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+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="XP.ii" class="div2">
+            <a href="summa.XP.i.html"></a>
+            <a href="summa.XP_Q1.html"></a>
+            <div id="XP_Q1" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP.ii.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q1-p0.1">OF THE PARTS OF PENANCE, IN PARTICULAR, AND FIRST OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q1-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q1-p2"> We must now consider each single part of Penance, and (1) Contrition; (2) Confession; (3) Satisfaction. The consideration
+                  about Contrition will be fourfold: (1) What is it? (2) What should it be about? (3) How great should it be? (4) Of its duration;
+                  (5) Of its effect.
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q1-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q1-p4"> (1) Whether Contrition is suitably defined?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q1-p5"> (2) Whether it is an act of virtue?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q1-p6"> (3) Whether attrition can become contrition?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q1_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q1_A1-p0.1">Whether contrition is an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of confessing them and of making satisfaction
+                     for them?
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that contrition is not "an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of confessing them and of making
+                     satisfaction for them," as some define it. For, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6), "sorrow is for those things that
+                     happen against our will." But this does not apply to sin. Therefore contrition is not sorrow for sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contrition is given us by God. But what is given is not assumed. Therefore contrition is not an assumed sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, satisfaction and confession are necessary for the remission of the punishment which was not remitted by contrition.
+                     But sometimes the whole punishment is remitted in contrition. Therefore it is not always necessary for the contrite person
+                     to have the purpose of confessing and of making satisfaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the definition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q1_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv"> Ecclus. 10:15, </a> "pride is the beginning of all sin," because thereby man clings to his own judgment, and strays from the Divine commandments.
+                     Consequently that which destroys sin must needs make man give up his own judgment. Now he that persists in his own judgment,
+                     is called metaphorically rigid and hard: wherefore anyone is said to be broken when he is torn from his own judgment. But,
+                     in material things, whence these
+                     expressions are transferred to spiritual things, there is a difference between breaking and crushing or contrition, as stated
+                     in Meteor. iv, in that we speak of breaking when a thing is sundered into large parts, but of crushing or contrition when
+                     that which was in itself solid is reduced to minute particles. And since, for the remission of sin, it is necessary that man
+                     should put aside entirely his attachment to sin, which implies a certain state of continuity and solidity in his mind,
+                     therefore it is that the act through which sin is cast aside is called contrition metaphorically.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p7"> In this contrition several things are to be observed, viz. the very substance of the act, the way of acting, its origin and
+                     its effect: in respect of which we find that contrition has been defined in various ways. For, as regards the substance of
+                     the act, we have the definition given above: and since the act of contrition is both an act of virtue, and a part of the sacrament
+                     of Penance, its nature as an act of virtue is explained in this definition by mentioning its genus, viz.
+                     "sorrow," its object by the words "for sins," and the act of choice which is necessary for an act of virtue, by the word "assumed":
+                     while, as a part of the sacrament, it is made manifest by pointing out its relation to the other parts, in the words "together
+                     with the purpose of confessing and of making satisfaction."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p8"> There is another definition which defines contrition, only as an act of virtue; but at the same time including the difference
+                     which confines it to a special virtue, viz. penance, for it is thus expressed: "Contrition is voluntary sorrow for sin whereby
+                     man punishes in himself that which he grieves to have done," because the addition of the word "punishes" defines the definition
+                     to a special virtue. Another definition is given by Isidore (De Sum. Bono ii, 12) as follows:
+                     "Contrition is a tearful sorrow and humility of mind, arising from remembrance of sin and fear of the Judgment." Here we have
+                     an allusion to the derivation of the word, when it is said that it is "humility of the mind," because just as pride makes
+                     the mind rigid, so is a man humbled, when contrition leads him to give up his mind. Also the external manner is indicated
+                     by the word "tearful," and the origin of contrition, by the words, "arising from remembrance of sin," etc. Another definition
+                     is
+                     taken from the words of Augustine [*Implicitly on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q1_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.46" target="asv">Ps. 46</a>], and indicates the effect of contrition. It runs thus: "Contrition is the sorrow which takes away sin." Yet another is gathered
+                     from the words of Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 11) as follows: "Contrition is humility of the soul, crushing sin between hope and
+                     fear." Here the derivation is indicated by saying that contrition is "humility of the soul"; the effect, by the words, "crushing
+                     sin"; and the origin, by the words, "between hope and
+                     fear." Indeed, it includes not only the principal cause, which is fear, but also its joint cause, which is hope, without which,
+                     fear might lead to despair.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although sins, when committed, were voluntary, yet when we are contrite for them, they are no longer voluntary, so that they
+                     occur against our will; not indeed in respect of the will that we had when we consented to them, but in respect of that which
+                     we have now, so as to wish they had never been.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Contrition is from God alone as to the form that quickens it, but as to the substance of the act, it is from the free-will
+                     and from God, Who operates in all works both of nature and of will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the entire punishment may be remitted by contrition, yet confession and satisfaction are still necessary, both because
+                     man cannot be sure that his contrition was sufficient to take away all, and because confession and satisfaction are a matter
+                     of precept: wherefore he becomes a transgressor, who confesses not and makes not satisfaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q1_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q1_A2-p0.1">Whether contrition is an act of virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that contrition is not an act of virtue. For passions are not acts of virtue, since "they bring us neither
+                     praise nor blame" (Ethic. ii, 5). But sorrow is a passion. As therefore contrition is sorrow, it seems that it is not an act
+                     of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as contrition is so called from its being a crushing, so is attrition. Now all agree in saying that attrition is
+                     not an act of virtue. Neither, therefore, is contrition an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but an act of virtue is meritorious. But contrition is a meritorious act. Therefore it is an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Contrition as to the literal signification of the word, does not denote an act of virtue, but a corporeal passion. But the
+                     question in point does not refer to contrition in this sense, but to that which the word is employed to signify by way of
+                     metaphor. For just as the inflation of one's own will unto wrong-doing implies, in itself, a generic evil, so the utter undoing
+                     and crushing of that same will implies something generically good, for this is to detest
+                     one's own will whereby sin was committed. Wherefore contrition, which signifies this, implies rectitude of the will; and so
+                     it is the act of that virtue to which it belongs to detest and destroy past sins, the act, to wit, of penance, as is evident
+                     from what was said above (Sent. iv, D, 14, Q[1], A[1]; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q1_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q85_A2.html">TP, Q[85], AA[2]</a>,3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Contrition includes a twofold sorrow for sin. One is in the sensitive part, and is a passion. This does not belong essentially
+                     to contrition as an act of virtue, but is rather its effect. For just as the virtue of penance inflicts outward punishment
+                     on the body, in order to compensate for the offense done to God through the instrumentality of the bodily members, so does
+                     it inflict on the concupiscible part of the soul a punishment, viz. the aforesaid
+                     sorrow, because the concupiscible also co-operated in the sinful deeds. Nevertheless this sorrow may belong to contrition
+                     taken as part of the sacrament, since the nature of a sacrament is such that it consists not only of internal but also of
+                     external acts and sensible things. The other sorrow is in the will, and is nothing else save displeasure for some evil, for
+                     the emotions of the will are named after the passions, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 26, Q[1], A[5]; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q1_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html">FS,
+                        Q[22], A[3]
+                     </a>, ad 3). Accordingly, contrition is essentially a kind of sorrow, and is an act of the virtue of penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Attrition denotes approach to perfect contrition, wherefore in corporeal matters, things are said to be attrite, when they
+                     are worn away to a certain extent, but not altogether crushed to pieces; while they are said to be contrite, when all the
+                     parts are crushed [tritae] minutely. Wherefore, in spiritual matters, attrition signifies a certain but not a perfect displeasure
+                     for sins committed, whereas contrition denotes perfect displeasure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q1_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q1_A3-p0.1">Whether attrition can become contrition?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that attrition can become contrition. For contrition differs from attrition, as living from dead. Now dead
+                     faith becomes living. Therefore attrition can become contrition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, matter receives perfection when privation is removed. Now sorrow is to grace, as matter to form, because grace quickens
+                     sorrow. Therefore the sorrow that was previously lifeless, while guilt remained, receives perfection through being quickened
+                     by grace: and so the same conclusion follows as above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Things which are caused by principles altogether diverse cannot be changed, one into the other. Now the principle of attrition
+                     is servile fear, while filial fear is the cause of contrition. Therefore attrition cannot become contrition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There are two opinions on this question: for some say that attrition may become contrition, even as lifeless faith becomes
+                     living faith. But, seemingly, this is impossible; since, although the habit of lifeless faith becomes living, yet never does
+                     an act of lifeless faith become an act of living faith, because the lifeless act passes away and remains no more, as soon
+                     as charity comes. Now attrition and contrition do not denote a habit, but an act only: and
+                     those habits of infused virtue which regard the will cannot be lifeless, since they result from charity, as stated above (Sent.
+                     iii, D, 27, Q[2], A[4]; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q1_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A4.html">FS, Q[65], A[4]</a>). Wherefore until grace be infused, there is no habit by which afterwards the act of contrition may be elicited; so that
+                     attrition can nowise become attrition: and this is the other opinion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is no comparison between faith and contrition, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the privation is removed from matter, the matter is quickened if it remains when the perfection comes. But the sorrow
+                     which was lifeless, does not remain when charity comes, wherefore it cannot be quickened.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p8"> It may also be replied that matter does not take its origin from the form essentially, as an act takes its origin from the
+                     habit which quickens it. Wherefore nothing hinders matter being quickened anew by some form, whereby it was not quickened
+                     previously: whereas this cannot be said of an act, even as it is impossible for the identically same thing to arise from a
+                     cause wherefrom it did not arise before, since a thing is brought into being but once.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP.ii.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q2" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q2-p0.1">OF THE OBJECT OF CONTRITION (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q2-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q2-p2"> We must now consider the object of contrition. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q2-p3"> (1) Whether a man should be contrite on account of his punishment?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q2-p4"> (2) Whether, on account of original sin?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q2-p5"> (3) Whether, for every actual sin he has committed?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q2-p6"> (4) Whether, for actual sins he will commit?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q2-p7"> (5) Whether, for the sins of others?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q2-p8"> (6) Whether, for each single mortal sin?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q2_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q2_A1-p0.1">Whether man should be contrite on account of the punishment, and not only on account of his sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man should be contrite on account of the punishment, and not only on account of his sin. For Augustine
+                     says in De Poenitentia [*Cf. Hom. 50 inter 1]: "No man desires life everlasting unless he repent of this mortal life." But
+                     the morality of this life is a punishment. Therefore the penitent should be contrite on account of his punishments also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 16, cap. i), quoting Augustine (De vera et falsa Poenitentia [*Work of an unknown
+                     author]), that the penitent should be sorry for having deprived himself of virtue. But privation of virtue is a punishment.
+                     Therefore contrition is sorrow for punishments also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No one holds to that for which he is sorry. But a penitent, by the very signification of the word, is one who holds to his
+                     punishment [*"Poenitens," i.e. "poenam tenens"]. Therefore he is not sorry on account of his punishment, so that contrition
+                     which is penitential sorrow is not on account of punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q2_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>), contrition implies the crushing of something hard and whole. Now this wholeness and hardness is found in the evil of fault,
+                     since the will, which is the cause thereof in the evil-doer, sticks to its own ground*, and refuses to yield to the precept
+                     of the law, wherefore displeasure at a suchlike evil is called metaphorically "contrition." [*There is a play on the words
+                     here---'integer' (whole) and 'in suis
+                     terminis' (to its own ground)]. But this metaphor cannot be applied to evil of punishment, because punishment simply denotes
+                     a lessening, so that it is possible to have sorrow for punishment but not contrition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to St. Augustine, penance should be on account of this mortal life, not by reason of its mortality (unless penance
+                     be taken broadly for every kind of sorrow); but by reason of sins, to which we are prone on account of the weakness of this
+                     life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sorrow for the loss of virtue through sin is not essentially the same as contrition, but is its principle. For just as we
+                     are moved to desire a thing on account of the good we expect to derive from it, so are we moved to be sorry for something
+                     on account of the evil accruing to us therefrom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q2_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q2_A2-p0.1">Whether contrition should be on account of original sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that contrition should be on account of original sin. For we ought to be contrite on account of actual sin;
+                     not by reason of the act, considered as a kind of being, but by reason of its deformity, since the act, regarded in its substance,
+                     is a good, and is from God. Now original sin has a deformity, even as actual sin has. Therefore we should be contrite on its
+                     account also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by original sin man has been turned away from God, since in punishment thereof he was to be deprived of seeing God.
+                     But every man should be displeased at having been turned away from God. Therefore man should be displeased at original sin;
+                     and so he ought to have contrition for it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The medicine should be proportionate to the disease. Now we contracted original sin without willing to do so. Therefore it
+                     is not necessary that we should be cleansed from it by an act of the will, such as contrition is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Contrition is sorrow, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q2_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], AA[1]</a>,2), respecting and, so to speak, crushing the hardness of the will. Consequently it can regard those sins only which result
+                     in us through the hardness of our will. And as original sin was not brought upon us by our own will, but contracted from the
+                     origin of our infected nature, it follows that, properly speaking, we cannot have contrition on its account, but only displeasure
+                     or
+                     sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Contrition is for sin, not by reason of the mere substance of the act, because it does not derive the character of evil therefrom;
+                     nor again, by reason of its deformity alone, because deformity, of itself, does not include the notion of guilt, and sometimes
+                     denotes a punishment. But contrition ought to be on account of sin, as implying deformity resulting from an act of the will;
+                     and this does not apply to original sin, so that contrition does not
+                     apply to it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p7"> The same Reply avails for the Second Objection, because contrition is due to aversion of the will.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q2_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q2_A3-p0.1">Whether we should have contrition for every actual sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we have no need to have contrition for every actual sin we have committed. For contraries are healed by
+                     their contraries. Now some sins are committed through sorrow, e.g. sloth and envy. Therefore their remedy should not be sorrow,
+                     such as contrition is, but joy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contrition is an act of the will, which cannot refer to that which is not known. But there are sins of which we
+                     have no knowledge, such as those we have forgotten. Therefore we cannot have contrition for them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by voluntary contrition those sins are blotted out which we committed voluntarily. But ignorance takes away voluntariness,
+                     as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iii, 1). Therefore contrition need not cover things which have occurred through ignorance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we need not be contrite for a sin which is not removed by contrition. Now some sins are not removed by contrition,
+                     e.g. venial sins, that remain after the grace of contrition. Therefore there is no need to have contrition for all one's past
+                     sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Penance is a remedy for all actual sins. But penance cannot regard some sins, without contrition regarding them also, for
+                     it is the first part of Penance. Therefore contrition should be for all one's past sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p7"> Further, no sin is forgiven a man unless he be justified. But justification requires contrition, as stated above (Q[1], A[1];
+                     
+                     <a id="XP_Q2_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113.html">FS, Q[113])</a>. Therefore it is necessary to have contrition for all one's sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Every actual sin is caused by our will not yielding to God's law, either by transgressing it, or by omitting it, or by acting
+                     beside it: and since a hard thing is one that is disposed not to give way easily, hence it is that a certain hardness of the
+                     will is to be found in every actual sin. Wherefore, if a sin is to be remedied, it needs to be taken away by contrition which
+                     crushes it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As clearly shown above (A[2], ad 1), contrition is opposed to sin, in so far as it proceeds from the choice of the will that
+                     had failed to obey the command of God's law, and not as regards the material part of sin: and it is on this that the choice
+                     of the will falls. Now the will's choice falls not only on the acts of the other powers, which the will uses for its own end,
+                     but also on the will's own proper act: for the will wills to will something.
+                     Accordingly the will's choice falls on that pain or sadness which is to be found in the sin of envy and the like, whether
+                     such pain be in the senses or in the will itself. Consequently the sorrow of contrition is opposed to those sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One may forget a thing in two ways, either so that it escapes the memory altogether, and then one cannot search for it; or
+                     so that it escapes from the memory in part, and in part remains, as when I remember having heard something in general, but
+                     know not what it was in particular, and then I search my memory in order to discover it. Accordingly a sin also may be forgotten
+                     in two ways, either so as to remain in a general, but not in a particular
+                     remembrance, and then a man is bound to bethink himself in order to discover the sin, because he is bound to have contrition
+                     for each individual mortal sin. And if he is unable to discover it, after applying himself with due care, it is enough that
+                     he be contrite for it, according as it stands in his knowledge, and indeed he should grieve not only for the sin, but also
+                     for having forgotten it, because this is owing to his neglect. If, however, the sin has escaped from his memory altogether,
+                     then he is excused from his duty through being unable to fulfill it, and it is enough that he be contrite in general for everything
+                     wherein he has offended God. But when this inability is removed, as when the sin is recalled to his memory, then he is bound
+                     to have contrition for that sin in particular, even as a poor man, who cannot pay a debt, is excused, and yet is bound to,
+                     as soon as he can.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If ignorance were to remove altogether the will to do evil, it will excuse, and there would be no sin: and sometimes it does
+                     not remove the will altogether, and then it does not altogether excuse, but only to a certain extent: wherefore a man is bound
+                     to be contrite for a sin committed through ignorance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A venial sin can remain after contrition for a mortal sin, but not after contrition for the venial sin: wherefore contrition
+                     should also cover venial sins even as penance does, as stated above (Sent. iv, D, 16, Q[2], A[2], qu. 2; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q2_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q87_A1.html">XP, Q[87], A[1]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q2_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q2_A4-p0.1">Whether a man is bound to have contrition for his future sins?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man is bound to have contrition for his future sins also. For contrition is an act of the free-will:
+                     and the free-will extends to the future rather than to the past, since choice, which is an act of the free-will, is about
+                     future contingents, as stated in Ethic. iii. Therefore contrition is about future sins rather than about past sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is aggravated by the result that ensues from it: wherefore Jerome says [*St. Basil asserts this implicitly in
+                     De Vera Virgin.] that the punishment of Arius is not yet ended, for it is yet possible for some to be ruined through his heresy,
+                     by reason of whose ruin his punishment would be increased: and the same applies to a man who is judged guilty of murder, if
+                     he has committed a murderous assault, even before his victim dies. Now the sinner ought
+                     to be contrite during that intervening time. Therefore the degree of his contrition ought to be proportionate not only to
+                     his past act, but also to its eventual result: and consequently contrition regards the future.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Contrition is a part of penance. But penance always regards the past: and therefore contrition does also, and consequently
+                     is not for a future sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In every series of things moving and moved ordained to one another, we find that the inferior mover has its proper movement,
+                     and besides this, it follows, in some respect, the movement of the superior mover: this is seen in the movement of the planets,
+                     which, in addition to their proper movements, follow the movement of the first heaven. Now, in all the moral virtues, the
+                     first mover is prudence, which is called the charioteer of the virtues. Consequently
+                     each moral virtue, in addition to its proper movement, has something of the movement of prudence: and therefore, since penance
+                     is a moral virtue, as it is a part of justice, in addition to its own act, it acquires the movement of prudence. Now its proper
+                     movement is towards its proper object, which is a sin committed. Wherefore its proper and principal act, viz. contrition,
+                     essentially regards past sins alone; but, inasmuch as it acquires something of the act of prudence, it regards future sins
+                     indirectly, although it is not essentially moved towards those future sins. For this reason, he that is contrite, is sorry
+                     for his past sins, and is cautious of future sins. Yet we do not speak of contrition for future sins, but of caution, which
+                     is a part of prudence conjoined to penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The free-will is said to regard future contingents, in so far as it is concerned with acts, but not with the object of acts:
+                     because, of his own free-will, a man can think about past and necessary things, and yet the very act of thinking, in so far
+                     as it is subject to the free-will, is a future contingent. Hence the act the contrition also is a future contingent, in so
+                     far as it is subject to the free-will; and yet its object can be something
+                     past.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The consequent result which aggravates a sin was already present in the act as in its cause; wherefore when the sin was committed,
+                     its degree of gravity was already complete, and no further guilt accrued to it when the result took place. Nevertheless some
+                     accidental punishment accrues to it, in the respect of which the damned will have the more motives of regret for the more
+                     evils that have resulted from their sins. It is in this sense that Jerome
+                     [*Basil] speaks. Hence there is not need for contrition to be for other than past sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q2_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q2_A5-p0.1">Whether a man ought to have contrition for another's sin? </h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man ought to have contrition for another's sin. For one should not ask forgiveness for a sin unless
+                     one is contrite for it. Now forgiveness is asked for another's sin in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q2_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.13" target="asv"> Ps. 18:13</a>: "From those of others spare thy servant." Therefore a man ought to be contrite for another's sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man is bound, ought of charity, to love his neighbor as himself. Now, through love of himself, he both grieves for
+                     his ills, and desires good things. Therefore, since we are bound to desire the goods of grace for our neighbor, as for ourselves,
+                     it seems that we ought to grieve for his sins, even as for our own. But contrition is nothing else than sorrow for sins. Therefore
+                     man should be contrite for the sins of others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Contrition is an act of the virtue of penance. But no one repents save for what he has done himself. Therefore no one is
+                     contrite for others' sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The same thing is crushed [conteritur] which hitherto was hard and whole. Hence contrition for sin must needs be in the same
+                     subject in which the hardness of sin was hitherto: so that there is no contrition for the sins of others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The prophet prays to be spared from the sins of others, in so far as, through fellowship with sinners, a man contracts a
+                     stain by consenting to their sins: thus it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q2_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.17.27" target="asv">Ps. 17:27</a>): "With the perverse thou wilt be perverted."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We ought to grieve for the sins of others, but not to have contrition for them, because not all sorrow for past sins is contrition,
+                     as is evident for what has been said already.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q2_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q2_A6-p0.1">Whether it is necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin. For the movement of contrition in justification
+                     is instantaneous: whereas a man cannot think of every mortal sin in an instant. Therefore it is not necessary to have contrition
+                     for each mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contrition should be for sins, inasmuch as they turn us away from God, because we need not be contrite for turning
+                     to creatures without turning away from God. Now all mortal sins agree in turning us away from God. Therefore one contrition
+                     for all is sufficient.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, mortal sins have more in common with one another, than actual and original sin. Now one Baptism blots out all sins
+                     both actual and original. Therefore one general contrition blots out all mortal sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> For diverse diseases there are diverse remedies, since "what heals the eye will not heal the foot," as Jerome says (Super
+                     Marc. ix, 28). But contrition is the special remedy for one mortal sin. Therefore one general contrition for all mortal sins
+                     does not suffice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p6"> Further, contrition is expressed by confession. But it is necessary to confess each mortal sin. Therefore it is necessary
+                     to have contrition for each mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Contrition may be considered in two ways, as to its origin, and as to its term. By origin of contrition I mean the process
+                     of thought, when a man thinks of his sin and is sorry for it, albeit not with the sorrow of contrition, yet with that of attrition.
+                     The term of contrition is when that sorrow is already quickened by grace. Accordingly, as regards the origin of contrition,
+                     a man needs to be contrite for each sin that he calls to mind; but as regards its
+                     term, it suffices for him to have one general contrition for all, because then the movement of his contrition acts in virtue
+                     of all his preceding dispositions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although all mortal sins agree in turning man away from God, yet they differ in the cause and mode of aversion, and in the
+                     degree of separation from God; and this regards the different ways in which they turn us to creatures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Baptism acts in virtue of Christ's merit, Who had infinite power for the blotting out of all sins; and so for all sins one
+                     Baptism suffices. But in contrition, in addition to the merit of Christ, an act of ours is requisite, which must, therefore,
+                     correspond to each sin, since it has not infinite power for contrition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p11"> It may also be replied that Baptism is a spiritual generation; whereas Penance, as regards contrition and its other parts,
+                     is a kind of spiritual healing by way of some alteration. Now it is evident in the generation of a body, accompanied by corruption
+                     of another body, that all the accidents contrary to the thing generated, and which were the accidents of the thing corrupted,
+                     are removed by the one generation: whereas in alteration, only that accident is removed which was
+                     contrary to the accident which is the term of the alteration. In like manner, one Baptism blots out all sins together and
+                     introduces a new life; whereas Penance does not blot out each sin, unless it be directed to each. For this reason it is necessary
+                     to be contrite for, and to confess each sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q3" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q3-p0.1">OF THE DEGREE OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q3-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q3-p2"> We must now consider the degree of contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q3-p3"> (1) Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q3-p4"> (2) Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q3-p5"> (3) Whether sorrow for one sin ought to be greater than for another?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q3_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q3_A1-p0.1">Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that contrition is not the greatest possible sorrow in the world. For sorrow is the sensation of hurt. But
+                     some hurts are more keenly felt than the hurt of sin, e.g. the hurt of a wound. Therefore contrition is not the greatest sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we judge of a cause according to its effect. Now the effect of sorrow is tears. Since therefore sometimes a contrite
+                     person does not shed outward tears for his sins, whereas he weeps for the death of a friend, or for a blow, or the like, it
+                     seems that contrition is not the greatest sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more a thing is mingled with its contrary, the less its intensity. But the sorrow of contrition has a considerable
+                     admixture of joy, because the contrite man rejoices in his delivery, in the hope of pardon, and in many like things. Therefore
+                     his sorrow is very slight.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the sorrow of contrition is a kind of displeasure. But there are many things more displeasing to the contrite than
+                     their past sins; for they would not prefer to suffer the pains of hell rather than to sin. nor to have suffered, nor yet to
+                     suffer all manner of temporal punishment; else few would be found contrite. Therefore the sorrow of contrition is not the
+                     greatest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), "all sorrow is based on love." Now the love of charity, on which the sorrow
+                     of contrition is based, is the greatest love. Therefore the sorrow of contrition is the greatest sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p7"> Further, sorrow is for evil. Therefore the greater the evil, the greater the sorrow. But the fault is a greater evil than
+                     its punishment. Therefore contrition which is sorrow for fault, surpasses all other sorrow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q3_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q1_A2.html">Q[1], A[2]</a>, ad 1), there is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the will, and is the very essence of contrition, being nothing
+                     else than displeasure at past sin, and this sorrow, in contrition, surpasses all other sorrows. For the more pleasing a thing
+                     is, the more displeasing is its contrary. Now the last end is above all things pleasing: wherefore sin, which turns us away
+                     from the last end, should be, above
+                     all things, displeasing. The other sorrow is in the sensitive part, and is caused by the former sorrow either from natural
+                     necessity, in so far as the lower powers follow the movements of the higher, or from choice, in so far as a penitent excites
+                     in himself this sorrow for his sins. In neither of these ways is such sorrow, of necessity, the greatest, because the lower
+                     powers are more deeply moved by their own objects than through redundance from the higher powers. Wherefore the nearer the
+                     operation of the higher powers approaches to the objects of the lower powers, the more do the latter follow the movement of
+                     the former. Consequently there is greater pain in the sensitive part, on account of a sensible hurt, than that which redounds
+                     into the sensitive part from the reason; and likewise, that which redounds from the reason when it deliberates on corporeal
+                     things, is greater than that which redounds from the reason in considering spiritual things. Therefore the sorrow which
+                     results in the sensitive part from the reason's displeasure at sin, is not greater than the other sorrows of which that same
+                     part is the subject: and likewise, neither is the sorrow which is assumed voluntarily greater than other sorrows---both because
+                     the lower appetite does not obey the higher appetite infallibly, as though in the lower appetite there should arise a passion
+                     of such intensity and of such a kind as the higher appetite might ordain---and because the passions are employed by the
+                     reason, in acts of virtue, according to a certain measure, which the sorrow that is without virtue sometimes does not observe,
+                     but exceeds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as sensible sorrow is on account of the sensation of hurt, so interior sorrow is on account of the thought of something
+                     hurtful. Therefore, although the hurt of sin is not perceived by the external sense, yet it is perceived to be the most grievous
+                     hurt by the interior sense or reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Affections of the body are the immediate result of the sensitive passions and, through them, of the emotions of the higher
+                     appetite. Hence it is that bodily tears flow more quickly from sensible sorrow, or even from a thing that hurts the senses,
+                     than from the spiritual sorrow of contrition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The joy which a penitent has for his sorrow does not lessen his displeasure (for it is not contrary to it), but increases
+                     it, according as every operation is increased by the delight which it causes, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Thus he who delights
+                     in learning a science, learns the better, and, in like manner, he who rejoices in his displeasure, is the more intensely displeased.
+                     But it may well happen that this joy tempers the sorrow that results from
+                     the reason in the sensitive part.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The degree of displeasure at a thing should be proportionate to the degree of its malice. Now the malice of mortal sin is
+                     measured from Him against Whom it is committed, inasmuch as it is offensive to Him; and from him who sins, inasmuch as it
+                     is hurtful to him. And, since man should love God more than himself, therefore he should hate sin, as an offense against God,
+                     more than as being hurtful to himself. Now it is hurtful to him chiefly because it
+                     separates him from God; and in this respect the separation from God which is a punishment, should be more displeasing than
+                     the sin itself, as causing this hurt (since what is hated on account of something else, is less hated), but less than the
+                     sin, as an offense against God. Again, among all the punishments of malice a certain order is observed according to the degree
+                     of the hurt. Consequently, since this is the greatest hurt, inasmuch as it consists in privation of the greatest good, the
+                     greatest of all punishments will be separation from God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p13"> Again, with regard to this displeasure, it is necessary to observe that there is also an accidental degree of malice, in
+                     respect of the present and the past; since what is past, is no more, whence it has less of the character of malice or goodness.
+                     Hence it is that a man shrinks from suffering an evil at the present, or at some future time, more than he shudders at the
+                     past evil: wherefore also, no passion of the soul corresponds directly to the past, as sorrow corresponds to
+                     present evil, and fear to future evil. Consequently, of two past evils, the mind shrinks the more from that one which still
+                     produces a greater effect at the present time, or which, it fears, will produce a greater effect in the future, although in
+                     the past it was the lesser evil. And, since the effect of the past sin is sometimes not so keenly felt as the effect of the
+                     past punishment, both because sin is more perfectly remedied than punishment, and because bodily defect is more manifest than
+                     spiritual defect, therefore even a man, who is well disposed, sometimes feels a greater abhorrence of his past punishment
+                     than of his past sin, although he would be ready to suffer the same punishment over again rather than commit the same sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p14"> We must also observe, in comparing sin with punishment, that some punishments are inseparable from offense of God, e.g. separation
+                     from God; and some also are everlasting, e.g. the punishment of hell. Therefore the punishment to which is connected offense
+                     of God is to be shunned in the same way as sin; whereas that which is everlasting is simply to be shunned more than sin. If,
+                     however, we separate from these punishments the notion of offense, and consider only the notion of
+                     punishment, they have the character of malice, less than sin has as an offense against God: and for this reason should cause
+                     less displeasure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p15"> We must, however, take note that, although the contrite should be thus disposed, yet he should not be questioned about his
+                     feelings, because man cannot easily measure them. Sometimes that which displeases least seems to displease most, through being
+                     more closely connected with some sensible hurt, which is more known to us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q3_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q3_A2-p0.1">Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sorrow of contrition cannot be too great. For no sorrow can be more immoderate than that which destroys
+                     its own subject. But the sorrow of contrition, if it be so great as to cause death or corruption of the body, is praiseworthy.
+                     For Anselm says (Orat. lii): "Would that such were the exuberance of my inmost soul, as to dry up the marrow of my body";
+                     and Augustine [*De Contritione Cordis, work of an unknown author] confesses that "he
+                     deserves to blind his eyes with tears." Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot be too great.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sorrow of contrition results from the love of charity. But the love of charity cannot be too great. Neither,
+                     therefore, can the sorrow of contrition be too great.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> On the contrary, Every moral virtue is destroyed by excess and deficiency. But contrition is an act of a moral virtue, viz.
+                     penance, since it is a part of justice. Therefore sorrow for sins can be too great.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Contrition, as regards the sorrow in the reason, i.e. the displeasure, whereby the sin is displeasing through being an offense
+                     against God, cannot be too great; even as neither can the love of charity be too great, for when this is increased the aforesaid
+                     displeasure is increased also. But, as regards the sensible sorrow, contrition may be too great, even as outward affliction
+                     of the body may be too great. In all these things the rule should be the
+                     safeguarding of the subject, and of that general well-being which suffices for the fulfillment of one's duties; hence it is
+                     written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q3_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.1" target="asv">Rom. 12:1</a>): "Let your sacrifice be reasonable [*Vulg.: 'Present your bodies . . . a reasonable sacrifice']."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Anselm desired the marrow of his body to be dried up by the exuberance of his devotion, not as regards the natural humor,
+                     but as to his bodily desires and concupiscences. And, although Augustine acknowledged that he deserved to lose the use of
+                     his bodily eyes on account of his sins, because every sinner deserves not only eternal, but also temporal death, yet he did
+                     not wish his eyes to be blinded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection considers the sorrow which is in the reason: while the Third considers the sorrow of the sensitive part.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q3_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q3_A3-p0.1">Whether sorrow for one sin should be greater than for another?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow for one sin need not be greater than for another. For Jerome (Ep. cviii) commends Paula for that
+                     "she deplored her slightest sins as much as great ones." Therefore one need not be more sorry for one sin than for another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the movement of contrition is instantaneous. Now one instantaneous movement cannot be at the same time more intense
+                     and more remiss. Therefore contrition for one sin need not be greater than for another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contrition is for sin chiefly as turning us away from God. But all mortal sins agree in turning us away from God,
+                     since they all deprive us of grace whereby the soul is united to God. Therefore we should have equal contrition for all mortal
+                     sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q3_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv">Dt. 25:2</a>): "According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now, in contrition, the stripes are measured
+                     according to the sins, because to contrition is united the purpose of making satisfaction. Therefore contrition should be
+                     for one sin more than for another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p6"> Further, man should be contrite for that which he ought to have avoided. But he ought to avoid one sin more than another,
+                     if that sin is more grievous, and it be necessary to do one or the other. Therefore, in like manner, he ought to be more sorry
+                     for one, viz. the more grievous, than for the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of contrition in two ways: first, in so far as it corresponds to each single sin, and thus, as regards the sorrow
+                     in the higher appetite, a man ought to be more sorry for a more grievous sin, because there is more reason for sorrow, viz.
+                     the offense against God, in such a sin than in another, since the more inordinate the act is, the more it offends God. In
+                     like manner, since the greater sin deserves a greater punishment, the sorrow also of the
+                     sensitive part, in so far as it is voluntarily undergone for sin, as the punishment thereof, ought to be greater where the
+                     sin is greater. But in so far as the emotions of the lower appetite result from the impression of the higher appetite, the
+                     degree of sorrow depends on the disposition of the lower faculty to the reception of impressions from the higher faculty,
+                     and not on the greatness of the sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p8"> Secondly, contrition may be taken in so far as it is directed to all one's sins together, as in the act of justification.
+                     Such contrition arises either from the consideration of each single sin, and thus although it is but one act, yet the distinction
+                     of the sins remains virtually therein; or, at least, it includes the purpose of thinking of each sin; and in this way too
+                     it is habitually more for one than for another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Paula is commended, not for deploring all her sins equally, but because she grieved for her slight sins as much as though
+                     they were grave sins, in comparison with other persons who grieve for their sins: but for graver sins she would have grieved
+                     much more.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In that instantaneous movement of contrition, although it is not possible to find an actually distinct intensity in respect
+                     of each individual sin, yet it is found in the way explained above; and also in another way, in so far as, in this general
+                     contrition, each individual sin is related to that particular motive of sorrow which occurs to the contrite person, viz. the
+                     offense against God. For he who loves a whole, loves its parts potentially although
+                     not actually, and accordingly he loves some parts more and some less, in proportion to their relation to the whole; thus he
+                     who loves a community, virtually loves each one more or less according to their respective relations to the common good. In
+                     like manner he who is sorry for having offended God, implicitly grieves for his different sins in different ways, according
+                     as by them he offended God more or less.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although each mortal sin turns us away from God and deprives us of His grace, yet some remove us further away than others,
+                     inasmuch as through their inordinateness they become more out of harmony with the order of the Divine goodness, than others
+                     do.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q4" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q4-p0.1">OF THE TIME FOR CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q4-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q4-p2"> We must now consider the time for contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q4-p3"> (1) Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q4-p4"> (2) Whether it is expedient to grieve continually for our sins?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q4-p5"> (3) Whether souls grieve for their sins even after this life?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q4_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q4_A1-p0.1">Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the time for contrition is not the whole of this life. For as we should be sorry for a sin committed,
+                     so should we be ashamed of it. But shame for sin does not last all one's life, for Ambrose says (De Poenit. ii) that "he whose
+                     sin is forgiven has nothing to be ashamed of." Therefore it seems that neither should contrition last all one's life, since
+                     it is sorrow for sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q4_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.18" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:18</a>) that "perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain." But sorrow also has pain. Therefore the sorrow of contrition
+                     cannot remain in the state of perfect charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there cannot be any sorrow for the past (since it is, properly speaking, about a present evil) except in so far
+                     as something of the past sin remains in the present time. Now, in this life, sometimes one attains to a state in which nothing
+                     remains of a past sin, neither disposition, nor guilt, nor any debt of punishment. Therefore there is no need to grieve any
+                     more for that sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q4_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>) that "to them that love God all things work together unto good," even sins as a gloss declares [*Augustine, De Correp. et
+                     Grat.]. Therefore there is no need for them to grieve for sin after it has been forgiven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, contrition is a part of Penance, condivided with satisfaction. But there is no need for continual satisfaction.
+                     Therefore contrition for sin need not be continual.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author] says that "when sorrow ceases, penance
+                     fails, and when penance fails, no pardon remains." Therefore, since it behooves one not to lose the forgiveness which has
+                     been granted, it seems that one ought always to grieve for one's sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p8"> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q4_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.5.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 5:5</a>): "Be not without fear about sin forgiven." Therefore man should always grieve, that his sins may be forgiven him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q4_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>), there is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the reason, and is detestation of the sin committed; the other is in
+                     the sensitive part, and results from the former: and as regards both, the time for contrition is the whole of the present
+                     state of life. For as long as one is a wayfarer, one detests the obstacles which retard or hinder one from reaching the end
+                     of the way. Wherefore, since past sin
+                     retards the course of our life towards God (because the time which was given to us for the course cannot be recovered), it
+                     follows that the state of contrition remains during the whole of this lifetime, as regards the detestation of sin. The same
+                     is to be said of the sensible sorrow, which is assumed by the will as a punishment: for since man, by sinning, deserved everlasting
+                     punishment, and sinned against the eternal God, the everlasting punishment being commuted into a temporal one, sorrow
+                     ought to remain during the whole of man's eternity, i.e. during the whole of the state of this life. For this reason Hugh
+                     of St. Victor says [*Richard of St. Victor, De Pot. Lig. et Solv. 3,5,13] that "when God absolves a man from eternal guilt
+                     and punishment, He binds him with a chain of eternal detestation of sin."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Shame regards sin only as a disgraceful act; wherefore after sin has been taken away as to its guilt, there is no further
+                     motive for shame; but there does remain a motive of sorrow, which is for the guilt, not only as being something disgraceful,
+                     but also as having a hurt connected with it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Servile fear which charity casts out, is opposed to charity by reason of its servility, because it regards the punishment.
+                     But the sorrow of contrition results from charity, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q4_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>): wherefore the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although, by penance, the sinner returns to his former state of grace and immunity from the debt of punishment, yet he never
+                     returns to his former dignity of innocence, and so something always remains from his past sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Just as a man ought not to do evil that good may come of it, so he ought not to rejoice in evil, for the reason that good
+                     may perchance come from it through the agency of Divine grace or providence, because his sins did not cause but hindered those
+                     goods; rather was it Divine providence that was their cause, and in this man should rejoice, whereas he should grieve for
+                     his sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Satisfaction depends on the punishment appointed, which should be enjoined for sins; hence it can come to an end, so that
+                     there be no further need of satisfaction. But that punishment is proportionate to sin chiefly on the part of its adherence
+                     to a creature whence it derives its finiteness. On the other hand, the sorrow of contrition corresponds to sin on the part
+                     of the aversion, whence it derives a certain infinity; wherefore contrition ought to
+                     continue always; nor is it unreasonable if that which precedes remains, when that which follows is taken away.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q4_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q4_A2-p0.1">Whether it is expedient to grieve for sin continually?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not expedient to grieve for sin continually. For it is sometimes expedient to rejoice, as is evident
+                     from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q4_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.4.4" target="asv"> Phil. 4:4, </a> where the gloss on the words, "Rejoice in the Lord always," says that "it is necessary to rejoice." Now it is not possible
+                     to rejoice and grieve at the same time. Therefore it is not expedient to grieve for sin continually.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which, in itself, is an evil and a thing to be avoided should not be taken upon oneself, except in so far as
+                     it is necessary as a remedy against something, as in the case of burning or cutting a wound. Now sorrow is in itself an evil;
+                     wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q4_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.24" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:24</a>): "Drive away sadness far from thee," and the reason is given (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q4_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.25" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:25</a>): "For sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit
+                     in it." Moreover the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. vii, 13,14; x, 5). Therefore one should not grieve for sin any longer
+                     than suffices for the sin to be blotted out. Now sin is already blotted out after the first sorrow of contrition. Therefore
+                     it is not expedient to grieve any longer.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Bernard says (Serm. xi in Cant.): "Sorrow is a good thing, if it is not continual; for honey should be mingled with
+                     wormwood." Therefore it seems that it is inexpedient to grieve continually.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author] says: "The penitent should always grieve, and rejoice
+                     in his grief."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p6"> Further, it is expedient always to continue, as far as it is possible, those acts in which beatitude consists. Now such is
+                     sorrow for sin, as is shown by the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q4_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.5" target="asv"> Mat. 5:5, </a> "Blessed are they that mourn." Therefore it is expedient for sorrow to be as continual as possible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We find this condition in the acts of the virtues, that in them excess and defect are not possible, as is proved in Ethic.
+                     ii, 6,7. Wherefore, since contrition, so far as it is a kind of displeasure seated in the rational appetite, is an act of
+                     the virtue of penance, there can never be excess in it, either as to its intensity, or as to its duration, except in so far
+                     as the act of one virtue hinders the act of another which is more urgent for the time being.
+                     Consequently the more continually a man can perform acts of this displeasure, the better it is, provided he exercises the
+                     acts of other virtues when and how he ought to. On the other hand, passions can have excess and defect, both in intensity
+                     and in duration. Wherefore, as the passion of sorrow, which the will takes upon itself, ought to be moderately intense, so
+                     ought it to be of moderate duration, lest, if it should last too long, man fall into despair, cowardice, and such like vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sorrow of contrition is a hindrance to worldly joy, but not to the joy which is about God, and which has sorrow itself
+                     for object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The words of Ecclesiasticus refer to worldly joy: and the Philosopher is referring to sorrow as a passion, of which we should
+                     make moderate use, according as the end, for which it is assumed, demands.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bernard is speaking of sorrow as a passion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q4_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q4_A3-p0.1">Whether our souls are contrite for sins even after this life?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our souls are contrite for sins even after this life. For the love of charity causes displeasure at sin.
+                     Now, after this life, charity remains in some, both as to its act and as to its habit, since "charity never falleth away."
+                     Therefore the displeasure at the sin committed, which is the essence of contrition, remains.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we should grieve more for sin than for punishment. But the souls in purgatory grieve for their sensible punishment
+                     and for the delay of glory. Much more, therefore, do they grieve for the sins they committed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the pain of purgatory satisfies for sin. But satisfaction derives its efficacy from the power of contrition. Therefore
+                     contrition remains after this life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> contrition is a part of the sacrament of Penance. But the sacraments do not endure after this life. Neither, therefore, does
+                     contrition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p6"> Further, contrition can be so great as to blot out both guilt and punishment. If therefore the souls in purgatory could have
+                     contrition, it would be possible for their debt of punishment to be remitted through the power of their contrition, so that
+                     they would be delivered from their sensible pain, which is false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Three things are to be observed in contrition: first, its genus, viz. sorrow; secondly, its form, for it is an act of virtue
+                     quickened by charity; thirdly, its efficacy, for it is a meritorious and sacramental act, and, to a certain extent, satisfactory.
+                     Accordingly, after this life, those souls which dwell in the heavenly country, cannot have contrition, because they are void
+                     of sorrow by reason of the fulness of their joy: those which are in hell, have no
+                     contrition, for although they have sorrow, they lack the grace which quickens sorrow; while those which are in purgatory have
+                     a sorrow for their sins, that is quickened by grace; yet it is not meritorious, for they are not in the state of meriting.
+                     In this life, however, all these three can be found.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity does not cause this sorrow, save in those who are capable of it; but the fulness of joy in the Blessed excludes all
+                     capability of sorrow from them: wherefore, though they have charity, they have no contrition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The souls in purgatory grieve for their sins; but their sorrow is not contrition, because it lacks the efficacy of contrition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The pain which the souls suffer in purgatory, cannot, properly speaking, be called satisfaction, because satisfaction demands
+                     a meritorious work; yet, in a broad sense, the payment of the punishment due may be called satisfaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q5" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q5-p0.1">OF THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q5-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q5-p2"> We must now consider the effect of contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q5-p3"> (1) Whether the remission of sin is the effect of contrition?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q5-p4"> (2) Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q5-p5"> (3) Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q5_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q5_A1-p0.1">Whether the forgiveness of sin is the effect of contrition?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the forgiveness of sin is not the effect of contrition. For God alone forgives sins. But we are somewhat
+                     the cause of contrition, since it is an act of our own. Therefore contrition is not the cause of forgiveness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contrition is an act of virtue. Now virtue follows the forgiveness of sin: because virtue and sin are not together
+                     in the soul. Therefore contrition is not the cause of the forgiveness of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing but sin is an obstacle to receiving the Eucharist. But the contrite should not go to Communion before going
+                     to confession. Therefore they have not yet received the forgiveness of their sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q5_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.50.19" target="asv"> Ps. 50:19, </a> "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit," says: "A hearty contrition is the sacrifice by which sins are loosed."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p6"> Further, virtue and vice are engendered and corrupted by the same causes, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2. Now sin is committed
+                     through the heart's inordinate love. Therefore it is destroyed by sorrow caused by the heart's ordinate love; and consequently
+                     contrition blots out sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Contrition can be considered in two ways, either as part of a sacrament, or as an act of virtue, and in either case it is
+                     the cause of the forgiveness of sin, but not in the same way. Because, as part of a sacrament, it operates primarily as an
+                     instrument for the forgiveness of sin, as is evident with regard to the other sacraments (cf. Sent. iv, D, 1, Q[1], A[4]:
+                     
+                     <a id="XP_Q5_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q62_A1.html">TP, Q[62], A[1]</a>); while, as an act of virtue, it is the quasi-material
+                     cause of sin's forgiveness. For a disposition is, as it were, a necessary condition for justification, and a disposition is
+                     reduced to a material cause, if it be taken to denote that which disposes matter to receive something. It is otherwise in
+                     the case of an agent's disposition to act, because this is reduced to the genus of efficient cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God alone is the principal efficient cause of the forgiveness of sin: but the dispositive cause can be from us also, and
+                     likewise the sacramental cause, since the sacramental forms are words uttered by us, having an instrumental power of conferring
+                     grace whereby sins are forgiven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The forgiveness of sin precedes virtue and the infusion of grace, in one way, and, in another, follows: and in so far as
+                     it follows, the act elicited by the virtue can be a cause of the forgiveness of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The dispensation of the Eucharist belongs to the ministers of the Church: wherefore a man should not go to Communion until
+                     his sin has been forgiven through the ministers of the Church, although his sin may be forgiven him before God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q5_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q5_A2-p0.1">Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that contrition cannot take away the debt of punishment entirely. For satisfaction and confession are ordained
+                     for man's deliverance from the debt of punishment. Now no man is so perfectly contrite as not to be bound to confession and
+                     satisfaction. Therefore contrition is never so great as to blot out the entire debt of punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in Penance the punishment should in some way compensate for the sin. Now some sins are accomplished by members of
+                     the body. Therefore, since it is for the due compensation for sin that "by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he
+                     is tormented" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q5_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.17" target="asv">Wis. 11:17</a>), it seems that the punishment for suchlike sins can never be remitted by contrition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sorrow of contrition is finite. Now an infinite punishment is due for some, viz. mortal, sins. Therefore contrition
+                     can never be so great as to remit the whole punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The affections of the heart are more acceptable to God than external acts. Now man is absolved from both punishment and guilt
+                     by means of external actions; and therefore he is also by means of the heart's affections, such as contrition is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p6"> Further, we have an example of this in the thief, to whom it was said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q5_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.23.43" target="asv">Lk. 23:43</a>): "This day shalt thou be with Me in paradise," on account of his one act of repentance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p7"> As to whether the whole debt of punishment is always taken away by contrition, this question has already been considered
+                     above (Sent. iv, D, 14, Q[2], AA[1],2; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q5_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q86_A4.html">TP, Q[86], A[4]</a>), where the same question was raised with regard to Penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The intensity of contrition may be regarded in two ways. First, on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure, and
+                     in this way it may happen that the act of charity is so intense that the contrition resulting therefrom merits not only the
+                     removal of guilt, but also the remission of all punishment. Secondly, on the part of the sensible sorrow, which the will excites
+                     in contrition: and since this sorrow is also a kind of punishment, it may be so intense
+                     as to suffice for the remission of both guilt and punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man cannot be sure that his contrition suffices for the remission of both punishment and guilt: wherefore he is bound to
+                     confess and to make satisfaction, especially since his contrition would not be true contrition, unless he had the purpose
+                     of confessing united thereto: which purpose must also be carried into effect, on account of the precept given concerning confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as inward joy redounds into the outward parts of the body, so does interior sorrow show itself in the exterior members:
+                     wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q5_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.17.22" target="asv">Prov. 17:22</a>): "A sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the sorrow of contrition is finite in its intensity, even as the punishment due for mortal sin is finite; yet it
+                     derives infinite power from charity, whereby it is quickened, and so it avails for the remission of both guilt and punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q5_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q5_A3-p0.1">Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that slight contrition does not suffice to blot out great sins. For contrition is the remedy for sin. Now a
+                     bodily remedy, that heals a lesser bodily infirmity, does not suffice to heal a greater. Therefore the least contrition does
+                     not suffice to blot out very great sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it was stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q5_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>) that for greater sins one ought to have greater contrition. Now contrition does not blot out sin, unless it fulfills the
+                     requisite conditions. Therefore the least contrition does not blot out all sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every sanctifying grace blots out every mortal sin, because it is incompatible therewith. Now every contrition is quickened
+                     by sanctifying grace. Therefore, however slight it be, it blots out all sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As we have often said (
+                     <a id="XP_Q5_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q1_A2.html">Q[1], A[2]</a>, ad 1;
+                     <a id="XP_Q5_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q3_A1.html"> Q[3], A[1]</a>;
+                     <a id="XP_Q5_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q4_A1.html"> Q[4] , A[1]</a>), contrition includes a twofold sorrow. One is in the reason, and is displeasure at the sin committed. This can be so slight
+                     as not to suffice for real contrition, e.g. if a sin were less displeasing to a man, than separation from his last end ought
+                     to be; just as love can be so slack as not to suffice for real charity. The
+                     other sorrow is in the senses, and the slightness of this is no hindrance to real contrition, because it does not, of itself,
+                     belong essentially to contrition, but is connected with it accidentally: nor again is it under our control. Accordingly we
+                     must say that sorrow, however slight it be, provided it suffice for true contrition, blots out all sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spiritual remedies derive infinite efficacy from the infinite power which operates in them: wherefore the remedy which suffices
+                     for healing a slight sin, suffices also to heal a great sin. This is seen in Baptism which looses great and small: and the
+                     same applies to contrition provided it fulfill the necessary conditions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It follows of necessity that a man grieves more for a greater sin than for a lesser, according as it is more repugnant to
+                     the love which causes his sorrow. But if one has the same degree of sorrow for a greater sin, as another has for a lesser,
+                     this would suffice for the remission of the sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q6" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q6-p0.1">OF CONFESSION, AS REGARDS ITS NECESSITY (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q6-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q6-p2"> We must now consider confession, about which there are six points for our consideration: (1) The necessity of confession;
+                  (2) Its nature; (3) Its minister; (4) Its quality; (5) Its effect; (6) The seal of confession.
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q6-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q6-p4"> (1) Whether confession is necessary for salvation?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q6-p5"> (2) Whether confession is according to the natural law?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q6-p6"> (3) Whether all are bound to confession?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q6-p7"> (4) Whether it is lawful to confess a sin of which one is not guilty?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q6-p8"> (5) Whether one is bound to confess at once?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q6-p9"> (6) Whether one can be dispensed from confessing to another man?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q6_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q6_A1-p0.1">Whether confession is necessary for salvation?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession is not necessary for salvation. For the sacrament of Penance is ordained for the sake of the
+                     remission of sin. But sin is sufficiently remitted by the infusion of grace. Therefore confession is not necessary in order
+                     to do penance for one's sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we read of some being forgiven their sins without confession, e.g. Peter, Magdalen and Paul. But the grace that
+                     remits sins is not less efficacious now than it was then. Therefore neither is it necessary for salvation now that man should
+                     confess.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a sin which is contracted from another, should receive its remedy from another. Therefore actual sin, which a man
+                     has committed through his own act, must take its remedy from the man himself. Now Penance is ordained against such sins. Therefore
+                     confession is not necessary for salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, confession is necessary for a judicial sentence, in order that punishment may be inflicted in proportion to the
+                     offense. Now a man is able to inflict on himself a greater punishment than even that which might be inflicted on him by another.
+                     Therefore it seems that confession is not necessary for salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. i): "If you want the physician to be of assistance to you, you must make your disease known to
+                     him." But it is necessary for salvation that man should take medicine for his sins. Therefore it is necessary for salvation
+                     that man should make his disease known by means of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p7"> Further, in a civil court the judge is distinct from the accused. Therefore the sinner who is the accused ought not to be
+                     his own judge, but should be judged by another and consequently ought to confess to him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Christ's Passion, without whose power, neither original nor actual sin is remitted, produces its effect in us through the
+                     reception of the sacraments which derive their efficacy from it. Wherefore for the remission of both actual and original sin,
+                     a sacrament of the Church is necessary, received either actually, or at least in desire, when a man fails to receive the sacrament
+                     actually, through an unavoidable obstacle, and not through contempt. Consequently
+                     those sacraments which are ordained as remedies for sin which is incompatible with salvation, are necessary for salvation:
+                     and so just as Baptism, whereby original sin is blotted out, is necessary for salvation, so also is the sacrament of Penance.
+                     And just as a man through asking to be baptized, submits to the ministers of the Church, to whom the dispensation of that
+                     sacrament belongs, even so, by confessing his sin, a man submits to a minister of the Church, that, through the sacrament
+                     of
+                     Penance dispensed by him, he may receive the pardon of his sins: nor can the minister apply a fitting remedy, unless he be
+                     acquainted with the sin, which knowledge he acquires through the penitent's confession. Wherefore confession is necessary
+                     for the salvation of a man who has fallen into a mortal actual sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The infusion of grace suffices for the remission of sin; but after the sin has been forgiven, the sinner still owes a debt
+                     of temporal punishment. Moreover, the sacraments of grace are ordained in order that man may receive the infusion of grace,
+                     and before he receives them, either actually or in his intention, he does not receive grace. This is evident in the case of
+                     Baptism, and applies to Penance likewise. Again, the penitent expiates his temporal
+                     punishment by undergoing the shame of confession, by the power of the keys to which he submits, and by the enjoined satisfaction
+                     which the priest moderates according to the kind of sins made known to him in confession. Nevertheless the fact that confession
+                     is necessary for salvation is not due to its conducing to the satisfaction for sins, because this punishment to which one
+                     remains bound after the remission of sin, is temporal, wherefore the way of salvation remains open, without such
+                     punishment being expiated in this life: but it is due to its conducing to the remission of sin, as explained above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although we do not read that they confessed, it may be that they did; for many things were done which were not recorded in
+                     writing. Moreover Christ has the power of excellence in the sacraments; so that He could bestow the reality of the sacrament
+                     without using the things which belong to the sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sin that is contracted from another, viz. original sin, can be remedied by an entirely extrinsic cause, as in the case
+                     of infants: whereas actual sin, which a man commits of himself, cannot be expiated, without some operation on the part of
+                     the sinner. Nevertheless man is not sufficient to expiate his sin by himself, though he was sufficient to sin by himself,
+                     because sin is finite on the part of the thing to which it turns, in which respect the
+                     sinner returns to self; while, on the part of the aversion, sin derives infinity, in which respect the remission of sin must
+                     needs begin from someone else, because "that which is last in order of generation is first in the order of intention" (Ethic.
+                     iii). Consequently actual sin also must needs take its remedy from another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Satisfaction would not suffice for the expiation of sin's punishment, by reason of the severity of the punishment which is
+                     enjoined in satisfaction, but it does suffice as being a part of the sacrament having the sacramental power; wherefore it
+                     ought to be imposed by the dispensers of the sacraments, and consequently confession is necessary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q6_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q6_A2-p0.1">Whether confession is according to the natural law?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession is according to the natural law. For Adam and Cain were bound to none but the precepts of the
+                     natural law, and yet they are reproached for not confessing their sin. Therefore confession of sin is according to the natural
+                     law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those precepts which are common to the Old and New Law are according to the natural law. But confession was prescribed
+                     in the Old Law, as may be gathered from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.43.26" target="asv"> Is. 43:26</a>: "Tell, if thou hast anything to justify thyself." Therefore it is according to the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Job was subject only to the natural law. But he confessed his sins, as appears from his words (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.31.33" target="asv">Job 31:33</a>) "If, as a man, I have hid my sin." Therefore confession is according to the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v.) that the natural law is the same in all. But confession is not in all in the same way. Therefore
+                     it is not according to the natural law. Further, confession is made to one who has the keys. But the keys of the Church are
+                     not an institution of the natural law; neither, therefore, is confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The sacraments are professions of faith, wherefore they ought to be proportionate to faith. Now faith surpasses the knowledge
+                     of natural reason, whose dictate is therefore surpassed by the sacraments. And since "the natural law is not begotten of opinion,
+                     but a product of a certain innate power," as Tully states (De Inv. Rhet. ii), consequently the sacraments are not part of
+                     the natural law, but of the Divine law which is above nature. This latter, however,
+                     is sometimes called natural, in so far as whatever a thing derives from its Creator is natural to it, although, properly speaking,
+                     those things are said to be natural which are caused by the principles of nature. But such things are above nature as God
+                     reserves to Himself; and these are wrought either through the agency of nature, or in the working of miracles, or in the revelation
+                     of mysteries, or in the institution of the sacraments. Hence confession, which is of sacramental necessity, is
+                     according to Divine, but not according to natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adam is reproached for not confessing his sin before God: because the confession which is made to God by the acknowledgment
+                     of one's sin, is according to the natural law. whereas here we are speaking of confession made to a man. We may also reply
+                     that in such a case confession of one's sin is according to the natural law, namely when one is called upon by the judge to
+                     confess in a court of law, for then the sinner should not lie by excusing or denying
+                     his sin, as Adam and Cain are blamed for doing. But confession made voluntarily to a man in order to receive from God the
+                     forgiveness of one's sins, is not according to the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precepts of the natural law avail in the same way in the law of Moses and in the New Law. But although there was a kind
+                     of confession in the law of Moses, yet it was not after the same manner as in the New Law, nor as in the law of nature; for
+                     in the law of nature it was sufficient to acknowledge one's sin inwardly before God; while in the law of Moses it was necessary
+                     for a man to declare his sin by some external sign, as by making a
+                     sin-offering, whereby the fact of his having sinned became known to another man; but it was not necessary for him to make
+                     known what particular sin he had committed, or what were its circumstances, as in the New Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Job is speaking of the man who hides his sin by denying it or excusing himself when he is accused thereof, as we may gather
+                     from a gloss [*Cf. Gregory, Moral. xxii, 9] on the passage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q6_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q6_A3-p0.1">Whether all are bound to confession?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all are bound to confession, for Jerome says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.9" target="asv"> Is. 3:9 </a>("They have proclaimed abroad"), "their sin," etc.: "Penance is the second plank after shipwreck." But some have not suffered
+                     shipwreck after Baptism. Therefore Penance is not befitting them, and consequently neither is confession which is a part of
+                     Penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is to the judge that confession should be made in any court. But some have no judge over them. Therefore they
+                     are not bound to confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some have none but venial sins. Now a man is not bound to confess such sins. Therefore not everyone is bound to
+                     confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Confession is condivided with satisfaction and contrition. Now all are bound to contrition and satisfaction. Therefore all
+                     are bound to confession also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p6"> Further, this appears from the Decretals (De Poenit. et Remiss. xii), where it is stated that "all of either sex are bound
+                     to confess their sins as soon as they shall come to the age of discretion."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We are bound to confession on two counts: first, by the Divine law, from the very fact that confession is a remedy, and in
+                     this way not all are bound to confession, but those only who fall into mortal sin after Baptism; secondly, by a precept of
+                     positive law, and in this way all are bound by the precept of the Church laid down in the general council (Lateran iv, Can.
+                     21) under Innocent III, both in order that everyone may acknowledge himself to be a sinner,
+                     because "all have sinned and need the grace of God" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.23" target="asv">Rom. 3:23</a>); and that the Eucharist may be approached with greater reverence; and lastly, that parish priests may know their flock,
+                     lest a wolf may hide therein.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is possible for a man, in this mortal life, to avoid shipwreck, i.e. mortal sin, after Baptism, yet he cannot
+                     avoid venial sins, which dispose him to shipwreck, and against which also Penance is ordained; wherefore there is still room
+                     for Penance, and consequently for confession, even in those who do not commit mortal sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All must acknowledge Christ as their judge, to Whom they must confess in the person of His vicar; and although the latter
+                     may be the inferior if the penitent be a prelate, yet he is the superior, in so far as the penitent is a sinner, while the
+                     confessor is the minister of Christ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A man is bound to confess his venial sins, not in virtue of the sacrament, but by the institution of the Church, and that,
+                     when he has no other sins to confess. We may also, with others, answer that the Decretal quoted above does not bind others
+                     than those who have mortal sins to confess. This is evident from the fact that it orders all sins to be confessed, which cannot
+                     apply to venial sins, because no one can confess all his venial sins.
+                     Accordingly, a man who has no mortal sins to confess, is not bound to confess his venial sins, but it suffices for the fulfillment
+                     of the commandment of the Church that he present himself before the priest, and declare himself to be unconscious of any mortal
+                     sin: and this will count for his confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q6_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q6_A4-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed. For, as Gregory says (Regist. xii),
+                     "it is the mark of a good conscience to acknowledge a fault where there is none." Therefore it is the mark of a good conscience
+                     to accuse oneself of those sins which one has not committed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by humility a man deems himself worse than another, who is known to be a sinner, and in this he is to be praised.
+                     But it is lawful for a man to confess himself to be what he thinks he is. Therefore it is lawful to confess having committed
+                     a more grievous sin than one has.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sometimes one doubts about a sin, whether it be mortal or venial, in which case, seemingly, one ought to confess
+                     it as mortal. Therefore a person must sometimes confess a sin which he has not committed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, satisfaction originates from confession. But a man can do satisfaction for a sin which he has not committed. Therefore
+                     he can also confess a sin which he has not done.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whosoever says he has done what he did not, tells an untruth. But no one ought to tell an untruth in confession, since every
+                     untruth is a sin. Therefore no one should confess a sin which he has not committed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p7"> Further, in the public court of justice, no one should be accused of a crime which cannot be proved by means of proper witnesses.
+                     Now the witness, in the tribunal of Penance, is the conscience. Therefore a man ought not to accuse himself of a sin which
+                     is not on his conscience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The penitent should, by his confession, make his state known to his confessor. Now he who tells the priest something other
+                     than what he has on his conscience, whether it be good or evil, does not make his state known to the priest, but hides it;
+                     wherefore his confession is unavailing: and in order for it to be effective his words must agree with his thoughts, so that
+                     his words accuse him only of what is on his conscience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To acknowledge a fault where there is none, may be understood in two ways: first, as referring to the substance of the act,
+                     and then it is untrue; for it is a mark, not of a good, but of an erroneous conscience, to acknowledge having done what one
+                     has not done. Secondly, as referring to the circumstances of the act, and thus the saying of Gregory is true, because a just
+                     man fears lest, in any act which is good in itself, there should be any defect on
+                     his part. thus it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Job.9.28" target="asv">Job 9:28</a>): "I feared all my works." Wherefore it is also the mark of a good conscience that a man should accuse himself in words of
+                     this fear which he holds in his thoughts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p10"> From this may be gathered the Reply to the Second Objection, since a just man, who is truly humble, deems himself worse not
+                     as though he had committed an act generically worse, but because he fears lest in those things which he seems to do well,
+                     he may by pride sin more grievously.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a man doubts whether a certain sin be mortal, he is bound to confess it, so long as he remains in doubt, because he
+                     sins mortally by committing or omitting anything, while doubting of its being a mortal sin, and thus leaving the matter to
+                     chance; and, moreover, he courts danger, if he neglect to confess that which he doubts may be a mortal sin. He should not,
+                     however, affirm that it was a mortal sin, but speak doubtfully, leaving the verdict to
+                     the priest, whose business it is to discern between what is leprosy and what is not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A man does not commit a falsehood by making satisfaction for a sin which he did not commit, as when anyone confesses a sin
+                     which he thinks he has not committed. And if he mentions a sin that he has not committed, believing that he has, he does not
+                     lie; wherefore he does not sin, provided his confession thereof tally with his conscience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q6_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q6_A5-p0.1">Whether one is bound to confess at once?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one is bound to confess at once. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii): "The contempt of confession
+                     is inexcusable, unless there be an urgent reason for delay." But everyone is bound to avoid contempt. Therefore everyone is
+                     bound to confess as soon as possible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everyone is bound to do more to avoid spiritual disease than to avoid bodily disease. Now if a man who is sick in
+                     body were to delay sending for the physician, it would be detrimental to his health. Therefore it seems that it must needs
+                     be detrimental to a man's health if he omits to confess immediately to a priest if there be one at hand.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is due always, is due at once. But man owes confession to God always. Therefore he is bound to confess
+                     at once.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A fixed time both for confession and for receiving the Eucharist is determined by the Decretals (Cap. Omnis utriusque sexus:
+                     De Poenit. et Remiss.). Now a man does not sin by failing to receive the Eucharist before the fixed time. Therefore he does
+                     not sin if he does not confess before that time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p6"> Further, it is a mortal sin to omit doing what a commandment bids us to do. If therefore a man is bound to confess at once,
+                     and omits to do so, with a priest at hand, he would commit a mortal sin; and in like manner at any other time, and so on,
+                     so that he would fall into many mortal sins for the delay in confessing one, which seems unreasonable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the purpose of confessing is united to contrition, a man is bound to have this purpose when he is bound to have contrition,
+                     viz. when he calls his sins to mind, and chiefly when he is in danger of death, or when he is so circumstanced that unless
+                     his sin be forgiven, he must fall into another sin: for instance, if a priest be bound to say Mass, and a confessor is at
+                     hand, he is bound to confess or, if there be no confessor, he is bound at least to
+                     contrition and to have the purpose of confessing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p8"> But to actual confession a man is bound in two ways. First, accidentally, viz. when he is bound to do something which he
+                     cannot do without committing a mortal sin, unless he go to confession first: for then he is bound to confess; for instance,
+                     if he has to receive the Eucharist, to which no one can approach, after committing a mortal sin, without confessing first,
+                     if a priest be at hand, and there be no urgent necessity. Hence it is that the Church obliges all to confess once a
+                     year; because she commands all to receive Holy Communion once a year, viz. at Easter, wherefore all must go to confession
+                     before that time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p9"> Secondly, a man is bound absolutely to go to confession; and here the same reason applies to delay of confession as to delay
+                     of Baptism, because both are necessary sacraments. Now a man is not bound to receive Baptism as soon as he makes up his mind
+                     to be baptized; and so he would not sin mortally, if he were not baptized at once: nor is there any fixed time beyond which,
+                     if he defer Baptism, he would incur a mortal sin. Nevertheless the delay of Baptism may amount to a mortal
+                     sin, or it may not, and this depends on the cause of the delay, since, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, text. 15), the
+                     will does not defer doing what it wills to do, except for a reasonable cause. Wherefore if the cause of the delay of Baptism
+                     has a mortal sin connected with it, e.g. if a man put off being baptized through contempt, or some like motive, the delay
+                     will be a mortal sin, but otherwise not: and the same seems to apply to confession which is not more necessary than Baptism.
+                     Moreover, since man is bound to fulfill in this life those things that are necessary for salvation, therefore, if he be in
+                     danger of death, he is bound, even absolutely, then and there to make his confession or to receive Baptism. For this reason
+                     too, James proclaimed at the same time the commandment about making confession and that about receiving Extreme Unction (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.14" target="asv">James 5:14</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.16" target="asv">16</a>). Therefore the opinion seems probable of those who say that a man is not bound to confess at
+                     once, though it is dangerous to delay.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p10"> Others, however, say that a contrite man is bound to confess at once, as soon as he has a reasonable and proper opportunity.
+                     Nor does it matter that the Decretal fixes the time limit to an annual confession, because the Church does not favor delay,
+                     but forbids the neglect involved in a further delay. Wherefore by this Decretal the man who delays is excused, not from sin
+                     in the tribunal of conscience; but from punishment in the tribunal of the Church; so that such a person would
+                     not be deprived of proper burial if he were to die before that time. But this seems too severe, because affirmative precepts
+                     bind, not at once, but at a fixed time; and this, not because it is most convenient to fulfill them then (for in that case
+                     if a man were not to give alms of his superfluous goods, whenever he met with a man in need, he would commit a mortal sin,
+                     which is false), but because the time involves urgency. Consequently, if he does not confess at the very first opportunity,
+                     it
+                     does not follow that he commits a mortal sin, even though he does not await a better opportunity. unless it becomes urgent
+                     for him to confess through being in danger of death. Nor is it on account of the Church's indulgence that he is not bound
+                     to confess at once, but on account of the nature of an affirmative precept, so that before the commandment was made, there
+                     was still less obligation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p11"> Others again say that secular persons are not bound to confess before Lent, which is the time of penance for them; but that
+                     religious are bound to confess at once, because, for them, all time is a time for penance. But this is not to the point; for
+                     religious have no obligations besides those of other men, with the exception of such as they are bound to by vow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hugh is speaking of those who die without this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not necessary for bodily health that the physician be sent for at once, except when there is necessity for being healed:
+                     and the same applies to spiritual disease.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The retaining of another's property against the owner's will is contrary to a negative precept, which binds always and for
+                     always, and therefore one is always bound to make immediate restitution. It is not the same with the fulfillment of an affirmative
+                     precept, which binds always, but not for always, wherefore one is not bound to fulfill it at once.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q6_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q6_A6-p0.1">Whether one can be dispensed from confession?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one can be dispensed from confessing his sins to a man. For precepts of positive law are subject to dispensation
+                     by the prelates of the Church. Now such is confession, as appears from what was said above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q6_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q6_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore one may be dispensed from confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man can grant a dispensation in that which was instituted by a man. But we read of confession being instituted,
+                     not by God, but by a man (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.16" target="asv">James 5:16</a>): "Confess your sins, one to another." Now the Pope has the power of dispensation in things instituted by the apostles, as
+                     appears in the matter of bigamists. Therefore he can also dispense a man from confessing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Penance, whereof confession is a part, is a necessary sacrament, even as Baptism is. Since therefore no one can be dispensed
+                     from Baptism, neither can one be dispensed from confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The ministers of the Church are appointed in the Church which is founded by God. Wherefore they need to be appointed by the
+                     Church before exercising their ministry, just as the work of creation is presupposed to the work of nature. And since the
+                     Church is founded on faith and the sacraments, the ministers of the Church have no power to publish new articles of faith,
+                     or to do away with those which are already published, or to institute new sacraments, or to
+                     abolish those that are instituted, for this belongs to the power of excellence, which belongs to Christ alone, Who is the
+                     foundation of the Church. Consequently, the Pope can neither dispense a man so that he may be saved without Baptism, nor that
+                     he be saved without confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of the sacrament. He can, however, dispense from confession,
+                     in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of the commandment of the Church; so that a man may delay confession longer
+                     than the limit prescribed by the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The precepts of the Divine law do not bind less than those of the natural law: wherefore, just as no dispensation is possible
+                     from the natural law, so neither can there be from positive Divine law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precept about confession was not instituted by a man first of all, though it was promulgated by James: it was instituted
+                     by God, and although we do not read it explicitly, yet it was somewhat foreshadowed in the fact that those who were being
+                     prepared by John's Baptism for the grace of Christ, confessed their sins to him, and that the Lord sent the lepers to the
+                     priests, and though they were not priests of the New Testament, yet the priesthood of
+                     the New Testament was foreshadowed in them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q7" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q7-p0.1">OF THE NATURE OF CONFESSION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q7-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q7-p2"> We must now consider the nature of confession, under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q7-p3"> (1) Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q7-p4"> (2) Whether confession is an act of virtue?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q7-p5"> (3) Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q7_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q7_A1-p0.1">Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Augustine defines confession unfittingly, when he says (Super 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q7_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.21" target="asv">Ps. 21</a>) that confession "lays bare the hidden disease by the hope of pardon." For the disease against which confession is ordained,
+                     is sin. Now sin is sometimes manifest. Therefore it should not be said that confession is the remedy for a "hidden" disease.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the beginning of penance is fear. But confession is a part of Penance. Therefore fear rather than "hope" should
+                     be set down as the cause of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is placed under a seal, is not laid bare, but closed up. But the sin which is confessed is placed under
+                     the seal of confession. Therefore sin is not laid bare in confession, but closed up.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, other definitions are to be found differing from the above. For Gregory says (Hom. xl in Evang.) that confession
+                     is "the uncovering of sins, and the opening of the wound." Others say that "confession is a legal declaration of our sins
+                     in the presence of a priest." Others define it thus: "Confession is the sinner's sacramental self-accusation through shame
+                     for what he has done, which through the keys of the Church makes satisfaction for his sins, and
+                     binds him to perform the penance imposed on him." Therefore it seems that the definition in question is insufficient, since
+                     it does not include all that these include.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Several things offer themselves to our notice in the act of confession: first, the very substance or genus of the act, which
+                     is a kind of manifestation; secondly, the matter manifested, viz. sin; thirdly, the person to whom the manifestation is made,
+                     viz. the priest; fourthly, its cause, viz. hope of pardon; fifthly, its effect, viz. release from part of the punishment,
+                     and the obligation to pay the other part. Accordingly the first definition, given by
+                     Augustine, indicates the substance of the act, by saying that "it lays bare"---the matter of confession, by saying that it
+                     is a "hidden disease"---its cause, which is "the hope of pardon"; while the other definitions include one or other of the
+                     five things aforesaid, as may be seen by anyone who considers the matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the priest, as a man, may sometimes have knowledge of the penitent's sin, yet he does not know it as a vicar of
+                     Christ (even as a judge sometimes knows a thing, as a man, of which he is ignorant, as a judge), and in this respect it is
+                     made known to him by confession. or we may reply that although the external act may be in the open, yet the internal act,
+                     which is the cause of the external act, is hidden; so that it needs to be revealed by
+                     confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Confession presupposes charity, which gives us life, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Now it is in contrition that
+                     charity is given; while servile fear, which is void of hope, is previous to charity: yet he that has charity is moved more
+                     by hope than by fear. Hence hope rather than fear is set down as the cause of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In every confession sin is laid bare to the priest, and closed to others by the seal of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is not necessary that every definition should include everything connected with the thing defined: and for this reason
+                     we find some definitions or descriptions that indicate one cause, and some that indicate another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q7_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q7_A2-p0.1">Whether confession is an act of virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession is not an act of virtue. For every act of virtue belongs to the natural law, since "we are
+                     naturally capable of virtue," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). But confession does not belong to the natural law. Therefore
+                     it is not an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an act of virtue is more befitting one who is innocent than one who has sinned. But the confession of a sin, which
+                     is the confession of which we are speaking now, cannot be befitting an innocent man. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the grace which is in the sacraments differs somewhat from the grace which is in the virtues and gifts. But confession
+                     is part of a sacrament. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. But confession comes under a precept. Therefore it is an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p6"> Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. But confession is meritorious, for "it opens the gate of heaven," as the
+                     Master says (Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore it seems that it is an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q7_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">FS, Q[18], AA[6]</a>,7; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q7_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q80.html">SS, Q[80];</a> 
+                     <a id="XP_Q7_A2-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q85_A3.html">SS, Q[85] , A[3]</a>; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q7_A2-p7.4" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q109_A3.html">SS, Q[109], A[3]</a>), for an act to belong to a virtue it suffices that it be of such a nature as to imply some condition belonging to virtue.
+                     Now, although confession does not include everything that is required for virtue, yet its very name implies the manifestation
+                     of that which a man has on his
+                     conscience: for thus his lips and heart agree. For if a man professes with his lips what he does not hold in his heart, it
+                     is not a confession but a fiction. Now to express in words what one has in one's thoughts is a condition of virtue; and, consequently,
+                     confession is a good thing generically, and is an act of virtue: yet it can be done badly, if it be devoid of other due circumstances.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Natural reason, in a general way, inclines a man to make confession in the proper way, to confess as he ought, what he ought,
+                     and when he ought, and in this way confession belongs to the natural law. But it belongs to the Divine law to determine the
+                     circumstances, when, how, what, and to whom, with regard to the confession of which we are speaking now. Accordingly it is
+                     evident that the natural law inclines a man to confession, by means of the Divine
+                     law, which determines the circumstances, as is the case with all matters belonging to the positive law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although an innocent man may have the habit of the virtue whose object is a sin already committed, he has not the act, so
+                     long as he remains innocent. Wherefore the confession of sins, of which confession we are speaking now, is not befitting an
+                     innocent man, though it is an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though the grace of the sacraments differs from the grace of the virtues, they are not contrary but disparate; hence there
+                     is nothing to prevent that which is an act of virtue, in so far as it proceeds from the free-will quickened by grace, from
+                     being a sacrament, or part of a sacrament, in so far as it is ordained as a remedy for sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q7_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q7_A3-p0.1">Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession is not an act of the virtue of penance. For an act belongs to the virtue which is its cause.
+                     Now the cause of confession is the hope of pardon, as appears from the definition given above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q7_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q7_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it seems that it is an act of hope and not of penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, shame is a part of temperance. But confession arises from shame, as appears in the definition given above (A[1],
+                     OBJ[4]). Therefore it is an act of temperance and not of penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of penance leans on Divine mercy. But confession leans rather on Divine wisdom, by reason of the truth which
+                     is required in it. Therefore it is not an act of penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we are moved to penance by the article of the Creed which is about the Judgment, on account of fear, which is the
+                     origin of penance. But we are moved to confession by the article which is about life everlasting, because it arises from hope
+                     of pardon. Therefore it is not an act of penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it belongs to the virtue of truth that a man shows himself to be what he is. But this is what a man does when he
+                     goes to confession. Therefore confession is an act of that virtue which is called truth, and not of penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Penance is ordained for the destruction of sin. Now confession is ordained to this also. Therefore it is an act of penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It must be observed with regard to virtues, that when a special reason of goodness or difficulty is added over and above
+                     the object of a virtue, there is need of a special virtue: thus the expenditure of large sums is the object of magnificence,
+                     although the ordinary kind of average expenditure and gifts belongs to liberality, as appears from Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1. The
+                     same applies to the confession of truth, which, although it belongs to the virtue of truth
+                     absolutely, yet, on account of the additional reason of goodness, begins to belong to another kind of virtue. Hence the Philosopher
+                     says (Ethic. iv, 7) that a confession made in a court of justice belongs to the virtue of justice rather than to truth. In
+                     like manner the confession of God's favors in praise of God, belongs not to truth, but to religion: and so too the confession
+                     of sins, in order to receive pardon for them, is not the elicited act of the virtue of truth, as some say, but of the
+                     virtue of penance. It may, however, be the commanded act of many virtues, in so far as the act of confession can be directed
+                     to the end of many virtues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope is the cause of confession, not as eliciting but as commanding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In that definition shame is not mentioned as the cause of confession, since it is more of a nature to hinder the act of confession,
+                     but rather as the joint cause of delivery from punishment (because shame is in itself a punishment), since also the keys of
+                     the Church are the joint cause with confession, to the same effect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By a certain adaptation the parts of Penance can be ascribed to three Personal Attributes, so that contrition may correspond
+                     to mercy or goodness, by reason of its being sorrow for evil---confession to wisdom, by reason of its being a manifestation
+                     of the truth---and satisfaction to power, on account of the labor it entails. And since contrition is the first part of Penance,
+                     and renders the other parts efficacious, for this reason the same is to be
+                     said of Penance as a whole, as of contrition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since confession results from hope rather than from fear, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), it is based on the article about
+                     eternal life which hope looks to, rather than on the article about the Judgment, which fear considers; although penance, in
+                     its aspect of contrition, is the opposite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p13"> The Reply to the Fifth Objection is to be gathered from what has been said.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q8" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q8-p0.1">OF THE MINISTER OF CONFESSION (SEVEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q8-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q8-p2"> We must now consider the minister of confession, under which head there are seven points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q8-p3"> (1) Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q8-p4"> (2) Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q8-p5"> (3) Whether outside a case of necessity one who is not a priest can hear the confession of venial sins?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q8-p6"> (4) Whether it is necessary for a man to confess to his own priest?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q8-p7"> (5) Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, in virtue of a privilege or of the command
+                  of a superior?
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q8-p8"> (6) Whether a penitent, in danger of death can be absolved by any priest?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q8-p9"> (7) Whether the temporal punishment should be enjoined in proportion to the sin?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q8_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q8_A1-p0.1">Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary to confess to a priest. For we are not bound to confession, except in virtue of its
+                     Divine institution. Now its Divine institution is made known to us (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.16" target="asv">James 5:16</a>): "Confess your sins, one to another," where there is no mention of a priest. Therefore it is not necessary to confess to
+                     a priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Penance is a necessary sacrament, as is also Baptism. But any man is the minister of Baptism, on account of its
+                     necessity. Therefore any man is the minister of Penance. Now confession should be made to the minister of Penance. Therefore
+                     it suffices to confess to anyone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, confession is necessary in order that the measure of satisfaction should be imposed on the penitent. Now, sometimes
+                     another than a priest might be more discreet than many priests are in imposing the measure of satisfaction on the penitent.
+                     Therefore it is not necessary to confess to a priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, confession was instituted in the Church in order that the rectors might know their sheep by sight. But sometimes
+                     a rector or prelate is not a priest. Therefore confession should not always be made to a priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The absolution of the penitent, for the sake of which he makes his confession, is imparted by none but priests to whom the
+                     keys are intrusted. Therefore confession should be made to a priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p7"> Further, confession is foreshadowed in the raising of the dead Lazarus to life. Now our Lord commanded none but the disciples
+                     to loose Lazarus (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.11.44" target="asv">Jn. 11:44</a>). Therefore confession should be made to a priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The grace which is given in the sacraments, descends from the Head to the members. Wherefore he alone who exercises a ministry
+                     over Christ's true body is a minister of the sacraments, wherein grace is given; and this belongs to a priest alone, who can
+                     consecrate the Eucharist. Therefore, since grace is given in the sacrament of Penance, none but a priest is the minister of
+                     the sacrament: and consequently sacramental confession which should be made to a
+                     minister of the Church, should be made to none but a priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> James speaks on the presupposition of the Divine institutions: and since confession had already been prescribed by God to
+                     be made to a priest, in that He empowered them, in the person of the apostles, to forgive sins, as related in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.23" target="asv"> Jn. 20:23, </a> we must take the words of James as conveying an admonishment to confess to priests.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Baptism is a sacrament of greater necessity than Penance, as regards confession and absolution, because sometimes Baptism
+                     cannot be omitted without loss of eternal salvation, as in the case of children who have not come to the use of reason: whereas
+                     this cannot be said of confession and absolution, which regard none but adults, in whom contrition, together with the purpose
+                     of confessing and the desire of absolution, suffices to deliver them from
+                     everlasting death. Consequently there is no parity between Baptism and confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In satisfaction we must consider not only the quantity of the punishment but also its power, inasmuch as it is part of a
+                     sacrament. In this way it requires a dispenser of the sacraments, though the quantity of the punishment may be fixed by another
+                     than a priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It may be necessary for two reasons to know the sheep by sight. First, in order to register them as members of Christ's flock,
+                     and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the pastoral charge and care, which is sometimes the duty of those who are
+                     not priests. Secondly, that they may be provided with suitable remedies for their health; and to know the sheep by sight thus
+                     belongs to the man, i.e. the priest, whose business it is to provide remedies
+                     conducive to health, such as the sacrament of the Eucharist, and other like things. It is to this knowledge of the sheep that
+                     confession is ordained.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q8_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q8_A2-p0.1">Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is never lawful to confess to another than a priest. For confession is a sacramental accusation, as
+                     appears from the definition given above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q8_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). But the dispensing of a sacrament belongs to none but the minister of a sacrament. Since then the proper minister of Penance
+                     is a priest, it seems that confession should be made to no one else.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every court of justice confession is ordained to the sentence. Now in a disputed case the sentence is void if
+                     pronounced by another than the proper judge; so that confession should be made to none but a judge. But, in the court of conscience,
+                     the judge is none but a priest, who has the power of binding and loosing. Therefore confession should be made to no one else.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the case of Baptism, since anyone can baptize, if a layman has baptized, even without necessity, the Baptism
+                     should not be repeated by a priest. But if anyone confess to a layman in a case of necessity, he is bound to repeat his confession
+                     to a priest, when the cause for urgency has passed. Therefore confession should not be made to a layman in a case of necessity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as Baptism is a necessary sacrament, so is Penance. And Baptism, through being a necessary sacrament has a twofold minister:
+                     one whose duty it is to baptize, in virtue of his office, viz. the priest, and another, to whom the conferring of Baptism
+                     is committed, in a case of necessity. In like manner the minister of Penance, to whom, in virtue of his office, confession
+                     should be made, is a priest; but in a case of necessity even a layman may take the
+                     place of a priest, and hear a person's confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the sacrament of Penance there is not only something on the part of the minister, viz. the absolution and imposition of
+                     satisfaction, but also something on the part of the recipient, which is also essential to the sacrament, viz. contrition and
+                     confession. Now satisfaction originates from the minister in so far as he enjoins it, and from the penitent who fulfills it;
+                     and, for the fulness of the sacrament, both these things should concur when
+                     possible. But when there is reason for urgency, the penitent should fulfill his own part, by being contrite and confessing
+                     to whom he can; and although this person cannot perfect the sacrament, so as to fulfill the part of the priest by giving absolution,
+                     yet this defect is supplied by the High Priest. Nevertheless confession made to a layman, through lack* of a priest, is quasi-sacramental,
+                     although it is not a perfect sacrament, on account of the absence of the part which belongs to the
+                     priest. [*Here and in the Reply to OBJ[2] the Leonine edition reads "through desire for a priest".]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a layman is not the judge of the person who confesses to him, yet, on account of the urgency, he does take the place
+                     of a judge over him, absolutely speaking, in so far as the penitent submits to him, through lack of a priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By means of the sacraments man must needs be reconciled not only to God, but also to the Church. Now he cannot be reconciled
+                     to the Church, unless the hallowing of the Church reach him. In Baptism the hallowing of the Church reaches a man through
+                     the element itself applied externally, which is sanctified by "the word of life" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.26" target="asv">Eph. 5:26</a>), by whomsoever it is conferred: and so when once a man has been baptized, no matter by whom,
+                     he must not be baptized again. On the other hand, in Penance the hallowing of the Church reaches man by the minister alone,
+                     because in that sacrament there is no bodily element applied externally, through the hallowing of which grace may be conferred.
+                     Consequently although the man who, in a case of necessity, has confessed to a layman, has received forgiveness from God, for
+                     the reason that he fulfilled, so far as he could, the purpose which he conceived in accordance with God's command, he is
+                     not yet reconciled to the Church, so as to be admitted to the sacraments, unless he first be absolved by a priest, even as
+                     he who has received the Baptism of desire, is not admitted to the Eucharist. Wherefore he must confess again to a priest,
+                     as soon as there is one at hand, and the more so since, as stated above (ad 1), the sacrament of Penance was not perfected,
+                     and so it needs yet to be perfected, in order that by receiving the sacrament, the penitent may receive a more plentiful effect,
+                     and that he may fulfill the commandment about receiving the sacrament of Penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q8_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q8_A3-p0.1">Whether, outside a case of necessity, anyone who is not a priest may hear the confession of venial sins?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that, outside a case of necessity, no one but a priest may hear the confession of venial sins. For the dispensation
+                     of a sacrament is committed to a layman by reason of necessity. But the confession of venial sins is not necessary. Therefore
+                     it is not committed to a layman.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Extreme Unction is ordained against venial sin, just as Penance is. But the former may not be given by a layman,
+                     as appears from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.14" target="asv"> James 5:14.</a> Therefore neither can the confession of venial sins be made to a layman.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of Bede (on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.16" target="asv"> James 5:16, </a> "Confess . . . one to another") quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> By venial sin man is separated neither from God nor from the sacraments of the Church: wherefore he does not need to receive
+                     any further grace for the forgiveness of such a sin, nor does he need to be reconciled to the Church. Consequently a man does
+                     not need to confess his venial sins to a priest. And since confession made to a layman is a sacramental, although it is not
+                     a perfect sacrament, and since it proceeds from charity, it has a natural aptitude to
+                     remit sins, just as the beating of one's breast, or the sprinkling of holy water (cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q8_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q87_A3.html">TP, Q[87], A[3]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p6"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection, because there is no need to receive a sacrament for the forgiveness of
+                     venial sins. and a sacramental, such as holy water or the like, suffices for the purpose.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Extreme Unction is not given directly as a remedy for venial sin, nor is any other sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q8_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q8_A4-p0.1">Whether it is necessary for one to confess to one's own priest?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is nol necessary to confess to one's own priest. For Gregory [*Cf. Can. Ex auctoritate xvi, Q[1]] says:
+                     "By our apostolic authority and in discharge of our solicitude we have decreed that priests, who as monks imitate the ex.
+                     ample of the apostles, may preach, baptize, give communion, pray for sinners, impose penances, and absolve from sins." Now
+                     monks are not the proper priests of anyone, since they have not the care of souls. Since,
+                     therefore confession is made for the sake of absolution it suffices for it to be made to any priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the minister of this sacrament is a priest, as also of the Eucharist. But any priest can perform the Eucharist.
+                     Therefore any priest can administer the sacrament of Penance. Therefore there is no need to confess to one's own priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when we are bound to one thing in particular it is not left to our choice. But the choice of a discreet priest is
+                     left to us as appears from the authority of Augustine quoted in the text (Sent. ix, D, 17): for he says in De vera et falsa
+                     Poenitentia [*Work of an unknown author]: "He who wishes to confess his sins, in order to find grace, must seek a priest who
+                     knows how to loose and to bind." Therefore it seems unnecessary to confess to one's own
+                     priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are some, such as prelates, who seem to have no priest of their own, since they have no superior: yet they
+                     are bound to confession. Therefore a man is not always bound to confess to his own priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, "That which is instituted for the sake of charity, does not militate against charity," as Bernard observes (De Praecept.
+                     et Dispens. ii). Now confession, which was instituted for the sake of charity, would militate against charity, if a man were
+                     bound to confess to any particular priest: e.g. if the sinner know that his own priest is a heretic, or a man of evil influence,
+                     or weak and prone to the very sin that he wishes to confess to him, or
+                     reasonably suspected of breaking the seal of confession, or if the penitent has to confess a sin committed against his confessor.
+                     Therefore it seems that one need not always confess to one's own priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, men should not be straitened in matters necessary for salvation, lest they be hindered in the way of salvation.
+                     But it seems a great inconvenience to be bound of necessity to confess to one particular man, and many might be hindered from
+                     going to confession, through either fear, shame, or something else of the kind. Therefore, since confession is necessary for
+                     salvation, men should not be straitened, as apparently they would be, by having to confess
+                     to their own priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p8">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands a decree of Pope Innocent III in the Fourth Lateran Council (Can. 21), who appointed "all of either sex to confess
+                     once a year to their own priest."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p9"> Further, as a bishop is to his diocese, so is a priest to his parish. Now it is unlawful, according to canon law (Can. Nullus
+                     primas ix
+                     <a id="XP_Q8_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q2.html">, Q[2];</a> Can. Si quis episcoporum xvi
+                     <a id="XP_Q8_A4-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q5.html">, Q[5])</a>, for a bishop to exercise the episcopal office in another diocese. Therefore it is not lawful for one priest to hear the
+                     confession of another's parishioner.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p10">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The other sacraments do not consist in an action of the recipient, but only in his receiving something, as is evident with
+                     regard to Baptism and so forth. though the action of the recipient is required as removing an obstacle, i.e. insincerity,
+                     in order that he may receive the benefit of the sacrament, if he has come to the use of his free-will. On the other hand,
+                     the action of the man who approaches the sacrament of Penance is essential to the sacrament,
+                     since contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are acts of the penitent, are parts of Penance. Now our actions, since
+                     they have their origin in us, cannot be dispensed by others, except through their command. Hence whoever is appointed a dispenser
+                     of this sacrament, must be such as to be able to command something to be done. Now a man is not competent to command another
+                     unless he have jurisdiction over him. Consequently it is essential to this sacrament, not only for the minister to be
+                     in orders, as in the case of the other sacraments, but also for him to have jurisdiction: wherefore he that has no jurisdiction
+                     cannot administer this sacrament any more than one who is not a priest. Therefore confession should be made not only to a
+                     priest, but to one's own priest; for since a priest does not absolve a man except by binding him to do something, he alone
+                     can absolve, who, by his command, can bind the penitent to do something.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking of those monks who have jurisdiction, through having charge of a parish; about whom some had maintained
+                     that from the very fact that they were monks, they could not absolve or impose penance, which is false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sacrament of the Eucharist does not require the power of command over a man, whereas this sacrament does, as stated above:
+                     and so the argument proves nothing. Nevertheless it is not lawful to receive the Eucharist from another than one's own priest,
+                     although it is a real sacrament that one receives from another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The choice of a discreet priest is not left to us in such a way that we can do just as we like; but it is left to the permission
+                     of a higher authority, if perchance one's own priest happens to be less suitable for applying a salutary remedy to our sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since it is the duty of prelates to dispense the sacraments, which the clean alone should handle, they are allowed by law
+                     (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Ne pro dilatione) to choose a priest for their confessor; who in this respect is the prelate's
+                     superior; even as one physician is cured by another, not as a physician but as a patient.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In those cases wherein the penitent has reason to fear some harm to himself or to the priest by reason of his confessing
+                     to him, he should have recourse to the higher authority, or ask permission of the priest himself to confess to another; and
+                     if he fails to obtain permission, the case is to be decided as for a man who has no priest at hand; so that he should rather
+                     choose a layman and confess to him. Nor does he disobey the law of the Church by so
+                     doing, because the precepts of positive law do not extend beyond the intention of the lawgiver, which is the end of the precept,
+                     and in this case, is charity, according to the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A4-p15.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>). Nor is any slur cast on the priest, for he deserves to forfeit his privilege, for abusing the power intrusted to him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The necessity of confessing to one's own priest does not straiten the way of salvation, but determines it sufficiently. A
+                     priest, however, would sin if he were not easy in giving permission to confess to another, because many are so weak that they
+                     would rather die without confession than confess to such a priest. Wherefore those priests who are too anxious to probe the
+                     consciences of their subjects by means of confession, lay a snare of damnation for
+                     many, and consequently for themselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p17"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p18"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q8_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q8_A5-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, in virtue of a privilege or a command given by
+                     a superior?
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, even in virtue of a privilege or
+                     command given by a superior. For no privilege should be given that wrongs a third party. Now it would be prejudicial to the
+                     subject's own priest, if he were to confess to another. Therefore this cannot be allowed by a superior's privilege, permission,
+                     or command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which hinders the observance of a Divine command cannot be the subject of a command or privilege given by man.
