should remain, for a time, + subject to suffering, in order that we may merit the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two things may be considered in actual sin, the substance of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance of + the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and die through eating too much. But as regards the fault, + it deprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects + of the body, as original justice did. Wherefore actual sin does not cause those + defects, as original sin does. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q85_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q86.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q85_A6-p0.1">Whether death and other defects are natural to man?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that death and such like defects are natural to man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically" + (Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as other animals which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally + corruptible. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally corruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But + such is the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now human life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore + the vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 50, it seems that death and + such like defects are natural to man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him. Now "God made not death" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>). Therefore death is not natural to man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p6"> (2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable + to it. But death and such like defects are the punishment of original sin, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q85_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Therefore they are not natural to man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p7"> (3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its end. Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated + above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[5] , AA[3],4): and the form of the human body is the rational soul, as was proved in the + <a id="FS_Q85_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A6.html">FP, Q[75], A[6]</a>. Therefore the human body is naturally incorruptible. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways; first, in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its particular + nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of action and self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every + corruption and defect is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo ii, text. 37, since this power tends to the being and preservation + of the thing to which it belongs. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p9"> On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly + body; or again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said by some to be "the Nature Who makes nature." + This force intends the good and the preservation of the universe, for which alternate generation and corruption in things + are requisite: and in this respect corruption and defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the + inclination of the form which is the principle of being and perfection, but as regards the inclination of matter which is + allotted proportionately to its particular form according to the discretion of the universal agent. And although every form + intends perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being can achieve its own perpetuity, except the rational + soul; for the reason that the latter is not entirely subject to matter, as other forms are; indeed it has an immaterial + operation of its own, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q85_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>. Consequently as regards his form, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things. But since that very + form has a matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in the whole. In + this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature + of his form. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p10"> The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore + in order to solve them, we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul, in respect of its incorruptibility + is adapted to its end, which is everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is corruptible, considered in respect + of its nature, is, in a way, adapted to its form, and, in another way, it is not. For we may note a twofold + condition in any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen by the agent, and is a natural condition + of matter. Thus, a smith in order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and flexible, which can be sharpened so as to + be useful for cutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife: but that iron be breakable and + inclined to rust, results from the natural disposition of iron, nor does the workman choose this in the iron, indeed he + would do without it if he could: wherefore this disposition of matter is not adapted to the workman's intention, nor to the + purpose of his art. In like manner the human body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of its being of a mixed temperament, + in order that it may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive and motive powers. Whereas the fact + that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature: indeed nature would choose an + incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in forming man supplied the defect of nature, + and by the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was stated in the + <a id="FS_Q85_A6-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>. It is in this sense that it is said that "God made not death," and that death is the punishment of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p11"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q85_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q86.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q84_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q86" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q86_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q86-p0.1">OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q86-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q86-p2"> We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q86-p3"> (1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul?</p> + <p id="FS_Q86-p4"> (2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?</p> + <div id="FS_Q86_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q86.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q86_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q86_A1-p0.1">Whether sin causes a stain on the soul?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For a higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature: + hence the sun's ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v). Now the + human soul is of a much higher nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sinning. Therefore it does not contract a + stain from them by sinning. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q86_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html">Q[74], AA[1]</a>,2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by considering + anything whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby. Therefore neither is the will stained by sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either something positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive, + it can only be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that nothing else can be caused by an act. But it is neither + disposition nor habit: for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or habit; for instance, + in a man who after committing a mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into a sin + of the opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote anything positive in the soul. Again, neither is it a pure privation. + Because all sins agree on the part of aversion and privation of grace: and so it would follow that there is but one stain + caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It was said to Solomon ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.47.22" target="asv">Ecclus. 47:22</a>): "Thou hast stained thy glory": and it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.27" target="asv">Eph. 5:27</a>): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle": and in each case it is question of + the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is the effect of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, when a comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another body, + e.g. a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is ascribed to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's + soul has a twofold comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural light of reason, whereby he is directed in his actions; + the other, from the refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, whereby + man is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there + is a kind of contact in the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, against the light of reason and of the + Divine law, as shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q86_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Wherefore the loss of comeliness occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their own power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the soul, + by its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them inordinately, against the light of reason and of the Divine law. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The action of the intellect is accomplished by the intelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of the + intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by them. On the other hand, the act of the will consists in + a movement towards things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to the thing loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained, + when it cleaves inordinately, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.9.10" target="asv"> Osee 9:10</a>: "They . + . . became abominable as those things were which they loved." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the soul's + brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which + is the privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the interposed + bodies. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q86.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q86_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q86_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q86_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q86_A2-p0.1">Whether the stain remains in the soul after the act of sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the + soul except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Therefore the + stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the shadow does not remain + when the body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when the act of sin is past. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause of the stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is + no longer there, neither is the stain in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Josh.22.17" target="asv">Jos. 22:17</a>): "Is it a small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime remaineth in you [Vulg.: 'us'] + to this day?" + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act of sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as stated above + (A[1] ), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on account of its withdrawing from the light of reason or of the + Divine law. And therefore so long as man remains out of this light, the stain of sin remains in him: but as soon as, moved + by grace, he returns to the Divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is removed. + For although the act of sin ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of the Divine law, man does not at once + return to the state in which he was before, and it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the previous + movement. Thus if one man be parted from another on account of some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as soon as + the movement ceases, but he needs to draw nigh to him and to return by a contrary movement. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something + private, viz. the privation of union with the Divine light. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> After the interposed body has passed by, the transparent body remains in the same position and relation as regards the illuminating + body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the sin is past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and + so there is no comparison. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act of sin parts man from God, which parting causes the defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local parting. + Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is not removed, so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain + removed. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q86_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q86_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q85_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q86_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q87" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q86_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q87-p0.1">OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q87-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87-p2"> We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ + in respect of the punishment due to them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q87-p4"> (1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q87-p5"> (2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?</p> + <p id="FS_Q87-p6"> (3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</p> + <p id="FS_Q87-p7"> (4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity?</p> + <p id="FS_Q87-p8"> (5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?</p> + <p id="FS_Q87-p9"> (6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q87-p10"> (7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q87-p11"> (8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?</p> + <div id="FS_Q87_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q87_A1-p0.1">Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does + not seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention + of the sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an + effect of sin, which is evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that "every inordinate affection is its own punishment." But punishment does not incur + a further debt of punishment, because then it would go on indefinitely. Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.9" target="asv">Rom. 2:9</a>): "Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh evil." But to work evil is to sin. Therefore sin incurs a + punishment which is signified by the words "tribulation and anguish." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It has passed from natural things to human affairs that whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment + therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one contrary supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which + reason "hot water freezes more rapidly," as stated in Meteor. i, 12. Wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man + is to repress those who rise up against him. Now it is evident that all things + contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up + against an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident + that whoever sins, commits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which + repression is punishment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p7"> Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is + subject. In the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his own reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order + of another man who governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member either of the state or of the household; + thirdly, it is subjected to the universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders is + disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold + punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is accidental + to the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt of punishment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by God or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin, + not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. iv) that "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is." Consequently the debt of punishment is considered + to be directly the effect of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This punishment of the "inordinate affection" is due to sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a + further punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q87_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q87_A2-p0.1">Whether sin can be the punishment of sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin. For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of + virtue, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not bring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in + the opposite direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice. + Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above + ( + <a id="FS_Q87_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A1.html">Q[74], AA[1]</a> ,2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins are punishments of others. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence, as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin as + such can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will, + for it is from this that it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially something against the will, + as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q87_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>. Consequently it is evident that sin + regarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p7"> On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, + by removing an impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like are causes of sin, but are impeded + by the help of Divine grace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of grace is a punishment, + and is from God, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q79_A3.html">Q[79], A[3]</a>), the result is that the sin which ensues + from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.24" target="asv">Rom. 1:24</a>) when he says: "Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart," i.e. to their passions; because, to wit, when + men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always said to be the + punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it + be an + interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with one who endures considerable + trouble and loss in order to achieve a sinful act, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.5.7" target="asv"> Wis. 5:7</a>: "We wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity." Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment + by reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding sin, but also with + regard to itself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed + it is for the good of those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise from sin, more humble and more cautious. But it is always + for the amendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the more fearful of sinning. With regard to the + other two ways, it is evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's + amendment, since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a nature to withdraw man from sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection considers sin essentially as such: and the same answer applies to the Third Objection. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q87_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q87_A3-p0.1">Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice + is equality: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.8" target="asv">Is. 27:8</a>): "In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now sin is temporal. Therefore it does not + incur a debt of eternal punishment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed + to an end, and "what is directed to an end, is not infinite," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment + should be infinite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it for its own sake. But "God hath not pleasure in the destruction + of men" [Vulg.: 'of the living']. Therefore He will not inflict eternal punishment on man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished. + Therefore it cannot be of infinite duration. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.46" target="asv">Mat. 25:46</a>): "These shall go into everlasting punishment"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.3.29" target="asv">Mk. 3:29</a>): "He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q87_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, sin incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore + so long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order + is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the + principle be saved, defects can be + repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except + by Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, + these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently + if a sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man's will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to + be considered in itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the principle of this + order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity, + considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of severity, both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however, + as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that + adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes + by imprisonment or banishment for life---sometimes even by death; wherein account is + not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the + living, so that this punishment, in its own way, represents the eternity of punishment inflicted by God. Now according to + Gregory (Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned against God in his own eternity should be punished in God's eternity. + A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also + because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. + iv, 44) that the "wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished, + but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, + that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.19.25" target="asv">Prov. 19:25</a>: "The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser." Accordingly the eternal punishments + inflicted by God on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin through the thought of those punishments, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.59.6" target="asv"> Ps. 59:6</a>: "Thou hast given a warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, that Thy beloved may be delivered." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although punishment is related indirectly to nature, nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order, + and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the punishment endures. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q87_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q87_A4-p0.1">Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.24" target="asv">Jer. 10:24</a>): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing." Now God's anger or fury + signifies metaphorically the vengeance of Divine justice: and to be brought to nothing is an infinite punishment, even as + to make a thing out of nothing denotes infinite power. Therefore according to God's vengeance, + sin is awarded a punishment infinite in quantity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of fault, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now a sin which is committed against God, + is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases according to the greatness of the person sinned against (thus it is a + more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a private individual), and God's greatness is infinite. + Therefore an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed against God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration, and in quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore + it is infinite in quantity also. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> If this were the case, the punishments of all mortal sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin comprises two things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good, + which is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there is the inordinate turning to mutable good. + In this respect sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement of turning towards + it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so far as sin + consists in turning away from something, its corresponding punishment is the "pain of loss," which also is infinite, because + it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its corresponding punishment + is the "pain of sense," which is also finite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for the sinner to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be incompatible + with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice requires, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q87_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. The expression "to be brought to nothing" is applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2</a>: "If I . . . have not charity, I am nothing." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers sin as turning away from something, for it is thus that man sins against God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of fault, not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain, for + as long as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But punishment corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And + a fault which is irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; wherefore it incurs an everlasting punishment. But + it is not infinite as regards the thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it + does not incur punishment of infinite quantity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q87_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q87_A5-p0.1">Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. Because punishment, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q87_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, is proportionate to the fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely from temporal punishment: whereas no sin, apparently, + differs infinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Since therefore some sins incur + a debt of everlasting punishment, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q87_A5-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, it seems that no sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that "the lightest punishment + is incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone." But original sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children + who have died in original sin through not being baptized, will never see the kingdom of God, as shown by our Lord's words + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.3" target="asv">Jn. 3:3</a>): " Unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of + God." Much more, therefore, will the punishments of all other sins be everlasting. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through being united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its + punishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because + in hell there is no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal punishment. Therefore temporal punishment + is not due for any sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not punished + eternally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q87_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, a sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order of Divine justice, + through being contrary to the very principle of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is + disorder indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things referable + to the end, in so far as one is too much or + too little intent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for instance, when a man is too fond of some + temporal thing, yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments. Consequently such sins do not + incur everlasting, but only temporal punishment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in respect of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the substance + of the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in respect of their turning away from something. Because some sins consist + in turning away from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting things referable to the end: and the last end differs + infinitely from the things that are referred to it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on account of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject, + viz. a human being deprived of grace, without which there is no remission of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p9"> The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin. Because eternity of punishment does not correspond to the + quantity of the sin, but to its irremissibility, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q87_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q87_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q87_A6-p0.1">Whether the debt of punishment remains after sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But + sin is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt of punishment ceases also. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when + sin is removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease. + Therefore, when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.12.13" target="asv">2 Kings xii. 13,14</a>): "David said to Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: The Lord also hath taken away thy sin; + thou shalt not die. Nevertheless because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme . . . the child + that is born to thee shall die." Therefore a man is punished by God even after his sin is forgiven: and so the debt of punishment + remains, when the sin has been removed. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, + when the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as + he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which + restores him to the equality of justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he + who has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's commandments, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something + contrary to what he would wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in + injuries done to one's fellow men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there still + remains the debt of punishment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p7"> But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, + without the soul being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him that it suffered the loss of its brightness, + in which the stain consists, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q87_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q86_A1.html">Q[86], A[1]</a>). Now man is united to God by his will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will accept the + order of Divine justice, + that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently the + punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory, + it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory + punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular case and for this particular + purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have explained + when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary ( + <a id="FS_Q87_A6-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A6.html">Q[6], A[6]</a>). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed + of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain remains, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q87_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q86_A2.html">Q[86], A[2]</a>), so the debt of punishment also can remain. But when the stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not remain + in the same way, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply, but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue demands + that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that + the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder + may be remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality + of justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so that those who were + scandalized at the sin many be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David quoted above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q87_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q87_A7-p0.1">Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.9.3" target="asv">Jn. 9:3</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#John.9.2" target="asv">2</a>) about the man born blind: "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born blind." In like manner + we see that many children, those also who have been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, diabolical + possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them after they have been baptized. Moreover + before they are baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore + not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of + these is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.5" target="asv">Ps. 72:5</a>): "They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they be scourged like other men"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.21.7" target="asv">Job 21:7</a>): "[Why then do] the wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strengthened with riches" (?)[*The words in + brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Hab.1.13" target="asv">Hab. 1:13</a>): "Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: 'them that do unjust things'], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man + oppresseth [Vulg.: 'devoureth'], the man that is more just than himself?" Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for + a sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written of Christ ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.22" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:22</a>) that "He did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth." And yet it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.21" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:21</a>) that "He suffered for us." Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by God for sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.4.7" target="asv">Job 4:7, </a> seqq.): "Who ever perished innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen those who work iniquity + . . . perishing by the blast of God"; and Augustine writes (Retract. i) that "all punishment is just, and is inflicted for + a sin." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As already stated + <a id="FS_Q87_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, punishment can be considered in two ways---simply, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. + And since those who differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one who + has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the debts of another + upon themselves. If, however, we + speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished. + Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a sin committed by him. Sometimes + it is a relation to original sin: and this, either principally or consequently---principally, the punishment of original sin + is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result + from + this defect in human nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p7"> Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species + of evil, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q87_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>. Now evil is privation of good. And since man's good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and external goods, + it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers + loss of money for the sake of bodily health, + or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul's health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to man, + not simply but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because + a medical man prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to health. And since such like are not punishments + properly speaking, they are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted sense: because the very fact + that human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the punishment + of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue; + so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is reduced to original sin as its cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such like defects of those who are born with them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of + original sin, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html">Q[85], A[5]</a>); and they remain even after baptism, for the cause stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html">Q[85], A[5]</a>, ad 2): and that they are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, which is left to itself, as stated above + ( + <a id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A5.html">Q[85], A[5]</a>, ad + 1). Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of others + who are admonished by their means---and also to the glory of God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's chief + goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal + goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii), "Divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude + of the virtuous man, by material gifts." The very fact that others receive + temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): "Therefore pride hath + held them fast." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but for our sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q87_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q87_A8-p0.1">Whether anyone is punished for another's sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv">Ex. 20:5</a>): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation + of them that hate Me"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.23.35" target="asv">Mat. 23:35</a>): "That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now, according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for + their parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for the father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his + father's wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather than of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those + whose crimes they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for their own sins, but for those of their + parents. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's punishment, + in so far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q87_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. If, however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is penal, then each one is punished for + his own sin only, because the sinful act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment that is medicinal, in this + way it + does happen that one is punished for another's sin. For it has been stated + <a id="FS_Q87_A8-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A7.html">(A[7])</a> that ills sustained in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for the health of the + soul. Wherefore there is no reason why one should not have such like punishments inflicted on one for another's sin, either + by God or by man; e.g. on children for their parents, or on servants for their masters, inasmuch as they are their property + so to speak; in such a + way, however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of punishment in + regard to both the one punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has the character + of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it is merely + medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other's sin), since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he + bears it patiently. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p7"> With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal, because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet + higher good. Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine + says (Ep. ad Avit.) [*Ep. ad Auxilium, ccl.], such like punishments are not inflicted on one for another's sin, because, as + regards the soul, the son is not the father's property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying + (Ezech. 18:4): "All souls are Mine." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be referred to temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the + property of their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else, if they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must + be understood in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus these words are added, "Of them that hate Me," and + in the chapter quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we read: "Fill ye up then the measure + of your fathers." The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their children, because the latter are the more prone + to sin through being brought up amid their parents' crimes, both by becoming accustomed to them, and by imitating their parents' + example, conforming to their authority as it were. Moreover they deserve heavier punishment if, seeing the punishment of their + parents, they fail to mend their ways. The text adds, "to the third and fourth generation," because men are wont to live + long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so that both the children can witness their parents' sins so as to imitate + them, and the parents can see their children's punishments so as to grieve for them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for another's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or + medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who are near of kin are said to be punished, rather than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because the punishment + of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as stated above, in so far as the child is the father's property, and + because the examples and the punishments that occur in one's own household are more moving. Consequently when a man is brought + up amid the sins of his parents, he is more eager to imitate them, and if he is + not deterred by their punishments, he would seem to be the more obstinate, and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q87_A8-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q86_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q88" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q88-p0.1">OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q88-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q88-p2"> In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, + we shall consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider venial sin in itself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q88-p4"> (1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q88-p5"> (2) Whether they differ generically?