+                     Now it is a Divine command to the rectors of churches to "know the countenance of their own cattle" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.23" target="asv">Prov. 27:23</a>); and this is hindered if another than the rector hear the confession of his subjects. Therefore this cannot be prescribed
+                     by any human privilege or command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he that hears another's confession is the latter's own judge, else he could not bind or loose him. Now one man cannot
+                     have several priests or judges of his own, for then he would be bound to obey several men, which would be impossible, if their
+                     commands were contrary or incompatible. Therefore one may not confess to another than one's own priest, even with the superior's
+                     permission.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is derogatory to a sacrament, or at least useless, to repeat a sacrament over the same matter. But he who has
+                     confessed to another priest, is bound to confess again to his own priest, if the latter requires him to do so, because he
+                     is not absolved from his obedience, whereby he is bound to him in this respect. Therefore it cannot be lawful for anyone to
+                     confess to another than his own priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> He that can perform the actions of an order can depute the exercise thereof to anyone who has the same order. Now a superior,
+                     such as a bishop, can hear the confession of anyone belonging to a priest's parish, for sometimes he reserves certain cases
+                     to himself, since he is the chief rector. Therefore he can also depute another priest to hear that man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p7"> Further, a superior can do whatever his subject can do. But the priest himself can give his parishioner permission to confess
+                     to another. Much more, therefore, can his superior do this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p8"> Further, the power which a priest has among his people, comes to him from the bishop. Now it is through that power that he
+                     can hear confessions. Therefore, in like manner, another can do so, to whom the bishop gives the same power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A priest may be hindered in two ways from hearing a man's confession: first, through lack of jurisdiction; secondly, through
+                     being prevented from exercising his order, as those who are excommunicate, degraded, and so forth. Now whoever has jurisdiction,
+                     can depute to another whatever comes under his jurisdiction; so that if a priest is hindered from hearing a man's confession
+                     through want of jurisdiction, anyone who has immediate jurisdiction over that man,
+                     priest, bishop, or Pope, can depute that priest to hear his confession and absolve him. If, on the other hand, the priest
+                     cannot hear the confession, on account of an impediment to the exercise of his order, anyone who has the power to remove that
+                     impediment can permit him to hear confessions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No wrong is done to a person unless what is taken away from him was granted for his own benefit. Now the power of jurisdiction
+                     is not granted a man for his own benefit, but for the good of the people and for the glory of God. Wherefore if the higher
+                     prelates deem it expedient for the furthering of the people's salvation and God's glory, to commit matters of jurisdiction
+                     to others, no wrong is done to the inferior prelates, except to those who "seek
+                     the things that are their own; not the things that are Jesus Christ's" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A5-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.21" target="asv">Phil. 2:21</a>), and who rule their flock, not by feeding it, but by feeding on it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The rector of a church should "know the countenance of his own cattle" in two ways. First, by an assiduous attention to their
+                     external conduct, so as to watch over the flock committed to his care: and in acquiring this knowledge he should not believe
+                     his subject, but, as far as possible, inquire into the truth of facts. Secondly, by the manifestation of confession; and with
+                     regard to this knowledge, he cannot arrive at any greater certainty than by
+                     believing his subject, because this is necessary that he may help his subject's conscience. Consequently in the tribunal of
+                     confession, the penitent is believed whether he speak for himself or against himself, but not in the court of external judgment:
+                     wherefore it suffices for this knowledge that he believe the penitent when he says that he has confessed to one who could
+                     absolve him. It is therefore clear that this knowledge of the flock is not hindered by a privilege granted to another to
+                     hear confessions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It would be inconvenient, if two men were placed equally over the same people, but there is no inconvenience if over the
+                     same people two are placed one of whom is over the other. In this way the parish priest, the bishop, and the Pope are placed
+                     immediately over the same people, and each of them can commit matters of jurisdiction to some other. Now a higher superior
+                     delegates a man in two ways: first, so that the latter takes the superior's place, as
+                     when the Pope or a bishop appoints his penitentiaries; and then the man thus delegated is higher than the inferior prelate,
+                     as the Pope's penitentiary is higher than a bishop, and the bishop's penitentiary than a parish priest, and the penitent is
+                     bound to obey the former rather than the latter. Secondly, so that the delegate is appointed the coadjutor of this other priest;
+                     and since a co-adjutor is subordinate to the person he is appointed to help, he holds a lower rank, and the penitent is
+                     not so bound to obey him as his own priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No man is bound to confess sins that he has no longer. Consequently, if a man has confessed to the bishop's penitentiary,
+                     or to someone else having faculties from the bishop, his sins are forgiven both before the Church and before God, so that
+                     he is not bound to confess them to his own priest, however much the latter may insist: but on account of the Ecclesiastical
+                     precept (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Omnis utriusque) which prescribes confession to be
+                     made once a year to one's own priest, he is under the same obligation as one who has committed none but venial sins. For such
+                     a one, according to some, is bound to confess none but venial sins, or he must declare that he is free from mortal sin, and
+                     the priest, in the tribunal of conscience, ought, and is bound, to believe him. If, however, he were bound to confess again,
+                     his first confession would not be useless, because the more priests one confesses to, the more is the punishment remitted,
+                     both by reason of the shame in confessing, which is reckoned as a satisfactory punishment, and by reason of the power of the
+                     keys: so that one might confess so often as to be delivered from all punishment. Nor is repetition derogatory to a sacrament,
+                     except in those wherein there is some kind of sanctification, either by the impressing of a character, or by the consecration
+                     of the matter, neither of which applies to Penance. Hence it would be well for him who hears confessions by the bishop's
+                     authority, to advise the penitent to confess to his own priest, yet he must absolve him, even if he declines to do so.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q8_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q8_A6-p0.1">Whether a penitent, at the point of death, can be absolved by any priest?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a penitent, at the point of death, cannot be absolved by any priest. For absolution requires jurisdiction,
+                     as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q8_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q8_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Now a priest does not acquire jurisdiction over a man who repents at the point of death. Therefore he cannot absolve him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he that receives the sacrament of Baptism, when in danger of death, from another than his own priest, does not need
+                     to be baptized again by the latter. If, therefore, any priest can absolve, from any sin, a man who is in danger of death,
+                     the penitent, if he survive the danger, need not go to his own priest; which is false, since otherwise the priest would not
+                     "know the countenance of his cattle."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when there is danger of death, Baptism can be conferred not only by a strange priest, but also by one who is not
+                     a priest. But one who is not a priest can never absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Therefore neither can a priest absolve
+                     a man who is not his subject, when he is in danger of death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Spiritual necessity is greater than bodily necessity. But it is lawful in a case of extreme necessity, for a man to make
+                     use of another's property, even against the owner's will, in order to supply a bodily need. Therefore in danger of death,
+                     a man may be absolved by another than his own priest, in order to supply his spiritual need.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p6"> Further, the authorities quoted in the text prove the same (Sent. iv, D, 20, Cap. Non Habet).</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> If we consider the power of the keys, every priest has power over all men equally and over all sins: and it is due to the
+                     fact that by the ordination of the Church, he has a limited jurisdiction or none at all, that he cannot absolve all men from
+                     all sins. But since "necessity knows no law" [*Cap. Consilium, De observ. jejun.; De reg. jur. (v, Decretal)] in cases of
+                     necessity the ordination of the Church does not hinder him from being able to absolve, since
+                     he has the keys sacramentally: and the penitent will receive as much benefit from the absolution of this other priest as if
+                     he had been absolved by his own. Moreover a man can then be absolved by any priest not only from his sins, but also from excommunication,
+                     by whomsoever pronounced, because such absolution is also a matter of that jurisdiction which by the ordination of the Church
+                     is con. fined within certain limits.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One person may act on the jurisdiction of another according to the latter's will, since matters of jurisdiction can be deputed.
+                     Since, therefore, the Church recognizes absolution granted by any priest at the hour of death, from this very fact a priest
+                     has the use of jurisdiction though he lack the power of jurisdiction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He needs to go to his own priest, not that he may be absolved again from the sins, from which he was absolved when in danger
+                     of death, but that his own priest may know that he is absolved. In like manner, he who has been absolved from excommunication
+                     needs to go to the judge, who in other circumstances could have absolved him, not in order to seek absolution, but in order
+                     to offer satisfaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Baptism derives its efficacy from the sanctification of the matter itself, so that a man receives the sacrament whosoever
+                     baptizes him: whereas the sacramental power of Penance consists in a sanctification pronounced by the minister, so that if
+                     a man confess to a layman, although he fulfills his own part of the sacramental confession, he does not receive sacramental
+                     absolution. Wherefore his confession avails him somewhat, as to the lessening of his
+                     punishment, owing to the merit derived from his confession and to his repentance. but he does not receive that diminution
+                     of his punishment which results from the power of the keys; and consequently he must confess again to a priest; and one who
+                     has confessed thus, is more punished hereafter than if he had confessed to a priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q8_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q8_A7-p0.1">Whether the temporal punishment is imposed according to the degree of the fault?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the temporal punishment, the debt of which remains after Penance, is not imposed according to the degree
+                     of fault. For it is imposed according to the degree of pleasure derived from the sin, as appears from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.18.7" target="asv"> Apoc. 18:7</a>: "As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye her." Yet sometimes where
+                     there is greater pleasure, there is less fault, since "carnal sins, which afford
+                     more pleasure than spiritual sins, are less guilty," according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 2). Therefore the punishment is
+                     not imposed according to the degree of fault.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the New Law one is bound to punishment for mortal sins, in the same way as in the Old Law. Now in the Old Law
+                     the punishment for sin was due to last seven days, in other words, they had to remain unclean seven days for one mortal sin.
+                     Since therefore, in the New Testament, a punishment of seven years is imposed for one mortal sin, it seems that the quantity
+                     of the punishment does not answer to the degree of fault.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sin of murder in a layman is more grievous than that of fornication in a priest, because the circumstance which
+                     is taken from the species of a sin, is more aggravating than that which is taken from the person of the sinner. Now a punishment
+                     of seven years' duration is appointed for a layman guilty of murder, while for fornication a priest is punished for ten years,
+                     according to Can. Presbyter, Dist. lxxxii. Therefore punishment is not imposed
+                     according to the degree of fault.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a sin committed against the very body of Christ is most grievous, because the greater the person sinned against,
+                     the more grievous the sin. Now for spilling the blood of Christ in the sacrament of the altar a punishment of forty days or
+                     a little more is enjoined, while a punishment of seven years is prescribed for fornication, according to the Canons (Can.
+                     Presbyter, Dist. lxxxii). Therefore the quantity of the punishment does not answer to the degree
+                     of fault.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.8" target="asv">Is. 27:8</a>): "In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Therefore the quantity of punishment adjudicated
+                     for sin answers the degree of fault.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p7"> Further, man is reduced to the equality of justice by the punishment inflicted on him. But this would not be so if the quantity
+                     of the fault and of the punishment did not mutually correspond. Therefore one answers to the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> After the forgiveness of sin, a punishment is required for two reasons, viz. to pay the debt, and to afford a remedy. Hence
+                     the punishment may be imposed in consideration of two things. First, in consideration of the debt, and in this way the quantity
+                     of the punishment corresponds radically to the quantity of the fault, before anything of the latter is forgiven: yet the more
+                     there is remitted by the first of those things which are of a nature to remit
+                     punishment, the less there remains to be remitted or paid by the other, because the more contrition remits of the punishment,
+                     the less there remains to be remitted by confession. Secondly, in consideration of the remedy, either as regards the one who
+                     sinned, or as regards others: and thus sometimes a greater punishment is enjoined for a lesser sin; either because one man's
+                     sin is more difficult to resist than another's (thus a heavier punishment is imposed on a young man for fornication, than
+                     on an old man, though the former's sin be less grievous), or because one man's sin; for instance, a priest's, is more dangerous
+                     to others, than another's sin, or because the people are more prone to that particular sin, so that it is necessary by the
+                     punishment of the one man to deter others. Consequently, in the tribunal of Penance, the punishment has to be imposed with
+                     due regard to both these things: and so a greater punishment is not always imposed for a greater sin. on the other hand, the
+                     punishment of Purgatory is only for the payment of the debt, because there is no longer any possibility of sinning, so that
+                     this punishment is meted only according to the measure of sin, with due consideration however for the degree of contrition,
+                     and for confession and absolution, since all these lessen the punishment somewhat: wherefore the priest in enjoining satisfaction
+                     should bear them in mind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the words quoted two things are mentioned with regard to the sin, viz. "glorification" and "delicacies" or "delectation";
+                     the first of which regards the uplifting of the sinner, whereby he resists God; while the second regards the pleasure of sin:
+                     and though sometimes there is less pleasure in a greater sin, yet there is greater uplifting; wherefore the argument does
+                     not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This punishment of seven days did not expiate the punishment due for the sin, so that even if the sinner died after that
+                     time, he would be punished in Purgatory: but it was in expiation of the irregularity incurred, from which all the legal sacrifices
+                     expiated. Nevertheless, other things being equal, a man sins more grievously under the New Law than under the Old, on account
+                     of the more plentiful sanctification received in Baptism, and on account of
+                     the more powerful blessings bestowed by God on the human race. This is evident from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A7-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.29" target="asv">Heb. 29</a>: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments," etc. And yet it is not universally true that a seven years'
+                     penance is exacted for every mortal sin: but it is a kind of general rule applicable to the majority of cases, which must,
+                     nevertheless, be disregarded, with due consideration for the various circumstances of sins and penitents.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A bishop or priest sins with greater danger to others or to himself; wherefore the canons are more anxious to withdraw him
+                     from sin, by inflicting a greater punishment, in as much as it is intended as a remedy; although sometimes so great a punishment
+                     is not strictly due. Hence he is punished less in Purgatory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This punishment refers to the case when this happens against the priest's will: for if he spilled it willingly he would deserve
+                     a much heavier punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q9" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A7.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q9-p0.1">OF THE QUALITY OF CONFESSION (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q9-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q9-p2"> We must now consider the quality of confession: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q9-p3"> (1) Whether confession can be lacking in form?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q9-p4"> (2) Whether confession ought to be entire?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q9-p5"> (3) Whether one can confess through another, or by writing?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q9-p6"> (4) Whether the sixteen conditions, which are assigned by the masters, are necessary for confession?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q9_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q9_A1-p0.1">Whether confession can be lacking in form?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession cannot be lacking in form. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q9_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.26" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:26</a>): "Praise [confession] perisheth from the dead as nothing." But a man without charity is dead, because charity is the life
+                     of the soul. Therefore there can be no confession without charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, confession is condivided with contrition and satisfaction. But contrition and satisfaction are impossible without
+                     charity. Therefore confession is also impossible without charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is necessary in confession that the word should agree with the thought for the very name of confession requires
+                     this. Now if a man confess while remaining attached to sin, his word is not in accord with his thought, since in his heart
+                     he holds to sin, while he condemns it with his lips. Therefore such a man does not confess.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every man is bound to confess his mortal sins. Now if a man in mortal sin has confessed once, he is not bound to confess
+                     the same sins again, because, as no man knows himself to have charity, no man would know of him that he had confessed. Therefore
+                     it is not necessary that confession should be quickened by charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Confession is an act of virtue, and is part of a sacrament. In so far as it is an act of virtue, it has the property of being
+                     meritorious, and thus is of no avail without charity, which is the principle of merit. But in so far as it is part of a sacrament,
+                     it subordinates the penitent to the priest who has the keys of the Church, and who by means of the confession knows the conscience
+                     of the person confessing. In this way it is possible for confession to be
+                     in one who is not contrite, for he can make his sins known to the priest, and subject himself to the keys of the Church: and
+                     though he does not receive the fruit of absolution then, yet he will begin to receive it, when he is sincerely contrite, as
+                     happens in the other sacraments: wherefore he is not bound to repeat his confession, but to confess his lack of sincerity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words must be understood as referring to the receiving of the fruit of confession, which none can receive who is not
+                     in the state of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Contrition and satisfaction are offered to God: but confession is made to man: hence it is essential to contrition and satisfaction,
+                     but not to confession, that man should be united to God by charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who declares the sins which he has, speaks the truth; and thus his thought agrees with his lips or words, as to the substance
+                     of confession, though it is discordant with the purpose of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q9_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q9_A2-p0.1">Whether confession should be entire?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary for confession to be entire, namely, for a man to confess all his sins to one priest.
+                     For shame conduces to the diminution of punishment. Now the greater the number of priests to whom a man confesses, the greater
+                     his shame. Therefore confession is more fruitful if it be divided among several priests.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, confession is necessary in Penance in order that punishment may be enjoined for sin according to the judgment of
+                     the priest. Now a sufficient punishment for different sins can be imposed by different priests. Therefore it is not necessary
+                     to confess all one's sins to one priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it may happen that a man after going to confession and performing his penance, remembers a mortal sin, which escaped
+                     his memory while confessing, and that his own priest to whom he confessed first is no longer available, so that he can only
+                     confess that sin to another priest, and thus he will confess different sins to different priests.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the sole reason for confessing one's sins to a priest is in order to receive absolution. Now sometimes, the priest
+                     who hears a confession can absolve from some of the sins, but not from all. Therefore in such a case at all events the confession
+                     need not be entire.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Hypocrisy is an obstacle to Penance. But it savors of hypocrisy to divide one's confession, as Augustine says [*De vera et
+                     falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author]. Therefore confession should be entire. Further, confession is a part of Penance.
+                     But Penance should be entire. Therefore confession also should be entire.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In prescribing medicine for the body, the physician should know not only the disease for which he is prescribing, but also
+                     the general constitution of the sick person, since one disease is aggravated by the addition of another, and a medicine which
+                     would be adapted to one disease, would be harmful to another. The same is to be said in regard to sins, for one is aggravated
+                     when another is added to it; and a remedy which would be suitable for one sin, might
+                     prove an incentive to another, since sometimes a man is guilty of contrary sins, as Gregory says (Pastoral. iii, 3). Hence
+                     it is necessary for confession that man confess all the sins that he calls to mind, and if he fails to do this, it is not
+                     a confession, but a pretense of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although a man's shame is multiplied when he makes a divided confession to different confessors, yet all his different shames
+                     together are not so great as that with which he confesses all his sins together: because one sin considered by itself does
+                     not prove the evil disposition of the sinner, as when it is considered in conjunction with several others, for a man may fall
+                     into one sin through ignorance or weakness, but a number of sins proves the
+                     malice of the sinner, or his great corruption.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The punishment imposed by different priests would not be sufficient, because each would only consider one sin by itself,
+                     and not the gravity which it derives from being in conjunction with another. Moreover sometimes the punishment which would
+                     be given for one sin would foster another. Again the priest in hearing a confession takes the place of God, so that confession
+                     should be made to him just as contrition is made to God: wherefore as there would be
+                     no contrition unless one were contrite for all the sins which one calls to mind, so is there no confession unless one confess
+                     all the sins that one remembers committing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some say that when a man remembers a sin which he had previously forgotten, he ought to confess again the sins which he had
+                     confessed before, especially if he cannot go to the same priest to whom his previous confession was made, in order that the
+                     total quantity of his sins may be made known to one priest. But this does not seem necessary, because sin takes its quantity
+                     both from itself and from the conjunction of another; and as to the sins which he
+                     confessed he had already manifested their quantity which they have of themselves, while as to the sin which he had forgotten,
+                     in order that the priest may know the quantity which it has under both the above heads, it is enough that the penitent declare
+                     it explicitly, and confess the others in general, saying that he had confessed many sins in his previous confession, but had
+                     forgotten this particular one.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the priest may be unable to absolve the penitent from all his sins, yet the latter is bound to confess all to him,
+                     that he may know the total quantity of his guilt, and refer him to the superior with regard to the sins from which he cannot
+                     absolve him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q9_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q9_A3-p0.1">Whether one may confess through another, or by writing?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one may confess through another, or by writing. For confession is necessary in order that the penitent's
+                     conscience may be made known to the priest. But a man can make his conscience known to the priest, through another or by writing.
+                     Therefore it is enough to confess through another or by writing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some are not understood by their own priests on account of a difference of language, and consequently cannot confess
+                     save through others. Therefore it is not essential to the sacrament that one should confess by oneself, so that if anyone
+                     confesses through another in any way whatever, it suffices for his salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is essential to the sacrament that a man should confess to his own priest, as appears from what has been said
+                     (
+                     <a id="XP_Q9_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q8_A5.html">Q[8], A[5]</a> ). Now sometimes a man's own priest is absent, so that the penitent cannot speak to him with his own voice. But he could
+                     make his conscience known to him by writing. Therefore it seems that he ought to manifest his conscience to him by writing
+                     to him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Man is bound to confess his sins even as he is bound to confess his faith. But confession of faith should be made "with the
+                     mouth," as appears from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q9_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.10" target="asv"> Rom. 10:10</a>: therefore confession of sins should also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p6"> Further, who sinned by himself should, by himself, do penance. But confession is part of penance. Therefore the penitent
+                     should confess his own sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Confession is not only an act of virtue, but also part of a sacrament. Now, though, in so far as it is an act of virtue it
+                     matters not how it is done, even if it be easier to do it in one way than in another, yet, in so far as it is part of a sacrament,
+                     it has a determinate act, just as the other sacraments have a determinate matter. And as in Baptism, in order to signify the
+                     inward washing, we employ that element which is chiefly used in washing, so in the
+                     sacramental act which is intended for manifestation we generally make use of that act which is most commonly employed for
+                     the purpose of manifestation, viz. our own words; for other ways have been introduced as supplementary to this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as in Baptism it is not enough to wash with anything, but it is necessary to wash with a determinate element, so neither
+                     does it suffice, in Penance, to manifest one's sins anyhow, but they must be declared by a determinate act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is enough for one who is ignorant of a language, to confess by writing, or by signs, or by an interpreter, because a man
+                     is not bound to do more than he can: although a man is not able or obliged to receive Baptism, except with water, which is
+                     from an entirely external source and is applied to us by another: whereas the act of confession is from within and is performed
+                     by ourselves, so that when we cannot confess in one way, we must confess as we
+                     can.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the absence of one's own priest, confession may be made even to a layman, so that there is no necessity to confess in
+                     writing, because the act of confession is more essential than the person to whom confession is made.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q9_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q9_A4-p0.1">Whether the sixteen conditions usually assigned are necessary for confession?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the conditions assigned by masters, and contained in the following lines, are not requisite for confession:
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p3"> Simple, humble, pure, faithful,</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p4"> Frequent, undisguised, discreet, voluntary,</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p5"> shamefaced,</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p6"> Entire, secret, tearful, not delayed,</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p7"> Courageously accusing, ready to obey.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p8">For fidelity, simplicity, and courage are virtues by themselves, and therefore should not be reckoned as conditions of confession.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is "pure" when it is not mixed with anything else: and "simplicity," in like manner, removes composition
+                     and admixture. Therefore one or the other is superfluous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one is bound to confess more than once a sin which he has committed but once. Therefore if a man does not commit
+                     a sin again, his penance need not be "frequent."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, confession is directed to satisfaction. But satisfaction is sometimes public. Therefore confession should not always
+                     be "secret."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, that which is not in our power is not required of us. But it is not in our power to shed "tears." Therefore it is
+                     not required of those who confess.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p13">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> We have the authority of the masters who assigned the above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p14">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some of the above conditions are essential to confession, and some are requisite for its well-being. Now those things which
+                     are essential to confession belong to it either as to an act of virtue, or as to part of a sacrament. If in the first way,
+                     it is either by reason of virtue in general, or by reason of the special virtue of which it is the act, or by reason of the
+                     act itself. Now there are four conditions of virtue in general, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4.
+                     The first is knowledge, in respect of which confession is said to be "discreet," inasmuch as prudence is required in every
+                     act of virtue: and this discretion consists in giving greater weight to greater sins. The second condition is choice, because
+                     acts of virtue should be voluntary, and in this respect confession is said to be "voluntary." The third condition is that
+                     the act be done for a particular purpose, viz. the due end, and in this respect confession is said to be "pure," i.e. with
+                     a
+                     right intention. The fourth condition is that one should act immovably, and in this respect it is said that confession should
+                     be "courageous," viz. that the truth should not be forsaken through shame.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p15"> Now confession is an act of the virtue of penance. First of all it takes its origin in the horror which one conceives for
+                     the shamefulness of sin, and in this respect confession should be "full of shame," so as not to be a boastful account of one's
+                     sins, by reason of some worldly vanity accompanying it. Then it goes on to deplore the sin committed, and in this respect
+                     it is said to be "tearful." Thirdly, it culminates in self-abjection, and in this respect it should be "humble,"
+                     so that one confesses one's misery and weakness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p16"> By reason of its very nature, viz. confession, this act is one of manifestation: which manifestation can be hindered by four
+                     things: first, by falsehood, and in this respect confession is said to be "faithful," i.e. true. Secondly, by the use of vague
+                     words, and against this confession is said to be "open," so as not to be wrapped up in vague words; thirdly, by "multiplicity"
+                     of words, in which respect it is said to be "simple" indicating that the penitent should relate only
+                     such matters as affect the gravity of the sin; fourthly none of those things should be suppressed which should be made known,
+                     and in this respect confession should be "entire."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p17"> In so far as confession is part of a sacrament it is subject to the judgment of the priest who is the minister of the sacrament.
+                     Wherefore it should be an "accusation" on the part of the penitent, should manifest his "readiness to obey" the priest, should
+                     be "secret" as regards the nature of the court wherein the hidden affairs of conscience are tried.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p18"> The well-being of confession requires that it should be "frequent"; and "not delayed," i.e. that the sinner should confess
+                     at once.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p19">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing unreasonable in one virtue being a condition of the act of another virtue, through this act being commanded
+                     by that virtue; or through the mean which belongs to one virtue principally, belonging to other virtues by participation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p20">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The condition "pure" excludes perversity of intention, from which man is cleansed: but the condition "simple" excludes the
+                     introduction of unnecessary matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p21">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This is not necessary for confession, but is a condition of its well-being.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p22">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Confession should be made not publicly but privately, lest others be scandalized, and led to do evil through hearing the
+                     sins confessed. On the other hand, the penance enjoined in satisfaction does not give rise to scandal, since like works of
+                     satisfaction are done sometimes for slight sins, and sometimes for none at all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p23">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> We must understand this to refer to tears of the heart.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p24"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p25"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A7.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q10" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q10-p0.1">OF THE EFFECT OF CONFESSION (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q10-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q10-p2"> We must now consider the effect of confession: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q10-p3"> (1) Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q10-p4"> (2) Whether confession delivers one in any way from punishment?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q10-p5"> (3) Whether confession opens Paradise to us?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q10-p6"> (4) Whether confession gives hope of salvation?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q10-p7"> (5) Whether a general confession blots out mortal sins that one has forgotten?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q10_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q10_A1-p0.1">Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession does not deliver one from the death of sin. For confession follows contrition. But contrition
+                     sufficiently blots out guilt. Therefore confession does not deliver one from the death of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as mortal sin is a fault, so is venial. Now confession renders venial that which was mortal before, as stated
+                     in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore confession does not blot out guilt, but one guilt is changed into another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Confession is part of the sacrament of Penance. But Penance deliver from guilt. Therefore confession does also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Penance, as a sacrament, is perfected chiefly in confession, because by the latter a man submits to the ministers of the
+                     Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments: for contrition has the desire of confession united thereto, and satisfaction
+                     is enjoined according to the judgment of the priest who hears the confession. And since in the sacrament of Penance, as in
+                     Baptism, that grace is infused whereby sins are forgiven, therefore confession in virtue of
+                     the absolution granted remits guilt, even as Baptism does. Now Baptism delivers one from the death of sin, not only by being
+                     received actually, but also by being received in desire, as is evident with regard to those who approach the sacrament of
+                     Baptism after being already sanctified. And unless a man offers an obstacle, he receives, through the very fact of being baptized,
+                     grace whereby his sins are remitted, if they are not already remitted. The same is to be said of confession, to which
+                     absolution is added because it delivered the penitent from guilt through being previously in his desire. Afterwards at the
+                     time of actual confession and absolution he receives an increase of grace, and forgiveness of sins would also be granted to
+                     him, if his previous sorrow for sin was not sufficient for contrition, and if at the time he offered no obstacle to grace.
+                     Consequently just as it is said of Baptism that it delivers from death, so can it be said of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Contrition has the desire of confession attached to it, and therefore it delivers penitents from death in the same way as
+                     the desire of Baptism delivers those who are going to be baptized.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the text venial does not designate guilt, but punishment that is easily expiated. and so it does not follow that one guilt
+                     is changed into another but that it is wholly done away. For "venial" is taken in three senses [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q10_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html">FS, Q[88], A[2]</a>]: first, for what is venial generically, e.g. an idle word: secondly, for what is venial in its cause, i.e. having within
+                     itself a motive of pardon, e.g. sins due to weakness: thirdly,
+                     for what is venial in the result, in which sense it is understood here, because the result of confession is that man's past
+                     guilt is pardoned.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q10_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q10_A2-p0.1">Whether confession delivers from punishment in some way?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession nowise delivers from punishment. For sin deserves no punishment but what is either eternal
+                     or temporal. Now eternal punishment is remitted by contrition, and temporal punishment by satisfaction. Therefore nothing
+                     of the punishment is remitted by confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "the will is taken for the deed" [*Cf. Can. Magna Pietas, De Poenit., Dist. i], as stated in the text (Sent. iv,
+                     D, 17). Now he that is contrite has the intention to confess. wherefore his intention avails him as though he had already
+                     confessed, and so the confession which he makes afterwards remits no part of the punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Confession is a penal work. But all penal works expiate the punishment due to sin. Therefore confession does also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Confession together with absolution has the power to deliver from punishment, for two reasons. First, from the power of absolution
+                     itself: and thus the very desire of absolution delivers a man from eternal punishment, as also from the guilt. Now this punishment
+                     is one of condemnation and total banishment: and when a man is delivered therefrom he still remains bound to a temporal punishment,
+                     in so far as punishment is a cleansing and perfecting remedy; and so
+                     this punishment remains to be suffered in Purgatory by those who also have been delivered from the punishment of hell. Which
+                     temporal punishment is beyond the powers of the penitent dwelling in this world, but is so far diminished by the power of
+                     the keys, that it is within the ability of the penitent, and he is able, by making satisfaction, to cleanse himself in this
+                     life. Secondly, confession diminishes the punishment in virtue of the very nature of the act of the one who confesses, for
+                     this
+                     act has the punishment of shame attached to it, so that the oftener one confesses the same sins, the more is the punishment
+                     diminished.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p6"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will is not taken for the deed, if this is done by another, as in the case of Baptism: for the will to receive Baptism
+                     is not worth as much as the reception of Baptism. But a man's will is taken for the deed, when the latter is something done
+                     by him, entirely. Again, this is true of the essential reward, but not of the removal of punishment and the like, which come
+                     under the head of accidental and secondary reward. Consequently one who has
+                     confessed and received absolution will be less punished in Purgatory than one who has gone no further than contrition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q10_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q10_A3-p0.1">Whether confession opens paradise?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession does not open Paradise. For different sacraments have different effects. But it is the effect
+                     of Baptism to open Paradise. Therefore it is not the effect of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is impossible to enter by a closed door before it be opened. But a dying man can enter heaven before making his
+                     confession. Therefore confession does not open Paradise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Confession makes a man submit to the keys of the Church. But Paradise is opened by those keys. Therefore it is opened by
+                     confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Guilt and the debt of punishment prevent a man from entering into Paradise: and since confession removes these obstacles,
+                     as shown above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q10_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q10_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), it is said to open Paradise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although Baptism and Penance are different sacraments, they act in virtue of Christ's one Passion, whereby a way was opened
+                     unto Paradise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the dying man was in mortal sin Paradise was closed to him before he conceived the desire to confess his sin, although
+                     afterwards it was opened by contrition implying a desire for confession, even before he actually confessed. Nevertheless the
+                     obstacle of the debt of punishment was not entirely removed before confession and satisfaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q10_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q10_A4-p0.1">Whether confession gives hope of salvation?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope of salvation should not be reckoned an effect of confession. For hope arises from all meritorious
+                     acts. Therefore, seemingly, it is not the proper effect of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we arrive at hope through tribulation, as appears from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q10_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.3" target="asv"> Rom. 5:3,4.</a> Now man suffers tribulation chiefly in satisfaction. Therefore, satisfaction rather than confession gives hope of salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b>" Confession makes a man more humble and more wary," as the Master states in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). But the result of
+                     this is that man conceives a hope of salvation. Therefore it is the effect of confession to give hope of salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We can have no hope for the forgiveness of our sins except through Christ: and since by confession a man submits to the keys
+                     of the Church which derive their power from Christ's Passion, therefore do we say that confession gives hope of salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not our actions, but the grace of our Redeemer, that is the principal cause of the hope of salvation: and since confession
+                     relies upon the grace of our Redeemer, it gives hope of salvation, not only as a meritorious act, but also as part of a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Tribulation gives hope of salvation, by making us exercise our own virtue, and by paying off the debt of punishment: while
+                     confession does so also in the way mentioned above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q10_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q10_A5-p0.1">Whether a general confession suffices to blot out forgotten mortal sins?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a general confession does not suffice to blot out forgotten mortal sins. For there is no necessity to
+                     confess again a sin which has been blotted out by confession. If, therefore, forgotten sins were forgiven by a general confession,
+                     there would be no need to confess them when they are called to mind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever is not conscious of sin, either is not guilty of sin, or has forgotten his sin. If, therefore, mortal sins
+                     are forgiven by a general confession, whoever is not conscious of a mortal sin, can be certain that he is free from mortal
+                     sin, whenever he makes a general confession: which is contrary to what the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q10_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:4</a>), "I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justified."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man profits by neglect. Now a man cannot forget a mortal sin without neglect, before it is forgiven him. Therefore
+                     he does not profit by his forgetfulness so that the sin is forgiven him without special mention thereof in confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which the penitent knows nothing about is further from his knowledge than that which he has forgotten. Now
+                     a general confession does not blot out sins committed through ignorance, else heretics, who are not aware that certain things
+                     they have done are sinful, and certain simple people, would be absolved by a general confession, which is false. Therefore
+                     a general confession does not take away forgotten sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q10_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.6" target="asv">Ps. 33:6</a>): "Come ye to Him and be enlightened, and your faces shall not be confounded." Now he who confesses all the sins of which
+                     he is conscious, approaches to God as much as he can: nor can more be required for him. Therefore he will not be confounded
+                     by being repelled, but will be forgiven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p7"> Further, he that confesses is pardoned unless he be insincere. But he who confesses all the sins that he calls to mind, is
+                     not insincere through forgetting some, because he suffers from ignorance of fact, which excuses from sin. Therefore he receives
+                     forgiveness, and then the sins which he has forgotten, are loosened, since it is wicked to hope for half a pardon.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Confession produces its effect, on the presupposition that there is contrition which blots out guilt: so that confession
+                     is directly ordained to the remission of punishment, which it causes in virtue of the shame which it includes, and by the
+                     power of the keys to which a man submits by confessing. Now it happens sometimes that by previous contrition a sin has been
+                     blotted out as to the guilt, either in a general way (if it was not remembered at the time) or
+                     in particular (and yet is forgotten before confession): and then general sacramental confession works for the remission of
+                     the punishment in virtue of the keys, to which man submits by confessing, provided he offers no obstacle so far as he is concerned:
+                     but so far as the shame of confessing a sin diminishes its punishment, the punishment for the sin for which a man does not
+                     express his shame, through failing to confess it to the priest, is not diminished.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In sacramental confession, not only is absolution required, but also the judgment of the priest who imposes satisfaction
+                     is awaited. Wherefore although the latter has given absolution, nevertheless the penitent is bound to confess in order to
+                     supply what was wanting to the sacramental confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above, confession does not produce its effect, unless contrition be presupposed; concerning which no man can know
+                     whether it be true contrition, even as neither can one know for certain if he has grace. Consequently a man cannot know for
+                     certain whether a forgotten sin has been forgiven him in a general confession, although he may think so on account of certain
+                     conjectural signs.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He does not profit by his neglect, since he does not receive such full pardon, as he would otherwise have received, nor is
+                     his merit so great. Moreover he is bound to confess the sin when he calls it to mind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Ignorance of the law does not excuse, because it is a sin by itself: but ignorance of fact does excuse. Therefore if a man
+                     omits to confess a sin, because he does not know it to be a sin, through ignorance of the Divine law, he is not excused from
+                     insincerity. on the other hand, he would be excused, if he did not know it to be a sin, through being unaware of some particular
+                     circumstance, for instance, if he had knowledge of another's wife, thinking
+                     her his own. Now forgetfulness of an act of sin comes under the head of ignorance of fact, wherefore it excuses from the sin
+                     of insincerity in confession, which is an obstacle to the fruit of absolution and confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q11" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q11-p0.1">OF THE SEAL OF CONFESSION (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q11-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q11-p2"> We must now inquire about the seal of confession, about which there are five points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q11-p3"> (1) Whether in every case a man is bound to hide what he knows under the seal of confession?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q11-p4"> (2) Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which have reference to confession?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q11-p5"> (3) Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q11-p6"> (4) Whether, by permission of the penitent, the priest can make known to another, a sin of his which he knew under the seal
+                  of confession?
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q11-p7"> (5) Whether he is bound to hide even what he knows through other sources besides?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q11_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q11_A1-p0.1">Whether in every case the priest is bound to hide the sins which he knows under the seal of confession?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the priest is not bound in every case to hide the sins which he knows under the seal of confession. For,
+                     as Bernard says (De Proecep. et Dispens. ii), "that which is instituted for the sake of charity does not militate against
+                     charity." Now the secret of confession would militate against charity in certain cases: for instance, if a man knew through
+                     confession that a certain man was a heretic, whom he cannot persuade to desist from misleading
+                     the people; or, in like manner, if a man knew, through confession, that certain people who wish to marry are related to one
+                     another. Therefore such ought to reveal what they know through confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is obligatory solely on account of a precept of the Church need not be observed, if the commandment be
+                     changed to the contrary. Now the secret of confession was introduced solely by a precept of the Church. If therefore the Church
+                     were to prescribe that anyone who knows anything about such and such a sin must make it known, a man that had such knowledge
+                     through confession would be bound to speak.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man is bound to safeguard his conscience rather than the good name of another, because there is order in charity.
+                     Now it happens sometimes that a man by hiding a sin injures his own conscience---for instance, if he be called upon to give
+                     witness of a sin of which he has knowledge through confession, and is forced to swear to tell the truth---or when an abbot
+                     knows through confession the sin of a prior who is subject to him, which sin would be an
+                     occasion of ruin to the latter, if he suffers him to retain his priorship, wherefore he is bound to deprive him of the dignity
+                     of his pastoral charge, and yet in depriving him he seem to divulge the secret of confession. Therefore it seems that in certain
+                     cases it is lawful to reveal a confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is possible for a priest through hearing a man's confession to be conscious that the latter is unworthy of ecclesiastical
+                     preferment. Now everyone is bound to prevent the promotion of the unworthy, if it is his business. Since then by raising an
+                     objection he seems to raise a suspicion of sin, and so to reveal the confession somewhat, it seems that it is necessary sometimes
+                     to divulge a confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Decretal says (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Omnis utriusque): "Let the priest beware lest he betray the sinner, by word,
+                     or sign, or in any other way whatever."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p7"> Further, the priest should conform himself to God, Whose minister he is. But God does not reveal the sins which are made
+                     known to Him in confession, but hides them. Neither, therefore, should the priest reveal them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Those things which are done outwardly in the sacraments are the signs of what takes place inwardly: wherefore confession,
+                     whereby a man subjects himself to a priest, is a sign of the inward submission, whereby one submits to God. Now God hides
+                     the sins of those who submit to Him by Penance; wherefore this also should be signified in the sacrament of Penance, and consequently
+                     the sacrament demands that the confession should remain hidden, and he who divulges
+                     a confession sins by violating the sacrament. Besides this there are other advantages in this secrecy, because thereby men
+                     are more attracted to confession, and confess their sins with greater simplicity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some say that the priest is not bound by the seal of confession to hide other sins than those in respect of which the penitent
+                     promises amendment; otherwise he may reveal them to one who can be a help and not a hindrance. But this opinion seems erroneous,
+                     since it is contrary to the truth of the sacrament; for just as, though the person baptized be insincere, yet his Baptism
+                     is a sacrament, and there is no change in the essentials of the sacrament on
+                     that account, so confession does not cease to be sacramental although he that confesses, does not purpose amendment. Therefore,
+                     this notwithstanding, it must be held secret; nor does the seal of confession militate against charity on that account, because
+                     charity does not require a man to find a remedy for a sin which he knows not: and that which is known in confession, is, as
+                     it were, unknown, since a man knows it, not as man, but as God knows it. Nevertheless in the cases quoted one should
+                     apply some kind of remedy, so far as this can be done without divulging the confession, e.g. by admonishing the penitent,
+                     and by watching over the others lest they be corrupted by heresy. He can also tell the prelate to watch over his flock with
+                     great care, yet so as by neither word nor sign to betray the penitent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precept concerning the secret of confession follows from the sacrament itself. Wherefore just as the obligation of making
+                     a sacramental confession is of Divine law, so that no human dispensation or command can absolve one therefrom, even so, no
+                     man can be forced or permitted by another man to divulge the secret of confession. Consequently if he be commanded under pain
+                     of excommunication to be incurred "ipso facto," to say whether he knows anything
+                     about such and such a sin, he ought not to say it, because he should assume that the intention of the person in commanding
+                     him thus, was that he should say what he knew as man. And even if he were expressly interrogated about a confession, he ought
+                     to say nothing, nor would he incur the excommunication, for he is not subject to his superior, save as a man, and he knows
+                     this not as a man, but as God knows it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A man is not called upon to witness except as a man, wherefore without wronging his conscience he can swear that he knows
+                     not, what he knows only as God knows it. In like manner a superior can, without wronging his conscience, leave a sin unpunished
+                     which he knows only as God knows it, or he may forbear to apply a remedy, since he is not bound to apply a remedy, except
+                     according as it comes to his knowledge. Wherefore with regard to matters which come
+                     to his knowledge in the tribunal of Penance, he should apply the remedy, as far as he can, in the same court: thus as to the
+                     case in point, the abbot should advise the prior to resign his office, and if the latter refuse, he can absolve him from the
+                     priorship on some other occasion, yet so as to avoid all suspicion of divulging the confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A man is rendered unworthy of ecclesiastical preferment, by many other causes besides sin, for instance, by lack of knowledge,
+                     age, or the like: so that by raising an objection one does not raise a suspicion of crime or divulge the secret of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q11_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q11_A2-p0.1">Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which have reference to confession?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the seal of confession extends to other matters besides those which have reference to confession. For
+                     sins alone have reference to confession. Now sometimes besides sins other matters are told which have no reference to confession.
+                     Therefore, since such things are told to the priest, as to God, it seems that the seal of confession extends to them also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sometimes one person tells another a secret, which the latter receives under the seal of confession. Therefore the
+                     seal of confession extends to matters having no relation to confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The seal of confession is connected with sacramental confession. But those things which are connected with a sacrament, do
+                     not extend outside the bounds of the sacrament. Therefore the seal of confession does not extend to matters other than those
+                     which have reference to sacramental confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The seal of confession does not extend directly to other matters than those which have reference to sacramental confession,
+                     yet indirectly matters also which are not connected with sacramental confession are affected by the seal of confession, those,
+                     for instance, which might lead to the discovery of a sinner or of his sin. Nevertheless these matters also must be most carefully
+                     hidden, both on account of scandal, and to avoid leading others into sin through
+                     their becoming familiar with it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p6"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A confidence ought not easily to be accepted in this way: but if it be done the secret must be kept in the way promised,
+                     as though one had the secret through confession, though not through the seal of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q11_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q11_A3-p0.1">Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession. For sometimes a priest hears a confession through
+                     an interpreter, if there be an urgent reason for so doing. But it seems that the interpreter is bound to keep the confession
+                     secret. Therefore one who is not a priest knows something under the seal of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is possible sometimes in cases of urgency for a layman to hear a confession. But he is bound to secrecy with
+                     regard to those sins, since they are told to him as to God. Therefore not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it may happen that a man pretends to be a priest, so that by this deceit he may know what is on another's conscience:
+                     and it would seem that he also sins if he divulges the confession. Therefore not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A priest alone is the minister of this sacrament. But the seal of confession is connected with this sacrament. Therefore
+                     the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p6"> Further, the reason why a man is bound to keep secret what he hears in confession, is because he knows them, not as man but
+                     as God knows them. But the priest alone is God's minister. Therefore he alone is bound to secrecy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The seal of confession affects the priest as minister of this sacrament: which seal is nothing else than the obligation of
+                     keeping the confession secret, even as the key is the power of absolving. Yet, as one who is not a priest, in a particular
+                     case has a kind of share in the act of the keys, when he hears a confession in a case of urgency, so also does he have a certain
+                     share in the act of the seal of confession, and is bound to secrecy, though, properly
+                     speaking, he is not bound by the seal of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q11_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q11_A4-p0.1">Whether by the penitent's permission, a priest may reveal to another a sin which he knows under the seal of confession?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a priest may not, by the penitent's permission, reveal to another a sin which he knows under the seal
+                     of confession. For an inferior may not do what his superior may not. Now the Pope cannot give permission for anyone to divulge
+                     a sin which he knows through confession. Neither therefore can the penitent give him such a permission.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is instituted for the common good of the Church cannot be changed at the will of an individual. Now the
+                     secrecy of confession was instituted for the good of the whole Church, in order that men might have greater confidence in
+                     approaching the confessional. Therefore the penitent cannot allow the priest to divulge his confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the priest could grant such a permission, this would seem to palliate the wickedness of bad priests, for they
+                     might pretend to have received the permission and so they might sin with impunity, which would be unbecoming. Therefore it
+                     seems that the penitent cannot grant this permission.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the one to whom this sin is divulged does not know that sin under the seal of confession, so that he may publish
+                     a sin which is already blotted out, which is unbecoming. Therefore this permission cannot be granted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> If the sinner consent, a superior may refer him by letter to an inferior priest. Therefore with the consent of the penitent,
+                     the priest may reveal a sin of his to another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p7"> Further, whosoever can do a thing of his own authority, can do it through another. But the penitent can by his own authority
+                     reveal his sin to another. Therefore he can do it through the priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p8"> I answer that There are two reasons for which the priest is bound to keep a sin secret: first and chiefly, because this very
+                     secrecy is essential to the sacrament, in so far as the priest knows that sin, as it is known to God, Whose place he holds
+                     in confession: secondly, in order to avoid scandal. Now the penitent can make the priest know, as a man, what he knew before
+                     only as God knows it, and he does this when he allows him to divulge it: so that if the priest does reveal it,
+                     he does not break the seal of confession. Nevertheless he should beware of giving scandal by revealing the sin, lest he be
+                     deemed to have broken the seal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Pope cannot permit a priest to divulge a sin, because he cannot make him to know it as a man, whereas he that has confessed
+                     it, can.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When that is told which was known through another source, that which is instituted for the common good is not done away with,
+                     because the seal of confession is not broken.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This does not bestow impunity on wicked priests, because they are in danger of having to prove that they had the penitent's
+                     permission to reveal the sin, if they should be accused of the contrary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> He that is informed of a sin through the priest with the penitent's consent, shares in an act of the priest's, so that the
+                     same applies to him as to an interpreter, unless perchance the penitent wish him to know it unconditionally and freely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q11_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q12.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q11_A5-p0.1">Whether a man may reveal that which he knows through confession and through some other source besides?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man may not reveal what he knows through confession and through some other source besides. For the seal
+                     of confession is not broken unless one reveals a sin known through confession. If therefore a man divulges a sin which he
+                     knows through confession, no matter how he knows it otherwise, he seems to break the seal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever hears someone's confession, is under obligation to him not to divulge his sins. Now if one were to promise
+                     someone to keep something secret, he would be bound to do so, even if he knew it through some other source. Therefore a man
+                     is bound to keep secret what he knows through the confession, no matter how he knows it otherwise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the stronger of two things draws the other to itself. Now the knowledge whereby a man knows a sin as God knows it,
+                     is stronger and more excellent than the knowledge whereby he knows a sin as man. Therefore it draws the latter to itself:
+                     and consequently a man cannot reveal that sin, because this is demanded by his knowing it as God knows it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the secrecy of confession was instituted in order to avoid scandal, and to prevent men being shy of going to confession.
+                     But if a man might say what he had heard in confession, though he knew it otherwise, scandal would result all the same. Therefore
+                     he can nowise say what he has heard.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No one can put another under a new obligation, unless he be his superior, who can bind him by a precept. Now he who knew
+                     of a sin by witnessing it was not bound to keep it secret. Therefore he that confesses to him, not being his superior, cannot
+                     put him under an obligation of secrecy by confessing to him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p7"> Further, the justice of the Church would be hindered if a man, in order to escape a sentence of excommunication, incurred
+                     on account of some sin, of which he has been convicted, were to confess to the person who has to sentence him. Now the execution
+                     of justice falls under a precept. Therefore a man is not bound to keep a sin secret, which he has heard in confession, but
+                     knows from some other source.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There are three opinions about this question. For some say that a man can by no means tell another what he has heard in confession,
+                     even if he knew it from some other source either before or after the confession: while others assert that the confession debars
+                     him from speaking of what he knew already, but not from saying what he knew afterwards and in another way. Now both these
+                     opinions, by exaggerating the seal of confession, are prejudicial to the truth
+                     and to the safeguarding of justice. For a man might be more inclined to sin, if he had no fear of being accused by his confessor
+                     supposing that he repeated the sin in his presence: and furthermore it would be most prejudicial to justice if a man could
+                     not bear witness to a deed which he has seen committed again after being confessed to him. Nor does it matter that, as some
+                     say, he ought to declare that he cannot keep it secret, for he cannot make such a declaration until the sin has already
+                     been confessed to him, and then every priest could, if he wished, divulge a sin, by making such a declaration, if this made
+                     him free to divulge it. Consequently there is a third and truer opinion, viz. that what a man knows through another source
+                     either before or after confession, he is not bound to keep secret, in so far as he knows it as a man, for he can say: "I know
+                     so end so since I saw it." But he is bound to keep it secret in so far as he knows it as God knows it, for he cannot say:
+                     "I
+                     heard so and so in confession." Nevertheless, on account of the scandal he should refrain from speaking of it unless there
+                     is an urgent reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If a man says that he has seen what he has heard in the confessional, he does not reveal what he heard in confession, save
+                     indirectly: even as one who knows something through hearing and seeing it, does not, properly speaking, divulge what he saw,
+                     if he says he heard it, but only indirectly, because he says he has heard what he incidentally saw. Wherefore he does not
+                     break the seal of confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The confessor is not forbidden to reveal a sin simply, but to reveal it as heard in confession: for in no case is he allowed
+                     to say that he has heard it in the confessional.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This is true of things that are in opposition to one another: whereas to know a sin as God knows it, and to know it as man
+                     knows it, are not in opposition; so that the argument proves nothing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It would not be right to avoid scandal so as to desert justice: for the truth should not be gainsayed for fear of scandal.
+                     Wherefore when justice and truth are in the balance, a man should not be deterred by the fear of giving scandal, from divulging
+                     what he has heard in confession, provided he knows it from some other source: although he ought to avoid giving scandal, as
+                     far as he is able.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q12.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q12" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q12-p0.1">OF SATISFACTION, AS TO ITS NATURE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q12-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q12-p2"> We must now consider satisfaction; about which four things have to be considered: (1) Its nature; (2) Its possibility; (3)
+                  Its quality; (4) The means whereby man offers satisfaction to God.
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q12-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q12-p4"> (1) Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q12-p5"> (2) Whether it is an act of justice?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q12-p6"> (3) Whether the definition of satisfaction contained in the text is suitable?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q12_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q12.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q12_A1-p0.1">Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that satisfaction is neither a virtue nor an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is meritorious; whereas,
+                     seemingly, satisfaction is not, since merit is gratuitous, while satisfaction answers to a debt. Therefore satisfaction is
+                     not an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every act of virtue is voluntary. But sometimes a man has to make satisfaction for something against his will, as
+                     when anyone is punished by the judge for an offense against another. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13): "Choice holds the chief place in moral virtue." But satisfaction
+                     is not an act of choice but regards chiefly external works. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Satisfaction belongs to penance. Now penance is a virtue. Therefore satisfaction is also an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p6"> Further, none but an act of virtue has the effect of blotting out sin, for one contrary is destroyed by the other. Now satisfaction
+                     destroys sin altogether. Therefore it is an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> An act is said to be the act of a virtue in two ways. First, materially; and thus any act which implies no malice, or defect
+                     of a due circumstance, may be called an act of virtue, because virtue can make use of any such act for its end, e.g. to walk,
+                     to speak, and so forth. Secondly, an act is said to belong to a virtue formally, because its very name implies the form and
+                     nature of virtue; thus to suffer courageously is an act of courage. Now the formal
+                     element in every moral virtue is the observance of a mean. wherefore every act that implies the observance of a mean is formally
+                     an act of virtue. And since equality is the mean implied in the name of satisfaction (for a thing is said to be satisfied
+                     by reason of an equal proportion to something), it is evident that satisfaction also is formally an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although to make satisfaction is due in itself, yet, in so far as the deed is done voluntarily by the one who offers satisfaction,
+                     it becomes something gratuitous on the part of the agent, so that he makes a virtue of necessity. For debt diminishes merit
+                     through being necessary and consequently against the will, so that if the will consent to the necessity, the element of merit
+                     is not forfeited.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of virtue demands voluntariness not in the patient but in the agent, for it is his act. Consequently since he on whom
+                     the judge wreaks vengeance is the patient and not the agent as regards satisfaction, it follows that satisfaction should be
+                     voluntary not in him but in the judge as agent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The chief element of virtue can be understood in two ways. First, as being the chief element of virtue as virtue, and thus
+                     the chief element of virtue denotes whatever belongs to the nature of virtue or is most akin thereto; thus choice and other
+                     internal acts hold the chief place in virtue. Secondly, the chief element of virtue may be taken as denoting that which holds
+                     the first place in such and such a virtue; and then the first place belongs to
+                     that which gives its determination. Now the interior act, in certain virtues, is determined by some external act, since choice,
+                     which is common to all virtues, becomes proper to such and such a virtue through being directed to such and such an act. Thus
+                     it is that external acts hold the chief place in certain virtues; and this is the case with satisfaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q12.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q12_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q12_A2-p0.1">Whether satisfaction is an act of justice?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that satisfaction is not an act of justice. Because the purpose of satisfaction is that one may be reconciled
+                     to the person offended. But reconciliation, being an act of love, belongs to charity. Therefore satisfaction is an act of
+                     charity and not of justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the causes of sin in us are the passions of the soul, which incline us to evil. But justice, according to the Philosopher
+                     (Ethic. v, 2,3), is not about passions, but about operations. Since therefore satisfaction aims at removing the causes of
+                     sin, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), it seems that it is not an act of justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to be careful about the future is not an act of justice but of prudence of which caution is a part. But it belongs
+                     to satisfaction, "to give no opening to the suggestions of sin" [*Cf. XP/Q[12]/A[3]/OBJ[1]]. Therefore satisfaction is not
+                     an act of justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No virtue but justice considers the notion of that which is due. But satisfaction gives due honor to God, as Anselm states
+                     (Cur Deus Homo i). Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p6"> Further, no virtue save justice establishes equality between external things. But this is done by satisfaction which establishes
+                     equality between amendment and the previous offense. Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3,4), the mean of justice is considered with regard to an equation between thing
+                     and thing according to a certain proportion. Wherefore, since the very name of satisfaction implies an equation of the kind,
+                     because the adverb "satis" [enough] denotes an equality of proportion, it is evident that satisfaction is formally an act
+                     of justice. Now the act of justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,4), is either an
+                     act done by one man to another, as when a man pays another what he owes him, or an act done by one man between two others,
+                     as when a judge does justice between two men. When it is an act of justice of one man to another, the equality is set up in
+                     the agent, while when it is something done between two others, the equality is set up in the subject that has suffered an
+                     injustice. And since satisfaction expresses equality in the agent, it denotes, properly speaking, an act of justice of one
+                     man to
+                     another. Now a man may do justice to another either in actions and passions or in external things; even as one may do an injustice
+                     to another, either by taking something away, or by a hurtful action. And since to give is to use an external thing, the act
+                     of justice, in so far as it establishes equality between external things, signifies, properly speaking, a giving back: but
+                     to make satisfaction clearly points to equality between actions, although sometimes one is put for the other. Now
+                     equalization concerns only such things as are unequal, wherefore satisfaction presupposes inequality among actions, which
+                     inequality constitutes an offense; so that satisfaction regards a previous offense. But no part of justice regards a previous
+                     offense, except vindictive justice, which establishes equality indifferently, whether the patient be the same subject as the
+                     agent, as when anyone punishes himself, or whether they be distinct, as when a judge punishes another man, since vindictive
+                     justice deals with both cases. The same applies to penance, which implies equality in the agent only, since it is the penitent
+                     who holds to the penance [poenam tenet], so that penance is in a way a species of vindictive justice. This proves that satisfaction,
+                     which implies equality in the agent with respect to a previous offense, is a work of justice, as to that part which is called
+                     penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Satisfaction, as appears from what has been said, is compensation for injury inflicted. Wherefore as the injury inflicted
+                     entailed of itself an inequality of justice, and consequently an inequality opposed to friendship, so satisfaction brings
+                     back directly equality of justice, and consequently equality of friendship. And since an act is elicited by the habit to whose
+                     end it is immediately directed, but is commanded by that habit to whose end it is
+                     directed ultimately, hence satisfaction is elicited by justice but is commanded by charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although justice is chiefly about operations, yet it is consequently about passions, in so far as they are the causes of
+                     operations. Wherefore as justice curbs anger, lest it inflict an unjust injury on another, and concupiscence from invading
+                     another's marriage right, so satisfaction removes the causes of other sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Each moral virtue shares in the act of prudence, because this virtue completes in it the conditions essential to virtue,
+                     since each moral virtue takes its mean according to the ruling of prudence, as is evident from the definition of virtue given
+                     in Ethic. ii, 6.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q12_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q13.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q12_A3-p0.1">Whether the definition of satisfaction given in the text is suitable?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the definition of satisfaction given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15) and quoted from Augustine [*Gennadius
+                     Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv] is unsuitable---viz. that "satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sins, and to give no
+                     opening to the suggestions thereof." For the cause of actual sin is the fomes. [*"Fomes" signifies literally "fuel," and metaphorically,
+                     "incentive." As used by the theologian, it denotes the quasi-material element and
+                     effect of original sin, and sometimes goes under the name of "concupiscence," Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q12_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html">FS, Q[82], A[3]</a>.] But we cannot remove the "fomes" in this life. Therefore satisfaction does not consist in removing the causes of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the cause of sin is stronger than sin itself. But man by himself cannot remove sin. Much less therefore can he remove
+                     the cause of sin; and so the same conclusion follows.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since satisfaction is a part of Penance, it regards the past and not the future. Now "to give no opening to the
+                     suggestions of sin" regards the future. Therefore it should not be put in the definition of satisfaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, satisfaction regards a past offense. Yet no mention is made of this. Therefore the definition of satisfaction is
+                     unsuitable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Anselm gives another definition (Cur Deus homo i): "Satisfaction consists in giving God due honor," wherein no reference
+                     is made to the things mentioned by Augustine [*Gennadius, OBJ[1]] in this definition. Therefore one or the other is unsuitable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, an innocent man can give due honor to God: whereas satisfaction is not compatible with innocence. Therefore Anselm's
+                     definition is faulty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Justice aims not only at removing inequality already existing, by punishing the past fault, but also at safeguarding equality
+                     for the future, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) "punishments are medicinal." Wherefore satisfaction which
+                     is the act of justice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins and preserving from future sins: so that when
+                     one man makes satisfaction to another, he offers compensation for the past, and takes
+                     heed for the future. Accordingly satisfaction may be defined in two ways, first with regard to past sin, which it heals by
+                     making compensation, and thus it is defined as "compensation for an inflicted injury according to the equality of justice."
+                     The definition of Anselm amounts to the same, for he says that "satisfaction consists in giving God due honor"; where duty
+                     is considered in respect of the sin committed. Secondly, satisfaction may be defined, considered as preserving us from future
+                     sins; and as Augustine (Cf. OBJ[1]) defines it. Now preservation from bodily sickness is assured by removing the causes from
+                     which the sickness may ensue, for if they be taken away the sickness cannot follow. But it is not thus in spiritual diseases,
+                     for the free-will cannot be forced, so that even in the presence of their causes, they can, though with difficulty, be avoided,
+                     while they can be incurred even when their causes are removed. Hence he puts two things in the definition of
+                     satisfaction, viz. removal of the causes, as to the first, and the free-will's refusal to sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By "causes" we must understand the proximate causes of actual sin, which are twofold: viz. the lust of sin through the habit
+                     or act of a sin that has been given up, and those things which are called the remnants of past sin; and external occasions
+                     of sin, such as place, bad company and so forth. Such causes are removed by satisfaction in this life, albeit the "fomes,"
+                     which is the remote cause of actual sin, is not entirely removed by satisfaction in
+                     this life though it is weakened.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the cause of evil or of privation (according as it has a cause) is nothing else than a defective good, and since it
+                     is easier to destroy good than to set it up, it follows that it is easier to uproot the causes of privation and of evil than
+                     to remove the evil itself, which can only be removed by setting up good, as may be seen in the case of blindness and its causes.
+                     Yet the aforesaid are not sufficient causes of sin, for sin does not, of
+                     necessity, ensue therefrom, but they are occasions of sin. Nor again can satisfaction be made without God's help, since it
+                     is not possible without charity, as we shall state further on (
+                     <a id="XP_Q12_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although Penance was primarily instituted and intended with a view to the past, yet, as a consequence, it regards the future,
+                     in so far as it is a safeguarding remedy; and the same applies to satisfaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine [*Gennadius Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv] defined satisfaction, as made to God, from Whom, in reality, nothing
+                     can be taken, though the sinner, for his own part, takes something away. Consequently in such like satisfaction, amendment
+                     for future time is of greater weight than compensation for the past. Hence Augustine defines satisfaction from this point
+                     of view. And yet it is possible to gauge the compensation for the past from the heed
+                     taken for the future, for the latter regards the same object as the former, but in the opposite way: since when looking at
+                     the past we detest the causes of sins on account of the sins themselves, which are the starting-point of the movement of detestation:
+                     whereas when taking heed of the future, we begin from the causes, that by their removal we may avoid sins the more easily.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> There is no reason why the same thing should not be described in different ways according to the various things found in
+                     it: and such is the case here, as explained above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> By debt is meant the debt we owe to God by reason of the sins we have committed, because Penance regards a debt, as stated
+                     above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q12_A3-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q12_A2.html">(A[2])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q13.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q13" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q13-p0.1">OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SATISFACTION (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q13-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q13-p2"> We must now consider the possibility of satisfaction, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q13-p3"> (1) Whether man can make satisfaction to God?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q13-p4"> (2) Whether one man can make satisfaction for another?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q13_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q13.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q13_A1-p0.1">Whether man can make satisfaction to God?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man cannot make satisfaction to God. For satisfaction should balance the offense, as shown above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q13_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q12_A2.html">Q[12], AA[2]</a>,3). But an offense against God is infinite, since it is measured by the person against whom it is committed, for it is a
+                     greater offense to strike a prince than anyone else. Therefore, as no action of man can be infinite, it seems that he cannot
+                     make satisfaction to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a slave cannot make compensation for a debt, since all that he has is his master's. But we are the slaves of God,
+                     and whatever good we have, we owe to Him. Therefore, as satisfaction is compensation for a past offense, it seems that we
+                     cannot offer it to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if all that a man has suffices not to pay one debt, he cannot pay another debt. Now all that man is, all that he
+                     can do, and all that he has, does not suffice to pay what he owes for the blessing of creation, wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q13_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.16" target="asv">Is. 40:16</a>) that "the wood of Libanus shall not be enough for a burnt offering [*Vulg.: 'Libanus shall not be enough to burn, nor the
+                     beasts thereof for a burnt offering']." Therefore by no means can
+                     he make satisfaction for the debt resulting from the offense committed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man is bound to spend all his time in the service of God. Now time once lost cannot be recovered, wherefore, as
+                     Seneca observes (Lib. i, Ep. i, ad Lucilium) loss of time is a very grievous matter. Therefore man cannot make compensation
+                     to God, and the same conclusion follows as before.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, mortal actual sin is more grievous than original sin. But none could satisfy for original sin unless he were both
+                     God and man. Neither, therefore, can he satisfy for actual sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Fidei ad Damasum] says: "Whoever maintains that God has commanded anything impossible to man, let
+                     him be anathema." But satisfaction is commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q13_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.3.8" target="asv">Lk. 3:8</a>): "Bring forth . . . fruits worthy of penance." Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p8"> Further, God is more merciful than any man. But it is possible to make satisfaction to a man. Therefore it is possible to
+                     make satisfaction to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p9"> Further, there is due satisfaction when the punishment balances the fault, since "justice is the same as counterpassion,"
+                     as the Pythagoreans said [*Aristotle, Ethic. v, 5; Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q13_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q61_A4.html">SS, Q[61], A[4]</a>]. Now punishment may equal the pleasure contained in a sin committed. Therefore satisfaction can be made to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p10">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Man becomes God's debtor in two ways; first, by reason of favors received, secondly, by reason of sin committed: and just
+                     as thanksgiving or worship or the like regard the debt for favors received, so satisfaction regards the debt for sin committed.
+                     Now in giving honor to one's parents or to the gods, as indeed the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14), it is impossible to
+                     repay them measure for measure, but it suffices that man repay as much as he can, for
+                     friendship does not demand measure for measure, but what is possible. Yet even this is equal somewhat, viz. according to proportion,
+                     for as the debt due to God is, in comparison with God, so is what man can do, in comparison with himself, so that in another
+                     way the form of justice is preserved. It is the same as regards satisfaction. Consequently man cannot make satisfaction to
+                     God if "satis" [enough] denotes quantitative equality; but he can, if it denote proportionate equality, as explained
+                     above, and as this suffices for justice, so does it suffice for satisfaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the offense derived a certain infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, so does satisfaction derive a certain
+                     infinity from the infinity of Divine mercy, in so far as it is quickened by grace, whereby whatever man is able to repay becomes
+                     acceptable. Others, however, say that the offense is infinite as regards the aversion, and in this respect it is pardoned
+                     gratuitously, but that it is finite as turning to a mutable good, in which
+                     respect it is possible to make satisfaction for it. But this is not to the point, since satisfaction does not answer to sin,
+                     except as this is an offense against God, which is a matter, not of turning to a creature but of turning away from God. Others
+                     again say that even as regards the aversion it is possible to make satisfaction for sin in virtue of Christ's merit, which
+                     was, in a way, infinite. And this comes to the same as what we said before, since grace is given to believers through faith
+                     in the Mediator. If, however, He were to give grace otherwise, satisfaction would suffice in the way explained above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man, who was made to God's image, has a certain share of liberty, in so far as he is master of his actions through his free-will;
+                     so that, through acting by his free-will, he can make satisfaction to God, for though it belongs to God, in so far as it was
+                     bestowed on him by God, yet it was freely bestowed on him, that he might be his own master, which cannot be said of a slave.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that it is impossible to make equivalent satisfaction to God, but not that it is impossible to make
+                     sufficient satisfaction to Him. For though man owes God all that he is able to give Him, yet it is not necessary for his salvation
+                     that he should actually do the whole of what he is able to do, for it is impossible for him, according to his present state
+                     of life, to put forth his whole power into any one single thing, since he has
+                     to be heedful about many things. And so his conduct is subject to a certain measure, viz. the fulfillment of God's commandments,
+                     over and above which he can offer something by way of satisfaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Though man cannot recover the time that is past, he can in the time that follows make compensation for what he should have
+                     done in the past, since the commandment did not exact from him the fulfillment of his whole power, as stated above (ad 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Though original sin has less of the nature of sin than actual sin has, yet it is a more grievous evil, because it is an infection
+                     of human nature itself, so that, unlike actual sin, it could not be expiated by the satisfaction of a mere man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q13.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q13_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q13_A2-p0.1">Whether one man can fulfill satisfactory punishment for another? </h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one man cannot fulfill satisfactory punishment for another. Because merit is requisite for satisfaction.
+                     Now one man cannot merit or demerit for another, since it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q13_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.61.12" target="asv">Ps. 61:12</a>): "Thou wilt render to every man according to his works." Therefore one man cannot make satisfaction for another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, satisfaction is condivided with contrition and confession. But one man cannot be contrite or confess for another.
+                     Neither therefore can one make satisfaction for another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by praying for another one merits also for oneself. If therefore a man can make satisfaction for another, he satisfies
+                     for himself by satisfying for another, so that if a man satisfy for another he need not make satisfaction for his own sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if one can satisfy for another, as soon as he takes the debt of punishment on himself, this other is freed from
+                     his debt. Therefore the latter will go straight to heaven, if he die after the whole of his debt of punishment has been taken
+                     up by another; else, if he be punished all the same, a double punishment will be paid for the same sin, viz. by him who has
+                     begun to make satisfaction, and by him who is punished in Purgatory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q13_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.6.2" target="asv">Gal. 6:2</a>): "Bear ye one another's burdens." Therefore it seems that one can bear the burden of punishment laid upon another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p7"> Further, charity avails more before God than before man. Now before man, one can pay another's debt for love of him. Much
+                     more, therefore, can this be done before the judgment seat of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Satisfactory punishment has a twofold purpose, viz. to pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for the avoidance of sin. Accordingly,
+                     as a remedy against future sin, the satisfaction of one does not profit another, for the flesh of one man is not tamed by
+                     another's fast; nor does one man acquire the habit of well-doing, through the actions of another, except accidentally, in
+                     so far as a man, by his good actions, may merit an increase of grace for another,
+                     since grace is the most efficacious remedy for the avoidance of sin. But this is by way of merit rather than of satisfaction.
+                     on the other hand, as regards the payment of the debt, one man can satisfy for another, provided he be in a state of charity,
+                     so that his works may avail for satisfaction. Nor is it necessary that he who satisfies for another should undergo a greater
+                     punishment than the principal would have to undergo (as some maintain, who argue that a man profits more by his own
+                     punishment than by another's), because punishment derives its power of satisfaction chiefly from charity whereby man bears
+                     it. And since greater charity is evidenced by a man satisfying for another than for himself, less punishment is required of
+                     him who satisfies for another, than of the principal: wherefore we read in the Lives of the Fathers (v, 5) of one who for
+                     love of his brother did penance for a sin which his brother had not committed, and that on account of his charity his brother
+                     was
+                     released from a sin which he had committed. Nor is it necessary that the one for whom satisfaction is made should be unable
+                     to make satisfaction himself, for even if he were able, he would be released from his debt when the other satisfied in his
+                     stead. But this is necessary in so far as the satisfactory punishment is medicinal: so that a man is not to be allowed to
+                     do penance for another, unless there be evidence of some defect in the penitent, either bodily, so that he is unable to bear
+                     it,
+                     or spiritual, so that he is not ready to undergo it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The essential reward is bestowed on a man according to his disposition, because the fulness of the sight of God will be according
+                     to the capacity of those who see Him. Wherefore just as one man is not disposed thereto by another's act, so one man does
+                     not merit the essential reward for another, unless his merit has infinite efficacy, as the merit of Christ, whereby children
+                     come to eternal life through Baptism. On the other hand, the temporal
+                     punishment due to sin after the guilt has been forgiven is not measured according to the disposition of the man to whom it
+                     is due, since sometimes the better man owes a greater debt of punishment. Consequently one man can merit for another as regards
+                     release from punishment, and one man's act becomes another's, by means of charity whereby we are "all one in Christ" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q13_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.28" target="asv">Gal. 3:28</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Contrition is ordained against the guilt which affects a man's disposition to goodness or malice, so that one man is not
+                     freed from guilt by another's contrition. In like manner by confession a man submits to the sacraments of the Church: nor
+                     can one man receive a sacrament instead of another, since in a sacrament grace is given to the recipient, not to another.
+                     Consequently there is no comparison between satisfaction and contrition and
+                     confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the payment of the debt we consider the measure of the punishment, whereas in merit we regard the root which is charity:
+                     wherefore he that, through charity, merits for another, at least congruously, merits more for himself; yet he that satisfies
+                     for another does not also satisfy for himself, because the measure of the punishment does not suffice for the sins of both,
+                     although by satisfying for another he merits something greater than the release
+                     from punishment, viz. eternal life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If this man bound himself to undergo a certain punishment, he would not be released from the debt before paying it: wherefore
+                     he himself will suffer the punishment, as long as the other makes satisfaction for him: and if he do not this, then both are
+                     debtors in respect of fulfilling this punishment, one for the sin committed, the other for his omission, so that it does not
+                     follow that one sin is twice punished.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q14" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q14-p0.1">OF THE QUALITY OF SATISFACTION (FIVE ARTICLES) </h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q14-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q14-p2"> We must now consider the quality of satisfaction, under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q14-p3"> (1) Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q14-p4"> (2) Whether if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for
+                  his other sins which were pardoned him through his contrition?
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q14-p5"> (3) Whether a man's previous satisfaction begins to avail when he recovers charity?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q14-p6"> (4) Whether works done without charity merit any good?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q14-p7"> (5) Whether such works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q14_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q14_A1-p0.1">Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another. Because when several things are not connected
+                     together one can be taken away without another. Now sins are not connected together, else whoever had one would have them
+                     all. Therefore one sin can be expiated by satisfaction, without another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is more merciful than man. But man accepts the payment of one debt without the payment of another. Therefore
+                     God accepts satisfaction for one sin without the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), "satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sin, and give no opening to the
+                     suggestions thereof." Now this can be done with regard to one sin and not another, as when a mall curbs his lust and perseveres
+                     in covetousness. Therefore we can make satisfaction for one sin without satisfying for another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The fast of those who fasted "for debates and strifes" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.58.4" target="asv">Is. 58:4,5</a>) was not acceptable to God, though fasting be a work of satisfaction. Now satisfaction cannot be made save by works that
+                     are acceptable to God. Therefore he that has a sin on his conscience cannot make satisfaction to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p6"> Further, satisfaction is a remedy for the healing of past sins, and for preserving from future sins, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q14_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q12_A3.html">Q[12], A[3]</a>). But without grace it is impossible to avoid sins. Therefore, since each sin excludes grace, it is not possible to make
+                     satisfaction for one sin and not for another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that it is possible to make satisfaction for one sin and not for another, as the Master states (Sent. iv,
+                     D, 15). But this cannot be. For since the previous offense has to be removed by satisfaction, the mode of satisfaction must
+                     needs be consistent with the removal of the offense. Now removal of offense is renewal of friendship: wherefore if there be
+                     anything to hinder the renewal of friendship there can be no satisfaction. Since, therefore,
+                     every sin is a hindrance to the friendship of charity, which is the friendship of man for God, it is impossible for man to
+                     make satisfaction for one sin while holding to another: even as neither would a man make satisfaction to another for a blow,
+                     if while throwing himself at his feet he were to give him another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As sins are not connected together in some single one, a man can incur one without incurring another; whereas all sins are
+                     remitted by reason of one same thing, so that the remissions of various sins are connected together. Consequently satisfaction
+                     cannot be made for one and not for another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man is under obligation to another by reason of a debt, the only inequality between them is that which is opposed
+                     to justice, so that for restitution nothing further is required than that the equality of justice should be reinstated, and
+                     this can be done in respect of one debt without another. But when the obligation is based on an offense, there is inequality
+                     not only of justice but also of friendship, so that for the offense to be removed by
+                     satisfaction, not only must the equality of justice be restored by the payment of a punishment equal to the offense, but also
+                     the equality of friendship must be reinstated, which is impossible so long as an obstacle to friendship remains.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By its weight, one sin drags us down to another, as Gregory says (Moral. xxv): so that when a man holds to one sin, he does
+                     not sufficiently cut himself off from the causes of further sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q14_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q14_A2-p0.1">Whether, when deprived of charity, a man can make satisfaction for sins for which he was previously contrite?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy
+                     for his other sins which were already pardoned him through his contrition. For Daniel said to Nabuchodonosor (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.4.24" target="asv">Dan. 4:24</a>): "Redeem thou thy sins with alms." Yet he was still a sinner, as is shown by his subsequent punishment. Therefore a man
+                     can make satisfaction while in a state of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.9.1" target="asv">Eccles. 9:1</a>). If therefore one cannot make satisfaction unless one be in a state of charity, it would be impossible to know whether one
+                     had made satisfaction, which would be unseemly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man's entire action takes its form from the intention which he had at the beginning. But a penitent is in a state
+                     of charity when he begins to repent. Therefore his whole subsequent satisfaction will derive its efficacy from the charity
+                     which quickens his intention.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, satisfaction consists in a certain equalization of guilt to punishment. But these things can be equalized even in
+                     one who is devoid of charity. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "Charity covereth all sins" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.10.12" target="asv">Prov. 10:12</a>). But satisfaction has the power of blotting out sins. Therefore it is powerless without charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p7"> Further, the chief work of satisfaction is almsdeeds. But alms given by one who is devoid of charity avail nothing, as is
+                     clearly stated 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:3</a>, "If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore there
+                     can be no satisfaction with mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that if, when all a man's sins have been pardoned through contrition, and before he has made satisfaction
+                     for them, he falls into sin, and then makes satisfaction, such satisfaction will be valid, so that if he die in that sin,
+                     he will not be punished in hell for the other sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p9"> But this cannot be, because satisfaction requires the reinstatement of friendship and the restoration of the equality of
+                     justice, the contrary of which destroys friendship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 1,3). Now in satisfaction made to
+                     God, the equality is based, not on equivalence but rather on God's acceptation: so that, although the offense be already removed
+                     by previous contrition, the works of satisfaction must be acceptable to God, and for this they are dependent
+                     on charity. Consequently works done without charity are not satisfactory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Daniel's advice meant that he should give up sin and repent, and so make satisfaction by giving alms.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even as man knows not for certain whether he had charity when making satisfaction, or whether he has it now, so too he knows
+                     not for certain whether he made full satisfaction: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.5.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 5:5</a>): "Be not without fear about sin forgiven." And yet man need not, on account of that fear, repeat the satisfaction made,
+                     if he is not conscious of a mortal sin. For although he may not have expiated his punishment by that
+                     satisfaction, he does not incur the guilt of omission through neglecting to make satisfaction; even as he who receives the
+                     Eucharist without being conscious of a mortal sin of which he is guilty, does not incur the guilt of receiving unworthily.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> His intention was interrupted by his subsequent sin, so that it gives no virtue to the works done after that sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sufficient equalization is impossible both as to the Divine acceptation and as to equivalence: so that the argument proves
+                     nothing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q14_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q14_A3-p0.1">Whether previous satisfaction begins to avail after man is restored to charity? </h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that when a man has recovered charity his previous satisfaction begins to avail, because a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.25.25" target="asv"> Lev. 25:25, </a> "If thy brother being impoverished," etc., says that "the fruit of a man's good works should be counted from the time when
+                     he sinned." But they would not be counted, unless they derived some efficacy from his subsequent charity. Therefore they begin
+                     to avail after he recovers charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the efficacy of satisfaction is hindered by sin, so the efficacy of Baptism is hindered by insincerity. Now Baptism
+                     begins to avail when insincerity ceases. Therefore satisfaction begins to avail when sin is taken away.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a man is given as a penance for the sins he has committed, to fast for several days, and then, after falling
+                     again into sin, he completes his penance, he is not told, when he goes to confession a second time, to fast once again. But
+                     he would be told to do so, if he did not fulfill his duty of satisfaction by them. Therefore his previous works become valid
+                     unto satisfaction, through his subsequent repentance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Works done without charity were not satisfactory, through being dead works. But they are not quickened by penance. Therefore
+                     they do not begin to be satisfactory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p6"> Further, charity does not quicken a work, unless in some way that work proceeds therefrom. But works cannot be acceptable
+                     to God, and therefore cannot be satisfactory, unless they be quickened by charity. Since then the works done without charity,
+                     in no way proceeded from charity, nor ever can proceed therefrom, they can by no means count towards satisfaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that works done while in a state of charity, which are called living works, are meritorious in respect of
+                     eternal life, and satisfactory in respect of paying off the debt of punishment; and that by subsequent charity, works done
+                     without charity are quickened so as to be satisfactory, but not so as to be meritorious of eternal life. But this is impossible,
+                     because works done in charity produce both these effects for the same reason, viz.
+                     because they are pleasing to God: wherefore just as charity by its advent cannot make works done without charity to be pleasing
+                     in one respect, so neither can it make them pleasing in the other respect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This means that the fruits are reckoned, not from the time when he was first in sin, but from the time when he ceased to
+                     sin, when, to wit, he was last in sin; unless he was contrite as soon as he had sinned, and did many good actions before he
+                     confessed. Or we may say that the greater the contrition the more it alleviates the punishment, and the more good actions
+                     a man does while in sin, the more he disposes himself to the grace of contrition, so
+                     that it is probable that he owes a smaller debt of punishment. For this reason the priest should use discretion in taking
+                     them into account, so as to give him a lighter penance, according as he finds him better disposed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Baptism imprints a character on the soul, whereas satisfaction does not. Hence on the advent of charity, which removes both
+                     insincerity and sin, it causes Baptism to have its effect, whereas it does not do this for satisfaction. Moreover Baptism
+                     confers justification in virtue of the deed [ex opere operato] which is not man's deed but God's, wherefore it does not become
+                     a lifeless deed as satisfaction does, which is a deed of man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes satisfaction is such as to leave an effect in the person who makes satisfaction, even after the act of satisfaction
+                     has been done; thus fasting leaves the body weak, and almsdeeds result in a diminution of a person's substance, and so on.
+                     In such cases there is no need to repeat the works of satisfaction if they have been done while in a state of sin, because
+                     through penance they are acceptable to God in the result they leave behind. But
+                     when a work of satisfaction leaves behind no effect in the person that does satisfaction, it needs to be repeated, as in the
+                     case of prayer and so forth. Interior works, since they pass away altogether, are nowise quickened, and must be repeated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q14_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q14_A4-p0.1">Whether works done without charity merit any, at least temporal, good?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that works done without charity merit some, at least a temporal, good. For as punishment is to the evil act,
+                     so is reward to a good act. Now no evil deed is unpunished by God the just judge. Therefore no good deed is unrewarded, and
+                     so every good deed merits some good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, reward is not given except for merit. Now some reward is given for works done without charity, wherefore it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.2" target="asv">Mat. 6:2</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.5" target="asv">5</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A4-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.16" target="asv">16</a>) of those who do good actions for the sake of human glory, that "they have received their reward." Therefore those works
+                     merit some good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there be two men both in sin, one of whom does many deeds that are good in themselves and in their circumstances,
+                     while the other does none, they are not equally near to the reception of good things from Gods else the latter need not be
+                     advised to do any good deeds. Now he that is nearer to God receives more of His good things. Therefore the former, on account
+                     of his good works, merits some good from God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says that "the sinner is not worthy of the bread he eats." Therefore he cannot merit anything from God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p6"> Further, he that is nothing, can merit nothing. But a sinner, through not having charity, is nothing in respect of spiritual
+                     being, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2.</a> Therefore he can merit nothing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking a merit is an action on account of which it is just that the agent should be given something. Now justice
+                     is twofold: first, there is justice properly so called, which regards something due on the part of the recipient. Secondly,
+                     there is metaphorical justice, so to speak, which regards something due on the part of the giver, for it may be right for
+                     the giver to give something to which the receiver has no claim. In this sense the "fitness
+                     of the Divine goodness" is justice; thus Anselm says (Proslog. x) that "God is just when He spares the sinner, because this
+                     is befitting." And in this way merit is also twofold. The first is an act in respect of which the agent himself has a claim
+                     to receive something, and this is called merit of "condignity." The second is an act the result of which is that there is
+                     a duty of giving in the giver by reason of fittingness, wherefore it is called merit of "congruity." Now since in all gratuitous
+                     givings, the primary reason of the giving is love, it is impossible for anyone, properly speaking, to lay claim to a gift,
+                     if he lack friendship. Wherefore, as all things, whether temporal or eternal, are bestowed on us by the bounty of God, no
+                     one can acquire a claim to any of them, save through charity towards God: so that works done without charity are not condignly
+                     meritorious of any good from God either eternal or temporal. But since it is befitting the goodness of God, that wherever
+                     He
+                     finds a disposition He should grant the perfection, a man is said to merit congruously some good by means of good works done
+                     without charity. Accordingly suchlike works avail for a threefold good, acquisition of temporal goods, disposition to grace,
+                     habituation to good works. Since, however, this is not merit properly so called, we should grant that such works are not meritorious
+                     of any good, rather than that they are.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), since no matter what a son may do, he can never give back to his father the
+                     equal of what he has received from him a father can never become his son's debtor: and much less can man make God his debtor
+                     on account of equivalence of work. Consequently no work of ours can merit a reward by reason of its measure of goodness, but
+                     it can by reason of charity, which makes friends hold their possessions in common.
+                     Therefore, no matter how good a work may be, if it be done without charity, it does not give man a claim to receive anything
+                     from God. On the other hand, an evil deed deserves an equivalent punishment according to the measure of its malice, because
+                     no evil has been done to us on the part of God, like the good which He has done. Therefore, although an evil deed deserves
+                     condign punishment, nevertheless a good deed without charity does not merit condign reward.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p9"> Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These arguments consider merit of congruity; while the other arguments consider merit of condignity.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q14_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q15.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q14_A5-p0.1">Whether the aforesaid works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the aforesaid works do not avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell. For the measure of punishment
+                     in hell will answer to the measure of guilt. But works done without charity do not diminish the measure of guilt. Neither,
+                     therefore, do they lessen the pains of hell.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the pain of hell, though infinite in duration, is nevertheless finite in intensity. Now anything finite is done
+                     away with by finite subtraction. If therefore works done without charity canceled any of the punishment due for sins, those
+                     works might be so numerous, that the pain of hell would be done away with altogether: which is false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the suffrages of the Church are more efficacious than works done without charity. But, according to Augustine (Enchiridion
+                     cx), "the suffrages of the Church do not profit the damned in hell." Much less therefore are those pains mitigated by works
+                     done without charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine also says (Enchiridion cx): "Whomsoever they profit, either receive a full pardon, or at least find damnation itself
+                     more tolerable."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p6"> Further, it is a greater thing to do a good deed than to omit an evil deed. But the omission of an evil deed always avoids
+                     a punishment, even in one who lacks charity. Much more, therefore, do good deeds void punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Mitigation of the pains of hell can be understood in two ways: first, as though one were delivered from the punishment which
+                     he already deserved, and thus, since no one is delivered from punishment unless he be absolved from guilt, (for an effect
+                     is not diminished or taken away unless its cause be diminished or taken away), the pain of hell cannot be mitigated by works
+                     done without charity, since they are unable to remove or diminish guilt. Secondly, so that
+                     the demerit of punishment is hindered; and thus the aforesaid works diminish the pain of hell---first because he who does
+                     such works escapes being guilty of omitting them---secondly, because such works dispose one somewhat to good, so that a man
+                     sins from less contempt, and indeed is drawn away from many sins thereby.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p8"> These works do, however merit a diminution or postponement of temporal punishment, as in the case of Achab (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 21:27, </a> seqq.), as also the acquisition of temporal goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p9"> Some, however, say that they mitigate the pains of hell, not by subtracting any of their substance, but by strengthening
+                     the subject, so that he is more able to bear them. But this is impossible, because there is no strengthening without a diminution
+                     of passibility. Now passibility is according to the measure of guilt, wherefore if guilt is not removed, neither can the subject
+                     be strengthened.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p10"> Some again say that the punishment is mitigated as to the remorse of conscience, though not as to the pain of fire. But neither
+                     will this stand, because as the pain of fire is equal to the guilt, so also is the pain of the remorse of conscience: so that
+                     what applies to one applies to the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p11"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q15.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q15" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q15-p0.1">OF THE MEANS OF MAKING SATISFACTION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q15-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q15-p2"> We must now consider the means of making satisfaction, under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q15-p3"> (1) Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q15-p4"> (2) Whether the scourges whereby God punishes man in this life, are satisfactory?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q15-p5"> (3) Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably reckoned, by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and
+                  prayer?
+               </p>
+               <div id="XP_Q15_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q15.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q15_A1-p0.1">Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that satisfaction need not be made by means of penal works. For satisfaction should make compensation for the
+                     offense committed against God. Now, seemingly, no compensation is given to God by penal works, for God does not delight in
+                     our sufferings, as appears from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.3.22" target="asv"> Tob. 3:22.</a> Therefore satisfaction need not be made by means of penal works.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the charity from which a work proceeds, the less penal is that work, for "charity hath no pain [*Vulg.:
+                     'Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain']" according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.18" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:18</a>. If therefore works of satisfaction need to be penal, the more they proceed from charity, the less satisfactory will they
+                     be: which is false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Satisfaction," as Anselm states (Cur Deus homo i) "consists in giving due honor to God." But this can be done by
+                     other means than penal works. Therefore satisfaction needs not to be made by means of penal works.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xx): "It is just that the sinner, by his repentance, should inflict on himself so much the greater
+                     suffering, as he has brought greater harm on himself by his sin."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p6"> Further, the wound caused by sin should be perfectly healed by satisfaction. Now punishment is the remedy for sins, as the
+                     Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3). Therefore satisfaction should be made by means of penal works.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q15_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q12_A3.html">Q[12], A[3]</a>), satisfaction regards both the past offense, for which compensation is made by its means, and also future sin wherefrom
+                     we are preserved thereby: and in both respects satisfaction needs to be made by means of penal works. For compensation for
+                     an offense implies equality, which must needs be between the offender and the person whom he offends. Now equalization in
+                     human justice consists in taking away from
+                     one that which he has too much of, and giving it to the person from whom something has been taken. And, although nothing can
+                     be taken away from God, so far as He is concerned, yet the sinner, for his part, deprives Him of something by sinning as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q15_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q12_A3.html">Q[12], AA[3]</a>,4). Consequently, in order that compensation be made, something by way of satisfaction that may conduce to the glory of God
+                     must be taken away from the sinner. Now a good work, as such, does not
+                     deprive the agent of anything, but perfects him: so that the deprivation cannot be effected by a good work unless it be penal.
+                     Therefore, in order that a work be satisfactory it needs to be good that it may conduce to God's honor, and it must be penal,
+                     so that something may be taken away from the sinner thereby.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p8"> Again punishment preserves from future sin, because a man does not easily fall back into sin when he has had experience of
+                     the punishment. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) punishments are medicinal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though God does not delight in our punishments as such, yet He does, in so far as they are just, and thus they can be satisfactory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as, in satisfaction, we have to note the penality of the work, so, in merit, we must observe its difficulty. Now if
+                     the difficulty of the work itself be diminished, other things being equal, the merit is also diminished; but if the difficulty
+                     be diminished on the part of the promptitude of the will, this does not diminish the merit, but increases it; and, in like
+                     manner, diminution of the penality of a work, on account of the will being made more
+                     prompt by charity, does not lessen the efficacy of satisfaction, but increases it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which is due for sin is compensation for the offense, and this cannot be done without punishment of the sinner. It is
+                     of this debt that Anselm speaks.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q15.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q15_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q15_A2-p0.1">Whether the scourges of the present life are satisfactory?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the scourges whereby we are punished by God in this life, cannot be satisfactory. For nothing but what
+                     is meritorious can be satisfactory, as is clear from what has been said (
+                     <a id="XP_Q15_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>). But we do not merit except by what is in our own power. Since therefore the scourges with which God punishes us are not
+                     in our power, it seems that they cannot be satisfactory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, only the good make satisfaction. But these scourges are inflicted on the wicked also, and are deserved by them most
+                     of all. Therefore they cannot be satisfactory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, satisfaction regards past sins. But these scourges are sometimes inflicted on those who have no sins, as in the
+                     case of Job. Therefore it seems that they are not satisfactory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.3" target="asv">Rom. 5:3,4</a>): "Tribulation worketh patience, and patience trial, i.e. deliverance from sin," as a gloss explains it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p6"> Further, Ambrose says (Super 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a>): "Although faith," i.e. the consciousness of sin, "be lacking, the punishment satisfies." Therefore the scourges of this
+                     life are satisfactory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Compensation for a past offense can be enforced either by the offender or by another. When it is enforced by another, such
+                     compensation is of a vindictive rather than of a satisfactory nature, whereas when it is made by the offender, it is also
+                     satisfactory. Consequently, if the scourges, which are inflicted by God on account of sin, become in some way the act of the
+                     sufferer they acquire a satisfactory character. Now they become the act of the sufferer in
+                     so far as he accepts them for the cleansing of his sins, by taking advantage of them patiently. If, however, he refuse to
+                     submit to them patiently, then they do not become his personal act in any way, and are not of a satisfactory, but merely of
+                     a vindictive character.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although these scourges are not altogether in our power, yet in some respect they are, in so far as we use them patiently.
+                     In this way man makes a virtue of necessity, so that such things can become both meritorious and satisfactory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i, 8), even as "the same fire makes gold glisten and straw reek," so by the same scourges
+                     are the good cleansed and the wicked worsened on account of their impatience. Hence, though the scourges are common to both,
+                     satisfaction is only on the side of the good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These scourges always regard past guilt, not always the guilt of the person, but sometimes the guilt of nature. For had there
+                     not been guilt in human nature, there would have been no punishment. But since guilt preceded in nature, punishment is inflicted
+                     by God on a person without the person's fault, that his virtue may be meritorious, and that he may avoid future sin. Moreover,
+                     these two things are necessary in satisfaction. For the work needs to be
+                     meritorious, that honor may be given to God, and it must be a safeguard of virtue, that we may be preserved from future sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q15_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q16.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q15_A3-p0.1">Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably enumerated?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the works of satisfaction are unsuitably enumerated by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting,
+                     and prayer. For a work of satisfaction should be penal. But prayer is not penal, since it is a remedy against penal sorrow,
+                     and is a source of pleasure, wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.13" target="asv">James 5:13</a>): "Is any of you sad? Let him pray. Is he cheerful in mind? Let him sing." Therefore prayer should not be reckoned among
+                     the
+                     works of satisfaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is either carnal or spiritual. Now, as Jerome says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.9.28" target="asv"> Mk. 9:28, </a> "This kind" of demons "can go out by nothing, but by prayer and fasting: Diseases of the body are healed by fasting, diseases
+                     of the mind, by prayer." Therefore no other work of satisfaction is necessary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, satisfaction is necessary in order for us to be cleansed from our sins. But almsgiving cleanses from all sins, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.11.41" target="asv">Lk. 11:41</a>: "Give alms, and behold all things are clean unto you." Therefore the other two are in excess.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, it seems that there should be more. For contrary heals contrary. But there are many more than three kinds
+                     of sin. Therefore more works of satisfaction should be enumerated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, pilgrimages and scourgings are also enjoined as works of satisfaction, and are not included among the above. Therefore
+                     they are not sufficiently enumerated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Satisfaction should be of such a nature as to involve something taken away from us for the honor of God. Now we have but
+                     three kinds of goods, bodily, spiritual, and goods of fortune, or external goods. By alms-deeds we deprive ourselves of some
+                     goods of fortune, and by fasting we retrench goods of the body. As to goods of the soul, there is no need to deprive ourselves
+                     of any of them, either in whole or in part, since thereby we become acceptable to God,
+                     but we should submit them entirely to God, which is done by prayer.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p8"> This number is shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction uproots the causes of sin, for these are reckoned to be three
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>), viz. "concupiscence of the flesh," "concupiscence of the eyes," and "pride of life." Fasting is directed against concupiscence
+                     of the "flesh," alms-deeds against concupiscence of the "eyes," and "prayer" against "pride of life," as Augustine says (Enarr.
+                     in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.42" target="asv">Ps. 42</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p9"> This number is also shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction does not open a way to the suggestions of sin, because
+                     every sin is committed either against God, and this is prevented by "prayer," or against our neighbor, and this is remedied
+                     by "alms-deeds," or against ourselves, and this is forestalled by "fasting."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to some, prayer is twofold. There is the prayer of contemplatives whose "conversation is in heaven": and this,
+                     since it is altogether delightful, is not a work of satisfaction. The other is a prayer which pours forth sighs for sin; this
+                     is penal and a part of satisfaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p11"> It may also be replied, and better, that every prayer has the character of satisfaction, for though it be sweet to the soul
+                     it is painful to the body, since, as Gregory says (Super Ezech., Hom. xiv), "doubtless, when our soul's love is strengthened,
+                     our body's strength is weakened"; hence we read (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.25" target="asv">Gn. 32:25</a>) that the sinew of Jacob's thigh shrank through his wrestling with the angel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Carnal sin is twofold; one which is completed in carnal delectation, as gluttony and lust. and, another which is completed
+                     in things relating to the flesh, though it be completed in the delectation of the soul rather than of the flesh, as covetousness.
+                     Hence such like sins are between spiritual and carnal sins, so that they need a satisfaction proper to them, viz. almsdeeds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although each of these three, by a kind of likeness, is appropriated to some particular kind of sin because it is reasonable
+                     that, whereby a man sins, in that he should be punished, and that satisfaction should cut out the very root of the sin committed,
+                     yet each of them can satisfy for any kind of sin. Hence if a man is unable to perform one of the above, another is imposed
+                     on him, chiefly almsdeeds, which can take the place of the others, in so far
+                     as in those to whom a man gives alms he purchases other works of satisfaction thereby. Consequently even if almsgiving washes
+                     all sins away, it does not follow that other works are in excess.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Though there are many kinds of sins, all are reduced to those three roots or to those three kinds of sin, to which, as we
+                     have said, the aforesaid works of satisfaction correspond.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Whatever relates to affliction of the body is all referred to fasting, and whatever is spent for the benefit of one's neighbor
+                     is a kind of alms, and whatever act of worship is given to God becomes a kind of prayer, so that even one work can be satisfactory
+                     in several ways.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q16.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q16" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q16-p0.1">OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q16-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q16-p2"> We must now consider the recipients of the sacrament of Penance: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q16-p3"> (1) Whether penance can be in the innocent?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q16-p4"> (2) Whether it can be in the saints in glory?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q16-p5"> (3) Whether in the good or bad angels?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q16_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q16.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q16_A1-p0.1">Whether penance can be in the innocent?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that penance cannot be in the innocent. For penance consists in bewailing one's evil deeds: whereas the innocent
+                     have done no evil. Therefore penance cannot be in them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the very name of penance [poenitentia] implies punishment [poena]. But the innocent do not deserve punishment. Therefore
+                     penance is not in them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, penance coincides with vindictive justice. But if all were innocent, there would be no room for vindictive justice.
+                     Therefore there would be no penance, so that there is none in the innocent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> All the virtues are infused together. But penance is a virtue. Since, therefore, other virtues are infused into the innocent
+                     at Baptism, penance is infused with them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p6"> Further, a man is said to be curable though he has never been sick in body: therefore in like manner, one who has never been
+                     sick spiritually. Now even as there can be no actual cure from the wound of sin without an act of penance, so is there no
+                     possibility of cure without the habit of penance. Therefore one who has never had the disease of sin, has the habit of penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Habit comes between power and act: and since the removal of what precedes entails the removal of what follows, but not conversely,
+                     the removal of the habit ensues from the removal of the power to act, but not from the removal of the act. And because removal
+                     of the matter entails the removal of the act, since there can be no act without the matter into which it passes, hence the
+                     habit of a virtue is possible in one for whom the matter is not available, for
+                     the reason that it can be available, so that the habit can proceed to its act---thus a poor man can have the habit of magnificence,
+                     but not the act, because he is not possessed of great wealth which is the matter of magnificence, but he can be possessed
+                     thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the innocent have committed no sin, nevertheless they can, so that they are competent to have the habit of penance.