</p> + <p id="FS_Q88-p6"> (3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q88-p7"> (4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?</p> + <p id="FS_Q88-p8"> (5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating circumstance?</p> + <p id="FS_Q88-p9"> (6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?</p> + <div id="FS_Q88_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q88_A1-p0.1">Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin + is a word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law." But the fact of being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. + Consequently every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:31</a>): "Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God." Now whoever sins breaks this commandment, + because sin is not done for God's glory. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it seems that + whoever sins, sins mortally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr. + Christ. i, 3,4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it: because he does not refer it to that good + which gives us happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore + whoever sins enjoys a mutable good. Now "to enjoy what we should use is human perverseness," + as Augustine again says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since "perverseness" [*The Latin 'pervertere' means to overthrow, + to destroy, hence 'perversion' of God's law is a mortal sin.] denotes a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable + good, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly + condivided with mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that "a crime is one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not." But + a crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken metaphorically: + thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but if we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and + fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of + the body, it does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. + But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is venial. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p8"> For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">Q[71], A[1]</a>, ad 3; + <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html"> Q[72], A[5]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A9.html"> Q[74], A[9]</a>, ad 2), is said to be mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an irreparable defect + consisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html">Q[72], A[5]</a>). Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is + the order to the last end, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html">Q[72], A[5]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.6" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html"> Q[87], A[3]</a>): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated + above ( + <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.7" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html">Q[87], A[3]</a>), because disorders in things referred to the end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be + repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order to the last end + cannot be repaired through something else as a higher principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such + sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, + the order to the end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called venial: because a sin receives its acquittal + [veniam] when the debt of punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as explained above ( + <a id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.8" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A6.html">Q[87], A[6]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p9"> Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic + principle, but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of the body or of the soul. Therefore venial + sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the + generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and + of the other afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other + hand, venial sin is called a sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in + relation to mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion + of being. For it is not "against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law forbids, nor omits what the + law prescribes to be done; but he acts "beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law intends. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not actually + refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal + sin each time that one fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has + to God habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human + act to God's glory, and not habitual reference: because it does not exclude charity, which refers man to God habitually. Therefore + it does not follow that he who sins venially, sins mortally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good, not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using + it, by referring it to God, not actually but habitually. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mutable good is not considered to be a term in contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed therein: because + what is referred to the end has not the character of finality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q88_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q88_A2-p0.1">Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some generically + venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above + ( + <a id="FS_Q88_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">Q[18], A[2]</a>). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good, + either less than God, which may be a venial + sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q88_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[72], A[5]; Q[87], A[3]), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired. Now irreparability + belongs to sin committed out of malice, which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to sins committed + through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice + differs from sin committed + through weakness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in cause, as stated above (Q[77], A[8], + ad 1). Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q88_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A3.html">Q[74], A[3]</a>, ad 3; A[10]) that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial sins. But sudden movements occur + in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins are generically venial. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic + mortal sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon]. Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has been + pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin venial": and this is called venial "from the result." Secondly, + a sin is called venial because it does not contain anything either partially or totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially, + as when a sin contains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed through + weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial "from the cause": totally, through not destroying the order to the last end, + wherefore it deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to speak now. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p7"> For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, + can have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, and another generically mortal, according as the + genus or species of an act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a thing that is in itself contrary + to charity, whereby man is directed to his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently + it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against + the love of one's neighbor, e.g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such sins are mortal by reason of their genus. + Sometimes, however, the sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain inordinateness, but which is not contrary + to the love of God and one's neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such sins are venial by reason + of their genus. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p8"> Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and malice, not only from their objects, but also from + some disposition of the agent, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q88_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html">Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6), it happens sometimes that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal on the part of the + agent, either because he fixes his last end therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own + genus; for example, if a man + direct an idle word to the commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a sin generically + mortal because venial, by reason of the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle + of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to sudden movements of unbelief. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The very fact that anyone chooses something that is contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of + God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves + contrary to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are mortal by reason of their genus. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers those sins which are venial from their cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers those sins which are venial by reason of the imperfection of the act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q88_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q88_A3-p0.1">Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial + and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q88_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an act disposes to something of like species, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that "from like acts like + dispositions and habits are engendered." But mortal and venial sin differ in genus or species, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q88_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is + a venial sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies + in wait for good works that it may destroy them." Therefore even good works would be venial sins, which is absurd. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 19:1</a>): "He that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little." Now he that sins venially seems to contemn small things. + Therefore by little and little he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition. + For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which + moves indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly + an act of sin disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it + disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to + a sin generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of + consequence, to a sin which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition or habit may be so far strengthened + by acts of venial sin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin: since the end + for one + who has a habit, as such, is to work according to that habit; and the consequence will be that, by sinning often venially, + he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. In this + way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin generically venial, turns + aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is + disposed not to subject his will even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a mortal sin in its genus. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in contrariety to one another, as though they were species of one genus, as stated + above (A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with substance. Wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial + form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order, albeit + in different ways, as stated ( + <a id="FS_Q88_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to mortal sin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally; + whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as stated. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q88_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q88_A4-p0.1">Whether a venial sin can become mortal?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin. For Augustine in explaining the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.36" target="asv"> Jn. 3:36</a>: "He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in Joan.): "The slightest," i.e. venial, "sins kill + if we make little of them." Now a sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul. Therefore a venial + sin can become mortal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent of reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, + as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q88_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A8.html">Q[74], A[8]</a>, ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and incurable disease, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q88_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But a curable disease may become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated + <a id="FS_Q88_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be + at first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act + of the will: so that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the act be continuous physically. If, however, + the will be not changed, it is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p7"> Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial, becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may + fix one's end in that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q88_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p8"> Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning + that many venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because all the venial sins in the world cannot incur + a debt of punishment equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration of the punishment, since mortal + sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as stated + above ( + <a id="FS_Q88_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A3.html">Q[87], AA[3]</a>,5). It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing + God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth.). It is also evident as regards + the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate + to one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p9"> If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above + + <a id="FS_Q88_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html">(A[3])</a> with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin disposes to mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins making one mortal sin dispositively. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same movement of the sensuality which preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement + of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may undergo + change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison + fails. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being perfected, + becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident which + disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p14"></p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A4-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q88_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q88_A5-p0.1">Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, + serm. xli) that "if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they become mortal sins." But anger and + drunkenness are not mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes + a venial sin to be mortal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, 24) that delectation, if morose [*See + <a id="FS_Q88_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A6.html"> Q[74], A[6]</a>], is a mortal sin, but that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a circumstance. Therefore a circumstance + makes a venial sin to be mortal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes + a good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus, because + the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by + reason of an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what + has been said ( + <a id="FS_Q88_A5-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q72_A5.html">Q[72], A[5]</a>, ad 1; + <a id="FS_Q88_A5-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A5.html"> Q[87], + A[5] + </a>, ad 1). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4; + <a id="FS_Q88_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A10.html">AA[10]</a> ,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such, is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance + may happen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its nature of circumstance, and constitutes + the species of the moral act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another genus; thus when a man + has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other be another + man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and accordingly + this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as adultery. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p7"> It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another + species. For it has been stated above + <a id="FS_Q88_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that the deformity of a venial sin consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, whereas the deformity + of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a venial + sin to be mortal, so long as it + remains a circumstance, but only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the specific difference + of the moral act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by something + accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance + something supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or the like. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p9"> We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's + neighbor, if the angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder or robbery, that anger will + be a mortal sin generically: and if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act, in so far as it is + a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through + the consent of reason. If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a sin generically venial, for + instance, if a man be angry with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a little, the + anger will not be mortal sin, however long it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to + great scandal or something of the kind. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p10"> With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and + through the mere lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is directed to God and avoids committing + many sins, is expressly contrary to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or weakness, as when a + man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, + for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk + frequently, this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than + to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to its specific nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the + delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad + 1): because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account of the approval of the deliberating reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil, unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q88_A5-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html">Q[18], A[5]</a> , ad 4). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A5-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q88_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q88_A6-p0.1">Whether a mortal sin can become venial?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from + venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q88_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this, that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while + he who sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that a person in committing a sin generically mortal, + loves a creature less than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary + to the love of God, commits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love + of God, to refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting counter to the love of God. Therefore his + will be a venial sin; and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more distant from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is + evil in itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much + more therefore can a mortal sin become venial. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal + punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can + become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity + pertaining to the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of fornication. On the other hand, + the perfect cannot become imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become + venial, by the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin is not diminished if a man commit + fornication in order to utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p7"> Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, because then + it does not completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident + from what we have said above + <a id="FS_Q88_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate + reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the + species of the act is destroyed. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man and not + vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that commits fornication + in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance + itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things + whereby he can safeguard himself in the love of God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good end." + Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5), + the judge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of the common weal, are not murderers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q88_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q87_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q89" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q89-p0.1">OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q89-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q89-p2"> We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q89-p3"> (1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?</p> + <p id="FS_Q89-p4"> (2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay," "stubble" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>); + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89-p5"> (3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?</p> + <p id="FS_Q89-p6"> (4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?</p> + <p id="FS_Q89-p7"> (5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?</p> + <p id="FS_Q89-p8"> (6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?</p> + <div id="FS_Q89_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q89_A1-p0.1">Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that + if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. + But the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a stain in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. + But, in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the + soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q89_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q86_A1.html">Q[86], A[1]</a>). But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings + a stain on the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written, ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.27" target="asv">Eph. 5:27</a>): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the gloss says: "i.e., some + grievous sin." Therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p6"> I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of comeliness due to contact with something, as may be + seen in corporeal matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of similitude. Now, just as in the + body there is a twofold comeliness, one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors, the other resulting + from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to + speak, intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but + not to habitual comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other virtues, as we + shall show further on ( + <a id="FS_Q89_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q24_A10.html">SS, Q[24], A[10]</a>; Q[133], A[1], ad 2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the thing stained, + wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual + rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, + we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness + that results from acts of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would + not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace, which + accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man + does not cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q89_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q89_A2-p0.1">Whether venial sins are suitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble"?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as "wood," "hay," and "stubble." Because wood hay and stubble are + said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions + are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:15</a>). But sometimes the man who commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in mortal sin to + which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>) those who build "gold, silver, precious stones," i.e. love of God and our neighbor, and good works, are others from those + who build wood, hay, and stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do good works, commit venial sins: for + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8</a>): "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore venial sins are not suitably + designated by these three. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are many more than three differences and degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under + these three. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:15</a>) that the man who builds up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that he will suffer punishment, + but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q89_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A5.html">Q[87], A[5]</a>). Therefore these three signify venial sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith, upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and + precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine + disapproves of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.21" target="asv">Gal. 5:21</a>), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the kingdom of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the + Apostle says that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by fire." Consequently wood, hay, stubble + cannot be understood to denote mortal sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p8"> Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed + with venial sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good thing, excessive love of his wife or + of his children or of his possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so that, to wit, for the sake of + these things he would be unwilling to do anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be + reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the love of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are + designated by "gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by "wood," "hay," and "stubble." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p9"> We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, + are designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a house, without belonging to the substance of the + house, and can be burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while the spiritual edifice + remains, and for them, man suffers fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after this life, + and yet he is saved for ever. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because + they are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.136.1" target="asv">Ps. 136:1</a>): "Upon the waters of Babylon," i.e. "beside the waters": because venial sins do not destroy the edifice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon" + the "foundation." And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." Accordingly, he that dies in mortal sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, + but not built upon the spiritual edifice; and + consequently he will not be saved so as by fire. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight venial + sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these + do not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly remain longer, because they are unable + to have such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove + them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2), "all things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the end." + Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to "wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble," + which is burnt up at once; and "hay," which is between these two: because venial sins are removed by fire, quickly or slowly, + according as man is more or less attached to them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q89_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q89_A3-p0.1">Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. Because on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:14, </a> "Adam was not seduced," a gloss says: "Having had no experience of God's severity, it was possible for him to be so mistaken + as to think that what he had done was a venial sin." But he would not have thought this unless he could have committed a venial + sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin without sinning mortally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): "We must not suppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first + of all there had arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should have been checked." Now the vainglory which preceded + man's defeat, which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be nothing more than a venial sin. In like + manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5) that "man was allured by a certain desire of + making the experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken the forbidden fruit." Again there seems to + have been a certain movement of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as appears from her saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.3" target="asv">Gn. 3:3</a>): "Lest perhaps we die." Now these apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin before he committed + a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally + notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could also sin venially. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (De Civ. + Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not + change man's state. Therefore he could not sin venially. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is generally admitted that man could not commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be understood + as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he + had committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another + species, unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or vow + or the like, which does not apply to the question in point. Consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into + mortal by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must therefore understand this to mean that he could not sin + venially, because it was impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in itself, before losing the integrity of the + original state by sinning mortally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p7"> The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden + movements, in a genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things referred to the end, the due order + of the end being safeguarded. Now each of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of the lower powers + not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the + sensuality not being perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement of reason itself is due, in us, to the + fact that the execution of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good, + as stated above (Q[74], A[10]); and that the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end, the due order + of the end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the + end, + which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the appetite, as stated above (Q[10], + AA[1],2, ad 3; Q[72], A[5]). Now, in the state of innocence, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q89_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html">FP, Q[95], A[1]</a>, there was an unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as man remained + subject to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all + the + highest part of man were not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin. From this it is evident that, in the state of + innocence, man could not commit a venial sin, before committing a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is easily + forgiven. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into + the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by + doubt, for she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept, as though she refused to be + held in check by the precept. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial sin + cannot do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is incompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is + that the first man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q89_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q89_A4-p0.1">Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially. Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul + which is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in Evang.) that "man understands in common with the angels." + But man can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel can commit a venial sin also. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally. + Therefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning venially. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like + frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be venial as stated above + <a id="FS_Q89_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q89_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, unless there is a special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin venially. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive + state, and much less, therefore, can an angel. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> An angel's intellect, as stated above in the + <a id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html">FP, Q[58], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A8.html">FP, Q[79], A[8]</a>, is not discursive, i.e. it does not proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do. + Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its principles. + Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Q[8], A[2]; Q[10], A[1]; Q[72], + A[5]), ends are like principles, while the means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel's mind is not directed to the means, + except as they stand under the order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no inordinateness in + respect of the means, unless at the same time they have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal sin. + Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts + are + acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination + to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of their own will. This does + not apply to the appetite for the natural good, which appetite we have stated to be in them ( + <a id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q63_A4.html">FP, Q[63], A[4]</a>; Q[64], A[2], ad 5). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel could not love a creature less than God, without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end, + or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The demons incite man to all such things which seem venial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to mortal + sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end they have in view. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q89_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q89_A5-p0.1">Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.1" target="asv">Rom. 8:1</a>) that "there is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh": and he is speaking + there of the concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.7" target="asv">Rom. 7</a>). Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not according to the + flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus. + Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Those who are not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow + the road of damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh." But damnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, + since man feels the sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, it seems that the first movements of concupiscence + in unbelievers are mortal sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Man was so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence." Now this + liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence + in an unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts against his duty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv"> Acts 10:34 </a>that "God is not a respecter of persons." Therefore he does not impute to one unto condemnation, what He does not impute to + another. But he does not impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither therefore does He impute them to + unbelievers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This + is evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself could not be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q79_A4.html">Q[79], A[4]</a>). Now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements + of the sensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins. + Secondly, from the state of the sinner. Because excellence of the person of the person never diminishes sin, but, on the contrary, + increases it, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A10.html">Q[73], A[10]</a>). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an unbeliever + are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of their ignorance, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.13" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:13</a>: "I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in + my unbelief": whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of grace, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.29" target="asv"> Heb. 10:29</a>: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments . . . who hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, + by which he was sanctified?" + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ, + although the "fomes" of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them + a sign of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p8"> In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is evident.</p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such liability + pertains, not to actual but to original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q89_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS.vi.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q89_A6-p0.1">Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is + a disposition to mortal sin, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q89_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A3.html">Q[88], A[3]</a>). Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes + unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an + unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin without committing another. Therefore he can also commit + a venial sin without committing a mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes + to that time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal sin, because this happens in the worst criminals. + Now it is possible for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however short it may be. Therefore venial sin + can be in anyone with original sin alone and without mortal sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Man is punished for original sin in the children's limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on ( + <a id="FS_Q89_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q69_A6.html">SS, Q[69], A[6]</a>): whereas men are punished in hell for no other than mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be punished + for venial sin with no other than original sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is because + before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, + wherefore, much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which is such generically. But when he begins + to have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal + sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself + to the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself + to the due end, and as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, for through not doing + that which is in his power to do. Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until + afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a necessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes disposes + to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on + account of the lack of use of reason, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free from + the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon as possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has + discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing + in the intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's + affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.1.3" target="asv">Zech. 1:3</a>): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q89_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS.vi.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q88_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q54_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q55.html"></a> + ` + </div> \ No newline at end of file