+                     Yet this habit can never proceed to its act, except perhaps with regard to their venial sins, because mortal sins destroy
+                     the habit. Nevertheless it is not without its purpose, because it is a perfection of the natural power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although they deserve no punishment actually, yet it is possible for something to be in them for which they would deserve
+                     to be punished.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> So long as the power to sin remains, there would be room for vindictive justice as to the habit, though not as to the act,
+                     if there were no actual sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q16.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q16_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q16_A2-p0.1">Whether the saints in glory have penance?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the saints in glory have not penance. For, as Gregory says (Moral. iv), "the blessed remember their sins,
+                     even as we, without grief, remember our griefs after we have been healed." But penance is grief of the heart. Therefore the
+                     saints in heaven have not penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the saints in heaven are conformed to Christ. But there was no penance in Christ, since there was no faith which
+                     is the principle of penance. Therefore there will be no penance in the saints in heaven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a habit is useless if it is not reduced to its act. But the saints in heaven will not repent actually, because,
+                     if they did, there would be something in them against their wish. Therefore the habit of penance will not be in them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, penance is a part of justice. But justice is "perpetual and immortal" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q16_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.15" target="asv">Wis. 1:15</a>), and will remain in heaven. Therefore penance will also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, we read in the Lives of the Fathers, that one of them said that even Abraham will repent of not having done more
+                     good. But one ought to repent of evil done more than of good left undone, and which one was not bound to do, for such is the
+                     good in question. Therefore repentance will be there of evil done.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The cardinal virtues will remain in heaven, but only as regards the acts which they exercise in respect of their end. Wherefore,
+                     since the virtue of penance is a part of justice which is a cardinal virtue, whoever has the habit of penance in this life,
+                     will have it in the life to come: but he will not have the same act as now, but another, viz. thanksgiving to God for His
+                     mercy in pardoning his sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that they do not have the same act as penance has now; and we grant this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Christ could not sin, wherefore the matter of this virtue was lacking in His respect both actually and potentially: so that
+                     there is no comparison between Him and others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Repentance, properly speaking, considered as that act of penance which is in this life, will not be in heaven: and yet the
+                     habit will not be without its use, for it will have another act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p11"> Reply OBJ 4,5: We grant the Fourth argument. But since the Fifth Objection proves that there will be the same act of penance
+                     in heaven as now, we answer the latter by saying that in heaven one will be altogether conformed to the will of God. Wherefore,
+                     as God, by His antecedent will, but not by His consequent will, wishes that all things should be good, and therefore that
+                     there should be no evil, so is it with the blessed. It is this will that this holy father improperly calls
+                     penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q16_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q17.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Whether an angel can be the subject of penance?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that even a good or bad angel can be a subject of penance. For fear is the beginning of penance. But fear is
+                     in the angels, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q16_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.19" target="asv"> James 2:19</a>: "The devils . . . believe and tremble." Therefore there can be penance in them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that "evil men are full of repentance, and this is a great punishment for them."
+                     Now the devils are exceeding evil, nor is there any punishment that they lack. Therefore they can repent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is more easily moved to that which is according to its nature than to that which is against its nature:
+                     thus water which has by violence been heated, of itself returns to its natural property. Now angels can be moved to sin which
+                     is contrary to their common nature. Much more therefore can they return to that which is in accord with their nature. But
+                     this is done by penance. Therefore they are susceptible to penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what applies to angels, applies equally to separated souls, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). But there can
+                     be penance in separated souls, as some say, as in the souls of the blessed in heaven. Therefore there can be penance in the
+                     angels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> By penance man obtains pardon for the sin he has committed. But this is impossible in the angels. Therefore they are not
+                     subjects of penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p7"> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that man is subject to penance on account of the weakness of his body. But
+                     the angels are not united to a body. Therefore no penance can be in them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In us, penance is taken in two senses; first, as a passion, and thus it is nothing but pain or sorrow on account of a sin
+                     committed: and though, as a passion it is only in the concupiscible part, yet, by way of comparison, the name of penance is
+                     given to that act of the will, whereby a man detests what he has done, even as love and other passions are spoken of as though
+                     they were in the intellectual appetite. Secondly, penance is taken as a virtue, and in
+                     this way its act consists in the detestation of evil done, together with the purpose of amendment and the intention of expiating
+                     the evil, or of placating God for the offense committed. Now detestation of evil befits a person according as he is naturally
+                     ordained to good. And since this order or inclination is not entirely destroyed in any creature, it remains even in the damned,
+                     and consequently the passion of repentance, or something like it, remains in them too, as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q16_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.5.3" target="asv"> Wis.
+                        5:3 
+                     </a>"(saying) within themselves, repenting," etc. This repentance, as it is not a habit, but a passion or act, can by no means
+                     be in the blessed angels, who have not committed any sins: but it is in the wicked angels, since the same applies to them
+                     as to the lost souls, for, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4), "death is to men what sin is to an angel." But no
+                     forgiveness is possible for the sin of an angel. Now sin is the proper object of the virtue itself which we call
+                     penance, in so far as it can be pardoned or expiated. Therefore, since the wicked angels cannot have the matter, they have
+                     not the power to produce the act, so that neither can they have the habit. Hence the angels cannot be subjects of the virtue
+                     of penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A certain movement of penance is engendered in them from fear, but not such as is a virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p10"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whatever is natural in them is entirely good, and inclines to good: but their free-will is fixed on evil. And since the movement
+                     of virtue and vice follows the inclination, not of nature, but of the free-will, there is no need that there should be movements
+                     of virtue in them either actually or possibly, although they are inclined to good by nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is no parity between the holy angels and the beatified souls, because in the latter there has been or could have been
+                     a sin that could be pardoned, but not in the former: so that though they are like as to their present state, they differ as
+                     to their previous states, which penance regards directly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q17.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q17" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q17-p0.1">OF THE POWER OF THE KEYS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q17-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q17-p2"> We must now consider the power of the ministers of this sacrament, which power depends on the keys. As to this matter, in
+                  the first place we shall treat of the keys, secondly, of excommunication, thirdly, of indulgences, since these two things
+                  are connected with the power of the keys. The first of these considerations will be fourfold: (1) the nature and meaning of
+                  the keys. (2) the use of the keys; (3) the ministers of the keys; (4) those on whom the use of the keys can be
+                  exercised.
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q17-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q17-p4"> (1) Whether there ought to be keys in the Church?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q17-p5"> (2) Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q17-p6"> (3) Whether there are two keys or only one?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q17_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q17.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q17_A1-p0.1">Whether there should be keys in the Church?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no necessity for keys in the Church. For there is no need for keys that one may enter a house
+                     the door of which is open. But it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q17_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.4.1" target="asv">Apoc. 4:1</a>): "I looked and behold a door was opened in heaven," which door is Christ, for He said of Himself (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q17_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#John.10.7" target="asv">Jn. 10:7</a>): "I am the door." Therefore the Church needs no keys for the entrance into heaven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a key is needed for opening and shutting. But this belongs to Christ alone, "Who openeth and no man shutteth, shutteth
+                     and no man openeth" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q17_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.7" target="asv">Apoc. 3:7</a>). Therefore the Church has no keys in the hands of her ministers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hell is opened to whomever heaven is closed, and vice versa. Therefore whoever has the keys of heaven, has the keys
+                     of hell. But the Church is not said to have the keys of hell. Therefore neither has she the keys of heaven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q17_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>): "To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p6"> Further, every dispenser should have the keys of the things that he dispenses. But the ministers of the Church are the dispensers
+                     of the divine mysteries, as appears from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q17_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:1.</a> Therefore they ought to have the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In material things a key is an instrument for opening a door. Now the door of the kingdom is closed to us through sin, both
+                     as to the stain and as to the debt of punishment. Wherefore the power of removing this obstacle is called a key. Now this
+                     power is in the Divine Trinity by authority; hence some say that God has the key of "authority." But Christ Man had the power
+                     to remove the above obstacle, through the merit of His Passion, which also is said to open
+                     the door; hence some say that He has the keys of "excellence." And since "the sacraments of which the Church is built, flowed
+                     from the side of Christ while He lay asleep on the cross" [*Augustine, Enarr. in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q17_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.138" target="asv">Ps. 138</a>], the efficacy of the Passion abides in the sacraments of the Church. Wherefore a certain power for the removal of the aforesaid
+                     obstacle is bestowed on the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments, not by their own, but by a
+                     Divine power and by the Passion
+                     of Christ. This power is called metaphorically the Church's key, and is the key of "ministry."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The door of heaven, considered in itself, is ever open, but it is said to be closed to someone, on account of some obstacle
+                     against entering therein, which is in himself. The obstacle which the entire human nature inherited from the sin of the first
+                     man was removed by Christ's Passion; hence, after the Passion, John saw an opened door in heaven. Yet that door still remains
+                     closed to this or that man, on account of the original sin which he has
+                     contracted, or the actual sin which he has committed: hence we need the sacraments and the keys of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This refers to His closing Limbo, so that thenceforth no one should go there, and to His opening of Paradise, the obstacle
+                     of nature being removed by His Passion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The key whereby hell is opened and closed, is the power of bestowing grace, whereby hell is opened to man, so that he is
+                     taken out from sin which is the door of hell, and closed, so that by the help of grace man should no more fall into sin. Now
+                     the power of bestowing grace belongs to God alone, wherefore He kept this key to Himself. But the key of the kingdom is also
+                     the power to remit the debt of temporal punishment, which debt prevents man from
+                     entering the kingdom Consequently the key of the kingdom can be given to man rather than the key of hell, for they are not
+                     the same, as is clear from what has been said. For a man may be set free from hell by the remission of the debt of eternal
+                     punishment, without being at once admitted to the kingdom, on account of his yet owing a debt of temporal punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p11"> It may also be replied, as some state, that the key of heaven is also the key of hell, since if one is opened to a man, the
+                     other, for that very reason, is closed to him, but it takes its name from the better of the two.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q17.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q17_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q17_A2-p0.1">Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the key is not the power of binding and loosing, whereby "the ecclesiastical judge has to admit the worthy
+                     to the kingdom and exclude the unworthy" therefrom, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 16). For the spiritual power conferred
+                     in a sacrament is the same as the character. But the key and the character do not seem to be the same, since by the character
+                     man is referred to God, whereas by the key he is referred to his subjects. Therefore
+                     the key is not a power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an ecclesiastical judge is only one who has jurisdiction, which is not given at the same time as orders. But the
+                     keys are given in the conferring of orders. Therefore there should have been no mention of the ecclesiastical judge in the
+                     definition of the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when a man has something of himself, he needs not to be reduced to act by some active power. Now a man is admitted
+                     to the kingdom from the very fact that he is worthy. Therefore it does not concern the power of the keys to admit the worthy
+                     to the kingdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sinners are unworthy of the kingdom. But the Church prays for sinners, that they may go to heaven. Therefore she
+                     does not exclude the unworthy, but admits them, so far as she is concerned.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, in every ordered series of agents, the last end belongs to the principal and not to the instrumental agent. But
+                     the principal agent in view of man's salvation is God. Therefore admission to the kingdom, which is the last end, belongs
+                     to Him, and not to those who have the keys, who are as instrumental or ministerial agents.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text. 33), "powers are defined from their acts." Wherefore, since the key is a
+                     kind of power, it should be defined from its act or use, and reference to the act should include its object from which it
+                     takes its species, and the mode of acting whereby the power is shown to be well-ordered. Now the act of the spiritual power
+                     is to open heaven, not absolutely, since it is already open, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), but
+                     for this or that man; and this cannot be done in an orderly manner without due consideration of the worthiness of the one
+                     to be admitted to heaven. Hence the aforesaid definition of the key gives the genus, viz. "power," the subject of the power,
+                     viz. the "ecclesiastical judge," and the act, viz. "of excluding or admitting," corresponding to the two acts of a material
+                     key which are to open and shut; the object of which act is referred to in the words "from the kingdom," and the mode, in the
+                     words, "worthy" and "unworthy," because account is taken of the worthiness or unworthiness of those on whom the act is exercised.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same power is directed to two things, of which one is the cause of the other, as heat, in fire, is directed to make a
+                     thing hot and to melt it. And since every grace and remission in a mystical body comes to it from its head, it seems that
+                     it is essentially the same power whereby a priest can consecrate, and whereby he can loose and bind, if he has jurisdiction,
+                     and that there is only a logical difference, according as it is referred to different
+                     effects, even as fire in one respect is said to have the power of heating, and in another, the power of melting. And because
+                     the character of the priestly order is nothing else than the power of exercising that act to which the priestly order is chiefly
+                     ordained (if we maintain that it is the same as a spiritual power), therefore the character, the power of consecrating, and
+                     the power of the keys are one and the same essentially, but differ logically.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All spiritual power is conferred by some kind of consecration. Therefore the key is given together with the order: yet the
+                     use of the key requires due matter, i.e. a people subject through jurisdiction, so that until he has jurisdiction, the priest
+                     has the keys, but he cannot exercise the act of the keys. And since the key is defined from its act, its definition contains
+                     a reference to jurisdiction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A person may be worthy to have something in two ways, either so as to have a right to possess it, and thus whoever is worthy
+                     has heaven already opened to him---or so that it is meet that he should receive it, and thus the power of the keys admits
+                     those who are worthy, but to whom heaven is not yet altogether opened.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even as God hardens not by imparting malice, but by withholding grace, so a priest is said to exclude, not as though he placed
+                     an obstacle to entrance, but because he does not remove an obstacle which is there, since he cannot remove it unless God has
+                     already removed it. [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he
+                     altered his opinion. Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q17_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q62_A1.html">TP, Q[62], A[1]</a>;
+                     
+                     <a id="XP_Q17_A2-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q64_A1.html">TP, Q[64], A[1]</a>; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q17_A2-p11.3" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q86_A6.html">TP, Q[86], A[6]</a>.] Hence God is prayed that He may absolve, so that there may be room for the priest's absolution.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The priest's act does not bear immediately on the kingdom, but on the sacraments, by means of which man wins to the kingdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q17_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q17_A3-p0.1">Whether there are two keys or only one?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not two keys but only one. For one lock requires but one key. Now the lock for the removal of
+                     which the keys of the Church are required, is sin. Therefore the Church does not require two keys for one sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the keys are given when orders are conferred. But knowledge is not always due to infusion, but sometimes is acquired,
+                     nor is it possessed by all those who are ordained, and is possessed by some who are not ordained. Therefore knowledge is not
+                     a key, so that there is but one key, viz. the power of judging.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the power which the priest has over the mystic body of Christ flows from the power which he has over Christ's true
+                     body. Now the power of consecrating Christ's true body is but one. Therefore the power which regards Christ's mystic body
+                     is but one. But this is a key. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, It seems that there are more than two keys. For just as knowledge and power are requisite for man to act,
+                     so is will. But the knowledge of discretion is reckoned as a key, and so is the power of judging. Therefore the will to absolve
+                     should be counted as a key.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, all three Divine Persons remit sins. Now the priest, through the keys, is the minister for the remission of sins.
+                     Therefore he should have three keys, so that he may be conformed to the Trinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whenever an act requires fitness on the part of the recipient, two things are necessary in the one who has to perform the
+                     act, viz. judgment of the fitness of the recipient, and accomplishment of the act. Therefore in the act of justice whereby
+                     a man is given what he deserves, there needs to be a judgment in order to discern whether he deserves to receive. Again, an
+                     authority or power is necessary for both these things, for we cannot give save what we have
+                     in our power; nor can there be judgment, without the right to enforce it, since judgment is determined to one particular thing,
+                     which determination it derives, in speculative matters, from the first principles which cannot be gainsaid, and, in practical
+                     matters, from the power of command vested in the one who judges. And since the act of the key requires fitness in the person
+                     on whom it is exercised---because the ecclesiastical judge, by means of the key, "admits the worthy and excludes the
+                     unworthy," as may be seen from the definition given above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q17_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a>---therefore the judge requires both judgment of discretion whereby he judges a man to be worthy, and also the very act of
+                     receiving (that man's confession); and for both these things a certain power or authority is necessary. Accordingly we may
+                     distinguish two keys, the first of which regards the judgment about the worthiness of the person to be absolved, while the
+                     other regards the absolution.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p8"> These two keys are distinct, not in the essence of authority, since both belong to the minister by virtue of his office,
+                     but in comparison with their respective acts, one of which presupposes the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One key is ordained immediately to the opening of one lock, but it is not unfitting that one key should be ordained to the
+                     act of another. Thus it is in the case in point. For it is the second key, which is the power of binding and loosing, that
+                     opens the lock of sin immediately, but the key of knowledge shows to whom that lock should be opened.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two opinions about the key of knowledge. For some say that knowledge considered as a habit, acquired or infused,
+                     is the key in this case, and that it is not the principal key, but is called a key through being subordinate to another key:
+                     so that it is not called a key when the other key is wanting, for instance, in an educated man who is not a priest. And although
+                     priests lack this key at times, through being without knowledge, acquired or
+                     infused, of loosing and binding, yet sometimes they make use of their natural endeavors, which they who hold this opinion
+                     call a little key, so that although knowledge be not bestowed together with orders, yet with the conferring of orders the
+                     knowledge becomes a key which it was not before. This seems to have been the opinion of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 19).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p11"> But this does not seem to agree with the words of the Gospel, whereby the keys are promised to Peter (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q17_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>), so that not only one but two are given in orders. For which reason the other opinion holds that the key is not knowledge
+                     considered as a habit, but the authority to exercise the act of knowledge, which authority is sometimes without knowledge,
+                     while the knowledge is sometimes present without the authority. This may be seen even in secular courts,
+                     for a secular judge may have the authority to judge, without having the knowledge of the law, while another man, on the contrary,
+                     has knowledge of the law without having the authority to judge. And since the act of judging to which a man is bound through
+                     the authority which is vested in him, and not through his habit of knowledge, cannot be well performed without both of the
+                     above, the authority to judge, which is the key of knowledge, cannot be accepted without sin by one who lacks knowledge;
+                     whereas knowledge void of authority can be possessed without sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of consecrating is directed to only one act of another kind, wherefore it is not numbered among the keys, nor is
+                     it multiplied as the power of the keys, which is directed to different acts, although as to the essence of power and authority
+                     it is but one, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Everyone is free to will, so that no one needs authority to will; wherefore will is not reckoned as a key.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> All three Persons remit sins in the same way as one Person, wherefore there is no need for the priest, who is the minister
+                     of the Trinity, to have three keys: and all the more, since the will, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, requires no
+                     key, as stated above (ad 4).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q18" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q18-p0.1">OF THE EFFECT OF THE KEYS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q18-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q18-p2"> We must now consider the effect of the keys under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q18-p3"> (1) Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q18-p4"> (2) Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q18-p5"> (3) Whether a priest can bind in virtue of the power of the keys?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q18-p6"> (4) Whether he can loose and bind according to his own judgment?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q18_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt? [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and
+                     replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. TP, Q[62], A[1]; TP, Q[64], A[1]; TP, Q[86], A[6]]
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt. For it was said to the disciples (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q18_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.23" target="asv">Jn. 20:23</a>): "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them." Now this was not said in reference to the declaration only, as
+                     the Master states (Sent. iv, D, 18), for in that case the priest of the New Testament would have no more power than the priest
+                     of the Old Testament. Therefore he exercises a power over the remission of
+                     the guilt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in Penance grace is given for the remission of sin. Now the priest is the dispenser of this sacrament by virtue
+                     of the keys. Therefore, since grace is opposed to sin, not on the part of the punishment, but on the part of the guilt, it
+                     seems that the priest operates unto the remission of sin by virtue of the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the priest receives more power by his consecration than the baptismal water by its sanctification. Now the baptismal
+                     water receives the power "to touch the body and cleanse the heart," as Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.). Much more, therefore,
+                     does the priest, in his consecration, receive the power to cleanse the heart from the stain of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Master stated above (Sent. iv, D, 18) that God has not bestowed on the minister the power to co-operate with Him in the
+                     inward cleansing. Now if he remitted sins as to the guilt, he would co-operate with God in the inward cleansing. Therefore
+                     the power of the keys does not extend to the remission of guilt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p6"> Further, sin is not remitted save by the Holy Ghost. But no man has the power to give the Holy Ghost, as the Master said
+                     above (Sent. i, D, 14). Neither therefore can he remit sins as to their guilt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to Hugh (De Sacram. ii), "the sacraments, by virtue of their sanctification, contain an invisible grace." Now this
+                     sanctification is sometimes essential to the sacrament both as regards the matter and as regards the minister, as may be seen
+                     in Confirmation, and then the sacramental virtue is in both together. Sometimes, however, the essence of the sacrament requires
+                     only sanctification of the matter, as in Baptism, which has no fixed minister on
+                     whom it depends necessarily, and then the whole virtue of the sacrament is in the matter. Again, sometimes the essence of
+                     the sacrament requires the consecration or sanctification of the minister without any sanctification of the matter, and then
+                     the entire sacramental virtue is in the minister, as in Penance. Hence the power of the keys which is in the priest, stands
+                     in the same relation to the effect of Penance, as the virtue in the baptismal water does to the effect of Baptism. Now Baptism
+                     and the sacrament of Penance agree somewhat in their effect, since each is directly ordained against guilt, which is not the
+                     case in the other sacraments: yet they differ in this, that the sacrament of Penance, since the acts of the recipient are
+                     as its matter, cannot be given save to adults, who need to be disposed for the reception of the sacramental effect; whereas
+                     Baptism is given, sometimes to adults, sometimes to children and others who lack the use of reason, so that by Baptism children
+                     receive grace and remission of sin without any previous disposition, while adults do not, for they require to be disposed
+                     by the removal of insincerity. This disposition sometimes precedes their Baptism by priority of time, being sufficient for
+                     the reception of grace, before they are actually baptized, but not before they have come to the knowledge of the truth and
+                     have conceived the desire for Baptism. At other times this disposition does not precede the reception of Baptism by a priority
+                     of
+                     time, but is simultaneous with it, and then the grace of the remission of guilt is bestowed through the reception of Baptism.
+                     On the other hand, grace is never given through the sacrament of Penance unless the recipient be disposed either simultaneously
+                     or before. Hence the power of the keys operates unto the remission of guilt, either through being desired or through being
+                     actually exercised, even as the waters of Baptism. But just as Baptism acts, not as a principal agent but as an
+                     instrument, and does not go so far as to cause the reception itself of grace, even instrumentally [*See note at beginning
+                     of this article], but merely disposes the recipient to the grace whereby his guilt is remitted, so is it with the power of
+                     the keys. Wherefore God alone directly remits guilt, and Baptism acts through His power instrumentally, as an inanimate instrument,
+                     and the priest as an animate instrument, such as a servant is, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11): and
+                     consequently the priest acts as a minister. Hence it is clear that the power of the keys is ordained, in a manner, to the
+                     remission of guilt, not as causing that remission, but as disposing thereto. Consequently if a man, before receiving absolution,
+                     were not perfectly disposed for the reception of grace, he would receive grace at the very time of sacramental confession
+                     and absolution, provided he offered no obstacle. For if the key were in no way ordained to the remission of guilt, but only
+                     to
+                     the remission of punishment, as some hold, it would not be necessary to have a desire of receiving the effect of the keys
+                     in order to have one's sins forgiven, just as it is not necessary to have a desire of receiving the other sacraments which
+                     are ordained, not to the remission of guilt, but against punishment. But this enables us to see that it is not ordained unto
+                     the remission of guilt, because the use of the keys, in order to be effective, always requires a disposition on the part of
+                     the
+                     recipient of the sacrament. And the same would apply to Baptism, were it never given save to adults.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Master says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 18), the power of forgiving sins was entrusted to priests, not that they may
+                     forgive them, by their own power, for this belongs to God, but that, as ministers, they may declare [*See note at the beginning
+                     of this article] the operation of God Who forgives. Now this happens in three ways. First, by a declaration, not of present,
+                     but of future forgiveness, without co-operating therein in any way: and thus the
+                     sacraments of the Old Law signified the Divine operation, so that the priest of the Old Law did but declare and did not operate
+                     the forgiveness of sins. Secondly, by a declaration of present forgiveness without co-operating in it at all: and thus some
+                     say that the sacraments of the New Law signify the bestowal of grace, which God gives when the sacraments are conferred, without
+                     the sacraments containing any power productive of grace, according to which opinion, even the power of the keys would
+                     merely declare the Divine operation that has its effect in the remission of guilt when the sacrament is conferred. Thirdly,
+                     by signifying the Divine operation causing then and there the remission of guilt, and by co-operating towards this effect
+                     dispositively and instrumentally: and then, according to another and more common opinion, the sacraments of the New Law declare
+                     the cleansing effected by God. In this way also the priest of the New Testament declares the recipient to be absolved from
+                     guilt, because in speaking of the sacraments, what is ascribed to the power of the ministers must be consistent with the sacrament.
+                     Nor is it unreasonable that the keys of the Church should dispose the penitent to the remission of his guilt, from the fact
+                     that the guilt is already remitted, even as neither is it unreasonable that Baptism, considered in itself, causes a disposition
+                     in one who is already sanctified.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Neither the sacrament of Penance, nor the sacrament of Baptism, by its operation, causes grace, or the remission of guilt,
+                     directly, but only dispositively [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later
+                     in life he altered his opinion. Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q18_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q62_A1.html">TP, Q[62], A[1]</a>; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q18_A1-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q64_A1.html">TP, Q[64], A[1]</a>; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q18_A1-p9.3" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q86_A6.html">TP, Q[86], A[6]</a>]. Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is
+                     evident.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p10"> The other arguments show that the power of the keys does not effect the remission of guilt directly, and this is to be granted.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q18_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a priest cannot remit sin as to the punishment. For sin deserves eternal and temporal punishment. But
+                     after the priest's absolution the penitent is still obliged to undergo temporal punishment either in Purgatory or in this
+                     world. Therefore the priest does not remit the punishment in any way.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the priest cannot anticipate the judgment of God. But Divine justice appoints the punishment which penitents have
+                     to undergo. Therefore the priest cannot remit any part of it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man who has committed a slight sin, is not less susceptible to the power of the keys, than one who has committed
+                     a graver sin. Now if the punishment for the graver sin be lessened in any way through the priestly administrations, it would
+                     be possible for a sin to be so slight that the punishment which it deserves is no greater than that which has been remitted
+                     for the graver sin. Therefore the priest would be able to remit the entire punishment due
+                     for the slight sin: which is false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the whole of the temporal punishment due for a sin is of one kind. If, therefore, by a first absolution something
+                     is taken away from the punishment, it will be possible for something more to be taken away by a second absolution, so that
+                     the absolution can be so often repeated, that by virtue of the keys the whole punishment will be taken away, since the second
+                     absolution is not less efficacious than the first: and consequently that sin will be
+                     altogether unpunished, which is absurd.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The key is the power of binding and loosing. But the priest can enjoin a temporal punishment. Therefore he can absolve from
+                     punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p7"> Further, the priest cannot remit sin either as to the guilt [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies
+                     in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q18_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q62_A1.html">TP, Q[62], A[1]</a>; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q18_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q64_A1.html">TP, Q[64], A[1]</a>; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q18_A2-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q86_A6.html">TP, Q[86], A[6]</a>], as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 18), or as to the eternal punishment, for a like reason. If therefore he cannot remit
+                     sin as to the temporal punishment, he would be
+                     unable to remit sin in any way, which is altogether contrary to the words of the Gospel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever may be said of the effect of Baptism conferred on one who has already received grace, applies equally to the effect
+                     of the actual exercise of the power of the keys on one who has already been contrite. For a man may obtain the grace of the
+                     remission of his sins as to their guilt, through faith and contrition, previous to Baptism; but when, afterwards, he actually
+                     receives Baptism, his grace is increased, and he is entirely absolved from the debt of
+                     punishment, since he is then made a partaker of the Passion of Christ. In like manner when a man, through contrition, has
+                     received the pardon of his sins as to their guilt, and consequently as to the debt of eternal punishment, (which is remitted
+                     together with the guilt) by virtue of the keys which derive their efficacy from the Passion of Christ, his grace is increased
+                     and the temporal punishment is remitted, the debt of which remained after the guilt had been forgiven. However, this temporal
+                     punishment is not entirely remitted, as in Baptism, but only partly, because the man who is regenerated in Baptism is conformed
+                     to the Passion of Christ, by receiving into himself entirely the efficacy of Christ's Passion, which suffices for the blotting
+                     out of all punishment, so that nothing remains of the punishment due to his preceding actual sins. For nothing should be imputed
+                     to a man unto punishment, save what he has done himself, and in Baptism man begins a new life, and by the baptismal
+                     water becomes a new man, as that no debt for previous sin remains in him. on the other hand, in Penance, a man does not take
+                     on a new life, since therein he is not born again, but healed. Consequently by virtue of the keys which produce their effect
+                     in the sacrament of Penance, the punishment is not entirely remitted, but something is taken off the temporal punishment,
+                     the debt of which could remain after the eternal punishment had been remitted. Nor does this apply only to the temporal
+                     punishment which the penitent owes at the time of confession, as some hold, (for then confession and sacramental absolution
+                     would be mere burdens, which cannot be said of the sacraments of the New Law), but also to the punishment due in Purgatory,
+                     so that one who has been absolved and dies before making satisfaction, is less punished in Purgatory, than if he had died
+                     before receiving absolution.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The priest does not remit the entire temporal punishment, but part of it; wherefore the penitent still remains obliged to
+                     undergo satisfactory punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Christ's Passion was sufficiently satisfactory for the sins of the whole world, so that without prejudice to Divine justice
+                     something can be remitted from the punishment which a sinner deserves, in so far as the effect of Christ's Passion reaches
+                     him through the sacraments of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some satisfactory punishment must remain for each sin, so as to provide a remedy against it. Wherefore though, by virtue
+                     of the absolution some measure of the punishment due to a grave sin is remitted, it does not follow that the same measure
+                     of punishment is remitted for each sin, because in that case some sin would remain without any punishment at all: but, by
+                     virtue of the keys, the punishments due to various sins are remitted in due
+                     proportion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some say that at the first absolution, as much as possible is remitted by virtue of the keys, and that, nevertheless, the
+                     second confession is valid, on account of the instruction received, on account of the additional surety, on account of the
+                     prayers of the priest or confessor, and lastly on account of the merit of the shame.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p13"> But this does not seem to be true, for though there might be a reason for repeating the confession, there would be no reason
+                     for repeating the absolution, especially if the penitent has no cause to doubt about his previous absolution; for he might
+                     just as well doubt after the second as after the first absolution: even as we see that the sacrament of Extreme Unction is
+                     not repeated during the same sickness, for the reason that all that could be done through the sacrament, has
+                     been done once. Moreover, in the second confession, there would be no need for the confessor to have the keys, if the power
+                     of the keys had no effect therein.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p14"> For these reasons others say that even in the second absolution something of the punishment is remitted by virtue of the
+                     keys, because when absolution is given a second time, grace is increased, and the greater the grace received, the less there
+                     remains of the blemish of the previous sin, and the less punishment is required to remove that blemish. Wherefore even when
+                     a man is first absolved, his punishment is more or less remitted by virtue of the keys, according as he disposes
+                     himself more or less to receive grace; and this disposition may be so great, that even by virtue of his contrition the whole
+                     punishment is remitted, as we have already stated (
+                     <a id="XP_Q18_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q5_A2.html">Q[5], A[2]</a>). Consequently it is not unreasonable, if by frequent confession even the whole punishment be remitted, that a sin remain
+                     altogether unpunished, since Christ made satisfaction for its punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q18_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Whether the priest can bind through the power of the keys?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the priest cannot bind by virtue of the power of the keys. For the sacramental power is ordained as a
+                     remedy against sin. Now binding is not a remedy for sin, but seemingly is rather conducive to an aggravation of the disease.
+                     Therefore, by the power of the keys, which is a sacramental power, the priest cannot bind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as to loose or to open is to remove an obstacle, so to bind is to place an obstacle. Now an obstacle to heaven
+                     is sin, which cannot be placed on us by an extrinsic cause, since no sin is committed except by the will. Therefore the priest
+                     cannot bind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the keys derive their efficacy from Christ's Passion. But binding is not an effect of the Passion. Therefore the
+                     priest cannot bind by the power of the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q18_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>): "Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound also in heaven."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p6"> Further, rational powers are directed to opposites. But the power of the keys is a rational power, since it has discretion
+                     connected with it. Therefore it is directed to opposites. Therefore if it can loose, it can bind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The operation of the priest in using the keys, is conformed to God's operation, Whose minister he is. Now God's operation
+                     extends both to guilt and to punishment; to the guilt indeed, so as to loose it directly. but to bind it indirectly, in so
+                     far as He is said to harden, when He withholds His grace; whereas His operation extends to punishment directly, in both respects,
+                     because He both spares and inflicts it. In like manner, therefore, although the priest,
+                     in absolving, exercises an operation ordained to the remission of guilt, in the way mentioned above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q18_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q18_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, nevertheless, in binding, he exercises no operation on the guilt; (unless he be said to bind by not absolving the penitent
+                     and by declaring him to be bound), but he has the power both of binding and of loosing with regard to the punishment. For
+                     he looses from the punishment which he remits, while he binds as to the punishment which remains. This he does in two
+                     ways---first as regards the quantity of the punishment considered in general, and thus he does not bind save by not loosing,
+                     and declaring the penitent to be bound, secondly, as regards this or that particular punishment, and thus he binds to punishment
+                     by imposing it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The remainder of the punishment to which the priest binds the penitent, is the medicine which cleanses the latter from the
+                     blemish of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only sin, but also punishment is an obstacle to heaven: and how the latter is enjoined by the priest, has been said in
+                     the article.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even the Passion of Christ binds us to some punishment whereby we are conformed to Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q18_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Whether the priest can bind and loose according to his own judgment?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the priest can bind and loose according to his own judgment. For Jerome [*Cf. Can. 86, Mensuram, De Poenit.
+                     Dist. i] says: "The canons do not fix the length of time for doing penance so precisely as to say how each sin is to be amended,
+                     but leave the decision of this matter to the judgment of a discreet priest." Therefore it seems that he can bind and loose
+                     according to his own judgment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "The Lord commended the unjust steward, forasmuch as he had done wisely" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q18_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.5" target="asv">Lk. 16:5</a>), because he had allowed a liberal discount to his master's debtors. But God is more inclined to mercy than any temporal
+                     lord. Therefore it seems that the more punishment the priest remits, the more he is to be commended.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Christ's every action is our instruction. Now on some sinners He imposed no punishment, but only amendment of life,
+                     as in the case of the adulterous woman (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q18_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.8" target="asv">Jn. 8</a>). Therefore it seems that the priest also, who is the vicar of Christ, can, according to his own judgment, remit the punishment,
+                     either wholly or in part.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory VII [*Cf. Act. Concil. Rom. v, Can. 5] says: "We declare it a mock penance if it is not imposed according to the
+                     authority of the holy fathers in proportion to the sin." Therefore it seems that it does not altogether depend on the priest's
+                     judgment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p6"> Further, the act of the keys requires discretion. Now if the priest could remit and impose as much as he liked of a penance,
+                     he would have no need of discretion, because there would be no room for indiscretion. Therefore it does not altogether depend
+                     on the priest's judgment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In using the keys, the priest acts as the instrument and minister of God. Now no instrument can have an efficacious act,
+                     except in so far as it is moved by the principal agent. Wherefore, Dionysius says (Hier. Eccl. cap. ult.) that "priests should
+                     use their hierarchical powers, according as they are moved by God." A sign of this is that before the power of the keys was
+                     conferred on Peter (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q18_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>) mention is made of the revelation
+                     vouchsafed to him of the Godhead; and the gift of the Holy Ghost, whereby "the sons of God are led" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q18_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.14" target="asv">Rom. 8:14</a>), is mentioned before power was given to the apostles to forgive sins. Consequently if anyone were to presume to use his
+                     power against that Divine motion, he would not realize the effect, as Dionysius states (Hier. Eccl., cap. ult.), and, besides,
+                     he would be turned away from the Divine order, and consequently would be guilty of a sin. Moreover, since satisfactory
+                     punishments are medicinal, just as the medicines prescribed by the medical art are not suitable to all, but have to be changed
+                     according to the judgment of a medical man, who follows not his own will, but his medical science, so the satisfactory punishments
+                     appointed by the canons are not suitable to all, but have to be varied according to the judgment of the priest guided by the
+                     Divine instinct. Therefore just as sometimes the physician prudently refrains from giving a medicine sufficiently
+                     efficacious to heal the disease, lest a greater danger should arise on account of the weakness of nature so the priest, moved
+                     by Divine instinct, some times refrains from enjoining the entire punishment due to one sin, lest by the severity of the punishment,
+                     the sick man come to despair and turn away altogether from repentance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This judgment should be guided entirely by the Divine instinct.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The steward is commended also for having done wisely. Therefore in the remission of the due punishment, there is need for
+                     discretion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ had the power of "excellence" in the sacraments, so that, by His own authority, He could remit the punishment wholly
+                     or in part, just as He chose. Therefore there is no comparison between Him and those who act merely as ministers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q19" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q19-p0.1">OF THE MINISTERS OF THE KEYS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q19-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q19-p2"> We must now consider the ministers and the use of the keys: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q19-p3"> (1) Whether the priest of the Law had the keys?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q19-p4"> (2) Whether Christ had the keys?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q19-p5"> (3) Whether priests alone have the keys?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q19-p6"> (4) Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys or their use?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q19-p7"> (5) Whether wicked priests have the effective use of the keys?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q19-p8"> (6) Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded, have the use of the keys?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q19_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether the priest of the Law had the keys?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the priests of the Law had the keys. For the possession of the keys results from having orders. But they
+                     had orders since they were called priests. Therefore the priests of the Law had the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D, 18), there are two keys, knowledge of discretion, and power of judgment. But
+                     the priests of the Law had authority for both of these: therefore they had the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the priests of the Law had some power over the rest of the people, which power was not temporal, else the kingly
+                     power would not have differed from the priestly power. Therefore it was a spiritual power; and this is the key. Therefore
+                     they had the key.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The keys are ordained to the opening of the heavenly kingdom, which could not be opened before Christ's Passion. Therefore
+                     the priest of the Law had not the keys. Further, the sacraments of the old Law did not confer grace. Now the gate of the heavenly
+                     kingdom could not be opened except by means of grace. Therefore it could not be opened by means of those sacraments, so that
+                     the priests who administered them, had not the keys of the heavenly kingdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that, under the Old Law, the keys of the kingdom were in the hands of the priests, because the right of imposing
+                     punishment for sin was conferred on them, as related in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.5" target="asv">Lev. 5</a>, which right seems to belong to the keys; but that these keys were incomplete then, whereas now they are complete as bestowed
+                     by Christ on the priests of the New Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p7"> But this seems to be contrary to the intent of the Apostle in the Epistle to the Hebrews (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.11" target="asv">Heb. 9:11-12</a>). For there the priesthood of Christ is given the preference over the priesthood of the Law, inasmuch as Christ came, "a
+                     high priest of the good things to come," and brought us "by His own blood" into a tabernacle not made with hand, whither the
+                     priesthood of the Old Law brought men "by the blood of goats and of oxen." Hence it is clear that the power of
+                     that priesthood did not reach to heavenly things but to the shadow of heavenly things: and so, we must say with others that
+                     they had not the keys, but that the keys were foreshadowed in them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The keys of the kingdom go with the priesthood whereby man is brought into the heavenly kingdom, but such was not the priesthood
+                     of Levi; hence it had the keys, not of heaven, but of an earthly tabernacle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The priests of the Old Law had authority to discern and judge, but not to admit those they judged into heaven, but only into
+                     the shadow of heavenly things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> They had no spiritual power, since, by the sacraments of the Law, they cleansed men not from their sins but from irregularities,
+                     so that those who were cleansed by them could enter into a tabernacle which was "made with hand."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q19_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether Christ had the key?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Christ did not have the key. For the key goes with the character of order. But Christ did not have a character.
+                     Therefore He had not the key.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Christ had power of "excellence" in the sacraments, so that He could produce the sacramental effect without the
+                     sacramental rite. Now the key is something sacramental. Therefore He needed no key, and it would have been useless to Him
+                     to have it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.7" target="asv">Apoc. 3:7</a>): "These things saith . . . He that hath the key of David," etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The power to do a thing is both in the instrument and in the principal agent, but not in the same way since it is more perfectly
+                     in the latter. Now the power of the keys which we have, like other sacramental powers, is instrumental: whereas it is in Christ
+                     as principal agent in the matter of our salvation, by authority, if we consider Him as God, by merit, if we consider Him as
+                     man [*For St. Thomas' later teaching on this point, Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q19_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q48_A6.html">TP,
+                        Q[48], A[6]
+                     </a>; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q19_A2-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q112_A1.html">FS, Q[112], A[1]</a>, AD 1]. But the very notion of a key expresses a power to open and shut, whether this be done by the principal agent or by
+                     an instrument. Consequently we must admit that Christ had the key, but in a higher way than His ministers, wherefore He is
+                     said to have the key of "excellence."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A character implies the notion of something derived from another, hence the power of the keys which we receive from Christ
+                     results from the character whereby we are conformed to Christ, whereas in Christ it results not from a character, but from
+                     the principal form.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The key, which Christ had was not sacramental, but the origin of the sacramental key.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q19_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether priests alone have the keys?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not only priests have the keys. For Isidore says (Etym. vii, 12) that the "doorkeepers have to tell the
+                     good from the bad, so as to admit the good and keep out the bad." Now this is the definition of the keys, as appears from
+                     what has been said (
+                     <a id="XP_Q19_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html">Q[17], A[2]</a>). Therefore not only priests but even doorkeepers have the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the keys are conferred on priests when by being anointed they receive power from God. But kings of Christian peoples
+                     also receive power from God and are consecrated by being anointed. Therefore not only priests have the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the priesthood is an order belonging to an individual person. But sometimes a number of people together seem to
+                     have the key, because certain Chapters can pass a sentence of excommunication, which pertains to the power of the keys. Therefore
+                     not only priests have the key.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a woman is not capable of receiving the priesthood, since she is not competent to teach, according to the Apostle
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.34" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:34</a>). But some women (abbesses, for instance, who exercise a spiritual power over their subjects), seem to have the keys. Therefore
+                     not only priests have the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Poenit. i): "This right," viz. of binding and loosing, "is granted to priests alone."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p7"> Further, by receiving the power of the keys, a man is set up between the people and God. But this belongs to the priest alone,
+                     who is "ordained . . . in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.1" target="asv">Heb. 5:1</a>). Therefore only priests have the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There are two kinds of key. one reaches to heaven itself directly, by remitting sin and thus removing the obstacles to the
+                     entrance into heaven; and this is called the key of "order." Priests alone have this key, because they alone are ordained
+                     for the people in the things which appertain to God directly. The other key reaches to heaven, not directly but through the
+                     medium of the Church Militant. By this key a man goes to heaven, since, by its means, a man
+                     is shut out from or admitted to the fellowship of the Church Militant, by excommunication or absolution. This is called the
+                     key of "jurisdiction" in the external court, wherefore even those who are not priests can have this key, e.g. archdeacons,
+                     bishops elect, and others who can excommunicate. But it is not properly called a key of heaven, but a disposition thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The doorkeepers have the key for taking care of those things which are contained in a material temple, and they have to judge
+                     whether a person should be excluded from or admitted to that temple; which judgment they pronounce, not by their own authority,
+                     but in pursuance to the priest's judgment, so that they appear to be the administrators of the priestly power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Kings have no power in spiritual matters, so that they do not receive the key of the heavenly kingdom. Their power is confined
+                     to temporal matters, and this too can only come to them from God, as appears from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv"> Rom. 13:1.</a> Nor are they consecrated by the unction of a sacred order: their anointing is merely a sign that the excellence of their
+                     power comes down to them from Christ, and that, under Christ, they reign over the Christian
+                     people.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in civil matters the whole power is sometimes vested in a judge, as in a kingdom, whereas sometimes it is vested
+                     in many exercising various offices but acting together with equal rights (Ethic. viii, 10,11), so too, spiritual jurisdiction
+                     may be exercised both by one alone, e.g. a bishop, and by many together, e.g. by a Chapter, and thus they have the key of
+                     jurisdiction, but they have not all together the key of order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.11" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:11</a>;
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A3-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Titus.2.5" target="asv"> Titus 2:5</a>), woman is in a state of subjection: wherefore she can have no spiritual jurisdiction, since the Philosopher also says (Ethic.
+                     viii) that it is a corruption of public life when the government comes into the hands of a woman. Consequently a woman has
+                     neither the key of order nor the key of jurisdiction. Nevertheless a certain use of the keys is allowed to women,
+                     such as the right to correct other women who are under them, on account of the danger that might threaten if men were to dwell
+                     under the same roof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q19_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that holy men, even those who are not priests, have the use of the keys. For loosing and binding, which are
+                     the effects of the keys, derive their efficacy from the merit of Christ's Passion. Now those are most conformed to Christ's
+                     Passion, who follow Christ, suffering by patience and other virtues. Therefore it seems that even if they have not the priestly
+                     order, they can bind and loose.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.7" target="asv">Heb. 7:7</a>): "Without all contradiction, that which is less is blessed by the greater [Vulg.: 'better']." Now "in spiritual matters,"
+                     according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), "to be better is to be greater." Therefore those who are better, i.e. who have more
+                     charity, can bless others by absolving them. Hence the same conclusion follows.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "Action belongs to that which has the power," as the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil. i). But the key which is a spiritual
+                     power belongs to priests alone. Therefore priests alone are competent to have the use of the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There is this difference between a principal and an instrumental agent, that the latter does not produce, in the effect,
+                     its own likeness, but the likeness of the principal agent, whereas the principal agent produces its own likeness. Consequently
+                     a thing becomes a principal agent through having a form, which it can reproduce in another, whereas an instrumental agent
+                     is not constituted thus, but through being applied by the principal agent in order to
+                     produce a certain effect. Since therefore in the act of the keys the principal agent by authority is Christ as God, and by
+                     merit is Christ as man,* it follows that on account of the very fulness of Divine goodness in Him, and of the perfection of
+                     His grace, He is competent to exercise the act of the keys. [*For St. Thomas' later teaching on this point, cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q19_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q48_A6.html">TP, Q[48], A[6]</a>; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q19_A4-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q112_A1.html">FS, Q[112], A[1]</a>, ad 1]. But another man is not competent to exercise
+                     this act as principal agent, since neither can he give another man grace whereby sins are remitted, nor can he merit sufficiently,
+                     so that he is nothing more than an instrumental agent. Consequently the recipient of the effect of the keys, is likened, not
+                     to the one who uses the keys, but to Christ. Therefore, no matter how much grace a man may have, he cannot produce the effect
+                     of the keys, unless he be appointed to that purpose by receiving orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as between instrument and effect there is need or likeness, not of a similar form, but of aptitude in the instrument
+                     for the effect, so is it as regards the instrument and the principal agent. The former is the likeness between holy men and
+                     the suffering Christ, nor does it bestow on them the use of the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a mere man cannot merit grace for another man condignly, yet the merit of one man can co-operate in the salvation
+                     of another. Hence there is a twofold blessing. One proceeds from a mere man, as meriting by his own act: this blessing can
+                     be conferred by any holy person in whom Christ dwells by His grace, in so far as he excels in goodness the person whom he
+                     blesses. The other blessing is when a man blesses, as applying a blessing
+                     instrumentally through the merit of Christ, and this requires excellence of order and not of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q19_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether wicked priests have the use of the keys?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wicked priests have not the use of the keys. For in the passage where the use of the keys is bestowed
+                     on the apostles (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.22" target="asv">Jn. 20:22,23</a>), the gift of the Holy Ghost is promised. But wicked men have not the Holy Ghost. Therefore they have not the use of the
+                     keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no wise king entrusts his enemy with the dispensation of his treasure. Now the use of the keys consists in dispensing
+                     the treasure of the King of heaven, Who is Wisdom itself. Therefore the wicked, who are His enemies on account of sin, have
+                     not the use of the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Bapt. v, 21) that God "gives the sacrament of grace even through wicked men, but grace itself
+                     only by Himself or through His saints." Hence He forgives sin by Himself, or by those who are members of the Dove. But the
+                     remission of sins is the use of the keys. Therefore sinners, who are not "members of the Dove," have not the use of the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the prayer of a wicked priest cannot effect reconciliation, for, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 11), "if an unacceptable
+                     person is sent to intercede, anger is provoked to yet greater severity." But the use of the keys implies a kind of intercession,
+                     as appears in the form of absolution. Therefore wicked priests cannot use the keys effectively.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No man can know whether another man is in the state of grace. If, therefore, no one could use the keys in giving absolution
+                     unless he were in a state of grace, no one would know that he had been absolved, which would be very unfitting.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p7"> Further, the wickedness of the minister cannot void the liberality of his lord. But the priest is no more than a minister.
+                     Therefore he cannot by his wickedness take away from us the gift which God has given through him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as participation of a form to be induced into an effect does not make a thing to be an instrument, so neither does the
+                     loss of that form prevent that thing being used as an instrument. Consequently, since man is merely an instrument in the use
+                     of the keys, however much he may through sin be deprived of grace, whereby sins are forgiven, yet he is by no means deprived
+                     of the use of the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gift of the Holy Ghost is requisite for the use of the keys, not as being indispensable for the purpose, but because
+                     it is unbecoming for the user to use them without it, though he that submits to them receives their effect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An earthly king can be cheated and deceived in the matter of his treasure, and so he does not entrust his enemy with the
+                     dispensation thereof. But the King of heaven cannot be cheated, because all tends to His own glory, even the abuse of the
+                     keys by some, for He can make good come out of evil, and produce many good effects through evil men. Hence the comparison
+                     fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine speaks of the remission of sins in so far as holy men co-operate therein, not by virtue of the keys, but by merit
+                     of congruity. Hence He says that God confers the sacraments even through evil men, and among the other sacraments, absolution
+                     which is the use of the keys should be reckoned: but that through "members of the Dove," i.e. holy men, He grants forgiveness
+                     of sins, in so far as He remits sins on account of their intercession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p12"> We might also reply that by "members of the Dove" he means all who are not cut off from the Church, for those who receive
+                     the sacraments from them, receive grace, whereas those who receive the sacraments from those who are cut off from the Church,
+                     do not receive grace, because they sin in so doing, except in the case of Baptism, which, in cases of necessity, may be received
+                     even from one who is excommunicate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The prayer which the wicked priest proffers on his own account, is not efficacious: but that which he makes as a minister
+                     of the Church, is efficacious through the merit of Christ. Yet in both ways the priest's prayer should profit those who are
+                     subject to him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q19_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q20.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys. For
+                     just as the power of the keys results from orders, so does the power of consecration. But the above cannot lose the use of
+                     the power of consecration, since if they do consecrate it is valid, though they sin in doing so. Therefore neither can they
+                     lose the use of the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, any active spiritual power in one who has the use of his free-will can be exercised by him when he wills. Now the
+                     power of the keys remains in the aforesaid, for, since it is only conferred with orders, they would have to be reordained
+                     when they return to the Church. Therefore, since it is an active power, they can exercise it when they will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, spiritual grace is hindered by guilt more than by punishment. Now excommunication, suspension and degradation are
+                     punishments. Therefore, since a man does not lose the use of the keys on account of guilt, it seems that he does not lose
+                     it on account of the aforesaid.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. cxxi in Joan.) that the "charity of the Church forgives sins." Now it is the charity of the Church
+                     which unites its members. Since therefore the above are disunited from the Church, it seems that they have not the use of
+                     the keys in remitting sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p6"> Further, no man is absolved from sin by sinning. Now it is a sin for anyone to seek absolution of his sins from the above,
+                     for he disobeys the Church in so doing. Therefore he cannot be absolved by them: and so the same conclusion follows.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In all the above the power of the keys remains as to its essence, but its use is hindered on account of the lack of matter.
+                     For since the use of the keys requires in the user authority over the person on whom they are used, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q19_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html">Q[17], A[2]</a>, ad 2), the proper matter on whom one can exercise the use of the keys is a man under one's authority. And since it is by
+                     appointment of the Church that one man has authority over
+                     another, so a man may be deprived of his authority over another by his ecclesiastical superiors. Consequently, since the Church
+                     deprives heretics, schismatics and the like, by withdrawing their subjects from them either altogether or in some respect,
+                     in so far as they are thus deprived, they cannot have the use of the keys.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist, on which the priest exercises his power, is not a man but wheaten bread, and
+                     in Baptism, the matter is simply a man. Wherefore, just as, were a heretic to be without wheaten bread, he could not consecrate,
+                     so neither can a prelate absolve if he be deprived of his authority, yet he can baptize and consecrate, albeit to his own
+                     damnation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The assertion is true, provided matter be not lacking as it is in the case in point.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sin, of itself, does not remove matter, as certain punishments do: so that punishment is a hindrance not because it is contrary
+                     to the effect, but for the reason stated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q20.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q20" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q20-p0.1">OF THOSE ON WHOM THE POWER OF THE KEYS CAN BE EXERCISED (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q20-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q20-p2"> We must now consider those on whom the power of the keys can be exercised. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q20-p3"> (1) Whether a priest can use the key, which he has, on any man?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q20-p4"> (2) Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q20-p5"> (3) Whether anyone can use the keys on his superior?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q20_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q20.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q20_A1-p0.1">Whether a priest can use the key which he has, on any man?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a priest can use the key which he has, on any man. For the power of the keys was bestowed on priests by
+                     Divine authority in the words: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q20_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.22" target="asv">Jn. 20:22,23</a>). But this was said without any restriction. Therefore he that has the key, can use it on any without restriction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a material key that opens one lock, opens all locks of the same pattern. Now every sin of every man is the same
+                     kind of obstacle against entering into heaven. Therefore if a priest can, by means of the key which he has, absolve one man,
+                     he can do the same for all others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the priesthood of the New Testament is more perfect than that of the Old Testament. But the priest of the Old Testament
+                     could use the power which he had of discerning between different kinds of leprosy, with regard to all indiscriminately. Much
+                     more therefore can the priest of the Gospel use his power with regard to all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in the Appendix of Gratian: "It is not lawful for every priest to loose or bind another priest's parishioner."
+                     Therefore a priest cannot absolve everybody.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p6"> Further, judgment in spiritual matters should be better regulated than in temporal matters. But in temporal matters a judge
+                     cannot judge everybody. Therefore, since the use of the keys is a kind of judgment, it is not within the competency of a priest
+                     to use his key with regard to everyone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> That which has to do with singular matters is not equally in the power of all. Thus, even as besides the general principles
+                     of medicine, it is necessary to have physicians, who adapt those general principles to individual patients or diseases, according
+                     to their various requirements, so in every kingdom, besides that one who proclaims the universal precepts of law, there is
+                     need for others to adapt those precepts to individual cases, according as each case
+                     demands. For this reason, in the heavenly hierarchy also, under the Powers who rule indiscriminately, a place is given to
+                     the Principalities, who are appointed to individual kingdoms, and to the Angels who are given charge over individual men,
+                     as we have explained above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q20_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html">FP, Q[113], AA[1]</a>,2). Consequently there should be a like order of authority in the Church Militant, so that an indiscriminate authority over
+                     all should be vested in one individual, and that there
+                     should be others under him, having distinct authority over various people. Now the use of the keys implies a certain power
+                     to exercise authority, whereby the one on whom the keys are used, becomes the proper matter of that act. Therefore he that
+                     has power over all indiscriminately, can use the keys on all, whereas those who have received authority over distinct persons,
+                     cannot use the keys on everyone, but only on those over whom they are appointed, except in cases of necessity, when the
+                     sacraments should be refused to no one.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A twofold power is required in order to absolve from sins, namely, power of order and power of jurisdiction. The former power
+                     is equally in all priests, but not the latter. And therefore, when our Lord (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q20_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.23" target="asv">Jn. 20:23</a>) gave all the apostles in general, the power of forgiving sins, this is to be understood of the power which results from
+                     receiving orders, wherefore these words are addressed to priests when they are ordained. But to
+                     Peter in particular He gave the power of forgiving sins (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q20_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>), that we may understand that he has the power of jurisdiction before the others. But the power of orders, considered in
+                     itself, extends to all who can be absolved: wherefore our Lord said indeterminately, "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are
+                     forgiven them," on the understanding that this power should be used in dependence on the power given to Peter, according to
+                     His appointment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A material key can open only its own lock. nor can any active force act save on its own matter. Now a man becomes the matter
+                     of the power of order by jurisdiction: and consequently no one can use the key in respect of another over whom he has not
+                     jurisdiction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The people of Israel were one people, and had but one temple, so that there was no need for a distinction in priestly jurisdiction,
+                     as there is now in the Church which comprises various peoples and nations.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q20.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q20_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q20_A2-p0.1">Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a priest cannot always absolve his subject. For, as Augustine says (De vera et false Poenitentia [*Work
+                     of an unknown author]), "no man should exercise the priestly office, unless he be free from those things which he condemns
+                     in others." But a priest might happen to share in a sin committed by his subject, e.g. by knowledge of a woman who is his
+                     subject. Therefore it seems that he cannot always use the power of the keys on his subjects.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by the power of the keys a man is healed of all his shortcomings. Now it happens sometimes that a sin has attached
+                     to it a defect of irregularity or a sentence of excommunication, from which a simple priest cannot absolve. Therefore it seems
+                     that he cannot use the power of the keys on such as are shackled by these things in the above manner.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the judgment and power of our priesthood was foreshadowed by the judgment of the ancient priesthood. Now according
+                     to the Law, the lesser judges were not competent to decide all cases, and had recourse to the higher judges, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q20_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.24.14" target="asv"> Ex. 24:14</a>: "If any question shall arise" among you, "you shall refer it to them." It seems, therefore, that a priest cannot absolve
+                     his subject from graver sins, but should refer him to his
+                     superior.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whoever has charge of the principal has charge of the accessory. Now priests are charged with the dispensation of the Eucharist
+                     to their subjects, to which sacrament the absolution of sins is subordinate [*Cf.
+                     <a id="XP_Q20_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html"> Q[17], A[2]</a>, ad 1]. Therefore, as far as the power of the keys is concerned, a priest can absolve his subject from any sins whatever.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p6"> Further, grace, however small, removes all sin. But a priest dispenses sacraments whereby grace is given. Therefore, as far
+                     as the power of the keys is concerned, he can absolve from all sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The power of order, considered in itself, extends to the remission of all sins. But since, as stated above, the use of this
+                     power requires jurisdiction which inferiors derive from their superiors, it follows that the superior can reserve certain
+                     matters to himself, the judgment of which he does not commit to his inferior; otherwise any simple priest who has jurisdiction
+                     can absolve from any sin. Now there are five cases in which a simple priest must refer
+                     his penitent to his superior. The first is when a public penance has to be imposed, because in that case the bishop is the
+                     proper minister of the sacrament. The second is the case of those who are excommunicated when the inferior priest cannot absolve
+                     a penitent through the latter being excommunicated by his superior. The third case is when he finds that an irregularity has
+                     been contracted, for the dispensation of which he has to have recourse to his superior. The fourth is the case of arson.
+                     The fifth is when it is the custom in a diocese for the more heinous crimes to be reserved to the bishop, in order to inspire
+                     fear, because custom in these cases either gives the power or takes it away.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this case the priest should not hear the confession of his accomplice, with regard to that particular sin, but must refer
+                     her to another: nor should she confess to him but should ask permission to go to another, or should have recourse to his superior
+                     if he refused, both on account of the danger, and for the sake of less shame. If, however, he were to absolve her it would
+                     be valid*: because when Augustine says that they should not be guilty of the
+                     same sin, he is speaking of what is congruous, not of what is essential to the sacrament. [*Benedict XIV declared the absolution
+                     of an accomplice "in materia turpi" to be invalid.]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Penance delivers man from all defects of guilt, but not from all defects of punishment, since even after doing penance for
+                     murder, a man remains irregular. Hence a priest can absolve from a crime, but for the remission of the punishment he must
+                     refer the penitent to the superior, except in the case of excommunication, absolution from which should precede absolution
+                     from sin, for as long as a man is excommunicated, he cannot receive any sacrament of
+                     the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers those cases in which superiors reserve the power of jurisdiction to themselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q20_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q20_A3-p0.1">Whether a man can use the keys with regard to his superior?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man cannot use the keys in respect of a superior. For every sacramental act requires its proper matter.
+                     Now the proper matter for the use of the keys, is a person who is subject, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q20_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q19_A6.html">Q[19], A[6]</a>). Therefore a priest cannot use the keys in respect of one who is not his subject.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Church Militant is an image of the Church Triumphant. Now in the heavenly Church an inferior angel never cleanses,
+                     enlightens or perfects a higher angel. Therefore neither can an inferior priest exercise on a superior a hierarchical action
+                     such as absolution.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the judgment of Penance should be better regulated than the judgment of an external court. Now in the external court
+                     an inferior cannot excommunicate or absolve his superior. Therefore, seemingly, neither can he do so in the penitential court.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The higher prelate is also "compassed with infirmity," and may happen to sin. Now the power of the keys is the remedy for
+                     sin. Therefore, since he cannot use the key on himself, for he cannot be both judge and accused at the same time, it seems
+                     that an inferior can use the power of the keys on him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p6"> Further, absolution which is given through the power of the keys, is ordained to the reception of the Eucharist. But an inferior
+                     can give Communion to his superior, if the latter asks him to. Therefore he can use the power of the keys on him if he submit
+                     to him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The power of the keys, considered in itself, is applicable to all, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q20_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q20_A2.html">(A[2])</a>: and that a priest is unable to use the keys on some particular person is due to his power being limited to certain individuals.
+                     Therefore he who limited his power can extend it to whom he wills, so that he can give him power over himself, although he
+                     cannot use the power of the keys on himself, because this power requires to be exercised on a
+                     subject, and therefore on someone else, for no man can be subject to himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the bishop whom a simple priest absolves is his superior absolutely speaking, yet he is beneath him in so far as
+                     he submits himself as a sinner to him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the angels there can be no defect by reason of which the higher angel can submit to the lower, such as there can happen
+                     to be among men; and so there is no comparison.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> External judgment is according to men, whereas the judgment of confession is according to God, in Whose sight a man is lessened
+                     by sinning, which is not the case in human prelacy. Therefore just as in external judgment no man can pass sentence of excommunication
+                     on himself, so neither can he empower another to excommunicate him. On the other hand, in the tribunal of conscience he can
+                     give another the power to absolve him, though he cannot use that
+                     power himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p11"> It may also be replied that absolution in the tribunal of the confessional belongs principally to the power of the keys and
+                     consequently to the power of jurisdiction, whereas excommunication regards jurisdiction exclusively. And, as to the power
+                     of orders, all are equal, but not as to jurisdiction. Wherefore there is no comparison.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q21" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q21-p0.1">OF THE DEFINITION, CONGRUITY AND CAUSE OF EXCOMMUNICATION (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q21-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q21-p2"> We must now treat of excommunication: we shall consider: (1) the definition, congruity and cause of excommunication; (2)
+                  who has the power to excommunicate; (3) communication with excommunicated persons; (4) absolution from excommunication.
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q21-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q21-p4"> (1) Whether excommunication is suitably defined?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q21-p5"> (2) Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q21-p6"> (3) Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q21-p7"> (4) Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q21_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q21_A1-p0.1">Whether excommunication is suitably defined as separation from the communion of the Church, etc?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that excommunication is unsuitably defined by some thus: "Excommunication is separation from the communion
+                     of the Church, as to fruit and general suffrages." For the suffrages of the Church avail for those for whom they are offered.
+                     But the Church prays for those who are outside the Church, as, for instance, for heretics and pagans. Therefore she prays
+                     also for the excommunicated, since they are outside the Church, and so the suffrages of the
+                     Church avail for them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one loses the suffrages of the Church except by his own fault. Now excommunication is not a fault, but a punishment.
+                     Therefore excommunication does not deprive a man of the general suffrages of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fruit of the Church seems to be the same as the Church's suffrages, for it cannot mean the fruit of temporal
+                     goods, since excommunication does not deprive a man of these. Therefore there is no reason for mentioning both.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there is a kind of excommunication called minor*, by which man is not deprived of the suffrages of the Church. [*Minor
+                     excommunication is no longer recognized by Canon Law.] Therefore this definition is unsuitable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> When a man enters the Church by Baptism, he is admitted to two things, viz. the body of the faithful and the participation
+                     of the sacraments: and this latter presupposes the former, since the faithful are united together in the participation of
+                     the sacraments. Consequently a person may be expelled from the Church in two ways. First, by being deprived merely of the
+                     participation of the sacraments, and this is the minor excommunication. Secondly, by being
+                     deprived of both, and this is the major excommunication, of which the above is the definition. Nor can there be a third, consisting
+                     in the privation of communion with the faithful, but not of the participation of the sacraments, for the reason already given,
+                     because, to wit, the faithful communicate together in the sacraments. Now communion with the faithful is twofold. One consists
+                     in spiritual things, such as their praying for one another, and meeting together for the reception of sacred
+                     things; while another consists in certain legitimate bodily actions. These different manners of communion are signified in
+                     the verse which declares that those who are excommunicate are deprived of---
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p7"> "os, orare, vale, communio, mensa."</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p8">"Os," i.e. we must not give them tokens of goodwill; "orare," i.e. we must not pray with them; "vale," we must not give them
+                     marks of respect; "communio," i.e. we must not communicate with them in the sacraments; "mensa," i.e. we must not take meals
+                     with them. Accordingly the above definition includes privation of the sacraments in the words "as to the fruit," and from
+                     partaking together with the faithful in spiritual things, in the words, "and the general prayers of the
+                     Church."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p9"> Another definition is given which expresses the privation of both kinds of acts, and is as follows: "Excommunication is the
+                     privation of all lawful communion with the faithful."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prayers are said for unbelievers, but they do not receive the fruit of those prayers unless they be converted to the faith.
+                     In like manner prayers may be offered up for those who are excommunicated, but not among the prayers that are said for the
+                     members of the Church. Yet they do not receive the fruit so long as they remain under the excommunication, but prayers are
+                     said for them that they may receive the spirit of repentance, so that they may be
+                     loosed from excommunication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One man's prayers profit another in so far as they can reach to him. Now the action of one man may reach to another in two
+                     ways. First, by virtue of charity which unites all the faithful, making them one in God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.63" target="asv"> Ps. 118:63</a>: "I am a partaker with all them that fear Thee." Now excommunication does not interrupt this union, since no man can be justly
+                     excommunicated except for a mortal sin, whereby a man is already
+                     separated from charity, even without being excommunicated. An unjust excommunication cannot deprive a man of charity, since
+                     this is one of the greatest of all goods, of which a man cannot be deprived against his will. Secondly, through the intention
+                     of the one who prays, which intention is directed to the person he prays for, and this union is interrupted by excommunication,
+                     because by passing sentence of excommunication, the Church severs a man from the whole body of the faithful, for whom she
+                     prays. Hence those prayers of the Church which are offered up for the whole Church, do not profit those who are excommunicated.
+                     Nor can prayers be said for them among the members of the Church as speaking in the Church's name, although a private individual
+                     may say a prayer with the intention of offering it for their conversion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The spiritual fruit of the Church is derived not only from her prayers, but also from the sacraments received and from the
+                     faithful dwelling together.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The minor excommunication does not fulfill all the conditions of excommunication but only a part of them, hence the definition
+                     of excommunication need not apply to it in every respect, but only in some.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q21_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q21_A2-p0.1">Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Church ought not to excommunicate anyone, because excommunication is a kind of curse, and we are forbidden
+                     to curse (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.14" target="asv">Rom. 12:14</a>). Therefore the Church should not excommunicate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Church Militant should imitate the Church Triumphant. Now we read in the epistle of Jude (verse 9) that "when
+                     Michael the Archangel disputing with the devil contended about the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment
+                     of railing speech, but said: The Lord command thee." Therefore the Church Militant ought not to judge any man by cursing or
+                     excommunicating him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man should be given into the hands of his enemies, unless there be no hope for him. Now by excommunication a
+                     man is given into the hands of Satan, as is clear from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:5.</a> Since then we should never give up hope about anyone in this life, the Church should not excommunicate anyone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:5</a>) ordered a man to be excommunicated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p6"> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.17" target="asv">Mat. 18:17</a>) about the man who refuses to hear the Church: "Let him be to thee as the heathen or publican." But heathens are outside
+                     the Church. Therefore they also who refuse to hear the Church, should be banished from the Church by excommunication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The judgment of the Church should be conformed to the judgment of God. Now God punishes the sinner in many ways, in order
+                     to draw him to good, either by chastising him with stripes, or by leaving him to himself so that being deprived of those helps
+                     whereby he was kept out of evil, he may acknowledge his weakness, and humbly return to God Whom he had abandoned in his pride.
+                     In both these respects the Church by passing sentence of excommunication imitates the
+                     judgment of God. For by severing a man from the communion of the faithful that he may blush with shame, she imitates the judgment
+                     whereby God chastises man with stripes; and by depriving him of prayers and other spiritual things, she imitates the judgment
+                     of God in leaving man to himself, in order that by humility he may learn to know himself and return to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A curse may be pronounced in two ways: first, so that the intention of the one who curses is fixed on the evil which he invokes
+                     or pronounces, and cursing in this sense is altogether forbidden. Secondly, so that the evil which a man invokes in cursing
+                     is intended for the good of the one who is cursed, and thus cursing is sometimes lawful and salutary: thus a physician makes
+                     a sick man undergo pain, by cutting him, for instance, in order to deliver him
+                     from his sickness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The devil cannot be brought to repentance, wherefore the pain of excommunication cannot do him any good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the very fact that a man is deprived of the prayers of the Church, he incurs a triple loss, corresponding to the three
+                     things which a man acquires through the Church's prayers. For they bring an increase of grace to those who have it, or merit
+                     grace for those who have it not; and in this respect the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. iv, D, 18): "The grace of God
+                     is taken away by excommunication." They also prove a safeguard of virtue; and in
+                     this respect he says that "protection is taken away," not that the excommunicated person is withdrawn altogether from God's
+                     providence, but that he is excluded from that protection with which He watches over the children of the Church in a more special
+                     way. Moreover, they are useful as a defense against the enemy, and in this respect he says that "the devil receives greater
+                     power of assaulting the excommunicated person, both spiritually and corporally." Hence in the early Church, when men had
+                     to be enticed to the faith by means of outward signs (thus the gift of the Holy Ghost was shown openly by a visible sign),
+                     so too excommunication was evidenced by a person being troubled in his body by the devil. Nor is it unreasonable that one,
+                     for whom there is still hope, be given over to the enemy, for he is surrendered, not unto damnation, but unto correction,
+                     since the Church has the power to rescue him from the hands of the enemy, whenever he is willing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q21_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q21_A3-p0.1">Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no man should be excommunicated for inflicting a temporal harm. For the punishment should not exceed the
+                     fault. But the punishment of excommunication is the privation of a spiritual good, which surpasses all temporal goods. Therefore
+                     no man should be excommunicated for temporal injuries.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we should render to no man evil for evil, according to the precept of the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.17" target="asv">Rom. 12:17</a>). But this would be rendering evil for evil, if a man were to be excommunicated for doing such an injury. Therefore this
+                     ought by no means to be done.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Peter sentenced Ananias and Saphira to death for keeping back the price of their piece of land (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.1" target="asv">Acts 5:1-10</a>). Therefore it is lawful for the Church to excommunicate for temporal injuries.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> By excommunication the ecclesiastical judge excludes a man, in a sense, from the kingdom. Wherefore, since he ought not to
+                     exclude from the kingdom others than the unworthy, as was made clear from the definition of the keys (
+                     <a id="XP_Q21_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html">Q[17], A[2]</a>), and since no one becomes unworthy, unless, through committing a mortal sin, he lose charity which is the way leading to
+                     the kingdom, it follows that no man should be excommunicated except for a
+                     mortal sin. And since by injuring a man in his body or in his temporalities, one may sin mortally and act against charity,
+                     the Church can excommunicate a man for having inflicted temporal injury on anyone. Yet, as excommunication is the most severe
+                     punishment, and since punishments are intended as remedies, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii), and again since a prudent
+                     physician begins with lighter and less risky remedies, therefore excommunication should not be inflicted, even for a
+                     mortal sin, unless the sinner be obstinate, either by not coming up for judgment, or by going away before judgment is pronounced,
+                     or by failing to obey the decision of the court. For then, if, after due warning, he refuse to obey, he is reckoned to be
+                     obstinate, and the judge, not being able to proceed otherwise against him, must excommunicate him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A fault is not measured by the extent of the damage a man does, but by the will with which he does it, acting against charity.
+                     Wherefore, though the punishment of excommunication exceeds the harm done, it does not exceed the measure of the sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man is corrected by being punished, evil is not rendered to him, but good: since punishments are remedies, as stated
+                     above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q21_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q21_A4-p0.1">Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an excommunication which is pronounced unjustly has no effect at all. Because excommunication deprives
+                     a man of the protection and grace of God, which cannot be forfeited unjustly. Therefore excommunication has no effect if it
+                     be unjustly pronounced.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Jerome says (on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv"> Mat. 16:19</a>: "I will give to thee the keys"): "It is a pharisaical severity to reckon as really bound or loosed, that which is bound
+                     or loosed unjustly." But that severity was proud and erroneous. Therefore an unjust excommunication has no effect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.), "the sentence of the pastor is to be feared whether it be just or unjust." Now
+                     there would be no reason to fear an unjust excommunication if it did not hurt. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> An excommunication may be unjust for two reasons. First, on the part of its author, as when anyone excommunicates through
+                     hatred or anger, and then, nevertheless, the excommunication takes effect, though its author sins, because the one who is
+                     excommunicated suffers justly, even if the author act wrongly in excommunicating him. Secondly, on the part of the excommunication,
+                     through there being no proper cause, or through the sentence being passed without the
+                     forms of law being observed. In this case, if the error, on the part of the sentence, be such as to render the sentence void,
+                     this has no effect, for there is no excommunication; but if the error does not annul the sentence, this takes effect, and
+                     the person excommunicated should humbly submit (which will be credited to him as a merit), and either seek absolution from
+                     the person who has excommunicated him, or appeal to a higher judge. If, however, he were to contemn the sentence, he would
+                     "ipso
+                     facto" sin mortally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p6"> But sometimes it happens that there is sufficient cause on the part of the excommunicator, but not on the part of the excommunicated,
+                     as when a man is excommunicated for a crime which he has not committed, but which has been proved against him: in this case,
+                     if he submit humbly, the merit of his humility will compensate him for the harm of excommunication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although a man cannot lose God's grace unjustly, yet he can unjustly lose those things which on our part dispose us to receive
+                     grace. for instance, a man may be deprived of the instruction which he ought to have. It is in this sense that excommunication
+                     is said to deprive a man of God's grace, as was explained above (A[2], ad 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Jerome is speaking of sin not of its punishments, which can be inflicted unjustly by ecclesiastical superiors.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q22" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q22-p0.1">OF THOSE WHO CAN EXCOMMUNICATE OR BE EXCOMMUNICATED (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q22-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q22-p2"> We must now consider those who can excommunicate or be excommunicated. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q22-p3"> (1) Whether every priest can excommunicate?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q22-p4"> (2) Whether one who is not a priest can excommunicate?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q22-p5"> (3) Whether one who is excommunicated or suspended, can excommunicate?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q22-p6"> (4) Whether anyone can excommunicate himself, or an equal, or a superior?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q22-p7"> (5) Whether a multitude can be excommunicated?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q22-p8"> (6) Whether one who is already excommunicated can be excommunicated again?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q22_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q22_A1-p0.1">Whether every priest can excommunicate?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every priest can excommunicate. For excommunication is an act of the keys. But every priest has the keys.
+                     Therefore every priest can excommunicate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is a greater thing to loose and bind in the tribunal of penance than in the tribunal of judgment. But every priest
+                     can loose and bind his subjects in the tribunal of Penance. Therefore every priest can excommunicate his subjects.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Matters fraught with danger should be left to the decision of superiors. Now the punishment of excommunication is fraught
+                     with many dangers, unless it be inflicted with moderation. Therefore it should not be entrusted to every priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In the tribunal of conscience the plea is between man and God, whereas in the outward tribunal it is between man and man.
+                     Wherefore the loosing or binding of one man in relation to God alone, belongs to the tribunal of Penance, whereas the binding
+                     or loosing of a man in relation to other men, belongs to the public tribunal of external judgment. And since excommunication
+                     severs a man from the communion of the faithful, it belongs to the external tribunal.
+                     Consequently those alone can excommunicate who have jurisdiction in the judicial tribunal. Hence, of their own authority,
+                     only bishops and higher prelates, according to the more common opinion can excommunicate, whereas parish priests can do so
+                     only by commission or in certain cases, as those of theft, rapine and the like, in which the law allows them to excommunicate.
+                     Others, however, have maintained that even parish priests can excommunicate: but the former opinion is more reasonable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Excommunication is an act of the keys not directly, but with respect to the external judgment. The sentence of excommunication,
+                     however, though it is promulgated by an external verdict, still, as it belongs somewhat to the entrance to the kingdom, in
+                     so far as the Church Militant is the way to the Church Triumphant, this jurisdiction whereby a man is competent to excommunicate,
+                     can be called a key. It is in this sense that some distinguish between the
+                     key of orders, which all priests have, and the key of jurisdiction in the tribunal of judgment, which none have but the judges
+                     of the external tribunal. Nevertheless God bestowed both on Peter (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q22_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>), from whom they are derived by others, whichever of them they have.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Parish priests have jurisdiction indeed over their subjects, in the tribunal of conscience, but not in the judicial tribunal,
+                     for they cannot summons them in contentious cases. Hence they cannot excommunicate, but they can absolve them in the tribunal
+                     of Penance. And though the tribunal of Penance is higher, yet more solemnity is requisite in the judicial tribunal, because
+                     therein it is necessary to make satisfaction not only to God but also to
+                     man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q22_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q22_A2-p0.1">Whether those who are not priests can excommunicate? </h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those who are not priests cannot excommunicate. Because excommunication is an act of the keys, as stated
+                     in Sent. iv, D, 18. But those who are not priests have not the keys. Therefore they cannot excommunicate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, more is required for excommunication than for absolution in the tribunal of Penance. But one who is not a priest
+                     cannot absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Neither therefore can he excommunicate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Archdeacons, legates and bishops-elect excommunicate, and yet sometimes they are not priests. Therefore not only priests
+                     can excommunicate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Priests alone are competent to dispense the sacraments wherein grace is given: wherefore they alone can loose and bind in
+                     the tribunal of Penance. On the other hand excommunication regards grace, not directly but consequently, in so far as it deprives
+                     a man of the Church's prayers, by which he is disposed for grace or preserved therein. Consequently even those who are not
+                     priests, provided they have jurisdiction in a contentious court, can excommunicate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though they have not the key of orders, they have the key of jurisdiction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These two are related to one another as something exceeding and something exceeded [*Cf. A[1], a[2];
+                     <a id="XP_Q22_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q24_A1.html"> Q[24], A[1]</a>, ad 1], and consequently one of them may be within the competency of someone while the other is not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q22_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q22_A3-p0.1">Whether a man who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate another?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate another. For such a one has lost neither orders
+                     nor jurisdiction, since neither is he ordained anew when he is absolved, nor is his jurisdiction renewed. But excommunication
+                     requires nothing more than orders or jurisdiction. Therefore even one who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further. it is a greater thing to consecrate the body of Christ than to excommunicate. But such persons can consecrate. Therefore
+                     they can excommunicate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> one whose body is bound cannot bind another. But spiritual gyves are stronger than bodily fetters. Therefore one who is excommunicated
+                     cannot excommunicate another, since excommunication is a spiritual chain.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Jurisdiction can only be used in relation to another man. Consequently, since every excommunicated person is severed from
+                     the communion of the faithful, he is deprived of the use of jurisdiction. And as excommunication requires jurisdiction, an
+                     excommunicated person cannot excommunicate, and the same reason applies to one who is suspended from jurisdiction. For if
+                     he be suspended from orders only, then he cannot exercise his order, but he can use his
+                     jurisdiction, while, on the other hand, if he be suspended from jurisdiction and not from orders. he cannot use his jurisdiction,
+                     though he can exercise his order: and if he be suspended from both, he can exercise neither.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although an excommunicated or suspended person does not lose his jurisdiction, yet he does lose its use.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of consecration results from the power of the character which is indelible, wherefore, from the very fact that
+                     a man has the character of order, he can always consecrate, though not always lawfully. It is different with the power of
+                     excommunication which results from jurisdiction, for this can be taken away and bound.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q22_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q22_A4-p0.1">Whether a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or his superior?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or his superior. For an angel of God was greater than Paul,
+                     according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q22_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>: "He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater then he, a greater" than whom "hath not risen among men that are
+                     born of women." Now Paul excommunicated an angel from heaven (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q22_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.1.8" target="asv">Gal. 1:8</a>). Therefore a man can excommunicate his superior.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sometimes a priest pronounces a general excommunication for theft or the like. But it might happen that he, or his
+                     equal, or a superior has done such things. Therefore a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or a superior.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man can absolve his superior or his equal in the tribunal of Penance, as when a bishop confesses to his subject,
+                     or one priest confesses venial sins to another. Therefore it seems that a man may also excommunicate his superior, or his
+                     equal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Excommunication is an act of jurisdiction. But no man has jurisdiction over himself (since one cannot be both judge and defendant
+                     in the same trial), or over his superior, or over an equal. Therefore a man cannot excommunicate his superior, or his equal,
+                     or himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since, by jurisdiction, a man is placed above those over whom he has jurisdiction, through being their judge, it follows
+                     that no man has jurisdiction over himself, his superior, or his equal, and that, consequently, no one can excommunicate either
+                     himself, or his superior, or his equal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking hypothetically, i.e. supposing an angel were to sin, for in that case he would not be higher than
+                     the Apostle, but lower. Nor is it absurd that, if the antecedent of a conditional sentence be impossible, the consequence
+                     be impossible also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In that case no one would be excommunicated, since no man has power over his peer.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Loosing and binding in the tribunal of confession affects our relation to God only, in Whose sight a man from being above
+                     another sinks below him through sin; while on the other hand excommunication is the affair of an external tribunal in which
+                     a man does not forfeit his superiority on account of sin. Hence there is no comparison between the two tribunals. Nevertheless,
+                     even in the tribunal of confession, a man cannot absolve himself, or his
+                     superior, or his equal, unless the power to do so be committed to him. This does not apply to venial sins, because they can
+                     be remitted through any sacraments which confer grace, hence remission of venial sins follows the power of orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q22_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q22_A5-p0.1">Whether a sentence of excommunication can be passed on a body of men?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sentence of excommunication can be passed on a body of men. Because it is possible for a number of people
+                     to be united together in wickedness. Now when a man is obstinate in his wickedness he should be excommunicated. Therefore
+                     a body of men can be excommunicated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the most grievous effect of an excommunication is privation of the sacraments of the Church. But sometimes a whole
+                     country is laid under an interdict. Therefore a body of people can be excommunicated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Ep. ccl] on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q22_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12" target="asv">Mat. 12</a> asserts that the sovereign and a body of people cannot be excommunicated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> No man should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. Now sin consists in an act: and acts do not belong to communities,
+                     but, generally speaking, to individuals. Wherefore individual members of a community can be excommunicated, but not the community
+                     itself. And although sometimes an act belongs to a whole multitude, as when many draw a boat, which none of them could draw
+                     by himself, yet it is not probable that a community would so wholly consent to evil
+                     that there would be no dissentients. Now God, Who judges all the earth, does not condemn the just with the wicked (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q22_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.18.25" target="asv">Gn. 18:25</a>). Therefore the Church, who should imitate the judgments of God, prudently decided that a community should not be excommunicated,
+                     lest the wheat be uprooted together with the tares and cockle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p6"> The Reply to the First Objection is evident from what has been said.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Suspension is not so great a punishment as excommunication, since those who are suspended are not deprived of the prayers
+                     of the Church, as the excommunicated are. Wherefore a man can be suspended without having committed a sin himself, just as
+                     a whole kingdom is laid under an interdict on account of the king's crime. Hence there is no comparison between excommunication
+                     and suspension.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q22_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q23.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q22_A6-p0.1">Whether a man can be excommunicated who is already under sentence of excommunication?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man who is already under sentence of excommunication cannot be excommunicated any further. For the Apostle
+                     says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q22_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:12</a>): "What have I to do to judge them that are without?" Now those who are excommunicated are already outside the Church. Therefore
+                     the Church cannot exercise any further judgment on them, so as to excommunicate them again.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, excommunication is privation of divine things and of the communion of the faithful. But when a man has been deprived
+                     of a thing, he cannot be deprived of it again. Therefore one who is excommunicated cannot be excommunicated again
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Excommunication is a punishment and a healing medicine. Now punishments and medicines are repeated when necessary. Therefore
+                     excommunication can be repeated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A man who is under sentence of one excommunication, can be excommunicated again, either by a repetition of the same excommunication,
+                     for his greater confusion, so that he may renounce sin, or for some other cause. And then there are as many principal excommunications,
+                     as there are causes for his being excommunicated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking of heathens and of other unbelievers who have no (sacramental) character, whereby they are numbered
+                     among the people of God. But since the baptismal character whereby a man is numbered among God's people, is indelible, one
+                     who is baptized always belongs to the Church in some way, so that the Church is always competent to sit in judgment on him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although privation does not receive more or less in itself, yet it can, as regards its cause. In this way an excommunication
+                     can be repeated, and a man who has been excommunicated several times is further from the Church's prayers than one who has
+                     been excommunicated only once.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q23.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q23" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q23-p0.1">OF COMMUNICATION WITH EXCOMMUNICATED PERSONS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q23-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q23-p2"> We must now consider communication with those who are excommunicated. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q23-p3"> (1) Whether it is lawful to communicate in matters purely corporal with one who is excommunicated?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q23-p4"> (2) Whether one who communicates with an excommunicated person is excommunicated?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q23-p5"> (3) Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated person in matters not permitted by law?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q23_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q23.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q23_A1-p0.1">Whether it is lawful, in matters purely corporal, to communicate with an excommunicated person?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is lawful, in matters purely corporal, to communicate with an excommunicated person. For excommunication
+                     is an act of the keys. But the power of the keys extends only to spiritual matters. Therefore excommunication does not prevent
+                     one from communicating with another in matters corporal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "What is instituted for the sake of charity, does not militate against charity" (Cf.
+                     <a id="XP_Q23_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q11_A1.html"> Q[11], A[1]</a>, OBJ[1]). But we are bound by the precept of charity to succor our enemies, which is impossible without some sort of communication.
+                     Therefore it is lawful to communicate with an excommunicated person in corporal matters.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q23_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:11</a>): "With such an one not so much as to eat."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Excommunication is twofold: there is minor excommunication, which deprives a man merely of a share in the sacraments, but
+                     not of the communion of the faithful. Wherefore it is lawful to communicate with a person lying under an excommunication of
+                     this kind, but not to give him the sacraments. The other is major excommunication which deprives a man of the sacraments of
+                     the Church and of the communion of the faithful. Wherefore it is not lawful to communicate
+                     with one who lies under such an excommunication. But, since the Church resorts to excommunication to repair and not to destroy,
+                     exception is made from this general law, in certain matters wherein communication is lawful, viz. in those which concern salvation,
+                     for one is allowed to speak of such matters with an excommunicated person; and one may even speak of other matters so as to
+                     put him at his ease and to make the words of salvation more acceptable. Moreover exception is made in favor of
+                     certain people whose business it is to be in attendance on the excommunicated person, viz. his wife, child, slave, vassal
+                     or subordinate. This, however, is to be understood of children who have not attained their majority, else they are forbidden
+                     to communicate with their father: and as to the others, the exception applies to them if they have entered his service before
+                     his excommunication, but not if they did so afterwards.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p6"> Some understand this exception to apply in the opposite way, viz. that the master can communicate with his subjects: while
+                     others hold the contrary. At any rate it is lawful for them to communicate with others in matters wherein they are under an
+                     obligation to them, for just as subjects are bound to serve their master, so is the master bound to look after his subjects.
+                     Again certain cases are excepted; as when the fact of the excommunication is unknown, or in the case of
+                     strangers or travelers in the country of those who are excommunicated, for they are allowed to buy from them, or to receive
+                     alms from them. Likewise if anyone were to see an excommunicated person in distress: for then he would be bound by the precept
+                     of charity to assist him. These are all contained in the following line: "Utility, law, lowliness, ignorance of fact, necessity,"
+                     where "utility" refers to salutary words, "law" to marriage, "lowliness" to subjection. The others need no
+                     explanation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Corporal matters are subordinate to spiritual matters. Wherefore the power which extends to spiritual things, can also extend
+                     to matters touching the body: even as the art which considers the end commands in matters ordained to the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In a case where one is bound by the precept of charity to hold communication, the prohibition ceases, as is clear from what
+                     has been said.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q23.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q23_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q23_A2-p0.1">Whether a person incurs excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a person does not incur excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated. For a heathen
+                     or a Jew is more separated from the Church than a person who is excommunicated. But one does not incur excommunication for
+                     communicating with a heathen or a Jew. Neither, therefore, does one for communicating with an excommunicated Christian.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a man incurs excommunication for communicating with an excommunicated person, for the same reason a third would
+                     incur excommunication for communicating with him, and thus one might go on indefinitely, which would seem absurd. Therefore
+                     one does not incur excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> An excommunicated person is banished from communion. Therefore whoever communicates with him leaves the communion of the
+                     Church: and hence he seems to be excommunicated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A person may incur excommunication in two ways. First, so that the excommunication includes both himself and whosoever communicates
+                     with him: and then, without any doubt, whoever communicates with him, incurs a major excommunication. Secondly, so that the
+                     excommunication is simply pronounced on him; and then a man may communicate with him either in his crime, by counsel, help
+                     or favor, in which case again he incurs the major excommunication, or he may
+                     communicate with him in other things by speaking to him, greeting him, or eating with him, in which case he incurs the minor
+                     excommunication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Church has no intention of correcting unbelievers as well as the faithful who are under her care: hence she does not
+                     sever those, whom she excommunicates, from the fellowship of unbelievers, as she does from the communion of the faithful over
+                     whom she exercises a certain power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is lawful to hold communion with one who has incurred a minor excommunication, so that excommunication does not pass on
+                     to a third person.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q23_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q24.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q23_A3-p0.1">Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated person in other cases than those in which it is allowed?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person in other cases than those in
+                     which it is allowed. Because a certain decretal (Cap. Sacris: De his quae vi, metuve, etc.) declares that "not even through
+                     fear of death should anyone hold communion with an excommunicated person, since one ought to die rather than commit a mortal
+                     sin." But this would be no reason unless it were always a mortal sin to hold communion with
+                     an excommunicated person. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is a mortal sin to act against a commandment of the Church. But the Church forbids anyone to hold communion with
+                     an excommunicated person. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man is debarred from receiving the Eucharist on account of a venial sin. But a man who holds communion with an
+                     excommunicated person, outside those cases in which it is allowed, is debarred from receiving the Eucharist, since he incurs
+                     a minor excommunication. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person, save in those cases
+                     in which it is allowed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no one should incur a major excommunication save for a mortal sin. Now according to the law (Can. Praecipue, seqq.,
+                     caus. xi) a man may incur a major excommunication for holding communion with an excommunicated person. Therefore it is a mortal
+                     sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> None can absolve a man from mortal sin unless he have jurisdiction over him. But any priest can absolve a man for holding
+                     communion with those who are excommunicated. Therefore it is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p7"> Further, the measure of the penalty should be according to the measure of the sin, as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q23_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.3" target="asv"> Dt. 25:3.</a> Now the punishment appointed by common custom for holding communion with an excommunicated person is not that which is inflicted
+                     for mortal sin, but rather that which is due for venial sin. Therefore it is not a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some hold that it is always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person, by word or in any of the forbidden
+                     ways mentioned above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q23_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q23_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, except in those cases allowed by law (Cap. Quoniam). But since it seems very hard that a man should be guilty of a mortal
+                     sin by uttering just a slight word to an excommunicated person, and that by excommunicating a person one would endanger the
+                     salvation of many, and lay a snare
+                     which might turn to one's own hurt, it seems to others more probable that he is not always guilty of a mortal sin, but only
+                     when he holds communion with him in a criminal deed, or in an act of Divine worship, or through contempt of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This decretal is speaking of holding communion in Divine worship. It may also be replied that the same reason applies both
+                     to mortal and venial sin, since just as one cannot do well by committing a mortal sin, so neither can one by committing a
+                     venial sin: so that just as it is a man's duty to suffer death rather than commit a mortal sin, so is it his duty to do so
+                     sooner than commit a venial sin, inasmuch as it is his duty to avoid venial sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The commandment of the Church regards spiritual matters directly, and legitimate actions as a consequence: hence by holding
+                     communion in Divine worship one acts against the commandment, and commits a mortal sin; but by holding communion in other
+                     matters, one acts beside the commandment, and sins venially.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes a man is debarred from the Eucharist even without his own fault, as in the case of those who are suspended or under
+                     an interdict, because these penalties are sometimes inflicted on one person for the sin of another who is thus punished.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although it is a venial sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated, yet to do so obstinately is a mortal sin: and
+                     for this reason one may be excommunicated according to the law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q24.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q24" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q24-p0.1">OF ABSOLUTION FROM EXCOMMUNICATION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q24-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q24-p2"> We must now consider absolution from excommunication: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q24-p3"> (1) Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q24-p4"> (2) Whether a man can be absolved from excommunication against his will?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q24-p5"> (3) Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from another?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q24_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q24.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q24_A1-p0.1">Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication? </h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication. For the chains of sin are stronger than those
+                     of excommunication. But any priest can absolve his subject from sin. Therefore much more can he absolve him from excommunication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the cause is removed the effect is removed. But the cause of excommunication is a mortal sin. Therefore since
+                     any priest can absolve (his subject) from that mortal sin, he is able likewise to absolve him from the excommunication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It belongs to the same power to excommunicate as to absolve from excommunication. But priests of inferior degree cannot excommunicate
+                     their subjects. Neither, therefore, can they absolve them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Anyone can absolve from minor excommunication who can absolve from the sin of participation in the sin of another. But in
+                     the case of a major excommunication, this is pronounced either by a judge, and then he who pronounced sentence or his superior
+                     can absolve---or it is pronounced by law, and then the bishop or even a priest can absolve except in the six cases which the
+                     Pope, who is the maker of laws, reserves to himself: the first is the case of a man who
+                     lays hands on a cleric or a religious; the second is of one who breaks into a church and is denounced for so doing; the third
+                     is of the man who sets fire to a church and is denounced for the deed; the fourth is of one who knowingly communicates in
+                     the Divine worship with those whom the Pope has excommunicated by name; the fifth is the case of one who tampers with the
+                     letters of the Holy See; the sixth is the case of one who communicates in a crime of one who is excommunicated. For he should
+                     not
+                     be absolved except by the person who excommunicated him, even though he be not subject to him, unless, by reason of the difficulty
+                     of appearing before him, he be absolved by the bishop or by his own priest, after binding himself by oath to submit to the
+                     command of the judge who pronounced the excommunication on him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p6"> There are however eight exceptions to the first case: (1) In the hour of death, when a person can be absolved by any priest
+                     from any excommunication; (2) if the striker be the doorkeeper of a man in authority, and the blow be given neither through
+                     hatred nor of set purpose; (3) if the striker be a woman; (4) if the striker be a servant, whose master is not at fault and
+                     would suffer from his absence; (5) if a religious strike a religious, unless he strike him very grievously; (6)
+                     if the striker be a poor man; (7) if he be a minor, an old man, or an invalid; (8) if there be a deadly feud between them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p7"> There are, besides, seven cases in which the person who strikes a cleric does not incur excommunication: (1) if he do it
+                     for the sake of discipline, as a teacher or a superior; (2) if it be done for fun; (3) if the striker find the cleric behaving
+                     with impropriety towards his wife his mother, his sister or his daughter; (4) if he return blow for blow at once; (5) if the
+                     striker be not aware that he is striking a cleric; (6) if the latter be guilty of apostasy after the triple
+                     admonition; (7) if the cleric exercise an act which is altogether contrary to the clerical life, e.g. if he become a soldier,
+                     or if he be guilty of bigamy [*Namely, that which is known by canonists as "similar bigamy"].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the chains of sin are in themselves greater than those of excommunication, yet in a certain respect the chains of
+                     excommunication are greater, inasmuch as they bind a man not only in the sight of God, but also in the eye of the Church.
+                     Hence absolution from excommunication requires jurisdiction in the external forum, whereas absolution from sin does not. Nor
+                     is there need of giving one's word by oath, as in the case of absolution from
+                     excommunication, because, as the Apostle declares (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q24_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.16" target="asv">Heb. 6:16</a>), controversies between men are decided by oath.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As an excommunicated person has no share in the sacraments of the Church, a priest cannot absolve him from his guilt, unless
+                     he be first absolved from excommunication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q24.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q24_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q24_A2-p0.1">Whether anyone can be absolved against his will?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no man can be absolved against his will. For spiritual things are not conferred on anyone against his
+                     will. Now absolution from excommunication is a spiritual favor. Therefore it cannot be granted to a man against his will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the cause of excommunication is contumacy. But when, through contempt of the excommunication, a man is unwilling
+                     to be absolved, he shows a high degree of contumacy. Therefore he cannot be absolved.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Excommunication can be pronounced on a man against his will. Now things that happen to a man against his will, can be removed
+                     from him against his will, as in the case of the goods of fortune. Therefore excommunication can be removed from a man against
+                     his will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Evil of fault and evil of punishment differ in this, that the origin of fault is within us, since all sin is voluntary, whereas
+                     the origin of punishment is sometimes without, since punishment does not need to be voluntary, in fact the nature of punishment
+                     is rather to be against the will. Wherefore, just as a man commits no sin except willingly, so no sin is forgiven him against
+                     his will. On the other hand just as a person can be excommunicated against his
+                     will, so can he be absolved therefrom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The assertion is true of those spiritual goods which depend on our will, such as the virtues, which we cannot lose unwillingly;
+                     for knowledge, although a spiritual good, can be lost by a man against his will through sickness. Hence the argument is not
+                     to the point.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is possible for excommunication to be removed from a man even though he be contumacious, if it seem to be for the good
+                     of the man for whom the excommunication was intended as a medicine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q24_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q25.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q24_A3-p0.1">Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from all?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man cannot be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from all. For an effect should
+                     be proportionate to its cause. Now the cause of excommunication is a sin. Since then a man cannot be absolved from one sin
+                     without being absolved from all, neither can this happen as regards excommunication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, absolution from excommunication is pronounced in the Church. But a man who is under the ban of one excommunication
+                     is outside the Church. Therefore so long as one remains, a man cannot be loosed from another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Excommunication is a punishment. Now a man can be loosed from one punishment, while another remains. Therefore a man can
+                     be loosed from one excommunication and yet remain under another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Excommunications are not connected together in any way, and so it is possible for a man to be absolved from one, and yet
+                     remain under another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p6"> It must be observed however that sometimes a man lies under several excommunications pronounced by one judge; and then, when
+                     he is absolved from one, he is understood to be absolved from all, unless the contrary be expressed, or unless he ask to be
+                     absolved from excommunication on one count only, whereas he was excommunicated under several. On the other hand sometimes
+                     a man lies under several sentences of excommunication pronounced by several judges; and then, when absolved from
+                     one excommunication, he is not therefore absolved from the others, unless at his prayer they all confirm his absolution, or
+                     unless they all depute one to absolve him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All sins are connected together in aversion from God, which is incompatible with the forgiveness of sin: wherefore one sin
+                     cannot be forgiven without another. But excommunications have no such connection. Nor again is absolution from excommunication
+                     hindered by contrariety of the will, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q24_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q24_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Hence the argument does not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as such a man was for several reasons outside the Church so is it possible for his separation to be removed on one count
+                     and to remain on another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q25.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q25" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q25-p0.1">OF INDULGENCES (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q25-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q25-p2"> We must now consider indulgence: (1) in itself; (2) those who grant indulgence; (3) those who receive it.</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q25-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q25-p4"> (1) Whether an indulgence remits any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q25-p5"> (2) Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q25-p6"> (3) Whether an indulgence should be granted for temporal assistance?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q25_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q25.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q25_A1-p0.1">Whether an indulgence can remit any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an indulgence cannot remit any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins. Because a gloss
+                     on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13</a>, "He cannot deny Himself," says: "He would do this if He did not keep His word." Now He said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv">Dt. 25:2</a>): "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." Therefore nothing can be remitted from
+                     the satisfactory punishment which is appointed according to the measure of
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an inferior cannot absolve from an obligation imposed by his superior. But when God absolves us from sin He binds
+                     us to temporal punishment, as Hugh of St. Victor declares (Tract. vi Sum. Sent. [*Of doubtful authenticity]). Therefore no
+                     man can absolve from that punishment, by remitting any part of it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the granting of the sacramental effect without the sacraments belongs to the power of excellence. Now none but Christ
+                     has the power of excellence in the sacraments. Since then satisfaction is a part of the sacrament of Penance, conducing to
+                     the remission of the punishment due, it seems that no mere man can remit the debt of punishment without satisfaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the power of the ministers of the Church was given them, not "unto destruction," but "unto edification" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.10.8" target="asv">2 Cor. 10:8</a>). But it would be conducive to destruction, if satisfaction, which was intended for our good, inasmuch as it serves for a
+                     remedy, were done away with. Therefore the power of the ministers of the Church does not extend to this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.2.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 2:10</a>): "For, what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ," and a
+                     gloss adds: i.e. "as though Christ Himself had pardoned." But Christ could remit the punishment of a sin without any satisfaction,
+                     as evidenced in the case of the adulterous woman (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.8" target="asv">Jn. 8</a>). Therefore Paul could do so likewise. Therefore the Pope can too, since his power in the Church is not
+                     less than Paul's.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p7"> Further, the universal Church cannot err; since He Who "was heard for His reverence" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.7" target="asv">Heb. 5:7</a>) said to Peter, on whose profession of faith the Church was founded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.32" target="asv">Lk. 22:32</a>): "I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not." Now the universal Church approves and grants indulgences. Therefore indulgences
+                     have some value.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> All admit that indulgences have some value, for it would be blasphemy to say that the Church does anything in vain. But some
+                     say that they do not avail to free a man from the debt of punishment which he has deserved in Purgatory according to God's
+                     judgment, and that they merely serve to free him from the obligation imposed on him by the priest as a punishment for his
+                     sins, or from the canonical penalties he has incurred. But this opinion does not seem to be
+                     true. First, because it is expressly opposed to the privilege granted to Peter, to whom it was said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>) that whatsoever he should loose on earth should be loosed also in heaven. Wherefore whatever remission is granted in the
+                     court of the Church holds good in the court of God. Moreover the Church by granting such indulgences would do more harm than
+                     good, since, by remitting the punishment she had enjoined on a man, she would deliver him to be punished more severely
+                     in Purgatory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p9"> Hence we must say on the contrary that indulgences hold good both in the Church's court and in the judgment of God, for the
+                     remission of the punishment which remains after contrition, absolution, and confession, whether this punishment be enjoined
+                     or not. The reason why they so avail is the oneness of the mystical body in which many have performed works of satisfaction
+                     exceeding the requirements of their debts; in which, too, many have patiently borne unjust tribulations whereby
+                     a multitude of punishments would have been paid, had they been incurred. So great is the quantity of such merits that it exceeds
+                     the entire debt of punishment due to those who are living at this moment: and this is especially due to the merits of Christ:
+                     for though He acts through the sacraments, yet His efficacy is nowise restricted to them, but infinitely surpasses their efficacy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p10"> Now one man can satisfy for another, as we have explained above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q25_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q13_A2.html">Q[13], A[2]</a>). And the saints in whom this super-abundance of satisfactions is found, did not perform their good works for this or that
+                     particular person, who needs the remission of his punishment (else he would have received this remission without any indulgence
+                     at all), but they performed them for the whole Church in general, even as the Apostle declares that he fills up "those things
+                     that
+                     are wanting of the sufferings of Christ . . . for His body, which is the Church" to whom he wrote (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Col.1.24" target="asv">Col. 1:24</a>). These merits, then, are the common property of the whole Church. Now those things which are the common property of a number
+                     are distributed to the various individuals according to the judgment of him who rules them all. Hence, just as one man would
+                     obtain the remission of his punishment if another were to satisfy for him, so would he too if another's satisfactions
+                     be applied to him by one who has the power to do so.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The remission which is granted by means of indulgences does not destroy the proportion between punishment and sin, since
+                     someone has spontaneously taken upon himself the punishment due for another's guilt, as explained above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He who gains an indulgence is not, strictly speaking, absolved from the debt of punishment, but is given the means whereby
+                     he may pay it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The effect of sacramental absolution is the removal of a man's guilt, an effect which is not produced by indulgences. But
+                     he who grants indulgences pays the debt of punishment which a man owes, out of the common stock of the Church's goods, as
+                     explained above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Grace affords a better remedy for the avoidance of sin than does habituation to (good) works. And since he who gains an indulgence
+                     is disposed to grace through the love which he conceives for the cause for which the indulgence is granted, it follows that
+                     indulgences provide a remedy against sin. Consequently it is not harmful to grant indulgences unless this be done without
+                     discretion. Nevertheless those who gain indulgences should be advised, not, on
+                     this account, to omit the penitential works imposed on them, so that they may derive a remedy from these also, even though
+                     they may be quit of the debt of punishment; and all the more, seeing that they are often more in debt than they think.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q25.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q25_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q25_A2-p0.1">Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that indulgences are not as effective as they claim to be. For indulgences have no effect save from the power
+                     of the keys. Now by the power of the keys, he who has that power can only remit some fixed part of the punishment due for
+                     sin, after taking into account the measure of the sin and of the penitent's sorrow. Since then indulgences depend on the mere
+                     will of the grantor, it seems that they are not as effective as they claim to be.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the debt of punishment keeps man back from the attainment of glory, which he ought to desire above all things. Now,
+                     if indulgences are as effective as they claim to be, a man by setting himself to gain indulgences might become immune from
+                     all debt of temporal punishment. Therefore it would seem that a man ought to put aside all other kinds of works, and devote
+                     himself to gain indulgences.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sometimes an indulgence whereby a man is remitted a third part of the punishment due for his sins is granted if
+                     he contribute towards the erection of a certain building. If, therefore, indulgences produce the effect which is claimed for
+                     them, he who gives a penny, and then another, and then again another, would obtain a plenary absolution from all punishment
+                     due for his sins, which seems absurd.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sometimes an indulgence is granted, so that for visiting a church a man obtains a seven years' remission. If, then,
+                     an indulgence avails as much as is claimed for it a man who lives near that church, or the clergy attached thereto who go
+                     there every day, obtain as much indulgence as one who comes from a distance (which would appear unjust); moreover, seemingly,
+                     they would gain the indulgence several times a day, since they go there repeatedly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, to remit a man's punishment beyond a just estimate seems to amount to the same as to remit it without reason; because
+                     in so far as he exceeds that estimate, he limits the compensation. Now he who grants an indulgence cannot without cause remit
+                     a man's punishment either wholly or partly, even though the Pope were to say to anyone: "I remit to all the punishment you
+                     owe for your sins." Therefore it seems that he cannot remit anything beyond the just
+                     estimate. Now indulgences are often published which exceed that just estimate. Therefore they do not avail as much as is claimed
+                     for them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.13.7" target="asv">Job 13:7</a>): "Hath God any need of your lie, that you should speak deceitfully for Him?" Therefore the Church, in publishing indulgences,
+                     does not lie; and so they avail as much as is claimed for them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p8"> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.14" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:14</a>): "If . . . our preaching is vain, your faith is also vain." Therefore whoever utters a falsehood in preaching, so far as
+                     he is concerned, makes faith void. and so sins mortally. If therefore indulgences are not as effective as they claim to be,
+                     all who publish indulgences would commit a mortal sin: which is absurd.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> on this point there are many opinions. For some maintain that indulgences have not the efficacy claimed for them, but that
+                     they simply avail each individual in proportion to his faith and devotion. And consequently those who maintain this, say that
+                     the Church publishes her indulgences in such a way as, by a kind of pious fraud, to induce men to do well, just as a mother
+                     entices her child to walk by holding out an apple. But this seems a very dangerous
+                     assertion to make. For as Augustine states (Ep. ad Hieron. lxxviii), "if any error were discovered in Holy Writ, the authority
+                     of Holy Writ would perish." In like manner, if any error were to be found in the Church's preaching, her doctrine would have
+                     no authority in settling questions of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p10"> Hence others have maintained that indulgences avail as much as is claimed for them, according to a just estimate, not of
+                     him who grants it---who perhaps puts too high a value on it---nor of the recipient---for he may prize too highly the gift
+                     he receives, but a just estimate according to the estimate of good men who consider the condition of the person affected,
+                     and the utility and needs of the Church, for the Church's needs are greater at one time than at another. Yet, neither,
+                     seemingly, can this opinion stand. First, because in that case indulgences would no longer be a remission, but rather a mere
+                     commutation. Moreover the preaching of the Church would not be excused from untruth, since, at times, indulgences are granted
+                     far in excess of the requirements of this just estimate, taking into consideration all the aforesaid conditions, as, for example,
+                     when the Pope granted to anyone who visited a certain church, an indulgence of seven years, which indulgence was
+                     granted by Blessed Gregory for the Roman Stations.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p11"> Hence others say that the quantity of remission accorded in an indulgence is not to be measured by the devotion of the recipient,
+                     as the first opinion suggested, nor according to the quantity of what is given, as the second opinion held; but according
+                     to the cause for which the indulgence is granted, and according to which a person is held deserving of obtaining such an indulgence.
+                     Thus according as a man approached near to that cause, so would he obtain remission in whole or in
+                     part. But neither will this explain the custom of the Church, who assigns, now a greater, now a lesser indulgence, for the
+                     same cause: thus, under the same circumstances, now a year's indulgence, now one of only forty days, according to the graciousness
+                     of the Pope, who grants the indulgence, is granted to those who visit a church. Wherefore the amount of the remission granted
+                     by the indulgence is not to be measured by the cause for which a person is worthy of an indulgence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p12"> We must therefore say otherwise that the quantity of an effect is proportionate to the quantity of the cause. Now the cause
+                     of the remission of punishment effected by indulgences is no other than the abundance of the Church's merits, and this abundance
+                     suffices for the remission of all punishment. The effective cause of the remission is not the devotion, or toil, or gift of
+                     the recipient; nor, again, is it the cause for which the indulgence was granted. We cannot, then, estimate
+                     the quantity of the remission by any of the foregoing, but solely by the merits of the Church---and these are always superabundant.
+                     Consequently, according as these merits are applied to a person so does he obtain remission. That they should be so applied
+                     demands, firstly, authority to dispense this treasure. secondly, union between the recipient and Him Who merited it---and
+                     this is brought about by charity; thirdly, there is required a reason for so dispensing this treasury, so that the
+                     intention, namely, of those who wrought these meritorious works is safeguarded, since they did them for the honor of God and
+                     for the good of the Church in general. Hence whenever the cause assigned tends to the good of the Church and the honor of
+                     God, there is sufficient reason for granting an indulgence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p13"> Hence, according to others, indulgences have precisely the efficacy claimed for them, provided that he who grants them have
+                     the authority, that the recipient have charity, and that, as regards the cause, there be piety which includes the honor of
+                     God and the profit of our neighbor. Nor in this view have we "too great a market of the Divine mercy" [*St. Bonaventure, Sent.
+                     iv, D, 20], as some maintain, nor again does it derogate from Divine justice, for no punishment is remitted,
+                     but the punishment of one is imputed to another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q25_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>) there are two keys, the key of orders and the key of jurisdiction. The key of orders is a sacramental: and as the effects
+                     of the sacraments are fixed, not by men but by God, the priest cannot decide in the tribunal of confession how much shall
+                     be remitted by means of the key of orders from the punishment due; it is God Who appoints the amount to be remitted. On the
+                     other hand the key of
+                     jurisdiction is not something sacramental, and its effect depends on a man's decision. The remission granted through indulgences
+                     is the effect of this key, since it does not belong to the dispensation of the sacraments, but to the distribution of the
+                     common property of the Church: hence it is that legates, even though they be not priests, can grant indulgences. Consequently
+                     the decision of how much punishment is to be remitted by an indulgence depends on the will of the one who grants that
+                     indulgence. If, however, he remits punishment without sufficient reason, so that men are enticed to substitute mere nothings,
+                     as it were, for works of penance, he sins by granting such indulgences, although the indulgence is gained fully.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although indulgences avail much for the remission of punishment, yet works of satisfaction are more meritorious in respect
+                     of the essential reward, which infinitely transcends the remission of temporal punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When an indulgence is granted in a general way to anyone that helps towards the building of a church, we must understand
+                     this to mean a help proportionate to the giver: and in so far as he approaches to this, he will gain the indulgence more or
+                     less fully. Consequently a poor man by giving one penny would gain the full indulgence, not so a rich man, whom it would not
+                     become to give so little to so holy and profitable a work; Just as a king would not
+                     be said to help a man if he gave him an "obol."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A person who lives near the church, and the priest and clergy of the church, gain the indulgence as much as those who come
+                     perhaps a distance of a thousand days' journey: because the remission, as stated above, is proportionate, not to the toil,
+                     but to the merits which are applied. Yet he who toils most gains most merit. This, however, is to be understood of those cases
+                     in which an indulgence is given in an undeterminate manner. For sometimes a
+                     distinction is expressed: thus the Pope at the time of general absolution grants an indulgence of five years to those who
+                     come from across the seas, and one of three years to those who come from across the mountains, to others an indulgence of
+                     one year. Nor does a person gain the indulgence each time he visits the church during the term of indulgence, because sometimes
+                     it is granted for a fixed time; thus when it is said, "Whoever visits such and such a church until such and such a day, shall
+                     gain so much indulgence," we must understand that it can be gained only once. on the other hand if there be a continual indulgence
+                     in a certain church, as the indulgence of forty days to be gained in the church of the Blessed Peter, then a person gains
+                     the indulgence as often as he visits the church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> An indulgence requires a cause, not as a measure of the remission of punishment, but in order that the intention of those
+                     whose merits are applied, may reach to this particular individual. Now one person's good is applied to another in two ways:
+                     first, by charity; and in this way, even without indulgences, a person shares in all the good deeds done, provided he have
+                     charity: secondly, by the intention of the person who does the good action; and in
+                     this way, provided there be a lawful cause, the intention of a person who has done something for the profit of the Church,
+                     may reach to some individual through indulgences.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p19"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p20"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q25_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q25_A3-p0.1">Whether an indulgence ought to be granted for temporal help?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an indulgence ought not to be granted for temporal help. Because the remission of sins is something spiritual.
+                     Now to exchange a spiritual for a temporal thing is simony. Therefore this ought not to be done.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, spiritual assistance is more necessary than temporal. But indulgences do not appear to be granted for spiritual
+                     assistance. Much less therefore ought they to be granted for temporal help.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the common custom of the Church in granting indulgences for pilgrimages and almsgiving.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Temporal things are subordinate to spiritual matters, since we must make use of temporal things on account of spiritual things.
+                     Consequently an indulgence must not be granted for the sake of temporal matters as such, but in so far as they are subordinate
+                     to spiritual things: such as the quelling of the Church's enemies, who disturb her peace; or such as the building of a church,
+                     of a bridge, and other forms of almsgiving. It is therefore evident that there
+                     is no simony in these transactions, since a spiritual thing is exchanged, not for a temporal but for a spiritual commodity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p6"> Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Indulgences can be, and sometimes are, granted even for purely spiritual matters. Thus Pope Innocent IV granted an indulgence
+                     of ten days to all who prayed for the king of France; and in like manner sometimes the same indulgence is granted to those
+                     who preach a crusade as to those who take part in it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q26" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q26-p0.1">OF THOSE WHO CAN GRANT INDULGENCES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q26-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q26-p2"> We must now consider those who can grant indulgences: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q26-p3"> (1) Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q26-p4"> (2) Whether a deacon or another, who is not a priest, can grant indulgences?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q26-p5"> (3) Whether a bishop can grant them?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q26-p6"> (4) Whether they can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q26_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q26_A1-p0.1">Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every parish priest can grant indulgences. For an indulgence derives its efficacy from the superabundance
+                     of the Church's merits. Now there is no congregation without some superabundance of merits. Therefore every priest, who has
+                     charge of a congregation, can grant indulgences, and, in like manner, so can every prelate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every prelate stands for a multitude, just as an individual stands for himself. But any individual can assign his
+                     own goods to another and thus offer satisfaction for a third person. Therefore a prelate can assign the property of the multitude
+                     subject to him, and so it seems that he can grant indulgences.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> To excommunicate is less than to grant indulgences. But a parish priest cannot do the former. Therefore he cannot do the
+                     latter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Indulgences are effective, in as much as the works of satisfaction done by one person are applied to another, not only by
+                     virtue of charity, but also by the intention of the person who did them being directed in some way to the person to whom they
+                     are applied. Now a person's intention may be directed to another in three ways, specifically, generically and individually.
+                     Individually, as when one person offers satisfaction for another particular person; and
+                     thus anyone can apply his works to another. Specifically, as when a person prays for the congregation to which he belongs,
+                     for the members of his household, or for his benefactors, and directs his works of satisfaction to the same intention: in
+                     this way the superior of a congregation can apply those works to some other person, by applying the intention of those who
+                     belong to his congregation to some fixed individual. Generically, as when a person directs his works for the good of the Church
+                     in
+                     general; and thus he who presides over the whole Church can communicate those works, by applying his intention to this or
+                     that individual. And since a man is a member of a congregation, and a congregation is a part of the Church, hence the intention
+                     of private good includes the intention of the good of the congregation, and of the good of the whole Church. Therefore he
+                     who presides over the Church can communicate what belongs to an individual congregation or to an individual man: and he who
+                     presides over a congregation can communicate what belongs to an individual man, but not conversely. Yet neither the first
+                     nor the second communication is called an indulgence, but only the third; and this for two reasons. First, because, although
+                     those communications loose man from the debt of punishment in the sight of God, yet he is not freed from the obligation of
+                     fulfilling the satisfaction enjoined, to which he is bound by a commandment of the Church; whereas the third communication
+                     frees
+                     man even from this obligation. Secondly, because in one person or even in one congregation there is not such an unfailing
+                     supply of merits as to be sufficient both for the one person or congregation and for all others; and consequently the individual
+                     is not freed from the entire debt of punishment unless satisfaction is offered for him individually, to the very amount that
+                     he owes. On the other hand, in the whole Church there is an unfailing supply of merits, chiefly on account of the merit of
+                     Christ. Consequently he alone who is at the head of the Church can grant indulgences. Since, however, the Church is the congregation
+                     of the faithful, and since a congregation of men is of two kinds, the domestic, composed of members of the same family, and
+                     the civil, composed of members of the same nationality, the Church is like to a civil congregation, for the people themselves
+                     are called the Church; while the various assemblies, or parishes of one diocese are likened to a congregation in the
+                     various families and services. Hence a bishop alone is properly called a prelate of the Church, wherefore he alone, like a
+                     bridegroom, receives the ring of the Church. Consequently full power in the dispensation of the sacraments, and jurisdiction
+                     in the public tribunal, belong to him alone as the public person, but to others by delegation from him. Those priests who
+                     have charge of the people are not prelates strictly speaking, but assistants, hence, in consecrating priests the bishop says:
+                     "The more fragile we are, the more we need these assistants": and for this reason they do not dispense all the sacraments.
+                     Hence parish priests, or abbots or other like prelates cannot grant indulgences.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p6"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p7"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p8"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q26_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q26_A2-p0.1">Whether a deacon or another who is not a priest can grant an indulgence?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a deacon, or one that is not a priest cannot grant an indulgence. Because remission of sins is an effect
+                     of the keys. Now none but a priest has the keys. Therefore a priest alone can grant indulgences.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a fuller remission of punishment is granted by indulgences than by the tribunal of Penance. But a priest alone has
+                     power in the latter, and, therefore, he alone has power in the former.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The distribution of the Church's treasury is entrusted to the same person as the government of the Church. Now this is entrusted
+                     sometimes to one who is not a priest. Therefore he can grant indulgences, since they derive their efficacy from the distribution
+                     of the Church's treasury.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The power of granting indulgences follows jurisdiction, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q26_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>). And since deacons and others, who are not priests, can have jurisdiction either delegated, as legates, or ordinary, as
+                     bishops-elect, it follows that even those who are not priests can grant indulgences, although they cannot absolve in the tribunal
+                     of Penance, since this follows the reception of orders. This suffices for the Replies to the
+                     Objections, because the granting of indulgences belongs to the key of jurisdiction and not to the key of orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A2-p6"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A2-p7"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q26_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q26_A3-p0.1">Whether a bishop can grant indulgences?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that even a bishop cannot grant indulgences. Because the treasury of the Church is the common property of the
+                     whole Church. Now the common property of the whole Church cannot be distributed save by him who presides over the whole Church.
+                     Therefore the Pope alone can grant indulgences.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, none can remit punishments fixed by law, save the one who has the power to make the law. Now punishments in satisfaction
+                     for sins are fixed by law. Therefore the Pope alone can remit these punishments, since he is the maker of the law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the custom of the Church in accordance with which bishops grant indulgences.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Pope has the plenitude of pontifical power, being like a king in his kingdom: whereas the bishops are appointed to a
+                     share in his solicitude, like judges over each city. Hence them alone the Pope, in his letters, addresses as "brethren," whereas
+                     he calls all others his "sons." Therefore the plenitude of the power of granting indulgences resides in the Pope, because
+                     he can grant them, as he lists, provided the cause be a lawful one: while, in bishops,
+                     this power resides subject to the Pope's ordination, so that they can grant them within fixed limits and not beyond.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p6"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p7"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p8"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q26_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q26_A4-p0.1">Whether indulgences can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that indulgences cannot be granted by one who is in mortal sin. For a stream can no longer flow if cut off
+                     from its source. Now the source of grace which is the Holy Ghost is cut off from one who is in mortal sin. Therefore such
+                     a one can convey nothing to others by granting indulgences.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is a greater thing to grant an indulgence than to receive one. But one who is in mortal sin cannot receive an
+                     indulgence, as we shall show presently (
+                     <a id="XP_Q26_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q27_A1.html">Q[27], A[1]</a>). Neither, therefore, can he grant one.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Indulgences are granted in virtue of the power conferred on the prelates of the Church. Now mortal sin takes away, not power
+                     but goodness. Therefore one who is in mortal sin can grant indulgences.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The granting of indulgences belongs to jurisdiction. But a man does not, through sin, lose jurisdiction. Consequently indulgences
+                     are equally valid, whether they be granted by one who is in mortal sin, or by a most holy person; since he remits punishment,
+                     not by virtue of his own merits, but by virtue of the merits laid up in the Church's treasury.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The prelate who, while in a state of mortal sin, grants an indulgence, does not pour forth anything of his own, and so it
+                     is not necessary that he should receive an inflow from the source, in order that he may grant a valid indulgence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Further, to grant an indulgence is more than to receive one, if we consider the power, but it is less, if we consider the
+                     personal profit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q27" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q27-p0.1">OF THOSE WHOM INDULGENCES AVAIL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q27-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q27-p2"> We must now consider those whom indulgences avail: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q27-p3"> (1) Whether indulgences avail those who are in mortal sin?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q27-p4"> (2) Whether they avail religious?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q27-p5"> (3) Whether they avail a person who does not fulfill the conditions for which the indulgence is given?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q27-p6"> (4) Whether they avail him who grants them?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q27_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q27_A1-p0.1">Whether an indulgence avails those who are in mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an indulgence avails those who are in mortal sin. For one person can merit grace and many other good things
+                     for another, even though he be in mortal sin. Now indulgences derive their efficacy from the application of the saints' merits
+                     to an individual. Therefore they are effective in one who is in mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the need, the more room there is for pity. Now a man who is in mortal sin is in very great need. Therefore
+                     all the more should pity be extended to him by indulgence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A dead member receives no inflow from the other members that are living. But one who is in mortal sin, is like a dead member.
+                     Therefore he receives no inflow, through indulgences, from the merits of living members.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some hold that indulgences avail those even who are in mortal sin, for the acquiring of grace, but not for the remission
+                     of their punishment, since none can be freed from punishment who is not yet freed from guilt. For he who has not yet been
+                     reached by God's operation unto the remission of guilt, cannot receive the remission of his punishment from the minister of
+                     the Church neither by indulgences nor in the tribunal of Penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p6"> But this opinion seems to be untrue. Because, although those merits which are applied by means of an indulgence, might possibly
+                     avail a person so that he could merit grace (by way of congruity and impetration), yet it is not for this reason that they
+                     are applied, but for the remission of punishment. Hence they do not avail those who are in mortal sin, and consequently, true
+                     contrition and confession are demanded as conditions for gaining all indulgences. If however the merits
+                     were applied by such a form as this: "I grant you a share in the merits of the whole Church---or of one congregation, or of
+                     one specified person," then they might avail a person in mortal sin so that he could merit something, as the foregoing opinion
+                     holds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although he who is in mortal sin is in greater need of help, yet he is less capable of receiving it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q27_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q27_A2-p0.1">Whether indulgences avail religious?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that indulgences do not avail religious. For there is no reason to bring supplies to those who supply others
+                     out of their own abundance. Now indulgences are derived from the abundance of works of satisfaction to be found in religious.
+                     Therefore it is unreasonable for them to profit by indulgences.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing detrimental to religious life should be done in the Church. But, if indulgences were to avail religious,
+                     this would be detrimental to regular discipline, because religious would become lax on account of indulgences, and would neglect
+                     the penances imposed in chapter. Therefore indulgences do not avail religious.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Good brings harm to no man. But the religious life is a good thing. Therefore it does not take away from religious the profit
+                     to be derived from indulgences.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Indulgences avail both seculars and religious, provided they have charity and satisfy the conditions for gaining the indulgences:
+                     for religious can be helped by indulgences no less than persons living in the world.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although religious are in the state of perfection, yet they cannot live without sin: and so if at times they are liable to
+                     punishment on account of some sin, they can expiate this debt by means of indulgences. For it is not unreasonable that one
+                     who is well off absolutely speaking, should be in want at times and in some respect, and thus need to be supplied with what
+                     he lacks. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q27_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.6.2" target="asv">Gal. 6:2</a>): "Bear ye one another's burdens."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is no reason why indulgences should be detrimental to religious observance, because, as to the reward of eternal life,
+                     religious merit more by observing their rule than by gaining indulgences; although, as to the remission of punishment, which
+                     is a lesser good, they merit less. Nor again do indulgences remit the punishment enjoined in chapter, because the chapter
+                     is a judicial rather than a penitential tribunal. hence even those who are not
+                     priests hold chapter. Absolution from punishment enjoined or due for sin is given in the tribunal of Penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q27_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q27_A3-p0.1">Whether an indulgence can ever be granted to one who does not fulfill the conditions required?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an indulgence can sometimes be granted to one who does not fulfill the required conditions. Because when
+                     a person is unable to perform a certain action his will is taken for the deed. Now sometimes an indulgence is to be gained
+                     by giving an alms, which a poor man is unable to do, though he would do so willingly. Therefore he can gain the indulgence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one man can make satisfaction for another. Now an indulgence is directed to the remission of punishment, just as
+                     satisfaction is. Therefore one man can gain an indulgence for another; and so a man can gain an indulgence without doing that
+                     for which the indulgence is given.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> If the cause is removed, the effect is removed. If therefore a person fails to do that for which an indulgence is granted,
+                     and which is the cause of the indulgence, he does not gain the indulgence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Failing the condition of a grant, no grant ensues. Hence, as an indulgence is granted on the condition that a person does
+                     or gives a certain thing, if he fails in this, he does not gain the indulgence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This is true of the essential reward, but not of certain accidental rewards, such as the remission of punishment and the
+                     like.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A person can by his intention apply his own action to whomever he lists, and so he can make satisfaction for whomever he
+                     chooses. On the other hand, an indulgence cannot be applied to someone, except in accordance with the intention of the grantor.
+                     Hence, since he applies it to the doer or giver of a particular action or thing, the doer cannot transfer this intention to
+                     another. If, however, the indulgence were expressed thus: "Whosoever does this, or
+                     for whomsoever this is done, shall gain so much indulgence," it would avail the person for whom it is done. Nor would the
+                     person who does this action, give the indulgence to another, but he who grants the indulgence in this form.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q27_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q28.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q27_A4-p0.1">Whether an indulgence avails the person who grants it?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an indulgence does not avail him who grants it. For the granting of an indulgence belongs to jurisdiction.
+                     Now no one can exercise jurisdiction on himself. thus no one can excommunicate himself. Therefore no one can participate in
+                     an indulgence granted by himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if this were possible, he who grants an indulgence might gain the remission of the punishment of all his sins for
+                     some small deed, so that he would sin with impunity, which seems senseless.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to grant indulgences and to excommunicate belong to the same power. Now a man cannot excommunicate himself. Therefore
+                     he cannot share in the indulgence of which he is the grantor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> He would be worse off than others if he could not make use of the Church's treasury which he dispenses to others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> An indulgence should be given for some reason, in order for anyone to be enticed by the indulgence to perform some action
+                     that conduces to the good of the Church and to the honor of God. Now the prelate to whom is committed the care of the Church's
+                     good and of the furthering of God's honor, does not need to entice himself thereto. Therefore he cannot grant an indulgence
+                     to himself alone; but he can avail himself of an indulgence that he grants for others,
+                     since it is based on a cause for granting it to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man cannot exercise an act of jurisdiction on himself, but a prelate can avail himself of those things which are granted
+                     to others by the authority of his jurisdiction, both in temporal and in spiritual matters: thus also a priest gives himself
+                     the Eucharist which he gives to others. And so a bishop too can apply to himself the suffrages of the Church which he dispenses
+                     to others, the immediate effect of which suffrages, and not of his jurisdiction,
+                     is the remission of punishment by means of indulgences.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p8"> The Reply to the Second Objection is clear from what had been said.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Excommunication is pronounced by way of sentence, which no man can pronounce on himself, for the reason that in the tribunal
+                     of justice the same man cannot be both judge and accused. On the other hand an indulgence is not given under the form of a
+                     sentence, but by way of dispensation, which a man can apply to himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q28.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q28" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q28-p0.1">OF THE SOLEMN RITE OF PENANCE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q28-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q28-p2"> We must now consider the solemn rite of Penance: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q28-p3"> (1) Whether a penance can be published or solemnized?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q28-p4"> (2) Whether a solemn penance can be repeated?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q28-p5"> (3) Whether public penance should be imposed on women?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q28_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q28.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q28_A1-p0.1">Whether a penance should be published or solemnized?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a penance should not be published or solemnized. Because it is not lawful for a priest, even through fear,
+                     to divulge anyone's sin, however notorious it may be. Now a sin is published by a solemn penance. Therefore a penance should
+                     not be solemnized.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the judgment should follow the nature of the tribunal. Now penance is a judgment pronounced in a secret tribunal.
+                     Therefore it should not be published or solemnized.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Every deficiency is made good by penance" as Ambrose [*Cf. Hypognost. iii, among the spurious works ascribed to
+                     St. Augustine] states. Now solemnization has a contrary effect, since it involves the penitent in many deficiencies: for a
+                     layman cannot be promoted to the ranks of the clergy nor can a cleric be promoted to higher orders, after doing solemn penance.
+                     Therefore Penance should not be solemnized.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Penance is a sacrament. Now some kind of solemnity is observed in every sacrament. Therefore there should be some solemnity
+                     in Penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p6"> Further, the medicine should suit the disease. Now a sin is sometimes public, and by its example draws many to sin. Therefore
+                     the penance which is its medicine should also be public and solemn so as to give edification to many.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some penances should be public and solemn for four reasons. First, so that a public sin may have a public remedy; secondly,
+                     because he who has committed a very grave crime deserves the greatest confusion even in this life; thirdly, in order that
+                     it may deter others; fourthly, that he may be an example of repentance, lest those should despair, who have committed grievous
+                     sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The priest does not divulge the confession by imposing such a penance, though people may suspect the penitent of having committed
+                     some great sin. For a man is not certainly taken to be guilty, because he is punished, since sometimes one does penance for
+                     another: thus we read in the Lives of the Fathers of a certain man who, in order to incite his companion to do penance, did
+                     penance together with him. And if the sin be public, the penitent, by
+                     fulfilling his penance, shows that he has been to confession.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A solemn penance, as to its imposition, does not go beyond the limits of a secret tribunal, since, just as the confession
+                     is made secretly, so the penance is imposed secretly. It is the execution of the penance, that goes beyond the limits of the
+                     secret tribunal: and there is nothing objectionable in this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although Penance cancels all deficiencies, by restoring man to his former state of grace, yet it does not always restore
+                     him to his former dignity. Hence women after doing penance for fornication are not given the veil, because they do not recover
+                     the honor of virginity. In like manner, after doing public penance, a sinner does not recover his former dignity so as to
+                     be eligible for the clerical state and a bishop who would ordain such a one ought to
+                     be deprived of the power of ordaining, unless perhaps the needs of the Church or custom require it. In that case such a one
+                     would be admitted to minor orders by way of exception, but not to the sacred orders. First, on account of the dignity of the
+                     latter; secondly, for fear of relapse; thirdly, in order to avoid the scandal which the people might take through recollection
+                     of his former sins; fourthly, because he would not have the face to correct others, by reason of the publicity of his own
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q28.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q28_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q28_A2-p0.1">Whether a solemn penance can be repeated?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a solemn penance can be repeated. For those sacraments which do not imprint a character, can be solemnized
+                     a second time, such as the Eucharist, Extreme Unction and the like. But Penance does not imprint a character, therefore it
+                     can be solemnized over again.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, penance is solemnized on account of the gravity and publicity of the sin. Now, after doing penance, a person may
+                     commit the same sins over again, or even more grievous sins. Therefore the solemn penance should be imposed again.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Solemn penance signifies the expulsion of the first man from paradise. Now this was done but once. Therefore solemn penance
+                     should be imposed once only.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Solemn penance ought not to be repeated, for three reasons. First, lest frequency bring it into contempt. Secondly, on account
+                     of its signification; for it signifies the expulsion of the first man from paradise, which happened only once; thirdly, because
+                     the solemnization indicates, in a way, that one makes profession of continual repentance. Wherefore repetition is inconsistent
+                     with solemnization. And if the sinner fall again, he is not precluded from doing
+                     penance, but a solemn penance should not be imposed on him again.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In those sacraments which are solemnized again and again, repetition is not inconsistent with solemnity, as it is in the
+                     present case. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although, if we consider his crime, he ought to do the same penance again, yet the repeated solemnization is not becoming,
+                     for the reasons stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q28_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q28_A3-p0.1">Whether solemn penance should be imposed on women and clerics, and whether any priest can impose it?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that solemn penance should not be imposed on women. Because, when this penance is imposed on a man, he has
+                     to cut his hair off. But this becomes not a woman, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q28_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:15.</a> Therefore she should not do solemn penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> It also seems that it ought to be imposed on clerics. For it is enjoined on account of a grievous crime. Now the same sin
+                     is more grievous in a cleric than in a layman. Therefore it ought to be imposed on a cleric more than on a layman.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> It also seems that it can be imposed by any priest. Because to absolve in the tribunal of Penance belongs to one who has
+                     the keys. Now an ordinary priest has the keys. Therefore he can administer this penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Every solemn penance is public, but not vice versa. For solemn penance is done as follows: "On the first day of Lent, these
+                     penitents clothed in sackcloth, with bare feet, their faces to the ground, and their hair shorn away, accompanied by their
+                     priests, present themselves to the bishop of the city at the door of the church. Having brought them into the church the bishop
+                     with all his clergy recites the seven penitential psalms, and then imposes his hand on
+                     them, sprinkles them with holy water, puts ashes on their heads, covers their shoulders with a hairshirt, and sorrowfully
+                     announces to them that as Adam was expelled from paradise, so are they expelled from the church. He then orders the ministers
+                     to put them out of the church, and the clergy follow reciting the responsory: 'In the sweat of thy brow,' etc. Every year
+                     on the day of our Lord's Supper they are brought back into the church by their priests, and there shall they be until the
+                     octave
+                     day of Easter, without however being admitted to Communion or to the kiss of peace. This shall be done every year as long
+                     as entrance into the church is forbidden them. The final reconciliation is reserved to the bishop, who alone can impose solemn
+                     penance" [*Cap. lxiv, dist. 50].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p6"> This penance can be imposed on men and women; but not on clerics, for fear of scandal. Nor ought such a penance to be imposed
+                     except for a crime which has disturbed the whole of the city.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p7"> On the other hand public but not solemn penance is that which is done in the presence of the Church, but without the foregoing
+                     solemnity, such as a pilgrimage throughout the world with a staff. A penance of this kind can be repeated, and can be imposed
+                     by a mere priest, even on a cleric. Sometimes however a solemn penance is taken to signify a public one: so that authorities
+                     speak of solemn penance in different senses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The woman's hair is a sign of her subjection, a man's is not. Hence it is not proper for a woman to put aside her hair when
+                     doing penance, as it is for a man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although in the same kind of sin, a cleric offends more grievously than a layman, yet a solemn penance is not imposed on
+                     him, lest his orders should be an object of contempt. Thus deference is given not to the person but to his orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Grave sins need great care in their cure. Hence the imposition of a solemn penance, which is only applied for the most grievous
+                     sins, is reserved to the bishop.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q29" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q29-p0.1">EXTREME UNCTION (QQ[29]-33)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q29-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q29-p2">OF EXTREME UNCTION, AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE AND INSTITUTION (NINE ARTICLES)</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q29-p3"> We must now consider the sacrament of Extreme Unction: in respect of which five points have to be considered: (1) Its essentials
+                  and institution; (2) Its effect; (3) Its minister; (4) on whom should it be conferred and in what parts; (5) Its repetition.
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q29-p4"> Under the first head there are nine points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q29-p5"> (1) Whether Extreme Unction is a sacrament?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q29-p6"> (2) Whether it is one sacrament?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q29-p7"> (3) Whether this sacrament was instituted by Christ?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q29-p8"> (4) Whether olive oil is a suitable matter for this sacrament?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q29-p9"> (5) Whether the oil ought to be consecrated?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q29-p10"> (6) Whether the matter of this sacrament should be consecrated by a bishop?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q29-p11"> (7) Whether this sacrament has any form?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q29-p12"> (8) Whether the form of this sacrament should take the shape of a deprecatory phrase?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q29-p13"> (9) Whether this is a suitable form for this sacrament?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q29_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q29_A1-p0.1">Whether Extreme Unction is a sacrament?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Extreme Unction is not a sacrament. For just as oil is used on sick people, so is it on catechumens. But
+                     anointing of catechumens with oil is not a sacrament. Therefore neither is the Extreme Unction of the sick with oil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. But there was no figure of Extreme
+                     Unction in the Old Law. Therefore it is not a sacrament of the New Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii, v) every sacrament aims at either cleansing, or enlightening, or perfecting.
+                     Now Extreme Unction does not aim at either cleansing, or enlightening, for this is ascribed to Baptism alone, or perfecting,
+                     for according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii), this belongs to Confirmation and the Eucharist. Therefore Extreme Unction is
+                     not a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The sacraments of the Church supply man's defects sufficiently with respect to every state of life. Now no other than Extreme
+                     Unction does this for those who are departing from this life. Therefore it is a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p6"> Further, the sacraments are neither more nor less than spiritual remedies. Now Extreme Unction is a spiritual remedy, since
+                     it avails for the remission of sins, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.15" target="asv"> James 5:15.</a> Therefore it is a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Among the visible operations of the Church, some are sacraments, as Baptism, some are sacramentals, as Exorcism. The difference
+                     between these is that a sacrament is an action of the Church that reaches to the principal effect intended in the administration
+                     of the sacraments, whereas a sacramental is an action which, though it does not reach to that effect, is nevertheless directed
+                     towards that principal action. Now the effect intended in the administration
+                     of the sacraments is the healing of the disease of sin: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.9" target="asv">Is. 27:9</a>): "This is all the fruit, that the sin . . . should be taken away." Since then Extreme Unction reaches to this effect, as
+                     is clear from the words of James, and is not ordained to any other sacrament as an accessory thereto, it is evident that Extreme
+                     Unction is not a sacramental but a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The oil with which catechumens are anointed does not convey the remission of sins to them by its unction, for that belongs
+                     to Baptism. It does, however, dispose them to receive Baptism, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q29_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q71_A3.html">TP, Q[71], A[3]</a>). Hence that unction is not a sacrament as Extreme Unction is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This sacrament prepares man for glory immediately, since it is given to those who are departing from this life. And as, under
+                     the Old Law, it was not yet time to enter into glory, because "the Law brought nobody [Vulg.: 'nothing'] to perfection" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.19" target="asv">Heb. 7:19</a>), so this sacrament had not to be foreshadowed therein by some corresponding sacrament, as by a figure of the same kind.
+                     Nevertheless it was somewhat foreshadowed remotely by
+                     all the healings related in the Old Testament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Dionysius makes no mention of Extreme Unction, as neither of Penance, nor of Matrimony, because he had no intention to decide
+                     any question about the sacraments, save in so far as they serve to illustrate the orderly disposition of the ecclesiastical
+                     hierarchy, as regards the ministers, their actions, and the recipients. Nevertheless since Extreme Unction confers grace and
+                     remission of sins, there is no doubt that it possesses an enlightening and
+                     cleansing power, even as Baptism, though not so copious.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q29_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q29_A2-p0.1">Whether Extreme Unction is one sacrament?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Extreme Unction is not one sacrament. Because the oneness of a thing depends on its matter and form, since
+                     being and oneness are derived from the same source. Now the form of this sacrament is said several times during the one administration,
+                     and the matter is applied to the person anointed in respect of various parts of his body. Therefore it is not one sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the unction itself is a sacrament, for it would be absurd to say that the oil is a sacrament. But there are several
+                     unctions. Therefore there are several sacraments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one sacrament should be performed by one minister. But the case might occur that Extreme Unction could not be conferred
+                     by one minister: thus if the priest die after the first unction, another priest would have to proceed with the others. Therefore
+                     Extreme Unction is not one sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> As immersion is in relation to Baptism, so is unction to this sacrament. But several immersions are but one sacrament of
+                     Baptism. Therefore the several unctions in Extreme Unction are also one sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p6"> Further, if it were not one sacrament, then after the first unction, it would not be essential for the perfection of the
+                     sacrament that the second unction should be performed, since each sacrament has perfect being of itself. But that is not true.
+                     Therefore it is one sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Strictly speaking, a thing is one numerically in three ways. First, as something indivisible, which is neither actually nor
+                     potentially several---as a point, and unity. Secondly, as something continuous, which is actually one, but potentially several---as
+                     a line. Thirdly, as something complete, that is composed of several parts---as a house, which is, in a way, several things,
+                     even actually, although those several things go together towards making one. In
+                     this way each sacrament is said to be one thing, in as much as the many things which are contained in one sacrament, are united
+                     together for the purpose of signifying or causing one thing, because a sacrament is a sign of the effect it produces. Hence
+                     when one action suffices for a perfect signification, the unity of the sacrament consists in that action only, as may be seen
+                     in Confirmation. When, however, the signification of the sacrament can be both in one and in several actions, then the
+                     sacrament can be complete both in one and in several actions, even as Baptism in one immersion and in three, since washing
+                     which is signified in Baptism, can be completed by one immersion and by several. But when the perfect signification cannot
+                     be expressed except by means of several actions, then these several actions are essential for the perfection of the sacrament,
+                     as is exemplified in the Eucharist, for the refreshment of the body which signifies that of the soul, can only be attained
+                     by
+                     means of meat and drink. It is the same in this sacrament, because the healing of the internal wounds cannot be perfectly
+                     signified save by the application of the remedy to the various sources of the wounds. Hence several actions are essential
+                     to the perfection of this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The unity of a complete whole is not destroyed by reason of a diversity of matter or form in the parts of that whole. Thus
+                     it is evident that there is neither the same matter nor the same form in the flesh and in the bones of which one man is composed.
+                     In like manner too, in the sacrament of the Eucharist, and in this sacrament, the diversity of matter and form does not destroy
+                     the unity of the sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although those actions are several simply, yet they are united together in one complete action, viz. the anointing of all
+                     the external senses, whence arises the infernal malady.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although, in the Eucharist, if the priest die after the consecration of the bread, another priest can go on with the consecration
+                     of the wine, beginning where the other left off, or can begin over again with fresh matter, in Extreme Unction he cannot begin
+                     over again, but should always go on, because to anoint the same part a second time would produce as much effect as if one
+                     were to consecrate a host a second time, which ought by no means to be done.
+                     Nor does the plurality of ministers destroy the unity of this sacrament, because they only act as instruments, and the unity
+                     of a smith's work is not destroyed by his using several hammers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q29_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q29_A3-p0.1">Whether this sacrament was instituted by Christ?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament was not instituted by Christ. For mention is made in the Gospel of the institution of those
+                     sacraments which Christ instituted, for instance the Eucharist and Baptism. But no mention is made of Extreme Unction. Therefore
+                     it was not instituted by Christ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master says explicitly (Sent. iv, D, 23) that it was instituted by the apostles. Therefore Christ did not institute
+                     it Himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Christ showed forth the sacraments which He instituted, as in the case of the Eucharist and Baptism. But He did
+                     not bestow this sacrament on anyone. Therefore He did not institute it Himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The sacraments of the New Law are more excellent than those of the Old Law. But all the sacraments of the Old Law were instituted
+                     by God. Therefore much more do all the sacraments of the New Law owe their institution to Christ Himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p6"> Further, to make an institution and to remove it belongs to the same authority. Now the Church, who enjoys the same authority
+                     in the successors of the apostles, as the apostles themselves possessed, cannot do away with the sacrament of Extreme Unction.
+                     Therefore the apostles did not institute it, but Christ Himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There are two opinions on this point. For some hold that this sacrament and Confirmation were not instituted by Christ Himself,
+                     but were left by Him to be instituted by the apostles; for the reason that these two sacraments, on account of the plenitude
+                     of grace conferred in them, could not be instituted before the mission of the Holy Ghost in perfect plenitude. Hence they
+                     are sacraments of the New Law in such a way as not to be foreshadowed in the Old Law.
+                     But this argument is not very cogent, since, just as Christ, before His Passion, promised the mission of the Holy Ghost in
+                     His plenitude, so could He institute these sacraments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p8"> Wherefore others hold that Christ Himself instituted all the sacraments, but that He Himself published some, which present
+                     greater difficulty to our belief, while he reserved some to be published by the apostles, such as Extreme Unction and Confirmation.
+                     This opinion seems so much the more probable, as the sacraments belong to the foundation of the Law, wherefore their institution
+                     pertains to the lawgiver; besides, they derive their efficacy from their institution, which
+                     efficacy is given them by God alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord did and said many things which are not related in the Gospel. For the evangelists were intent on handing down chiefly
+                     those things that were necessary for salvation or concerned the building of the ecclesiastical edifice. Hence they related
+                     the institution by Christ of Baptism, Penance, the Eucharist and orders, rather than of Extreme Unction and Confirmation,
+                     which are not necessary for salvation, nor do they concern the building or division
+                     of the Church. As a matter of fact however an anointing done by the apostles is mentioned in the Gospel (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.6.13" target="asv">Mk. 6:13</a>) where it is said that they "anointed the sick with oil."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Master says it was instituted by the apostles because its institution was made known to us by the teaching of the apostles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ did not show forth any sacrament except such as He received by way of example: but He could not be a recipient of
+                     Penance and Extreme Unction, since there was no sin in Him: hence He did not show them forth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q29_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q29_A4-p0.1">Whether olive oil is a suitable matter for this sacrament?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that olive oil is not a suitable matter for this sacrament. For this sacrament is ordained immediately to the
+                     state of incorruption. Now incorruption is signified by balsam which is contained in chrism. Therefore chrism would be a more
+                     suitable matter for this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, this sacrament is a spiritual healing. Now spiritual healing is signified by the use of wine, as may be gathered
+                     from the parable of the wounded man (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.34" target="asv">Lk. 10:34</a>). Therefore wine also would be more suitable a matter for this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where there is the greater danger, the remedy should be a common one. But olive oil is not a common remedy, since
+                     the olive is not found in every country. Therefore, since this sacrament is given to the dying, who are in the greatest danger,
+                     it seems that olive oil is not a suitable matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> oil is appointed (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.14" target="asv">James 5:14</a>) as the matter of this sacrament. Now, properly speaking, oil is none but olive oil. Therefore this is the matter of this
+                     sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p6"> Further, spiritual healing is signified by anointing with oil, as is evident from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.1.6" target="asv"> Is. 1:6 </a>where we read: " . . . swelling sores: they are not . . . dressed nor fomented with oil." Therefore the suitable matter for
+                     this sacrament is oil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The spiritual healing, which is given at the end of life, ought to be complete, since there is no other to follow; it ought
+                     also to be gentle, lest hope, of which the dying stand in utmost need, be shattered rather than fostered. Now oil has a softening
+                     effect, it penetrates to the very heart of a thing, and spreads over it. Hence, in both the foregoing respects, it is a suitable
+                     matter for this sacrament. And since oil is, above all, the name of the liquid
+                     extract of olives, for other liquids are only called oil from their likeness to it, it follows that olive oil is the matter
+                     which should be employed in this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The incorruption of glory is something not contained in this sacrament: and there is no need for the matter to signify such
+                     a thing. Hence it is not necessary for balsam to be included in the matter of this sacrament, because on account of its fragrance
+                     it is indicative of a good name, which is no longer necessary, for its own sake, to those who are dying; they need only a
+                     clear conscience which is signified by oil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wine heals by its roughness, oil by its softness, wherefore healing with wine pertains to Penance rather than to this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though olive oil is not produced everywhere, yet it can easily be transported from one place to another. Moreover this sacrament
+                     is not so necessary that the dying cannot obtain salvation without it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q29_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q29_A5-p0.1">Whether the oil ought to be consecrated?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the oil need not be consecrated. Because there is a sanctification in the use of this sacrament, through
+                     the form of words. Therefore another sanctification is superfluous if it be applied to the matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the efficacy and signification of the sacraments are in their very matter. But the signification of the effect of
+                     this sacrament, is suitable to oil on account of its natural properties, and the efficacy thereof is due to the Divine institution.
+                     Therefore its matter does not need to be sanctified.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Baptism is a more perfect sacrament than Extreme Unction. But, so far as the essentials of the sacrament are concerned,
+                     the baptismal matter needs no sanctification. Neither therefore does the matter of Extreme Unction need to be sanctified.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> In all other anointings the matter is previously consecrated. Therefore since this sacrament is an anointing, it requires
+                     consecrated matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some hold that mere oil is the matter of this sacrament, and that the sacrament itself is perfected in the consecration of
+                     the oil by the bishop. But this is clearly false since we proved when treating of the Eucharist that that sacrament alone
+                     consists in the consecration of the matter (
+                     <a id="XP_Q29_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q2_A1.html">Q[2], A[1]</a>, ad 2).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p7"> We must therefore say that this sacrament consists in the anointing itself, just as Baptism consists in the washing, and
+                     that the matter of this sacrament is consecrated oil. Three reasons may be assigned why consecrated matter is needed in this
+                     sacrament and in certain others. The first is that all sacramental efficacy is derived from Christ: wherefore those sacraments
+                     which He Himself used, derived their efficacy from His use of them, even as, by the contact of His flesh, He
+                     bestowed the force of regeneration on the waters. But He did not use this sacrament, nor any bodily anointing, wherefore in
+                     all anointings a consecrated matter is required. The second reason is that this sacrament confers a plenitude of grace, so
+                     as to take away not only sin but also the remnants of sin, and bodily sickness. The third reason is that its effect on the
+                     body, viz. bodily health, is not caused by a natural property of the matter. wherefore it has to derive this efficacy from
+                     being
+                     consecrated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first consecration sanctifies the matter in itself, but the second regards rather the use of the matter considered as
+                     actually producing its effect. Hence neither is superfluous, because instruments also receive their efficacy from the craftsman,
+                     both when they are made, and when they are used for action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The efficacy which the sacrament derives from its institution, is applied to this particular matter when it is consecrated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p10"> The Reply to the Third Objection is gathered from what has been said.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q29_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q29_A6-p0.1">Whether the matter of this sacrament need be consecrated by a bishop?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the matter of this sacrament need not be consecrated by a bishop. Because the consecration of the Eucharistic
+                     elements surpasses that of the matter in this sacrament. But a priest can consecrate the matter in the Eucharist. Therefore
+                     he can do so in this sacrament also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in material works the higher art never prepares the matter for the lower, because the art which applies the matter
+                     is more excellent than that which prepares it, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 25. Now a bishop is above a priest. Therefore
+                     he does not prepare the matter of a sacrament which is applied by a priest. But a priest dispenses this sacrament, as we shall
+                     state further on (
+                     <a id="XP_Q29_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q31.html">Q[31])</a>. Therefore the consecration of the matter
+                     does not belong to a bishop.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> In other anointings also the matter is consecrated by a bishop. Therefore the same applies to this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The minister of a sacrament produces the effect, not by his own power, as though he were the principal agent, but by the
+                     efficacy of the sacrament which he dispenses. This efficacy comes, in the first place, from Christ, and from Him flows down
+                     to others in due order, viz. to the people through the medium of the ministers who dispense the sacraments, and to the lower
+                     ministers through the medium of the higher ministers who sanctify the matter. Wherefore, in
+                     all the sacraments which require a sanctified matter, the first consecration of the matter is performed by a bishop, and the
+                     application thereof sometimes by a priest, in order to show that the priest's power is derived from the bishop's, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.132.2" target="asv"> Ps. 132:2</a>: "Like the precious ointment on the head," i.e. Christ, "that ran down upon the beard of Aaron" first, and then "to the skirt
+                     of his garment."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sacrament of the Eucharist consists in the consecration of the matter and not in its use. Consequently, strictly speaking,
+                     that which is the matter of the sacrament is not a consecrated thing. Hence no consecration of the matter by a bishop is required
+                     beforehand: but the altar and such like things, even the priest himself, need to be consecrated, all of which can be done
+                     by none but a bishop: so that in this sacrament also, the priest's power is
+                     shown to be derived from the bishop's, as Dionysius observes (Eccl. Hier. iii). The reason why a priest can perform that consecration
+                     of matter which is a sacrament by itself, and not that which, as a sacramental, is directed to a sacrament consisting in something
+                     used by the faithful, is that in respect of Christ's true body no order is above the priesthood, whereas, in respect of Christ's
+                     mystic body the episcopate is above the priesthood, as we shall state further on (
+                     <a id="XP_Q29_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q40_A4.html">Q[40], A[4]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sacramental matter is not one that is made into something else by him that uses it, as occurs in the mechanical arts:
+                     it is one, in virtue of which something is done, so that it partakes somewhat of the nature of an efficient cause, in so far
+                     as it is the instrument of a Divine operation. Hence the matter needs to acquire this virtue from a higher art or power, since
+                     among efficient causes, the more prior the cause the more perfect it is, whereas
+                     in material causes, the more prior the matter, the more imperfect it is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q29_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q29_A7-p0.1">Whether this sacrament has a form?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament has no form. Because, since the efficacy of the sacraments is derived from their institution,
+                     as also from their form, the latter must needs be appointed by the institutor of the sacrament. But there is no account of
+                     the form of this sacrament being instituted either by Christ or by the apostles. Therefore this sacrament has no form.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is essential to a sacrament is observed everywhere in the same way. Now nothing is so essential to a sacrament
+                     that has a form, as that very form. Therefore, as in this sacrament there is no form commonly used by all, since various words
+                     are in use, it seems that this sacrament has no form.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in Baptism no form is needed except for the sanctification of the matter, because the water is "sanctified by the
+                     word of life so as to wash sin away," as Hugh states (De Sacram. ii). Now the matter of this sacrament is already consecrated.
+                     Therefore it needs no form of words.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Master says (Sent. iv, D, 1) that every sacrament of the New Law consists in things and words. Now the words are the
+                     sacramental form. Therefore, since this is a sacrament of the New Law, it seems that it has a form.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p6"> Further, this is confirmed by the rite of the Universal Church, who uses certain words in the bestowal of this sacrament.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that no farm is essential to this sacrament. This, however, seems derogatory to the effect of this sacrament,
+                     since every sacrament signifies its effect. Now the matter is indifferent as regards its effect, and consequently cannot be
+                     determined to any particular effect save by the form of words. Hence in all the sacraments of the New Law, since they effect
+                     what they signify, there must needs be things and words. Moreover James (5:14,15) seems
+                     to ascribe the whole force of this sacrament to prayer, which is the form thereof, as we shall state further on (ad 2: AA[8],9).
+                     Wherefore the foregoing opinion seems presumptuous and erroneous; and for that reason we should hold with the common opinion
+                     that this, like all the other sacraments, has a fixed form.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Holy Writ is proposed to all alike: and so, the form of Baptism, which can be conferred by all, should be expressed in Holy
+                     Writ, as also the form of the Eucharist, which in regard to that sacrament, expresses faith which is necessary for salvation.
+                     Now the forms of the other sacraments are not contained in Holy Writ, but were handed down to the Church by the apostles,
+                     who received them from our Lord, as the Apostle declares (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.23" target="asv">1 Cor.
+                        11:23
+                     </a>): "For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered to you," etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The words which are essential to the form, viz. the prayer of deprecation, are said by all; but other words which pertain
+                     to the well-being thereof, are not said by all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The matter of Baptism has a certain sanctification of its own from the very contact of our Saviour's flesh; but the form
+                     of words sanctifies it so that it has a sanctifying force. In like manner when the matter of this sacrament has been sanctified
+                     in itself, it requires sanctification in its use, so that it may sanctify actually.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q29_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q29_A8-p0.1">Whether the form of this sacrament should be expressed by way of assertion or of petition?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the form of this sacrament should be expressed by way of assertion rather than of petition. Because all
+                     the sacraments of the New Law have a sure effect. But sureness of effect is not expressed in the sacramental forms except
+                     by way of assertion, as when we say: "This is My body" or "I baptize thee." Therefore the form of this sacrament should be
+                     expressed as an assertion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intention of the minister should be expressed in the sacramental forms because it is essential to the sacrament.
+                     But the intention of conferring a sacrament is not expressed except by an assertion. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in some churches the following words are said in the conferring of this sacrament: "I anoint these eyes with consecrated
+                     oil in the name of the Father," etc., which is in keeping with the forms of the other sacraments. Therefore it seems that
+                     such is the form of this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The form of a sacrament must needs be one that is observed everywhere. Now the words employed according to the custom of
+                     all the churches are not those quoted above, but take the form of a petition viz.: "Through this holy unction, and His most
+                     tender mercy, may the Lord pardon thee whatever sins thou hast committed, by sight," etc. Therefore the form of this sacrament
+                     is expressed as a petition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p6"> Further, this seems to follow from the words of James, who ascribes the effect of this sacrament to prayer: "The prayer of
+                     faith," says he (5:15), "shall save the sick man." Since then a sacrament takes its efficacy from its form, it seems that
+                     the form of this sacrament is expressed as a petition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The form of this sacrament is expressed by way of a petition, as appears from the words of James, and from the custom of
+                     the Roman Church, who uses no other than words of supplication in conferring this sacrament. Several reasons are assigned
+                     for this: first, because the recipient of this sacrament is deprived of his strength, so that he needs to be helped by prayers;
+                     secondly, because it is given to the dying, who are on the point of quitting the courts of
+                     the Church, and rest in the hands of God alone, for which reason they are committed to Him by prayer; thirdly, because the
+                     effect of this sacrament is not such that it always results from the minister's prayer, even when all essentials have been
+                     duly observed, as is the case with the character in Baptism and Confirmation, transubstantiation in the Eucharist, remission
+                     of sin in Penance (given contrition) which remission is essential to the sacrament of Penance but not to this sacrament.
+                     Consequently the form of this sacrament cannot be expressed in the indicative mood, as in the sacraments just mentioned.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This sacrament, like the others mentioned, considered in itself, is sure of its effect. yet this effect can be hindered through
+                     the insincerity of the recipient (though by his intention he submit to the sacrament), so that he receives no effect at all.
+                     Hence there is no parity between this sacrament, and the others wherein some effect always ensues.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intention is sufficiently expressed by the act which is mentioned in the form, viz.: "By this holy unction."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These words in the indicative mood, which some are wont to say before the prayer, are not the sacramental form, but are a
+                     preparation for the form, in so far as they determine the intention of the minister.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q29_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q30.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q29_A9-p0.1">Whether the foregoing prayer is a suitable form for this sacrament?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the foregoing prayer is not a suitable form for this sacrament. For in the forms of the other sacraments
+                     mention is made of the matter, for instance in Confirmation, whereas this is not done in the aforesaid words. Therefore it
+                     is not a suitable form.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the effect of this sacrament is bestowed on us by the mercy of God, so are the effects of the other sacraments.
+                     But mention is made in the forms of the other sacraments, not of the Divine mercy, but rather of the Trinity and of the Passion.
+                     Therefore the same should be done here.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this sacrament is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 23) to have a twofold effect. But in the foregoing words mention
+                     is made of only one effect, viz. the remission of sins, and not of the healing of the body to which end James directs the
+                     prayer of faith to be made (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A9-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.15" target="asv">James 5:15</a>): "The prayer of faith shall save the sick man." Therefore the above form is unsuitable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The prayer given above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q29_A9-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q29_A8.html">(A[8])</a> is a suitable form for this sacrament, for it includes the sacrament by the words: "By this holy unction," and that which
+                     works in the sacrament, viz. "the mercy of God," and the effect, viz. "remission of sins."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The matter of this sacrament may be understood in the act of anointing, whereas the matter of Confirmation cannot be implied
+                     by the act expressed in the form. Hence there is no parity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of mercy is misery: and because this sacrament is given when we are in a state of misery, i.e. of sickness, mention
+                     of mercy is made in this rather than in other sacraments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The form should contain mention of the principal effect, and of that which always ensues in virtue of the sacrament, unless
+                     there be something lacking on the part of the recipient. Now bodily health is not an effect of this kind, as we shall state
+                     further on (
+                     <a id="XP_Q29_A9-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q30_A1.html">Q[30], AA[1]</a> ,2), though it does ensue at times, for which reason James ascribes this effect to the prayer which is the form of this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q30.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q30" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A9.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q30-p0.1">OF THE EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q30-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q30-p2"> We must now consider the effect of this sacrament: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q30-p3"> (1) Whether Extreme Unction avails for the remission of sins?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q30-p4"> (2) Whether bodily health is an effect of this sacrament?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q30-p5"> (3) Whether this sacrament imprints a character?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q30_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q30.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q30_A1-p0.1">Whether Extreme Unction avails for the remission of sins?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Extreme Unction does not avail for the remission of sins. For when a thing can be attained by one means,
+                     no other is needed. Now repentance is required in the recipient of Extreme Unction for the remission of his sins. Therefore
+                     sins are not remitted by Extreme Unction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there are no more than three things in sin, the stain, the debt of punishment, and the remnants of sin. Now Extreme
+                     Unction does not remit the stain without contrition, and this remits sin even without Unction; nor does it remit the punishment,
+                     for if the recipient recover, he is still bound to fulfill the satisfaction enjoined; nor does it take away the remnants of
+                     sin, since the dispositions remaining from preceding acts still remain, as may easily
+                     be seen after recovery. Therefore remission of sins is by no means the effect of Extreme Unction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, remission of sins takes place, not successively, but instantaneously. On the other hand, Extreme Unction is not
+                     done all at once, since several anointings are required. Therefore the remission of sins is not its effect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q30_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.15" target="asv">James 5:15</a>): "If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p6"> Further, every sacrament of the New Law confers grace. Now grace effects the forgiveness of sins. Therefore since Extreme
+                     Unction is a sacrament of the New Law, its effect is the remission of sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Each sacrament was instituted for the purpose of one principal effect, though it may, in consequence, produce other effects
+                     besides. And since a sacrament causes what it signifies, the principal effect of a sacrament must be gathered from its signification.
+                     Now this sacrament is conferred by way of a kind of medicament, even as Baptism is conferred by way of washing, and the purpose
+                     of a medicament is to expel sickness. Hence the chief object of the
+                     institution of this sacrament is to cure the sickness of sin. Therefore, just as Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, and
+                     Penance, a spiritual resurrection, so Extreme Unction is a spiritual healing or cure. Now just as a bodily cure presupposes
+                     bodily life in the one who is cured, so does a spiritual cure presuppose spiritual life. Hence this sacrament is not an antidote
+                     to those defects which deprive man of spiritual life, namely. original and mortal sin, but is a remedy for such defects as
+                     weaken man spiritually, so as to deprive him of perfect vigor for acts of the life of grace or of glory; which defects consist
+                     in nothing else but a certain weakness and unfitness, the result in us of actual or original sin. against which weakness man
+                     is strengthened by this sacrament. Since, however, this strength is given by grace, which is incompatible with sin, it follows
+                     that. in consequence, if it finds any sin, either mortal or venial, it removes it as far as the guilt is concerned,
+                     provided there be no obstacle on the part of the recipient; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the Eucharist
+                     and Confirmation (
+                     <a id="XP_Q30_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q73_A7.html">TP, Q[73], A[7]</a>; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q30_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q79_A3.html">TP, Q[79], A[3]</a>). Hence, too, James speaks of the remission of sin as being conditional, for he says: "If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven
+                     him," viz. as to the guilt. Because it does not always blot out sin, since it does not always find any: but it always remits
+                     in respect of the
+                     aforesaid weakness which some call the remnants of sin. Some, however, maintain that it is instituted chiefly as a remedy
+                     for venial sin which cannot be cured perfectly in this lifetime: for which reason the sacrament of the dying is ordained specially
+                     against venial sin. But this does not seem to be true, since Penance also blots out venial sins sufficiently during this life
+                     as to their guilt, and that we cannot avoid them after doing penance, does not cancel the effect of the previous
+                     penance; moreover this is part of the weakness mentioned above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p8"> Consequently we must say that the principal effect of this sacrament is the remission of sin, as to its remnants, and, consequently,
+                     even as to its guilt, if it find it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the principal effect of a sacrament can be obtained without actually receiving that sacrament (either without any
+                     sacrament at all, or indirectly by means of some other sacrament), yet it never can be obtained without the purpose of receiving
+                     that sacrament. And so, since Penance was instituted chiefly against actual sin, whichever other sacrament may blot out sin
+                     indirectly, it does not exclude the necessity of Penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Extreme Unction remits sin in some way as to those three things. For, although the stain of sin is not washed out without
+                     contrition, yet this sacrament, by the grace which it bestows, makes the movement of the free will towards sin to be one of
+                     contrition, just as may occur in the Eucharist and Confirmation. Again it diminishes the debt of temporal punishment; and
+                     this indirectly, in as much as it takes away weakness, for a strong man bears the same
+                     punishment more easily than a weak man. Hence it does not follow that the measure of satisfaction is diminished. As to the
+                     remnants of sin, they do not mean here those dispositions which result from acts, and are inchoate habits so to speak, but
+                     a certain spiritual debility in the mind, which debility being removed, though such like habits or dispositions remain, the
+                     mind is not so easily prone to sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When many actions are ordained to one effect, the last is formal with respect to all the others that precede, and acts by
+                     virtue of them: wherefore by the last anointing is infused grace which gives the sacrament its effect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q30.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q30_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q30_A2-p0.1">Whether bodily health is an effect of this sacrament?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that bodily health is not an effect of this sacrament. For every sacrament is a spiritual remedy. Now a spiritual
+                     remedy is ordained to spiritual health, just as a bodily remedy is ordained to health of the body. Therefore bodily health
+                     is not an effect of this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sacraments always produce their effect in those who approach them in the proper dispositions. Now sometimes
+                     the recipient of this sacrament does not receive bodily health, no matter how devoutly he receives it. Therefore bodily health
+                     is not its effect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the efficacy of this sacrament is notified to us in the fifth chapter of James. Now healing is ascribed there as
+                     the effect, not of the anointing, but of the prayer, for he says: "The prayer of faith shall save the sick man." Therefore
+                     bodily healing is not an effect of this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The operation of the Church is more efficacious since Christ's Passion than before. Now, before the Passion, those whom the
+                     apostles anointed with oil were healed (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q30_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.6.13" target="asv">Mk. 6:13</a>). Therefore unction has its effect now in healing bodies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p6"> Further, the sacraments produce their effect by signifying it. Now Baptism signifies and effects a spiritual washing, through
+                     the bodily washing in which it consists outwardly. Therefore Extreme Unction signifies and causes a spiritual healing through
+                     the bodily healing which it effects externally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as Baptism causes a spiritual cleansing from spiritual stains by means of a bodily washing, so this sacrament causes
+                     an inward healing by means of an outward sacramental healing: and even as the baptismal washing has the effect of a bodily
+                     washing, since it effects even a bodily cleansing, so too, Extreme Unction has the effect of a bodily remedy, namely a healing
+                     of the body. But there is a difference, for as much as the bodily washing causes a bodily
+                     cleansing by a natural property of the bodily element, and consequently always causes it, whereas Extreme Unction causes a
+                     bodily healing, not by a natural property of the matter, but by the Divine power which works reasonably. And since reasonable
+                     working never produces a secondary effect, except in so far as it is required for the principal effect, it follows that a
+                     bodily healing does not always ensue from this sacrament, but only when it is requisite for the spiritual healing: and then
+                     it
+                     produces it always, provided there be no obstacle on the part of the recipient.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection proves that bodily health is not the principal effect of this sacrament: and this is true.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p9"> The Reply to the Second Objection is clear from what has been said above (cf.
+                     <a id="XP_Q30_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q29_A8.html"> Q[29], A[8]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This prayer is the form of this sacrament as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q30_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q29_A8.html">Q[29], AA[8]</a>,9). Hence, so far as its form is concerned, this sacrament derives from it its efficacy in healing the body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q30_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q31.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q30_A3-p0.1">Whether this sacrament imprints a character?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament imprints a character. For a character is a distinctive sign. Now just as one who is baptized
+                     is distinguished from one who is not so is one who is anointed, from one who is not. Therefore, just as Baptism imprints a
+                     character so does Extreme Unction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is an anointing in the sacraments or order and Confirmation, as there is in this sacrament. But a character
+                     is imprinted in those sacraments. Therefore a character is imprinted in this one also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sacrament contains something that is a reality only, something that is a sacrament only, and something that
+                     is both reality and sacrament. Now nothing in this sacrament can be assigned as both reality and sacrament except a character.
+                     Therefore in this sacrament also, a character is imprinted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No sacrament that imprints a character is repeated. But this sacrament is repeated as we shall state further on (
+                     <a id="XP_Q30_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q33.html">Q[33])</a>. Therefore it does not imprint a character.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p6"> Further, a sacramental character causes a distinction among those who are in the present Church. But Extreme Unction is given
+                     to one who is departing from the present Church. Therefore it does not imprint a character.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A character is not imprinted except in those sacraments whereby man is deputed to some sacred duty. Now this sacrament is
+                     for no other purpose than a remedy, and man is not deputed thereby to do or receive anything holy. Therefore it does not imprint
+                     a character.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A character marks a distinction of . states with regard to duties which have to be performed in the Church, a distinction
+                     which a man does not receive by being anointed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The unction of orders and Confirmation, is the unction of consecration whereby a man is deputed to some sacred duty, whereas
+                     this unction is remedial. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In this sacrament, that which is both reality and sacrament is not a character, but a certain inward devotion which is a
+                     kind of spiritual anointing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q31.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A9.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q31" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q31-p0.1">OF THE MINISTER OF THIS SACRAMENT (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q31-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q31-p2"> We must now consider the minister of this sacrament: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q31-p3"> (1) Whether a layman can confer this sacrament?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q31-p4"> (2) Whether a deacon can?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q31-p5"> (3) Whether none but a bishop can confer it?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q31_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q31.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q31_A1-p0.1">Whether a layman can confer this sacrament?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that even a layman can confer this sacrament. For this sacrament derives its efficacy from prayer, as James
+                     declares (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q31_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.15" target="asv">James 5:15</a>). But a layman's prayer is sometimes as acceptable to God as a priest's. Therefore he can confer this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we read of certain fathers in Egypt that they sent the oil to the sick, and that these were healed. It is also related
+                     of the Blessed Genevieve that she anointed the sick with oil. Therefore this sacrament can be conferred even by lay people.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Remission of sins is given in this sacrament. But laymen have not the power to forgive sins. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) there are some who exercise hierarchical actions, and some who are recipients only.
+                     Hence laymen are officially incompetent to dispense any sacrament: and that they can baptize in cases of necessity, is due
+                     to the Divine dispensation, in order that no one may be deprived of spiritual regeneration.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This prayer is not said by the priest in his own person, for since sometimes he is in sin, he would not in that case be heard.
+                     But it is said in the person of the whole Church, in whose person he can pray as a public official, whereas a layman cannot,
+                     for he is a private individual.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These unctions were not sacramental. It was due to the devotion of the recipients of the unction, and to the merits of those
+                     who anointed them that they procured the effects of bodily health, through the "grace of healing" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q31_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:9</a>) but not through sacramental grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q31.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q31_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q31_A2-p0.1">Whether deacons can confer this sacrament?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that deacons can confer this sacrament. For, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) "deacons have the power
+                     to cleanse." Now this sacrament was instituted precisely to cleanse from sickness of the mind and body. Therefore deacons
+                     also can confer it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Baptism is a more excellent sacrament than the one of which we are speaking. But deacons can baptize, as instanced
+                     by the Blessed Laurence. Therefore they can confer this sacrament also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q31_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.14" target="asv">James 5:14</a>): "Let him bring in the priests of the Church."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A deacon has the power to cleanse but not to enlighten. Hence, since enlightenment is an effect of grace, no sacrament whereby
+                     grace is conferred can be given by a deacon in virtue of his office: and so he cannot confer this sacrament, since grace is
+                     bestowed therein.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This sacrament cleanses by enlightening through the bestowal of grace: wherefore a deacon is not competent to confer it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This is not a necessary sacrament, as Baptism is. Hence its bestowal is not committed to all in cases of necessity, but only
+                     to those who are competent to do so in virtue of their office. Nor are deacons competent to baptize in virtue of their office.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q31_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q31_A3-p0.1">Whether none but a bishop can confer this sacrament?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that none but a bishop can confer this sacrament. For this sacrament consists in an anointing, just as Confirmation
+                     does. Now none but a bishop can confirm. Therefore only a bishop can confer this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who cannot do what is less cannot do what is greater. Now the use of consecrated matter surpasses the act of
+                     consecrating the matter, since the former is the end of the latter. Therefore since a priest cannot consecrate the matter,
+                     neither can he use the matter after it has been consecrated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The minister of this sacrament has to be brought in to the recipient, as is clear from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q31_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.14" target="asv"> James 5:14.</a> Now a bishop cannot go to all the sick people of his diocese. Therefore the bishop is not the only one who can confer this
+                     sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), the office of perfecting belongs to a bishop, just as it belongs to a priest to enlighten.
+                     Wherefore those sacraments are reserved to a bishop's dispensation, which place the recipient in a state of perfection above
+                     others. But this is not the case with this sacrament, for it is given to all. Consequently it can be given by ordinary priests.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Confirmation imprints a character, whereby man is placed in a state of perfection, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q31_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q63_A1.html">TP, Q[63], AA[1]</a>, 2,6). But this does not take place in this sacrament; hence there is no comparison.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the use of consecrated matter is of more importance than the consecration of the matter, from the point of view
+                     of the final cause; nevertheless, from the point of view of efficient cause, the consecration of the matter is the more important,
+                     since the use of the matter is dependent thereon, as on its active cause: hence the consecration of the matter demands a higher
+                     power than the use of the matter does.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q32" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q32-p0.1">ON WHOM SHOULD THIS SACRAMENT BE CONFERRED AND ON WHAT PART OF THE BODY? (SEVEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q32-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q32-p2"> We must now consider on whom this sacrament should be conferred and on what part of the body: under which head there are
+                  seven points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q32-p3"> (1) Whether this sacrament should be conferred on those who are in good health?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q32-p4"> (2) Whether it should be conferred in any kind of sickness?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q32-p5"> (3) Whether it should be conferred on madmen and imbeciles?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q32-p6"> (4) Whether it should be given to children?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q32-p7"> (5) Whether, in this sacrament, the whole body should be anointed?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q32-p8"> (6) Whether certain parts are suitably assigned to be anointed?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q32-p9"> (7) Whether those who are deformed in the above parts ought to be anointed thereon?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q32_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q32_A1-p0.1">Whether this sacrament ought to be conferred on those who are in good health?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament should be conferred even on those who are in good health. For the healing of the mind is
+                     a more important effect of this sacrament than the healing of the body, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q32_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q30_A2.html">Q[30], A[2]</a>). Now even those who are healthy in body need to be healed in mind. Therefore this sacrament should be conferred on them
+                     also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, this is the sacrament of those who are departing this life, just as Baptism is the sacrament of those who are entering
+                     this life. Now Baptism is given to all who enter. Therefore this sacrament should be given to all who are departing. But sometimes
+                     those who are near departure are in good health, for instance those who are to be beheaded. Therefore this sacrament should
+                     be conferred on them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q32_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.14" target="asv">James 5:14</a>): "Is any man sick among you," etc. Therefore none but the sick are competent to receive this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> This sacrament is a spiritual healing, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q32_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q30_A1.html">Q[30], AA[1]</a>,2), and is signified by way of a healing of the body. Hence this sacrament should not be conferred on those who are not subjects
+                     for bodily healing, those namely, who are in good health.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although spiritual health is the principal effect of this sacrament, yet this same spiritual healing needs to be signified
+                     by a healing of the body, although bodily health may not actually ensue. Consequently spiritual health can be conferred by
+                     this sacrament on those alone who are competent to receive bodily healing, viz. the sick; even as he alone can receive Baptism
+                     who is capable of a bodily washing, and not a child yet in its mother's womb.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even those who are entering into life cannot receive Baptism unless they are capable of a bodily washing. And so those who
+                     are departing this life cannot receive this sacrament, unless they be subjects for a bodily healing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q32_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q32_A2-p0.1">Whether this sacrament ought to be given in any kind of sickness?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament should be given in any kind of sickness. For no kind of sickness is determined in the fifth
+                     chapter of James where this sacrament is delivered to us. Therefore this sacrament should be given in all kinds of sickness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more excellent a remedy is, the more generally should it be available. Now this sacrament is more excellent
+                     than bodily medicine. Since then bodily medicine is given to all manner of sick persons, it seems that this sacrament should
+                     be given in like manner to all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> This sacrament is called by all Extreme Unction. Now it is not every sickness that brings man to the extremity of his life,
+                     since some ailments prolong life, according to the Philosopher (De Long. et Brev. Vitae i). Therefore this sacrament should
+                     not be given in every case of sickness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> This sacrament is the last remedy that the Church can give, since it is an immediate preparation for glory. Therefore it
+                     ought to be given to those only, who are so sick as to be in a state of departure from this life, through their sickness being
+                     of such a nature as to cause death, the danger of which is to be feared.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Any sickness can cause death, if it be aggravated. Hence if we consider the different kinds of disease, there is none in
+                     which this sacrament cannot be given; and for this reason the apostle does not determine any particular one. But if we consider
+                     the degree and the stage of the complaint, this sacrament should not be given to every sick person.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The principal effect of bodily medicine is bodily health, which all sick people lack, whatever be the stage of their sickness.
+                     But the principal effect of this sacrament is that immunity from disorder which is needed by those who are taking their departure
+                     from this life and setting out for the life of glory. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q32_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q32_A3-p0.1">Whether this sacrament ought to be given to madmen and imbeciles?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament should be given to madmen and imbeciles. For these diseases are full of danger and cause
+                     death quickly. Now when there is danger it is the time to apply the remedy. Therefore this sacrament, which was intended as
+                     a remedy to human weakness, should be given to such people.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Baptism is a greater sacrament than this. Now Baptism is conferred on mad people as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q32_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q68_A12.html">TP, Q[68], A[12]</a>). Therefore this sacrament also should be given to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> This sacrament should be given to none but such as acknowledge it. Now this does not apply to madmen and imbeciles. Therefore
+                     it should not be given to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The devotion of the recipient, the personal merit of the minister, and the general merits of the whole Church, are of great
+                     account towards the reception of the effect of this sacrament. This is evident from the fact that the form of this sacrament
+                     is pronounced by way of a prayer. Hence it should not be given those who cannot acknowledge it, and especially to madmen and
+                     imbeciles, who might dishonor the sacrament by their offensive conduct, unless they have
+                     lucid intervals, when they would be capable of acknowledging the sacrament, for then the sacrament should be given to children
+                     the same in that state.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although such people are sometimes in danger of death; yet the remedy cannot be applied to them, on account of their lack
+                     of devotion. Hence it should not be given to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Baptism does not require a movement of the free-will, because it is given chiefly as a remedy for original sin, which, in
+                     us, is not taken away by a movement of the free-will. On the other hand this sacrament requires a movement of the free-will;
+                     wherefore the comparison fails. Moreover Baptism is a necessary sacrament, while Extreme Unction is not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q32_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q32_A4-p0.1">Whether this sacrament should be given to children?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament ought to be given to children. Because children suffer from the same ailments sometimes
+                     as adults. Now the same disease requires the same remedy. Therefore this sacrament should be given to children the same as
+                     to adults.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, this sacrament is given in order to remove the remnants of sin, whether original or actual, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q32_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q30_A1.html">Q[30], A[1]</a>). Now the remnants of original sin are in children. Therefore this sacrament should be given to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> This sacrament should be given to none but those to whom the form applies. But the form of this sacrament does not apply
+                     to children, since they have not sinned by sight and hearing; as expressed in the form. Therefore this sacrament should not
+                     be given to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> This sacrament, like the Eucharist, requires actual devotion in the recipient. Therefore, just as the Eucharist ought not
+                     to be given to children, so neither ought this sacrament to be given to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Children's infirmities are not caused by actual sin, as in adults, and this sacrament is given chiefly as a remedy for infirmities
+                     that result from sins, being the remnants of sin, as it were.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This sacrament is not given as a remedy for the remnants of original sin, except in so far as they gather strength, so to
+                     speak, from actual sins. Hence from the very form it appears that it is given chiefly as a remedy for actual sins, which are
+                     not in children.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q32_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q32_A5-p0.1">Whether the whole body should be anointed in this sacrament?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the whole body should be anointed in this sacrament. For, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 6), "the
+                     whole soul is in every part of the body." Now this sacrament is given chiefly in order to heal the soul. Therefore the whole
+                     body ought to be anointed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the remedy should be applied to the part affected by the disease. But sometimes the disease is general, and affects
+                     the whole body, as a fever does. Therefore the whole body should be anointed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in Baptism the whole body is dipped under the water. Therefore in this sacrament the whole body should be anointed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the rite observed throughout the Church, according to which in this sacrament the sick man is anointed, only in certain
+                     fixed parts of the body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> This sacrament is shown to us under the form of a healing. Now bodily healing has to be effected, by applying the remedy,
+                     not to the whole body, but to those parts where the root of the disease is seated. Consequently the sacramental unction also
+                     ought to be applied to those parts only in which the spiritual sickness is rooted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the whole soul is, as to its essence, in each part of the body, it is not as to its powers which are the roots of
+                     sinful acts. Hence certain fixed parts have to be anointed, those, namely, in which powers have their being.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The remedy is not always applied to the part affected by the disease, but, with greater reason, to the part where the root
+                     of the disease is seated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Baptism is given under the form of washing: and a bodily washing cleanses only the part to which it is applied; for this
+                     reason Baptism is applied to the whole body. It is different with Extreme Unction for the reason given above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q32_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q32_A6-p0.1">Whether the parts to be anointed are suitably assigned?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that these parts are unsuitably assigned, namely, that the eyes, nose, ears, lips, hands, and feet should be
+                     anointed. For a wise physician heals the disease in its root. Now "from the heart come forth thoughts . . . that defile a
+                     man" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q32_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.19" target="asv">Mat. 15:19,20</a>). Therefore the breast ought to be anointed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, purity of mind is not less necessary to those who are departing this life than to those who are entering therein.
+                     Now those who are entering are anointed with chrism on the head by the priest, to signify purity of mind. Therefore in this
+                     sacrament those who are departing should be anointed on the head.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the remedy should be applied where the disease is most virulent. Now spiritual sickness is most virulent in the
+                     loins in men, and in the navel in women, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q32_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.40.11" target="asv"> Job 40:11</a>: "His strength is in his loins, and his force in the navel of his belly," as Gregory expounds the passage (Moral. xxxii,
+                     11). Therefore these parts should be anointed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sins are committed with other parts of the body, no less than with the feet. Therefore, as the feet are anointed,
+                     so ought other members of the body to be anointed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The principles of sinning are the same in us as the principles of action, for a sin is an act. Now there are in us three
+                     principles of action; the first is the directing principle, namely, the cognitive power; the second is the commanding principle,
+                     namely, the appetitive power; the third is the executive principle, namely, the motive power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p7"> Now all our knowledge has its origin in the senses. And, since the remedy for sin should be applied where sin originates
+                     in us first, for that reason the places of the five senses are anointed. the eyes, to wit, on account of the sight, the ears
+                     on account of hearing, the nostrils on account of the smell, the mouth on account of the taste, the hands on account of the
+                     touch which is keenest in the finger tips, (in some places too the loins are anointed on account of the
+                     appetite), and the feet are anointed on account of the motive power of which they are the chief instrument. And since the
+                     cognitive power is the first principle of human activity, the anointing of the five senses is observed by all, as being essential
+                     to the sacrament. But some do not observe the other unctions---some also anoint the feet but not the loins---because the appetitive
+                     and motive powers are secondary principles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No thought arises in the heart without an act of the imagination which is a movement proceeding from sensation (De Anima
+                     ii). Hence the primary root of thought is not the heart, but the sensory organs, except in so far as the heart is a principle
+                     of the whole body, albeit a remote principle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who enter have to receive purity of the mind, whereas those who are departing have to cleanse the mind. Hence the latter
+                     need to be anointed in those parts in respect of which the mind's purity may be sullied.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some are wont to anoint the loins, because they are the chief seat of the concupiscible appetite: however, as stated above,
+                     the appetitive power is not the primary root.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The bodily organs which are the instruments of sin, are the feet, hands, and tongue, all of which are anointed, and the organs
+                     of generation which it would be unbecoming to anoint, on account of their uncleanliness, and out of respect for the sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q32_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q33.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q32_A7-p0.1">Whether those who are deformed in those parts should be anointed?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those who are deformed should not be anointed in those parts. For just as this sacrament demands a certain
+                     disposition on the part of the recipient, viz. that he should be sick, so it demands that he should be anointed in a certain
+                     part of the body. Now he that is not sick cannot be anointed. Therefore neither can he be anointed who lacks the part to be
+                     anointed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man born blind does not sin by his sight. Yet in the anointing of the eyes mention is made of sins by sight. Therefore
+                     this anointing ought not to be applied to one born blind, and in like manner as regards the other senses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Bodily deformity is not an impediment to any other sacrament. Therefore it should not be an impediment to this one. Now each
+                     of the anointings is essential to the sacrament. Therefore all should be applied to those who are deformed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Even those who are deformed should be anointed, and that as near as possible to the part which ought to have been anointed.
+                     For though they have not the members, nevertheless, they have, at least radically, the powers of the soul, corresponding to
+                     those members, and they may commit inwardly the sins that pertain to those members, though they cannot outwardly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p6"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p7"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p8"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q33.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q33" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A7.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q33-p0.1">OF THE REPETITION OF THIS SACRAMENT (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q33-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q33-p2"> We must now consider the repetition of this sacrament: under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q33-p3"> (1) Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q33-p4"> (2) Whether it ought to be repeated during the same sickness?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q33_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q33.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q33_A1-p0.1">Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament ought not to be repeated. For the anointing of a man is of greater import than the anointing
+                     of a stone. But the anointing of an altar is not repeated, unless the altar be shattered. Neither, therefore, should Extreme
+                     Unction, whereby a man is anointed, be repeated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing comes after what is extreme. But this unction is called extreme. Therefore it should not be repeated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> This sacrament is a spiritual healing applied under the form of a bodily cure. But a bodily cure is repeated. Therefore this
+                     sacrament also can be repeated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> No sacramental or sacrament, having an effect that lasts for ever, can be repeated, because this would imply that the sacrament
+                     had failed to produce that effect; and this would be derogatory to the sacrament. On the other hand a sacrament whose effect
+                     does not last for ever, can be repeated without disparaging that sacrament, in order that the lost effect may be recovered.
+                     And since health of body and soul, which is the effect of this sacrament, can be lost
+                     after it has been effected, it follows that this sacrament can, without disparagement thereto, be repeated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The stone is anointed in order that the altar may be consecrated, and the stone remains consecrated, as long as the altar
+                     remains, hence it cannot be anointed again. But a man is not consecrated by being anointed, since it does not imprint a character
+                     on him. Hence there is no comparison.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What men think to be extreme is not always extreme in reality. It is thus that this sacrament is called Extreme Unction,
+                     because it ought not to be given save to those whose death men think to be nigh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q33.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q33_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q33_A2-p0.1">Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated during the same sickness?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament ought not to be repeated during the same sickness. For one disease demands one remedy.
+                     Now this sacrament is a spiritual remedy. Therefore it ought not to be repeated for one sickness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a sick man could be anointed more than once during one disease, this might be done for a whole day: which is
+                     absurd.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Sometimes a disease lasts long after the sacrament has been received, so that the remnants of sin, against which chiefly
+                     this sacrament is given, would be contracted. Therefore it ought to be given again.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> This sacrament regards not only the sickness, but also the state of the sick man, because it ought not to be given except
+                     to those sick people who seem, in man's estimation, to be nigh to death. Now some diseases do not last long; so that if this
+                     sacrament is given at the time that the sick man is in a state of danger of death, he does not leave that state except the
+                     disease be cured, and thus he needs not to be anointed again. But if he has a relapse, it
+                     will be a second sickness, and he can be anointed again. on the other hand some diseases are of long duration, as hectic fever,
+                     dropsy and the like, and those who lie sick of them should not be anointed until they seem to be in danger of death. And if
+                     the sick man escape that danger while the disease continues, and be brought again thereby to the same state of danger, he
+                     can be anointed again, because it is, as it were, another state of sickness, although strictly speaking, it is not another
+                     sickness. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A2-p6"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q33_A2-p7"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A7.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q34" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q34-p0.1">HOLY ORDERS (QQ[34]-40)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q34-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q34-p2">OF THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER AS TO ITS ESSENCE AND ITS PARTS (FIVE ARTICLES)</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q34-p3"> In the next place we must consider the sacrament of Order: (1) Order in general; (2) the difference of Orders; (3) those
+                  who confer Orders; (4) the impediments to receiving Orders; (5) things connected with Orders.
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q34-p4"> Concerning Order in general three points have to be considered: (1) Its essence, quiddity, and parts; (2) Its effect; (3)
+                  The recipients of Orders.
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q34-p5"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q34-p6"> (1) Whether there should be Order in the Church?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q34-p7"> (2) Whether it is fittingly defined?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q34-p8"> (3) Whether it is a sacrament?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q34-p9"> (4) Whether its form is expressed properly?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q34-p10"> (5) Whether this sacrament has any matter?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q34_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q34_A1-p0.1">Whether there should be Order in the Church?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there should not be Order in the Church. For Order requires subjection and preeminence. But subjection
+                     seemingly is incompatible with the liberty whereunto we are called by Christ. Therefore there should not be Order in the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who has received an Order becomes another's superior. But in the Church everyone should deem himself lower than
+                     another (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q34_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.3" target="asv">Phil. 2:3</a>): "Let each esteem others better than themselves." Therefore Order should not be in the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we find order among the angels on account of their differing in natural and gratuitous gifts. But all men are one
+                     in nature, and it is not known who has the higher gifts of grace. Therefore Order should not be in the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "Those things that are of God, are in order [*Vulg: 'Those (powers) that are, are ordained of God.']." Now the Church is
+                     of God, for He Himself built it with His blood. Therefore there ought to be Order in the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p6"> Further, the state of the Church is between the state of nature and the state of glory. Now we find order in nature, in that
+                     some things are above others, and likewise in glory, as in the angels. Therefore there should be Order in the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> God wished to produce His works in likeness to Himself, as far as possible, in order that they might be perfect, and that
+                     He might be known through them. Hence, that He might be portrayed in His works, not only according to what He is in Himself,
+                     but also according as He acts on others, He laid this natural law on all things, that last things should be reduced and perfected
+                     by middle things, and middle things by the first, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v).
+                     Wherefore that this beauty might not be lacking to the Church, He established Order in her so that some should deliver the
+                     sacraments to others, being thus made like to God in their own way, as co-operating with God; even as in the natural body,
+                     some members act on others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The subjection of slavery is incompatible with liberty; for slavery consists in lording over others and employing them for
+                     one's own profit. Such subjection is not required in Order, whereby those who preside have to seek the salvation of their
+                     subjects and not their own profit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Each one should esteem himself lower in merit, not in office; and orders are a kind of office.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Order among the angels does not arise from difference of nature, unless accidentally, in so far as difference of grace results
+                     in them from difference of nature. But in them it results directly from their difference in grace; because their orders regard
+                     their participation of divine things, and their communicating them in the state of glory, which is according to the measure
+                     of grace, as being the end and effect, so to speak, of grace. on the other
+                     hand, the Orders of the Church militant regard the participation in the sacraments and the communication thereof, which are
+                     the cause of grace and, in a way, precede grace; and consequently our Orders do not require sanctifying grace, but only the
+                     power to dispense the sacraments; for which reason order does not correspond to the difference of sanctifying grace, but to
+                     the difference of power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q34_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q34_A2-p0.1">Whether Order is properly defined?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that order is improperly defined by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 53), where it is said "Order is a seal of the
+                     Church, whereby spiritual power is conferred on the person ordained." For a part should not be described as the genus of the
+                     whole. Now the character which is denoted by the seal in a subsequent definition is a part of order, since it is placed in
+                     contradistinction with that which is either reality only, or sacrament only, since it is both
+                     reality and sacrament. Therefore seal should not be mentioned as the genus of Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as a character is imprinted in the sacrament of order, so is it in the sacrament of Baptism. Now character
+                     was not mentioned in the definition of Baptism. Therefore neither should it be mentioned in the definition of Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in Baptism there is also given a certain spiritual power to approach the sacraments; and again it is a seal, since
+                     it is a sacrament. Therefore this definition is applicable to Baptism; and consequently it is improperly applied to Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Order is a kind of relation, and relation is realized in both its terms. Now the terms of the relation of order
+                     are the superior and the inferior. Therefore inferiors have order as well as superiors. Yet there is no power of preeminence
+                     in them, such as is mentioned here in the definition of Order, as appears from the subsequent explanation (Sent. iv, D, 53),
+                     where promotion to power is mentioned. Therefore Order is improperly defined there.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Master's definition of Order applies to Order as a sacrament of the Church. Hence he mentions two things, namely the
+                     outward sign, a "kind of seal," i.e. a kind of sign, and the inward effect, "whereby spiritual power," etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Seal stands here, not for the inward character, but for the outward action, which is the sign and cause of inward power;
+                     and this is also the sense of character in the other definition. If, however, it be taken for the inward character, the definition
+                     would not be unsuitable; because the division of a sacrament into those three things is not a division into integral parts,
+                     properly speaking; since what is reality only is not essential to the
+                     sacrament, and that which is the sacrament is transitory; while that which is sacrament and reality is said to remain. Wherefore
+                     it follows that inward character itself is essentially and principally the sacrament of Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although in Baptism there is conferred a spiritual power to receive the other sacraments, for which reason it imprints a
+                     character, nevertheless this is not its principal effect, but the inward cleansing; wherefore Baptism would be given even
+                     though the former motive did not exist. On the other hand, order denotes power principally. Wherefore the character which
+                     is a spiritual power is included in the definition of Order, but not in that of
+                     Baptism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In Baptism there is given a certain spiritual potentiality to receive, and consequently a somewhat passive potentiality.
+                     But power properly denotes active potentiality, together with some kind of preeminence. Hence this definition is not applicable
+                     to Baptism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The word "order" is used in two ways. For sometimes it denotes the relation itself, and thus it is both in the inferior and
+                     in the superior, as the objection states; but it is not thus that we use the word here. On the other hand, it denotes the
+                     degree which results in the order taken in the first sense. And since the notion of order as relation is observed where we
+                     first meet with something higher than another, it follows that this degree of
+                     pre-eminence by spiritual power is called Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q34_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q34_A3-p0.1">Whether Order is a sacrament?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Order is not a sacrament. For a sacrament, according to Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacram. i) "is a material
+                     element." Now Order denotes nothing of the kind, but rather relation or power; since Order is a part of power according to
+                     Isidore. Therefore it is not a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sacraments do not concern the Church triumphant. Yet Order is there, as in the angels. Therefore it is not a
+                     sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as spiritual authority, which is Order, is given by means of consecration, so is secular authority, since kings
+                     also are anointed, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q34_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>, ad 2). But the kingly power is not a sacrament. Therefore neither is order of which we speak now.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is mentioned by all among the seven sacraments of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p6"> Further, "the cause of a thing being such, is still more so." Now Order is the cause of man being the dispenser of the other
+                     sacraments. Therefore Order has more reason for being a sacrament than the others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[29], A[1]; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q34_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q60.html">TP, Q[60])</a>, a sacrament is nothing else than a sanctification conferred on man with some outward sign. Wherefore, since by receiving
+                     orders a consecration is conferred on man by visible signs, it is clear that Order is a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although Order does not by its name express a material element, it is not conferred without some material element.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Power must needs be proportionate to the purpose for which it is intended. Now the communication of divine things, which
+                     is the purpose for which spiritual power is given, is not effected among the angels by means of sensible signs, as is the
+                     case among men. Hence the spiritual power that is Order is not bestowed on the angels by visible signs, as on men. Wherefore
+                     Order is a sacrament among men, but not among angels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not every blessing or consecration given to men is a sacrament, for both monks and abbots are blessed, and yet such blessings
+                     are not sacraments, and in like manner neither is the anointing of a king; because by such blessings men are not ordained
+                     to the dispensing of the divine sacraments, as by the blessing of Order. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q34_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q34_A4-p0.1">Whether the form of this sacrament is suitably expressed?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the form of this sacrament is unsuitably set forth in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Because the sacraments
+                     take their efficacy from their form. Now the efficacy of the sacraments is from the divine power, which works our salvation
+                     in them in a most hidden manner. Therefore the form of this sacrament should include a mention of the divine power by the
+                     invocation of the Trinity, as in the other sacraments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to command pertains to one who has authority. Now the dispenser of the sacrament exercises no authority, but only
+                     ministry. Therefore he should not use the imperative mood by saying: "Do" or "Receive" this or that, or some similar expression.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, mention should not be made in the sacramental form, except of such things as are essential to the sacrament. But
+                     the use of the power received is not essential to this sacrament, but is consequent upon it. Therefore it should not be mentioned
+                     in the form of this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all the sacraments direct us to an eternal reward. But the forms of the other sacraments make no mention of a reward.
+                     Therefore neither should any mention be made thereof in the form of this sacrament, as in the words: "Since thou wilt have
+                     a share, if faithfully," etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> This sacrament consists chiefly in the power conferred. Now power is conferred by power, as like proceeds from like; and
+                     again power is made known by its use, since powers are manifested by their acts. Wherefore in the form of order the use of
+                     order is expressed by the act which is commanded; and the conferring of power is expressed by employing the imperative mood.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The other sacraments are not ordained chiefly to effects similar to the power whereby the sacraments are dispensed, as this
+                     sacrament is. Hence in this sacrament there is a kind of universal communication. Wherefore in the other sacraments something
+                     is expressed on the part of the divine power to which the effect of the sacrament is likened, but not in this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> [There is a special reason why this sacrament, rather than the others, is conferred by employing the imperative mood. For]*
+                     although the bishop who is the minister of this sacrament has no authority in respect of the conferring of this sacrament,
+                     nevertheless he has some power with regard to the power of Order, which power he confers, in so far as it is derived, from
+                     his. [*The sentence in brackets is not in the Leonine edition.]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The use of power is the effect of power in the genus of efficient cause, and from this point of view it has no reason to
+                     be mentioned in the definition of Order. But it is somewhat a cause in the genus of final cause, and from this point of view
+                     it can be placed in the definition of order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is here a difference between this and the other sacraments. Because by this sacrament an office or the power to do
+                     something is conferred; and so it is fitting that mention be made of the reward to be obtained if it be administered faithfully.
+                     But in the other sacraments no such office or power to act is conferred, and so no mention of reward is made in them. Accordingly
+                     the recipient is somewhat passive in relation to the other sacraments,
+                     because he receives them for the perfecting of his own state only, whereas in relation to this sacrament he holds himself
+                     somewhat actively, since he receives it for the sake of exercising hierarchical duties in the Church. Wherefore although the
+                     other sacraments, from the very fact that they give grace, direct the recipient to salvation, properly speaking they do not
+                     direct him to a reward, in the same way as this sacrament does.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q34_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q34_A5-p0.1">Whether this sacrament has any matter?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament has no matter. Because in every sacrament that has a matter the power that works in the
+                     sacrament is in the matter. But in the material objects which are used here, such as keys, candlesticks, and so forth, there
+                     is not apparently any power of sanctification. Therefore it has no matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in this sacrament the fulness of sevenfold grace is conferred, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24), just as
+                     in Confirmation. But the matter of Confirmation requires to be consecrated beforehand. Since then the things which appear
+                     to be material in this sacrament are not consecrated beforehand, it would seem that they are not the matter of the sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in any sacrament that has matter there needs to be contact of matter with the recipient of the sacrament. Now, as
+                     some say, it is not essential to this sacrament that there be contact between the aforesaid material objects and the recipient
+                     of the sacrament, but only that they be presented to him. Therefore the aforesaid material objects are not the matter of this
+                     sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every sacrament consists of things and words. Now in any sacrament the thing is the matter. Therefore the things employed
+                     in this sacrament are its matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p6"> Further, more is requisite to dispense the sacraments than to receive them. Yet Baptism, wherein the power is given to receive
+                     the sacraments, needs a matter. Therefore order also does, wherein the power is given to dispense them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The matter employed outwardly in the sacraments signifies that the power which works in the sacraments comes entirely from
+                     without. Wherefore, since the effect proper to this sacrament, namely the character, is not received through any operation
+                     of the one who approaches the sacrament, as was the case in Penance, but comes wholly from without, it is fitting that it
+                     should have a matter, yet otherwise than the other sacraments that have matter; because that
+                     which is bestowed in the other sacraments comes from God alone, and not from the minister who dispenses the sacrament; whereas
+                     that which is conferred in this sacrament, namely the spiritual power, comes also from him who gives the sacrament, as imperfect
+                     from perfect power. Hence the efficacy of the other sacraments resides chiefly in the matter which both signifies and contains
+                     the divine power through the sanctification applied by the minister; whereas the efficacy of this sacrament resides
+                     chiefly with him who dispenses the sacrament. And the matter is employed to show the powers conferred in particular by one
+                     who has it completely, rather than to cause power; and this is clear from the fact that the matter is in keeping with the
+                     use of power. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is necessary for the matter to be consecrated in the other sacraments, on account of the power it contains; but it is
+                     not so in the case in point.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If we admit this assertion, the reason for it is clear from what we have said; for since the power of order is received from
+                     the minister and not from the matter, the presenting of the matter is more essential to the sacrament than contact therewith.
+                     However, the words themselves of the form would seem to indicate that contact with the matter is essential to the sacrament,
+                     for it is said: "Receive" this or that.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q35" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q35-p0.1">OF THE EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q35-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q35-p2"> We must next consider me effect of this sacrament. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q35-p3"> (1) Whether sanctifying grace is conferred in the sacrament of Order?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q35-p4"> (2) Whether a character is imprinted in connection with all the Orders?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q35-p5"> (3) Whether the character of Order presupposes of necessity the character of Baptism?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q35-p6"> (4) Whether it presupposes of necessity the character of Confirmation?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q35-p7"> (5) Whether the character of one Order presupposes of necessity the character of another Order?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q35_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q35_A1-p0.1">Whether sanctifying grace is conferred in the sacrament of Order?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sanctifying grace is not conferred in the sacrament of Order. For it is commonly agreed that the sacrament
+                     of Order is directed to counteract the defect of ignorance. Now not sanctifying grace but gratuitous grace is given to counteract
+                     ignorance, for sanctifying grace has more to do with the will. Therefore sanctifying grace is not given in the sacrament of
+                     Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Order implies distinction. Now the members of the Church are distinguished, not by sanctifying but by gratuitous
+                     grace, of which it is said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q35_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:4</a>): "There are diversities of graces." Therefore sanctifying grace is not given in order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no cause presupposes its effect. But grace is presupposed in one who receives orders, so that he may be worthy to
+                     receive them. Therefore this same grace is not given in the conferring of Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The sacraments of the New Law cause what they signify. Now Order by its sevenfold number signifies the seven gifts of the
+                     Holy Ghost, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are not apart from sanctifying
+                     grace, are given in Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p6"> Further, Order is a sacrament of the New Law. Now the definition of a sacrament of that kind includes the words, "that it
+                     may be a cause of grace." Therefore it causes grace in the recipient.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p7"> I answer that The works of God are perfect (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q35_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>); and consequently whoever receives power from above receives also those things that render him competent to exercise that
+                     power. This is also the case in natural things, since animals are provided with members, by which their soul's powers are
+                     enabled to proceed to their respective actions unless there be some defect on the part of matter. Now just as sanctifying
+                     grace is necessary in order that man
+                     receive the sacraments worthily, so is it that he may dispense them worthily. Wherefore as in Baptism, whereby a man is adapted
+                     to receive the other sacraments, sanctifying grace is given, so is it in the sacrament of Order whereby man is ordained to
+                     the dispensation of the other sacraments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Order is given as a remedy, not to one person but to the whole Church. Hence, although it is said to be given in order to
+                     counteract ignorance, it does not mean that by receiving Orders a man has his ignorance driven out of him, but that the recipient
+                     of Orders is set in authority to expel ignorance from among the people.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the gifts of sanctifying grace are common to all the members of the Church, nevertheless a man cannot be the worthy
+                     recipient of those gifts, in respect of which the members of the Church are distinguished from one another, unless he have
+                     charity, and this cannot be apart from sanctifying grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The worthy exercise of Orders requires not any kind of goodness but excellent goodness, in order that as they who receive
+                     orders are set above the people in the degree of Order, so may they be above them by the merit of holiness. Hence they are
+                     required to have the grace that suffices to make them worthy members of Christ's people, but when they receive Orders they
+                     are given a yet greater gift of grace, whereby they are rendered apt for greater
+                     things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q35_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q35_A2-p0.1">Whether in the sacrament of Order a character is imprinted in connection with all the Orders?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the sacrament of Order a character is not imprinted in connection with all the Orders. For the character
+                     of Order is a spiritual power. Now some Orders are directed only to certain bodily acts, for instance those of the doorkeeper
+                     or of the acolyte. Therefore a character is not imprinted in these Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every character is indelible. Therefore a character places a man in a state whence he cannot withdraw. Now those
+                     who have certain Orders can lawfully return to the laity. Therefore a character is not imprinted in all the Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by means of a character a man is appointed to give or to receive some sacred thing. Now a man is sufficiently adapted
+                     to the reception of the sacraments by the character of Baptism, and a man is not appointed to dispense the sacraments except
+                     in the Order of priesthood. Therefore a character is not imprinted in the other Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every sacrament in which a character is not imprinted can be repeated. But no Order can be repeated. Therefore a character
+                     is imprinted in each Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p6"> Further, a character is a distinctive sign. Now there is something distinct in every Order. Therefore every Order imprints
+                     a character.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There have been three opinions on this point. For some have said that a character is imprinted only in the Order of priesthood;
+                     but this is not true, since none but a deacon can exercise the act of the diaconate, and so it is clear that in the dispensation
+                     of the sacraments, he has a spiritual power which others have not. For this reason others have said that a character is impressed
+                     in the sacred, but not in the minor, Orders. But this again comes to
+                     nothing, since each Order sets a man above the people in some degree of authority directed to the dispensation of the sacraments.
+                     Wherefore since a character is a sign whereby one thing is distinguished from another, it follows that a character is imprinted
+                     in each Order. And this is confirmed by the fact that they remain for ever and are never repeated. This is the third and more
+                     common opinion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Each Order either has an act connected with the sacrament itself, or adapts a man to the dispensation of the sacraments;
+                     thus doorkeepers exercise the act of admitting men to witness the Divine sacraments, and so forth; and consequently a spiritual
+                     power is required in each.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> For all that a man may return to the laity, the character always remains in him. This is evident from the fact that if he
+                     return to the clerical state, he does not receive again the order which he had already.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p10"> The Reply to the Third Objection is the same as to the First.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q35_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q35_A3-p0.1">Whether the character of Order presupposes the baptismal character?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the character of Order does not presuppose the character of Baptism. For the character of Order makes
+                     a man a dispenser of the sacraments; while the character of Baptism makes him a recipient of them. Now active power does not
+                     necessarily presuppose passive power, for it can be without it, as in God. Therefore the character of Order does not necessarily
+                     presuppose the character of Baptism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it may happen that a man is not baptized, and yet think with probability that he has been baptized. If therefore
+                     such a person present himself for Orders, he will not receive the character of Order, supposing the character of Order to
+                     presuppose the character of Baptism; and consequently whatever he does by way of consecration or absolution will be invalid,
+                     and the Church will be deceived therein, which is inadmissible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Baptism is the door of the sacraments. Therefore since Order is a sacrament, it presupposes Baptism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> No one can receive what he has not the power to receive. Now the character of Baptism gives a man the power to receive the
+                     other sacraments. Wherefore he that has not the baptismal character, can receive no other sacrament; and consequently the
+                     character of Order presupposes the character of Baptism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In one who has active power of himself, the active does not presuppose the passive power; but in one who has active power
+                     from another, passive power, whereby he is enabled to receive the active power, is prerequisite to active power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Such a man if he be ordained to the priesthood is not a priest, and he can neither consecrate, nor absolve in the tribunal
+                     of Penance. Wherefore according to the canons he must be baptized, and reordained (Extra De Presbyt. non Bapt., cap. Si quis;
+                     cap. Veniens). And even though he be raised to the episcopate, those whom he ordains receive not the Order. Yet it may piously
+                     be believed that as regards the ultimate effects of the sacraments, the High
+                     Priest will supply the defect, and that He would not allow this to be so hidden as to endanger the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q35_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q35_A4-p0.1">Whether the character of Order necessarily presupposes the character of Confirmation?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the character of Order necessarily presupposes the character of Confirmation. For in things subordinate
+                     to one another, as the middle presupposes the first, so does the last presuppose the middle. Now the character of Confirmation
+                     presupposes that of Baptism as being the first. Therefore the character of Order presupposes that of Confirmation as being
+                     in the middle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those who are appointed to confirm should themselves be most firm. Now those who receive the sacrament of Order
+                     are appointed to confirm others. Therefore they especially should have received the sacrament of Confirmation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The apostles received the power of order before the Ascension (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q35_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.22" target="asv">Jn. 20:22</a>), where it is said: "Receive the Holy Ghost." But they were confirmed after the Ascension by the coming of the Holy Ghost.
+                     Therefore order does not presuppose Confirmation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> For the reception of Orders something is prerequisite for the validity of the sacrament, and something as congruous to the
+                     sacrament. For the validity of the sacrament it is required that one who presents himself for Orders should be capable of
+                     receiving them, and this is competent to him through Baptism; wherefore the baptismal character is prerequisite for the validity
+                     of the sacrament, so that the sacrament of Order cannot be conferred without it. On the
+                     other hand, as congruous to the sacrament a man is required to have every perfection whereby he becomes adapted to the exercise
+                     of Orders, and one of these is that he be confirmed. Wherefore the character of Order presupposes the character of Confirmation
+                     as congruous but not as necessary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this case the middle does not stand in the same relation to the last as the first to the middle, because the character
+                     of Baptism enables a man to receive the sacrament of Confirmation, whereas the character of Confirmation does not enable a
+                     man to receive the sacrament of Order. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers aptness by way of congruity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q35_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q35_A5-p0.1">Whether the character of one Order necessarily presupposes the character of another Order?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the character of one Order necessarily presupposes the character of another Order. For there is more in
+                     common between one Order and another, than between Order and another sacrament. But the character of Order presupposes the
+                     character of another sacrament, namely Baptism. Much more therefore does the character of one Order presuppose the character
+                     of another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Orders are degrees of a kind. Now no one can reach a further degree, unless he first mount the previous degree.
+                     Therefore no one can receive the character of a subsequent Order unless he has first received the preceding Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> If anything necessary for a sacrament be omitted in that sacrament, the sacrament must be repeated. But if one receive a
+                     subsequent Order, without receiving a preceding Order, he is not reordained, but he receives what was lacking, according to
+                     the canonical statutes (cap. Tuae literae, De clerico per salt. prom.). Therefore the preceding Order is not necessary for
+                     the following.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is not necessary for the higher Orders that one should have received the minor Orders, because their respective powers
+                     are distinct, and one, considered in its essentials, does not require another in the same subject. Hence even in the early
+                     Church some were ordained priests without having previously received the lower Orders and yet they could do all that the lower
+                     Orders could, because the lower power is comprised in the higher, even as sense in
+                     understanding, and dukedom in kingdom. Afterwards, however, it was decided by the legislation of the Church that no one should
+                     present himself to the higher orders who had not previously humbled himself in the lower offices. And hence it is that according
+                     to the Canons (cap. Tuae literae, De clerico per salt. prom.) those who are ordained without receiving a preceding Order are
+                     not reordained, but receive what was lacking to them of the preceding Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Orders have more in common with one another as regards specific likeness, than order has with Baptism. But as regards proportion
+                     of power to action, Baptism has more in common with Order, than one Order with another, because Baptism confers on man the
+                     passive power to receive Orders, whereas a lower Order does not give him the passive power to receive higher Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Orders are not degrees combining in one action or in one movement, so that it be necessary to reach the last through the
+                     first; but they are like degrees consisting in things of different kinds, such as the degrees between man and angel, and it
+                     is not necessary that one who is an angel be first of all a man. Such also are the degrees between the head and all members
+                     of the body; nor is it necessary that that which is the head should be previously a
+                     foot; and thus it is in the case in point.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q36" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q36-p0.1">OF THE QUALITIES REQUIRED OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THIS SACRAMENT (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q36-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q36-p2"> We must next consider the qualities required of those who receive the sacrament of Order. Under this head there are five
+                  points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q36-p3"> (1) Whether goodness of life is required of those who receive this sacrament?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q36-p4"> (2) Whether the knowledge of the whole of Sacred Writ is required?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q36-p5"> (3) Whether the degree of Orders is obtained by mere merit of life?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q36-p6"> (4) Whether he who raises the unworthy to Orders sins?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q36-p7"> (5) Whether one who is in sin can without committing a sin exercise the Order he has received?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q36_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q36_A1-p0.1">Whether goodness of life is required of those who receive Orders?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that goodness of life is not required of those who receive Orders. For by Orders a man is ordained to the dispensation
+                     of the sacraments. But the sacraments can be administered by good and wicked. Therefore goodness of life is not requisite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the service of God in the sacraments is no greater than service offered to Him in the body. Now our Lord did not
+                     cast aside the sinful and notorious woman from rendering Him a bodily service (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q36_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.7" target="asv">Lk. 7</a>). Therefore neither should the like be debarred from His service in the sacraments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by every grace a remedy is given against sin. Now those who are in sin should not be refused a remedy that may avail
+                     them. Since then grace is given in the sacrament of order, it would seem that this sacrament ought also to be conferred on
+                     sinners.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "Whosoever of the seed of Aaron throughout their families hath a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God neither shall
+                     he approach to minister to him [*Vulg.: 'Say to Aaron: Whosoever of thy seed,'etc.]" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q36_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.21.17" target="asv">Lev. 21:17,18</a>). Now "blemish signifies all kinds of vice" according to a gloss. Therefore he who is shackled by any vice should not be
+                     admitted to the ministry of Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p6"> Further, Jerome commenting on the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q36_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.2.15" target="asv"> Titus 2:15, </a> "Let no man despise thee," says that "not only should bishops, priests, and deacons take very great care to be examples of
+                     speech and conduct to those over whom they are placed, but also the lower grades, and without exception all who serve the
+                     household of God, since it is most disastrous to the Church if the laity be better than the clergy." Therefore holiness of
+                     life is requisite in all the
+                     Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), "even as the more subtle and clear essences, being filled by the outpouring of the solar
+                     radiance, like the sun enlighten other bodies with their brilliant light, so in all things pertaining to God a man must not
+                     dare to become a leader of others, unless in all his habits he be most deiform and godlike." Wherefore, since in every order
+                     a man is appointed to lead others in Divine things, he who being conscious of mortal
+                     sin presents himself for Orders is guilty of presumption and sins mortally. Consequently holiness of life is requisite for
+                     Orders, as a matter of precept, but not as essential to the sacrament; and if a wicked man be ordained, he receives the Order
+                     none the less, and yet with sin withal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the sinner dispenses sacraments validly, so does he receive validly the sacrament of Orders, and as he dispenses
+                     unworthily, even so he receives unworthily.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The service in point consisted only in the exercise of bodily homage, which even sinners can offer lawfully. It is different
+                     with the spiritual service to which the ordained are appointed, because thereby they are made to stand between God and the
+                     people. Wherefore they should shine with a good conscience before God, and with a good name before men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain medicines require a robust constitution, else it is mortally dangerous to take them; others can be given to the weakly.
+                     So too in spiritual things certain sacraments are ordained as remedies for sin, and the like are to be given to sinners, as
+                     Baptism and Penance, while others, which confer the perfection of grace, require a man made strong by grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q36_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q36_A2-p0.1">Whether knowledge of all Holy Writ is required?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that knowledge of all Holy Writ is required. For one from whose lips we seek the law, should have knowledge
+                     of the law. Now the laity seek the law at the mouth of the priest (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q36_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.2.7" target="asv">Malachi 2:7</a>). Therefore he should have knowledge of the whole law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "being always ready to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that faith and hope in you [*Vulg.: 'Of that
+                     hope which is in you; St. Thomas apparently took his reading from Bede]." Now to give a reason for things pertaining to faith
+                     and hope belongs to those who have perfect knowledge of Holy Writ. Therefore the like knowledge should be possessed by those
+                     who are placed in Orders, and to whom the aforesaid words are addressed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one is competent to read what he understands not, since to read without intelligence is "negligence,"* as Cato
+                     declares (Rudiment.). [*"Legere et non intelligere est negligere." The play on the words is more evident in Latin.] Now it
+                     belongs to the reader (which is the lower Order) to read the Old Testament, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore
+                     he should understand the whole of the Old Testament; and much more those in the higher
+                     Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Many are raised to the priesthood even who know nothing at all of these things, even in many religious Orders. Therefore
+                     apparently this knowledge is not required.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p6"> Further, we read in the Lives of the Fathers that some who were monks were raised to the priesthood, being of a most holy
+                     life. Therefore the aforesaid knowledge is not required in those to be ordained.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> For any human act to be rightly ordered there must needs be the direction of reason. Wherefore in order that a man exercise
+                     the office of an Order, it is necessary for him to have as much knowledge as suffices for his direction in the act of that
+                     Order. And consequently one who is to be raised to Orders is required to have that knowledge, and to be instructed in Sacred
+                     Scripture, not the whole, but more or less, according as his office is of a greater or
+                     lesser extent---to wit, that those who are placed over others, and receive the care of souls, know things pertaining to the
+                     doctrine of faith and morals, and that others know whatever concerns the exercise of their Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A priest exercises a twofold action: the one, which is principal, over the true body of Christ; the other, which is secondary,
+                     over the mystical body of Christ. The second act depends on the first, but not conversely. Wherefore some are raised to the
+                     priesthood, to whom the first act alone is deputed, for instance those religious who are not empowered with the care of souls.
+                     The law is not sought at the mouth of these, they are required only for the
+                     celebration of the sacraments; and consequently it is enough for them to have such knowledge as enables them to observe rightly
+                     those things that regard the celebration of the sacrament. Others are raised to exercise the other act which is over the mystical
+                     body of Christ, and it is at the mouth of these that the people seek the law; wherefore they ought to possess knowledge of
+                     the law, not indeed to know all the difficult points of the law (for in these they should have recourse to their
+                     superiors), but to know what the people have to believe and fulfill in the law. To the higher priests, namely the bishops,
+                     it belongs to know even those points of the law which may offer some difficulty, and to know them the more perfectly according
+                     as they are in a higher position.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason that we have to give for our faith and hope does not denote one that suffices to prove matters of faith and hope,
+                     since they are both of things invisible; it means that we should be able to give general proofs of the probability of both,
+                     and for this there is not much need of great knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reader has not to explain Holy Writ to the people (for this belongs to the higher orders), but merely to voice the words.
+                     Therefore he is not required to have so much knowledge as to understand Holy Writ, but only to know how to pronounce it correctly.
+                     And since such knowledge is obtained easily and from many persons, it may be supposed with probability that the ordained will
+                     acquire that knowledge even if he have it not already, especially if it
+                     appear that he is on the road to acquire it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q36_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q36_A3-p0.1">Whether a man obtains the degrees of Order by the merit of one's life?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man obtains the degrees of order by the mere merit of his life. For, according to Chrysostom [*Hom.
+                     xliii in the Opus Imperfectum, wrongly ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "not every priest is a saint, but every saint is
+                     a priest." Now a man becomes a saint by the merit of his life. Consequently he thereby also becomes a priest, and "a fortiori"
+                     has he the other Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in natural things, men obtain a higher degree from the very fact that they are near God, and have a greater share
+                     of His favors, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iv). Now it is by merit of holiness and knowledge that a man approaches nearer
+                     to God and receives more of His favors. Therefore by this alone he is raised to the degree of Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Holiness once possessed can be lost. But when once a man is ordained he never loses his order. Therefore order does not consist
+                     in the mere merit of holiness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A cause should be proportionate to its effect. And consequently as in Christ, from Whom grace comes down on all men, there
+                     must needs be fulness of grace; so in the ministers of the Church, to whom it belongs, not to give grace, but to give the
+                     sacraments of grace, the degree of order does not result from their having grace, but from their participating in a sacrament
+                     of grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chrysostom is speaking of the priest in reference to the reason for which he is so called, the word "sacerdos" signifying
+                     dispenser of holy things [sacra dans]: for in this sense every righteous man, in so far as he assists others by the sacraments,
+                     may be called a priest. But he is not speaking according to the actual meaning of the words; for this word "sacerdos" [priest]
+                     is employed to signify one who gives sacred things by dispensing the
+                     sacraments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Natural things acquire a degree of superiority over others, from the fact that they are able to act on them by virtue of
+                     their form; wherefore from the very fact that they have a higher form, they obtain a higher degree. But the ministers of the
+                     Church are placed over others, not to confer anything on them by virtue of their own holiness (for this belongs to God alone),
+                     but as ministers, and as instruments, so to say, of the outpouring from the Head
+                     to the members. Hence the comparison fails as regards the dignity of Order, although it applies as to congruity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q36_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q36_A4-p0.1">Whether he who raises the unworthy to Orders commits a sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that he who raises the unworthy to orders commits no sin. For a bishop needs assistants appointed to the lesser
+                     offices. But he would be unable to find them in sufficient number, if he were to require of them such qualifications as the
+                     saints enumerate. Therefore if he raise some who are not qualified, he would seem to be excusable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Church needs not only ministers for the dispensation of things spiritual, but also for the supervision of temporalities.
+                     But sometimes men without knowledge or holiness of life may be useful for the conduct of temporal affairs, either because
+                     of their worldly power, or on account of their natural industry. Therefore seemingly the like can be promoted without sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everyone is bound to avoid sin, as far as he can. If therefore a bishop sins in promoting the unworthy, he is bound
+                     to take the utmost pains to know whether those who present themselves for Orders be worthy, by making a careful inquiry about
+                     their morals and knowledge, and yet seemingly this is not done anywhere.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is worse to raise the wicked to the sacred ministry, than not to correct those who are raised already. But Heli sinned
+                     mortally by not correcting his sons for their wickedness; wherefore "he fell backwards . . . and died" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q36_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.4.18" target="asv">1 Kings 4:18</a>). Therefore he who promotes the unworthy does not escape sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p6"> Further, spiritual things must be set before temporal things in the Church. Now a man would commit a mortal sin were he knowingly
+                     to endanger the temporalities of the Church. Much more therefore is it a mortal sin to endanger spiritual things. But whoever
+                     promotes the unworthy endangers spiritual things, since according to Gregory (Hom. xii in Evang.) "if a man's life is contemptible,
+                     his preaching is liable to be despised"; and for the same reason all the spiritual things that
+                     he dispenses. Therefore he who promotes the unworthy sins mortally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Our Lord describes the faithful servant whom He has set "over His household to give them their measure of wheat." Hence he
+                     is guilty of unfaithfulness who gives any man Divine things above his measure: and whoso promotes the unworthy does this.
+                     Wherefore he commits a mortal crime, as being unfaithful to his sovereign Lord, especially since this is detrimental to the
+                     Church and to the Divine honor which is promoted by good ministers. For a man would be
+                     unfaithful to his earthly lord were he to place unworthy subjects in his offices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God never so abandons His Church that apt ministers are not to be found sufficient for the needs of the people, if the worthy
+                     be promoted and the unworthy set aside. And though it were impossible to find as many ministers as there are now, it were
+                     better to have few good ministers than many bad ones, as the blessed Clement declares in his second epistle to James the brother
+                     of the Lord.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Temporal things are not to be sought but for the sake of spiritual things. Wherefore all temporal advantage should count
+                     for nothing, and all gain be despised for the advancement of spiritual good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is at least required that the ordainer know that nothing contrary to holiness is in the candidate for ordination. But
+                     besides this he is required to take the greatest care, in proportion to the Order or office to be enjoined, so as to be certain
+                     of the qualifications of those to be promoted, at least from the testification of others. This is the meaning of the Apostle
+                     when he says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q36_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.22" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:22</a>): "Impose not hands lightly on any
+                     man."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q36_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q36_A5-p0.1">Whether a man who is in sin can without sin exercise the Order he has received? [*Cf. TP, Q[64], A[6]]</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one who is in sin can without sin exercise the order he has received. For since, by virtue of his office,
+                     he is bound to exercise his order, he sins if he fails to do so. If therefore he sins by exercising it, he cannot avoid sin:
+                     which is inadmissible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a dispensation is a relaxation of the law. Therefore although by rights it would be unlawful for him to exercise
+                     the order he has received, it would be lawful for him to do so by dispensation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever co-operates with another in a mortal sin, sins mortally. If therefore a sinner sins mortally by exercising
+                     his order, he who receives or demands any Divine thing from him also sins mortally: and this seems absurd.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if he sins by exercising his order, it follows that every act of his order that he performs is a mortal sin; and
+                     consequently since many acts concur in the one exercise of his order, it would seem that he commits many mortal sins: which
+                     seems very hard.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Ep. ad Demophil.): "It seems presumptuous for such a man, one to wit who is not enlightened, to lay hands
+                     on priestly things; he is not afraid nor ashamed, all unworthy that he is to take part in Divine things, with the thought
+                     that God does not see what he sees in himself; he thinks, by false pretense, to cheat Him Whom he falsely calls his Father;
+                     he dares to utter in the person of Christ, words polluted by his infamy, I will not call
+                     them prayers, over the Divine symbols." Therefore a priest is a blasphemer and a cheat if he exercises his order unworthily,
+                     and thus he sins mortally: and in like manner any other person in orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p7"> Further, holiness of life is required in one who receives an order, that he may be qualified to exercise it. Now a man sins
+                     mortally if he present himself for orders in mortal sin. Much more therefore does he sin mortally whenever he exercises his
+                     order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The law prescribes (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q36_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.20" target="asv">Dt. 16:20</a>) that "man should follow justly after that which is just." Wherefore whoever fulfills unworthily the duties of his order
+                     follows unjustly after that which is just, and acts contrary to a precept of the law, and thereby sins mortally. Now anyone
+                     who exercises a sacred office in mortal sin, without doubt does so unworthily. Hence it is clear that he sins mortally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He is not perplexed as though he were in the necessity of sinning; for he can renounce his sin, or resign his office whereby
+                     he was bound to the exercise of his order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The natural law allows of no dispensation; and it is of natural law that man handle holy things holily. Therefore no one
+                     can dispense from this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> So long as a minister of the Church who is in mortal sin is recognized by the Church, his subject must receive the sacraments
+                     from him, since this is the purpose for which he is bound to him. Nevertheless, outside the case of necessity, it would not
+                     be safe to induce him to an execution of his Order, as long as he is conscious of being in mortal sin, which conscience, however,
+                     he can lay aside since a man is repaired in an instant by Divine grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When any man performs an action as a minister of the Church while in a state of mortal sin, he sins mortally, and as often
+                     as he performs that action, since, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. i), "it is wrong for the unclean even to touch the symbols,"
+                     i.e. the sacramental signs. Hence when they touch sacred things in the exercise of their office they sin mortally. It would
+                     be otherwise if they were to touch some sacred thing or perform some sacred duty
+                     in a case of necessity, when it would be allowable even to a layman, for instance if they were to baptize in a case of urgency,
+                     or gather up the Lord's body should it be cast to the ground.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q37" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q37-p0.1">OF THE DISTINCTION OF ORDERS, OF THEIR ACTS, AND THE IMPRINTING OF THE CHARACTER (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q37-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q37-p2"> In the next place we must consider the distinction of the orders and their acts, and the imprinting of the character. Under
+                  this head there are five points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q37-p3"> (1) Whether Order should be divided into several kinds?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q37-p4"> (2) How many are there?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q37-p5"> (3) Whether they ought to be divided into those that are sacred and those that are not?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q37-p6"> (4) Whether the acts of the Orders are rightly assigned in the text?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q37-p7"> (5) When are the characters of the Orders imprinted?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q37_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q37_A1-p0.1">Whether we ought to distinguish several Orders? </h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not to distinguish several Orders. For the greater a power is, the less is it multiplied. Now
+                     this sacrament ranks above the others in so far as it places its recipients in a degree above other persons. Since then the
+                     other sacraments are not divided into several of which the whole is predicated, neither ought this sacrament to be divided
+                     into several Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be divided, the parts of the division are either integral or subjective. But they are not integral, for then
+                     the whole would not be predicated of them. Therefore it is a division into subjective parts. Now subjective parts can have
+                     the remote genus predicated of them in the plural in the same way as the proximate genus; thus man and ass are several animals,
+                     and are several animated bodies. Therefore also priesthood and diaconate, as they are
+                     several Orders, even so are several sacraments, since sacrament is the genus, so to speak, in respect of Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10) the form of authority in which one alone governs is a better government
+                     of the common weal than aristocracy, where different persons occupy different offices. But the government of the Church should
+                     be the best of all. Therefore in the Church there should be no distinction of Orders for different acts, but the whole power
+                     should reside in one person; and consequently there ought to be only one Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Church is Christ's mystical body, like to our natural body, according to the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.5" target="asv">Rom. 12:5</a>; 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:12</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p5.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.27" target="asv">27</a>; 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p5.4" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.22" target="asv">Eph. 1:22,23</a>;
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p5.5" href="./asv.html#Col.1.24" target="asv"> Col. 1:24</a>). Now in the natural body there are various offices of the members. Therefore in the Church also there should be various
+                     Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p6"> Further, the ministry of the New Testament is superior to that of the Old Testament (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3" target="asv">2 Cor. 3</a>). Now in the Old Testament not only the priests, but also their ministers, the Levites, were consecrated. Therefore likewise
+                     in the New Testament not only the priests but also their ministers should be consecrated by the sacrament of Order; and consequently
+                     there ought to be several Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Multiplicity of Orders was introduced into the Church for three reasons. First to show forth the wisdom of God, which is
+                     reflected in the orderly distinction of things both natural and spiritual. This is signified in the statement of 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 10:4,5</a> that "when the queen of Saba saw . . . the order of" Solomon's "servants . . . she had no longer any spirit in her," for
+                     she was breathless from admiration of his wisdom. Secondly, in order
+                     to succor human weakness, because it would be impossible for one man, without his being heavily burdened, to fulfill all things
+                     pertaining to the Divine mysteries; and so various orders are severally appointed to the various offices; and this is shown
+                     by the Lord giving Moses seventy ancients to assist him. Thirdly, that men may be given a broader way for advancing (to perfection),
+                     seeing that the various duties are divided among many men, so that all become the co-operators of God; than which
+                     nothing is more God-like, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The other sacraments are given that certain effects may be received; but this sacrament is given chiefly that certain acts
+                     may be performed. Hence it behooves the sacrament of Order to be differentiated according to the diversity of acts, even as
+                     powers are differentiated by their acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The division of Order is not that of an integral whole into its parts, nor of a universal whole, but of a potential whole,
+                     the nature of which is that the notion of the whole is found to be complete in one part, but in the others by some participation
+                     thereof. Thus it is here: for the entire fulness of the sacrament is in one Order, namely the priesthood, while in the other
+                     sacraments there is a participation of Order. And this is signified by the
+                     Lord saying (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Num.11.17" target="asv">Num. 11:17</a>): "I will take of thy spirit and give to them, that they may bear with thee the burden of the people." Therefore all the
+                     Orders are one sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In a kingdom, although the entire fulness of power resides in the king, this does not exclude the ministers having a power
+                     which is a participation of the kingly power. It is the same in Order. In the aristocratic form of government, on the contrary,
+                     the fulness of power resides in no one, but in all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q37_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q37_A2-p0.1">Whether there are seven Orders?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not seven Orders. For the Orders of the Church are directed to the hierarchical acts. But there
+                     are only three hierarchical acts, namely "to cleanse, to enlighten, and to perfect," for which reason Dionysius distinguishes
+                     three Orders (Eccl. Hier. v). Therefore there are not seven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the sacraments derive their efficacy and authenticity from their institution by Christ, or at least by His apostles.
+                     But no mention except of priests and deacons is made in the teaching of Christ and His apostles. Therefore seemingly there
+                     are no other Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the sacrament of Order a man is appointed to dispense the other sacraments. But there are only six other sacraments.
+                     Therefore there should be only six Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, It would seem that there ought to be more. For the higher a power is, the less is it subject to multiplication.
+                     Now the hierarchical power is in the angels in a higher way than in us, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. i). Since then there
+                     are nine Orders in the angelic hierarchy, there should be as many, or more, in the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the prophecy of the Psalms is the most noble of all the prophecies. Now there is one Order, namely of readers, for
+                     reading the other prophecies in the Church. Therefore there ought to be another Order for reading the Psalms, especially since
+                     (Decretals, Dist. xxi, cap. Cleros) the "psalmist" is reckoned as the second Order after the doorkeeper.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some show the sufficiency of the orders from their correspondence with the gratuitous graces which are indicated 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 12</a>. For they say that the "word of wisdom" belongs to the bishop, because he is the ordainer of others, which pertains to wisdom;
+                     the "word of knowledge" to the priest, for he ought to have the key of knowledge; "faith" to the deacon, for he preaches the
+                     Gospel; the "working of miracles" to the subdeacon, who sets himself to do deeds of
+                     perfection by the vow of continency; "interpretation of speeches" to the acolyte, this being signified by the light which
+                     he bears; the "grace of healing" to the exorcist; "diverse kinds of tongues" to the psalmist; "prophecy" to the reader; and
+                     the "discerning of spirits" to the doorkeeper, for he excludes some and admits others. But this is of no account, for the
+                     gratuitous graces are not given, as the Orders are, to one same man. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:4</a>): "There
+                     are distributions [Douay: 'diversities'] of graces." Moreover the episcopate [*Cf.
+                     <a id="XP_Q37_A2-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q40_A5.html"> Q[40], A[5]</a>] and the office of psalmist are included, which are not Orders. Wherefore others account for the Orders by likening them
+                     to the heavenly hierarchy, where the Orders are distinguished in reference to cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting. Thus
+                     they say that the doorkeeper cleanses outwardly, by separating even in the body the good from the wicked; that the acolyte
+                     cleanses
+                     inwardly, because by the light which he bears, he signifies that he dispels inward darkness; and that the exorcist cleanses
+                     both ways, for he casts out the devil who disturbs a man both ways. But enlightening, which is effected by teaching, is done
+                     by readers as regards prophetic doctrine; by subdeacons as to apostolic doctrine; and by deacons as to the gospel doctrine;
+                     while ordinary perfection, such as the perfection of Penance, Baptism, and so forth is the work of the priest; excellent
+                     perfection, such as the consecration of priests and virgins, is the work of the bishop; while the most excellent perfection
+                     is the work of the Sovereign Pontiff in whom resides the fulness of authority. But this again is of no account; both because
+                     the orders of the heavenly hierarchy are not distinguished by the aforesaid hierarchical actions, since each of them is applicable
+                     to every Order; and because, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), perfecting belongs to the bishops alone,
+                     enlightening to the priests, and cleansing to all the ministers. Wherefore others suit the orders to the seven gifts, so that
+                     the priesthood corresponds to the gift of wisdom, which feeds us with the bread of life and understanding, even as the priest
+                     refreshes us with the heavenly bread; fear to the doorkeeper, for he separates us from the wicked; and thus the intermediate
+                     Orders to the intermediate gifts. But this again is of no account, since the sevenfold grace is given in each one of the
+                     Orders. Consequently we must answer differently by saying that the sacrament of Order is directed to the sacrament of the
+                     Eucharist, which is the sacrament of sacraments, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii). For just as temple, altar, vessels,
+                     and vestments need to be consecrated, so do the ministers who are ordained for the Eucharist; and this consecration is the
+                     sacrament of Order. Hence the distinction of Orders is derived from their relation to the Eucharist. For the power of Order
+                     is
+                     directed either to the consecration of the Eucharist itself, or to some ministry in connection with this sacrament of the
+                     Eucharist. If in the former way, then it is the Order of priests; hence when they are ordained, they receive the chalice with
+                     wine, and the paten with the bread, because they are receiving the power to consecrate the body and blood of Christ. The co-operation
+                     of the ministers is directed either to the sacrament itself, or to the recipients. If the former, this happens in
+                     three ways. For in the first place, there is the ministry whereby the minister co-operates with the priest in the sacrament
+                     itself, by dispensing, but not by consecrating, for this is done by the priest alone; and this belongs to the deacon. Hence
+                     in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) it is said that it belongs to the deacon to minister to the priests in whatever is done in Christ's
+                     sacraments, wherefore he dispenses Christ's blood. Secondly, there is the ministry directed to the disposal of the
+                     sacramental matter in the sacred vessels of the sacrament. and this belongs to subdeacons. Wherefore it is stated in the text
+                     (Sent. iv, D, 24) that they carry the vessels of our Lord's body and blood, and place the oblation on the altar; hence, when
+                     they are ordained, they receive the chalice, empty however, from the bishop's hands. Thirdly, there is the ministry directed
+                     to the proffering of the sacramental matter, and this belongs to the acolyte. For he, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D,
+                     24), prepares the cruet with wine and water; wherefore he receives an empty cruet. The ministry directed to the preparation
+                     of the recipients can be exercised only over the unclean, since those who are clean are already apt for receiving the sacraments.
+                     Now the unclean are of three kinds, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii). For some are absolute unbelievers and unwilling
+                     to believe; and these must be altogether debarred from beholding Divine things and from the assembly of the faithful;
+                     this belongs to the doorkeepers. Some, however, are willing to believe, but are not as yet instructed, namely catechumens,
+                     and to the instruction of such persons the Order of readers is directed, who are therefore entrusted with the reading of the
+                     first rudiments of the doctrine of faith, namely the Old Testament. But some are believers and instructed, yet lie under an
+                     impediment through the power of the devil, namely those who are possessed: and to this ministry the order of exorcists is
+                     directed. Thus the reason and number of the degrees of Orders is made clear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius is speaking of the orders not as sacraments, but as directed to hierarchical actions. Wherefore he distinguishes
+                     three Orders corresponding to those actions. The first of these Orders, namely the bishop, has all three actions; the second,
+                     namely the priest, has two; while the third has one, namely to cleanse; this is the deacon who is called a minister: and under
+                     this last all the lower Orders are comprised. But the Orders derive their
+                     sacramental nature from their relation to the greatest of the sacraments, and consequently the number of Orders depends on
+                     this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the early Church, on account of the fewness of ministers, all the lower ministries were entrusted to the deacons, as Dionysius
+                     says (Eccl. Hier. iii), where he says: "Some of the ministers stand at the closed door of the Church, others are otherwise
+                     occupied in the exercise of their own order; others place the sacred bread and the chalice of benediction on the altar and
+                     offer them to the priests." Nevertheless all the power to do all these things
+                     was included in the one power of the deacon, though implicitly. But afterwards the Divine worship developed, and the Church
+                     committed expressly to several persons that which had hitherto been committed implicitly in one Order. This is what the Master
+                     means, when He says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) that the Church instituted other Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The orders are directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist chiefly, and to the other sacraments consequently, for even the
+                     other sacraments flow from that which is contained in that sacrament. Hence it does not follow that the orders ought to be
+                     distinguished according to the sacraments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The angels differ specifically [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q37_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html">FP, Q[50], A[4]</a>]: for this reason it is possible for them to have various modes of receiving Divine things, and hence also they are divided
+                     into various hierarchies. But in men there is only one hierarchy, because they have only one mode of receiving Divine things,
+                     which results from the human species, namely through the images of sensible objects. Consequently the distinction of orders
+                     in
+                     the angels cannot bear any relation to a sacrament as it is with us, but only a relation to the hierarchical actions which
+                     among them each Order exercises on the Orders below. In this respect our Orders correspond to theirs; since in our hierarchy
+                     there are three Orders, distinguished according to the three hierarchical actions, even as in each angelic hierarchy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The office of psalmist is not an Order, but an office annexed to an Order. For the psalmist is also styled precentor because
+                     the psalms are recited with chant. Now precentor is not the name of a special Order, both because it belongs to the whole
+                     choir to sing, and because he has no special relation to the sacrament of the Eucharist. Since, however, it is a particular
+                     office, it is sometimes reckoned among the Orders, taking these in a broad
+                     sense.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q37_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q37_A3-p0.1">Whether the Order should be divided into those that are sacred and those that are not?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Orders ought not to be divided into those that are sacred and those that are not. For all the Orders
+                     are sacraments, and all the sacraments are sacred. Therefore all the Orders are sacred.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by the Orders of the Church a man is not appointed to any other than Divine offices. Now all these are sacred. Therefore
+                     all the Orders also are sacred.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The sacred Orders are an impediment to the contracting of marriage and annul the marriage that is already contracted. But
+                     the four lower orders neither impede the contracting nor annul the contract. Therefore these are not sacred Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> An Order is said to be sacred in two ways. First, in itself, and thus every order is sacred, since it is a sacrament. Secondly,
+                     by reason of the matter about which it exercises an act, and thus an Order is called sacred, if it exercises an act about
+                     some consecrated thing. In this sense there are only three sacred Orders, namely the priesthood and diaconate, which exercise
+                     an act about the consecrated body and blood of Christ, and the subdiaconate, which
+                     exercises an act about the consecrated vessels. Wherefore continency is enjoined them, that they who handle holy things may
+                     themselves be holy and clean.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p6"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p7"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p8"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q37_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q37_A4-p0.1">Whether the acts of the Orders are rightly assigned in the text?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the acts of the Orders are not rightly assigned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Because a person is prepared
+                     by absolution to receive Christ's body. Now the preparation of the recipients of a sacrament belongs to the lower Orders.
+                     Therefore absolution from sins is unfittingly reckoned among the acts of a priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man is made like to God immediately in Baptism, by receiving the character which causes this likeness. But prayer
+                     and the offering of oblations are acts directed immediately to God. Therefore every baptized person can perform these acts,
+                     and not priests alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, different Orders have different acts. But it belongs to the subdeacon to place the oblations on the altar, and to
+                     read the epistle; and subdeacons carry the cross before the Pope. Therefore these acts should not be assigned to the deacon.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the same truth is contained in the Old and in the New Testament. But it belongs to the readers to read the Old Testament.
+                     Therefore it should belong to them likewise, and not to deacons, to read the New Testament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the apostles preached naught else but the gospel of Christ (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.15" target="asv">Rom. 1:15</a>). But the teaching of the apostles is entrusted to subdeacons to be read by them. Therefore the Gospel teaching should be
+                     also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) that which belongs to a higher Order should not be applicable to a lower
+                     Order. But it is an act of subdeacons to minister with the cruets. Therefore it should not be assigned to acolytes.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, spiritual actions should rank above bodily actions. But the acolyte's act is merely corporeal. Therefore the exorcist
+                     has not the spiritual act of casting out devils, since he is of inferior rank.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, things that have most in common should be placed beside one another. Now the reading of the Old Testament must needs
+                     have most in common with the reading of the New Testament, which latter belongs to the higher ministers. Therefore the reading
+                     of the Old Testament should be reckoned the act, not of the reader, but rather of the acolyte; especially since the bodily
+                     light which the acolytes carry signifies the light of spiritual doctrine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, in every act of a special Order, there should be some special power, which the person ordained has to the exclusion
+                     of other persons. But in opening and shutting doors the doorkeeper has no special power that other men have not. Therefore
+                     this should not be reckoned their act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p11">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since the consecration conferred in the sacrament of orders is directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="XP_Q37_A4-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the principal act of each order is that whereby it is most nearly directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist. In this respect,
+                     too, one order ranks above another, in so far as one act is more nearly directed to that same sacrament. But because many
+                     things are directed to the Eucharist, as being the most
+                     exalted of the sacraments, it follows not unfittingly that one Order has many acts besides its principal act, and all the
+                     more, as it ranks higher, since a power extends to the more things, the higher it is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The preparation of the recipients of a sacrament is twofold. One is remote and is effected by the ministers: another is proximate,
+                     whereby they are rendered apt at once for receiving the sacraments. This latter belongs to priests, since even in natural
+                     things matter receives from one and the same agent both the ultimate disposition to the form, and the form itself. And since
+                     a person acquires the proximate disposition to the Eucharist by being
+                     cleansed from sin, it follows that the priest is the proper minister of all those sacraments which are chiefly instituted
+                     for the cleansing of sins, namely Baptism, Penance, and Extreme Unction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Acts are directed immediately to God in two ways; in one way on the part of one person only, for instance the prayers of
+                     individuals, vows, and so forth: such acts befit any baptized person. In another way on the part of the whole Church, and
+                     thus the priest alone exercises acts immediately directed to God; because to impersonate the whole Church belongs to him alone
+                     who consecrates the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of the universal Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The offerings made by the people are offered through the priest. Hence a twofold ministry is necessary with regard to offerings.
+                     One on the part of the people: and this belongs to the subdeacon who receives the offerings from the people and places them
+                     on the altar or offers them to the deacon. the other is on the part of the priest, and belongs to the deacon, who hands the
+                     offerings to the priest. This is the principal act of both Orders, and for
+                     this reason the deacon's Order is the higher. But to read the epistle does not belong to a deacon, except as the acts of lower
+                     Orders are ascribed to the higher; and in like manner to carry the cross. Moreover, this depends on the customs of Churches,
+                     because in secondary acts it is not unfitting for customs to vary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Doctrine is a remote preparation for the reception of a sacrament; wherefore the announcement of doctrine is entrusted to
+                     the ministers. But the doctrine of the Old Testament is more remote than that of the New Testament, since it contains no instruction
+                     about this sacrament except in figures. Hence announcing of the New Testament is entrusted to the higher ministers, and that
+                     of the Old Testament to the lower ministers. Moreover the doctrine of the
+                     New Testament is more perfect as delivered by our Lord Himself, than as made known by His apostles. Wherefore the Gospel is
+                     committed to deacons and the Epistle to subdeacons.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p16"> This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Acolytes exercise an act over the cruet alone, and not over the contents of the cruet; whereas the subdeacon exercises an
+                     act over the contents of the cruet, because he handles the water and wine to the end that they be put into the chalice,* and
+                     again he pours the water over the hands of the priest; and the deacon, like the subdeacon, exercises an act over the chalice
+                     only, not over its contents, whereas the priest exercises an act over the contents.
+                     [*The wording of St. Thomas is sufficiently vague to refer either to the Roman rite, where the priest pours the wine and water
+                     into the chalice, or to the Dominican rite, where this is done by the subdeacon.] Wherefore as the subdeacon at his ordination
+                     receives an empty chalice, while the priest receives a full chalice, so the acolyte receives an empty cruet, but the subdeacon
+                     a full one. Thus there is a certain connection among the Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The bodily acts of the acolyte are more intimately connected with the act of Holy orders than the act of the exorcist, although
+                     the latter is, in a fashion, spiritual. For the acolytes exercise a ministry over the vessels in which the sacramental matter
+                     is contained, as regards the wine, which needs a vessel to hold it on account of its humidity. Hence of all the minor orders
+                     the Order of acolytes is the highest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p19">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> The act of the acolyte is more closely connected with the principal acts of the higher ministers, than the acts of the other
+                     minor Orders, as is self-evident; and again as regards the secondary acts whereby they prepare the people by doctrine. For
+                     the acolyte by bearing a light represents the doctrine of the New Testament in a visible manner, while the reader by his recital
+                     represents it differently, wherefore the acolyte is of higher rank. It is the
+                     same with the exorcist, for as the act of the reader is compared with the secondary act of the deacon and subdeacon, so is
+                     the act of the exorcist compared with the secondary act of the priest, namely to bind and to loose, by which man is wholly
+                     freed from the slavery of the devil. This, too, shows the degrees of Order to be most orderly. since only the three higher
+                     Orders co-operate with the priest in his principal act which is to consecrate the body of Christ, while both the higher and
+                     lower
+                     Orders co-operate with him in his secondary act, which is to loose and bind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p20">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> Some say that in receiving the Order the doorkeeper is given a Divine power to debar others from entering the Church, even
+                     as Christ had, when He cast out the sellers from the Temple. But this belongs to a gratuitous grace rather than to a sacramental
+                     grace. Wherefore we should reply that he receives the power to do this by virtue of his office, although others may do so,
+                     but not officially. It is the case in all the acts of the minor Orders, that
+                     they can be lawfully exercised by others, even though these have no office to that effect: just as Mass may be said in an
+                     unconsecrated building, although the consecration of a church is directed to the purpose that Mass be said there.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p21"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p22"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q37_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q38.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q37_A5-p0.1">Whether the character is imprinted on a priest when the chalice is handed to him?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the character is not imprinted on the priest at the moment when the chalice is handed to him. For the
+                     consecration of a priest is done by anointing as in Confirmation. Now in Confirmation the character is imprinted at the moment
+                     of anointing; and therefore in the priesthood also and not at the handing of the chalice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, our Lord gave His disciples the priestly power when He said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.22" target="asv">Jn. 20:22,23</a>): "Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins you shall forgive," etc. Now the Holy Ghost is given by the imposition of hands.
+                     Therefore the character of order is given at the moment of the imposition of hands.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the ministers are consecrated, even so are the ministers' vestments. Now the blessing alone consecrates the vestments.
+                     Therefore the consecration of the priest also is effected by the mere blessing of the bishop.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as a chalice is handed to the priest, even so is the priestly vestment. Therefore if a character is imprinted at
+                     the giving of the chalice, so likewise is there at the giving of the chasuble, and thus a priest would have two characters:
+                     but this is false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the deacon's order is more closely allied to the priest's Order than is the subdeacon's. But if a character is imprinted
+                     on the priest at the moment of the handing of the chalice, the subdeacon would be more closely allied to the priest than the
+                     deacon; because the subdeacon receives the character at the handing of the chalice and not the deacon. Therefore the priestly
+                     character is not imprinted at the handing of the chalice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Order of acolytes approaches nearer to the priestly act by exercising an act over the cruet than by exercising
+                     an act over the torch. Yet the character is imprinted on the acolytes when they receive the torch rather than when they receive
+                     the cruet, because the name of acolyte signifies candle-bearer. Therefore the character is not imprinted on the priest when
+                     he receives the chalice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p8">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The principal act of the priest's Order is to consecrate Christ's body. Now he receives the power to this effect at the handing
+                     of the chalice. Therefore the character is imprinted on him then.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[4], ad 1), to cause the form and to give the matter its proximate preparation for the form belong to the
+                     same agent. Wherefore the bishop in conferring orders does two things; for he prepares the candidates for the reception of
+                     orders, and delivers to them the power of order. He prepares them, both by instructing them in their respective offices and
+                     by doing something to them, so that they may be adapted to receive the power. This
+                     preparation consists of three things, namely blessing, imposition of hands, and anointing. By the blessing they are enlisted
+                     in the Divine service, wherefore the blessing is given to all. By the imposition of hands the fulness of grace is given, whereby
+                     they are qualified for exalted duties, wherefore only deacons and priests receive the imposition of hands, because they are
+                     competent to dispense the sacraments, although the latter as principal dispensers, the former as ministers. But by the
+                     anointing they are consecrated for the purpose of handling the sacrament, wherefore the anointing is done to the priests alone
+                     who touch the body of Christ with their own hands; even as a chalice is anointed because it holds the blood, and the paten
+                     because it holds the body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p10"> The conferring of power is effected by giving them something pertaining to their proper act. And since the principal act
+                     of a priest is to consecrate the body and blood of Christ, the priestly character is imprinted at the very giving of the chalice
+                     under the prescribed form of words.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In Confirmation there is not given the office of exercising an act on an exterior matter, wherefore the character is not
+                     imprinted in that sacrament at the handing of some particular thing, but at the mere imposition of hands and anointing. But
+                     it is otherwise in the priestly Order, and consequently the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our Lord gave His disciples the priestly power, as regards the principal act, before His passion at the supper when He said:
+                     "Take ye and eat" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A5-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.26" target="asv">Mat. 26:26</a>), wherefore He added: "Do this for a commemoration of Me" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A5-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.19" target="asv">Lk. 22:19</a>). After the resurrection, however, He gave them the priestly power, as to its secondary act, which is to bind and loose.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Vestments require no other consecration except to be set aside for the Divine worship, wherefore the blessing suffices for
+                     their consecration. But it is different with those who are ordained, as explained above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The priestly vestment signifies, not the power given to the priest, but the aptitude required of him for exercising the act
+                     of that power. Wherefore a character is imprinted neither on the priest nor on anyone else at the giving of a vestment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The deacon's power is midway between the subdeacon's and the priest's. For the priest exercises a power directly on Christ's
+                     body, the subdeacon on the vessels only, and the deacon on Christ's body contained in a vessel. Hence it is not for him to
+                     touch Christ's body, but to carry the body on the paten, and to dispense the blood with the chalice. Consequently his power,
+                     as to the principal act, could not be expressed, either by the giving of the
+                     vessel only, or by the giving of the matter; and his power is expressed as to the secondary act alone, by his receiving the
+                     book of the Gospels, and this power is understood to contain the other; wherefore the character is impressed at the handing
+                     of the book.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The act of the acolyte whereby he serves with the cruet ranks before his act of carrying the torch; although he takes his
+                     name from the secondary act, because it is better known and more proper to him. Hence the acolyte receives the character when
+                     he is given the cruet, by virtue of the words uttered by the bishop.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p17"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p18"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q38.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q38" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q38-p0.1">OF THOSE WHO CONFER THIS SACRAMENT (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q38-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q38-p2"> We must now consider those who confer this sacrament. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q38-p3"> (1) Whether a bishop alone can confer this sacrament?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q38-p4"> (2) Whether a heretic or any other person cut off from the Church can confer this sacrament?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q38_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q38.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q38_A1-p0.1">Whether a bishop alone confers the sacrament of Order?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not only a bishop confers the sacrament of Order. For the imposition of hands has something to do with
+                     the consecration. Now not only the bishop but also the assisting priests lay hands on the priests who are being ordained.
+                     Therefore not only a bishop confers the sacrament of Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man receives the power of Order, when that which pertains to the act of his Order is handed to him. Now the cruet
+                     with water, bowl* and towel, are given to the subdeacon by the archdeacon; as also the candlestick with candle, and the empty
+                     cruet to the acolyte. [*"Bacili." The rubric has "aquamanili." Some texts of the Summa have "mantili" ("maniple"), but the
+                     archdeacon does not give the maniple to the subdeacon.] Therefore not only the bishop
+                     confers the sacrament of Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which belongs to an Order cannot be entrusted to one who has not the Order. Now the conferring of minor Orders
+                     is entrusted to certain persons who are not bishops, for instance to Cardinal priests. Therefore the conferring of Orders
+                     does not belong to the episcopal Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever is entrusted with the principal is entrusted with the accessory also. Now the sacrament of Order is directed
+                     to the Eucharist, as accessory to principal. Since then a priest consecrates the Eucharist, he can also confer Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, there is a greater distinction between a priest and a deacon than between bishop and bishop. But a bishop can consecrate
+                     a bishop. Therefore a priest can ordain a deacon.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ministers are applied by their Orders to the Divine worship in a more noble way than the sacred vessels. But the consecration
+                     of the vessels belongs to a bishop only. Much more therefore does the consecration of ministers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p8"> Further, the sacrament of Order ranks higher than the sacrament of Confirmation. Now a bishop alone confirms. Much more therefore
+                     does a bishop alone confer the sacrament of Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p9"> Further, virgins are not placed in a degree of spiritual power by their consecration, as the ordained are. Yet a bishop alone
+                     can consecrate a virgin. Therefore much more can he alone ordain.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p10">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The episcopal power stands in the same relation to the power of the lower Orders, as political science, which seeks the common
+                     good, to the lower acts and virtues which seek some special good, as appears from what was said above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q38_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q37_A1.html">Q[37], A[1]</a>). Now political science, as stated in Ethic. i, 2, lays down the law to lower sciences, namely what science each one ought
+                     to cultivate, and how far he should pursue it and in what way. Wherefore
+                     it belongs to a bishop to assign others to places in all the Divine services. Hence he alone confirms, because those who are
+                     confirmed receive the office, as it were, of confessing the faith; again he alone blesses virgins who are images of the Church,
+                     Christ's spouse, the care of which is entrusted chiefly to him; and he it is who consecrates the candidates for ordination
+                     to the ministry of Orders, and, by his consecration, appoints the vessels that they are to use; even as secular offices in
+                     various cities are allotted by him who holds the highest power, for instance by the king.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q38_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q37_A5.html">Q[37], A[5]</a>), at the imposition of hands there is given, not the character of the priestly Order, but grace which makes a man fit to
+                     exercise his Order. And since those who are raised to the priesthood need most copious grace, the priests together with the
+                     bishop lay hands on them, but the bishop alone lays hands on deacons.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the archdeacon is as it were minister-in-chief, all things pertaining to the ministry are handed by him, for instance
+                     the candle with which the acolyte serves the deacon by carrying it before him at the Gospel, and the cruet with which he serves
+                     the subdeacon; and in like manner he gives the subdeacon the things with which the latter serves the higher Orders. And yet
+                     the principal act of the subdeacon does not consist in these things, but in his
+                     co-operation as regards the matter of the sacrament; wherefore he receives the character through the chalice being handed
+                     to him by the bishop. On the other hand, the acolyte receives the character by virtue of the words of the bishop when the
+                     aforesaid things---the cruet rather than the candlestick---are handed to him by the archdeacon. Hence it does not follow that
+                     the archdeacon ordains.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Pope, who has the fulness of episcopal power, can entrust one who is not a bishop with things pertaining to the episcopal
+                     dignity, provided they bear no immediate relation to the true body of Christ. Hence by virtue of his commission a simple priest
+                     can confer the minor Orders and confirm; but not one who is not a priest. Nor can a priest confer the higher Orders which
+                     bear an immediate relation to Christ's body, over the consecration of which the
+                     Pope's power is no greater than that of a simple priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the Eucharist is in itself the greatest of the sacraments, it does not place a man in an office as does the sacrament
+                     of Order. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In order to bestow what one has on another, it is necessary not only to be near him but also to have fulness of power. And
+                     since a priest has not fulness of power in the hierarchical offices, as a bishop has, it does not follow that he can raise
+                     others to the diaconate, although the latter Order is near to his.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q38.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q38_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q38_A2-p0.1">Whether heretics and those who are cut off from the Church can confer Orders? [*Cf. TP, Q[64], AA[5],9] </h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heretics and those who are cut off from the Church cannot confer Orders. For to confer Orders is a greater
+                     thing than to loose or bind anyone. But a heretic cannot loose or bind. Neither therefore can he ordain.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a priest that is separated from the Church can consecrate, because the character whence he derives this power remains
+                     in him indelibly. But a bishop receives no character when he is raised to the episcopate. Therefore he does not necessarily
+                     retain the episcopal power after his separation from the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in no community can one who is expelled therefrom dispose of the offices of the community. Now Orders are offices
+                     of the Church. Therefore one who is outside the Church cannot confer Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the sacraments derive their efficacy from Christ's passion. Now a heretic is not united to Christ's passion; neither
+                     by his own faith, since he is an unbeliever, nor by the faith of the Church, since he is severed from the Church. Therefore
+                     he cannot confer the sacrament of Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a blessing is necessary in the conferring of Orders. But a heretic cannot bless; in fact his blessing is turned
+                     into a curse, as appears from the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 25). Therefore he cannot ordain.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> When a bishop who has fallen into heresy is reconciled he is not reconsecrated. Therefore he did not lose the power which
+                     he had of conferring Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p8"> Further, the power to ordain is greater than the power of Orders. But the power of Orders is not forfeited on account of
+                     heresy and the like. Neither therefore is the power to ordain.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p9"> Further, as the one who baptizes exercises a merely outward ministry, so does one who ordains, while God works inwardly.
+                     But one who is cut off from the Church by no means loses the power to baptize. Neither therefore does he lose the power to
+                     ordain.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p10">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> on this question four opinions are mentioned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 25). For some said that heretics, so long as they
+                     are tolerated by the Church, retain the power to ordain, but not after they have been cut off from the Church; as neither
+                     do those who have been degraded and the like. This is the first opinion. Yet this is impossible, because, happen what may,
+                     no power that is given with a consecration can be taken away so long as the thing itself
+                     remains, any more than the consecration itself can be annulled, for even an altar or chrism once consecrated remains consecrated
+                     for ever. Wherefore, since the episcopal power is conferred by consecration, it must needs endure for ever, however much a
+                     man may sin or be cut off from the Church. For this reason others said that those who are cut off from the Church after having
+                     episcopal power in the Church, retain the power to ordain and raise others, but that those who are raised by them have
+                     not this power. This is the fourth opinion. But this again is impossible, for if those who were ordained in the Church retain
+                     the power they received, it is clear that by exercising their power they consecrate validly, and therefore they validly confer
+                     whatever power is given with that consecration, and thus those who receive ordination or promotion from them have the same
+                     power as they. Wherefore others said that even those who are cut off from the Church can confer Orders and the other
+                     sacraments, provided they observe the due form and intention, both as to the first effect, which is the conferring of the
+                     sacrament, and as to the ultimate effect which is the conferring of grace. This is the second opinion. But this again is inadmissible,
+                     since by the very fact that a person communicates in the sacraments with a heretic who is cut off from the Church, he sins,
+                     and thus approaches the sacrament insincerely and cannot obtain grace, except perhaps in Baptism in a case of
+                     necessity. Hence others say that they confer the sacraments validly, but do not confer grace with them, not that the sacraments
+                     are lacking in efficacy, but on account of the sins of those who receive the sacraments from such persons despite the prohibition
+                     of the Church. This is the third and the true opinion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The effect of absolution is nothing else but the forgiveness of sins which results from grace, and consequently a heretic
+                     cannot absolve, as neither can he confer grace in the sacraments. Moreover in order to give absolution it is necessary to
+                     have jurisdiction, which one who is cut off from the Church has not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man is raised to the episcopate he receives a power which he retains for ever. This, however, cannot be called a character,
+                     because a man is not thereby placed in direct relation to God, but to Christ's mystical body. Nevertheless it remains indelibly
+                     even as the character, because it is given by consecration.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who are ordained by heretics, although they receive an Order, do not receive the exercise thereof, so as to minister
+                     lawfully in their Orders, for the very reason indicated in the Objection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> They are united to the passion of Christ by the faith of the Church, for although in themselves they are severed from it,
+                     they are united to it as regards the form of the Church which they observe.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> This refers to the ultimate effect of the sacraments, as the third opinion maintains.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q39" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q39-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO THIS SACRAMENT (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q39-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q39-p2"> We must next consider the impediments to this sacrament. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q39-p3"> (1) Whether the female sex is an impediment to receiving this sacrament?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q39-p4"> (2) Whether lack of the use of reason is?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q39-p5"> (3) Whether the state of slavery is?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q39-p6"> (4) Whether homicide is?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q39-p7"> (5) Whether illegitimate birth is?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q39-p8"> (6) Whether lack of members is?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q39_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q39_A1-p0.1">Whether the female sex is an impediment to receiving Orders?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the female sex is no impediment to receiving Orders. For the office of prophet is greater than the office
+                     of priest, since a prophet stands midway between God and priests, just as the priest does between God and people. Now the
+                     office of prophet was sometimes granted to women, as may be gathered from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 22:14.</a> Therefore the office of priest also may be competent to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as Order pertains to a kind of pre-eminence, so does a position of authority as well as martyrdom and the religious
+                     state. Now authority is entrusted to women in the New Testament, as in the case of abbesses, and in the Old Testament, as
+                     in the case of Debbora, who judged Israel (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Judg.2" target="asv">Judges 2</a>). Moreover martyrdom and the religious life are also befitting to them. Therefore the Orders of the Church are also competent
+                     to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the power of orders is founded in the soul. But sex is not in the soul. Therefore difference in sex makes no difference
+                     to the reception of Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.12" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:12</a>): "I suffer not a woman to teach (in the Church),* nor to use authority over the man." [*The words in parenthesis are from
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.34" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:34, </a> "Let women keep silence in the churches."]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p6"> Further, the crown is required previous to receiving Orders, albeit not for the validity of the sacrament. But the crown
+                     or tonsure is not befitting to women according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 11</a>. Neither therefore is the receiving of Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Certain things are required in the recipient of a sacrament as being requisite for the validity of the sacrament, and if
+                     such things be lacking, one can receive neither the sacrament nor the reality of the sacrament. Other things, however, are
+                     required, not for the validity of the sacrament, but for its lawfulness, as being congruous to the sacrament; and without
+                     these one receives the sacrament, but not the reality of the sacrament. Accordingly we must say
+                     that the male sex is required for receiving Orders not only in the second, but also in the first way. Wherefore even though
+                     a woman were made the object of all that is done in conferring Orders, she would not receive Orders, for since a sacrament
+                     is a sign, not only the thing, but the signification of the thing, is required in all sacramental actions; thus it was stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q39_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q32_A2.html">Q[32], A[2]</a>) that in Extreme Unction it is necessary to have a sick man, in order to signify
+                     the need of healing. Accordingly, since it is not possible in the female sex to signify eminence of degree, for a woman is
+                     in the state of subjection, it follows that she cannot receive the sacrament of Order. Some, however, have asserted that the
+                     male sex is necessary for the lawfulness and not for the validity of the sacrament, because even in the Decretals (cap. Mulieres
+                     dist. 32; cap. Diaconissam, 27, qu. i) mention is made of deaconesses and priestesses. But deaconess there denotes a woman
+                     who shares in some act of a deacon, namely who reads the homilies in the Church; and priestess [presbytera] means a widow,
+                     for the word "presbyter" means elder.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prophecy is not a sacrament but a gift of God. Wherefore there it is not the signification, but only the thing which is necessary.
+                     And since in matters pertaining to the soul woman does not differ from man as to the thing (for sometimes a woman is found
+                     to be better than many men as regards the soul), it follows that she can receive the gift of prophecy and the like, but not
+                     the sacrament of Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p9"> And thereby appears the Reply to the Second and Third Objections. However, as to abbesses, it is said that they have not
+                     ordinary authority, but delegated as it were, on account of the danger of men and women living together. But Debbora exercised
+                     authority in temporal, not in priestly matters, even as now woman may have temporal power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q39_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q39_A2-p0.1">Whether boys and those who lack the use of reason can receive Orders?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that boys and those who lack the use of reason cannot receive Orders. For, as stated in the text (Sent. iv,
+                     D, 25), the sacred canons have appointed a certain fixed age in those who receive Orders. But this would not be if boys could
+                     receive the sacrament of Orders. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sacrament of Orders ranks above the sacrament of matrimony. Now children and those who lack the use of reason
+                     cannot contract matrimony. Neither therefore can they receive Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, act and power are in the same subject, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vigil. i). Now the act of Orders
+                     requires the use of reason. Therefore the power of Orders does also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> one who is raised to Orders before the age of discretion is sometimes allowed to exercise them without being reordained,
+                     as appears from Extra., De Cler. per salt. prom. But this would not be the case if he had not received Orders. Therefore a
+                     boy can receive Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p6"> Further, boys can receive other sacraments in which a character is imprinted, namely Baptism and Confirmation. Therefore
+                     in like manner they can receive Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Boyhood and other defects which remove the use of reason occasion an impediment to act. Wherefore the like are unfit to receive
+                     all those sacraments which require an act on the part of the recipient of the sacrament, such as Penance, Matrimony, and so
+                     forth. But since infused powers like natural powers precede acts---although acquired powers follow acts---and the removal
+                     of that which comes after does not entail the removal of what comes first, it follows
+                     that children and those who lack the use of reason can receive all the sacraments in which an act on the part of the recipient
+                     is not required for the validity of the sacrament, but some spiritual power is conferred from above; with this difference,
+                     however, that in the minor orders the age of discretion is required out of respect for the dignity of the sacrament, but not
+                     for its lawfulness, nor for its validity. Hence some can without sin be raised to the minor orders before the years of
+                     discretion, if there be an urgent reason for it and hope of their proficiency. and they are validly ordained; for although
+                     at the time they are not qualified for the offices entrusted to them, they will become qualified by being habituated thereto.
+                     For the higher Orders, however, the use of reason is required both out of respect for, and for the lawfulness of the sacrament,
+                     not only on account of the vow of continency annexed thereto, but also because the handling of the sacraments is entrusted
+                     to them [*See Acts of the Council of Trent: De Reform., Sess. xxii, cap. 4,11,12]. But for the episcopate whereby a man receives
+                     power also over the mystical body, the act of accepting the pastoral care of souls is required; wherefore the use of reason
+                     is necessary for the validity of episcopal consecration. Some, however, maintain that the use of reason is necessary for the
+                     validity of the sacrament in all the Orders. but this statement is not confirmed either by authority or by reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in the Article, not all that is necessary for the lawfulness of a sacrament is required for its validity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The cause of matrimony is consent, which cannot be without the use of reason. Whereas in the reception of Orders no act is
+                     required on the part of the recipients since no act on their part is expressed in their consecration. Hence there is no comparison.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Act and power are in the same subject; yet sometimes a power, such as the free-will, precedes its act; and thus it is in
+                     the case in point.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q39_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q39_A3-p0.1">Whether the state of slavery is an impediment to receiving Orders?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the state of slavery is not an impediment to receiving Orders. For corporal subjection is not incompatible
+                     with spiritual authority. But in a slave there is corporal subjection. Therefore he is not hindered from receiving the spiritual
+                     authority which is given in orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is an occasion for humility should not be an impediment to the reception of a sacrament. Now such is
+                     slavery, for the Apostle counsels a man, if possible, rather to remain in slavery (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.21" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:21</a>). Therefore it should not hinder him from being raised to Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is more disgraceful for a cleric to become a slave than for a slave to be made a cleric. Yet a cleric may lawfully
+                     be sold as a slave; for a bishop of Nola, Paulinus, to wit, sold himself as a slave as related by Gregory (Dial. iii). Much
+                     more therefore can a slave be made a cleric.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, It would seem that it is an impediment to the validity of the sacrament. For a woman, on account of her
+                     subjection, cannot receive the sacrament of Orders. But greater still is the subjection in a slave; since woman was not given
+                     to man as his handmaid (for which reason she was not made from his feet). Therefore neither can a slave receive this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a man, from the fact that he receives an Order, is bound to minister in that Order. But he cannot at the same time
+                     serve his carnal master and exercise his spiritual ministry. Therefore it would seem that he cannot receive Orders, since
+                     the master must be indemnified.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> By receiving Orders a man pledges himself to the Divine offices. And since no man can give what is not his, a slave who has
+                     not the disposal of himself, cannot be raised to Orders. If, however, he be raised, he receives the Order, because freedom
+                     is not required for the validity of the sacrament, although it is requisite for its lawfulness, since it hinders not the power,
+                     but the act only. The same reason applies to all who are under an obligation to others,
+                     such as those who are in debt and like persons.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reception of spiritual power involves also an obligation to certain bodily actions, and consequently it is hindered by
+                     bodily subjection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man may take an occasion for humility from many other things which do not prove a hindrance to the exercise of Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The blessed Paulinus did this out of the abundance of his charity, being led by the spirit of God; as was proved by the result
+                     of his action, since by his becoming a slave, many of his flock were freed from slavery. Hence we must not draw a conclusion
+                     from this particular instance, since "where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:17</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sacramental signs signify by reason of their natural likeness. Now a woman is a subject by her nature, whereas a slave
+                     is not. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> If he be ordained, his master knowing and not dissenting, by this very fact he becomes a freedman. But if his master be in
+                     ignorance, the bishop and he who presented him are bound to pay the master double the slave's value, if they knew him to be
+                     a slave. Otherwise if the slave has possessions of his own, he is bound to buy his freedom, else he would have to return to
+                     the bondage of his master, notwithstanding the impossibility of his exercising his
+                     Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q39_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q39_A4-p0.1">Whether a man should be debarred from receiving Orders on account of homicide?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man ought not to be debarred from receiving Orders on account of homicide. Because our Orders originated
+                     with the office of the Levites, as stated in the previous Distinction (Sent. iv, D, 24). But the Levites consecrated their
+                     hands by shedding the blood of their brethren (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.29" target="asv">Ex. 32:29</a>). Therefore neither should anyone in the New Testament be debarred from receiving Orders on account of the shedding of blood.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one should be debarred from a sacrament on account of an act of virtue. Now blood is sometimes shed for justice'
+                     sake, for instance by a judge; and he who has the office would sin if he did not shed it. Therefore he is not hindered on
+                     that account from receiving Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, punishment is not due save for a fault. Now sometimes a person commits homicide without fault, for instance by defending
+                     himself, or again by mishap. Therefore he ought not to incur the punishment of irregularity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Against this there are many canonical statutes [*Cap. Miror; cap. Clericum; cap. De his Cler., dist. 1; cap. Continebatur,
+                     De homic. volunt.], as also the custom of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> All the Orders bear a relation to the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of the peace vouchsafed to us by
+                     the shedding of Christ's blood. And since homicide is most opposed to peace, and those who slay are conformed to Christ's
+                     slayers rather than to Christ slain, to whom all the ministers of the aforesaid sacrament ought to be conformed, it follows
+                     that it is unlawful, although not invalid, for homicides to be raised to Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Old Law inflicted the punishment of blood, whereas the New Law does not. Hence the comparison fails between the ministers
+                     of the Old Testament and those of the New, which is a sweet yoke and a light burden (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.30" target="asv">Mat. 11:30</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irregularity is incurred not only on account of sin, but chiefly on account of a person being unfit to administer the sacrament
+                     of the Eucharist. Hence the judge and all who take part with him in a cause of blood, are irregular, because the shedding
+                     of blood is unbecoming to the ministers of that sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No one does a thing without being the cause thereof, and in man this is something voluntary. Hence he who by mishap slays
+                     a man without knowing that it is a man, is not called a homicide, nor does he incur irregularity (unless he was occupying
+                     himself in some unlawful manner, or failed to take sufficient care, since in this case the slaying becomes somewhat voluntary).
+                     But this is not because he is not in fault, since irregularity is incurred even
+                     without fault. Wherefore even he who in a particular case slays a man in self-defense without committing a sin, is none the
+                     less irregular [*St. Thomas is speaking according to the canon law of his time. This is no longer the case now.].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q39_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q39_A5-p0.1">Whether those of illegitimate birth should be debarred from receiving Orders?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those who are of illegitimate birth should not be debarred from receiving Orders. For the son should not
+                     bear the iniquity of the father (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>); and yet he would if this were an impediment to his receiving Orders. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one's own fault is a greater impediment than the fault of another. Now unlawful intercourse does not always debar
+                     a man from receiving Orders. Therefore neither should he be debarred by the unlawful intercourse of his father.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.2" target="asv">Dt. 23:2</a>): "A mamzer, that is to say, one born of a prostitute, shall not enter into the Church of the Lord until the tenth generation."
+                     Much less therefore should he be ordained.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Those who are ordained are placed in a position of dignity over others. Hence by a kind of propriety it is requisite that
+                     they should be without reproach, not for the validity but for the lawfulness of the sacrament, namely that they should be
+                     of good repute, bedecked with a virtuous life, and not publicly penitent. And since a man's good name is bedimmed by a sinful
+                     origin, therefore those also who are born of an unlawful union are debarred from receiving
+                     orders, unless they receive a dispensation; and this is the more difficult to obtain, according as their origin is more discreditable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Irregularity is not a punishment due for sin. Hence it is clear that those who are of illegitimate birth do not bear the
+                     iniquity of their father through being irregular.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What a man does by his own act can be removed by repentance and by a contrary act; not so the things which are from nature.
+                     Hence the comparison fails between sinful act and sinful origin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q39_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q39_A6-p0.1">Whether lack of members should be an impediment?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man ought not to be debarred from receiving Orders on account of a lack of members. For one who is afflicted
+                     should not receive additional affliction. Therefore a man ought not to be deprived of the degree of Orders on account of his
+                     suffering a bodily defect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, integrity of discretion is more necessary for the act of orders than integrity of body. But some can be ordained
+                     before the years of discretion. Therefore they can also be ordained though deficient in body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The like were debarred from the ministry of the Old Law (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.21.18" target="asv">Lev. 21:18, </a> seqq.). Much more therefore should they be debarred in the New Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p5"> We shall speak of bigamy in the treatise on Matrimony (
+                     <a id="XP_Q39_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q66.html">Q[66])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As appears from what we have said above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q39_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q39_A3.html">AA[3]</a>,4,5), a man is disqualified from receiving Orders, either on account of an impediment to the act, or on account of an impediment
+                     affecting his personal comeliness. Hence he who suffers from a lack of members is debarred from receiving Orders, if the defect
+                     be such as to cause a notable blemish, whereby a man's comeliness is bedimmed (for instance if his nose be cut off) or the
+                     exercise
+                     of his Order imperilled; otherwise he is not debarred. This integrity, however, is necessary for the lawfulness and not for
+                     the validity of the sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p7"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q40" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q40-p0.1">OF THE THINGS ANNEXED TO THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER (SEVEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q40-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q40-p2"> We must now consider the things that are annexed to the sacrament of Order. Under this head there are seven points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q40-p3"> (1) Whether those who are ordained ought to be shaven and tonsured in the form of a crown?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q40-p4"> (2) Whether the tonsure is an Order?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q40-p5"> (3) Whether by receiving the tonsure one renounces temporal goods?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q40-p6"> (4) Whether above the priestly Order there should be an episcopal power?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q40-p7"> (5) Whether the episcopate is an Order?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q40-p8"> (6) Whether in the Church there can be any power above the episcopate?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q40-p9"> (7) Whether the vestments of the ministers are fittingly instituted by the Church?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q40_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q40_A1-p0.1">Whether those who are ordained ought to wear the tonsure?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those who are ordained ought not to wear the tonsure in the shape of a crown. For the Lord threatened
+                     captivity and dispersion to those who were shaven in this way: "Of the captivity of the bare head of the enemies" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.42" target="asv">Dt. 32:42</a>), and: "I will scatter into every wind them that have their hair cut round" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.49.32" target="asv">Jer. 49:32</a>). Now the ministers of Christ should not be captives, but free. Therefore shaving and
+                     tonsure in the shape of a crown does not become them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the truth should correspond to the figure. Now the crown was prefigured in the Old Law by the tonsure of the Nazarenes,
+                     as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore since the Nazarenes were not ordained to the Divine ministry, it would
+                     seem that the ministers of the Church should not receive the tonsure or shave the head in the form of a crown. The same would
+                     seem to follow from the fact that lay brothers, who are not ministers of the Church,
+                     receive a tonsure in the religious Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the hair signifies superabundance, because it grows from that which is superabundant. But the ministers of the Church
+                     should cast off all superabundance. Therefore they should shave the head completely and not in the shape of a crown.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Gregory, "to serve God is to reign" (Super 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.101.23" target="asv"> Ps. 101:23</a>). Now a crown is the sign of royalty. Therefore a crown is becoming to those who are devoted to the Divine ministry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p6"> Further, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:15, </a> hair is given us "for a covering." But the ministers of the altar should have the mind uncovered. Therefore the tonsure is
+                     becoming to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is becoming for those who apply themselves to the Divine ministry to be shaven or tonsured in the form of a crown by reason
+                     of the shape. Because a crown is the sign of royalty; and of perfection, since it is circular; and those who are appointed
+                     to the Divine service acquire a royal dignity and ought to be perfect in virtue. It is also becoming to them as it involves
+                     the hair being taken both from the higher part of the head by shaving, lest their mind
+                     be hindered by temporal occupations from contemplating Divine things, and from the lower part by clipping, lest their senses
+                     be entangled in temporal things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Lord threatens those who did this for the worship of demons.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The things that were done in the Old Testament represent imperfectly the things of the New Testament. Hence things pertaining
+                     to the ministers of the New Testament were signified not only by the offices of the Levites, but also by all those persons
+                     who professed some degree of perfection. Now the Nazarenes professed a certain perfection by having their hair cut off, thus
+                     signifying their contempt of temporal things, although they did not have it cut
+                     in the shape of a crown, but cut it off completely, for as yet it was not the time of the royal and perfect priesthood. In
+                     like manner lay brothers have their hair cut because they renounce temporalities. but they do not shave the head, because
+                     they are not occupied in the Divine ministry, so as to have to contemplate Divine things with the mind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not only the renunciation of temporalities, but also the royal dignity has to be signified by the form of a crown; wherefore
+                     the hair should not be cut off entirely. Another reason is that this would be unbecoming.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q40_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q40_A2-p0.1">Whether the tonsure is an Order?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the tonsure is an Order. For in the acts of the Church the spiritual corresponds to the corporal. Now
+                     the tonsure is a corporal sign employed by the Church. Therefore seemingly there is some interior signification corresponding
+                     thereto; so that a person receives a character when he receives the tonsure, and consequently the latter is an Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as Confirmation and the other Orders are given by a bishop alone, so is the tonsure. Now a character is imprinted
+                     in Confirmation, and the other Orders. Therefore one is imprinted likewise in receiving the tonsure. Therefore the same conclusion
+                     follows.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Order denotes a degree of dignity. Now a cleric by the very fact of being a cleric is placed on a degree above the
+                     people. Therefore the tonsure by which he is made a cleric is an Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No Order is given except during the celebration of Mass. But the tonsure is given even outside the office of the Mass. Therefore
+                     it is not an Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p6"> Further, in the conferring of every Order mention is made of some power granted, but not in the conferring of the tonsure.
+                     Therefore it is not an Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The ministers of the Church are severed from the people in order that they may give themselves entirely to the Divine worship.
+                     Now in the Divine worship are certain actions that have to be exercised by virtue of certain definite powers, and for this
+                     purpose the spiritual power of order is given; while other actions are performed by the whole body of ministers in common,
+                     for instance the recital of the Divine praises. For such things it is not necessary to
+                     have the power of Order, but only to be deputed to such an office; and this is done by the tonsure. Consequently it is not
+                     an Order but a preamble to Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The tonsure has some spiritual thing inwardly corresponding to it, as signate corresponds to sign; but this is not a spiritual
+                     power. Wherefore a character is not imprinted in the tonsure as in an Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a man does not receive a character in the tonsure, nevertheless he is appointed to the Divine worship. Hence this
+                     appointment should be made by the supreme minister, namely the bishop, who moreover blesses the vestments and vessels and
+                     whatsoever else is employed in the Divine worship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A man through being a cleric is in a higher state than a layman; but as regards power he has not the higher degree that is
+                     required for Orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q40_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q40_A3-p0.1">Whether by receiving the tonsure a man renounces temporal goods?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men renounce temporal goods by receiving the tonsure, for when they are tonsured they say: "The Lord is
+                     the portion of my inheritance." But as Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot.), "the Lord disdains to be made a portion together with
+                     these temporal things." Therefore he renounces temporalities.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the justice of the ministers of the New Testament ought to abound more than that of the ministers of the Old Testament
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv">Mat. 5:20</a>). But the ministers of the Old Testament, namely the Levites, did not receive a portion of inheritance with their brethren
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.10" target="asv">Dt. 10</a>; 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A3-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.18" target="asv">Dt. 18</a>). Therefore neither should the ministers of the New Testament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Hugh says (De Sacram. ii) that "after a man is made a cleric, he must from thenceforward live on the pay of the
+                     Church." But this would not be so were he to retain his patrimony. Therefore he would seem to renounce it by becoming a cleric.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Jeremias was of the priestly order (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.1.1" target="asv">Jer. 1:1</a>). Yet he retained possession of his inheritance (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.32.8" target="asv">Jer. 32:8</a>). Therefore clerics can retain their patrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p6"> Further, if this were not so there would seem to be no difference between religious and the secular clergy.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Clerics by receiving the tonsure, do not renounce their patrimony or other temporalities; since the possession of earthly
+                     things is not contrary to the Divine worship to which clerics are appointed, although excessive care for such things is; for
+                     as Gregory says (Moral. x, 30), "it is not wealth but the love of wealth that is sinful."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 11:</b> The Lord disdains to be a portion as being loved equally with other things, so that a man place his end in God and the things
+                     of the world. He does not, however, disdain to be the portion of those who so possess the things of the world as not to be
+                     withdrawn thereby from the Divine worship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the Old Testament the Levites had a right to their paternal inheritance; and the reason why they did not receive a portion
+                     with the other tribes was because they were scattered throughout all the tribes, which would have been impossible if, like
+                     the other tribes, they had received one fixed portion of the soil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Clerics promoted to holy orders, if they be poor, must be provided for by the bishop who ordained them; otherwise he is not
+                     so bound. And they are bound to minister to the Church in the Order they have received. The words of Hugh refer to those who
+                     have no means of livelihood.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q40_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q40_A4-p0.1">Whether above the priestly Order there ought to be an episcopal power?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there ought not to be an episcopal power above the priestly Order. For as stated in the text (Sent. iv,
+                     D, 24) "the priestly Order originated from Aaron." Now in the Old Law there was no one above Aaron. Therefore neither in the
+                     New Law ought there to be any power above that of the priests.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, powers rank according to acts. Now no sacred act can be greater than to consecrate the body of Christ, whereunto
+                     the priestly power is directed. Therefore there should not be an episcopal above the priestly power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the priest, in offering, represents Christ in the Church, Who offered Himself for us to the Father. Now no one is
+                     above Christ in the Church, since He is the Head of the Church. Therefore there should not be an episcopal above the priestly
+                     power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A power is so much the higher according as it extends to more things. Now the priestly power, according to Dionysius (Eccl.
+                     Hier. v), extends only to cleansing and enlightening, whereas the episcopal power extends both to this and to perfecting.
+                     Therefore the episcopal should be above the priestly power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p6"> Further, the Divine ministries should be more orderly than human ministries. Now the order of human ministries requires that
+                     in each office there should be one person to preside, just as a general is placed over soldiers. Therefore there should also
+                     be appointed over priests one who is the chief priest, and this is the bishop. Therefore the episcopal should be above the
+                     priestly power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A priest has two acts: one is the principal, namely to consecrate the body of Christ. the other is secondary, namely to prepare
+                     God's people for the reception of this sacrament, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q40_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html">Q[37], AA[2]</a>,4). As regards the first act, the priest's power does not depend on a higher power save God's; but as to the second, it depends
+                     on a higher and that a human power. For every power that cannot exercise its act without certain
+                     ordinances, depends on the power that makes those ordinances. Now a priest cannot loose and bind, except we presuppose him
+                     to have the jurisdiction of authority, whereby those whom he absolves are subject to him. But he can consecrate any matter
+                     determined by Christ, nor is anything else required for the validity of the sacrament; although, on account of a certain congruousness,
+                     the act of the bishop is pre-required in the consecration of the altar, vestments, and so forth. Hence it is clear
+                     that it behooves the episcopal to be above the priestly power, as regards the priest's secondary act, but not as regards his
+                     primary act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aaron was both priest and pontiff, that is chief priest. Accordingly the priestly power originated from him, in so far as
+                     he was a priest offering sacrifices, which was lawful even to the lesser priests; but it does not originate from him as pontiff,
+                     by which power he was able to do certain things; for instance, to enter once a year the Holy of Holies, which it was unlawful
+                     for the other priests to do.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is no higher power with regard to this act, but with regard to another, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the perfections of all natural things pre-exist in God as their exemplar, so was Christ the exemplar of all ecclesiastical
+                     offices. Wherefore each minister of the Church is, in some respect, a copy of Christ, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D,
+                     24). Yet he is the higher who represents Christ according to a greater perfection. Now a priest represents Christ in that
+                     He fulfilled a certain ministry by Himself, whereas a bishop represents Him in
+                     that He instituted other ministers and founded the Church. Hence it belongs to a bishop to dedicate a thing to the Divine
+                     offices, as establishing the Divine worship after the manner of Christ. For this reason also a bishop is especially called
+                     the bridegroom of the Church even as Christ is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q40_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q40_A5-p0.1">Whether the episcopate is an Order?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the episcopate is an Order. First of all, because Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) assigns these three orders
+                     to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the bishop, the priest, and the minister. In the text also (Sent. iv, D, 24) it is stated
+                     that the episcopal Order is fourfold.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Order is nothing else but a degree of power in the dispensing of spiritual things. Now bishops can dispense certain
+                     sacraments which priests cannot dispense, namely Confirmation and Order. Therefore the episcopate is an Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the Church there is no spiritual power other than of Order or jurisdiction. But things pertaining to the episcopal
+                     power are not matters of jurisdiction, else they might be committed to one who is not a bishop, which is false. Therefore
+                     they belong to the power of Order. Therefore the bishop has an Order which a simple priest has not; and thus the episcopate
+                     is an Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> One Order does not depend on a preceding order as regards the validity of the sacrament. But the episcopal power depends
+                     on the priestly power, since no one can receive the episcopal power unless he have previously the priestly power. Therefore
+                     the episcopate is not an Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p6"> Further, the greater Orders are not conferred except on Saturdays [*The four Ember Saturdays]. But the episcopal power is
+                     bestowed on Sundays [*Dist. lxxv, can. Ordinationes]. Therefore it is not an Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Order may be understood in two ways. In one way as a sacrament, and thus, as already stated (
+                     <a id="XP_Q40_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html">Q[37], AA[2]</a>,4), every Order is directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist. Wherefore since the bishop has not a higher power than the
+                     priest, in this respect the episcopate is not an Order. In another way Order may be considered as an office in relation to
+                     certain sacred actions: and thus since in hierarchical actions a bishop has in
+                     relation to the mystical body a higher power than the priest, the episcopate is an Order. It is in this sense that the authorities
+                     quoted speak.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p8"> Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Order considered as a sacrament which imprints a character is specially directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist, in which
+                     Christ Himself is contained, because by a character we are made like to Christ Himself [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q40_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q63_A3.html">TP, Q[63], A[3]</a>]. Hence although at his promotion a bishop receives a spiritual power in respect of certain sacraments, this power nevertheless
+                     has not the nature of a character. For this reason the episcopate is
+                     not an Order, in the sense in which an Order is a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The episcopal power is one not only of jurisdiction but also of Order, as stated above, taking Order in the sense in which
+                     it is generally understood.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q40_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q40_A6-p0.1">Whether in the Church there can be anyone above the bishops?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be anyone in the Church higher than the bishops. For all the bishops are the successors of
+                     the apostles. Now the power so given to one of the apostles, namely Peter (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>), was given to all the apostles (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#John.20.23" target="asv">Jn. 20:23</a>). Therefore all bishops are equal, and one is not above another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the rite of the Church ought to be more conformed to the Jewish rite than to that of the Gentiles. Now the distinction
+                     of the episcopal dignity and the appointment of one over another, were introduced by the Gentiles. as stated in the text (Sent.
+                     iv, D, 24); and there was no such thing in the Old Law. Therefore neither in the Church should one bishop be above another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a higher power cannot be conferred by a lower, nor equal by equal, because "without all contradiction that which
+                     is less is blessed by the greater [Vulg.: 'better']"; hence a priest does not consecrate a bishop or a priest, but a bishop
+                     consecrates a priest. But a bishop can consecrate any bishop, since even the bishop of Ostia consecrates the Pope. Therefore
+                     the episcopal dignity is equal in all matters, and consequently one bishop should not be
+                     subject to another, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> We read in the council of Constantinople: "In accordance with the Scriptures and the statutes and definitions of the canons,
+                     we venerate the most holy bishop of ancient Rome the first and greatest of bishops, and after him the bishop of Constantinople."
+                     Therefore one bishop is above another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p6"> Further, the blessed Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, says: "That we may remain members of our apostolic head, the throne of
+                     the Roman Pontiffs, of whom it is our duty to seek what we are to believe and what we are to hold, venerating him, beseeching
+                     him above others; for his it is to reprove, to correct, to appoint, to loose, and to bind in place of Him Who set up that
+                     very throne, and Who gave the fulness of His own to no other, but to him alone, to whom by divine right all bow
+                     the head, and the primates of the world are obedient as to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself." Therefore bishops are subject to
+                     someone even by divine right.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Wherever there are several authorities directed to one purpose, there must needs be one universal authority over the particular
+                     authorities, because in all virtues and acts the order is according to the order of their ends (Ethic. i, 1,2). Now the common
+                     good is more Godlike than the particular good. Wherefore above the governing power which aims at a particular good there must
+                     be a universal governing power in respect of the common good, otherwise there
+                     would be no cohesion towards the one object. Hence since the whole Church is one body, it behooves, if this oneness is to
+                     be preserved, that there be a governing power in respect of the whole Church, above the episcopal power whereby each particular
+                     Church is governed, and this is the power of the Pope. Consequently those who deny this power are called schismatics as causing
+                     a division in the unity of the Church. Again, between a simple bishop and the Pope there are other degrees of rank
+                     corresponding to the degrees of union, in respect of which one congregation or community includes another; thus the community
+                     of a province includes the community of a city, and the community of a kingdom includes the community of one province, and
+                     the community of the whole world includes the community of one kingdom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the power of binding and loosing was given to all the apostles in common, nevertheless in order to indicate some
+                     order in this power, it was given first of all to Peter alone, to show that this power must come down from him to the others.
+                     For this reason He said to him in the singular: "Confirm thy brethren" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.32" target="asv">Lk. 22:32</a>), and: "Feed My sheep" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A6-p8.2" href="./asv.html#John.21.17" target="asv">Jn. 21:17</a>), i.e. according to Chrysostom: "Be thou the
+                     president and head of thy brethren in My stead, that they, putting thee in My place, may preach and confirm thee throughout
+                     the world whilst thou sittest on thy throne."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Jewish rite was not spread abroad in various kingdoms and provinces, but was confined to one nation; hence there was
+                     no need to distinguish various pontiffs under the one who had the chief power. But the rite of the Church, like that of the
+                     Gentiles, is spread abroad through various nations; and consequently in this respect it is necessary for the constitution
+                     of the Church to be like the rite of the Gentiles rather than that of the Jews.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The priestly power is surpassed by the episcopal power, as by a power of a different kind; but the episcopal is surpassed
+                     by the papal power as by a power of the same kind. Hence a bishop can perform every hierarchical act that the Pope can; whereas
+                     a priest cannot perform every act that a bishop can in conferring the sacraments. Wherefore as regards matters pertaining
+                     to the episcopal Order, all bishops are equal, and for this reason any bishop can
+                     consecrate another bishop.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q40_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q40_A7-p0.1">Whether the vestments of the ministers are fittingly instituted in the Church?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the vestments of the ministers are not fittingly instituted in the Church. For the ministers of the New
+                     Testament are more bound to chastity than were the ministers of the Old Testament. Now among the vestments of the Old Testament
+                     there were the breeches as a sign of chastity. Much more therefore should they have a place among the vestments of the Church's
+                     ministers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the priesthood of the New Testament is more worthy than the priesthood of the Old. But the priests of the Old Testament
+                     had mitres, which are a sign of dignity. Therefore the priests of the New Testament should also have them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the priest is nearer than the episcopal Order to the Orders of ministers. Now the bishop uses the vestments of the
+                     ministers, namely the dalmatic, which is the deacon's vestment, and the tunic, which is the subdeacon's. Much more therefore
+                     should simple priests use them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the Old Law the pontiff wore the ephod [*Superhumerale, i.e. over-the-shoulders], which signified the burden
+                     of the Gospel, as Bede observes (De Tabernac. iii). Now this is especially incumbent on our pontiffs. Therefore they ought
+                     to wear the ephod.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, "Doctrine and Truth" were inscribed on the "rational" which the pontiffs of the Old Testament wore. Now truth was
+                     made known especially in the New Law. Therefore it is becoming to the pontiffs of the New Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the golden plate on which was written the most admirable name of God, was the most admirable of the adornments of
+                     the Old Law. Therefore it should especially have been transferred to the New Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, the things which the ministers of the Church wear outwardly are signs of inward power. Now the archbishop has no
+                     other kind of power than a bishop, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q40_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q40_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. Therefore he should not have the pallium which other bishops have not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, the fulness of power resides in the Roman Pontiff. But he has not a crozier. Therefore other bishops should not
+                     have one.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p10">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The vestments of the ministers denote the qualifications required of them for handling Divine things. And since certain things
+                     are required of all, and some are required of the higher, that are not so exacted of the lower ministers, therefore certain
+                     vestments are common to all the ministers, while some pertain to the higher ministers only. Accordingly it is becoming to
+                     all the ministers to wear the "amice" which covers the shoulders, thereby signifying
+                     courage in the exercise of the Divine offices to which they are deputed; and the "alb," which signifies a pure life, and the
+                     "girdle," which signifies restraint of the flesh. But the subdeacon wears in addition the "maniple" on the left arm; this
+                     signifies the wiping away of the least stains, since a maniple is a kind of handkerchief for wiping the face; for they are
+                     the first to be admitted to the handling of sacred things. They also have the "narrow tunic," signifying the doctrine of Christ;
+                     wherefore in the Old Law little bells hung therefrom, and subdeacons are the first admitted to announce the doctrine of the
+                     New Law. The deacon has in addition the "stole" over the left shoulder, as a sign that he is deputed to a ministry in the
+                     sacraments themselves, and the "dalmatic" (which is a full vestment, so called because it first came into use in Dalmatia),
+                     to signify that he is the first to be appointed to dispense the sacraments: for he dispenses the blood, and in dispensing
+                     one
+                     should be generous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p11"> But in the case of the priest the "stole" hangs from both shoulders, to show that he has received full power to dispense
+                     the sacraments, and not as the minister of another man, for which reason the stole reaches right down. He also wears the "chasuble,"
+                     which signifies charity, because he it is who consecrates the sacrament of charity, namely the Eucharist.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p12"> Bishops have nine ornaments besides those which the priest has; these are the "stockings, sandals, succinctory, tunic, dalmatic,
+                     mitre, gloves, ring, and crozier," because there are nine things which they can, but priests cannot, do, namely ordain clerics,
+                     bless virgins, consecrate bishops, impose hands, dedicate churches, depose clerics, celebrate synods, consecrate chrism, bless
+                     vestments and vessels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p13"> We may also say that the "stockings" signify his upright walk; the "sandals" which cover the feet, his contempt of earthly
+                     things; the "succinctory" which girds the stole with the alb, his love of probity; the "tunic," perseverance, for Joseph is
+                     said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A7-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.37.23" target="asv">Gn. 37:23</a>) to have had a long tunic---"talaric," because it reached down to the ankles [talos], which denote the end of life; the "dalmatic,"
+                     generosity in works of mercy; the "gloves," prudence in action; the
+                     "mitre," knowledge of both Testaments, for which reason it has two crests; the "crozier," his pastoral care, whereby he has
+                     to gather together the wayward (this is denoted by the curve at the head of the crozier), to uphold the weak (this is denoted
+                     by the stem of the crozier), and to spur on the laggards (this is denoted by the point at the foot of the crozier). Hence
+                     the line:
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p14"> "Gather, uphold, spur on</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p15"> The wayward, the weak, and the laggard."</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p16">The "ring" signifies the sacraments of that faith whereby the Church is espoused to Christ. For bishops are espoused to the
+                     Church in the place of Christ. Furthermore archbishops have the "pallium" in sign of their privileged power, for it signifies
+                     the golden chain which those who fought rightfully were wont to receive.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The priests of the Old Law were enjoined continency only for the time of their attendance for the purpose of their ministry.
+                     Wherefore as a sign of the chastity which they had then to observe, they wore the breeches while offering sacrifices. But
+                     the ministers of the New Testament are enjoined perpetual continency; and so the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The mitre was not a sign of dignity, for it was a kind of hat, as Jerome says (Ep. ad Fabiol.). But the diadem which was
+                     a sign of dignity was given to the pontiffs alone, as the mitre is now.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p19">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of the ministers resides in the bishop as their source, but not in the priest, for he does not confer those Orders.
+                     Wherefore the bishop, rather than the priest, wears those vestments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p20">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Instead of the ephod, they wear the stole, which is intended for the same signification as the ephod.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p21">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The pallium takes the place of the "rational."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p22">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Instead of that plate our pontiff wears the cross, as Innocent III says (De Myst. Miss. i), just as the breeches are replaced
+                     by the sandals, the linen garment by the alb, the belt by the girdle, the long or talaric garment by the tunic, the ephod
+                     by the amice, the "rational" by the pallium, the diadem by the mitre.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p23">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> Although he has not another kind of power he has the same power more fully. and so in order to designate this perfection,
+                     he receives the pallium which surrounds him on all sides.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p24">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> The Roman Pontiff does not use a pastoral staff because Peter sent his to restore to life a certain disciple who afterwards
+                     became bishop of Treves. Hence in the diocese of Treves the Pope carries a crozier but not elsewhere; or else it is a sign
+                     of his not having a restricted power denoted by the curve of the staff.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p25"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p26"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q41" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A7.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q41-p0.1">MATRIMONY (QQ[41]-67)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q41-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q41-p2">OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY AS DIRECTED TO AN OFFICE OF NATURE (FOUR ARTICLES)</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q41-p3"> In the next place we must consider matrimony. We must treat of it (1) as directed to an office of nature; (2) as a sacrament;
+                  (3) as considered absolutely and in itself. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q41-p4"> (1) Whether it is of natural law?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q41-p5"> (2) Whether it is a matter of precept?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q41-p6"> (3) Whether its act is lawful?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q41-p7"> (4) Whether its act can be meritorious?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q41_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q41_A1-p0.1">Whether matrimony is of natural law?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that matrimony is not natural. Because "the natural law is what nature has taught all animals" [*Digest. I,
+                     i, de justitia et jure, 1]. But in other animals the sexes are united without matrimony. Therefore matrimony is not of natural
+                     law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> Further, that which is of natural law is found in all men with regard to their every state. But matrimony was not in every
+                     state of man, for as Tully says (De Inv. Rhet.), "at the beginning men were savages and then no man knew his own children,
+                     nor was he bound by any marriage tie," wherein matrimony consists. Therefore it is not natural.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, natural things are the same among all. But matrimony is not in the same way among all, since its practice varies
+                     according to the various laws. Therefore it is not natural.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, those things without which the intention of nature can be maintained would seem not to be natural. But nature intends
+                     the preservation of the species by generation which is possible without matrimony, as in the case of fornicators. Therefore
+                     matrimony is not natural.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> At the commencement of the Digests it is stated: "The union of male and female, which we call matrimony, is of natural law."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p7"> Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) says that "man is an animal more inclined by nature to connubial than political
+                     society." But "man is naturally a political and gregarious animal," as the same author asserts (Polit. i, 2). Therefore he
+                     is naturally inclined to connubial union, and thus the conjugal union or matrimony is natural.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, as resulting of necessity from the principles of nature; thus upward movement
+                     is natural to fire. In this way matrimony is not natural, nor are any of those things that come to pass at the intervention
+                     or motion of the free-will. Secondly, that is said to be natural to which nature inclines although it comes to pass through
+                     the intervention of the free-will; thus acts of virtue and the virtues themselves are
+                     called natural; and in this way matrimony is natural, because natural reason inclines thereto in two ways. First, in relation
+                     to the principal end of matrimony, namely the good of the offspring. For nature intends not only the begetting of offspring,
+                     but also its education and development until it reach the perfect state of man as man, and that is the state of virtue. Hence,
+                     according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12), we derive three things from our parents, namely "existence,"
+                     "nourishment," and "education." Now a child cannot be brought up and instructed unless it have certain and definite parents,
+                     and this would not be the case unless there were a tie between the man and a definite woman and it is in this that matrimony
+                     consists. Secondly, in relation to the secondary end of matrimony, which is the mutual services which married persons render
+                     one another in household matters. For just as natural reason dictates that men should live together, since one is not
+                     self-sufficient in all things concerning life, for which reason man is described as being naturally inclined to political
+                     society, so too among those works that are necessary for human life some are becoming to men, others to women. Wherefore nature
+                     inculcates that society of man and woman which consists in matrimony. These two reasons are given by the Philosopher (Ethic.
+                     viii, 11,12).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man's nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way, because that thing is becoming to the generic nature, and this
+                     is common to all animals; in another way because it is becoming to the nature of the difference, whereby the human species
+                     in so far as it is rational overflows the genus; such is an act of prudence or temperance. And just as the generic nature,
+                     though one in all animals, yet is not in all in the same way, so neither does it incline
+                     in the same way in all, but in a way befitting each one. Accordingly man's nature inclines to matrimony on the part of the
+                     difference, as regards the second reason given above; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12; Polit. i) gives this
+                     reason in men over other animals; but as regards the first reason it inclines on the part of the genus; wherefore he says
+                     that the begetting of offspring is common to all animals. Yet nature does not incline thereto in the same way in all animals;
+                     since
+                     there are animals whose offspring are able to seek food immediately after birth, or are sufficiently fed by their mother;
+                     and in these there is no tie between male and female; whereas in those whose offspring needs the support of both parents,
+                     although for a short time, there is a certain tie, as may be seen in certain birds. In man, however, since the child needs
+                     the parents' care for a long time, there is a very great tie between male and female, to which tie even the generic nature
+                     inclines.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The assertion of Tully may be true of some particular nation, provided we understand it as referring to the proximate beginning
+                     of that nation when it became a nation distinct from others; for that to which natural reason inclines is not realized in
+                     all things, and this statement is not universally true, since Holy Writ states that there has been matrimony from the beginning
+                     of the human race.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii) "human nature is not unchangeable as the Divine nature is." Hence things that are
+                     of natural law vary according to the various states and conditions of men; although those which naturally pertain to things
+                     Divine nowise vary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nature intends not only being in the offspring, but also perfect being, for which matrimony is necessary, as shown above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q41_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q41_A2-p0.1">Whether matrimony still comes under a precept?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that matrimony still comes under a precept. For a precept is binding so long as it is not recalled. But the
+                     primary institution of matrimony came under a precept, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26); nor do we read anywhere that
+                     this precept was recalled, but rather that it was confirmed (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.6" target="asv">Mat. 19:6</a>): "What . . . God hath joined together let no man put asunder." Therefore matrimony still comes under a precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the precepts of natural law are binding in respect of all time. Now matrimony is of natural law, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="XP_Q41_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good of the species is better than the good of the individual, "for the good of the State is more Godlike than
+                     the good of one man" (Ethic. i, 2). Now the precept given to the first man concerning the preservation of the good of the
+                     individual by the act of the nutritive power is still in force. Much more therefore does the precept concerning matrimony
+                     still hold, since it refers to the preservation of the species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where the reason of an obligation remains the same, the obligation must remain the same. Now the reason why men
+                     were bound to marry in olden times was lest the human race should cease to multiply. Since then the result would be the same,
+                     if each one were free to abstain from marriage, it would seem that matrimony comes under a precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.38" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:38</a>): "He that giveth not his virgin in marriage doth better [*Vulg.: 'He that giveth his virgin in marriage doth well, and he
+                     that giveth her not doth better']," namely than he that giveth her in marriage. Therefore the contract of marriage is not
+                     now a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p7"> Further, no one deserves a reward for breaking a precept. Now a special reward, namely the aureole, is due to virgins [*Cf.
+                     <a id="XP_Q41_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q96_A5.html"> Q[96], A[5]</a>]. Therefore matrimony does not come under a precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way as to that which is necessary for the perfection of the individual, and
+                     such an obligation is binding on each one, since natural perfections are common to all. In another way it inclines to that
+                     which is necessary for the perfection of the community; and since there are many things of this kind, one of which hinders
+                     another, such an inclination does not bind each man by way of precept; else each man would be
+                     bound to husbandry and building and to such offices as are necessary to the human community; but the inclination of nature
+                     is satisfied by the accomplishment of those various offices by various individuals. Accordingly, since the perfection of the
+                     human community requires that some should devote themselves to the contemplative life to which marriage is a very great obstacle,
+                     the natural inclination to marriage is not binding by way of precept even according to the philosophers. Hence
+                     Theophrastus proves that it is not advisable for a wise man to marry, as Jerome relates (Contra Jovin. i).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This precept has not been recalled, and yet it is not binding on each individual, for the reason given above, except at that
+                     time when the paucity of men required each one to betake himself to the begetting of children.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p10"> The Replies to objections 2 and 3 are clear from what has been said.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Human nature has a general inclination to various offices and acts, as already stated. But since it is variously in various
+                     subjects, as individualized in this or that one, it inclines one subject more to one of those offices, and another subject
+                     more to another, according to the difference of temperament of various individuals. And it is owing to this difference, as
+                     well as to Divine providence which governs all, that one person chooses one office
+                     such as husbandry, and another person another. And so it is too that some choose the married life and some the contemplative.
+                     Wherefore no danger threatens.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q41_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q41_A3-p0.1">Whether the marriage act is always sinful?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the marriage act is always sinful. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.29" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:29</a>): "That they . . . who have wives, be as if they had none." But those who are not married do not perform the marriage act.
+                     Therefore even those who are married sin in that act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Now the marriage act divides man from God wherefore the
+                     people who were to see God (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.19.11" target="asv">Ex. 19:11</a>) were commanded not to go near their wives (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.19.20" target="asv">Ex. 19:20</a>); and Jerome says (Ep. ad Ageruch.: Contra Jovini, 18) that in the marriage act "the Holy Ghost touches not the hearts of
+                     the prophets." Therefore it is sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is shameful in itself can by no means be well done. Now the marriage act is always connected with concupiscence,
+                     which is always shameful. Therefore it is always sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing is the object of excuse save sin. Now the marriage act needs to be excused by the marriage blessings, as
+                     the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 26). Therefore it is a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, things alike in species are judged alike. But marriage intercourse is of the same species as the act of adultery,
+                     since its end is the same, namely the human species. Therefore since the act of adultery is a sin, the marriage act is likewise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, excess in the passions corrupts virtue. Now there is always excess of pleasure in the marriage act, so much so that
+                     it absorbs the reason which is man's principal good, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "in that act it
+                     is impossible to understand anything." Therefore the marriage act is always a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p8">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:28</a>): "If a virgin marry she hath not sinned," and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:14</a>): "I will . . . that the younger should marry," and "bear children." But there can be no bearing of children without carnal
+                     union. Therefore the marriage act is not a sin; else the Apostle would not have approved of it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p9"> Further, no sin is a matter of precept. But the marriage act is a matter of precept (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:3</a>): "Let the husband render the debt to his life." Therefore it is not a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p10">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> If we suppose the corporeal nature to be created by the good God we cannot hold that those things which pertain to the preservation
+                     of the corporeal nature and to which nature inclines, are altogether evil; wherefore, since the inclination to beget an offspring
+                     whereby the specific nature is preserved is from nature, it is impossible to maintain that the act of begetting children is
+                     altogether unlawful, so that it be impossible to find the mean of virtue
+                     therein; unless we suppose, as some are mad enough to assert, that corruptible things were created by an evil god, whence
+                     perhaps the opinion mentioned in the text is derived (Sent. iv, D, 26); wherefore this is a most wicked heresy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By these words the Apostle did not forbid the marriage act, as neither did he forbid the possession of things when he said
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:31</a>): "They that use this world" (let them be) "as if they used it not." In each case he forbade enjoyment [*"Fruitionem," i.e.
+                     enjoyment of a thing sought as one's last end]; which is clear from the way in which he expresses himself; for he did not
+                     say "let them not use it," or "let them not have them," but let them be
+                     "as if they used it not" and "as if they had none."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We are united to God by the habit of grace and by the act of contemplation and love. Therefore whatever severs the former
+                     of these unions is always a sin, but not always that which severs the latter, since a lawful occupation about lower things
+                     distracts the mind so that it is not fit for actual union with God; and this is especially the case in carnal intercourse
+                     wherein the mind is withheld by the intensity of pleasure. For this reason those who
+                     have to contemplate Divine things or handle sacred things are enjoined not to have to do with their wives for that particular
+                     time; and it is in this sense that the Holy Ghost, as regards the actual revelation of hidden things, did not touch the hearts
+                     of the prophets at the time of the marriage act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The shamefulness of concupiscence that always accompanies the marriage act is a shamefulness not of guilt, but of punishment
+                     inflicted for the first sin, inasmuch as the lower powers and the members do not obey reason. Hence the argument does not
+                     prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Properly speaking, a thing is said to be excused when it has some appearance of evil, and yet is not evil, or not as evil
+                     as it seems, because some things excuse wholly, others in part. And since the marriage act, by reason of the corruption of
+                     concupiscence, has the appearance of an inordinate act, it is wholly excused by the marriage blessing, so as not to be a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Although they are the same as to their natural species, they differ as to their moral species, which differs in respect of
+                     one circumstance, namely intercourse with one's wife and with another than one's wife; just as to kill a man by assault or
+                     by justice differentiates the moral species, although the natural species is the same; and yet the one is lawful and the other
+                     unlawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The excess of passions that corrupts virtue not only hinders the act of reason, but also destroys the order of reason. The
+                     intensity of pleasure in the marriage act does not do this, since, although for the moment man is not being directed, he was
+                     previously directed by his reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p17"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p18"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q41_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q41_A4-p0.1">Whether the marriage act is meritorious?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the marriage act is not meritorious. For Chrysostom [*Hom. i in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed
+                     to St. John Chrysostom] says in his commentary on Matthew: "Although marriage brings no punishment to those who use it, it
+                     affords them no meed." Now merit bears a relation to meed. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to refrain from what is meritorious deserves not praise. Yet virginity whereby one refrains from marriage is praiseworthy.
+                     Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he who avails himself of an indulgence granted him, avails himself of a favor received. But a man does not merit
+                     by receiving a favor. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, merit like virtue, consists in difficulty. But the marriage act affords not difficulty but pleasure. Therefore it
+                     is not meritorious.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, that which cannot be done without venial sin is never meritorious, for a man cannot both merit and demerit at the
+                     same time. Now there is always a venial sin in the marriage act, since even the first movement in such like pleasures is a
+                     venial sin. Therefore the aforesaid act cannot be meritorious.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every act whereby a precept is fulfilled is meritorious if it be done from charity. Now such is the marriage act, for it
+                     is said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:3</a>): "Let the husband render the debt to his wife." Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p8"> Further, every act of virtue is meritorious. Now the aforesaid act is an act of justice, for it is called the rendering of
+                     a debt. Therefore it is meritorious.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since no act proceeding from a deliberate will is indifferent, as stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 40, Q[1], A[3];
+                     
+                     <a id="XP_Q41_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A9.html">FS, Q[18], A[9]</a>), the marriage act is always either sinful or meritorious in one who is in a state of grace. For if the motive for the marriage
+                     act be a virtue, whether of justice that they may render the debt, or of religion, that they may beget children for the worship
+                     of God, it is meritorious. But if the
+                     motive be lust, yet not excluding the marriage blessings, namely that he would by no means be willing to go to another woman,
+                     it is a venial sin; while if he exclude the marriage blessings, so as to be disposed to act in like manner with any woman,
+                     it is a mortal sin. And nature cannot move without being either directed by reason, and thus it will be an act of virtue,
+                     or not so directed, and then it will be an act of lust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The root of merit, as regards the essential reward, is charity itself; but as regards an accidental reward, the reason for
+                     merit consists in the difficulty of an act; and thus the marriage act is not meritorious except in the first way.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The difficulty required for merit of the accidental reward is a difficulty of labor, but the difficulty required for the
+                     essential reward is the difficulty of observing the mean, and this is the difficulty in the marriage act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> First movements in so far as they are venial sins are movements of the appetite to some inordinate object of pleasure. This
+                     is not the case in the marriage act, and consequently the argument does not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A7.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q42" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q42-p0.1">OF MATRIMONY AS A SACRAMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q42-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q42-p2"> We must next consider matrimony as a sacrament. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q42-p3"> (1) Whether matrimony is a sacrament?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q42-p4"> (2) Whether it ought to have been instituted before sin was committed?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q42-p5"> (3) Whether it confers grace?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q42-p6"> (4) Whether carnal intercourse belongs to the integrity of matrimony?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q42_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q42_A1-p0.1">Whether matrimony is a sacrament?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that matrimony is not a sacrament. For every sacrament of the New Law has a form that is essential to the sacrament.
+                     But the blessing given by the priest at a wedding is not essential to matrimony. Therefore it is not a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a sacrament according to Hugh (De Sacram. i) is "a material element." But matrimony has not a material element for
+                     its matter. Therefore it is not a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sacraments derive their efficacy from Christ's Passion. But matrimony, since it has pleasure annexed to it,
+                     does not conform man to Christ's Passion, which was painful. Therefore it is not a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every sacrament of the New Law causes that which it signifies. Yet matrimony does not cause the union of Christ
+                     with the Church, which union it signifies. Therefore matrimony is not a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, in the other sacraments there is something which is reality and sacrament. But this is not to be found in matrimony,
+                     since it does not imprint a character, else it would not be repeated. Therefore it is not a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q42_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.32" target="asv">Eph. 5:32</a>): "This is a great sacrament." Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p8"> Further, a sacrament is the sign of a sacred thing. But such is Matrimony. Therefore, etc.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A sacrament denotes a sanctifying remedy against sin offered to man under sensible signs [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q42_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q61_A1.html">TP, Q[61], A[1]</a>; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q42_A1-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q65_A1.html">TP, Q[65], A[1]</a>]. Wherefore since this is the case in matrimony, it is reckoned among the sacraments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words whereby the marriage consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament, and not the priest's blessing, which
+                     is a sacramental.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sacrament of Matrimony, like that of Penance, is perfected by the act of the recipient. Wherefore just as Penance has
+                     no other matter than the sensible acts themselves, which take the place of the material element, so it is in Matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although Matrimony is not conformed to Christ's Passion as regards pain, it is as regards charity, whereby He suffered for
+                     the Church who was to be united to Him as His spouse.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The union of Christ with the Church is not the reality contained in this sacrament, but is the reality signified and not
+                     contained---and no sacrament causes a reality of that kind---but it has another both contained and signified which it causes,
+                     as we shall state further on (ad 5). The Master, however (Sent. iv, D, 26), asserts that it is a non-contained reality, because
+                     he was of opinion that Matrimony has no reality contained therein.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In this sacrament also those three things [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q42_A1-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q66_A1.html">TP, Q[66], A[1]</a>] are to be found, for the acts externally apparent are the sacrament only; the bond between husband and wife resulting from
+                     those acts is reality and sacrament; and the ultimate reality contained is the effect of this sacrament, while the non-contained
+                     reality is that which the Master assigns (Sent. iv, D, 26).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q42_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q42_A2-p0.1">Whether this sacrament ought to have been instituted before sin was committed?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Matrimony ought not to have been instituted before sin. Because that which is of natural law needs not
+                     to be instituted. Now such is Matrimony, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q42_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html">Q[41], A[1]</a>). Therefore it ought not to have been instituted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sacraments are medicines against the disease of sin. But a medicine is not made ready except for an actual disease.
+                     Therefore it should not have been instituted before sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one institution suffices for one thing. Now Matrimony was instituted also after sin, as stated in the text (Sent.
+                     iv, D, 26). Therefore it was not instituted before sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the institution of a sacrament must come from God. Now before sin, the words relating to Matrimony were not definitely
+                     said by God but by Adam; the words which God uttered (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q42_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.22" target="asv">Gn. 1:22</a>), "Increase and multiply," were addressed also to the brute creation where there is no marriage. Therefore Matrimony was
+                     not instituted before sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Matrimony is a sacrament of the New Law. But the sacraments of the New Law took their origin from Christ. Therefore
+                     it ought not to have been instituted before sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q42_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.4" target="asv">Mat. 19:4</a>): "Have ye not read that He Who made man from the beginning 'made them male and female'"?
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p8"> Further, Matrimony was instituted for the begetting of children. But the begetting of children was necessary to man before
+                     sin. Therefore it behooved Matrimony to be instituted before sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Nature inclines to marriage with a certain good in view, which good varies according to the different states of man, wherefore
+                     it was necessary for matrimony to be variously instituted in the various states of man in reference to that good. Consequently
+                     matrimony as directed to the begetting of children, which was necessary even when there was no sin, was instituted before
+                     sin; according as it affords a remedy for the wound of sin, it was instituted after
+                     sin at the time of the natural law; its institution belongs to the Mosaic Law as regards personal disqualifications; and it
+                     was instituted in the New Law in so far as it represents the mystery of Christ's union with the Church, and in this respect
+                     it is a sacrament of the New Law. As regards other advantages resulting from matrimony, such as the friendship and mutual
+                     services which husband and wife render one another, its institution belongs to the civil law. Since, however, a sacrament
+                     is
+                     essentially a sign and a remedy, it follows that the nature of sacrament applies to matrimony as regards the intermediate
+                     institution; that it is fittingly intended to fulfill an office of nature as regards the first institution; and. as regards
+                     the last-mentioned institution, that it is directed to fulfill an office of society.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things which are of natural law in a general way, need to be instituted as regards their determination which is subject to
+                     variation according to various states; just as it is of natural law that evil-doers be punished, but that such and such a
+                     punishment be appointed for such and such a crime is determined by positive law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Matrimony is not only for a remedy against sin, but is chiefly for an office of nature; and thus it was instituted before
+                     sin, not as intended for a remedy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no reason why matrimony should not have had several institutions corresponding to the various things that had to
+                     be determined in connection with marriage. Hence these various institutions are not of the same thing in the same respect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Before sin matrimony was instituted by God, when He fashioned a helpmate for man out of his rib, and said to them: "Increase
+                     and multiply." And although this was said also to the other animals, it was not to be fulfilled by them in the same way as
+                     by men. As to Adam's words, he uttered them inspired by God to understand that the institution of marriage was from God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As was clearly stated, matrimony was not instituted before Christ as a sacrament of the New Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q42_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q42_A3-p0.1">Whether matrimony confers grace?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that matrimony does not confer grace. For, according to Hugh (De Sacram. i) "the sacraments, by virtue of their
+                     sanctification, confer an invisible grace." But matrimony has no sanctification essential to it. Therefore grace is not conferred
+                     therein.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sacrament that confers grace confers it by virtue of its matter and form. Now the acts which are the matter
+                     in this sacrament are not the cause of grace (for it would be the heresy of Pelagius to assert that our acts cause grace);
+                     and the words expressive of consent are not the cause of grace, since no sanctification results from them. Therefore grace
+                     is by no means given in matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the grace that is directed against the wound of sin is necessary to all who have that wound. Now the wound of concupiscence
+                     is to be found in all. Therefore if grace were given in matrimony against the wound of concupiscence, all men ought to contract
+                     marriage, and it would be very stupid to refrain from matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sickness does not seek a remedy where it finds aggravation. Now concupiscence is aggravated by concupiscence, because,
+                     according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12), "the desire of concupiscence is insatiable, and is increased by congenial actions."
+                     Therefore it would seem that grace is not conferred in matrimony, as a remedy for concupiscence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Definition and thing defined should be convertible. Now causality of grace is included in the definition of a sacrament.
+                     Since, then, matrimony is a sacrament, it is a cause of grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p7"> Further, Augustine says (De Bono Viduit. viii; Gen. ad lit. ix, 7) that "matrimony affords a remedy to the sick." But it
+                     is not a remedy except in so far as it has some efficacy. Therefore it has some efficacy for the repression of concupiscence.
+                     Now concupiscence is not repressed except by grace. Therefore grace is conferred therein.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There have been three opinions on this point. For some [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iv, D, 2] said that matrimony is nowise the
+                     cause of grace, but only a sign thereof. But this cannot be maintained, for in that case it would in no respect surpass the
+                     sacraments of the Old Law. Wherefore there would be no reason for reckoning it among the sacraments of the New Law; since
+                     even in the Old Law by the very nature of the act it was able to afford a remedy to
+                     concupiscence lest the latter run riot when held in too strict restraint.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p9"> Hence others [*St. Albert Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 26] said that grace is conferred therein as regards the withdrawal from evil,
+                     because the act is excused from sin, for it would be a sin apart from matrimony. But this would be too little, since it had
+                     this also in the Old Law. And so they say that it makes man withdraw from evil, by restraining the concupiscence lest it tend
+                     to something outside the marriage blessings, but that this grace does not enable a man to do good works. But
+                     this cannot be maintained, since the same grace hinders sin and inclines to good, just as the same heat expels cold and gives
+                     heat.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p10"> Hence others [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. iv, D, 26] say that matrimony, inasmuch as it is contracted in the faith of Christ,
+                     is able to confer the grace which enables us to do those works which are required in matrimony. and this is more probable,
+                     since wherever God gives the faculty to do a thing, He gives also the helps whereby man is enabled to make becoming use of
+                     that faculty; thus it is clear that to all the soul's powers there correspond bodily members by which they can
+                     proceed to act. Therefore, since in matrimony man receives by Divine institution the faculty to use his wife for the begetting
+                     of children, he also receives the grace without which he cannot becomingly do so; just as we have said of the sacrament of
+                     orders (
+                     <a id="XP_Q42_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q35_A1.html">Q[35], A[1]</a>). And thus this grace which is given is the last thing contained in this sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the baptismal water by virtue of its contact with Christ's body [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q42_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q66_A3.html">TP, Q[66], A[3]</a>, ad 4] is able to "touch the body and cleanse the heart" [*St. Augustine, Tract. lxxx in Joan.], so is matrimony able to
+                     do so through Christ having represented it by His Passion, and not principally through any blessing of the priest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the water of Baptism together with the form of words results immediately not in the infusion of grace, but in the
+                     imprinting of the character, so the outward acts and the words expressive of consent directly effect a certain tie which is
+                     the sacrament of matrimony; and this tie by virtue of its Divine institution works dispositively [*Cf.
+                     <a id="XP_Q42_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q18_A1.html"> Q[18], A[1]</a>, where St. Thomas uses the same expression; and Editor's notes at the
+                     beginning of the Supplement and on that Article] to the infusion of grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would hold if no more efficacious remedy could be employed against the disease of concupiscence; but a yet
+                     more powerful remedy is found in spiritual works and mortification of the flesh by those who make no use of matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A remedy can be employed against concupiscence in two ways. First, on the part of concupiscence by repressing it in its root,
+                     and thus matrimony affords a remedy by the grace given therein. Secondly, on the part of its act, and this in two ways: first,
+                     by depriving the act to which concupiscence inclines of its outward shamefulness, and this is done by the marriage blessings
+                     which justify carnal concupiscence; secondly, by hindering the shameful act,
+                     which is done by the very nature of the act. because concupiscence, being satisfied by the conjugal act, does not incline
+                     so much to other wickedness. For this reason the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q42_A3-p14.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:9</a>): "It is better to marry than to burn." For though the works congenial to concupiscence are in themselves of a nature to
+                     increase concupiscence, yet in so far as they are directed according to reason they repress concupiscence, because like acts
+                     result in like dispositions and
+                     habits.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q42_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q43.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q42_A4-p0.1">Whether carnal intercourse is an integral part of this sacrament?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that carnal intercourse is an integral part of marriage. For at the very institution of marriage it was declared
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q42_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.24" target="asv">Gn. 2:24</a>): "They shall be two in one flesh." Now this is not brought about save by carnal intercourse. Therefore it is an integral
+                     part of marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which belongs to the signification of a sacrament is necessary for the sacrament, as we have stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q42_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q42_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[9], A[1] ). Now carnal intercourse belongs to the signification of matrimony, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26).
+                     Therefore it is an integral part of the sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this sacrament is directed to the preservation of the species. But the species cannot be preserved without carnal
+                     intercourse. Therefore it is an integral part of the sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Matrimony is a sacrament inasmuch as it affords a remedy against concupiscence; according to the Apostle's saying
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q42_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:9</a>): "It is better to marry than to burn." But it does not afford this remedy to those who have no carnal intercourse. Therefore
+                     the same conclusion follows as before.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> There was matrimony in Paradise, and yet there was no carnal intercourse. Therefore carnal intercourse is not an integral
+                     part of matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p7"> Further, a sacrament by its very name denotes a sanctification. But matrimony is holier without carnal intercourse, according
+                     to the text (Sent. D, 26). Therefore carnal intercourse is not necessary for the sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Integrity is twofold. One regards the primal perfection consisting in the very essence of a thing; the other regards the
+                     secondary perfection consisting in operation. Since then carnal intercourse is an operation or use of marriage which gives
+                     the faculty for that intercourse, it follows, that carnal intercourse belongs to the latter, and not to the former integrity
+                     of marriage [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q42_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q29_A2.html">TP, Q[29], A[2]</a> ].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adam expressed the integrity of marriage in regard to both perfections, because a thing is known by its operation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Signification of the thing contained is necessary for the sacrament. Carnal intercourse belongs not to this signification,
+                     but to the thing not contained, as appears from what was said above (A[1], ad 4,5).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A thing does not reach its end except by its own act. Wherefore, from the fact that the end of matrimony is not attained
+                     without carnal intercourse, it follows that it belongs to the second and not to the first integrity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Before carnal intercourse marriage is a remedy by virtue of the grace given therein, although not by virtue of the act, which
+                     belongs to the second integrity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q43.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q43" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q43-p0.1">OF MATRIMONY WITH REGARD TO THE BETROTHAL (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q43-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q43-p2"> In the next place we must consider matrimony absolutely; and here we must treat (1) of the betrothal; (2) of the nature of
+                  matrimony; (3) of its efficient cause, namely the consent; (4) of its blessings; (5) of the impediments thereto; (6) of second
+                  marriages; (7) of certain things annexed to marriage.
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q43-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q43-p4"> (1) What is the betrothal?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q43-p5"> (2) Who can contract a betrothal?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q43-p6"> (3) Whether a betrothal can be canceled?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q43_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q43.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q43_A1-p0.1">Whether a betrothal is a promise of future marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a betrothal is not rightly defined "a promise of future marriage," as expressed in the words of Pope Nicholas
+                     I (Resp. ad Consul. Bulgar., iii). For as Isidore says (Etym. iv), "a man is betrothed not by a mere promise, but by giving
+                     his troth [spondet] and providing sureties [sponsores]". Now a person is said to be betrothed by reason of his betrothal.
+                     Therefore it is wrongly described as a promise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever promises a thing must be compelled to fulfill his promise. But those who have contracted a betrothal are
+                     not compelled by the Church to fulfill the marriage. Therefore a betrothal is not a promise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sometimes a betrothal does not consist of a mere promise, but an oath is added, as also certain pledges. Therefore
+                     seemingly it should not be defined as a mere promise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, marriage should be free and absolute. But a betrothal is sometimes expressed under a condition even of money to
+                     be received. Therefore it is not fittingly described as a promise of marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, promising about the future is blamed in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q43_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.13" target="asv"> James 4:13, </a> seqq. But there should be nothing blameworthy about the sacraments. Therefore one ought not to make a promise of future marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, no man is called a spouse except on account of his espousals. But a man is said to be a spouse on account of actual
+                     marriage, according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 27). Therefore espousals are not always a promise of future marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Consent to conjugal union if expressed in words of the future does not make a marriage, but a promise of marriage; and this
+                     promise is called "a betrothal from plighting one's troth," as Isidore says (Etym. iv). For before the use of writing-tablets,
+                     they used to give pledges of marriage, by which they plighted their mutual consent under the marriage code, and they provided
+                     guarantors. This promise is made in two ways, namely absolutely, or conditionally.
+                     Absolutely, in four ways: firstly, a mere promise, by saying: "I will take thee for my wife," and conversely; secondly, by
+                     giving betrothal pledges, such as money and the like; thirdly, by giving an engagement ring; fourthly, by the addition of
+                     an oath. If, however, this promise be made conditionally, we must draw a distinction; for it is either an honorable condition,
+                     for instance if we say: "I will take thee, if thy parents consent," and then the promise holds if the condition is fulfilled,
+                     and does not hold if the condition is not fulfilled; or else the condition is dishonorable, and this in two ways: for either
+                     it is contrary to the marriage blessings, as if we were to say: "I will take thee if thou promise means of sterility," and
+                     then no betrothal is contracted; or else it is not contrary to the marriage blessings, as were one to say: "I will take thee
+                     if thou consent to my thefts," and then the promise holds, but the condition should be removed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The betrothal itself and giving of sureties are a ratification of the promise, wherefore it is denominated from these as
+                     from that which is more perfect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By this promise one party is bound to the other in respect of contracting marriage; and he who fulfills not his promise sins
+                     mortally, unless a lawful impediment arise; and the Church uses compulsion in the sense that she enjoins a penance for the
+                     sin. But he is not compelled by sentence of the court, because compulsory marriages are wont to have evil results; unless
+                     the parties be bound by oath, for then he ought to be compelled, in the opinion of
+                     some, although others think differently on account of the reason given above, especially if there be fear of one taking the
+                     other's life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such things are added only in confirmation of the promise, and consequently they are not distinct from it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The condition that is appended does not destroy the liberty of marriage; for if it be unlawful, it should be renounced; and
+                     if it be lawful, it is either about things that are good simply, as were one to say, "I will take thee, if thy parents consent,"
+                     and such a condition does not destroy the liberty of the betrothal, but gives it an increase of rectitude. or else it is about
+                     things that are useful, as were one to say: "I will marry thee if thou pay
+                     me a hundred pounds," and then this condition is appended, not as asking a price for the consent of marriage, but as referring
+                     to the promise of a dowry; so that the marriage does not lose its liberty. Sometimes, however, the condition appended is the
+                     payment of a sum of money by way of penalty, and then, since marriage should be free, such a condition does not hold, nor
+                     can such a penalty be exacted from a person who is unwilling to fulfill the promise of marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> James does not intend to forbid altogether the making of promises about the future, but the making of promises as though
+                     one were certain of one's life; hence he teaches that we ought to add the condition. "If the Lord will," which, though it
+                     be not expressed in words, ought nevertheless to be impressed on the heart.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> In marriage we may consider both the marriage union and the marriage act; and on account of his promise of the first as future
+                     a man is called a "spouse" from his having contracted his espousals by words expressive of the future; but from the promise
+                     of the second a man is called a "spouse," even when the marriage has been contracted by words expressive of the present, because
+                     by this very fact he promises [spondet] the marriage act. However, properly
+                     speaking, espousals are so called from the promise [sponsione] in the first sense, because espousals are a kind of sacramental
+                     annexed to matrimony, as exorcism to baptism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q43.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q43_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q43_A2-p0.1">Whether seven years is fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that seven years is not fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal. For a contract that can be formed by others
+                     does not require discretion in those whom it concerns. Now a betrothal can be arranged by the parents without the knowledge
+                     of either of the persons betrothed. Therefore a betrothal can be arranged before the age of seven years as well as after.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as some use of reason is necessary for the contract of betrothal, so is there for the consent to mortal sin.
+                     Now, as Gregory says (Dial. iv), a boy of five years of age was carried off by the devil on account of the sin of blasphemy.
+                     Therefore a betrothal can take place before the age of seven years.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a betrothal is directed to marriage. But for marriage the same age is not assigned to boy and girl.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, one can become betrothed as soon as future marriage can be agreeable to one. Now signs of this agreeableness are
+                     often apparent in boys before the age of seven. Therefore they can become betrothed before that age.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if persons become betrothed before they are seven years old, and subsequently after the age of seven and before
+                     the age of maturity renew their promise in words expressive of the present, they are reckoned to be betrothed. Now this is
+                     not by virtue of the second contract, since they intend to contract not betrothal but marriage. Therefore it is by the virtue
+                     of the first; and thus espousals can be contracted before the age of seven.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, when a thing is done by many persons in common, if one fails he is supplied by another, as in the case of those
+                     who row a boat. Now the contract of betrothal is an action common to the contracting parties. Therefore if one be of mature
+                     age, he can contract a betrothal with a girl who is not seven years old, since the lack of age in one is more than counterbalanced
+                     in the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, those who at about the age of puberty, but before it, enter into the marriage contract by words expressive of the
+                     present are reputed to be married. Therefore in like manner if they contract marriage by words expressive of the future, before
+                     yet close on the age of puberty, they are to be reputed as betrothed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The age of seven years is fixed reasonably enough by law for the contracting of betrothals, for since a betrothal is a promise
+                     of the future, as already stated 
+                     <a id="XP_Q43_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q43_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it follows that they are within the competency of those who can make a promise in some way, and this is only for those who
+                     can have some foresight of the future, and this requires the use of reason, of which three degrees are to be observed, according
+                     to the
+                     Philosopher (Ethic. i, 4). The first is when a person neither understands by himself nor is able to learn from another; the
+                     second stage is when a man can learn from another but is incapable by himself of consideration and understanding; the third
+                     degree is when a man is both able to learn from another and to consider by himself. And since reason develops in man by little
+                     and little, in proportion as the movement and fluctuation of the humors is calmed, man reaches the first stage of reason
+                     before his seventh year; and consequently during that period he is unfit for any contract, and therefore for betrothal. But
+                     he begins to reach the second stage at the end of his first seven years, wherefore children at that age are sent to school.
+                     But man begins to reach the third stage at the end of his second seven years, as regards things concerning his person, when
+                     his natural reason develops; but as regards things outside his person, at the end of his third seven years. Hence before his
+                     first seven years a man is not fit to make any contract, but at the end of that period he begins to be fit to make certain
+                     promises for the future, especially about those things to which natural reason inclines us more, though he is not fit to bind
+                     himself by a perpetual obligation, because as yet he has not a firm will. Hence at that age betrothals can be contracted.
+                     But at the end of the second seven years he can already bind himself in matters concerning his person, either to religion
+                     or to
+                     wedlock. And after the third seven years he can bind himself in other matters also; and according to the laws he is given
+                     the power of disposing of his property after his twenty-second year.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the parties are betrothed by another person before they reach the age of puberty, either of them or both can demur; wherefore
+                     in that case the betrothal does not take effect, so that neither does any affinity result therefrom. Hence a betrothal made
+                     between certain persons by some other takes effect, in so far as those between whom the betrothal is arranged do not demur
+                     when they reach the proper age, whence they are understood to consent to what
+                     others have done.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that the boy of whom Gregory tells this story was not lost, and that he did not sin mortally; and that this vision
+                     was for the purpose of making the father sorrowful, for he had sinned in the boy through failing to correct him. But this
+                     is contrary to the express intention of Gregory, who says (Dial. iv) that "the boy's father having neglected the soul of his
+                     little son, fostered no little sinner for the flames of hell." Consequently it must
+                     be said that for a mortal sin it is sufficient to give consent to something present, whereas in a betrothal the consent is
+                     to something future; and greater discretion of reason is required for looking to the future than for consenting to one present
+                     act. Wherefore a man can sin mortally before he can bind himself to a future obligation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Regarding the age for the marriage contract a disposition is required not only on the part of the use of reason, but also
+                     on the part of the body, in that it is necessary to be of an age adapted to procreation. And since a girl becomes apt for
+                     the act of procreation in her twelfth year, and a boy at the end of his second seven years, as the Philosopher says (De Hist.
+                     Anim. vii), whereas the age is the same in both for attaining the use of reason which
+                     is the sole condition for betrothal, hence it is that the one age is assigned for both as regards betrothal, but not as regards
+                     marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This agreeableness in regard to boys under the age of seven does not result from the perfect use of reason, since they are
+                     not as yet possessed of complete self-control; it results rather from the movement of nature than from any process of reason.
+                     Consequently, this agreeableness does not suffice for contracting a betrothal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In this case, although the second contract does not amount to marriage, nevertheless the parties show that they ratify their
+                     former promise; wherefore the first contract is confirmed by the second.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Those who row a boat act by way of one cause, and consequently what is lacking in one can be supplied by another. But those
+                     who make a contract of betrothal act as distinct persons, since a betrothal can only be between two parties; wherefore it
+                     is necessary for each to be qualified to contract, and thus the defect of one is an obstacle to their betrothal, nor can it
+                     be supplied by the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> It is true that in the matter of betrothal if the contracting parties are close upon the age of seven, the contract of betrothal
+                     is valid, since, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 56), "when little is lacking it seems as though nothing were lacking."
+                     Some fix the margin at six months. but it is better to determine it according to the condition of the contracting parties,
+                     since the use of reason comes sooner to some than to others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p17"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p18"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q43_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q44.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q43_A3-p0.1">Whether a betrothal can be dissolved?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a betrothal cannot be dissolved if one of the parties enter religion. For if I have promised a thing to
+                     someone I cannot lawfully pledge it to someone else. Now he who betroths himself promises his body to the woman. Therefore
+                     he cannot make a further offering of himself to God in religion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Again, seemingly it should not be dissolved when one of the parties leaves for a distant country, because in doubtful matters
+                     one should always choose the safer course. Now the safer course would be to wait for him. Therefore she is bound to wait for
+                     him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Again, neither seemingly is it dissolved by sickness contracted after betrothal, for no man should be punished for being
+                     under a penalty. Now the man who contracts an infirmity would be punished if he were to lose his right to the woman betrothed
+                     to him. Therefore a betrothal should not be dissolved on account of a bodily infirmity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Again, neither seemingly should a betrothal be dissolved on account of a supervening affinity, for instance if the spouse
+                     were to commit fornication with a kinswoman of his betrothed; for in that case the affianced bride would be penalized for
+                     the sin of her affianced spouse, which is unreasonable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Again, seemingly they cannot set one another free; for it would be a proof of greatest fickleness if they contracted together
+                     and then set one another free; and such conduct ought not to be tolerated by the Church. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Again, neither seemingly ought a betrothal to be dissolved on account of the fornication of one of the parties. For a betrothal
+                     does not yet give the one power over the body of the other; wherefore it would seem that they nowise sin against one another
+                     if meanwhile they commit fornication. Consequently a betrothal should not be dissolved on that account.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Again, neither seemingly on account of his contracting with another woman by words expressive of the present. For a subsequent
+                     sale does not void a previous sale. Therefore neither should a second contract void a previous one.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Again, neither seemingly should it be dissolved on account of deficient age; since what is not cannot be dissolved. Now a
+                     betrothal is null before the requisite age. Therefore it cannot be dissolved.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p10">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In all the cases mentioned above the betrothal that has been contracted is dissolved, but in different ways. For in two of
+                     them---namely when a party enters religion, and when either of the affianced spouses contracts with another party by words
+                     expressive of the present---the betrothal is dissolved by law, whereas in the other cases it has to be dissolved according
+                     to the judgment of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The like promise is dissolved by spiritual death, for that promise is purely spiritual, as we shall state further on (
+                     <a id="XP_Q43_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q61_A2.html">Q[61], A[2]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This doubt is solved by either party not putting in an appearance at the time fixed for completing the marriage. Wherefore
+                     if it was no fault of that party that the marriage was not completed, he or she can lawfully marry without any sin. But if
+                     he or she was responsible for the non-completion of the marriage, this responsibility involves the obligation of doing penance
+                     for the broken promise---or oath if the promise was confirmed by oath---and he or
+                     she can contract with another if they wish it, subject to the judgment of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If either of the betrothed parties incur an infirmity which notably weakens the subject (as epilepsy or paralysis), or causes
+                     a deformity (as loss of the nose or eyes, and the like), or is contrary to the good of the offspring (as leprosy, which is
+                     wont to be transmitted to the children), the betrothal can be dissolved, lest the betrothed be displeasing to one another,
+                     and the marriage thus contracted have an evil result. Nor is one punished for being
+                     under a penalty, although one incurs a loss from one's penalty, and this is not unreasonable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If the affianced bridegroom has carnal knowledge of a kinswoman of his spouse, or "vice versa," the betrothal must be dissolved;
+                     and for proof it is sufficient that the fact be the common talk, in order to avoid scandal; for causes whose effects mature
+                     in the future are voided of their effects, not only by what actually is, but also by what happens subsequently. Hence just
+                     as affinity, had it existed at the time of the betrothal, would have prevented
+                     that contract, so, if it supervene before marriage, which is an effect of the betrothal, the previous contract is voided of
+                     its effect. Nor does the other party suffer in consequence, indeed he or she gains, being set free from one who has become
+                     hateful to God by committing fornication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Some do not admit this case. Yet they have against them the Decretal (cap. Praeterea, De spons. et matr.) which says expressly:
+                     "Just as those who enter into a contract of fellowship by pledging their faith to one another and afterwards give it back,
+                     so it may be patiently tolerated that those who are betrothed to one another should set one another free." Yet to this they
+                     say that the Church allows this lest worse happen rather than because it is
+                     according to strict law. But this does not seem to agree with the example quoted by the Decretal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p16"> Accordingly we must reply that it is not always a proof of fickleness to rescind an agreement, since "our counsels are uncertain"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q43_A3-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Although when they become betrothed they have not yet given one another power over one another's body, yet if this [*Referring
+                     to the contention of the Objection] were to happen it would make them suspicious of one another's fidelity; and so one can
+                     ensure himself against the other by breaking off the engagement.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> This argument would hold if each contract were of the same kind; whereas the second contract of marriage has greater force
+                     than the first, and consequently dissolves it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p19">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Although it was not a true betrothal, there was a betrothal of a kind; and consequently, lest approval should seem to be
+                     given when they come to the lawful age, they should seek a dissolution of the betrothal by the judgment of the Church, for
+                     the sake of a good example.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p20"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p21"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q44.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q44" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q44-p0.1">OF THE DEFINITION OF MATRIMONY (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q44-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q44-p2"> We must now consider the nature of matrimony. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q44-p3"> (1) Whether matrimony is a kind of joining?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q44-p4"> (2) Whether it is fittingly named?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q44-p5"> (3) Whether it is fittingly defined?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q44_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q44.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q44_A1-p0.1">Whether matrimony is a kind of joining?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that matrimony is not a kind of joining. Because the bond whereby things are tied together differs from their
+                     joining, as cause from effect. Now matrimony is the bond whereby those who are joined in matrimony are tied together. Therefore
+                     it is not a kind of joining.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sacrament is a sensible sign. But no relation is a sensible accident. Therefore since matrimony is a sacrament,
+                     it is not a kind of relation, and consequently neither is it a kind of joining.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a joining is a relation of equiparance as well as of equality. Now according to Avicenna the relation of equality
+                     is not identically the same in each extreme. Neither therefore is there an identically same joining; and consequently if matrimony
+                     is a kind of joining, there is not only one matrimony between man and wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is by relation that things are related to one another. Now by matrimony certain things are related to one another; for
+                     the husband is the wife's husband, and the wife is the husband's wife. Therefore matrimony is a kind of relation, nor is it
+                     other than a joining.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p6"> Further, the union of two things into one can result only from their being joined. Now such is the effect of matrimony (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q44_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.24" target="asv">Gn. 2:24</a>): "They shall be two in one flesh." Therefore matrimony is a kind of joining.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A joining denotes a kind of uniting, and so wherever things are united there must be a joining. Now things directed to one
+                     purpose are said to be united in their direction thereto, thus many men are united in following one military calling or in
+                     pursuing one business, in relation to which they are called fellow-soldiers or business partners. Hence, since by marriage
+                     certain persons are directed to one begetting and upbringing of children, and again to one
+                     family life, it is clear that in matrimony there is a joining in respect of which we speak of husband and wife; and this joining,
+                     through being directed to some one thing, is matrimony; while the joining together of bodies and minds is a result of matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Matrimony is the bond by which they are tied formally, not effectively, and so it need not be distinct from the joining.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although relation is not itself a sensible accident, its causes may be sensible. Nor is it necessary in a sacrament for that
+                     which is both reality and sacrament [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q44_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q66_A1.html">TP, Q[66], A[1]</a>] to be sensible (for such is the relation of the aforesaid joining to this sacrament), whereas the words expressive of consent,
+                     which are sacrament only and are the cause of that same joining, are sensible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A relation is founded on something as its cause---for instance likeness is founded on quality---and on something as its subject---for
+                     instance in the things themselves that are like; and on either hand we may find unity and diversity of relation. Since then
+                     it is not the same identical quality that conduces to likeness, but the same specific quality in each of the like subjects,
+                     and since, moreover, the subjects of likeness are two in number, and the
+                     same applies to equality, it follows that both equality and likeness are in every way numerically distinct in either of the
+                     like or equal subjects. But the relations of matrimony, on the one hand, have unity in both extremes, namely on the part of
+                     the cause, since it is directed to the one identical begetting; whereas on the part of the subject there is numerical diversity.
+                     The fact of this relation having a diversity of subjects is signified by the terms "husband" and "wife," while its unity
+                     is denoted by its being called matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q44.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q44_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q44_A2-p0.1">Whether matrimony is fittingly named?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that matrimony is unfittingly named. Because a thing should be named after that which ranks higher. But the
+                     father ranks above the mother. Therefore the union of father and mother should rather be named after the father.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing should be named from that which is essential to it, since a "definition expresses the nature signified by
+                     a name" (Metaph. iv, 28). Now nuptials are not essential to matrimony. Therefore matrimony should not be called nuptials.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a species cannot take its proper name from that which belongs to the genus. Now a joining [conjunctio] is the genus
+                     of matrimony. Therefore it should not be called a conjugal union.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the common use of speech.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Three things may be considered in matrimony. First, its essence, which is a joining together, and in reference to this it
+                     is called the "conjugal union"; secondly, its cause, which is the wedding, and in reference to this it is called the "nuptial
+                     union" from "nubo" [*The original meaning of 'nubo' is 'to veil'], because at the wedding ceremony, whereby the marriage is
+                     completed, the heads of those who are wedded are covered with a veil [*This is still done
+                     in some countries]; thirdly, the effect, which is the offspring, and in reference to this it is called "matrimony," as Augustine
+                     says (Contra Faust. xix, 26), because "a woman's sole purpose in marrying should be motherhood." Matrimony may also be resolved
+                     into "matris munium" [*i.e. munus], i.e. a mother's duty, since the duty of bringing up the children chiefly devolves on the
+                     women; or into "matrem muniens," because it provides the mother with a protector and support in the person of her
+                     husband; or into "matrem monens," as admonishing her not to leave her husband and take up with another man; or into "materia
+                     unius," because it is a joining together for the purpose of providing the matter of one offspring as though it were derived
+                     from {monos} and "materia"; or into "matre" and "nato," as Isidore says (Etym. ix), because it makes a woman the mother of
+                     a child.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the father ranks above the mother, the mother has more to do with the offspring than the father has. or we may say
+                     that woman was made chiefly in order to be man's helpmate in relation to the offspring, whereas the man was not made for this
+                     purpose. Wherefore the mother has a closer relation to the nature of marriage than the father has.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sometimes essentials are known by accidentals, wherefore some things can be named even after their accidentals, since a name
+                     is given to a thing for the purpose that it may become known.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes a species is named after something pertaining to the genus on account of an imperfection in the species, when namely
+                     it has the generic nature completely, yet adds nothing pertaining to dignity; thus the accidental property retains the name
+                     of property, which is common to it and to the definition. Sometimes, however, it is on account of a perfection, when we find
+                     the generic nature completely in one species and not in another; thus animal is
+                     named from soul [anima], and this belongs to an animate body, which is the genus of animal; yet animation is not found perfectly
+                     in those animate beings that are not animals. It is thus with the case in point. for the joining of husband and wife by matrimony
+                     is the greatest of all joinings, since it is a joining of soul and body, wherefore it is called a "conjugal" union.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q44_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q44_A3-p0.1">Whether matrimony is fittingly defined in the text?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that matrimony is unfittingly defined in the text* (Sent. iv, D, 27). [*The definition alluded to is as follows:
+                     "Marriage is the marital union of man and woman involving living together in undivided partnership."] For it is necessary
+                     to mention matrimony in defining a husband, since it is the husband who is joined to the woman in matrimony. Now "marital
+                     union" is put in the definition of matrimony. Therefore in these definitions there would seem
+                     to be a vicious circle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, matrimony makes the woman the man's wife no less than it makes the man the woman's husband. Therefore it should
+                     not be described as a "marital union" rather than an uxorial union.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit [consuetudo] pertains to morals. Yet it often happens that married persons differ very much in habit. Therefore
+                     the words "involving their living together [consuetudinem] in undivided partnership" should have no place in the definition
+                     of matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we find other definitions given of matrimony, for according to Hugh (Sum. Sent. vii, 6), "matrimony is the lawful
+                     consent of two apt persons to be joined together." Also, according to some, "matrimony is the fellowship of a common life
+                     and a community regulated by Divine and human law"; and we ask how these definitions differ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q44_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, three things are to be considered in matrimony, namely its cause, its essence, and its effect; and accordingly we find three
+                     definitions given of matrimony. For the definition of Hugh indicates the cause, namely the consent, and this definition is
+                     self-evident. The definition given in the text indicates the essence of matrimony, namely the "union," and adds determinate
+                     subjects by the words "between lawful
+                     persons." It also points to the difference of the contracting parties in reference to the species, by the word "marital,"
+                     for since matrimony is a joining together for the purpose of some one thing, this joining together is specified by the purpose
+                     to which it is directed, and this is what pertains to the husband [maritum]. It also indicates the force of this joining---for
+                     it is indissoluble---by the words "involving," etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p7"> The remaining definition indicates the effect to which matrimony is directed, namely the common life in family matters. And
+                     since every community is regulated by some law, the code according to which this community is directed, namely Divine and
+                     human law, finds a place in this definition. while other communities, such as those of traders or soldiers, are established
+                     by human law alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes the prior things from which a definition ought to be given are not known to us, and consequently certain things
+                     are defined from things that are posterior simply, but prior to us; thus in the definition of quality the Philosopher employs
+                     the word "such" [quale] when he says (Cap. De Qualitate) that "quality is that whereby we are said to be such." Thus, too,
+                     in defining matrimony we say that it is a "marital union," by which we mean that
+                     matrimony is a union for the purpose of those things required by the marital office, all of which could not be expressed in
+                     one word.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated 
+                     <a id="XP_Q44_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, this difference indicates the end of the union. And since, according to the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q44_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:9</a>), the "man is not [Vulg.: 'was not created'] for the woman, but the woman for the man," it follows that this difference should
+                     be indicated in reference to the man rather than the woman.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the civic life denotes not the individual act of this or that one, but the things that concern the common action
+                     of the citizens, so the conjugal life is nothing else than a particular kind of companionship pertaining to that common action.
+                     wherefore as regards this same life the partnership of married persons is always indivisible, although it is divisible as
+                     regards the act belonging to each party.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p11"> The Reply to the Fourth Objection is clear from what has been said above.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q45" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q45-p0.1">OF THE MARRIAGE CONSENT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q45-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q45-p2"> In the next place we have to consider the consent; and the first point to discuss is the consent considered in itself; the
+                  second is the consent confirmed by oath or by carnal intercourse; the third is compulsory consent and conditional consent;
+                  and the fourth is the object of the consent.
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q45-p3"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q45-p4"> (1) Whether the consent is the efficient cause of matrimony?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q45-p5"> (2) Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q45-p6"> (3) Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q45-p7"> (4) Whether consent given in words expressive of the present, without inward consent, makes a true marriage outwardly?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q45-p8"> (5) Whether consent given secretly in words expressive of the present makes a marriage?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q45_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q45_A1-p0.1">Whether consent is the efficient cause of matrimony?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent is not the efficient cause of matrimony. For the sacraments depend not on the human will but on
+                     the Divine institution, as shown above (Sent. iv, D, 2; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q45_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q64_A2.html">TP, Q[64], A[2]</a>). But consent belongs to the human will. Therefore it is no more the cause of matrimony than of the other sacraments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is its own cause. But seemingly matrimony is nothing else than the consent, since it is the consent which
+                     signifies the union of Christ with the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, of one thing there should be one cause. Now there is one marriage between two persons, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q45_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>); whereas the consents of the two parties are distinct, for they are given by different persons and to different things,
+                     since on the one hand there is consent to take a husband, and on the other hand consent to take a wife. Therefore mutual consent
+                     is not the cause of matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "It is not coition but consent
+                     that makes a marriage."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p6"> Further, one person does not receive power over that which is at the free disposal of another, without the latter's consent.
+                     Now by marriage each of the married parties receives power over the other's body (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q45_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:4</a>), whereas hitherto each had free power over his own body. Therefore consent makes a marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In every sacrament there is a spiritual operation by means of a material operation which signifies it; thus in Baptism the
+                     inward spiritual cleansing is effected by a bodily cleansing. Wherefore, since in matrimony there is a kind of spiritual joining
+                     together, in so far as matrimony is a sacrament, and a certain material joining together, in so far as it is directed to an
+                     office of nature and of civil life, it follows that the spiritual joining is the
+                     effect of the Divine power by means of the material joining. Therefore seeing that the joinings of material contracts are
+                     effected by mutual consent, it follows that the joining together of marriage is effected in the same way.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first cause of the sacraments is the Divine power which works in them the welfare of the soul; but the second or instrumental
+                     causes are material operations deriving their efficacy from the Divine institution, and thus consent is the cause in matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Matrimony is not the consent itself, but the union of persons directed to one purpose, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q45_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>), and this union is the effect of the consent. Moreover, the consent, properly speaking, signifies not the union of Christ
+                     with the Church, but His will whereby His union with the Church was brought about.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as marriage is one on the part of the object to which the union is directed, whereas it is more than one on the part
+                     of the persons united, so too the consent is one on the part of the thing consented to, namely the aforesaid union, whereas
+                     it is more than one on the part of the persons consenting. Nor is the direct object of consent a husband but union with a
+                     husband on the part of the wife, even as it is union with a wife on the part of the
+                     husband.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q45_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q45_A2-p0.1">Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no need for the consent to be expressed in words. For a man is brought under another's power
+                     by a vow just as he is by matrimony. Now a vow is binding in God's sight, even though it be not expressed in words. Therefore
+                     consent also makes a marriage binding even without being expressed in words.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there can be marriage between persons who are unable to express their mutual consent in words, through being dumb
+                     or of different languages. Therefore expression of the consent by words is not required for matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if that which is essential to a sacrament be omitted for any reason whatever, there is no sacrament. Now there is
+                     a case of marriage without the expression of words if the maid is silent through bashfulness when her parents give her away
+                     to the bridegroom. Therefore the expression of words is not essential to matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Matrimony is a sacrament. Now a sensible sign is required in every sacrament. Therefore it is also required in matrimony,
+                     and consequently there must needs be at least words by which the consent is made perceptible to the senses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p6"> Further, in matrimony there is a contract between husband and wife. Now in every contract there must be expression of the
+                     words by which men bind themselves mutually to one another. Therefore in matrimony also the consent must be expressed in words.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q45_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q45_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the marriage union is effected in the same way as the bond in material contracts. And since material contracts are not feasible
+                     unless the contracting parties express their will to one another in words, it follows that the consent which makes a marriage
+                     must also be expressed in words, so that the expression of words is to marriage what the outward washing is to Baptism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In a vow there is not a sacramental but only a spiritual bond, wherefore there is no need for it to be done in the same way
+                     as material contracts, in order that it be binding, as in the case of matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the like cannot plight themselves to one another in words, they can do so by signs, and such signs count for words.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Hugh of S. Victor (Tract. vii, Sum. Sent.), persons who are being married should give their consent by accepting
+                     one another freely. and this is judged to be the case if they show no dissent when they are being wedded. Wherefore in such
+                     a case the words of the parents are taken as being the maid's, for the fact that she does not contradict them is a sign that
+                     they are her words.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q45_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q45_A3-p0.1">Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage. For as present is to present, so is
+                     future to future. But consent given in words expressive of the present makes a marriage in the present. Therefore consent
+                     given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage in the future.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in other civil contracts, just as in matrimony, a certain obligation results from the words expressing consent.
+                     Now in other contracts it matters not whether the obligation is effected by words of the present or of the future tense. Therefore
+                     neither does it make any difference in matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the religious vow man contracts a spiritual marriage with God. Now the religious vow is expressed in words of
+                     the future tense, and is binding. Therefore carnal marriage also can be effected by words of the future tense.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A man who consents in words of the future tense to take a particular woman as his wife, and after, by words of the present
+                     tense, consents to take another, according to law must take the second for his wife (cap. Sicut ex Litteris, De spons. et
+                     matr.). But this would not be the case if consent given in words of the future tense made a marriage, since from the very
+                     fact that his marriage with the one is valid, he cannot, as long as she lives, marry another.
+                     Therefore consent given in words of the future tense does not make a marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p6"> Further, he who promises to do a certain thing does it not yet. Now he who consents in words of the future tense, promises
+                     to marry a certain woman. Therefore he does not marry her yet.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The sacramental causes produce their effect by signifying it; hence they effect what they signify. Since therefore when a
+                     man expresses his consent by words of the future tense, he does not signify that he is marrying, but promises that he will
+                     marry, it follows that a consent expressed in this manner does not make a marriage, but a promise [sponsionem] of marriage,
+                     and this promise is known as a betrothal [sponsalia].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When consent is expressed in words of the present tense, not only are the words actually present, but consent is directed
+                     to the present, so that they coincide in point of time; but when consent is given in words of the future tense, although the
+                     words are actually present, the consent is directed to a future time, and hence they do not coincide in point of time. For
+                     this reason the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even in other contracts, a man who uses words referring to the future, does not transfer the power over his property to another
+                     person---for instance if he were to say "I will give thee"---but only when he uses words indicative of the present.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the vow of religious profession it is not the spiritual marriage itself that is expressed in words which refer to the
+                     future, but an act of the spiritual marriage, namely obedience or observance of the rule. If, however, a man vow spiritual
+                     marriage in the future, it is not a spiritual marriage, for a man does not become a monk by taking such a vow, but promises
+                     to become one.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q45_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q45_A4-p0.1">Whether, in the absence of inward consent, a marriage is made by consent given in words of the present?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that even in the absence of inward consent a marriage is made by consent expressed in words of the present.
+                     For "fraud and deceit should benefit no man," according to the law (cap. Ex Tenore, De Rescrip., cap. Si Vir, De cognat. spir.).
+                     Now he who gives consent in words without consenting in heart commits a fraud. Therefore he should not benefit by it, through
+                     being released of the bond of marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mental consent of one person cannot be known to another, except in so far as it is expressed in words. If then
+                     the expression of the words is not enough, and inward consent is required in both parties, neither of them will be able to
+                     know that he is truly married to the other; and consequently whenever he uses marriage he will commit fornication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a man is proved to have consented to take a certain woman to wife in words of the present tense, he is compelled
+                     under pain of excommunication to take her as his wife, even though he should say that he was wanting in mental consent, notwithstanding
+                     that afterwards he may have contracted marriage with another woman by words expressive of consent in the present. But this
+                     would not be the case if mental consent were requisite for marriage. Therefore
+                     it is not required.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Innocent III says in a Decretal (cap. Tua Nos, De Spons. et matr.) in reference to this case: "Other things cannot complete
+                     the marriage bond in the absence of consent."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p6"> Further, intention is necessary in all the sacraments. Now he who consents not in his heart has no intention of contracting
+                     marriage; and therefore he does not contract a marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The outward cleansing stands in the same relation to baptism as the expression of words to this sacrament, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="XP_Q45_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q45_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Wherefore just as were a person to receive the outward cleansing, with the intention, not of receiving the sacrament, but
+                     of acting in jest or deceit, he would not be baptized; so, too, expression of words without inward consent makes no marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are two things here, namely the lack of consent---which benefits him in the tribunal of his conscience so that he is
+                     not bound by the marriage tie, albeit not in the tribunal of the Church where judgment is pronounced according to the evidence---and
+                     the deceit in the words, which does not benefit him, neither in the tribunal of his conscience nor in the tribunal of the
+                     Church, since in both he is punished for this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If mental consent is lacking in one of the parties, on neither side is there marriage, since marriage consists in a mutual
+                     joining together, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q45_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>). However one may believe that in all probability there is no fraud unless there be evident signs thereof; because we must
+                     presume good of everyone, unless there be proof of the contrary. Consequently the party in whom there is no fraud is excused
+                     from sin on
+                     account of ignorance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In such a case the Church compels him to hold to his first wife, because the Church judges according to outward appearances;
+                     nor is she deceived in justice or right, although she is deceived in the facts of the case. Yet such a man ought to bear the
+                     excommunication rather than return to his first wife; or else he should go far away into another country.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q45_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q46.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q45_A5-p0.1">Whether consent given secretly in words of the present makes a marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent given secretly in words of the present does not make a marriage. For a thing that is in one person's
+                     power is not transferred to the power of another without the consent of the person in whose power it was. Now the maid is
+                     in her father's power. Therefore she cannot by marriage be transferred to a husband's power without her father's consent.
+                     Wherefore if consent be given secretly, even though it should be expressed in words of the
+                     present, there will be no marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in penance, just as in matrimony, our act is as it were essential to the sacrament. But the sacrament of penance
+                     is not made complete except by means of the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments. Therefore neither
+                     can marriage be perfected without the priest's blessing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Church does not forbid baptism to be given secretly, since one may baptize either privately or publicly. But
+                     the Church does forbid the celebration of clandestine marriages (cap. Cum inhibitio, De clandest. despons.). Therefore they
+                     cannot be done secretly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, marriage cannot be contracted by those who are related in the second degree, because the Church has forbidden it.
+                     But the Church has also forbidden clandestine marriages. Therefore they cannot be valid marriages.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Given the cause the effect follows. Now the sufficient cause of matrimony is consent expressed in words of the present. Therefore
+                     whether this be done in public or in private the result is a marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p7"> Further, wherever there is the due matter and the due form of a sacrament there is the sacrament. Now in a secret marriage
+                     there is the due matter, since there are persons who are able lawfully to contract---and the due form, since there are the
+                     words of the present expressive of consent. Therefore there is a true marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as in the other sacraments certain things are essential to the sacrament, and if they are omitted there is no sacrament,
+                     while certain things belong to the solemnization of the sacrament, and if these be omitted the sacrament is nevertheless validly
+                     performed, although it is a sin to omit them; so, too, consent expressed in words of the present between persons lawfully
+                     qualified to contract makes a marriage, because these two conditions are essential to
+                     the sacrament; while all else belongs to the solemnization of the sacrament, as being done in order that the marriage may
+                     be more fittingly performed. Hence if these be omitted it is a true marriage, although the contracting parties sin, unless
+                     they have a lawful motive for being excused. [*Clandestine marriages have since been declared invalid by the Council of Trent
+                     (sess. xxiv). It must be borne in mind that throughout the treatise on marriage St. Thomas gives the Canon Law of his time.]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The maid is in her father's power, not as a female slave without power over her own body, but as a daughter, for the purpose
+                     of education. Hence, in so far as she is free, she can give herself into another's power without her father's consent, even
+                     as a son or daughter, since they are free, may enter religion without their parent's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In penance our act, although essential to the sacrament, does not suffice for producing the proximate effect of the sacrament,
+                     namely forgiveness of sins, and consequently it is necessary that the act of the priest intervene in order that the sacrament
+                     be perfected. But in matrimony our acts are the sufficient cause for the production of the proximate effect, which is the
+                     marriage bond, because whoever has the right to dispose of himself can bind
+                     himself to another. Consequently the priest's blessing is not required for matrimony as being essential to the sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is also forbidden to receive baptism otherwise than from a priest, except in a case of necessity. But matrimony is not
+                     a necessary sacrament: and consequently the comparison fails. However, clandestine marriages are forbidden on account of the
+                     evil results to which they are liable, since it often happens that one of the parties is guilty of fraud in such marriages;
+                     frequently, too, they have recourse to other nuptials when they repent of having
+                     married in haste; and many other evils result therefrom, besides which there is something disgraceful about them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Clandestine marriages are not forbidden as though they were contrary to the essentials of marriage, in the same way as the
+                     marriages of unlawful persons, who are undue matter for this sacrament; and hence there is no comparison.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q46.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q46" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q46-p0.1">OF THE CONSENT TO WHICH AN OATH OR CARNAL INTERCOURSE IS APPENDED (TWO ARTICLES) </h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q46-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q46-p2"> We must now consider the consent to which an oath or carnal intercourse is appended. Under this head there are two points
+                  of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q46-p3"> (1) Whether an oath added to the consent that is expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q46-p4"> (2) Whether carnal intercourse supervening to such a consent makes a marriage?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q46_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q46.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q46_A1-p0.1">Whether an oath added to the consent that is expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that if an oath be added to a consent that is expressed in words of the future tense it makes a marriage. For
+                     no one can bind himself to act against the Divine Law. But the fulfilling of an oath is of Divine law according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q46_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.33" target="asv"> Mat. 5:33, </a> "Thou shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord." Consequently no subsequent obligation can relieve a man of the obligation to
+                     keep an oath previously taken. If, therefore, after consenting to marry a
+                     woman by words expressive of the future and confirming that consent with an oath, a man binds himself to another woman by
+                     words expressive of the present, it would seem that none the less he is bound to keep his former oath. But this would not
+                     be the case unless that oath made the marriage complete. Therefore an oath affixed to a consent expressed in words of the
+                     future tense makes a marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Divine truth is stronger than human truth. Now an oath confirms a thing with the Divine truth. Since then words
+                     expressive of consent in the present in which there is mere human truth complete a marriage, it would seem that much more
+                     is this the case with words of the future confirmed by an oath.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q46_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.16" target="asv">Heb. 6:16</a>), "An oath for confirmation is the end of all . . . controversy"; wherefore in a court of justice at any rate one must stand
+                     by an oath rather than by a mere affirmation. Therefore if a man consent to marry a woman by a simple affirmation expressed
+                     in words of the present, after having consented to marry another in words of the future confirmed by oath, it would seem that
+                     in the judgment of the
+                     Church he should be compelled to take the first and not the second as his wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the simple uttering of words relating to the future makes a betrothal. But the addition of an oath must have some
+                     effect. Therefore it makes something more than a betrothal. Now beyond a betrothal there is nothing but marriage. Therefore
+                     it makes a marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> What is future is not yet. Now the addition of an oath does not make words of the future tense signify anything else than
+                     consent to something future. Therefore it is not a marriage yet.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p7"> Further, after a marriage is complete, no further consent is required for the marriage. But after the oath there is yet another
+                     consent which makes the marriage, else it would be useless to swear to a future marriage. Therefore it does not make a marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> An oath is employed in confirmation of one's words; wherefore it confirms that only which is signified by the words, nor
+                     does it change their signification. Consequently, since it belongs to words of the future tense, by their very signification,
+                     not to make a marriage, since what is promised in the future is not done yet, even though an oath be added to the promise,
+                     the marriage is not made yet, as the Master says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 28).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The fulfilling of a lawful oath is of Divine law, but not the fulfilling of an unlawful oath. Wherefore if a subsequent obligation
+                     makes that oath unlawful, whereas it was lawful before, he who does not keep the oath he took previously does not disobey
+                     the Divine law. And so it is in the case in point; since he swears unlawfully who promises unlawfully; and a promise about
+                     another's property is unlawful. Consequently the subsequent consent by words of
+                     the present, whereby a man transfers the power over his body to another woman, makes the previous oath unlawful which was
+                     lawful before.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Divine truth is most efficacious in confirming that to which it is applied. Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is
+                     clear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The oath has some effect, not by causing a new obligation, but confirming that which is already made, and thus he who violates
+                     it sins more grievously.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q46.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q46_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q46_A2-p0.1">Whether carnal intercourse after consent expressed in words of the future makes a marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that carnal intercourse after consent expressed in words of the future makes a marriage. For consent by deed
+                     is greater than consent by word. But he who has carnal intercourse consents by deed to the promise he has previously made.
+                     Therefore it would seem that much more does this make a marriage than if he were to consent to mere words referring to the
+                     present.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, not only explicit but also interpretive consent makes a marriage. Now there can be no better interpretation of consent
+                     than carnal intercourse. Therefore marriage is completed thereby.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all carnal union outside marriage is a sin. But the woman, seemingly, does not sin by admitting her betrothed to
+                     carnal intercourse. Therefore it makes a marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "Sin is not forgiven unless restitution be made," as Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.). Now a man cannot reinstate
+                     a woman whom he has violated under the pretense of marriage unless he marry her. Therefore it would seem that even if, after
+                     his carnal intercourse, he happen to contract with another by words of the present tense, he is bound to return to the first;
+                     and this would not be the case unless he were married to her. Therefore carnal
+                     intercourse after consent referring to the future makes a marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Pope Nicholas I says (Resp. ad Consult. Bulg. iii; Cap. Tuas dudum, De clandest. despons.), "Without the consent to marriage,
+                     other things, including coition, are of no effect."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p7"> Further, that which follows a thing does not make it. But carnal intercourse follows the actual marriage, as effect follows
+                     cause. Therefore it cannot make a marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of marriage in two ways. First, in reference to the tribunal of conscience, and thus in very truth carnal intercourse
+                     cannot complete a marriage the promise of which has previously been made in words expressive of the future, if inward consent
+                     is lacking, since words, even though expressive of the present, would not make a marriage in the absence of mental consent,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q46_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q45_A4.html">Q[45], A[4]</a>). Secondly, in reference to
+                     the judgment of the Church; and since in the external tribunal judgment is given in accordance with external evidence, and
+                     since nothing is more expressly significant of consent than carnal intercourse, it follows that in the judgment of the Church
+                     carnal intercourse following on betrothal is declared to make a marriage, unless there appear clear signs of deceit or fraud
+                     [*According to the pre-Tridentine legislation] (De sponsal. et matrim., cap. Is qui fidem).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In reality he who has carnal intercourse consents by deed to the act of sexual union, and does not merely for this reason
+                     consent to marriage except according to the interpretation of the law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This interpretation does not alter the truth of the matter, but changes the judgment which is about external things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the woman admit her betrothed, thinking that he wishes to consummate the marriage, she is excused from the sin, unless
+                     there be clear signs of fraud; for instance if they differ considerably in birth or fortune, or some other evident sign appear.
+                     Nevertheless the affianced husband is guilty of fornication, and should be punished for this fraud he has committed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In a case of this kind the affianced husband, before his marriage with the other woman, is bound to marry the one to whom
+                     he was betrothed, if she be his equal or superior in rank. But if he has married another woman, he is no longer able to fulfill
+                     his obligation, wherefore it suffices if he provide for her marriage. Nor is he bound even to do this, according to some,
+                     if her affianced husband is of much higher rank than she, or if there be some
+                     evident sign of fraud, because it may be presumed that in all probability she was not deceived but pretended to be.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q47" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q47-p0.1">OF COMPULSORY AND CONDITIONAL CONSENT (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q47-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q47-p2"> We must now consider compulsory and conditional consent. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q47-p3"> (1) Whether compulsory consent is possible?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q47-p4"> (2) Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q47-p5"> (3) Whether compulsory consent invalidates marriage?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q47-p6"> (4) Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party using compulsion?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q47-p7"> (5) Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q47-p8"> (6) Whether one can be compelled by one's father to marry?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q47_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q47_A1-p0.1">Whether a compulsory consent is possible?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no consent can be compulsory. For, as stated above (Sent. ii, D, 25 [*
+                     <a id="XP_Q47_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A4.html">FS, Q[6], A[4]</a>]) the free-will cannot be compelled. Now consent is an act of the free-will. Therefore it cannot be compulsory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, violent is the same as compulsory. Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), "a violent action is one the
+                     principle of which is without, the patient concurring not at all." But the principle of consent is always within. Therefore
+                     no consent can be compulsory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is perfected by consent. But that which perfects a sin cannot be compulsory, for, according to Augustine
+                     (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18), "no one sins in what he cannot avoid." Since then violence is defined by jurists (i, ff. de eo quod
+                     vi metusve) as the "force of a stronger being that cannot be repulsed," it would seem that consent cannot be compulsory or
+                     violent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, power is opposed to liberty. But compulsion is allied to power, as appears from a definition of Tully's in which
+                     he says that "compulsion is the force of one who exercises his power to detain a thing outside its proper bounds." Therefore
+                     the free-will cannot be compelled, and consequently neither can consent which is an act thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> That which cannot be, cannot be an impediment. But compulsory consent is an impediment to matrimony, as stated in the text
+                     (Sent. iv, D, 29). Therefore consent can be compelled.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p7"> Further, in marriage there is a contract. Now the will can be compelled in the matter of contracts; for which reason the
+                     law adjudges that restitution should be made of the whole, for it does not ratify "that which was done under compulsion or
+                     fear" (Sent. iv, D[29]). Therefore in marriage also it is possible for the consent to be compulsory.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Compulsion or violence is twofold. One is the cause of absolute necessity, and violence of this kind the Philosopher calls
+                     (Ethic. iii, 1) "violent simply," as when by bodily strength one forces a person to move; the other causes conditional necessity,
+                     and the Philosopher calls this a "mixed violence," as when a person throws his merchandise overboard in order to save himself.
+                     In the latter kind of violence, although the thing done is not voluntary in
+                     itself, yet taking into consideration the circumstances of place and time it is voluntary. And since actions are about particulars,
+                     it follows that it is voluntary simply, and involuntary in a certain respect (Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q47_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A6.html">FS, Q[6], A[6]</a>). Wherefore this latter violence or compulsion is consistent with consent, but not the former. And since this compulsion
+                     results from one's fear of a threatening danger, it follows that this violence coincides with fear which, in a manner,
+                     compels the will, whereas the former violence has to do with bodily actions. Moreover, since the law considers not merely
+                     internal actions, but rather external actions, consequently it takes violence to mean absolute compulsion, for which reason
+                     it draws a distinction between violence and fear. Here, however, it is a question of internal consent which cannot be influenced
+                     by compulsion or violence as distinct from fear. Therefore as to the question at issue compulsion and fear are the same.
+                     Now, according to lawyers fear is "the agitation of the mind occasioned by danger imminent or future" (Ethic. iii, 1).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for the first set of arguments consider the first kind of compulsion, and
+                     the second set of arguments consider the second.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q47_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q47_A2-p0.1">Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "a constant man" [*Cap. Ad audientiam, De his quae vi.] cannot be compelled by fear. Because the nature
+                     of a constant man is not to be agitated in the midst of dangers. Since then fear is "agitation of the mind occasioned by imminent
+                     danger," it would seem that he is not compelled by fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Of all fearsome things death is the limit," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), as though it were the
+                     most perfect of all things that inspire fear. But the constant man is not compelled by death, since the brave face even mortal
+                     dangers. Therefore no fear influences a constant man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, of all dangers a good man fears most that which affects his good name. But the fear of disgrace is not reckoned
+                     to influence a constant man, because, according to the law (vii, ff, de eo quod metus, etc.), "fear of disgrace is not included
+                     under the ordinance, 'That which is done through fear'" [*Dig. iv, 2, Quod metus causa]. Therefore neither does any other
+                     kind of fear influence a constant man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in him who is compelled by fear, fear leaves a sin, for it makes him promise what he is unwilling to fulfill, and
+                     thus it makes him lie. But a constant man does not commit a sin, not even a very slight one, for fear. Therefore no fear influences
+                     a constant man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Abraham and Isaac were constant. Yet they were influenced by fear, since on account of fear each said that his wife was his
+                     sister (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q47_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.12.12" target="asv">Gn. 12:12</a>; 26:7).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p7"> Further, wherever there is mixed violence, it is fear that compels. But however constant a man may be he may suffer violence
+                     of that kind, for if he be on the sea, he will throw his merchandise overboard if menaced with shipwreck. Therefore fear can
+                     influence a constant man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> By fear influencing a man we mean his being compelled by fear. A man is compelled by fear when he does that which otherwise
+                     he would not wish to do, in order to avoid that which he fears. Now the constant differs from the inconstant man in two respects.
+                     First, in respect of the quality of the danger feared, because the constant man follows right reason, whereby he knows whether
+                     to omit this rather than that, and whether to do this rather than that. Now the
+                     lesser evil or the greater good is always to be chosen in preference; and therefore the constant man is compelled to bear
+                     with the lesser evil through fear of the greater evil, but he is not compelled to bear with the greater evil in order to avoid
+                     the lesser. But the inconstant man is compelled to bear with the greater evil through fear of a lesser evil, namely to commit
+                     sin through fear of bodily suffering; whereas on the contrary the obstinate man cannot be compelled even to permit or to do
+                     a lesser evil, in order to avoid a greater. Hence the constant man is a mean between the inconstant and the obstinate. Secondly,
+                     they differ as to their estimate of the threatening evil, for a constant man is not compelled unless for grave and probable
+                     reasons, while the inconstant man is compelled by trifling motives: "The wicked man seeth when no man pursueth" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q47_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.28.1" target="asv">Prov. 28:1</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The constant man, like the brave man, is fearless, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 4), not that he is altogether without
+                     fear, but because he fears not what he ought not to fear, or where, or when he ought not to fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin is the greatest of evils, and consequently a constant man can nowise be compelled to sin; indeed a man should die rather
+                     than suffer the like, as again the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6,9). Yet certain bodily injuries are less grievous than
+                     certain others; and chief among them are those which relate to the person, such as death, blows, the stain resulting from
+                     rape, and slavery. Wherefore the like compel a constant man to suffer other bodily
+                     injuries. They are contained in the verse: "Rape, status, blows, and death." Nor does it matter whether they refer to his
+                     own person, or to the person of his wife or children, or the like.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although disgrace is a greater injury it is easy to remedy it. Hence fear of disgrace is not reckoned to influence a constant
+                     man according to law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The constant man is not compelled to lie, because at the time he wishes to give; yet afterwards he wishes to ask for restitution,
+                     or at least to appeal to the judge, if he promised not to ask for restitution. But he cannot promise not to appeal, for since
+                     this is contrary to the good of justice, he cannot be compelled thereto, namely to act against justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q47_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q47_A3-p0.1">Whether compulsory consent invalidates a marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that compulsory consent does not invalidate a marriage. For just as consent is necessary for matrimony, so
+                     is intention necessary for Baptism. Now one who is compelled by fear to receive Baptism, receives the sacrament. Therefore
+                     one who is compelled by fear to consent is bound by his marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), that which is done on account of mixed violence is more voluntary
+                     than involuntary. Now consent cannot be compelled except by mixed violence. Therefore it is not entirely involuntary, and
+                     consequently the marriage is valid.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seemingly he who has consented to marriage under compulsion ought to be counseled to stand to that marriage; because
+                     to promise and not to fulfill has an "appearance of evil," and the Apostle wishes us to refrain from all such things (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q47_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.5.22" target="asv">1 Thess 5:22</a>). But that would not be the case if compulsory consent invalidated a marriage altogether. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A Decretal says (cap. Cum locum, De sponsal. et matrim.): "Since there is no room for consent where fear or compulsion enters
+                     in, it follows that where a person's consent is required, every pretext for compulsion must be set aside." Now mutual contract
+                     is necessary in marriage. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p6"> Further, Matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church, which union is according to the liberty of love. Therefore
+                     it cannot be the result of compulsory consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The marriage bond is everlasting. Hence whatever is inconsistent with its perpetuity invalidates marriage. Now the fear which
+                     compels a constant man deprives the contract of its perpetuity, since its complete rescission can be demanded. Wherefore this
+                     compulsion by fear which influences a constant man, invalidates marriage, but not the other compulsion. Now a constant man
+                     is reckoned a virtuous man who, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4), is a
+                     measure in all human actions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p8"> However, some say that if there be consent although compulsory, the marriage is valid in conscience and in God's sight, but
+                     not in the eyes of the Church, who presumes that there was no inward consent on account of the fear. But this is of no account,
+                     because the Church should not presume a person to sin until it be proved; and he sinned if he said that he consented whereas
+                     he did not consent. Wherefore the Church presumes that he did consent, but judges this compulsory consent
+                     to be insufficient for a valid marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intention is not the efficient cause of the sacrament in baptism, it is merely the cause that elicits the action of the
+                     agent; whereas the consent is the efficient cause in matrimony. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not any kind of voluntariness suffices for marriage: it must be completely voluntary, because it has to be perpetual; and
+                     consequently it is invalidated by violence of a mixed nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He ought not always to be advised to stand to that marriage, but only when evil results are feared from its dissolution.
+                     Nor does he sin if he does otherwise, because there is no appearance of evil in not fulfilling a promise that one has made
+                     unwillingly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q47_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q47_A4-p0.1">Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party who uses compulsion?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that compulsory consent makes a marriage, at least as regards the party who uses compulsion. For matrimony
+                     is a sign of a spiritual union. But spiritual union which is by charity may be with one who has not charity. Therefore marriage
+                     is possible with one who wills it not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if she who was compelled consents afterwards, it will be a true marriage. But he who compelled her before is not
+                     bound by her consent. Therefore he was married to her by virtue of the consent he gave before.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Matrimony is an equiparant relation. Now a relation of that kind is equally in both terms. Therefore if there is an impediment
+                     on the part of one, there will be no marriage on the part of the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since marriage is a kind of relation, and a relation cannot arise in one of the terms without arising in the other, it follows
+                     that whatever is an impediment to matrimony in the one, is an impediment to matrimony in the other; since it is impossible
+                     for a man to be the husband of one who is not his wife, or for a woman to be a wife without a husband, just as it is impossible
+                     to be a mother without having a child. Hence it is a common saying that "marriage is
+                     not lame."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the act of the lover can be directed to one who loves not, there can be no union between them, unless love be mutual.
+                     Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) that friendship which consists in a kind of union requires a return of love.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Marriage does not result from the consent of her who was compelled before, except in so far as the other party's previous
+                     consent remains in force; wherefore if he were to withdraw his consent there would be no marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q47_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q47_A5-p0.1">Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not even a conditional consent makes a marriage, because a statement is not made simply if it is made
+                     subject to a condition. But in marriage the words expressive of consent must be uttered simply. Therefore a conditional consent
+                     makes no marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, marriage should be certain. But where a statement is made under a condition it is rendered doubtful. Therefore a
+                     like consent makes no marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> In other contracts an obligation is undertaken conditionally, and holds so long as the condition holds. Therefore since marriage
+                     is a contract, it would seem that it can be made by a conditional consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The condition made is either of the present or of the future. If it is of the present and is not contrary to marriage, whether
+                     it be moral or immoral, the marriage holds if the condition is verified, and is invalid if the condition is not verified.
+                     If, however, it be contrary to the marriage blessings, the marriage is invalid, as we have also said in reference to betrothals
+                     (
+                     <a id="XP_Q47_A5-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q43_A1.html">Q[43], A[1]</a>). But if the condition refer to the future, it
+                     is either necessary, as that the sun will rise tomorrow---and then the marriage is valid, because such future things are present
+                     in their causes---or else it is contingent, as the payment of a sum of money, or the consent of the parents, and then the
+                     judgment about a consent of this kind is the same as about a consent expressed in words of the future tense; wherefore it
+                     makes no marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p6"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p7"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p8"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q47_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q48.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q47_A6-p0.1">Whether one can be compelled by one's father's command to marry?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one can be compelled by one's father's command to marry. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q47_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.20" target="asv">Col. 3:20</a>): "Children, obey your parents in all things." Therefore they are bound to obey them in this also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaac charged Jacob (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q47_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.28.1" target="asv">Gn. 28:1</a>) not to take a wife from the daughters of Chanaan. But he would not have charged him thus unless he had the right to command
+                     it. Therefore a son is bound to obey his father in this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one should promise, especially with an oath, for one whom he cannot compel to keep the promise. Now parents promise
+                     future marriages for their children, and even confirm their promise by oath. Therefore they can compel their children to keep
+                     that promise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, our spiritual father, the Pope to wit, can by his command compel a man to a spiritual marriage, namely to accept
+                     a bishopric. Therefore a carnal father can compel his son to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A son may lawfully enter religion though his father command him to marry. Therefore he is not bound to obey him in this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p7"> Further, if he were bound to obey, a betrothal contracted by the parents would hold good without their children's consent.
+                     But this is against the law (cap. Ex litteris, De despon. impub.). Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since in marriage there is a kind of perpetual service, as it were, a father cannot by his command compel his son to marry,
+                     since the latter is of free condition: but he may induce him for a reasonable cause; and thus the son will be affected by
+                     his father's command in the same way as he is affected by that cause, so that if the cause be compelling as indicating either
+                     obligation or fitness, his father's command will compel him in the same measure: otherwise
+                     he may not compel him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle do not refer to those matters in which a man is his own master as the father is. Such is marriage
+                     by which the son also becomes a father.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There were other motives why Jacob was bound to do what Isaac commanded him, both on account of the wickedness of those women,
+                     and because the seed of Chanaan was to be cast forth from the land which was promised to the seed of the patriarchs. Hence
+                     Isaac could command this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> They do not swear except with the implied condition "if it please them"; and they are bound to induce them in good faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some say that the Pope cannot command a man to accept a bishopric, because consent should be free. But if this be granted
+                     there would be an end of ecclesiastical order, for unless a man can be compelled to accept the government of a church, the
+                     Church could not be preserved, since sometimes those who are qualified for the purpose are unwilling to accept unless they
+                     be compelled. Therefore we must reply that the two cases are not parallel; for there is
+                     no bodily service in a spiritual marriage as there is in the bodily marriage; because the spiritual marriage is a kind of
+                     office for dispensing the public weal: "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the
+                     mysteries of God" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q47_A6-p12.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:1</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q48.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q48" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q48-p0.1">OF THE OBJECT OF THE CONSENT (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q48-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q48-p2"> We must now consider the object of the consent. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q48-p3"> (1) Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q48-p4"> (2) Whether consent to marry a person for an immoral motive makes a marriage?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q48_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q48.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q48_A1-p0.1">Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the consent which makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse. For Jerome [*The words quoted are
+                     found implicitly in St. Augustine (De Bono Viduit ix)] says that "for those who have vowed virginity it is wicked, not only
+                     to marry, but even to wish to marry." But it would not be wicked unless it were contrary to virginity, and marriage is not
+                     contrary to virginity except by reason of carnal intercourse. Therefore the will's consent in
+                     marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever there is in marriage between husband and wife is lawful between brother and sister except carnal intercourse.
+                     But there cannot lawfully be a consent to marriage between them. Therefore the marriage consent is a consent to carnal intercourse.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the woman say to the man: "I consent to take thee provided however that you know me not," it is not a marriage
+                     consent, because it contains something against the essence of that consent. Yet this would not be the case unless the marriage
+                     consent were a consent to carnal intercourse. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in everything the beginning corresponds to the consummation. Now marriage is consummated by carnal intercourse.
+                     Therefore, since it begins by the consent, it would seem that the consent is to carnal intercourse.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No one that consents to carnal intercourse is a virgin in mind and body. Yet Blessed John the evangelist after consenting
+                     to marriage was a virgin both in mind and body. Therefore he did not consent to carnal intercourse.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p7"> Further, the effect corresponds to its cause. Now consent is the cause of marriage. Since then carnal intercourse is not
+                     essential to marriage, seemingly neither is the consent which causes marriage a consent to carnal intercourse.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The consent that makes a marriage is a consent to marriage, because the proper effect of the will is the thing willed. Wherefore,
+                     according as carnal intercourse stands in relation to marriage, so far is the consent that causes marriage a consent to carnal
+                     intercourse. Now, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q48_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>;
+                     <a id="XP_Q48_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q45_A1.html"> Q[45], AA[1]</a>,2), marriage is not essentially the carnal union itself, but a certain joining together of
+                     husband and wife ordained to carnal intercourse, and a further consequent union between husband and wife, in so far as they
+                     each receive power over the other in reference to carnal intercourse, which joining together is called the nuptial bond. Hence
+                     it is evident that they said well who asserted that to consent to marriage is to consent to carnal intercourse implicitly
+                     and not explicitly. For carnal intercourse is not to be understood, except as an effect is implicitly contained in its cause,
+                     for the power to have carnal intercourse, which power is the object of the consent, is the cause of carnal intercourse, just
+                     as the power to use one's own property is the cause of the use.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why consent to marriage after taking the vow of virginity is sinful, is because that consent gives a power to
+                     do what is unlawful: even so would a man sin if he gave another man the power to receive that which he has in deposit, and
+                     not only by actually delivering it to him. With regard to the consent of the Blessed Virgin, we have spoken about it above
+                     (Sent. iv, D, 3; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q48_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q29_A2.html">TP, Q[29], A[2]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Between brother and sister there can be no power of one over the other in relation to carnal intercourse, even as neither
+                     can there be lawfully carnal intercourse itself. Consequently the argument does not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such an explicit condition is contrary not only to the act but also to the power of carnal intercourse, and therefore it
+                     is contrary to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Marriage begun corresponds to marriage consummated, as habit or power corresponds to the act which is operation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p13"> The arguments on the contrary side show that consent is not given explicitly to carnal intercourse; and this is true.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q48.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q48_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q48_A2-p0.1">Whether marriage can result from one person's consent to take another for a base motive?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that marriage cannot result from one person's consent to take another for a base motive. For there is but one
+                     reason for one thing. Now marriage is one sacrament. Therefore it cannot result from the intention of any other end than that
+                     for which it was instituted by God; namely the begetting of children.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the marriage union is from God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q48_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.6" target="asv"> Mat. 19:6, </a> "What . . . God hath joined together let no man put asunder." But a union that is made for immoral motives is not from God.
+                     Therefore it is not a marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the other sacraments, if the intention of the Church be not observed, the sacrament is invalid. Now the intention
+                     of the Church in the sacrament of matrimony is not directed to a base purpose. Therefore, if a marriage be contracted for
+                     a base purpose, it will not be a valid marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Boethius (De Diff., Topic. ii) "a thing is good if its end be good." But matrimony is always good.
+                     Therefore it is not matrimony if it is done for an evil end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church; and in this there can be nothing base. Neither therefore
+                     can marriage be contracted for a base motive.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> He who baptizes another for the sake of gain baptizes validly. Therefore if a man marries a woman for the purpose of gain
+                     it is a valid marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p8"> Further, the same conclusion is proved by the examples and authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 30).</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The final cause of marriage may be taken as twofold, namely essential and accidental. The essential cause of marriage is
+                     the end to which it is by its very nature ordained, and this is always good, namely the begetting of children and the avoiding
+                     of fornication. But the accidental final cause thereof is that which the contracting parties intend as the result of marriage.
+                     And since that which is intended as the result of marriage is consequent upon marriage,
+                     and since that which comes first is not altered by what comes after, but conversely; marriage does not become good or evil
+                     by reason of that cause, but the contracting parties to whom this cause is the essential end. And since accidental causes
+                     are infinite in number, it follows that there can be an infinite number of such causes in matrimony, some of which are good
+                     and some bad.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This is true of the essential and principal cause; but that which has one essential and principal end may have several secondary
+                     essential ends, and an infinite number of accidental ends.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The joining together can be taken for the relation itself which is marriage, and that is always from God, and is good, whatever
+                     be its cause; or for the act of those who are being joined together, and thus it is sometimes evil and is not from God simply.
+                     Nor is it unreasonable that an effect be from God, the cause of which is evil, such as a child born of adultery; for it is
+                     not from that cause as evil, but as having some good in so far as it is from
+                     God, although it is not from God simply.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intention of the Church whereby she intends to confer a sacrament is essential to each sacrament, so that if it be not
+                     observed, all sacraments are null. But the intention of the Church whereby she intends an advantage resulting from the sacrament
+                     belongs to the well-being and not to the essence of a sacrament; wherefore, if it be not observed, the sacrament is none the
+                     less valid. Yet he who omits this intention sins; for instance if in baptism
+                     one intend not the healing of the mind which the Church intends. In like manner he who intends to marry, although he fail
+                     to direct it to the end which the Church intends, nevertheless contracts a valid marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This evil which is intended is the end not of marriage, but of the contracting parties.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The union itself, and not the action of those who are united, is the sign of the union of Christ with the Church: wherefore
+                     the conclusion does not follow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q49" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q49-p0.1">OF THE MARRIAGE GOODS* (SIX ARTICLES) [*"Bona matrimonii," variously rendered marriage goods, marriage blessings, and advantages
+                  of marriage.]
+               </h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q49-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q49-p2"> In the next place we must consider the marriage goods. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q49-p3"> (1) Whether certain goods are necessary in order to excuse marriage?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q49-p4"> (2) Whether those assigned are sufficient?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q49-p5"> (3) Whether the sacrament is the principal among the goods?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q49-p6"> (4) Whether the marriage act is excused from sin by the aforesaid goods?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q49-p7"> (5) Whether it can ever be excused from sin without them?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q49-p8"> (6) Whether in their absence it is always a mortal sin?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q49_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q49_A1-p0.1">Whether certain blessings are necessary in order to excuse marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that certain blessings are not necessary in order to excuse marriage. For just as the preservation of the individual
+                     which is effected by the nutritive power is intended by nature, so too is the preservation of the species which is effected
+                     by marriage; and indeed so much the more as the good of the species is better and more exalted than the good of the individual.
+                     But no goods are necessary to excuse the act of the nutritive power. Neither
+                     therefore are they necessary to excuse marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) the friendship between husband and wife is natural, and includes
+                     the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But that which is virtuous in itself needs no excuse. Therefore neither should
+                     any goods be assigned for the excuse of matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, matrimony was instituted as a remedy and as an office, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q49_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q42_A2.html">Q[42], A[2]</a>). Now it needs no excuse in so far as it is instituted as an office, since then it would also have needed an excuse in paradise,
+                     which is false, for there, as Augustine says, "marriage would have been without reproach and the marriage-bed without stain"
+                     (Gen. ad lit. ix). In like manner neither does it need an excuse in so far as it is intended
+                     as a remedy, any more than the other sacraments which were instituted as remedies for sin. Therefore matrimony does not need
+                     these excuses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the virtues are directed to whatever can be done aright. If then marriage can be righted by certain goods, it needs
+                     nothing else to right it besides the virtues of the soul; and consequently there is no need to assign to matrimony any goods
+                     whereby it is righted, any more than to other things in which the virtues direct us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever there is indulgence, there must needs be some reason for excuse. Now marriage is allowed in the state of infirmity
+                     "by indulgence" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q49_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:6</a>). Therefore it needs to be excused by certain goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p7"> Further, the intercourse of fornication and that of marriage are of the same species as regards the species of nature. But
+                     the intercourse of fornication is wrong in itself. Therefore, in order that the marriage intercourse be not wrong, something
+                     must be added to it to make it right, and draw it to another moral species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> No wise man should allow himself to lose a thing except for some compensation in the shape of an equal or better good. Wherefore
+                     for a thing that has a loss attached to it to be eligible, it needs to have some good connected with it, which by compensating
+                     for that loss makes that thing ordinate and right. Now there is a loss of reason incidental to the union of man and woman,
+                     both because the reason is carried away entirely on account of the vehemence of the
+                     pleasure, so that it is unable to understand anything at the same time, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11); and again
+                     because of the tribulation of the flesh which such persons have to suffer from solicitude for temporal things (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q49_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:28</a>). Consequently the choice of this union cannot be made ordinate except by certain compensations whereby that same union is
+                     righted. and these are the goods which excuse marriage and make it right.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the act of eating there is not such an intense pleasure overpowering the reason as in the aforesaid action, both because
+                     the generative power, whereby original sin is transmitted, is infected and corrupt, whereas the nutritive power, by which
+                     original sin is not transmitted, is neither corrupt nor infected; and again because each one feels in himself a defect of
+                     the individual more than a defect of the species. Hence, in order to entice a man to
+                     take food which supplies a defect of the individual, it is enough that he feel this defect; but in order to entice him to
+                     the act whereby a defect of the species is remedied, Divine providence attached pleasure to that act, which moves even irrational
+                     animals in which there is not the stain of original sin. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These goods which justify marriage belong to the nature of marriage, which consequently needs them, not as extrinsic causes
+                     of its rectitude, but as causing in it that rectitude which belongs to it by nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the very fact that marriage is intended as an office or as a remedy it has the aspect of something useful and right;
+                     nevertheless both aspects belong to it from the fact that it has these goods by which it fulfills the office and affords a
+                     remedy to concupiscence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An act of virtue may derive its rectitude both from the virtue as its elicitive principle, and from its circumstances as
+                     its formal principles; and the goods of marriage are related to marriage as circumstances to an act of virtue which owes it
+                     to those circumstances that it can be an act of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q49_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q49_A2-p0.1">Whether the goods of marriage are sufficiently enumerated?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goods of marriage are insufficiently enumerated by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 31), namely "faith, offspring,
+                     and sacrament." For the object of marriage among men is not only the begetting and feeding of children, but also the partnership
+                     of a common life, whereby each one contributes his share of work to the common stock, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12. Therefore
+                     as the offspring is reckoned a good of matrimony, so also should the
+                     communication of works.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the union of Christ with the Church, signified by matrimony, is the effect of charity. Therefore charity rather
+                     than faith should be reckoned among the goods of matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in matrimony, just as it is required that neither party have intercourse with another, so is it required that the
+                     one pay the marriage debt to the other. Now the former pertains to faith according to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 31). Therefore
+                     justice should also be reckoned among the goods of marriage on account of the payment of the debt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in matrimony as signifying the union of Christ with the Church, just as indivisibility is required, so also is unity,
+                     whereby one man has one wife. But the sacrament which is reckoned among the three marriage goods pertains to indivisibility.
+                     Therefore there should be something else pertaining to unity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> On the other hand, it would seem that they are too many. For one virtue suffices to make one act right. Now faith is one
+                     virtue. Therefore it was not necessary to add two other goods to make marriage right.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the same cause does not make a thing both useful and virtuous, since the useful and the virtuous are opposite divisions
+                     of the good. Now marriage derives its character of useful from the offspring. Therefore the offspring should not be reckoned
+                     among the goods that make marriage virtuous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, nothing should be reckoned as a property or condition of itself. Now these goods are reckoned to be conditions of
+                     marriage. Therefore since matrimony is a sacrament, the sacrament should not be reckoned a condition of matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Matrimony is instituted both as an office of nature and as a sacrament of the Church. As an office of nature it is directed
+                     by two things, like every other virtuous act. one of these is required on the part of the agent and is the intention of the
+                     due end, and thus the "offspring" is accounted a good of matrimony; the other is required on the part of the act, which is
+                     good generically through being about a due matter; and thus we have "faith," whereby a man
+                     has intercourse with his wife and with no other woman. Besides this it has a certain goodness as a sacrament, and this is
+                     signified by the very word "sacrament."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Offspring signifies not only the begetting of children, but also their education, to which as its end is directed the entire
+                     communion of works that exists between man and wife as united in marriage, since parents naturally "lay up" for their "children"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q49_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:14</a>); so that the offspring like a principal end includes another, as it were, secondary end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith is not taken here as a theological virtue, but as part of justice, in so far as faith [fides] signifies the suiting
+                     of deed to word [fiant dicta] by keeping one's promises; for since marriage is a contract it contains a promise whereby this
+                     man is assigned to this woman.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the marriage promise means that neither party is to have intercourse with a third party, so does it require that
+                     they should mutually pay the marriage debt. The latter is indeed the chief of the two, since it follows from the power which
+                     each receives over the other. Consequently both these things pertain to faith, although the Book of Sentences mentions that
+                     which is the less manifest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> By sacrament we are to understand not only indivisibility, but all those things that result from marriage being a sign of
+                     Christ's union with the Church. We may also reply that the unity to which the objection refers pertains to faith, just as
+                     indivisibility belongs to the sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Faith here does not denote a virtue, but that condition of virtue which is a part of justice and is called by the name of
+                     faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Just as the right use of a useful good derives its rectitude not from the useful but from the reason which causes the right
+                     use, so too direction to a useful good may cause the goodness of rectitude by virtue of the reason causing the right direction;
+                     and in this way marriage, through being directed to the offspring, is useful, and nevertheless righteous, inasmuch as it is
+                     directed aright.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> As the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 31), sacrament here does not mean matrimony itself, but its indissolubility, which is a
+                     sign of the same thing as matrimony is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p17"> We may also reply that although marriage is a sacrament, marriage as marriage is not the same as marriage as a sacrament,
+                     since it was instituted not only as a sign of a sacred thing, but also as an office of nature. Hence the sacramental aspect
+                     is a condition added to marriage considered in itself, whence also it derives its rectitude. Hence its sacramentality, if
+                     I may use the term, is reckoned among the goods which justify marriage; and accordingly this third good of
+                     marriage, the sacrament to wit, denotes not only its indissolubility, but also whatever pertains to its signification.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p18"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p19"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q49_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q49_A3-p0.1">Whether the sacrament is the chief of the marriage goods?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the "sacrament" is not the chief of the marriage goods. For the end is principal in everything. Now the
+                     end of marriage is the offspring. Therefore the offspring is the chief marriage good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the specific nature the difference is more important than the genus, even as the form is more important than
+                     matter in the composition of a natural thing. Now "sacrament" refers to marriage on the part of its genus, while "offspring"
+                     and "faith" refer thereto on the part of the difference whereby it is a special kind of sacrament. Therefore these other two
+                     are more important than sacrament in reference to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as we find marriage without "offspring" and without "faith," so do we find it without indissolubility, as in
+                     the case where one of the parties enters religion before the marriage is consummated. Therefore neither from this point of
+                     view is "sacrament" the most important marriage good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, an effect cannot be more important than its cause. Now consent, which is the cause of matrimony, is often changed.
+                     Therefore the marriage also can be dissolved and consequently inseparability is not always a condition of marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the sacraments which produce an everlasting effect imprint a character. But no character is imprinted in matrimony.
+                     Therefore it is not conditioned by a lasting inseparability. Consequently just as there is marriage without "offspring" so
+                     is there marriage without "sacrament," and thus the same conclusion follows as above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> That which has a place in the definition of a thing is most essential thereto. Now inseparability, which pertains to sacrament,
+                     is placed in the definition of marriage (
+                     <a id="XP_Q49_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A3.html">Q[44], A[3]</a>), while offspring and faith are not. Therefore among the other goods sacrament is the most essential to matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p8"> Further, the Divine power which works in the sacraments is more efficacious than human power. But "offspring" and "faith"
+                     pertain to matrimony as directed to an office of human nature, whereas "sacrament" pertains to it as instituted by God. Therefore
+                     sacrament takes a more important part in marriage than the other two.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> This or that may be more important to a thing in two ways, either because it is more essential or because it is more excellent.
+                     If the reason is because it is more excellent, then "sacrament" is in every way the most important of the three marriage goods,
+                     since it belongs to marriage considered as a sacrament of grace; while the other two belong to it as an office of nature;
+                     and a perfection of grace is more excellent than a perfection of nature. If,
+                     however, it is said to be more important because it is more essential, we must draw a distinction; for "faith" and "offspring"
+                     can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, and thus they regard the use of matrimony in begetting children and observing
+                     the marriage compact; while inseparability, which is denoted by "sacrament," regards the very sacrament considered in itself,
+                     since from the very fact that by the marriage compact man and wife give to one another power the one over the other
+                     in perpetuity, it follows that they cannot be put asunder. Hence there is no matrimony without inseparability, whereas there
+                     is matrimony without "faith" and "offspring," because the existence of a thing does not depend on its use; and in this sense
+                     "sacrament" is more essential to matrimony than "faith" and "offspring." Secondly, "faith" and "offspring" may be considered
+                     as in their principles, so that "offspring" denote the intention of having children, and "faith" the duty of remaining
+                     faithful, and there can be no matrimony without these also, since they are caused in matrimony by the marriage compact itself,
+                     so that if anything contrary to these were expressed in the consent which makes a marriage, the marriage would be invalid.
+                     Taking "faith" and "offspring" in this sense, it is clear that "offspring" is the most essential thing in marriage, secondly
+                     "faith," and thirdly "sacrament"; even as to man it is more essential to be in nature than to be in grace, although it is
+                     more excellent to be in grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The end as regards the intention stands first in a thing, but as regards the attainment it stands last. It is the same with
+                     "offspring" among the marriage goods; wherefore in a way it is the most important and in another way it is not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sacrament, even as holding the third place among the marriage goods, belongs to matrimony by reason of its difference; for
+                     it is called "sacrament" from its signification of that particular sacred thing which matrimony signifies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. ix), marriage is a good of mortals, wherefore in the resurrection "they shall neither
+                     marry nor be married" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q49_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>). Hence the marriage bond does not last after the life wherein it is contracted, and consequently it is said to be inseparable,
+                     because it cannot be sundered in this life, but either by bodily death after carnal union, or by spiritual death after a merely
+                     spiritual
+                     union.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the consent which makes a marriage is not everlasting materially, i.e. in regard to the substance of the act, since
+                     that act ceases and a contrary act may succeed it, nevertheless formally speaking it is everlasting, because it is a consent
+                     to an ever lasting bond, else it would not make a marriage, for a consent to take a woman for a time makes no marriage. Hence
+                     it is everlasting formally, inasmuch as an act takes its species from its
+                     object; and thus it is that matrimony derives its inseparability from the consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In those sacraments wherein a character is imprinted, power is given to perform spiritual actions; but in matrimony, to perform
+                     bodily actions. Wherefore matrimony by reason of the power which man and wife receive over one another agrees with the sacraments
+                     in which a character is imprinted, and from this it derives its inseparability, as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 31); yet
+                     it differs from them in so far as that power regards bodily acts; hence it
+                     does not confer a spiritual character.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q49_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q49_A4-p0.1">Whether the marriage act is excused by the aforesaid goods?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the marriage act cannot be altogether excused from sin by the aforesaid goods. For whoever allows himself
+                     to lose a greater good for the sake of a lesser good sins because he allows it inordinately. Now the good of reason which
+                     is prejudiced in the marriage act is greater than these three marriage goods. Therefore the aforesaid goods do not suffice
+                     to excuse marriage intercourse.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a moral good be added to a moral evil the sum total is evil and not good, since one evil circumstance makes an
+                     action evil, whereas one good circumstance does not make it good. Now the marriage act is evil in itself, else it would need
+                     no excuse. Therefore the addition of the marriage goods cannot make the act good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wherever there is immoderate passion there is moral vice. Now the marriage goods cannot prevent the pleasure in
+                     that act from being immoderate. Therefore they cannot excuse it from being a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15), shame is only caused by a disgraceful deed. Now the marriage goods
+                     do not deprive that deed of its shame. Therefore they cannot excuse it from sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The marriage act differs not from fornication except by the marriage goods. If therefore these were not sufficient to excuse
+                     it marriage would be always unlawful; and this is contrary to what was stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q49_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q41_A3.html">Q[41], A[3]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p7"> Further, the marriage goods are related to its act as its due circumstances, as stated above (A[1], ad 4). Now the like circumstances
+                     are sufficient to prevent an action from being evil. Therefore these goods can excuse marriage so that it is nowise a sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> An act is said to be excused in two ways. First, on the part of the agent, so that although it be evil it is not imputed
+                     as sin to the agent, or at least not as so grave a sin. thus ignorance is said to excuse a sin wholly or partly. Secondly,
+                     an act is said to be excused on its part, so that, namely, it is not evil; and it is thus that the aforesaid goods are said
+                     to excuse the marriage act. Now it is from the same cause that an act is not morally evil, and
+                     that it is good, since there is no such thing as an indifferent act, as was stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 40; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q49_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A9.html">FS, Q[18], A[9]</a>). Now a human act is said to be good in two ways. In one way by goodness of virtue, and thus an act derives its goodness
+                     from those things which place it in the mean. This is what "faith" and "offspring" do in the marriage act, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="XP_Q49_A4-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q49_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. In another way, by goodness of the "sacrament," in which way
+                     an act is said to be not only good, but also holy, and the marriage act derives this goodness from the indissolubility of
+                     the union, in respect of which it signifies the union of Christ with the Church. Thus it is clear that the aforesaid goods
+                     sufficiently excuse the marriage act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the marriage act man does not incur harm to his reason as to habit, but only as to act. Nor is it unfitting that a certain
+                     act which is generically better be sometimes interrupted for some less good act; for it is possible to do this without sin,
+                     as in the case of one who ceases from the act of contemplation in order meanwhile to devote himself to action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would avail if the evil that is inseparable from carnal intercourse were an evil of sin. But in this case it
+                     is an evil not of sin but of punishment alone, consisting in the rebellion of concupiscence against reason; and consequently
+                     the conclusion does not follow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The excess of passion that amounts to a sin does not refer to the passion's quantitative intensity, but to its proportion
+                     to reason; wherefore it is only when a passion goes beyond the bounds of reason that it is reckoned to be immoderate. Now
+                     the pleasure attaching to the marriage act, while it is most intense in point of quantity, does not go beyond the bounds previously
+                     appointed by reason before the commencement of the act, although reason is
+                     unable to regulate them during the pleasure itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The turpitude that always accompanies the marriage act and always causes shame is the turpitude of punishment, not of sin,
+                     for man is naturally ashamed of any defect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q49_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q49_A5-p0.1">Whether the marriage act can be excused without the marriage goods?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage goods. For he who is moved by nature alone to
+                     the marriage act, apparently does not intend any of the marriage goods, since the marriage goods pertain to grace or virtue.
+                     Yet when a person is moved to the aforesaid act by the natural appetite alone, seemingly he commits no sin, for nothing natural
+                     is an evil, since "evil is contrary to nature and order," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
+                     iv). Therefore the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who has intercourse with his wife in order to avoid fornication, does not seemingly intend any of the marriage
+                     goods. Yet he does not sin apparently, because marriage was granted to human weakness for the very purpose of avoiding fornication
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q49_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:2</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q49_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.6" target="asv">6</a>). Therefore the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he who uses as he will that which is his own does not act against justice, and thus seemingly does not sin. Now
+                     marriage makes the wife the husband's own, and "vice versa." Therefore, if they use one another at will through the instigation
+                     of lust, it would seem that it is no sin; and thus the same conclusion follows.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which is good generically does not become evil unless it be done with an evil intention. Now the marriage act
+                     whereby a husband knows his wife is generically good. Therefore it cannot be evil unless it be done with an evil intention.
+                     Now it can be done with a good intention, even without intending any marriage good, for instance by intending to keep or acquire
+                     bodily health. Therefore it seems that this act can be excused even without the
+                     marriage goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> If the cause be removed the effect is removed. Now the marriage goods are the cause of rectitude in the marriage act. Therefore
+                     the marriage act cannot be excused without them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p7"> Further, the aforesaid act does not differ from the act of fornication except in the aforesaid goods. But the act of fornication
+                     is always evil. Therefore the marriage act also will always be evil unless it be excused by the aforesaid goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as the marriage goods, in so far as they consist in a habit, make a marriage honest and holy, so too, in so far as they
+                     are in the actual intention, they make the marriage act honest, as regards those two marriage goods which relate to the marriage
+                     act. Hence when married persons come together for the purpose of begetting children, or of paying the debt to one another
+                     (which pertains to "faith") they are wholly excused from sin. But the third good does
+                     not relate to the use of marriage, but to its excuse, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q49_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q49_A3.html">(A[3])</a>; wherefore it makes marriage itself honest, but not its act, as though its act were wholly excused from sin, through being
+                     done on account of some signification. Consequently there are only two ways in which married persons can come together without
+                     any sin at all, namely in order to have offspring, and in order to pay the debt. otherwise it is always at least a venial
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The offspring considered as a marriage good includes something besides the offspring as a good intended by nature. For nature
+                     intends offspring as safeguarding the good of the species, whereas the offspring as a good of the sacrament of marriage includes
+                     besides this the directing of the child to God. Wherefore the intention of nature which intends the offspring must needs be
+                     referred either actually or habitually to the intention of having an
+                     offspring, as a good of the sacrament: otherwise the intention would go no further than a creature; and this is always a sin.
+                     Consequently whenever nature alone moves a person to the marriage act, he is not wholly excused from sin, except in so far
+                     as the movement of nature is further directed actually or habitually to the offspring as a good of the sacrament. Nor does
+                     it follow that the instigation of nature is evil, but that it is imperfect unless it be further directed to some marriage
+                     good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If a man intends by the marriage act to prevent fornication in his wife, it is no sin, because this is a kind of payment
+                     of the debt that comes under the good of "faith." But if he intends to avoid fornication in himself, then there is a certain
+                     superfluity, and accordingly there is a venial sin, nor was the sacrament instituted for that purpose, except by indulgence,
+                     which regards venial sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One due circumstance does not suffice to make a good act, and consequently it does not follow that, no matter how one use
+                     one's own property, the use is good, but when one uses it as one ought according to all the circumstances.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although it is not evil in itself to intend to keep oneself in good health, this intention becomes evil, if one intend health
+                     by means of something that is not naturally ordained for that purpose; for instance if one sought only bodily health by the
+                     sacrament of baptism, and the same applies to the marriage act in the question at issue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q49_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q50.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q49_A6-p0.1">Whether it is a mortal sin for a man to have knowledge of his wife, with the intention not of a marriage good but merely of
+                     pleasure?
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that whenever a man has knowledge of his wife, with the intention not of a marriage good but merely of pleasure,
+                     he commits a mortal sin. For according to Jerome (Comment. in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q49_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.25" target="asv"> Eph. 5:25</a>), as quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 31), "the pleasure taken in the embraces of a wanton is damnable in a husband." Now
+                     nothing but mortal sin is said to be damnable. Therefore it is always a mortal sin to have knowledge of one's wife for
+                     mere pleasure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, consent to pleasure is a mortal sin, as stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 24). Now whoever knows his wife
+                     for the sake of pleasure consents to the pleasure. Therefore he sins mortally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever fails to refer the use of a creature to God enjoys a creature, and this is a mortal sin. But whoever uses
+                     his wife for mere pleasure does not refer that use to God. Therefore he sins mortally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no one should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. Now according to the text (Sent. ii, D, 24) a man who knows
+                     his wife for mere pleasure is debarred from entering the Church, as though he were excommunicate. Therefore every such man
+                     sins mortally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> As stated in the text (Sent. ii, D, 24), according to Augustine (Contra Jul. ii, 10; De Decem Chord. xi; Serm. xli, de Sanct.),
+                     carnal intercourse of this kind is one of the daily sins, for which we say the "Our Father." Now these are not mortal sins.
+                     Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p7"> Further, it is no mortal sin to take food for mere pleasure. Therefore in like manner it is not a mortal sin for a man to
+                     use his wife merely to satisfy his desire.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that whenever pleasure is the chief motive for the marriage act it is a mortal sin; that when it is an indirect
+                     motive it is a venial sin; and that when it spurns the pleasure altogether and is displeasing, it is wholly void of venial
+                     sin; so that it would be a mortal sin to seek pleasure in this act, a venial sin to take the pleasure when offered, but that
+                     perfection requires one to detest it. But this is impossible, since according to the
+                     Philosopher (Ethic. x, 3,4) the same judgment applies to pleasure as to action, because pleasure in a good action is good,
+                     and in an evil action, evil; wherefore, as the marriage act is not evil in itself, neither will it be always a mortal sin
+                     to seek pleasure therein. Consequently the right answer to this question is that if pleasure be sought in such a way as to
+                     exclude the honesty of marriage, so that, to wit, it is not as a wife but as a woman that a man treats his wife, and that
+                     he is
+                     ready to use her in the same way if she were not his wife, it is a mortal sin; wherefore such a man is said to be too ardent
+                     a lover of his wife, because his ardor carries him away from the goods of marriage. If, however, he seek pleasure within the
+                     bounds of marriage, so that it would not be sought in another than his wife, it is a venial sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man seeks wanton pleasure in his wife when he sees no more in her that he would in a wanton.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Consent to the pleasure of the intercourse that is a mortal sin is itself a mortal sin; but such is not the consent to the
+                     marriage act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although he does not actually refer the pleasure to God, he does not place his will's last end therein; otherwise he would
+                     seek it anywhere indifferently. Hence it does not follow that he enjoys a creature; but he uses a creature actually for his
+                     own sake, and himself habitually, though not actually, for God's sake.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The reason for this statement is not that man deserves to be excommunicated for this sin, but because he renders himself
+                     unfit for spiritual things, since in that act, he becomes flesh and nothing more.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q50.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q50" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q50_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q50-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF MARRIAGE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q50-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q50-p2"> In the next place we must consider the impediments of marriage: (1) In general; (2) In particular.</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q50_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q50.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q51.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q50_A1-p0.1">Whether it is fitting that impediments should be assigned to marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unfitting for impediments to be assigned to marriage. For marriage is a sacrament condivided with the others.
+                     But no impediments are assigned to the others. Neither therefore should they be assigned to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the less perfect a thing is the fewer its obstacles. Now matrimony is the least perfect of the sacraments. Therefore
+                     it should have either no impediments or very few.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wherever there is disease, it is necessary to have a remedy for the disease. Now concupiscence, a remedy for which
+                     is permitted in matrimony (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q50_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:6</a>), is in all. Therefore there should not be any impediment making it altogether unlawful for a particular person to marry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, unlawful means against the law. Now these impediments that are assigned to matrimony are not against the natural
+                     law, because they are not found to be the same in each state of the human race, since more degrees of kindred come under prohibition
+                     at one time than at another. Nor, seemingly, can human law set impediments against marriage, since marriage, like the other
+                     sacraments, is not of human but of Divine institution. Therefore impediments should
+                     not be assigned to marriage, making it unlawful for a person to marry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, lawful and unlawful differ as that which is against the law from that which is not, and between these there is no
+                     middle term, since they are opposed according to affirmation and negation. Therefore there cannot be impediments to marriage,
+                     placing a person in a middle position between those who are lawful and those who are unlawful subjects of marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, union of man and woman is unlawful save in marriage. Now every unlawful union should be dissolved. Therefore if
+                     anything prevent a marriage being contracted, it will "de facto" dissolve it after it has been contracted; and thus impediments
+                     should not be assigned to marriage, which hinder it from being contracted, and dissolve it after it has been contracted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, no impediment can remove from a thing that which is part of its definition. Now indissolubility is part of the definition
+                     of marriage. Therefore there cannot be any impediments which annul a marriage already contracted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 8:</b> On the other hand, it would seem that there should be an infinite number of impediments to marriage. For marriage is a good.
+                     Now good may be lacking in an infinite number of ways, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii). Therefore there is an infinite number
+                     of impediments to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, the impediments to marriage arise from the conditions of individuals. But such like conditions are infinite in number.
+                     Therefore the impediments to marriage are also infinite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p11">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In marriage, as in other sacraments, there are certain things essential to marriage, and others that belong to its solemnization.
+                     And since even without the things that pertain to its solemnization it is still a true sacrament, as also in the case of the
+                     other sacraments, it follows that the impediments to those things that pertain to the solemnization of this sacrament do not
+                     derogate from the validity of the marriage. These impediments are said to hinder
+                     the contracting of marriage, but they do not dissolve the marriage once contracted; such are the veto of the Church, or the
+                     holy seasons. Hence the verse:
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p12"> "The veto of the Church and holy tide</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p13"> Forbid the knot, but loose it not if tied."</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p14"> On the other hand, those impediments which regard the essentials of marriage make a marriage invalid, wherefore they are
+                     said not only to hinder the contracting of marriage, but to dissolve it if contracted; and they are contained in the following
+                     verse:
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p15"> "Error, station, vow, kinship, crime,</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p16"> Difference of worship, force, holy orders,</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p17"> Marriage bond, honesty, affinity, impotence,</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p18"> All these forbid marriage, and annul it though</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p19"> contracted."</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p20"> The reason for this number may be explained as follows: Marriage may be hindered either on the part of the contract or in
+                     regard to the contracting parties. If in the first way, since the marriage contract is made by voluntary consent, and this
+                     is incompatible with either ignorance or violence, there will be two impediments to marriage, namely "force," i.e. compulsion,
+                     and "error" in reference to ignorance. Wherefore the Master pronounced on these two impediments when treating
+                     of the cause of matrimony (Sent. iv, DD 29,30). Here, however, he is treating of the impediments as arising from the contracting
+                     parties, and these may be differentiated as follows. A person may be hindered from contracting marriage either simply, or
+                     with some particular person. If simply, so that he be unable to contract marriage with any woman, this can only be because
+                     he is hindered from performing the marriage act. This happens in two ways. First, because he cannot "de facto," either
+                     through being altogether unable---and thus we have the impediment of "impotence"---or through being unable to do so freely,
+                     and thus we have the impediment of the "condition of slavery." Secondly, because he cannot do it lawfully, and this because
+                     he is bound to continence, which happens in two ways, either through his being bound on account of the office he has undertaken
+                     to fulfill---and thus we have the impediment of "Order"---or on account of his having taken a vow---and thus "Vow" is an
+                     impediment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p21"> If, however, a person is hindered from marrying, not simply but in reference to a particular person, this is either because
+                     he is bound to another person, and thus he who is married to one cannot marry another, which constitutes the impediment of
+                     the "bond of marriage"---or through lack of proportion to the other party, and this for three reasons. First, on account of
+                     too great a distance separating them, and thus we have "difference of worship"; secondly, on account of their
+                     being too closely related, and thus we have three impediments, namely "kinship," then "affinity," which denotes the close
+                     relationship between two persons, in reference to a third united to one of them by marriage, and the "justice of public honesty,"
+                     where we have a close relationship between two persons arising out of the betrothal of one of them to a third person; thirdly,
+                     on account of a previous undue union between him and the woman, and thus the "crime of adultery" previously committed
+                     with her is an impediment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p22">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There may be impediments to the other sacraments also in the omission either of that which is essential, or of that which
+                     pertains to the solemnization of the sacrament, as stated above. However, impediments are assigned to matrimony rather than
+                     to the other sacraments for three reasons. First, because matrimony consists of two persons, and consequently can be impeded
+                     in more ways than the other sacraments which refer to one person taken individually;
+                     secondly, because matrimony has its cause in us and in God, while some of the other sacraments have their cause in God alone.
+                     Wherefore penance which in a manner has a cause in us, is assigned certain impediments by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 16), such
+                     as hypocrisy, the public games, and so forth; thirdly, because other sacraments are objects of command or counsel, as being
+                     more perfect goods, whereas marriage is a matter of indulgence, as being a less perfect good (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q50_A1-p22.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.6" target="asv">1 Cor.
+                        7:6
+                     </a>). Wherefore, in order to afford an opportunity of proficiency towards a greater good, more impediments are assigned to matrimony
+                     than to the other sacraments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p23">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The more perfect things can be hindered in more ways, in so far as more conditions are required for them. And if an imperfect
+                     thing requires more conditions, there will be more impediments to it; and thus it is in matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p24">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would hold, were there no other and more efficacious remedies for the disease of concupiscence; which is false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p25">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Persons are said to be unlawful subjects for marriage through being contrary to the law whereby marriage is established.
+                     Now marriage as fulfilling an office of nature is established by the natural law; as a sacrament, by the Divine law; as fulfilling
+                     an office of society, by the civil law. Consequently a person may be rendered an unlawful subject of marriage by any of the
+                     aforesaid laws. Nor does the comparison with the other sacraments hold, for
+                     they are sacraments only. And since the natural law is particularized in various ways according to the various states of mankind,
+                     and since positive law, too, varies according to the various conditions of men, the Master (Sent. iv, D, 34) asserts that
+                     at various times various persons have been unlawful subjects of marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p26">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The law may forbid a thing either altogether, or in part and in certain cases. Hence between that which is altogether according
+                     to the law and that which is altogether against the law (which are opposed by contrariety and not according to affirmation
+                     and negation), that which is somewhat according to the law and somewhat against the law is a middle term. For this reason
+                     certain persons hold a middle place between those who are simply lawful subjects
+                     and those who are simply unlawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p27">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Those impediments which do not annul a marriage already contracted sometimes hinder a marriage from being contracted, by
+                     rendering it not invalid but unlawful. And if it be contracted it is a true marriage although the contracting parties sin;
+                     just as by consecrating after breaking one's fast one would sin by disobeying the Church's ordinance, and yet it would be
+                     a valid sacrament because it is not essential to the sacrament that the consecrator be
+                     fasting.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p28">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> When we say that the aforesaid impediments annul marriage already contracted, we do not mean that they dissolve a marriage
+                     contracted in due form, but that they dissolve a marriage contracted "de facto" and not "de jure." Wherefore if an impediment
+                     supervene after a marriage has been contracted in due form, it cannot dissolve the marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p29">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> The impediments that hinder a good accidentally are infinite in number, like all accidental causes. But the causes which
+                     of their own nature corrupt a certain good are directed to that effect, and determinate, even as are the causes which produce
+                     that good; for the causes by which a thing is destroyed and those by which it is made are either contrary to one another,
+                     or the same but taken in a contrary way.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p30">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> The conditions of particular persons taken individually are infinite in number, but taken in general, they may be reduced
+                     to a certain number; as instanced in medicine and all operative arts, which consider the conditions of particular persons
+                     in whom acts are.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p31"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p32"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q50.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q51.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q50_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q51" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q50_A1.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q51-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF ERROR (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q51-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q51-p2"> We must now consider the impediments to matrimony in particular, and in the first place the impediment of error. Under this
+                  head there are two points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q51-p3"> (1) Whether error of its very nature is an impediment to matrimony?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q51-p4"> (2) What kind of error?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q51_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q51.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q51_A1-p0.1">Whether it is right to reckon error as an impediment to marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that error should not be reckoned in itself an impediment to marriage. For consent, which is the efficient
+                     cause of marriage, is hindered in the same way as the voluntary. Now the voluntary, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
+                     1), may be hindered by ignorance. But ignorance is not the same as error, because ignorance excludes knowledge altogether,
+                     whereas error does not, since "error is to approve the false as though it were true,"
+                     according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 11). Therefore ignorance rather than error should have been reckoned here as an impediment
+                     to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which of its very nature can be an impediment to marriage is in opposition to the good of marriage. But error
+                     is not a thing of this kind. Therefore error is not by its very nature an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as consent is required for marriage, so is intention required for baptism. Now if one were to baptize John,
+                     thinking to baptize Peter, John would be baptized none the less. Therefore error does not annul matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there was true marriage between Lia and Jacob, and yet, in this case, there was error. Therefore error does not
+                     annul a marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the Digests (Si per errorem, ff. De jurisdic. omn. judic.): "What is more opposed to consent than error?" Now
+                     consent is required for marriage. Therefore error is an impediment to matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p7"> Further, consent denotes something voluntary. Now error is an obstacle to the voluntary, since "the voluntary," according
+                     to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (De Nat. Hom. xxxii),
+                     "is that which has its principle in one who has knowledge of singulars which are the matter of actions." But this does not
+                     apply to one who is in error. Therefore error is an impediment to matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever hinders a cause, of its very nature hinders the effect likewise. Now consent is the cause of matrimony, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q51_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q45_A1.html">Q[45], A[1]</a>). Hence whatever voids the consent, voids marriage. Now consent is an act of the will, presupposing an act of the intellect;
+                     and if the first be lacking, the second must needs be lacking also. Hence, when error hinders knowledge, there follows a defect
+                     in the consent also, and consequently in
+                     the marriage. Therefore it is possible according to the natural law for error to void marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Speaking simply, ignorance differs from error, because ignorance does not of its very nature imply an act of knowledge, while
+                     error supposes a wrong judgment of reason about something. However, as regards being an impediment to the voluntary, it differs
+                     not whether we call it ignorance or error, since no ignorance can be an impediment to the voluntary, unless it have error
+                     in conjunction with it, because the will's act presupposes an estimate or
+                     judgment about something which is the object of the will. Wherefore if there be ignorance there must needs be error; and for
+                     this reason error is set down as being the proximate cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although error is not of itself contrary to matrimony, it is contrary thereto as regards the cause of marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The character of baptism is not caused directly by the intention of the baptizer, but by the material element applied outwardly;
+                     and the intention is effective only as directing the material element to its effect; whereas the marriage tie is caused by
+                     the consent directly. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 30) the marriage between Lia and Jacob was effected not by their coming together, which
+                     happened through an error, but by their consent, which followed afterwards. Yet both are clearly to be excused from sin (Sent.
+                     iv, D, 30).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q51.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q51_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q51_A2-p0.1">Whether every error is an impediment to matrimony?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every error is an impediment to matrimony, and not, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 30), only error
+                     about the condition or the person. For that which applies to a thing as such applies to it in all its bearings. Now error
+                     is of its very nature an impediment to matrimony, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q51_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q51_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore every error is an impediment to matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if error, as such, is an impediment to matrimony, the greater the error the greater the impediment. Now the error
+                     concerning faith in a heretic who disbelieves in this sacrament is greater than an error concerning the person. Therefore
+                     it should be a greater impediment than error about the person.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, error does not void marriage except as removing voluntariness. Now ignorance about any circumstance takes away voluntariness
+                     (Ethic. iii, 1). Therefore it is not only error about condition or person that is an impediment to matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as the condition of slavery is an accident affecting the person, so are bodily or mental qualities. But error
+                     regarding the condition is an impediment to matrimony. Therefore error concerning quality or fortune is equally an impediment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, just as slavery or freedom pertains to the condition of person, so do high and low rank, or dignity of position
+                     and the lack thereof. Now error regarding the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony. Therefore error about the
+                     other matters mentioned is also an impediment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, just as the condition of slavery is an impediment, so are difference of worship and impotence, as we shall say further
+                     on (
+                     <a id="XP_Q51_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q52_A2.html">Q[52], A[2]</a>;
+                     <a id="XP_Q51_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q58_A1.html"> Q[58], A[1]</a>;
+                     <a id="XP_Q51_A2-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A1.html"> Q[59], A[1]</a>). Therefore just as error regarding the condition is an impediment, so also should error about those other matters be reckoned
+                     an impediment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> On the other hand, it would seem that not even error about the person is an impediment to marriage. For marriage is a contract
+                     even as a sale is. Now in buying and selling the sale is not voided if one coin be given instead of another of equal value.
+                     Therefore a marriage is not voided if one woman be taken instead of another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, it is possible for them to remain in this error for many years and to beget between them sons and daughters. But
+                     it would be a grave assertion to maintain that they ought to be separated then. Therefore their previous error did not void
+                     their marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, it might happen that the woman is betrothed to the brother of the man whom she thinks that she is consenting to
+                     marry, and that she has had carnal intercourse with him; in which case, seemingly, she cannot go back to the man to whom she
+                     thought to give her consent, but should hold on to his brother. Thus error regarding the person is not an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p11">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as error, through causing involuntariness, is an excuse from sin, so on the same count is it an impediment to marriage.
+                     Now error does not excuse from sin unless it refer to a circumstance the presence or absence of which makes an action lawful
+                     or unlawful. For if a man were to strike his father with an iron rod thinking it to be of wood, he is not excused from sin
+                     wholly, although perhaps in part; but if a man were to strike his father, thinking to
+                     strike his son to correct him, he is wholly excused provided he take due care. Wherefore error, in order to void marriage,
+                     must needs be about the essentials of marriage. Now marriage includes two things, namely the two persons who are joined together,
+                     and the mutual power over one another wherein marriage consists. The first of these is removed by error concerning the person,
+                     the second by error regarding the condition, since a slave cannot freely give power over his body to another, without
+                     his master's consent. For this reason these two errors, and no others, are an impediment to matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not from its generic nature that error is an impediment to marriage, but from the nature of the difference added thereto;
+                     namely from its being error about one of the essentials to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An error of faith about matrimony is about things consequent upon matrimony, for instance on the question of its being a
+                     sacrament, or of its being lawful. Wherefore such error as these is no impediment to marriage, as neither does an error about
+                     baptism hinder a man from receiving the character, provided he intend to receive what the Church gives, although he believe
+                     it to be nothing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not any ignorance of a circumstance that causes the involuntariness which is an excuse from sin, as stated above; wherefore
+                     the argument does not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Difference of fortune or of quality does not make a difference in the essentials to matrimony, as the condition of slavery
+                     does. Hence the argument does not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Error about a person's rank, as such, does not void a marriage, for the same reason as neither does error about a personal
+                     quality. If, however, the error about a person's rank or position amounts to an error about the person, it is an impediment
+                     to matrimony. Hence, if the woman consent directly to this particular person, her error about his rank does not void the marriage;
+                     but if she intend directly to consent to marry the king's son, whoever he may
+                     be, then, if another man than the king's son be brought to her, there is error about the person, and the marriage will be
+                     void.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Error is an impediment to matrimony, although it be about other impediments to marriage if it concern those things which
+                     render a person an unlawful subject of marriage. But (the Master) does not mention error about such things, because they are
+                     an impediment to marriage whether there be error about them or not; so that if a woman contract with a subdeacon, whether
+                     she know this or not, there is no marriage; whereas the condition of slavery is no
+                     impediment if the slavery be known. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> In contracts money is regarded as the measure of other things (Ethic. v, 5), and not as being sought for its own sake. Hence
+                     if the coin paid is not what it is thought to be but another of equal value, this does not void the contract. But if there
+                     be error about a thing sought for its own sake, the contract is voided, for instance if one were to sell a donkey for a horse;
+                     and thus it is in the case in point.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p19">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> No matter how long they have cohabited, unless she be willing to consent again, there is no marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p20">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> If she did not consent previously to marry his brother, she may hold to the one whom she took in error. Nor can she return
+                     to his brother, especially if there has been carnal intercourse between her and the man she took to husband. If, however,
+                     she had previously consented to take the first one in words of the present, she cannot have the second while the first lives.
+                     But she may either leave the second or return to the first; and ignorance of the
+                     fact excuses her from sin, just as she would be excused if after the consummation of the marriage a kinsman of her husband
+                     were to know her by fraud since she is not to be blamed for the other's deceit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p21"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p22"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q50_A1.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q52" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q52-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF THE CONDITION OF SLAVERY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q52-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q52-p2"> We must now consider the impediment of the condition of slavery. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q52-p3"> (1) Whether the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q52-p4"> (2) Whether a slave can marry without his master's consent?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q52-p5"> (3) Whether a man who is already married can make himself a slave without his wife's consent?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q52-p6"> (4) Whether the children should follow the condition of their father or of their mother?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q52_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q52_A1-p0.1">Whether the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the condition of slavery is no impediment to matrimony. For nothing is an impediment to marriage except
+                     what is in some way opposed to it. But slavery is in no way opposed to marriage, else there could be no marriage among slaves.
+                     Therefore slavery is no impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is contrary to nature cannot be an impediment to that which is according to nature. Now slavery is contrary
+                     to nature, for as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 6), "it is contrary to nature for man to wish to lord it over another man"; and
+                     this is also evident from the fact that it was said of man (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q52_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>) that he should "have dominion over the fishes of the sea," but not that he should have dominion over man. Therefore it
+                     cannot be an impediment to marriage, which is a natural thing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it is an impediment, this is either of natural law or of positive law. But it is not of natural law, since according
+                     to natural law all men are equal, as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 6), while it is stated at the beginning of the Digests (Manumissiones,
+                     ff. de just. et jure.) that slavery is not of natural law; and positive law springs from the natural law, as Tully says (De
+                     Invent. ii). Therefore, according to law, slavery is not an impediment to any
+                     marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which is an impediment to marriage is equally an impediment whether it be known or not, as in the case of consanguinity.
+                     Now the slavery of one party, if it be known to the other, is no impediment to their marriage. Therefore slavery, considered
+                     in itself, is unable to void a marriage; and consequently it should not be reckoned by itself as a distinct impediment to
+                     marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, just as one may be in error about slavery, so as to deem a person free who is a slave, so may one be in error about
+                     freedom, so as to deem a person a slave whereas he is free. But freedom is not accounted an impediment to matrimony. Therefore
+                     neither should slavery be so accounted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, leprosy is a greater burden to the fellowship of marriage and is a greater obstacle to the good of the offspring
+                     than slavery is. Yet leprosy is not reckoned an impediment to marriage. Therefore neither should slavery be so reckoned.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p8">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A Decretal says (De conjug. servorum, cap. Ad nostram) that "error regarding the condition hinders a marriage from being
+                     contracted and voids that which is already contracted."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p9"> Further, marriage is one of the goods that are sought for their own sake, because it is qualified by honesty; whereas slavery
+                     is one of the things to be avoided for their own sake. Therefore marriage and slavery are contrary to one another; and consequently
+                     slavery is an impediment to matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p10">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In the marriage contract one party is bound to the other in the matter of paying the debt; wherefore if one who thus binds
+                     himself is unable to pay the debt, ignorance of this inability, on the side of the party to whom he binds himself, voids the
+                     contract. Now just as impotence in respect of coition makes a person unable to pay the debt, so that he is altogether disabled,
+                     so slavery makes him unable to pay it freely. Therefore, just as ignorance or
+                     impotence in respect of coition is an impediment if not known but not if known, as we shall state further on (
+                     <a id="XP_Q52_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q58.html">Q[58])</a>, so the condition of slavery is an impediment if not known, but not if it be known.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Slavery is contrary to marriage as regards the act to which marriage binds one party in relation to the other, because it
+                     prevents the free execution of that act; and again as regards the good of the offspring who become subject to the same condition
+                     by reason of the parent's slavery. Since, however, it is free to everyone to suffer detriment in that which is his due, if
+                     one of the parties knows the other to be a slave, the marriage is none the less
+                     valid. Likewise since in marriage there is an equal obligation on either side to pay the debt, neither party can exact of
+                     the other a greater obligation than that under which he lies; so that if a slave marry a bondswoman, thinking her to be free,
+                     the marriage is not thereby rendered invalid. It is therefore evident that slavery is no impediment to marriage except when
+                     it is unknown to the other party, even though the latter be in a condition of freedom; and so nothing prevents marriage between
+                     slaves, or even between a freeman and a bondswoman.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing prevents a thing being against nature as to the first intention of nature, and yet not against nature as to its second
+                     intention. Thus, as stated in De Coelo, ii, all corruption, defect, and old age are contrary to nature, because nature intends
+                     being and perfection, and yet they are not contrary to the second intention of nature, because nature, through being unable
+                     to preserve being in one thing, preserves it in another which is engendered
+                     of the other's corruption. And when nature is unable to bring a thing to a greater perfection it brings it to a lesser; thus
+                     when it cannot produce a male it produces a female which is "a misbegotten male" (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3). I say then in
+                     like manner that slavery is contrary to the first intention of nature. Yet it is not contrary to the second, because natural
+                     reason has this inclination, and nature has this desire---that everyone should be good; but from the fact that a person sins,
+                     nature has an inclination that he should be punished for his sin, and thus slavery was brought in as a punishment of sin.
+                     Nor is it unreasonable for a natural thing to be hindered by that which is unnatural in this way; for thus is marriage hindered
+                     by impotence of coition, which impotence is contrary to nature in the way mentioned.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural law requires punishment to be inflicted for guilt, and that no one should be punished who is not guilty; but
+                     the appointing of the punishment according to the circumstances of person and guilt belongs to positive law. Hence slavery
+                     which is a definite punishment is of positive law, and arises out of natural law, as the determinate from that which is indeterminate.
+                     And it arises from the determination of the same positive law that slavery
+                     if unknown is an impediment to matrimony, lest one who is not guilty be punished; for it is a punishment to the wife to have
+                     a slave for husband, and "vice versa."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Certain impediments render a marriage unlawful; and since it is not our will that makes a thing lawful or unlawful, but the
+                     law to which our will ought to be subject, it follows that the validity or invalidity of a marriage is not affected either
+                     by ignorance (such as destroys voluntariness) of the impediment or by knowledge thereof; and such an impediment is affinity
+                     or a vow, and others of the same kind. other impediments, however, render a marriage
+                     ineffectual as to the payment of the debt; and since it is within the competency of our will to remit a debt that is due to
+                     us, it follows that such impediments, if known, do not invalidate a marriage, but only when ignorance of them destroys voluntariness.
+                     Such impediments are slavery and impotence of coition. And, because they have of themselves the nature of an impediment, they
+                     are reckoned as special impediments besides error; whereas a change of person is not reckoned a special impediment
+                     besides error, because the substitution of another person has not the nature of an impediment except by reason of the intention
+                     of one of the contracting parties.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Freedom does not hinder the marriage act, wherefore ignorance of freedom is no impediment to matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Leprosy does not hinder marriage as to its first act, since lepers can pay the debt freely; although they lay a burden upon
+                     marriage as to its secondary effects; wherefore it is not an impediment to marriage as slavery is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p17"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p18"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q52_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q52_A2-p0.1">Whether a slave can marry without his master's consent?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a slave cannot marry without his master's consent. For no one can give a person that which is another's
+                     without the latter's consent. Now a slave is his master's chattel. Therefore he cannot give his wife power over his body by
+                     marrying without his master's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a slave is bound to obey his master. But his master may command him not to consent to marry. Therefore he cannot
+                     marry without his consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, after marriage, a slave is bound even by a precept of the Divine law to pay the debt to his wife. But at the time
+                     that his wife asks for the debt his master may demand of him a service which he will be unable to perform if he wish to occupy
+                     himself in carnal intercourse. Therefore if a slave can marry without his master's consent, the latter would be deprived of
+                     a service due to him without any fault of his; and this ought not to be.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a master may sell his slave into a foreign country, where the latter's wife is unable to follow him, through either
+                     bodily weakness, or imminent danger to her faith; for instance if he be sold to unbelievers, or if her master be unwilling,
+                     supposing her to be a bondswoman; and thus the marriage will be dissolved, which is unfitting. Therefore a slave cannot marry
+                     without his master's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the burden under which a man binds himself to the Divine service is more advantageous than that whereby a man subjects
+                     himself to his wife. But a slave cannot enter religion or receive orders without his master's consent. Much less therefore
+                     can he be married without his consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "In Christ Jesus . . . there is neither bond nor free" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q52_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.26" target="asv">Gal. 3:26</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q52_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.28" target="asv">28</a>). Therefore both freeman and bondsman enjoy the same liberty to marry in the faith of Christ Jesus.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p8"> Further, slavery is of positive law; whereas marriage is of natural and Divine law. Since then positive law is not prejudicial
+                     to the natural or the Divine law, it would seem that a slave can marry without his master's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 3), the positive law arises out of the natural law, and consequently slavery, which is of positive
+                     law, cannot be prejudicious to those things that are of natural law. Now just as nature seeks the preservation of the individual,
+                     so does it seek the preservation of the species by means of procreation; wherefore even as a slave is not so subject to his
+                     master as not to be at liberty to eat, sleep, and do such things as pertain to the
+                     needs of his body, and without which nature cannot be preserved, so he is not subject to him to the extent of being unable
+                     to marry freely, even without his master's knowledge or consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A slave is his master's chattel in matters superadded to nature, but in natural things all are equal. Wherefore, in things
+                     pertaining to natural acts, a slave can by marrying give another person power over his body without his master's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A slave is bound to obey his master in those things which his master can command lawfully; and just as his master cannot
+                     lawfully command him not to eat or sleep, so neither can he lawfully command him to refrain from marrying. For it is the concern
+                     of the lawgiver how each one uses his own, and consequently if the master command his slave not to marry, the slave is not
+                     bound to obey his master.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If a slave has married with his master's consent, he should omit the service commanded by his master and pay the debt to
+                     his wife; because the master, by consenting to his slave's marriage, implicitly consented to all that marriage requires. If,
+                     however, the marriage was contracted without the master's knowledge or consent, he is not bound to pay the debt, but in preference
+                     to obey his master, if the two things are incompatible. Nevertheless in such
+                     matters there are many particulars to be considered, as in all human acts, namely the danger to which his wife's chastity
+                     is exposed, and the obstacle which the payment of the debt places in the way of the service commanded, and other like considerations,
+                     all of which being duly weighed it will be possible to judge which of the two in preference the slave is bound to obey, his
+                     master or his wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In such a case it is said that the master should be compelled not to sell the slave in such a way as to increase the weight
+                     of the marriage burden, especially since he is able to obtain anywhere a just price for his slave.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> By entering religion or receiving orders a man is bound to the Divine service for all time; whereas a husband is bound to
+                     pay the debt to his wife not always, but at a fitting time; hence the comparison fails. Moreover, he who enters religion or
+                     receives orders binds himself to works that are superadded to natural works, and in which his master has power over him, but
+                     not in natural works to which a man binds himself by marriage. Hence he cannot vow
+                     continence without his master's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q52_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q52_A3-p0.1">Whether slavery can supervene to marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that slavery cannot supervene to marriage, by the husband selling himself to another as slave. Because what
+                     is done by fraud and to another's detriment should not hold. But a husband who sells himself for a slave, does so sometimes
+                     to cheat marriage, and at least to the detriment of his wife. Therefore such a sale should not hold as to the effect of slavery.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, two favorable things outweigh one that is not favorable. Now marriage and freedom are favorable things and are contrary
+                     to slavery, which in law is not a favorable thing. Therefore such a slavery ought to be entirely annulled in marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in marriage husband and wife are on a par with one another. Now the wife cannot surrender herself to be a slave
+                     without her husband's consent. Therefore neither can the husband without his wife's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in natural things that which hinders a thing being generated destroys it after it has been generated. Now bondage
+                     of the husband, if unknown to the wife, is an impediment to the act of marriage before it is performed. Therefore if it could
+                     supervene to marriage it would dissolve it; which is unreasonable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Everyone can give another that which is his own. Now the husband is his own master since he is free. Therefore he can surrender
+                     his right to another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p7"> Further, a slave can marry without his master's consent, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q52_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q52_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore a husband can in like manner subject himself to a master, without his wife's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A husband is subject to his wife in those things which pertain to the act of nature; in these things they are equal, and
+                     the subjection of slavery does not extend thereto. Wherefore the husband, without his wife's knowledge, can surrender himself
+                     to be another's slave. Nor does this result in a dissolution of the marriage, since no impediment supervening to marriage
+                     can dissolve it, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q52_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q50_A1.html">Q[50], A[1]</a>, ad 7).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The fraud can indeed hurt the person who has acted fraudulently, but it cannot be prejudicial to another person: wherefore
+                     if the husband, to cheat his wife, surrender himself to be another's slave, It will be to his own prejudice, through his losing
+                     the inestimable good of freedom; whereas this can nowise be prejudicial to the wife, and he is bound to pay her the debt when
+                     she asks, and to do all that marriage requires of him for he cannot be taken
+                     away from these obligations by his master's command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In so far as slavery is opposed to marriage, marriage is prejudicial to slavery, since the slave is bound then to pay the
+                     debt to his wife, though his master be unwilling.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although husband and wife are considered to be on a par in the marriage act and in things relating to nature, to which the
+                     condition of slavery does not extend, nevertheless as regards the management of the household, and other such additional matters
+                     the husband is the head of the wife and should correct her, and not "vice versa." Hence the wife cannot surrender herself
+                     to be a slave without her husband's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This argument considers corruptible things; and yet even in these there are many obstacles to generation that are not capable
+                     of destroying what is already generated. But in things which have stability it is possible to have an impediment which prevents
+                     a certain thing from beginning to be, yet does not cause it to cease to be; as instanced by the rational soul. It is the same
+                     with marriage, which is a lasting tie so long as this life lasts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q52_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q52_A4-p0.1">Whether children should follow the condition of their father?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that children should follow the condition of their father. Because dominion belongs to those of higher rank.
+                     Now in generating the father ranks above the mother. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the being of a thing depends on the form more than on the matter. Now in generation the father gives the form, and
+                     the mother the matter (De Gener. Animal. ii, 4). Therefore the child should follow the condition of the father rather than
+                     of the mother.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing should follow that chiefly to which it is most like. Now the son is more like the father than the mother,
+                     even as the daughter is more like the mother. Therefore at least the son should follow the father in preference, and the daughter
+                     the mother.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in Holy Writ genealogies are not traced through the women but through the men. Therefore the children follow the
+                     father rather than the mother.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> If a man sows on another's land, the produce belongs to the owner of the land. Now the woman's womb in relation to the seed
+                     of man is like the land in relation to the sower. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p7"> Further, we observe that in animals born from different species the offspring follows the mother rather that the father,
+                     wherefore mules born of a mare and an ass are more like mares than those born of a she-ass and a horse. Therefore it should
+                     be the same with men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to civil law (XIX, ff. De statu hom. vii, cap. De rei vendit.) the offspring follows the womb: and this is reasonable
+                     since the offspring derives its formal complement from the father, but the substance of the body from the mother. Now slavery
+                     is a condition of the body, since a slave is to the master a kind of instrument in working; wherefore children follow the
+                     mother in freedom and bondage; whereas in matters pertaining to dignity as proceeding
+                     from a thing's form, they follow the father, for instance in honors, franchise, inheritance and so forth. The canons are in
+                     agreement with this (cap. Liberi, 32, qu. iv, in gloss.: cap. Inducens, De natis ex libero ventre) as also the law of Moses
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q52_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21" target="asv">Ex. 21</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p9"> In some countries, however, where the civil law does not hold, the offspring follows the inferior condition, so that if the
+                     father be a slave the children will be slaves although the mother be free; but not if the father gave himself up as a slave
+                     after his marriage and without his wife's consent; and the same applies if the case be reversed. And if both be of servile
+                     condition and belong to different masters, the children, if several, are divided among the latter, or if one
+                     only, the one master will compensate the other in value and will take the child thus born for his slave. However it is incredible
+                     that this custom have as much reason in its favor as the decision of the time-honored deliberations of many wise men. Moreover
+                     in natural things it is the rule that what is received is in the recipient according to the mode of the recipient and not
+                     according to the mode of the giver; wherefore it is reasonable that the seed received by the mother should be drawn to
+                     her condition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the father is a more noble principle than the mother, nevertheless the mother provides the substance of the body,
+                     and it is to this that the condition of slavery attaches.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As regards things pertaining to the specific nature the son is like the father rather than the mother, but in material conditions
+                     should be like the mother rather than the father, since a thing has its specific being from its form, but material conditions
+                     from matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The son is like the father in respect of the form which is his, and also the father's, complement. Hence the argument is
+                     not to the point.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is because the son derives honor from his father rather than from his mother that in the genealogies of Scripture, and
+                     according to common custom, children are named after their father rather than from their mother. But in matters relating to
+                     slavery they follow the mother by preference.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q53" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q53-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF VOWS AND ORDERS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q53-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q53-p2"> We must now consider the impediment of vows and orders. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q53-p3"> (1) Whether a simple vow is a diriment impediment to matrimony?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q53-p4"> (2) Whether a solemn vow is a diriment impediment?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q53-p5"> (3) Whether order is an impediment to matrimony?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q53-p6"> (4) Whether a man can receive a sacred order after being married?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q53_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q53_A1-p0.1">Whether marriage already contracted should be annulled by the obligation of a simple vow?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a marriage already contracted ought to be annulled by the obligation of a simple vow. For the stronger
+                     tie takes precedence of the weaker. Now a vow is a stronger tie than marriage, since the latter binds man to man, but the
+                     former binds man to God. Therefore the obligation of a vow takes precedence of the marriage tie.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God's commandment is no less binding than the commandment of the Church. Now the commandment of the Church is so
+                     binding that a marriage is void if contracted in despite thereof; as instanced in the case of those who marry within the degrees
+                     of kindred forbidden by the Church. Therefore, since it is a Divine commandment to keep a vow, it would seem that if a person
+                     marry in despite of a vow his marriage should be annulled for that reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in marriage a man may have carnal intercourse without sin. Yet he who has taken a simple vow of chastity can never
+                     have carnal intercourse with his wife without sin. Therefore a simple vow annuls marriage. The minor is proved as follows.
+                     It is clear that it is a mortal sin to marry after taking a simple vow of continence, since according to Jerome [*Cf. St.
+                     Augustine, De Bono Viduit, ix] "for those who vow virginity it is damnable not only to marry,
+                     but even to wish to marry." Now the marriage contract is not contrary to the vow of continence, except by reason of carnal
+                     intercourse: and therefore he sins mortally the first time he has intercourse with his wife, and for the same reason every
+                     other time, because a sin committed in the first instance cannot be an excuse for a subsequent sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, husband and wife should be equal in marriage, especially as regards carnal intercourse. But he who has taken a simple
+                     vow of continence can never ask for the debt without a sin, for this is clearly against his vow of continence, since he is
+                     bound to continence by vow. Therefore neither can he pay the debt without sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Pope Clement [*Alexander III] says (cap. Consuluit, De his qui cler. vel vovent.) that a "simple vow is an impediment to
+                     the contract of marriage, but does not annul it after it is contracted."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing ceases to be in one man's power from the fact that it passes into the power of another. Now the promise of a thing
+                     does not transfer it into the power of the person to whom it is promised, wherefore a thing does not cease to be in a person's
+                     power for the reason that he has promised it. Since then a simple vow contains merely a simple promise of one's body to the
+                     effect of keeping continence for God's sake, a man still retains power over his own body
+                     after a simple vow, and consequently can surrender it to another, namely his wife; and in this surrender consists the sacrament
+                     of matrimony, which is indissoluble. Therefore although a simple vow is an impediment to the contracting of a marriage, since
+                     it is a sin to marry after taking a simple vow of continence, yet since the contract is valid, the marriage cannot be annulled
+                     on that account.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A vow is a stronger tie than matrimony, as regards that to which man is tied, and the obligation under which he lies. because
+                     by marriage a man is tied to his wife, with the obligation of paying the debt, whereas by a vow a man is tied to God, with
+                     the obligation of remaining continent. But as to the manner in which he is tied marriage is a stronger tie than a simple vow,
+                     since by marriage a man surrenders himself actually to the power of his wife,
+                     but not by a simple vow as explained above: and the possessor is always in the stronger position. In this respect a simple
+                     vow binds in the same way as a betrothal; wherefore a betrothal must be annulled on account of a simple vow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The contracting of a marriage between blood relations is annulled by the commandment forbidding such marriages, not precisely
+                     because it is a commandment of God or of the Church, but because it makes it impossible for the body of a kinswoman to be
+                     transferred into the power of her kinsman: whereas the commandment forbidding marriage after a simple vow has not this effect,
+                     as already stated. Hence the argument is void for it assigns as a cause that
+                     which is not cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If after taking a simple vow a man contract marriage by words of the present, he cannot know his wife without mortal sin,
+                     because until the marriage is consummated he is still in a position to fulfill the vow of continence. But after the marriage
+                     has been consummated, thenceforth through his fault it is unlawful for him not to pay the debt when his wife asks: wherefore
+                     this is not covered by his obligation to his vow, as explained above (ad 1).
+                     Nevertheless he should atone for not keeping continence, by his tears of repentance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> After contracting marriage he is still bound to keep his vow of continence in those matters wherein he is not rendered unable
+                     to do so. Hence if his wife die he is bound to continence altogether. And since the marriage tie does not bind him to ask
+                     for the debt, he cannot ask for it without sin, although he can pay the debt without sin on being asked, when once he has
+                     incurred this obligation through the carnal intercourse that has already occurred.
+                     And this holds whether the wife ask expressly or interpretively, as when she is ashamed and her husband feels that she desires
+                     him to pay the debt, for then he may pay it without sin. This is especially the case if he fears to endanger her chastity:
+                     nor does it matter that they are equal in the marriage act, since everyone may renounce what is his own. Some say, however,
+                     that he may both ask and pay lest the marriage become too burdensome to the wife who has always to ask; but if this be looked
+                     into aright, it is the same as asking interpretively.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q53_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q53_A2-p0.1">Whether a solemn vow dissolves a marriage already contracted?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not even a solemn vow dissolves a marriage already contracted. For according to a Decretal (cap. Rursus,
+                     De his qui cler. vel vovent.) "in God's sight a simple vow is no less binding than a solemn one." Now marriage stands or falls
+                     by virtue of the Divine acceptance. Therefore since a simple vow does not dissolve marriage, neither will a solemn vow dissolve
+                     it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a solemn vow does not add the same force to a simple vow as an oath does. Now a simple vow, even though an oath
+                     be added thereto, does not dissolve a marriage already contracted. Neither therefore does a solemn vow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a solemn vow has nothing that a simple vow cannot have. For a simple vow may give rise to scandal since it may be
+                     public, even as a solemn vow. Again the Church could and should ordain that a simple vow dissolves a marriage already contracted,
+                     so that many sins may be avoided. Therefore for the same reason that a simple vow does not dissolve a marriage already contracted,
+                     neither should a solemn vow dissolve it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> He who takes a solemn vow contracts a spiritual marriage with God, which is much more excellent than a material marriage.
+                     Now a material marriage already contracted annuls a marriage contracted afterwards. Therefore a solemn vow does also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p6"> Further, the same conclusion may be proved by many authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 28).</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> All agree that as a solemn vow is an impediment to the contracting of marriage, so it invalidates the contract. Some assign
+                     scandal as the reason. But this is futile, because even a simple vow sometimes leads to scandal since it is at times somewhat
+                     public. Moreover the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the truth of life [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q53_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html">FP, Q[16], A[4]</a>, ad 3; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q53_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html">FP, Q[21], A[2]</a>, ad 2; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q53_A2-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q109_A3.html">SS,
+                        Q[109], A[3]
+                     </a>, ad 3], which truth is not to be set aside on account of scandal. Wherefore others say that it is on account of the ordinance
+                     of the Church. But this again is insufficient, since in that case the Church might decide the contrary, which is seemingly
+                     untrue. Wherefore we must say with others that a solemn vow of its very nature dissolves the marriage contract, inasmuch namely
+                     as thereby a man has lost the power over his own body, through surrendering it to God for the purpose of
+                     perpetual continence. Wherefore he is unable to surrender it to the power of a wife by contracting marriage. And since the
+                     marriage that follows such a vow is void, a vow of this kind is said to annul the marriage contracted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A simple vow is said to be no less binding in God's sight than a solemn vow, in matters pertaining to God, for instance the
+                     separation from God by mortal sin, because he who breaks a simple vow commits a mortal sin just as one who breaks a solemn
+                     vow, although it is more grievous to break a solemn vow, so that the comparison be understood as to the genus and not as to
+                     the definite degree of guilt. But as regards marriage, whereby one man is under an
+                     obligation to another, there is no need for it to be of equal obligation even in general, since a solemn vow binds to certain
+                     things to which a simple vow does not bind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An oath is more binding than a vow on the part of the cause of the obligation: but a solemn vow is more binding as to the
+                     manner in which it binds, in so far as it is an actual surrender of that which is promised; while an oath does not do this
+                     actually. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A solemn vow implies the actual surrender of one's body, whereas a simple vow does not, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q53_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q53_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Hence the argument does not suffice to prove the conclusion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q53_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q53_A3-p0.1">Whether order is an impediment to matrimony?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that order is not an impediment to matrimony. For nothing is an impediment to a thing except its contrary.
+                     But order is not contrary to matrimony. Therefore it is not an impediment thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, orders are the same with us as with the Eastern Church. But they are not an impediment to matrimony in the Eastern
+                     Church. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church. Now this is most fittingly signified in those who are Christ's
+                     ministers, those namely who are ordained. Therefore order is not an impediment to matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all the orders are directed to spiritual things. Now order cannot be an impediment to matrimony except by reason
+                     of its spirituality. Therefore if order is an impediment to matrimony, every order will be an impediment, and this is untrue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, every ordained person can have ecclesiastical benefices, and can enjoy equally the privilege of clergy. If, therefore,
+                     orders are an impediment to marriage, because married persons cannot have an ecclesiastical benefice, nor enjoy the privilege
+                     of clergy, as jurists assert (cap. Joannes et seqq., De cler. conjug.), then every order ought to be an impediment. Yet this
+                     is false, as shown by the Decretal of Alexander III (De cler. conjug., cap. Si Quis):
+                     and consequently it would seem that no order is an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> the Decretal says (De cler. conjug., cap. Si Quis): "any person whom you shall find to have taken a wife after receiving
+                     the subdiaconate or the higher orders, you shall compel to put his wife away." But this would not be so if the marriage were
+                     valid.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p8"> Further, no person who has vowed continence can contract marriage. Now some orders have a vow of continence connected with
+                     them, as appears from the text (Sent. iv, D, 37). Therefore in that case order is an impediment to matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> By a certain fittingness the very nature of holy order requires that it should be an impediment to marriage: because those
+                     who are in holy orders handle the sacred vessels and the sacraments: wherefore it is becoming that they keep their bodies
+                     clean by continence [*Cf.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q53_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.52.11" target="asv"> Is. 52:11</a>]. But it is owing to the Church's ordinance that it is actually an impediment to marriage. However it is not the same with
+                     the Latins as with the Greeks; since
+                     with the Greeks it is an impediment to the contracting of marriage, solely by virtue of order; whereas with the Latins it
+                     is an impediment by virtue of order, and besides by virtue of the vow of continence which is annexed to the sacred orders;
+                     for although this vow is not expressed in words, nevertheless a person is understood to have taken it by the very fact of
+                     his being ordained. Hence among the Greeks and other Eastern peoples a sacred order is an impediment to the contracting of
+                     matrimony
+                     but it does not forbid the use of marriage already contracted: for they can use marriage contracted previously, although they
+                     cannot be married again. But in the Western Church it is an impediment both to marriage and to the use of marriage, unless
+                     perhaps the husband should receive a sacred order without the knowledge or consent of his wife, because this cannot be prejudicial
+                     to her.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p10"> Of the distinction between sacred and non-sacred orders now and in the early Church we have spoken above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q53_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q37_A3.html">Q[37], A[3]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although a sacred order is not contrary to matrimony as a sacrament, it has a certain incompatibility with marriage in respect
+                     of the latter's act which is an obstacle to spiritual acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The objection is based on a false statement: since order is everywhere an impediment to the contracting of marriage, although
+                     it has not everywhere a vow annexed to it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who are in sacred orders signify Christ by more sublime actions, as appears from what has been said in the treatise
+                     on orders (
+                     <a id="XP_Q53_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html">Q[37], AA[2]</a>,4), than those who are married. Consequently the conclusion does not follow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those who are in minor orders are not forbidden to marry by virtue of their order; for although those orders are entrusted
+                     with certain spiritualities, they are not admitted to the immediate handling of sacred things, as those are who are in sacred
+                     orders. But according to the laws of the Western Church, the use of marriage is an impediment to the exercise of a non-sacred
+                     order, for the sake of maintaining a greater honesty in the offices of the
+                     Church. And since the holding of an ecclesiastical benefice binds a man to the exercise of his order, and since for this very
+                     reason he enjoys the privilege of clergy, it follows that in the Latin Church this privilege is forfeit to a married cleric.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p15"> This suffices for the Reply to the last Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q53_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q53_A4-p0.1">Whether a sacred order cannot supervene to matrimony?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sacred order cannot supervene to matrimony. For the stronger prejudices the weaker. Now a spiritual
+                     obligation is stronger than a bodily tie. Therefore if a married man be ordained, this will prejudice the wife, so that she
+                     will be unable to demand the debt, since order is a spiritual, and marriage a bodily bond. Hence it would seem that a man
+                     cannot receive a sacred order after consummating marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, after consummating the marriage, one of the parties cannot vow continence without the other's consent [*Cf.
+                     <a id="XP_Q53_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q61_A1.html"> Q[61], A[1]</a>]. Now a sacred order has a vow of continence annexed to it. Therefore if the husband be ordained without his wife's consent,
+                     she will be bound to remain continent against her will, since she cannot marry another man during her husband's lifetime.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a husband may not even for a time devote himself to prayer without his wife's consent (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q53_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:5</a>). But in the Eastern Church those who are in sacred orders are bound to continence for the time when they exercise their
+                     office. Therefore neither may they be ordained without their wife's consent, and much less may the Latins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, husband and wife are on a par with one another. Now a Greek priest cannot marry again after his wife's death. Therefore
+                     neither can his wife after her husband's death. But she cannot be deprived by her husband's act of the right to marry after
+                     his death. Therefore her husband cannot receive orders after marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, order is as much opposed to marriage as marriage to order. Now a previous order is an impediment to a subsequent
+                     marriage. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Religious are bound to continence like those who are in sacred orders. But a man may enter religion after marriage, if his
+                     wife die, or if she consent. Therefore he can also receive orders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p8"> Further, a man may become a man's bondsman after marriage. Therefore he can become a bondsman of God by receiving orders.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Marriage is not an impediment to the receiving of sacred orders, since if a married man receive sacred orders, even though
+                     his wife be unwilling, he receives the character of order: but he lacks the exercise of his order. If, however, his wife consent,
+                     or if she be dead, he receives both the order and the exercise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The bond of orders dissolves the bond of marriage as regards the payment of the debt, in respect of which it is incompatible
+                     with marriage, on the part of the person ordained, since he cannot demand the debt, nor is the wife bound to pay it. But it
+                     does not dissolve the bond in respect of the other party, since the husband is bound to pay the debt to the wife if he cannot
+                     persuade her to observe continence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the husband receive sacred orders with the knowledge and consent of his wife, she is bound to vow perpetual continence,
+                     but she is not bound to enter religion, if she has no fear of her chastity being endangered through her husband having taken
+                     a solemn vow: it would have been different, however, if he had taken a simple vow. On the other hand, if he be ordained without
+                     her consent, she is not bound in this way, because the result is not
+                     prejudicial to her in any way.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It would seem more probable, although some say the contrary, that even a Greek ought not to receive sacred orders without
+                     his wife's consent, since at least at the time of his ministry she would be deprived of the payment of the debt, of which
+                     she cannot be deprived according to law if the husband should have been ordained without her consent or knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated, among the Greeks the wife, by the very fact of consenting to her husband's receiving a sacred order, binds herself
+                     never to marry another man, because the signification of marriage would not be safeguarded, and this is especially required
+                     in the marriage of a priest. If, however, he be ordained without her consent, seemingly she would not be under that obligation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Marriage has for its cause our consent: not so order, which has a sacramental cause appointed by God. Hence matrimony may
+                     be impeded by a previous order; so as not to be true marriage: whereas order cannot be impeded by marriage, so as not to be
+                     true order, because the power of the sacraments is unchangeable, whereas human acts can be impeded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q54" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q54-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF CONSANGUINITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q54-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q54-p2"> We must next consider the impediment of consanguinity. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q54-p3"> (1) Whether consanguinity is rightly defined by some?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q54-p4"> (2) Whether it is fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q54-p5"> (3) Whether certain degrees are by natural law an impediment to marriage?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q54-p6"> (4) Whether the impediment degrees can be fixed by the ordinance of the Church?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q54_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q54_A1-p0.1">Whether consanguinity is rightly defined?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consanguinity is unsuitably defined by some as follows: "Consanguinity is the tie contracted between persons
+                     descending from the same common ancestor by carnal procreation." For all men descend from the same common ancestor, namely
+                     Adam, by carnal procreation. Therefore if the above definition of consanguinity is right, all men would be related by consanguinity:
+                     which is false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a tie is only between things in accord with one another, since a tie unites. Now there is not greater accordance
+                     between persons descended from a common ancestor than there is between other men, since they accord in species but differ
+                     in number, just as other men do. Therefore consanguinity is not a tie.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, carnal procreation, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. ii, 19), is effected from the surplus food [*Cf.
+                     
+                     <a id="XP_Q54_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q119_A2.html">FP, Q[119], A[2]</a>]. Now this surplus has more in common with that which is eaten, since it agrees with it in substance, than with him who eats.
+                     Since then no tie of consanguinity arises between the person born of semen and that which he eats, neither will there be any
+                     tie of kindred between him and the person of
+                     whom he is born by carnal procreation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Laban said to Jacob (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q54_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.29.14" target="asv">Gn. 29:14</a>): "Thou art my bone and my flesh," on account of the relationship between them. Therefore such a kinship should be called
+                     flesh-relationship rather than blood-relationship [consanguinitas].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, carnal procreation is common to men and animals. But no tie of consanguinity is contracted among animals from carnal
+                     procreation. Therefore neither is there among men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11, 12) "all friendship is based on some kind of fellowship." And since friendship
+                     is a knot or union, it follows that the fellowship which is the cause of friendship is called "a tie." Wherefore in respect
+                     of any kind of a fellowship certain persons are denominated as though they were tied together: thus we speak of fellow-citizens
+                     who are connected by a common political life, of fellow-soldiers who are connected by
+                     the common business of soldiering, and in the same way those who are connected by the fellowship of nature are said to be
+                     tied by blood [consanguinei]. Hence in the above definition "tie" is included as being the genus of consanguinity; the "persons
+                     descending from the same common ancestor," who are thus tied together are the subject of this tie. while "carnal procreation"
+                     is mentioned as being its origin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An active force is not received into an instrument in the same degree of perfection as it has in the principal agent. And
+                     since every moved mover is an instrument, it follows that the power of the first mover in a particular genus when drawn out
+                     through many mediate movers fails at length, and reaches something that is moved and not a mover. But the power of a begetter
+                     moves not only as to that which belongs to the species, but also as to that which
+                     belongs to the individual, by reason of which the child is like the parent even in accidentals and not only in the specific
+                     nature. And yet this individual power of the father is not so perfect in the son as it was in the father, and still less so
+                     in the grandson, and thus it goes on failing: so that at length it ceases and can go no further. Since then consanguinity
+                     results from this power being communicated to many through being conveyed to them from one person by procreation, it destroys
+                     itself by little and little, as Isidore says (Etym. ix). Consequently in defining consanguinity we must not take a remote
+                     common ancestor but the nearest, whose power still remains in those who are descended from him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is clear from what has been said that blood relations agree not only in the specific nature but also in that power peculiar
+                     to the individual which is conveyed from one to many: the result being that sometimes the child is not only like his father,
+                     but also his grandfather or his remote ancestors (De Gener. Anim. iv, 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Likeness depends more on form whereby a thing is actually, than on matter whereby a thing is potentially: for instance, charcoal
+                     has more in common with fire than with the tree from which the wood was cut. In like manner food already transformed by the
+                     nutritive power into the substance of the person fed has more in common with the subject nourished than with that from which
+                     the nourishment was taken. The argument however would hold according to the
+                     opinion of those who asserted that the whole nature of a thing is from its matter and that all forms are accidents: which
+                     is false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is the blood that is proximately changed into the semen, as proved in De Gener. Anim. i, 18. Hence the tie contracted
+                     by carnal procreation is more fittingly called blood-relationship than flesh-relationship. That sometimes one relation is
+                     called the flesh of another, is because the blood which is transformed into the man's seed or into the menstrual fluid is
+                     potentially flesh and bone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Some say that the reason why the tie of consanguinity is contracted among men through carnal procreation, and not among other
+                     animals, is because whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in all men was in our first parent: which does not apply
+                     to other animals. But according to this, matrimonial consanguinity would never come to an end. However the above theory was
+                     disproved in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30: 
+                     <a id="XP_Q54_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html">FP, Q[119],
+                        A[1]
+                     </a>). Wherefore we must reply that the reason for this is that animals are not united together in the union of friendship through
+                     the begetting of many from one proximate parent, as is the case with men, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q54_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q54_A2-p0.1">Whether consanguinity is fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consanguinity is unfittingly distinguished by degrees and lines. For a line of consanguinity is described
+                     as "the ordered series of persons related by blood, and descending from a common ancestor in various degrees." Now consanguinity
+                     is nothing else but a series of such persons. Therefore a line of consanguinity is the same as consanguinity. Now a thing
+                     ought not to be distinguished by itself. Therefore consanguinity is not fittingly
+                     distinguished into lines.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that by which a common thing is divided should not be placed in the definition of that common thing. Now descent
+                     is placed in the above definition of consanguinity. Therefore consanguinity cannot be divided into ascending, descending and
+                     collateral lines.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a line is defined as being between two points. But two points make but one degree. Therefore one line has but one
+                     degree, and for this reason it would seem that consanguinity should not be divided into lines and degrees.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a degree is defined as "the relation between distant persons, whereby is known the distance between them." Now since
+                     consanguinity is a kind of propinquity, distance between persons is opposed to consanguinity rather than a part thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if consanguinity is distinguished and known by its degrees, those who are in the same degree ought to be equally
+                     related. But this is false since a man's great-uncle and great-nephew are in the same degree, and yet they are not equally
+                     related according to a Decretal (cap. Porro; cap. Parenteloe, 35, qu. v). Therefore consanguinity is not rightly divided into
+                     degrees.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in ordinary things a different degree results from the addition of one thing to another, even as every additional
+                     unity makes a different species of number. Yet the addition of one person to another does not always make a different degree
+                     of consanguinity, since father and uncle are in the same degree of consanguinity, for they are side by side. Therefore consanguinity
+                     is not rightly divided into degrees.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, if two persons be akin to one another there is always the same measure of kinship between them, since the distance
+                     from one extreme to the other is the same either way. Yet the degrees of consanguinity are not always the same on either side,
+                     since sometimes one relative is in the third and the other in the fourth degree. Therefore the measure of consanguinity cannot
+                     be sufficiently known by its degrees.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Consanguinity as stated 
+                     <a id="XP_Q54_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q54_A1.html">(A[1])</a> is a certain propinquity based on the natural communication by the act of procreation whereby nature is propagated. Wherefore
+                     according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) this communication is threefold. one corresponds to the relationship between
+                     cause and effect, and this is the consanguinity of father to son, wherefore he says that "parents love their children as being
+                     a part of themselves."
+                     Another corresponds to the relation of effect to cause, and this is the consanguinity of son to father, wherefore he says
+                     that "children love their parents as being themselves something which owes its existence to them." The third corresponds to
+                     the mutual relation between things that come from the same cause, as brothers, "who are born of the same parents," as he again
+                     says (Ethic. viii, 12). And since the movement of a point makes a line, and since a father by procreation may be said to
+                     descend to his son, hence it is that corresponding to these three relationships there are three lines of consanguinity, namely
+                     the "descending" line corresponding to the first relationship, the "ascending" line corresponding to the second, and the "collateral"
+                     line corresponding to the third. Since however the movement of propagation does not rest in one term but continues beyond,
+                     the result is that one can point to the father's father and to the son's son, and so on, and according to the
+                     various steps we take we find various degrees in one line. And seeing that the degrees of a thing are parts of that thing,
+                     there cannot be degrees of propinquity where there is no propinquity. Consequently identity and too great a distance do away
+                     with degrees of consanguinity; since no man is kin to himself any more than he is like himself: for which reason there is
+                     no degree of consanguinity where there is but one person, but only when one person is compared to another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p10"> Nevertheless there are different ways of counting the degrees in various lines. For the degree of consanguinity in the ascending
+                     and descending line is contracted from the fact that one of the parties whose consanguinity is in question, is descended from
+                     the other. Wherefore according to the canonical as well as the legal reckoning, the person who occupies the first place, whether
+                     in the ascending or in the descending line, is distant from a certain one, say Peter, in the first
+                     degree---for instance father and son; while the one who occupies the second place in either direction is distant in the second
+                     degree, for instance grandfather, grandson and so on. But the consanguinity that exists between persons who are in collateral
+                     lines is contracted not through one being descended from the other, but through both being descended from one: wherefore the
+                     degrees of consanguinity in this line must be reckoned in relation to the one principle whence it arises. Here, however,
+                     the canonical and legal reckonings differ: for the legal reckoning takes into account the descent from the common stock on
+                     both sides, whereas the canonical reckoning takes into account only one, that namely on which the greater number of degrees
+                     are found. Hence according to the legal reckoning brother and sister, or two brothers, are related in the second degree, because
+                     each is separated from the common stock by one degree; and in like manner the children of two brothers are distant from one
+                     another in the fourth degree. But according to the canonical reckoning, two brothers are related in the first degree, since
+                     neither is distant more than one degree from the common stock: but the children of one brother are distant in the second degree
+                     from the other brother, because they are at that distance from the common stock. Hence, according to the canonical reckoning,
+                     by whatever degree a person is distant from some higher degree, by so much and never by less is he distant from each
+                     person descending from that degree, because "the cause of a thing being so is yet more so." Wherefore although the other descendants
+                     from the common stock be related to some person on account of his being descended from the common stock, these descendants
+                     of the other branch cannot be more nearly related to him than he is to the common stock. Sometimes, however, a person is more
+                     distantly related to a descendant from the common stock, than he himself is to the common stock, because this other
+                     person may be more distantly related to the common stock than he is: and consanguinity must be reckoned according to the more
+                     distant degree.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection is based on a false premise: for consanguinity is not the series but a mutual relationship existing between
+                     certain persons, the series of whom forms a line of consanguinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Descent taken in a general sense attaches to every line of consanguinity, because carnal procreation whence the tie of consanguinity
+                     arises is a kind of descent: but it is a particular kind of descent, namely from the person whose consanguinity is in question,
+                     that makes the descending line.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A line may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken properly for the dimension itself that is the first species of continuous
+                     quantity: and thus a straight line contains actually but two points which terminate it, but infinite points potentially, any
+                     one of which being actually designated, the line is divided, and becomes two lines. But sometimes a line designates things
+                     which are arranged in a line, and thus we have line and figure in numbers, in
+                     so far as unity added to unity involves number. Thus every unity added makes a degree in a particular line: and it is the
+                     same with the line of consanguinity: wherefore one line contains several degrees.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even as there cannot be likeness without a difference, so there is no propinquity without distance. Hence not every distance
+                     is opposed to consanguinity, but such as excludes the propinquity of blood-relationship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Even as whiteness is said to be greater in two ways, in one way through intensity of the quality itself, in another way through
+                     the quantity of the surface, so consanguinity is said to be greater or lesser in two ways. First, intensively by reason of
+                     the very nature of consanguinity: secondly, extensively as it were, and thus the degree of consanguinity is measured by the
+                     persons between whom there is the propagation of a common blood, and in this way
+                     the degrees of consanguinity are distinguished. Wherefore it happens that of two persons related to one person in the same
+                     degree of consanguinity, one is more akin to him than the other, if we consider the quantity of consanguinity in the first
+                     way: thus a man's father and brother are related to him in the first degree of consanguinity, because in neither case does
+                     any person come in between; and yet from the point of view of intensity a man's father is more closely related to him than
+                     his
+                     brother, since his brother is related to him only because he is of the same father. Hence the nearer a person is to the common
+                     ancestor from whom the consanguinity descends, the greater is his consanguinity although he be not in a nearer degree. In
+                     this way a man's great-uncle is more closely related to him than his great-nephew, although they are in the same degree.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Although a man's father and uncle are in the same degree in respect of the root of consanguinity, since both are separated
+                     by one degree from the grandfather, nevertheless in respect of the person whose consanguinity is in question, they are not
+                     in the same degree, since the father is in the first degree, whereas the uncle cannot be nearer than the second degree, wherein
+                     the grandfather stands.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> Two persons are always related in the same degree to one another, although they are not always distant in the same number
+                     of degrees from the common ancestor, as explained above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p18"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p19"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q54_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q54_A3-p0.1">Whether consanguinity is an impediment to marriage by virtue of the natural law?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consanguinity is not by natural law an impediment to marriage. For no woman can be more akin to a man
+                     than Eve was to Adam, since of her did he say (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q54_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.23" target="asv">Gn. 2:23</a>): "This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh." Yet Eve was joined in marriage to Adam. Therefore as regards the
+                     natural law no consanguinity is an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the natural law is the same for all. Now among the uncivilized nations no person is debarred from marriage by reason
+                     of consanguinity. Therefore, as regards the law of nature, consanguinity is no impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the natural law is what "nature has taught all animals," as stated at the beginning of the Digests (i, ff. De just.
+                     et jure). Now brute animals copulate even with their mother. Therefore it is not of natural law that certain persons are debarred
+                     from marriage on account of consanguinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing that is not contrary to one of the goods of matrimony is an impediment to marriage. But consanguinity is
+                     not contrary to any of the goods of marriage. Therefore it is not an impediment thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, things which are more akin and more similar to one another are better and more firmly united together. Now matrimony
+                     is a kind of union. Since then consanguinity is a kind of kinship, it does not hinder marriage but rather strengthens the
+                     union.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the natural law whatever is an obstacle to the good of the offspring is an impediment to marriage. Now consanguinity
+                     hinders the good of the offspring, because in the words of Gregory (Regist., epis. xxxi) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D,
+                     40): "We have learnt by experience that the children of such a union cannot thrive." Therefore according to the law of nature
+                     consanguinity is an impediment to matrimony.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p8"> Further, that which belongs to human nature when it was first created is of natural law. Now it belonged to human nature
+                     from when it was first created that one should be debarred from marrying one's father or mother: in proof of which it was
+                     said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q54_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.24" target="asv">Gn. 2:24</a>): "Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother": which cannot be understood of cohabitation, and consequently must refer
+                     to the union of marriage. Therefore consanguinity is an impediment to marriage
+                     according to the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In relation to marriage a thing is said to be contrary to the natural law if it prevents marriage from reaching the end for
+                     which it was instituted. Now the essential and primary end of marriage is the good of the offspring. and this is hindered
+                     by a certain consanguinity, namely that which is between father and daughter, or son and mother. It is not that the good of
+                     the offspring is utterly destroyed, since a daughter can have a child of her father's semen
+                     and with the father rear and teach that child in which things the good of the offspring consists, but that it is not effected
+                     in a becoming way. For it is out of order that a daughter be mated to her father in marriage for the purpose of begetting
+                     and rearing children, since in all things she ought to be subject to her father as proceeding from him. Hence by natural law
+                     a father and mother are debarred from marrying their children; and the mother still more than the father, since it is more
+                     derogatory to the reverence due to parents if the son marry his mother than if the father marry his daughter; since the wife
+                     should be to a certain extent subject to her husband. The secondary essential end of marriage is the curbing of concupiscence;
+                     and this end would be forfeit if a man could marry any blood-relation, since a wide scope would be afforded to concupiscence
+                     if those who have to live together in the same house were not forbidden to be mated in the flesh. Wherefore the Divine law
+                     debars from marriage not only father and mother, but also other kinsfolk who have to live in close intimacy with one another
+                     and ought to safeguard one another's modesty. The Divine law assigns this reason (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q54_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.10" target="asv">Lev. 18:10</a>): "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness" of such and such a one, "because it is thy own nakedness."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p10"> But the accidental end of marriage is the binding together of mankind and the extension of friendship: for a husband regards
+                     his wife's kindred as his own. Hence it would be prejudicial to this extension of friendship if a man could take a woman of
+                     his kindred to wife since no new friendship would accrue to anyone from such a marriage. Wherefore, according to human law
+                     and the ordinances of the Church, several degrees of consanguinity are debarred from marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p11"> Accordingly it is clear from what has been said that consanguinity is by natural law an impediment to marriage in regard
+                     to certain persons, by Divine law in respect of some, and by human law in respect of others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although Eve was formed from Adam she was not Adam's daughter, because she was not formed from him after the manner in which
+                     it is natural for a man to beget his like in species, but by the Divine operation, since from Adam's rib a horse might have
+                     been formed in the same way as Eve was. Hence the natural connection between Eve and Adam was not so great as between daughter
+                     and father, nor was Adam the natural principle of Eve as a father is of his
+                     daughter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That certain barbarians are united carnally to their parents does not come from the natural law but from the passion of concupiscence
+                     which has clouded the natural law in them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Union of male and female is said to be of natural law, because nature has taught this to animals: yet she has taught this
+                     union to various animals in various ways according to their various conditions. But carnal copulation with parents is derogatory
+                     to the reverence due to them. For just as nature has instilled into parents solicitude in providing for their offspring, so
+                     has it instilled into the offspring reverence towards their parents: yet to no
+                     kind of animal save man has she instilled a lasting solicitude for his children or reverence for parents; but to other animals
+                     more or less, according as the offspring is more or less necessary to its parents, or the parents to their offspring. Hence
+                     as the Philosopher attests (De Animal. ix, 47) concerning the camel and the horse, among certain animals the son abhors copulation
+                     with its mother as long as he retains knowledge of her and a certain reverence for her. And since all honest customs
+                     of animals are united together in man naturally, and more perfectly than in other animals, it follows that man naturally abhors
+                     carnal knowledge not only of his mother, but also of his daughter, which is, however, less against nature, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p15"> Moreover consanguinity does not result from carnal procreation in other animals as in man, as stated above (A[1], ad 5).
+                     Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It has been shown how consanguinity between married persons is contrary to the goods of marriage. Hence the Objection proceeds
+                     from false premises.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> It is not unreasonable for one of two unions to be hindered by the other, even as where there is identity there is not likeness.
+                     In like manner the tie of consanguinity may hinder the union of marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p18"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p19"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q54_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q54_A4-p0.1">Whether the degrees of consanguinity that are an impediment to marriage could be fixed by the Church?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the degrees of consanguinity that are an impediment to marriage could not be fixed by the Church so as
+                     to reach to the fourth degree. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q54_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.6" target="asv">Mat. 19:6</a>): "What God hath joined together let no man put asunder." But God joined those together who are married within the fourth
+                     degree of consanguinity, since their union is not forbidden by the Divine law. Therefore they should not be put asunder by
+                     a human law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, matrimony is a sacrament as also is baptism. Now no ordinance of the Church could prevent one who is baptized from
+                     receiving the baptismal character, if he be capable of receiving it according to the Divine law. Therefore neither can an
+                     ordinance of the Church forbid marriage between those who are not forbidden to marry by the Divine law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, positive law can neither void nor extend those things which are natural. Now consanguinity is a natural tie which
+                     is in itself of a nature to impede marriage. Therefore the Church cannot by its ordinance permit or forbid certain people
+                     to marry, any more than she can make them to be kin or not kin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, an ordinance of positive law should have some reasonable cause, since it is for this reasonable cause that it proceeds
+                     from the natural law. But the causes that are assigned for the number of degrees seem altogether unreasonable, since they
+                     bear no relation to their effect; for instance, that consanguinity be an impediment as far as the fourth degree on account
+                     of the four elements as far as the sixth degree on account of the six ages of the world, as
+                     far as the seventh degree on account of the seven days of which all time is comprised. Therefore seemingly this prohibition
+                     is of no force.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, where the cause is the same there should be the same effect. Now the causes for which consanguinity is an impediment
+                     to marriage are the good of the offspring, the curbing of concupiscence, and the extension of friendship, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="XP_Q54_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q54_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, which are equally necessary for all time. Therefore the degrees of consanguinity should have equally impeded marriage at
+                     all times: yet this is not true since consanguinity is now an
+                     impediment to marriage as far as the fourth degree, whereas formerly it was an impediment as far as the seventh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, one and the same union cannot be a kind of sacrament and a kind of incest. But this would be the case if the Church
+                     had the power of fixing a different number in the degrees which are an impediment to marriage. Thus if certain parties related
+                     in the fifth degree were married when that degree was an impediment, their union would be incestuous, and yet this same union
+                     would be a marriage afterwards when the Church withdrew her prohibition. And the
+                     reverse might happen if certain degrees which were not an impediment were subsequently to be forbidden by the Church. Therefore
+                     seemingly the power of the Church does not extend to this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, human law should copy the Divine law. Now according to the Divine law which is contained in the Old Law, the prohibition
+                     of degrees does not apply equally in the ascending and descending lines: since in the Old Law a man was forbidden to marry
+                     his father's sister but not his brother's daughter. Therefore neither should there remain now a prohibition in respect of
+                     nephews and uncles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p9">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said to His disciples (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q54_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.16" target="asv">Lk. 10:16</a>): "He that heareth you heareth Me." Therefore a commandment of the Church has the same force as a commandment of God. Now
+                     the Church sometimes has forbidden and sometimes allowed certain degrees which the Old Law did not forbid. Therefore those
+                     degrees are an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p10"> Further, even as of old the marriages of pagans were controlled by the civil law, so now is marriage controlled by the laws
+                     of the Church. Now formerly the civil law decided which degrees of consanguinity impede marriage, and which do not. Therefore
+                     this can be done now by a commandment of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p11">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The degrees within which consanguinity has been an impediment to marriage have varied according to various times. For at
+                     the beginning of the human race father and mother alone were debarred from marrying their children, because then mankind were
+                     few in number, and then it was necessary for the propagation of the human race to be ensured with very great care, and consequently
+                     only such persons were to be debarred as were unfitted for marriage even in respect
+                     of its principal end which is the good of the offspring, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q54_A4-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q54_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Afterwards however, the human race having multiplied, more persons were excluded by the law of Moses, for they already began
+                     to curb concupiscence. Wherefore as Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) all those persons were debarred from marrying one
+                     another who are wont to live together in one household, because if a lawful carnal intercourse were possible between them,
+                     this would prove a
+                     very great incentive to lust. Yet the Old Law permitted other degrees of consanguinity, in fact to a certain extent it commanded
+                     them; to wit that each man should take a wife from his kindred, in order to avoid confusion of inheritances: because at that
+                     time the Divine worship was handed down as the inheritance of the race. But afterwards more degrees were forbidden by the
+                     New Law which is the law of the spirit and of love, because the worship of God is no longer handed down and spread abroad
+                     by a carnal birth but by a spiritual grace: wherefore it was necessary that men should be yet more withdrawn from carnal things
+                     by devoting themselves to things spiritual, and that love should have a yet wider play. Hence in olden times marriage was
+                     forbidden even within the more remote degrees of consanguinity, in order that consanguinity and affinity might be the sources
+                     of a wider natural friendship; and this was reasonably extended to the seventh degree, both because beyond this it was
+                     difficult to have any recollection of the common stock, and because this was in keeping with the sevenfold grace of the Holy
+                     Ghost. Afterwards, however, towards these latter times the prohibition of the Church has been restricted to the fourth degree,
+                     because it became useless and dangerous to extend the prohibition to more remote degrees of consanguinity. Useless, because
+                     charity waxed cold in many hearts so that they had scarcely a greater bond of friendship with their more remote kindred
+                     than with strangers: and it was dangerous because through the prevalence of concupiscence and neglect men took no account
+                     of so numerous a kindred, and thus the prohibition of the more remote degrees became for many a snare leading to damnation.
+                     Moreover there is a certain fittingness in the restriction of the above prohibition to the fourth degree. First because men
+                     are wont to live until the fourth generation, so that consanguinity cannot lapse into oblivion, wherefore God threatened
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q54_A4-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv">Ex. 20:5</a>) to visit the parent's sins on their children to the third and fourth generation. Secondly, because in each generation the
+                     blood, the identity of which causes consanguinity, receives a further addition of new blood, and the more another blood is
+                     added the less there is of the old. And because there are four elements, each of which is the more easily mixed with another,
+                     according as it is more rarefied it follows that at the first admixture the identity of blood
+                     disappears as regards the first element which is most subtle; at the second admixture, as regards the second element; at the
+                     third, as to the third element; at the fourth, as to the fourth element. Thus after the fourth generation it is fitting for
+                     the carnal union to be repeated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as God does not join together those who are joined together against the Divine command, so does He not join together
+                     those who are joined together against the commandment of the Church, which has the same binding force as a commandment of
+                     God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Matrimony is not only a sacrament but also fulfills an office; wherefore it is more subject to the control of the Church's
+                     ministers than baptism which is a sacrament only: because just as human contracts and offices are controlled by human laws,
+                     so are spiritual contracts and offices controlled by the law of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the tie of consanguinity is natural, it is not natural that consanguinity forbid carnal intercourse, except as regards
+                     certain degrees, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q54_A4-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q54_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Wherefore the Church's commandment does not cause certain people to be kin or not kin, because they remain equally kin at
+                     all times: but it makes carnal intercourse to be lawful or unlawful at different times for different degrees of consanguinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The reasons assigned are given as indicating aptness and congruousness rather than causality and necessity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The reason for the impediment of consanguinity is not the same at different times: wherefore that which it was useful to
+                     allow at one time, it was beneficial to forbid at another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> A commandment does not affect the past but the future. Wherefore if the fifth degree which is now allowed were to be forbidden
+                     at any time, those in the fifth degree who are married would not have to separate, because no impediment supervening to marriage
+                     can annul it; and consequently a union which was a marriage from the first would not be made incestuous by a commandment of
+                     the Church. In like manner, if a degree which is now forbidden were to be
+                     allowed, such a union would not become a marriage on account of the Church's commandment by reason of the former contract,
+                     because they could separate if they wished. Nevertheless, they could contract anew, and this would be a new union.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> In prohibiting the degrees of consanguinity the Church considers chiefly the point of view of affection. And since the reason
+                     for affection towards one's brother's son is not less but even greater than the reasons for affection towards one's father's
+                     brother, inasmuch as the son is more akin to the father than the father to the son (Ethic. viii, 12), therefore did the Church
+                     equally prohibit the degrees of consanguinity in uncles and nephews. On the
+                     other hand the Old Law in debarring certain persons looked chiefly to the danger of concupiscence arising from cohabitation;
+                     and debarred those persons who were in closer intimacy with one another on account of their living together. Now it is more
+                     usual for a niece to live with her uncle than an aunt with her nephew: because a daughter is more identified with her father,
+                     being part of him, whereas a sister is not in this way identified with her brother, for she is not part of him but is born
+                     of the same parent. Hence there was not the same reason for debarring a niece and an aunt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p19"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p20"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q55" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q55-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF AFFINITY (ELEVEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q55-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q55-p2"> We must consider next the impediment of affinity. Under this head there are eleven points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q55-p3"> (1) Whether affinity results from matrimony?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q55-p4"> (2) Whether it remains after the death of husband or wife?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q55-p5"> (3) Whether it is caused through unlawful intercourse?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q55-p6"> (4) Whether it arises from a betrothal?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q55-p7"> (5) Whether affinity is caused through affinity?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q55-p8"> (6) Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q55-p9"> (7) Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q55-p10"> (8) Whether its degrees extend as far as the degrees of consanguinity?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q55-p11"> (9) Whether marriages of persons related to one another by consanguinity or affinity should always be dissolved by divorce?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q55-p12"> (10) Whether the process for the dissolution of like marriages should always be by way of accusation?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q55-p13"> (11) Whether witnesses should be called in such a case?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q55_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q55_A1-p0.1">Whether a person contracts affinity through the marriage of a blood-relation?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a person does not contract affinity through the marriage of a blood-relation. For "the cause of a thing
+                     being so is yet more so." Now the wife is not connected with her husband's kindred except by reason of the husband. Since
+                     then she does not contract affinity with her husband, neither does she contract it with her husband's kindred.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if certain things be separate from one another and something be connected with one of them, it does not follow that
+                     it is connected with the other. Now a person's blood relations are separate from one another. Therefore it does not follow,
+                     if a certain woman be married to a certain man, that she is therefore connected with all his kindred.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, relations result from certain things being united together. Now the kindred of the husband do not become united
+                     together by the fact of his taking a wife. Therefore they do not acquire any relationship of affinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Husband and wife are made one flesh. Therefore if the husband is related in the flesh to all his kindred, for the same reason
+                     his wife will be related to them all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p6"> Further, this is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41).</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A certain natural friendship is founded on natural fellowship. Now natural fellowship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
+                     viii, 12), arises in two ways; first, from carnal procreation; secondly, from connection with orderly carnal procreation,
+                     wherefore he says (Ethic. viii, 12) that the friendship of a husband towards his wife is natural. Consequently even as a person
+                     through being connected with another by carnal procreation is bound to him by a tie of
+                     natural friendship, so does one person become connected with another through carnal intercourse. But there is a difference
+                     in this, that one who is connected with another through carnal procreation, as a son with his father, shares in the same common
+                     stock and blood, so that a son is connected with his father's kindred by the same kind of tie as the father was, the tie,
+                     namely of consanguinity, albeit in a different degree on account of his being more distant from the stock: whereas one who
+                     is
+                     connected with another through carnal intercourse does not share in the same stock, but is as it were an extraneous addition
+                     thereto: whence arises another kind of tie known by the name of "affinity." This is expressed in the verse:
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p8"> Marriage makes a new kind of connection,</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p9"> While birth makes a new degree,</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p10">because, to wit, the person begotten is in the same kind of relationship, but in a different degree, whereas through carnal
+                     intercourse he enters into a new kind of relationship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although a cause is more potent than its effect, it does not always follow that the same name is applicable to the cause
+                     as to the effect, because sometimes that which is in the effect, is found in the cause not in the same but in a higher way;
+                     wherefore it is not applicable to both cause and effect under the same name or under the same aspect, as is the case with
+                     all equivocal effective causes. Thus, then, the union of husband and wife is stronger
+                     than the union of the wife with her husband's kindred, and yet it ought not to be named affinity, but matrimony which is a
+                     kind of unity; even as a man is identical with himself, but not with his kinsman.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Blood-relations are in a way separate, and in a way connected: and it happens in respect of their connection that a person
+                     who is connected with one of them is in some way connected with all of them. But on account of their separation and distance
+                     from one another it happens that a person who is connected with one of them in one way is connected with another in another
+                     way, either as to the kind of connection or as to the degree.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Further, a relation results sometimes from a movement in each extreme, for instance fatherhood and sonship, and a relation
+                     of this kind is really in both extremes. Sometimes it results from the movement of one only, and this happens in two ways.
+                     In one way when a relation results from the movement of one extreme without any movement previous or concomitant of the other
+                     extreme; as in the Creator and the creature, the sensible and the sense, knowledge
+                     and the knowable object: and then the relation is in one extreme really and in the other logically only. In another way when
+                     the relation results from the movement of one extreme without any concomitant movement, but not without a previous movement
+                     of the other; thus there results equality between two men by the increase of one, without the other either increasing or decreasing
+                     then, although previously he reached his actual quantity by some movement or change, so that this relation is founded
+                     really in both extremes. It is the same with consanguinity and affinity, because the relation of brotherhood which results
+                     in a grown child on the birth of a boy, is caused without any movement of the former's at the time, but by virtue of that
+                     previous movement of his wherein he was begotten; wherefore at the time it happens that there results in him the aforesaid
+                     relation through the movement of another. Likewise because this man descends through his own birth from the same stock as
+                     the
+                     husband, there results in him affinity with the latter's wife, without any new change in him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q55_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q55_A2-p0.1">Whether affinity remains after the death of husband or wife?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that affinity does not remain after the death of husband or wife, between the blood-relations of husband and
+                     wife or "vice versa." Because if the cause cease the effect ceases. Now the cause of affinity was the marriage, which ceases
+                     after the husband's death, since then "the woman . . . is loosed from the law of the husband" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q55_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.2" target="asv">Rom. 7:2</a>). Therefore the aforesaid affinity ceases also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, consanguinity is the cause of affinity. Now the consanguinity of the husband with his blood-relations ceases at
+                     his death. Therefore, the wife's affinity with them ceases also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Affinity is caused by consanguinity. Now consanguinity binds persons together for all time as long as they live. Therefore
+                     affinity does so also: and consequently affinity (between two persons) is not dissolved through the dissolution of the marriage
+                     by the death of a third person.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A relation ceases in two ways: in one way through the corruption of its subject, in another way by the removal of its cause;
+                     thus likeness ceases when one of the like subjects dies, or when the quality that caused the likeness is removed. Now there
+                     are certain relations which have for their cause an action, or a passion or movement (Metaph. v, 20): and some of these are
+                     caused by movement, through something being moved actually; such is the relation between
+                     mover and moved: some of them are caused through something being adapted to movement, for instance the relations between the
+                     motive power and the movable, or between master and servant; and some of them result from something, having been moved previously,
+                     such as the relation between father and son, for the relation between them is caused not by (the con) being begotten now,
+                     but by his having been begotten. Now aptitude for movement and for being moved is transitory; whereas the fact of having
+                     been moved is everlasting, since what has been never ceases having been. Consequently fatherhood and sonship are never dissolved
+                     through the removal of the cause, but only through the corruption of the subject, that is of one of the subjects. The same
+                     applies to affinity, for this is caused by certain persons having been joined together not by their being actually joined.
+                     Wherefore it is not done away, as long as the persons between whom affinity has been contracted survive, although the person
+                     die through whom it was contracted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The marriage tie causes affinity not only by reason of actual union, but also by reason of the union having been effected
+                     in the past.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Consanguinity is not the chief cause of affinity, but union with a blood-relation, not only because that union is now, but
+                     because it has been. Hence the argument does not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q55_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q55_A3-p0.1">Whether unlawful intercourse causes affinity?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that unlawful intercourse does not cause affinity. For affinity is an honorable thing. Now honorable things
+                     do not result from that which is dishonorable. Therefore affinity cannot be caused by a dishonorable intercourse.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, where there is consanguinity there cannot be affinity; since affinity is a relationship between persons that results
+                     from carnal intercourse and is altogether void of blood-relationship. Now if unlawful intercourse were a cause of affinity,
+                     it would sometimes happen that a man would contract affinity with his blood-relations and with himself: for instance when
+                     a man is guilty of incest with a blood-relation. Therefore affinity is not caused by
+                     unlawful intercourse.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, unlawful intercourse is according to nature or against nature. Now affinity is not caused by unnatural unlawful
+                     intercourse as decided by law (can. Extraordinaria, xxxv, qu. 2,3). Therefore it is not caused only by unlawful intercourse
+                     according to nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> He who is joined to a harlot is made one body (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q55_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.16" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:16</a>). Now this is the reason why marriage caused affinity. Therefore unlawful intercourse does so for the same reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p6"> Further, carnal intercourse is the cause of affinity, as shown by the definition of affinity, which definition is as follows:
+                     Affinity is the relationship of persons which results from carnal intercourse and is altogether void of blood-relationship.
+                     But there is carnal copulation even in unlawful intercourse. Therefore unlawful intercourse causes affinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) the union of husband and wife is said to be natural chiefly on account of
+                     the procreation of offspring, and secondly on account of the community of works: the former of which belongs to marriage by
+                     reason of carnal copulation, and the latter, in so far as marriage is a partnership directed to a common life. Now the former
+                     is to be found in every carnal union where there is a mingling of seeds, since such a union
+                     may be productive of offspring, but the latter may be wanting. Consequently since marriage caused affinity, in so far as it
+                     was a carnal mingling, it follows that also an unlawful intercourse causes affinity in so far as it has something of natural
+                     copulation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In an unlawful intercourse there is something natural which is common to fornication and marriage, and in this respect it
+                     causes affinity. There is also something which is inordinate whereby it differs from marriage, and in this respect it does
+                     not cause affinity. Hence affinity remains honorable, although its cause is in a way dishonorable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is no reason why diverse relations should not be in the same subject by reason of different things. Consequently there
+                     can be affinity and consanguinity between two persons, not only on account of unlawful but also on account of lawful intercourse:
+                     for instance if a blood-relation of mine on my father's side marries a blood-relation of mine on my mother's side. Hence in
+                     the above definition the words "which is altogether void of
+                     blood-relationship" apply to affinity as such. Nor does it follow that a man by having intercourse with his blood-relation
+                     contracts affinity with himself, since affinity, like consanguinity, requires diversity of subjects, as likeness does.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In unnatural copulation there is no mingling of seeds that makes generation possible: wherefore a like intercourse does not
+                     cause affinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q55_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q55_A4-p0.1">Whether affinity is caused by betrothal?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that affinity cannot be caused by betrothal. For affinity is a lasting tie: whereas a betrothal is sometimes
+                     broken off. Therefore it cannot cause affinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further if the hymen be penetrated without the deed being consummated, affinity is not contracted. Yet this is much more
+                     akin to carnal intercourse than a betrothal. Therefore betrothal does not cause affinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, betrothal is nothing but a promise of future marriage. Now sometimes there is a promise of future marriage without
+                     affinity being contracted, for instance if it take place before the age of seven years; or if a man having a perpetual impediment
+                     of impotence promise a woman future marriage; or if a like promise be made between persons to whom marriage is rendered unlawful
+                     by a vow; or in any other way whatever. Therefore betrothal cannot cause
+                     affinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Pope Alexander (cap. Ad audiendem, De spons. et matrim.) forbade a certain woman to marry a certain man, because she had
+                     been betrothed to his brother. Now this would not be the case unless affinity were contracted by betrothal. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as a betrothal has not the conditions of a perfect marriage, but is a preparation for marriage, so betrothal causes
+                     not affinity as marriage does, but something like affinity. This is called "the justice of public honesty," which is an impediment
+                     to marriage even as affinity and consanguinity are, and according to the same degrees, and is defined thus: "The justice of
+                     public honesty is a relationship arising out of betrothal, and derives its force from
+                     ecclesiastical institution by reason of its honesty." This indicates the reason of its name as well as its cause, namely that
+                     this relationship was instituted by the Church on account of its honesty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Betrothal, by reason not of itself but of the end to which it is directed, causes this kind of affinity known as "the justice
+                     of public honesty": wherefore just as marriage is a lasting tie, so is the aforesaid kind of affinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In carnal intercourse man and woman become one flesh by the mingling of seeds. Wherefore it is not every invasion or penetration
+                     of the hymen that causes affinity to be contracted, but only such as is followed by a mingling of seeds. But marriage causes
+                     affinity not only on account of carnal intercourse, but also by reason of the conjugal fellowship, in respect of which also
+                     marriage is according to nature. Consequently affinity results from the
+                     marriage contract itself expressed in words of the present and before its consummation, and in like manner there results from
+                     betrothal, which is a promise of conjugal fellowship, something akin to affinity, namely the justice of public honesty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All those impediments which void a betrothal prevent affinity being contracted through a promise of marriage. Hence whether
+                     he who actually promises marriage be lacking in age, or be under a solemn vow of continence or any like impediment, no affinity
+                     nor anything akin to it results because the betrothal is void. If however, a minor, laboring under insensibility or malefice,
+                     having a perpetual impediment, is betrothed before the age of puberty and
+                     after the age of seven years, with a woman who is of age, from such a contract there results the impediment called "justice
+                     of public honesty," because at the time the impediment was not actual, since at that age the boy who is insensible is equally
+                     impotent in respect of the act in question.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q55_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q55_A5-p0.1">Whether affinity is a cause of affinity?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that affinity also is a cause of affinity. For Pope Julius I says (cap. Contradicimus 35, qu. iii): "No man
+                     may marry his wife's surviving blood-relation": and it is said in the next chapter (cap. Porro duorum) that "the wives of
+                     two cousins are forbidden to marry, one after the other, the same husband." But this is only on account of affinity being
+                     contracted through union with a person related by affinity. Therefore affinity is a cause of
+                     affinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, carnal intercourse makes persons akin even as carnal procreation, since the degrees of affinity and consanguinity
+                     are reckoned equally. But consanguinity causes affinity. Therefore affinity does also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things that are the same with one and the same are the same with one another. But the wife contracts the same relations
+                     with all her husband's kindred. Therefore all her husband's kindred are made one with all who are related by affinity to the
+                     wife, and thus affinity is the cause of affinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, If affinity is caused by affinity a man who has connection with two women can marry neither of them, because
+                     then the one would be related to the other by affinity. But this is false. Therefore affinity does not cause affinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if affinity arose out of affinity a man by marrying another man's widow would contract affinity with all her first
+                     husband's kindred, since she is related to them by affinity. But this cannot be the case because he would become especially
+                     related by affinity to her deceased husband. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, consanguinity is a stronger tie than affinity. But the blood-relations of the wife do not become blood-relations
+                     of the husband. Much less, therefore, does affinity to the wife cause affinity to her blood-relations, and thus the same conclusion
+                     follows.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which one thing proceeds from another: in one way a thing proceeds from another in likeness of species,
+                     as a man is begotten of a man: in another way one thing proceeds from another, not in likeness of species; and this process
+                     is always towards a lower species, as instanced in all equivocal agents. The first kind of procession, however often it be
+                     repeated, the same species always remains: thus if one man be begotten of another by an
+                     act of the generative power, of this man also another man will be begotten, and so on. But the second kind of procession,
+                     just as in the first instance it produces another species, so it makes another species as often as it is repeated. Thus by
+                     movement from a point there proceeds a line and not a point, because a point by being moved makes a line; and from a line
+                     moved lineally, there proceeds not a line but a surface, and from a surface a body, and in this way the procession can go
+                     no
+                     further. Now in the procession of kinship we find two kinds whereby this tie is caused: one is by carnal procreation, and
+                     this always produces the same species of relationship; the other is by the marriage union, and this produces a different kind
+                     of relationship from the beginning: thus it is clear that a married woman is related to her husband's blood-relations not
+                     by blood but by affinity. Wherefore if this kind of process be repeated, the result will be not affinity but another kind
+                     of
+                     relationship; and consequently a married party contracts with the affines of the other party a relation not of affinity but
+                     of some other kind which is called affinity of the second kind. And again if a person through marriage contracts relationship
+                     with an affine of the second kind, it will not be affinity of the second kind, but of a third kind, as indicated in the verse
+                     quoted above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q55_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q55_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Formerly these two kinds were included in the prohibition, under the head of
+                     the justice of public honesty rather than under the head of affinity, because they fall short of true affinity, in the same
+                     way as the relationship arising out of betrothal. Now however they have ceased to be included in the prohibition, which now
+                     refers only to the first kind of affinity in which true affinity consists.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A husband contracts affinity of the first kind with his wife's male blood-relation, and affinity of the second kind with
+                     the latter's wife: wherefore if the latter man dies the former cannot marry his widow on account of the second kind of affinity.
+                     Again if a man A marry a widow B, C, a relation of her former husband being connected with B by the first kind of affinity,
+                     contracts affinity of the second kind with her husband A; and D, the wife of this
+                     relation C being connected, by affinity of the second kind, with B, this man's wife contracts affinity of the third kind with
+                     her husband A. And since the third kind of affinity was included in the prohibition on account of a certain honesty more than
+                     by reason of affinity, the canon (cap. Porro duorum 35, qu. iii) says: "The justice of public honesty forbids the wives of
+                     two cousins to be married to the same man, the one after the other." But this prohibition is done away with.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although carnal intercourse is a cause of people being connected with one another, it is not the same kind of connection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The wife contracts the same connection with her husband's relatives as to the degree but not as to the kind of connection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p12"> Since however the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show that no tie is caused by affinity, we must reply to
+                     them lest the time-honored prohibition of the Church seem unreasonable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above, a woman does not contract affinity of the first kind with the man to whom she is united in the flesh, wherefore
+                     she does not contract affinity of the second kind with a woman known by the same man; and consequently if a man marry one
+                     of these women, the other does not contract affinity of the third kind with him. And so the laws of bygone times did not forbid
+                     the same man to marry successively two women known by one man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As a man is not connected with his wife by affinity of the first kind, so he does not contract affinity of the second kind
+                     with the second husband of the same wife. Wherefore the argument does not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> One person is not connected with me through another, except they be connected together. Hence through a woman who is affine
+                     to me, no person becomes connected with me, except such as is connected with her. Now this cannot be except through carnal
+                     procreation from her, or through connection with her by marriage: and according to the olden legislation, I contracted some
+                     kind of connection through her in both ways: because her son even by another husband
+                     becomes affine to me in the same kind and in a different degree of affinity, as appears from the rule given above: and again
+                     her second husband becomes affine to me in the second kind of affinity. But her other blood-relations are not connected with
+                     him, but she is connected with them, either as with father or mother, inasmuch as she descends from them, or, as with her
+                     brothers, as proceeding from the same principle; wherefore the brother or father of my affine does not become affine to me
+                     in
+                     any kind of affinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q55_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q55_A6-p0.1">Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that affinity is not an impediment to marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage except what is contrary
+                     thereto. But affinity is not contrary to marriage since it is caused by it. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by marriage the wife becomes a possession of the husband. Now the husband's kindred inherit his possessions after
+                     his death. Therefore they can succeed to his wife, although she is affine to them, as shown above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q55_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q55_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Therefore affinity is not an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q55_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.8" target="asv">Lev. 18:8</a>): "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy father's wife." Now she is only affine. Therefore affinity is an impediment
+                     to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Affinity that precedes marriage hinders marriage being contracted and voids the contract, for the same reason as consanguinity.
+                     For just as there is a certain need for blood-relations to live together, so is there for those who are connected by affinity:
+                     and just as there is a tie of friendship between blood-relations, so is there between those who are affine to one another.
+                     If, however, affinity supervene to matrimony, it cannot void the marriage, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q55_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q50_A7.html">Q[50], A[7]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Affinity is not contrary to the marriage which causes it, but to a marriage being contracted with an affine, in so far as
+                     the latter would hinder the extension of friendship and the curbing of concupiscence, which are sought in marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The husband's possessions do not become one with him as the wife is made one flesh with him. Wherefore just as consanguinity
+                     is an impediment to marriage or union with the husband according to the flesh, so is one forbidden to marry the husband's
+                     wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q55_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q55_A7-p0.1">Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that affinity in itself admits of degrees. For any kind of propinquity can itself be the subject of degrees.
+                     Now affinity is a kind of propinquity. Therefore it has degrees in itself apart from the degrees of consanguinity by which
+                     it is caused.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41) that the child of a second marriage could not take a consort from within
+                     the degrees of affinity of the first husband. But this would not be the case unless the son of an affine were also affine.
+                     Therefore affinity like consanguinity admits itself of degrees.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Affinity is caused by consanguinity. Therefore all the degrees of affinity are caused by the degrees of consanguinity: and
+                     so it has no degrees of itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing does not of itself admit of being divided except in reference to something belonging to it by reason of its genus:
+                     thus animal is divided into rational and irrational and not into white and black. Now carnal procreation has a direct relation
+                     to consanguinity, because the tie of consanguinity is immediately contracted through it; whereas it has no relation to affinity
+                     except through consanguinity which is the latter's cause. Wherefore since the
+                     degrees of relationship are distinguished in reference to carnal procreation, the distinction of degrees is directly and immediately
+                     referable to consanguinity, and to affinity through consanguinity. Hence the general rule in seeking the degrees of affinity
+                     is that in whatever degree of consanguinity I am related to the husband, in that same degree of affinity I am related to the
+                     wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The degrees in propinquity of relationship can only be taken in reference to ascent and descent of propagation, to which
+                     affinity is compared only through consanguinity. Wherefore affinity has no direct degrees, but derives them according to the
+                     degrees of consanguinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Formerly it used to be said that the son of my affine by a second marriage was affine to me, not directly but accidentally
+                     as it were: wherefore he was forbidden to marry on account of the justice of public honesty rather than affinity. And for
+                     this reason this prohibition is now revoked.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q55_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q55_A8-p0.1">Whether the degrees of affinity extend in the same way as the degrees of consanguinity?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the degrees of affinity do not extend in the same way as the degrees of consanguinity. For the tie of
+                     affinity is less strong than the tie of consanguinity, since affinity arises from consanguinity in diversity of species, as
+                     from an equivocal cause. Now the stronger the tie the longer it lasts. Therefore the tie of affinity does not last to the
+                     same number of degrees as consanguinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human law should imitate Divine law. Now according to the Divine law certain degrees of consanguinity were forbidden,
+                     in which degrees affinity was not an impediment to marriage: as instanced in a brother's wife whom a man could marry although
+                     he could not marry her sister. Therefore now too the prohibition of affinity and consanguinity should not extend to the same
+                     degrees.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A woman is connected with me by affinity from the very fact that she is married to a blood-relation of mine. Therefore in
+                     whatever degree her husband is related to me by blood she is related to me in that same degree by affinity: and so the degrees
+                     of affinity should be reckoned in the same number as the degrees of consanguinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since the degrees of affinity are reckoned according to the degrees of consanguinity, the degrees of affinity must needs
+                     be the same in number as those of consanguinity. Nevertheless, affinity being a lesser tie than consanguinity, both formerly
+                     and now, a dispensation is more easily granted in the more remote degrees of affinity than in the remote degrees of consanguinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The fact that the tie of affinity is less than the tie of consanguinity causes a difference in the kind of relationship but
+                     not in the degrees. Hence this argument is not to the point.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man could not take his deceased brother's wife except, in the case when the latter died without issue, in order to raise
+                     up seed to his brother. This was requisite at a time when religious worship was propagated by means of the propagation of
+                     the flesh, which is not the case now. Hence it is clear that he did not marry her in his own person as it were, but as supplying
+                     the place of his brother.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q55_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q55_A9-p0.1">Whether a marriage contracted by persons with the degrees of affinity or consanguinity should always be annulled?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a marriage contracted by persons within the degrees of affinity or consanguinity ought not always to be
+                     annulled by divorce. For "what God hath joined together let no man put asunder" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q55_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.6" target="asv">Mat. 19:6</a>). Since then it is understood that what the Church does God does, and since the Church sometimes through ignorance joins
+                     such persons together, it would seem that if subsequently this came to knowledge they ought not to be separated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the tie of marriage is less onerous than the tie of ownership. Now after a long time a man may acquire by prescription
+                     the ownership of a thing of which he was not the owner. Therefore by length of time a marriage becomes good in law, although
+                     it was not so before.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, of like things we judge alike. Now if a marriage ought to be annulled on account of consanguinity, in the case when
+                     two brothers marry two sisters, if one be separated on account of consanguinity, the other ought to be separated for the same
+                     reason. and yet this is not seemly. Therefore a marriage ought not to be annulled on account of affinity or consanguinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Consanguinity and affinity forbid the contracting of a marriage and void the contract. Therefore if affinity or consanguinity
+                     be proved, the parties should be separated even though they have actually contracted marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since all copulation apart from lawful marriage is a mortal sin, which the Church uses all her endeavors to prevent, it belongs
+                     to her to separate those between whom there cannot be valid marriage, especially those related by blood or by affinity, who
+                     cannot without incest be united in the flesh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the Church is upheld by God's gift and authority, yet in so far as she is an assembly of men there results in her
+                     acts something of human frailty which is not Divine. Therefore a union effected in the presence of the Church who is ignorant
+                     of an impediment is not indissoluble by Divine authority, but is brought about contrary to Divine authority through man's
+                     error, which being an error of fact excuses from sin, as long as it remains. Hence
+                     when the impediment comes to the knowledge of the Church, she ought to sever the aforesaid union.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which cannot be done without sin is not ratified by any prescription, for as Innocent III says (Conc. Later. iv, can.
+                     50: cap. Non debent, De consang. et affinit.), "length of time does not diminish sin but increases it": nor can it in any
+                     way legitimize a marriage which could not take place between unlawful persons.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In contentious suits between two persons the verdict does not prejudice a third party, wherefore although the one brother's
+                     marriage with the one sister is annulled on account of consanguinity, the Church does not therefore annul the other marriage
+                     against which no action is taken. Yet in the tribunal of the conscience the other brother ought not on this account always
+                     to be bound to put away his wife, because such accusations frequently proceed from
+                     ill-will, and are proved by false witnesses. Hence he is not bound to form his conscience on what has been done about the
+                     other marriage: but seemingly one ought to draw a distinction, because either he has certain knowledge of the impediment of
+                     his marriage, or he has an opinion about it, or he has neither. In the first case, he can neither seek nor pay the debt, in
+                     the second, he must pay, but not ask, in the third he can both pay and ask.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q55_A10" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A11.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q55_A10-p0.1">Whether it is necessary to proceed by way of accusation for the annulment of a marriage contracted by persons related to each
+                     other by affinity or consanguinity?
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one ought not to proceed by way of accusation in order to sever a marriage contracted between persons
+                     related by affinity or consanguinity. Because accusation is preceded by inscription* whereby a man binds himself to suffer
+                     the punishment of retaliation, if he fail to prove his accusation. [*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere)
+                     the writ of accusation; Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q55_A10-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A7.html">SS, Q[33], A[7]</a>]. But this is not
+                     required when a matrimonial separation is at issue. Therefore accusation has no place then.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in a matrimonial lawsuit only the relatives are heard, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41). But in accusations
+                     even strangers are heard. Therefore in a suit for matrimonial separation the process is not by way of accusation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a marriage ought to be denounced this should be done especially where it is least difficult to sever the tie.
+                     Now this is when only the betrothal has been contracted, and then it is not the marriage that is denounced. Therefore accusation
+                     should never take place at any other time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a man is not prevented from accusing by the fact that he does not accuse at once. But this happens in marriage,
+                     for if he was silent at first when the marriage was being contracted, he cannot denounce the marriage afterwards without laying
+                     himself open to suspicion. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is unlawful can be denounced. But the marriage of relatives by affinity and consanguinity is unlawful. Therefore
+                     it can be denounced.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Accusation is instituted lest the guilty be tolerated as though they were innocent. Now just as it happens through ignorance
+                     of fact that a guilty man is reputed innocent, so it happens through ignorance of a circumstance that a certain fact is deemed
+                     lawful whereas it is unlawful. Wherefore just as a man is sometimes accused, so is a fact sometimes an object of accusation.
+                     It is in this way that a marriage is denounced, when through ignorance of an
+                     impediment it is deemed lawful, whereas it is unlawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The punishment of retaliation takes place when a person is accused of a crime, because then action is taken that he may be
+                     punished. But when it is a deed that is accused, action is taken not for the punishment of the doer, but in order to prevent
+                     what is unlawful. Hence in a matrimonial suit the accuser does not bind himself to a punishment. Moreover, the accusation
+                     may be made either in words or in writing, provided the person who denounces the
+                     marriage denounced, and the impediment for which it is denounced, be expressed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Strangers cannot know of the consanguinity except from the relatives, since these know with greater probability. Hence when
+                     these are silent, a stranger is liable to be suspected of acting from ill-will unless he wish the relatives to prove his assertion.
+                     Wherefore a stranger is debarred from accusing when there are relatives who are silent, and by whom he cannot prove his accusation.
+                     On the other hand the relatives, however nearly related they be,
+                     are not debarred from accusing, when the marriage is denounced on account of a perpetual impediment, which prevents the contracting
+                     of the marriage and voids the contract. When, however, the accusation is based on a denial of the contract having taken place,
+                     the parents should be debarred from witnessing as being liable to suspicion, except those of the party that is inferior in
+                     rank and wealth, for they, one is inclined to think, would be willing for the marriage to stand.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the marriage is not yet contracted and there is only a betrothal, there can be no accusation, for what is not, cannot
+                     be accused. But the impediment can be denounced lest the marriage be contracted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> He who is silent at first is sometimes heard afterwards if he wish to denounce the marriage, and sometimes he is repulsed.
+                     This is made clear by the Decretal (cap. Cum in tua, De his qui matrim. accus. possunt.) which runs as follows: "If an accuser
+                     present himself after the marriage has been contracted, since he did not declare himself when according to custom, the banns
+                     were published in church, we may rightly ask whether he should be allowed to
+                     voice his accusation. In this matter we deem that a distinction should be made, so that if he who lodges information against
+                     persons already married was absent from the diocese at the time of the aforesaid publication, or if for some other reason
+                     this could not come to his knowledge, for instance if through exceeding stress of weakness and fever he was not in possession
+                     of his faculties, or was of so tender years as to be too young to understand such matters, or if he were hindered by some
+                     other lawful cause, his accusation should be heard. otherwise without doubt he should be repulsed as open to suspicion, unless
+                     he swear that the information lodged by him came to his knowledge subsequently and that he is not moved by ill-will to make
+                     his accusation."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A11.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q55_A11" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q55_A11-p0.1">Whether in a suit of this kind one should proceed by hearing witnesses in the same way as in other suits?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in such a suit one ought not to proceed by hearing witnesses, in the same way as in other suits where
+                     any witnesses may be called provided they be unexceptionable. But here strangers are not admitted, although they be unexceptionable.
+                     Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, witnesses who are suspected of private hatred or love are debarred from giving evidence. Now relatives are especially
+                     open to suspicion of love for one party, and hatred for the other. Therefore their evidence should not be taken.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, marriage is a more favorable suit than those others in which purely corporeal questions are at stake. Now in these
+                     the same person cannot be both accuser and witness. Neither therefore can this be in a matrimonial suit; and so it would appear
+                     that it is not right to proceed by hearing witnesses in a suit of this kind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Witnesses are called in a suit in order to give the judge evidence concerning matters of doubt. Now evidence should be afforded
+                     the judge in this suit as in other suits, since he must not pronounce a hasty judgment on what is not proven. Therefore here
+                     as in other lawsuits witnesses should be called.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In this kind of lawsuit as in others, truth must be unveiled by witnesses: yet, as the lawyers say, there are many things
+                     peculiar to this suit; namely that "the same person can be accuser and witness; that evidence is not taken 'on oath of calumny,'
+                     since it is a quasi-spiritual lawsuit; that relatives are allowed as witnesses; that the juridical order is not perfectly
+                     observed, since if the denunciation has been made, and the suit is uncontested, the
+                     defendant may be excommunicated if contumacious; that hearsay evidence is admitted; and that witnesses may be called after
+                     the publication of the names of the witnesses." All this is in order to prevent the sin that may occur in such a union (cap.
+                     Quoties aliqui; cap. Super eo, De test. et attest.; cap. Literas, De juram. calumn.).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p7"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q56" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A11.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q56-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q56-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q56-p2"> We must now consider the impediment of spiritual relationship: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q56-p3"> (1) Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q56-p4"> (2) From what cause is it contracted?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q56-p5"> (3) Between whom?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q56-p6"> (4) Whether it passes from husband to wife?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q56-p7"> (5) Whether it passes to the father's carnal children?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q56_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q56_A1-p0.1">Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual relationship is not an impediment to marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage save
+                     what is contrary to a marriage good. Now spiritual relationship is not contrary to a marriage good. Therefore it is not an
+                     impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a perpetual impediment to marriage cannot stand together with marriage. But spiritual relationship sometimes stands
+                     together with marriage, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42), as when a man in a case of necessity baptizes his own child,
+                     for then he contracts a spiritual relationship with his wife, and yet the marriage is not dissolved. Therefore spiritual relationship
+                     is not an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, union of the spirit does not pass to the flesh. But marriage is a union of the flesh. Therefore since spiritual
+                     relationship is a union of the spirit, it cannot become an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, contraries have not the same effects. Now spiritual relationship is apparently contrary to disparity of worship,
+                     since spiritual relationship is a kinship resulting from the giving of a sacrament or the intention of so doing [*See next
+                     Article, ad 3]: whereas disparity of worship consists in the lack of a sacrament, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q56_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q50_A1.html">Q[50], A[1]</a>). Since then disparity of worship is an impediment to matrimony, it would seem that
+                     spiritual relationship has not this effect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The holier the bond, the more is it to be safeguarded. Now a spiritual bond is holier than a bodily tie: and since the tie
+                     of bodily kinship is an impediment to marriage, it follows that spiritual relationship should also be an impediment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p7"> Further, in marriage the union of souls ranks higher than union of bodies, for it precedes it. Therefore with much more reason
+                     can a spiritual relationship hinder marriage than bodily relationship does.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as by carnal procreation man receives natural being, so by the sacraments he receives the spiritual being of grace.
+                     Wherefore just as the tie that is contracted by carnal procreation is natural to man, inasmuch as he is a natural being, so
+                     the tie that is contracted from the reception of the sacraments is after a fashion natural to man, inasmuch as he is a member
+                     of the Church. Therefore as carnal relationship hinders marriage, even so does spiritual
+                     relationship by command of the Church. We must however draw a distinction in reference to spiritual relationship, since either
+                     it precedes or follows marriage. If it precedes, it hinders the contracting of marriage and voids the contract. If it follows,
+                     it does not dissolve the marriage bond: but we must draw a further distinction in reference to the marriage act. For either
+                     the spiritual relationship is contracted in a case of necessity, as when a father baptizes his child who is at the point
+                     of death---and then it is not an obstacle to the marriage act on either side---or it is contracted without any necessity and
+                     through ignorance, in which case if the person whose action has occasioned the relationship acted with due caution, it is
+                     the same with him as in the former case---or it is contracted purposely and without any necessity, and then the person whose
+                     action has occasioned the relationship, loses the right to ask for the debt; but is bound to pay if asked, because the fault
+                     of
+                     the one party should not be prejudicial to the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although spiritual relationship does not hinder any of the chief marriage goods, it hinders one of the secondary goods, namely
+                     the extension of friendship, because spiritual relationship is by itself a sufficient reason for friendship: wherefore intimacy
+                     and friendship with other persons need to be sought by means of marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Marriage is a lasting bond, wherefore no supervening impediment can sever it. Hence it happens sometimes that marriage and
+                     an impediment to marriage stand together, but not if the impediment precedes.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In marriage there is not only a bodily but also a spiritual union: and consequently kinship of spirit proves an impediment
+                     thereto, without spiritual kinship having to pass into a bodily relationship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is nothing unreasonable in two things that are contrary to one another being contrary to the same thing, as great and
+                     small are contrary to equal. Thus disparity of worship and spiritual relationship are opposed to marriage, because in one
+                     the distance is greater, and in the other less, than required by marriage. Hence there is an impediment to marriage in either
+                     case.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q56_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q56_A2-p0.1">Whether spiritual relationship is contracted by baptism only?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual relationship is contracted by Baptism only. For as bodily kinship is to bodily birth, so is
+                     spiritual kinship to spiritual birth. Now Baptism alone is called spiritual birth. Therefore spiritual kinship is contracted
+                     by Baptism only, even as only by carnal birth is carnal kinship contracted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a character is imprinted in order as in Confirmation. But spiritual relationship does not result from receiving
+                     orders. Therefore it does not result from Confirmation but only from Baptism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sacraments are more excellent than sacramentals. Now spiritual relationship does not result from certain sacraments,
+                     for instance from Extreme Unction. Much less therefore does it result from catechizing, as some maintain.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, many other sacramentals are attached to Baptism besides catechizing. Therefore spiritual relationship is not contracted
+                     from catechism any more than from the others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, prayer is no less efficacious than instruction of catechism for advancement in good. But spiritual relationship
+                     does not result from prayer. Therefore it does not result from catechism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the instruction given to the baptized by preaching to them avails no less than preaching to those who are not yet
+                     baptized. But no spiritual relationship results from preaching. Neither therefore does it result from catechism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> On the other hand, It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q56_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:15</a>): "In Christ Jesus by the gospel I have begotten you." Now spiritual birth causes spiritual relationship. Therefore spiritual
+                     relationship results from the preaching of the gospel and instruction, and not only from Baptism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, as original sin is taken away by Baptism, so is actual sin taken away by Penance. Therefore just as Baptism causes
+                     spiritual relationship, so also does Penance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, "father" denotes relationship. Now a man is called another's spiritual father in respect of Penance, teaching, pastoral
+                     care and many other like things. Therefore spiritual relationship is contracted from many other sources besides Baptism and
+                     Confirmation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p11">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There are three opinions on this question. Some say that as spiritual regeneration is bestowed by the sevenfold grace of
+                     the Holy Ghost, it is caused by means of seven things, beginning with the first taste of blessed salt and ending with Confirmation
+                     given by the bishop: and they say that spiritual relationship is contracted by each of these seven things. But this does not
+                     seem reasonable, for carnal relationship is not contracted except by a perfect act of
+                     generation. Wherefore affinity is not contracted except there be mingling of seeds, from which it is possible for carnal generation
+                     to follow. Now spiritual generation is not perfected except by a sacrament: wherefore it does not seem fitting for spiritual
+                     relationship to be contracted otherwise than through a sacrament. Hence others say that spiritual relationship is only contracted
+                     through three sacraments, namely catechism, Baptism and Confirmation, but these do not apparently know the
+                     meaning of what they say, since catechism is not a sacrament but a sacramental. Wherefore others say that it is contracted
+                     through two sacraments only, namely Confirmation and Baptism, and this is the more common opinion. Some however of these say
+                     that catechism is a weak impediment, since it hinders the contracting of marriage but does not void the contract.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Carnal birth is twofold. The first is in the womb, wherein that which is born is a weakling and cannot come forth without
+                     danger: and to this birth regeneration by Baptism is likened; wherein a man is regenerated as though yet needing to be fostered
+                     in the womb of the Church. The second is birth from out of the womb, when that which was born in the womb is so far strengthened
+                     that it can without danger face the outer world which has a natural
+                     corruptive tendency. To this is likened Confirmation, whereby man being strengthened goes forth abroad to confess the name
+                     of Christ. Hence spiritual relationship is fittingly contracted through both these sacraments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The effect of the sacrament of order is not regeneration but the bestowal of power, for which reason it is not conferred
+                     on women, and consequently no impediment to marriage can arise therefrom. Hence this kind of relationship does not count.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In catechism one makes a profession of future Baptism, just as in betrothal one enters an engagement of future marriage.
+                     Wherefore just as in betrothal a certain kind of propinquity is contracted, so is there in catechism, whereby marriage is
+                     rendered at least unlawful, as some say; but not in the other sacraments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is not made a profession of faith in the other sacramentals of Baptism, as in catechism: wherefore the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p16"> The same answer applies to the Fifth and Sixth Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The Apostle had instructed them in the faith by a kind of catechism; and consequently his instruction was directed to their
+                     spiritual birth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Properly speaking a spiritual relationship is not contracted through the sacrament of Penance. Wherefore a priest's son can
+                     marry a woman whose confession the priest has heard, else in the whole parish he could not find a woman whom he could marry.
+                     Nor does it matter that by Penance actual sin is taken away, for this is not a kind of birth, but a kind of healing. Nevertheless
+                     Penance occasions a kind of bond between the woman penitent and the priest,
+                     that has a resemblance to spiritual relationship, so that if he have carnal intercourse with her, he sins as grievously as
+                     if she were his spiritual daughter. The reason of this is that the relations between priest and penitent are most intimate,
+                     and consequently in order to remove the occasion of sin this prohibition [*Can. Omnes quos, and seqq., Caus. xxx] was made.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p19">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> A spiritual father is so called from his likeness to a carnal father. Now as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) a carnal
+                     father gives his child three things, being nourishment and instruction: and consequently a person's spiritual father is so
+                     called from one of these three things. Nevertheless he has not, through being his spiritual father, a spiritual relationship
+                     with him, unless he is like a (carnal) father as to generation which is the way to
+                     being. This solution may also be applied to the foregoing Eighth Objection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p20"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p21"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q56_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q56_A3-p0.1">Whether spiritual relationship is contracted between the person baptized and the person who raises him from the sacred font?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual relationship is not contracted between the person baptized and the person who raises him from
+                     the sacred font. For in carnal generation carnal relationship is contracted only on the part of the person of whose seed the
+                     child is born; and not on the part of the person who receives the child after birth. Therefore neither is spiritual relationship
+                     contracted between the receiver and the received at the sacred font.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who raises a person from the sacred font is called {anadochos} by Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii): and it is part
+                     of his office to instruct the child. But instruction is not a sufficient cause of spiritual relationship, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="XP_Q56_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q56_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore no relationship is contracted between him and the person whom he raises from the sacred font.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it may happen that someone raises a person from the sacred font before he himself is baptized. Now spiritual relationship
+                     is not contracted in such a case, since one who is not baptized is not capable of spirituality. Therefore raising a person
+                     from the sacred font is not sufficient to contract a spiritual relationship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> There is the definition of spiritual relationship quoted above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q56_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q56_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, as also the authorities mentioned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as in carnal generation a person is born of a father and mother, so in spiritual generation a person is born again a
+                     son of God as Father, and of the Church as Mother. Now while he who confers the sacrament stands in the place of God, whose
+                     instrument and minister he is, he who raises a baptized person from the sacred font, or holds the candidate for Confirmation,
+                     stands in the place of the Church. Therefore spiritual relationship is contracted with
+                     both.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not only the father, of whose seed the child is born, is related carnally to the child, but also the mother who provides
+                     the matter, and in whose womb the child is begotten. So too the godparent who in place of the Church offers and raises the
+                     candidate for Baptism and holds the candidate for Confirmation contracts spiritual relationship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He contracts spiritual relationship not by reason of the instruction it is his duty to give, but on account of the spiritual
+                     birth in which he co-operates.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A person who is not baptized cannot raise anyone from the sacred font, since he is not a member of the Church whom the godparent
+                     in Baptism represents: although he can baptize, because he is a creature of God Whom the baptizer represents. And yet he cannot
+                     contract a spiritual relationship, since he is void of spiritual life to which man is first born by receiving Baptism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q56_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q56_A4-p0.1">Whether spiritual relationship passes from husband to wife?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass from husband to wife. For spiritual and bodily union are disparate
+                     and differ generically. Therefore carnal union which is between husband and wife cannot be the means of contracting a spiritual
+                     relationship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the godfather and godmother have more in common in the spiritual birth that is the cause of spiritual relationship,
+                     than a husband, who is godfather, has with his wife. Now godfather and godmother do not hereby contract spiritual relationship.
+                     Therefore neither does a wife contract a spiritual relationship through her husband being godfather to someone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it may happen that the husband is baptized, and his wife not, for instance when he is converted from unbelief without
+                     his wife being converted. Now spiritual relationship cannot be contracted by one who is not baptized. Therefore it does not
+                     always pass from husband to wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, husband and wife together can raise a person from the sacred font, since no law forbids it. If therefore spiritual
+                     relationship passed from husband to wife, it would follow that each of them is twice godfather or godmother of the same individual:
+                     which is absurd.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Spiritual goods are more communicable than bodily goods. But the bodily consanguinity of the husband passes to his wife by
+                     affinity. Much more therefore does spiritual relationship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A may become co-parent with B in two ways. First, by the act of another (B), who baptizes A's child, or raises him in Baptism.
+                     In this way spiritual relationship does not pass from husband to wife, unless perchance it be his wife's child, for then she
+                     contracts spiritual relationship directly, even as her husband. Secondly, by his own act, for instance when he raises B's
+                     child from the sacred font, and thus spiritual relationship passes to the wife if he has
+                     already had carnal knowledge of her, but not if the marriage be not yet consummated, since they are not as yet made one flesh:
+                     and this is by way of a kind of affinity; wherefore it would seem on the same grounds to pass to a woman of whom he has carnal
+                     knowledge, though she be not his wife. Hence the verse: "I may not marry my own child's godmother, nor the mother of my godchild:
+                     but I may marry the godmother of my wife's child."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that corporal and spiritual union differ generically we may conclude that the one is not the other, but not
+                     that the one cannot cause the other, since things of different genera sometimes cause one another either directly or indirectly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The godfather and godmother of the same person are not united in that person's spiritual birth save accidentally, since one
+                     of them would be self-sufficient for the purpose. Hence it does not follow from this that any spiritual relationship results
+                     between them whereby they are hindered from marrying one another. Hence the verse:
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p10"> "Of two co-parents one is always spiritual, the other carnal: this rule is infallible."</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p11"> On the other hand, marriage by itself makes husband and wife one flesh: wherefore the comparison fails.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the wife be not baptized, the spiritual relationship will not reach her, because she is not a fit subject, and not because
+                     spiritual relationship cannot pass from husband to wife through marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since no spiritual relationship results between godfather and godmother, nothing prevents husband and wife from raising together
+                     someone from the sacred font. Nor is it absurd that the wife become twice godmother of the same person from different causes,
+                     just as it is possible for her to be connected in carnal relationship both by affinity and consanguinity to the same person.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q56_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q57.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q56_A5-p0.1">Whether spiritual relationship passes to the godfather's carnal children?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass to the godfather's carnal children. For no degrees are assigned to
+                     spiritual relationship. Yet there would be degrees if it passed from father to son, since the person begotten involves a change
+                     of degree, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q56_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q55_A5.html">Q[55], A[5]</a>). Therefore it does not pass to the godfather's carnal sons.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, father and son are related in the same degree as brother and brother. If therefore spiritual relationship passes
+                     from father to son, it will equally pass from brother to brother: and this is false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> This is proved by authority quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A son is something of his father and not conversely (Ethic. viii, 12): wherefore spiritual relationship passes from father
+                     to his carnal son and not conversely. Thus it is clear that there are three spiritual relationships: one called spiritual
+                     fatherhood between godfather and godchild; another called co-paternity between the godparent and carnal parent of the same
+                     person; and the third is called spiritual brotherhood, between godchild and the carnal
+                     children of the same parent. Each of these hinders the contracting of marriage and voids the contract.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The addition of a person by carnal generation entails a degree with regard to a person connected by the same kind of relationship,
+                     but not with regard to one connected by another kind of relationship. Thus a son is connected with his father's wife in the
+                     same degree as his father, but by another kind of relationship. Now spiritual relationship differs in kind from carnal. Wherefore
+                     a godson is not related to his godfather's carnal son in the same
+                     degree as the latter's father is related to him, through whom the spiritual relationship is contracted. Consequently it does
+                     not follow that spiritual relationship admits of degrees.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man is not part of his brother as a son is of his father. But a wife is part of her husband, since she is made one with
+                     him in body. Consequently the relationship does not pass from brother to brother, whether the brother be born before or after
+                     spiritual brotherhood.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q57.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A11.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q57" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q57-p0.1">OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS BY ADOPTION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q57-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q57-p2"> We must now consider legal relationship which is by adoption. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q57-p3"> (1) What is adoption?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q57-p4"> (2) Whether one contracts through it a tie that is an impediment to marriage?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q57-p5"> (3) Between which persons is this tie contracted.</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q57_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q57.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q57_A1-p0.1">Whether adoption is rightly defined?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that adoption is not rightly defined: "Adoption is the act by which a person lawfully takes for his child or
+                     grandchild and so on one who does not belong to him." For the child should be subject to its father. Now, sometimes the person
+                     adopted does not come under the power of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not always the taking of someone as a child.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Parents should lay up for their children" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q57_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:14</a>). But the adoptive father does not always necessarily lay up for his adopted child, since sometimes the adopted does not
+                     inherit the goods of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not the taking of someone as a child.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, adoption, whereby someone is taken as a child, is likened to natural procreation whereby a child is begotten naturally.
+                     Therefore whoever is competent to beget a child naturally is competent to adopt. But this is untrue, since neither one who
+                     is not his own master, nor one who is not twenty-five years of age, nor a woman can adopt, and yet they can beget a child
+                     naturally. Therefore, properly speaking, adoption is not the taking of someone as a
+                     child.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, to take as one's child one who is not one's own seems necessary in order to supply the lack of children begotten
+                     naturally. Now one who is unable to beget, through being a eunuch or impotent, suffers especially from the absence of children
+                     of his own begetting. Therefore he is especially competent to adopt someone as his child. But he is not competent to adopt.
+                     Therefore adoption is not the taking of someone as one's child.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, in spiritual relationship, where someone is taken as a child without carnal procreation, it is of no consequence
+                     whether an older person become the father of a younger, or "vice versa," since a youth can baptize an old man and "vice versa."
+                     Therefore, if by adoption a person is taken as a child without being carnally begotten, it would make no difference whether
+                     an older person adopted a younger, or a younger an older person; which is not true.
+                     Therefore the same conclusion follows.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, there is no difference of degree between adopted and adopter. Therefore whoever is adopted, is adopted as a child;
+                     and consequently it is not right to say that one may be adopted as a grandchild.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, adoption is a result of love, wherefore God is said to have adopted us as children through charity. Now we should
+                     have greater charity towards those who are connected with us than towards strangers. Therefore adoption should be not of a
+                     stranger but of someone connected with us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Art imitates nature and supplies the defect of nature where nature is deficient. Hence just as a man begets by natural procreation,
+                     so by positive law which is the art of what is good and just, one person can take to himself another as a child in likeness
+                     to one that is his child by nature, in order to take the place of the children he has lost, this being the chief reason why
+                     adoption was introduced. And since taking implies a term "wherefrom," for which
+                     reason the taker is not the thing taken, it follows that the person taken as a child must be a stranger. Accordingly, just
+                     as natural procreation has a term "whereto," namely the form which is the end of generation, and a term "wherefrom," namely
+                     the contrary form, so legal generation has a term "whereto," namely a child or grandchild, and a term "wherefrom," namely,
+                     a stranger. Consequently the above definition includes the genus of adoption, for it is described as a "lawful taking," and
+                     the
+                     term "wherefrom," since it is said to be the taking of "a stranger," and the term "whereto," because it says, "as a child
+                     or grandchild ."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sonship of adoption is an imitation of natural sonship. Wherefore there are two species of adoption, one which imitates
+                     natural sonship perfectly, and this is called "arrogatio," whereby the person adopted is placed under the power of the adopter;
+                     and one who is thus adopted inherits from his adopted father if the latter die intestate, nor can his father legally deprive
+                     him of a fourth part of his inheritance. But no one can adopt in this way
+                     except one who is his own master, one namely who has no father or, if he has, is of age. There can be no adoption of this
+                     kind without the authority of the sovereign. The other kind of adoption imitates natural sonship imperfectly, and is called
+                     "simple adoption," and by this the adopted does not come under the power of the adopter: so that it is a disposition to perfect
+                     adoption, rather than perfect adoption itself. In this way even one who is not his own master can adopt, without the consent
+                     of the sovereign and with the authority of a magistrate: and one who is thus adopted does not inherit the estate of the adopter,
+                     nor is the latter bound to bequeath to him any of his goods in his will, unless he will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p11"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural procreation is directed to the production of the species; wherefore anyone in whom the specific nature is not hindered
+                     is competent to be able to beget naturally. But adoption is directed to hereditary succession, wherefore those alone are competent
+                     to adopt who have the power to dispose of their estate. Consequently one who is not his own master, or who is less than twenty-five
+                     years of age, or a woman, cannot adopt anyone, except by special
+                     permission of the sovereign.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An inheritance cannot pass to posterity through one who has a perpetual impediment from begetting: hence for this very reason
+                     it ought to pass to those who ought to succeed to him by right of relationship; and consequently he cannot adopt, as neither
+                     can he beget. Moreover greater is sorrow for children lost than for children one has never had. Wherefore those who are impeded
+                     from begetting need no solace for their lack of children as those who have
+                     had and have lost them, or could have had them but have them not by reason of some accidental impediment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Spiritual relationship is contracted through a sacrament whereby the faithful are born again in Christ, in Whom there is
+                     no difference between male and female, bondman and free, youth and old age (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q57_A1-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.28" target="asv">Gal. 3:28</a>;
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q57_A1-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Col.3.11" target="asv"> Col. 3:11</a>). Wherefore anyone can indifferently become another's godfather. But adoption aims at hereditary succession and a certain
+                     subjection of the adopted to the adopter: and it is not fitting that
+                     older persons should be subjected to younger in the care of the household. Consequently a younger person cannot adopt an older;
+                     but according to law the adopted person must be so much younger than the adopter, that he might have been the child of his
+                     natural begetting.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> One may lose one's grandchildren and so forth even as one may lose one's children. Wherefore since adoption was introduced
+                     as a solace for children lost, just as someone may be adopted in place of a child, so may someone be adopted in place of a
+                     grandchild and so on.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> A relative ought to succeed by right of relationship; and therefore such a person is not competent to be chosen to succeed
+                     by adoption. And if a relative, who is not competent to inherit the estate, be adopted, he is adopted not as a relative, but
+                     as a stranger lacking the right of succeeding to the adopter's goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p17"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p18"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q57.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q57_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q57_A2-p0.1">Whether a tie that is an impediment to marriage is contracted through adoption?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not contracted through adoption a tie that is an impediment to marriage. For spiritual care is
+                     more excellent than corporeal care. But no tie of relationship is contracted through one's being subjected to another's spiritual
+                     care: else all those who dwell in the parish would be related to the parish priest and would be unable to marry his son. Neither
+                     therefore can this result from adoption which places the adopted under the care of
+                     the adopter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no tie of relationship results from persons conferring a benefit on another. But adoption is nothing but the conferring
+                     of a benefit. Therefore no tie of relationship results from adoption.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a natural father provides for his child chiefly in three things, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11,12),
+                     namely by giving him being, nourishment and education; and hereditary succession is subsequent to these. Now no tie of relationship
+                     is contracted by one's providing for a person's nourishment and education, else a person would be related to his nourishers,
+                     tutors and masters, which is false. Therefore neither is any relationship contracted
+                     through adoption by which one inherits another's estate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the sacraments of the Church are not subject to human laws. Now marriage is a sacrament of the Church. Since then
+                     adoption was introduced by human law, it would seem that a tie contracted from adoption cannot be an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Relationship is an impediment to marriage. Now a kind of relationship results from adoption, namely legal relationship, as
+                     evidenced by its definition, for "legal relationship is a connection arising out of adoption." Therefore adoption results
+                     in a tie which is an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p7"> Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Divine law especially forbids marriage between those persons who have to live together lest, as Rabbi Moses observes
+                     (Doc. Perp. iii, 49), if it were lawful for them to have carnal intercourse, there should be more room for concupiscence to
+                     the repression of which marriage is directed. And since the adopted child dwells in the house of his adopted father like one
+                     that is begotten naturally human laws forbid the contracting of marriage between the like,
+                     and this prohibition is approved by the Church. Hence it is that legal adoption is an impediment to marriage. This suffices
+                     for the Replies to the first three Objections, because none of those things entails such a cohabitation as might be an incentive
+                     to concupiscence. Therefore they do not cause a relationship that is an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The prohibition of a human law would not suffice to make an impediment to marriage, unless the authority of the Church intervenes
+                     by issuing the same prohibition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q57_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q57_A3-p0.1">Whether legal relationship is contracted only between the adopting father and the adopted child?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a relationship of this kind is contracted only between the adopting father and the adopted child. For
+                     it would seem that it ought above all to be contracted between the adopting father and the natural mother of the adopted,
+                     as happens in spiritual relationship. Yet there is no legal relationship between them. Therefore it is not contracted between
+                     any other persons besides the adopter and adopted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relationship that impedes marriage is a perpetual impediment. But there is not a perpetual impediment between
+                     the adopted son and the naturally begotten daughter of the adopted; because when the adoption terminates at the death of the
+                     adopter, or when the adopted comes of age, the latter can marry her. Therefore he was not related to her in such a way as
+                     to prevent him from marrying her.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, spiritual relationship passes to no person incapable of being a god-parent; wherefore it does not pass to one who
+                     is not baptized. Now a woman cannot adopt, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore legal relationship does not pass from husband
+                     to wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, spiritual relationship is stronger than legal. But spiritual relationship does not pass to a grandchild. Neither,
+                     therefore, does legal relationship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Legal relationship is more in agreement with carnal union or procreation than spiritual relationship is. But spiritual relationship
+                     passes to another person. Therefore legal relationship does so also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p7"> Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Legal relationship is of three kinds. The first is in the descending order as it were, and is contracted between the adoptive
+                     father and the adopted child, the latter's child grandchild and so on; the second is between the adopted child and the naturally
+                     begotten child; the third is like a kind of affinity, and is between the adoptive father and the wife of the adopted son,
+                     or contrariwise between the adopted son and the wife of the adoptive father.
+                     Accordingly the first and third relationships are perpetual impediments to marriage: but the second is not, but only so long
+                     as the adopted person remains under the power of the adoptive father, wherefore when the father dies or when the child comes
+                     of age, they can be married.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By spiritual generation the son is not withdrawn from the father's power, as in the case of adoption, so that the godson
+                     remains the son of both at the same time, whereas the adopted son does not. Hence no relationship is contracted between the
+                     adoptive father and the natural mother or father, as was the case in spiritual relationship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Legal relationship is an impediment to marriage on account of the parties dwelling together: hence when the need for dwelling
+                     together ceases, it is not unreasonable that the aforesaid tie cease, for instance when he ceases to be under the power of
+                     the same father. But the adoptive father and his wife always retain a certain authority over their adopted son and his wife,
+                     wherefore the tie between them remains.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even a woman can adopt by permission of the sovereign, wherefore legal relationship passes also to her. Moreover the reason
+                     why spiritual relationship does not pass to a non-baptized person is not because such a person cannot be a god-parent but
+                     because he is not a fit subject of spirituality.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> By spiritual relationship the son is not placed under the power and care of the godfather, as in legal relationship: because
+                     it is necessary that whatever is in the son's power pass under the power of the adoptive father. Wherefore if a father be
+                     adopted the children and grandchildren who are in the power of the person adopted are adopted also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q58" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q58-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF IMPOTENCE, SPELL, FRENZY OR MADNESS, INCEST AND DEFECTIVE AGE (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q58-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q58-p2"> We must now consider five impediments to marriage, namely the impediments of impotence, spell, frenzy or madness, incest,
+                  and defective age. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q58-p3"> (1) Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q58-p4"> (2) Whether a spell is?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q58-p5"> (3) Whether frenzy or madness is?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q58-p6"> (4) Whether incest is?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q58-p7"> (5) Whether defective age is?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q58_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q58_A1-p0.1">Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that impotence is not an impediment to marriage. For carnal copulation is not essential to marriage, since
+                     marriage is more perfect when both parties observe continency by vow. But impotence deprives marriage of nothing save carnal
+                     copulation. Therefore it is not a diriment impediment to the marriage contract.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as impotence prevents carnal copulation so does frigidity. But frigidity is not reckoned an impediment to marriage.
+                     Therefore neither should impotence be reckoned as such.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all old people are frigid. Yet old people can marry. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the woman knows the man to be frigid when she marries him, the marriage is valid. Therefore frigidity, considered
+                     in itself, is not an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, calidity may prove a sufficient incentive to carnal copulation with one who is not a virgin, but not with one who
+                     is, because it happens to be so weak as to pass away quickly, and is therefore insufficient for the deflowering of a virgin.
+                     Or again it may move a man sufficiently in regard to a beautiful woman, but insufficiently in regard to an uncomely one. Therefore
+                     it would seem that frigidity, although it be an impediment in regard to one, is not
+                     an impediment absolutely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, generally speaking woman is more frigid than man. But women are not debarred from marriage. Neither therefore should
+                     men be debarred on account of frigidity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p8">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated (Extra, De Frigidis et Malefic., cap. Quod Sedem): "Just as a boy who is incapable of marital intercourse is
+                     unfit to marry, so also those who are impotent are deemed most unfit for the marriage contract." Now persons affected with
+                     frigidity are the like. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p9"> Further, no one can bind himself to the impossible. Now in marriage man binds himself to carnal copulation; because it is
+                     for this purpose that he gives the other party power over his body. Therefore a frigid person, being incapable of carnal copulation,
+                     cannot marry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p10">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In marriage there is a contract whereby one is bound to pay the other the marital debt: wherefore just as in other contracts,
+                     the bond is unfitting if a person bind himself to what he cannot give or do, so the marriage contract is unfitting, if it
+                     be made by one who cannot pay the marital debt. This impediment is called by the general name of impotence as regards coition,
+                     and can arise either from an intrinsic and natural cause, or from an extrinsic and
+                     accidental cause, for instance spell, of which we shall speak later 
+                     <a id="XP_Q58_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q58_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. If it be due to a natural cause, this may happen in two ways. For either it is temporary, and can be remedied by medicine,
+                     or by the course of time, and then it does not void a marriage: or it is perpetual and then it voids marriage, so that the
+                     party who labors under this impediment remains for ever without hope of marriage, while the other may "marry to whom she will
+                     . . . in the Lord"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q58_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.39" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:39</a>). In order to ascertain whether the impediment be perpetual or not, the Church has appointed a fixed time, namely three years,
+                     for putting the matter to a practical proof: and if after three years, during which both parties have honestly endeavored
+                     to fulfil their marital intercourse, the marriage remain unconsummated, the Church adjudges the marriage to be dissolved.
+                     And yet the Church is sometimes mistaken in this, because three years are sometimes
+                     insufficient to prove impotence to be perpetual. Wherefore if the Church find that she has been mistaken, seeing that the
+                     subject of the impediment has completed carnal copulation with another or with the same person, she reinstates the former
+                     marriage and dissolves the subsequent one, although the latter has been contracted with her permission. [*"Nowadays it is
+                     seldom necessary to examine too closely into this matter, as all cases arising from it are treated as far as possible under
+                     the form
+                     of dispensations of non-consummated marriages." Cf. Catholic Encyclopedia, article Canonical Impediments.]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the act of carnal copulation is not essential to marriage, ability to fulfill the act is essential, because marriage
+                     gives each of the married parties power over the other's body in relation to marital intercourse.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Excessive calidity can scarcely be a perpetual impediment. If, however, it were to prove an impediment to marital intercourse
+                     for three years it would be adjudged to be perpetual. Nevertheless, since frigidity is a greater and more frequent impediment
+                     (for it not only hinders the mingling of seeds but also weakens the members which co-operate in the union of bodies), it is
+                     accounted an impediment rather than calidity, since all natural defects are
+                     reduced to frigidity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although old people have not sufficient calidity to procreate, they have sufficient to copulate. Wherefore they are allowed
+                     to marry, in so far as marriage is intended as a remedy, although it does not befit them as fulfilling an office of nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In all contracts it is agreed on all hands that anyone who is unable to satisfy an obligation is unfit to make a contract
+                     which requires the fulfilling of that obligation. Now this inability is of two kinds. First, because a person is unable to
+                     fulfill the obligation "de jure," and such inability renders the contract altogether void, whether the party with whom he
+                     contracts knows of this or not. Secondly, because he is unable to fulfill "de facto";
+                     and then if the party with whom he contracts knows of this and, notwithstanding, enters the contract, this shows that the
+                     latter seeks some other end from the contract, and the contract stands. But if he does not know of it the contract is void.
+                     Consequently frigidity which causes such an impotence that a man cannot "de facto" pay the marriage debt, as also the condition
+                     of slavery, whereby a man cannot "de facto" give his service freely, are impediments to marriage, when the one married party
+                     does not know that the other is unable to pay the marriage debt. But an impediment whereby a person cannot pay the marriage
+                     debt "de jure," for instance consanguinity, voids the marriage contract, whether the other party knows of it or not. For this
+                     reason the Master holds (Sent. iv, D, 34) that these two impediments, frigidity and slavery, make it not altogether unlawful
+                     for their subjects to marry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A man cannot have a perpetual natural impediment in regard to one person and not in regard to another. But if he cannot fulfill
+                     the carnal act with a virgin, while he can with one who is not a virgin, the hymeneal membrane may be broken by a medical
+                     instrument, and thus he may have connection with her. Nor would this be contrary to nature, for it would be done not for pleasure
+                     but for a remedy. Dislike for a woman is not a natural cause, but an
+                     accidental extrinsic cause: and therefore we must form the same judgment in its regard as about spells, of which we shall
+                     speak further on 
+                     <a id="XP_Q58_A1-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q58_A2.html">(A[2])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The male is the agent in procreation, and the female is the patient, wherefore greater calidity is required in the male than
+                     in the female for the act of procreation. Hence the frigidity which renders the man impotent would not disable the woman.
+                     Yet there may be a natural impediment from another cause, namely stricture, and then we must judge of stricture in the woman
+                     in the same way as of frigidity in the man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p17"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p18"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q58_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q58_A2-p0.1">Whether a spell can be an impediment to marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a spell cannot be an impediment to marriage. For the spells in question are caused by the operation of
+                     demons. But the demons have no more power to prevent the marriage act than other bodily actions; and these they cannot prevent,
+                     for thus they would upset the whole world if they hindered eating and walking and the like. Therefore they cannot hinder marriage
+                     by spells.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God's work is stronger than the devil's. But a spell is the work of the devil. Therefore it cannot hinder marriage
+                     which is the work of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no impediment, unless it be perpetual, voids the marriage contract. But a spell cannot be a perpetual impediment,
+                     for since the devil has no power over others than sinners, the spell will be removed if the sin be cast out, or by another
+                     spell, or by the exorcisms of the Church which are employed for the repression of the demon's power. Therefore a spell cannot
+                     be an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, carnal copulation cannot be hindered, unless there be an impediment to the generative power which is its principle.
+                     But the generative power of one man is equally related to all women. Therefore a spell cannot be an impediment in respect
+                     of one woman without being so also in respect of all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in the Decretals (XXXIII, qu. 1, cap. iv): "If by sorcerers or witches . . . ," and further on, "if they be
+                     incurable, they must be separated."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p7"> Further, the demons' power is greater than man's: "There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him who was made
+                     to fear no one" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q58_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.41.24" target="asv">Job 41:24</a>). Now through the action of man, a person may be rendered incapable of carnal copulation by some power or by castration;
+                     and this is an impediment to marriage. Therefore much more can this be done by the power of a demon.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some have asserted that witchcraft is nothing in the world but an imagining of men who ascribed to spells those natural effects
+                     the causes of which are hidden. But this is contrary to the authority of holy men who state that the demons have power over
+                     men's bodies and imaginations, when God allows them: wherefore by their means wizards can work certain signs. Now this opinion
+                     grows from the root of unbelief or incredulity, because they do not believe that
+                     demons exist save only in the imagination of the common people, who ascribe to the demon the terrors which a man conjures
+                     from his thoughts, and because, owing to a vivid imagination, certain shapes such as he has in his thoughts become apparent
+                     to the senses, and then he believes that he sees the demons. But such assertions are rejected by the true faith whereby we
+                     believe that angels fell from heaven, and that the demons exist, and that by reason of their subtle nature they are able to
+                     do
+                     many things which we cannot; and those who induce them to do such things are called wizards.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p9"> Wherefore others have maintained that witchcraft can set up an impediment to carnal copulation, but that no such impediment
+                     is perpetual: hence it does not void the marriage contract, and they say that the laws asserting this have been revoked. But
+                     this is contrary to actual facts and to the new legislation which agrees with the old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p10"> We must therefore draw a distinction: for the inability to copulate caused by witchcraft is either perpetual and then it
+                     voids marriage, or it is not perpetual and then it does not void marriage. And in order to put this to practical proof the
+                     Church has fixed the space of three years in the same way as we have stated with regard to frigidity 
+                     <a id="XP_Q58_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q58_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. There is, however this difference between a spell and frigidity, that a person who is impotent through
+                     frigidity is equally impotent in relation to one as to another, and consequently when the marriage is dissolved, he is not
+                     permitted to marry another woman. whereas through witchcraft a man may be rendered impotent in relation to one woman and not
+                     to another, and consequently when the Church adjudges the marriage to be dissolved, each party is permitted to seek another
+                     partner in marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first corruption of sin whereby man became the slave of the devil was transmitted to us by the act of the generative
+                     power, and for this reason God allows the devil to exercise his power of witchcraft in this act more than in others. Even
+                     so the power of witchcraft is made manifest in serpents more than in other animals according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q58_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3" target="asv">Gn. 3</a>, since the devil tempted the woman through a serpent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's work may be hindered by the devil's work with God's permission; not that the devil is stronger than God so as to destroy
+                     His works by violence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some spells are so perpetual that they can have no human remedy, although God might afford a remedy by coercing the demon,
+                     or the demon by desisting. For, as wizards themselves admit, it does not always follow that what was done by one kind of witchcraft
+                     can be destroyed by another kind, and even though it were possible to use witchcraft as a remedy, it would nevertheless be
+                     reckoned to be perpetual, since nowise ought one to invoke the demon's help
+                     by witchcraft. Again, if the devil has been given power over a person on account of sin, it does not follow that his power
+                     ceases with the sin, because the punishment sometimes continues after the fault has been removed. And again, the exorcisms
+                     of the Church do not always avail to repress the demons in all their molestations of the body, if God will it so, but they
+                     always avail against those assaults of the demons against which they are chiefly instituted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Witchcraft sometimes causes an impediment in relation to all, sometimes in relation to one only: because the devil is a voluntary
+                     cause not acting from natural necessity. Moreover, the impediment resulting from witchcraft may result from an impression
+                     made by the demon on a man's imagination, whereby he is deprived of the concupiscence that moves him in regard to a particular
+                     woman and not to another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q58_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q58_A3-p0.1">Whether madness is an impediment to marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that madness is not an impediment to marriage. For spiritual marriage which is contracted in Baptism is more
+                     excellent than carnal marriage. But mad persons can be baptized. Therefore they can also marry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, frigidity is an impediment to marriage because it impedes carnal copulation, which is not impeded by madness. Therefore
+                     neither is marriage impeded thereby.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, marriage is not voided save by a perpetual impediment. But one cannot tell whether madness is a perpetual impediment.
+                     Therefore it does not void marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the impediments that hinder marriage are sufficiently contained in the verses given above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q58_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q50.html">Q[50])</a>. But they contain no mention of madness. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Madness removes the use of reason more than error does. But error is an impediment to marriage. Therefore madness is also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p7"> Further, mad persons are not fit for making contracts. But marriage is a contract. Therefore, etc.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The madness is either previous or subsequent to marriage. If subsequent, it nowise voids the marriage, but if it be previous,
+                     then the mad person either has lucid intervals, or not. If he has, then although it is not safe for him to marry during that
+                     interval, since he would not know how to educate his children, yet if he marries, the marriage is valid. But if he has no
+                     lucid intervals, or marries outside a lucid interval, then, since there can be no consent
+                     without use of reason, the marriage will be invalid.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The use of reason is not necessary for Baptism as its cause, in which way it is necessary for matrimony. Hence the comparison
+                     fails. We have, however, spoken of the Baptism of mad persons (
+                     <a id="XP_Q58_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q68_A12.html">TP, Q[68], A[12]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Madness impedes marriage on the part of the latter's cause which is the consent, although not on the part of the act as frigidity
+                     does. Yet the Master treats of it together with frigidity, because both are defects of nature (Sent. iv, D, 34).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A passing impediment which hinders the cause of marriage, namely the consent, voids marriage altogether. But an impediment
+                     that hinders the act must needs be perpetual in order to void the marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This impediment is reducible to error, since in either case there is lack of consent on the part of the reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q58_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q58_A4-p0.1">Whether marriage is annulled by the husband committing incest with his wife's sister?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that marriage is not annulled by the husband committing incest with his wife's sister. For the wife should
+                     not be punished for her husband's sin. Yet she would be punished if the marriage were annulled. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is a greater sin to know one's own relative, than to know the relative of one's wife. But the former sin is not
+                     an impediment to marriage. Therefore neither is the second.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if this is inflicted as a punishment of the sin, it would seem, if the incestuous husband marry even after his wife's
+                     death, that they ought to be separated: which is not true.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, this impediment is not mentioned among those enumerated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q58_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q50.html">Q[50])</a>. Therefore it does not void the marriage contract.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> By knowing his wife's sister he contracts affinity, with his wife. But affinity voids the marriage contract. Therefore the
+                     aforesaid incest does also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p7"> Further, by whatsoever a man sinneth, by the same also is he punished. Now such a man sins against marriage. Therefore he
+                     ought to be punished by being deprived of marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> If a man has connection with the sister or other relative of his wife before contracting marriage, even after his betrothal,
+                     the marriage should be broken off on account of the resultant affinity. If, however, the connection take place after the marriage
+                     has been contracted and consummated, the marriage must not be altogether dissolved: but the husband loses his right to marital
+                     intercourse, nor can he demand it without sin. And yet he must grant it if
+                     asked, because the wife should not be punished for her husband's sin. But after the death of his wife he ought to remain without
+                     any hope of marriage, unless he receive a dispensation on account of his frailty, through fear of unlawful intercourse. If,
+                     however, he marry without a dispensation, he sins by contravening the law of the Church, but his marriage is not for this
+                     reason to be annulled. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, for incest is accounted an impediment to marriage
+                     not so much for its being a sin as on account of the affinity which it causes. For this reason it is not mentioned with the
+                     other impediments, but is included in the impediment of affinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q58_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q58_A5-p0.1">Whether defective age is an impediment to marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that deficient age is not an impediment to marriage. For according to the laws children are under the care
+                     of a guardian until their twenty-fifth year. Therefore it would seem that before that age their reason is not sufficiently
+                     mature to give consent, and consequently that ought seemingly to be the age fixed for marrying. Yet marriage can be contracted
+                     before that age. Therefore lack of the appointed age is not an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the tie of religion is perpetual so is the marriage tie. Now according to the new legislation (cap. Non
+                     Solum, De regular. et transeunt.) no one can be professed before the fourteenth year of age. Therefore neither could a person
+                     marry if defective age were an impediment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as consent is necessary for marriage on the part of the man, so is it on the part of the woman. Now a woman
+                     can marry before the age of fourteen. Therefore a man can also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, inability to copulate, unless it be perpetual and not known, is not an impediment to marriage. But lack of age is
+                     neither perpetual nor unknown. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is not included under any of the aforesaid impediments (
+                     <a id="XP_Q58_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q50.html">Q[50])</a>, and consequently would seem not to be an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A Decretal (cap. Quod Sedem, De frigid et malefic.) says that "a boy who is incapable of marriage intercourse is unfit to
+                     marry." But in the majority of cases he cannot pay the marriage debt before the age of fourteen (De Animal. vii). Therefore,
+                     etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p8"> Further, "There is a fixed limit of size and growth for all things in nature" according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
+                     4): and consequently it would seem that, since marriage is natural, it must have a fixed age by defect of which it is impeded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since marriage is effected by way of a contract, it comes under the ordinance of positive law like other contracts. Consequently
+                     according to law (cap. Tua, De sponsal. impub.) it is determined that marriage may not be contracted before the age of discretion
+                     when each party is capable of sufficient deliberation about marriage, and of mutual fulfilment of the marriage debt, and that
+                     marriages otherwise contracted are void. Now for the most part this age is
+                     the fourteenth year in males and the twelfth year in women: but since the ordinances of positive law are consequent upon what
+                     happens in the majority of cases, if anyone reach the required perfection before the aforesaid age, so that nature and reason
+                     are sufficiently developed to supply the lack of age, the marriage is not annulled. Wherefore if the parties who marry before
+                     the age of puberty have marital intercourse before the aforesaid age, their marriage is none the less perpetually
+                     indissoluble.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In matters to which nature inclines there is not required such a development of reason in order to deliberate, as in other
+                     matters: and therefore it is possible after deliberation to consent to marriage before one is able to manage one's own affairs
+                     in other matters without a guardian.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same answer applies, since the religious vow is about matters outside the inclination of nature, and which offer greater
+                     difficulty than marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is said that woman comes to the age of puberty sooner than man does (De Animal. ix); hence there is no parallel between
+                     the two.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In this case there is an impediment not only as to inability to copulate, but also on account of the defect of the reason,
+                     which is not yet qualified to give rightly that consent which is to endure in perpetuity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The impediment arising from defective age, like that which arises from madness, is reducible to the impediment of error;
+                     because a man has not yet the full use of his free-will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q59" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q59-p0.1">OF DISPARITY OF WORSHIP AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q59-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q59-p2"> We must now consider disparity of worship as an impediment to marriage. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q59-p3"> (1) Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q59-p4"> (2) Whether there is marriage between unbelievers?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q59-p5"> (3) Whether a husband being converted to the faith can remain with his wife if she be unwilling to be converted?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q59-p6"> (4) Whether he may leave his unbelieving wife?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q59-p7"> (5) Whether after putting her away he may take another wife?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q59-p8"> (6) Whether a husband may put aside his wife on account of other sins as he may for unbelief?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q59_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q59_A1-p0.1">Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a believer can marry an unbeliever. For Joseph married an Egyptian woman, and Esther married Assuerus:
+                     and in both marriages there was disparity of worship, since one was an unbeliever and the other a believer. Therefore disparity
+                     of worship previous to marriage is not an impediment thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Old Law teaches the same faith as the New. But according to the Old Law there could be marriage between a believer
+                     and an unbeliever, as evidenced by
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.10" target="asv"> Dt. 21:10 </a>seqq.: "If thou go out to the fight . . . and seest in the number of the captives a beautiful woman and lovest her, and wilt
+                     have her to wife . . . thou shalt go in unto her, and shalt sleep with her, and she shall be thy wife." Therefore it is lawful
+                     also under the New
+                     Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, betrothal is directed to marriage. Now there can be a betrothal between a believer and an unbeliever in the case
+                     where a condition is made of the latter's future conversion. Therefore under the same condition there can be marriage between
+                     them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every impediment to marriage is in some way contrary to marriage. But unbelief is not contrary to marriage, since
+                     marriage fulfills an office of nature whose dictate faith surpasses. Therefore disparity of worship is not an impediment to
+                     marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, there is sometime disparity of worship even between two persons who are baptized, for instance when, after Baptism,
+                     a person falls into heresy. Yet if such a person marry a believer, it is nevertheless a valid marriage. Therefore disparity
+                     of worship is not an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:14</a>): "What concord hath light with darkness? [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ
+                     with Belial?']" Now there is the greatest concord between husband and wife. Therefore one who is in the light of faith cannot
+                     marry one who is in the darkness of unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p8"> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.2.11" target="asv">Malachi 2:11</a>): "Juda hath profaned the holiness of the Lord, which he loved, and hath married the daughter of a strange god." But such
+                     had not been the case if they could have married validly. Therefore disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The chief good of marriage is the offspring to be brought up to the worship of God. Now since education is the work of father
+                     and mother in common, each of them intends to bring up the child to the worship of God according to their own faith. Consequently
+                     if they be of different faith, the intention of the one will be contrary to the intention of the other, and therefore there
+                     cannot be a fitting marriage between them. For this reason disparity of faith
+                     previous to marriage is an impediment to the marriage contract.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the Old Law it was allowable to marry with certain unbelievers, and forbidden with others. It was however especially forbidden
+                     with regard to inhabitants of the land of Canaan, both because the Lord had commanded them to be slain on account of their
+                     obstinacy, and because it was fraught with a greater danger, lest to wit they should pervert to idolatry those whom they married
+                     or their children, since the Israelites were more liable to adopt their
+                     rites and customs through dwelling among them. But it was permitted in regard to other unbelievers, especially when there
+                     could be no fear of their being drawn into idolatry. And thus Joseph, Moses, and Esther married unbelievers. But under the
+                     New Law which is spread throughout the whole world the prohibition extends with equal reason to all unbelievers. Hence disparity
+                     of worship previous to marriage is an impediment to its being contracted and voids the contract.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This law either refers to other nations with whom they could lawfully marry, or to the case when the captive woman was willing
+                     to be converted to the faith and worship of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Present is related to present in the same way as future to future. Wherefore just as when marriage is contracted in the present,
+                     unity of worship is required in both contracting parties, so in the case of a betrothal, which is a promise of future marriage,
+                     it suffices to add the condition of future unity of worship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It has been made clear that disparity of worship is contrary to marriage in respect of its chief good, which is the good
+                     of the offspring.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Matrimony is a sacrament: and therefore so far as the sacramental essentials are concerned, it requires purity with regard
+                     to the sacrament of faith, namely Baptism, rather than with regard to interior faith. For which reason also this impediment
+                     is not called disparity of faith, but disparity of worship which concerns outward service, as stated above (Sent. iii, D,
+                     9
+                     <a id="XP_Q59_A1-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q1_A1.html">, Q[1], A[1]</a>, qu. 1). Consequently if a believer marry a
+                     baptized heretic, the marriage is valid, although he sins by marrying her if he knows her to be a heretic: even so he would
+                     sin were he to marry an excommunicate woman, and yet the marriage would not be void: whereas on the other hand if a catechumen
+                     having right faith but not having been baptized were to marry a baptized believer, the marriage would not be valid.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q59_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q59_A2-p0.1">Whether there can be marriage between unbelievers?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be no marriage between unbelievers. For matrimony is a sacrament of the Church. Now Baptism
+                     is the door of the sacraments. Therefore unbelievers, since they are not baptized, cannot marry any more than they can receive
+                     other sacraments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, two evils are a greater impediment to good than one. But the unbelief of only one party is an impediment to marriage.
+                     Much more, therefore, is the unbelief of both, and consequently there can be no marriage between unbelievers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as there is disparity of worship between believer and unbeliever, so can there be between two unbelievers,
+                     for instance if one be a heathen and the other a Jew. Now disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="XP_Q59_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore there can be no valid marriage at least between unbelievers of different worship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in marriage there is real chastity. But according to Augustine (De Adult. Conjug. i, 18) there is no real chastity
+                     between an unbeliever and his wife, and these words are quoted in the Decretals (XXVIII, qu. i, can. Sic enim.). Neither therefore
+                     is there a true marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, true marriage excuses carnal intercourse from sin. But marriage contracted between unbelievers cannot do this, since
+                     "the whole life of unbelievers is a sin," as a gloss observes on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv"> Rom. 14:23, </a> "All that is not of faith is sin." Therefore there is no true marriage between unbelievers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:12</a>): "If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she consent to dwell with him, let him not put her away." But she is
+                     not called his wife except by reason of marriage. Therefore marriage between unbelievers is a true marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p8"> Further, the removal of what comes after does not imply the removal of what comes first. Now marriage belongs to an office
+                     of nature, which precedes the state of grace, the principle of which is faith. Therefore unbelief does not prevent the existence
+                     of marriage between unbelievers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Marriage was instituted chiefly for the good of the offspring, not only as to its begetting---since this can be effected
+                     even without marriage---but also as to its advancement to a perfect state, because everything intends naturally to bring its
+                     effect to perfection. Now a twofold perfection is to be considered in the offspring. one is the perfection of nature, not
+                     only as regards the body but also as regards the soul, by those means which are of the natural
+                     law. The other is the perfection of grace: and the former perfection is material and imperfect in relation to the latter.
+                     Consequently, since those things which are for the sake of the end are proportionate to the end, the marriage that tends to
+                     the first perfection is imperfect and material in comparison with that which tends to the second perfection. And since the
+                     first perfection can be common to unbelievers and believers, while the second belongs only to believers, it follows that between
+                     unbelievers there is marriage indeed, but not perfected by its ultimate perfection as there is between believers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Marriage was instituted not only as a sacrament, but also as an office of nature. And therefore, although marriage is not
+                     competent to unbelievers, as a sacrament dependent on the dispensation of the Church's ministers, it is nevertheless competent
+                     to them as fulfilling an office of nature. And yet even a marriage of this kind is a sacrament after the manner of a habit,
+                     although it is not actually since they do not marry actually in the faith of the
+                     Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage, not by reason of unbelief, but on account of the difference of faith.
+                     For disparity of worship hinders not only the second perfection of the offspring, but also the first, since the parents endeavor
+                     to draw their children in different directions, which is not the case when both are unbelievers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As already stated (ad 1) there is marriage between unbelievers, in so far as marriage fulfills an office of nature. Now those
+                     things that pertain to the natural law are determinable by positive law: and therefore if any law among unbelievers forbid
+                     the contracting of marriage with unbelievers of a different rite, the disparity of worship will be an impediment to their
+                     intermarrying. They are not, however, forbidden by Divine law, because before God,
+                     however much one may stray from the faith, this makes no difference to one's being removed from grace: nor is it forbidden
+                     by any law of the Church who has not to judge of those who are without.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The chastity and other virtues of unbelievers are said not to be real, because they cannot attain the end of real virtue,
+                     which is real happiness. Thus we say it is not a real wine if it has not the effect of wine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> An unbeliever does not sin in having intercourse with his wife, if he pays her the marriage debt, for the good of the offspring,
+                     or for the troth whereby he is bound to her: since this is an act of justice and of temperance which observes the due circumstance
+                     in pleasure of touch; even as neither does he sin in performing acts of other civic virtues. Again, the reason why the whole
+                     life of unbelievers is said to be a sin is not that they sin in every
+                     act, but because they cannot be delivered from the bondage of sin by that which they do.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q59_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q59_A3-p0.1">Whether the husband, being converted to the faith, may remain with his wife is she be unwilling to be converted?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that when a husband is converted to the faith he cannot remain with his wife who is an unbeliever and is unwilling
+                     to be converted, and whom he had married while he was yet an unbeliever. For where the danger is the same one should take
+                     the same precautions. Now a believer is forbidden to marry an unbeliever for fear of being turned away from the faith. Since
+                     then if the believer remain with the unbeliever whom he had married previously, the
+                     danger is the same, in fact greater, for neophytes are more easily perverted than those who have been brought up in the faith,
+                     it would seem that a believer, after being converted, cannot remain with an unbeliever.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "An unbeliever cannot remain united to her who has been received into the Christian faith" (Decretals, XXVIII, qu.
+                     1, can. Judaei). Therefore a believer is bound to put away a wife who does not believe.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a marriage contracted between believers is more perfect than one contracted between unbelievers. Now, if believers
+                     marry within the degrees forbidden by the Church, their marriage is void. Therefore the same applies to unbelievers, and thus
+                     a believing husband cannot remain with an unbelieving wife, at any rate, if as an unbeliever he married her within the forbidden
+                     degrees.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sometimes an unbeliever has several wives recognized by his law. If, then, he can remain with those whom he married
+                     while yet an unbeliever, it would seem that even after his conversion he can retain several wives.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it may happen that after divorcing his first wife he has married a second, and that he is converted during this
+                     latter marriage. It would seem therefore that at least in this case he cannot remain with this second wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle counsels him to remain (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:12</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p8"> Further, no impediment that supervenes upon a true marriage dissolves it. Now it was a true marriage when they were both
+                     unbelievers. Therefore when one of them is converted, the marriage is not annulled on that account; and thus it would seem
+                     that they may lawfully remain together.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The faith of a married person does not dissolve but perfects the marriage. Wherefore, since there is true marriage between
+                     unbelievers, as stated above (A[2], ad 1), the marriage tie is not broken by the fact that one of them is converted to the
+                     faith, but sometimes while the marriage tie remains, the marriage is dissolved as to cohabitation and marital intercourse,
+                     wherein unbelief and adultery are on a par, since both are against the good of the offspring.
+                     Consequently, the husband has the same power to put away an unbelieving wife or to remain with her, as he has to put away
+                     an adulterous wife or to remain with her. For an innocent husband is free to remain with an adulterous wife in the hope of
+                     her amendment, but not if she be obstinate in her sin of adultery, lest he seem to approve of her disgrace; although even
+                     if there be hope of her amendment he is free to put her away. In like manner the believer after his conversion may remain
+                     with the
+                     unbeliever in the hope of her conversion, if he see that she is not obstinate in her unbelief, and he does well in remaining
+                     with her, though not bound to do so: and this is what the Apostle counsels (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:12</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is easier to prevent a thing being done than to undo what is rightly done. Hence there are many things that impede the
+                     contracting of marriage if they precede it, which nevertheless cannot dissolve it if they follow it. Such is the case with
+                     affinity (
+                     <a id="XP_Q59_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q55_A6.html">Q[55], A[6]</a>): and it is the same with disparity of worship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the early Church at the time of the apostles, both Jews and Gentiles were everywhere converted to the faith: and consequently
+                     the believing husband could then have a reasonable hope for his wife's conversion, even though she did not promise to be converted.
+                     Afterwards, however, as time went on the Jews became more obstinate than the Gentiles, because the Gentiles still continued
+                     to come to the faith, for instance, at the time of the martyrs, and at
+                     the time of Constantine and thereabouts. Wherefore it was not safe then for a believer to cohabit with an unbelieving Jewish
+                     wife, nor was there hope for her conversion as for that of a Gentile wife. Consequently, then, the believer could, after his
+                     conversion, cohabit with his wife if she were a Gentile, but not if she were a Jewess, unless she promised to be converted.
+                     This is the sense of that decree. Now, however, they are on a par, namely Gentiles and Jews, because both are obstinate; and
+                     therefore unless the unbelieving wife be willing to be converted, he is not allowed to cohabit with her, be she Gentile or
+                     Jew.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Non-baptized unbelievers are not bound by the laws of the Church, but they are bound by the ordinances of the Divine law.
+                     Hence unbelievers who have married within the degrees forbidden by the Divine law, whether both or one of them be converted
+                     to the faith, cannot continue in a like marriage. But if they have married within the degrees forbidden by a commandment of
+                     the Church, they can remain together if both be converted, or if one be converted and
+                     there be hope of the other's conversion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To have several wives is contrary to the natural law by which even unbelievers are bound. Wherefore an unbeliever is not
+                     truly married save to her whom he married first. Consequently if he be converted with all his wives, he may remain with the
+                     first, and must put the others away. If, however, the first refuse to be converted, and one of the others be converted, he
+                     has the same right to marry her again as he would have to marry another. We shall treat
+                     of this matter further on 
+                     <a id="XP_Q59_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A5.html">(A[5])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> To divorce a wife is contrary to the law of nature, wherefore it is not lawful for an unbeliever to divorce his wife. Hence
+                     if he be converted after divorcing one and marrying another, the same judgment is to be pronounced in this case as in the
+                     case of a man who had several wives, because if he wish to be converted he is bound to take the first whom he had divorced
+                     and to put the other away.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q59_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q59_A4-p0.1">Whether a believer can, after his conversion, put away his unbelieving wife if she be willing to cohabit with him without
+                     insult to the Creator?
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a believer, after his conversion, cannot put away his unbelieving wife if she be willing to cohabit with
+                     him without insult to the Creator. For the husband is more bound to his wife than a slave to his master. But a converted slave
+                     is not freed from the bond of slavery, as appears from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.21" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:21</a>; 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.1" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:1.</a> Therefore neither can a believing husband put away his unbelieving wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one may act to another's prejudice without the latter's consent. Now the unbelieving wife had a right in the
+                     body of her unbelieving husband. If, then, her husband's conversion to the faith could be prejudicial to the wife, so that
+                     he would be free to put her away, the husband could not be converted to the faith without his wife's consent, even as he cannot
+                     receive orders or vow continence without her consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a man, whether slave or free, knowingly marry a bondwoman, he cannot put her away on account of her different
+                     condition. Since, then, the husband, when he married an unbeliever, knew that she was an unbeliever, it would seem that in
+                     like manner he cannot put her away on account of her unbelief.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a father is in duty bound to work for the salvation of his children. But if he were to leave his unbelieving wife,
+                     the children of their union would remain with the mother, because "the offspring follows the womb," and thus their salvation
+                     would be imperiled. Therefore he cannot lawfully put away his unbelieving wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, an adulterous husband cannot put away an adulterous wife, even after he has done penance for his adultery. Therefore
+                     if an adulterous and an unbelieving husband are to be judged alike, neither can the believer put aside the unbeliever, even
+                     after his conversion to the faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> are the words of the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:15,16</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p8"> Further, spiritual adultery is more grievous than carnal. But a man can put his wife away, as to cohabitation, on account
+                     of carnal adultery. Much more, therefore, can he do so on account of unbelief, which is spiritual adultery.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Different things are competent and expedient to man according as his life is of one kind or of another. Wherefore he who
+                     dies to his former life is not bound to those things to which he was bound in his former life. Hence it is that he who vowed
+                     certain things while living in the world is not bound to fulfill them when he dies to the world by adopting the religious
+                     life. Now he who is baptized is regenerated in Christ and dies to his former life, since the
+                     generation of one thing is the corruption of another, and consequently he is freed from the obligation whereby he was bound
+                     to pay his wife the marriage debt, and is not bound to cohabit with her when she is unwilling to be converted, although in
+                     a certain case he is free to do so, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q59_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, just as a religious is free to fulfill the vows he took in the world, if they be not contrary to his religious profession,
+                     although he is not bound to do so.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Bondage is not inconsistent with the perfection of the Christian religion, which makes a very special profession of humility.
+                     But the obligation to a wife, or the conjugal bond, is somewhat derogatory to the perfection of Christian life, the highest
+                     state of which is in the possession of the continent: hence the comparison fails. Moreover one married party is not bound
+                     to the other as the latter's possession, as a slave to his master, but by way of a
+                     kind of partnership, which is unfitting between unbeliever and believer as appears from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.15" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:15</a>; hence there is no comparison between a slave and a married person.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The wife had a right in the body of her husband only as long as he remained in the life wherein he had married, since also
+                     when the husband dies the wife "is delivered from the law of her husband" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.3" target="asv">Rom. 7:3</a>). Wherefore if the husband leave her after he has changed his life by dying to his former life, this is nowise prejudicial
+                     to her. Now he who goes over to the religious life dies but a spiritual death and not a bodily death. Wherefore if the
+                     marriage be consummated, the husband cannot enter religion without his wife's consent, whereas he can before carnal connection
+                     when there is only a spiritual connection. On the other hand, he who is baptized is even corporeally buried together with
+                     Christ unto death; and therefore he is freed from paying the marriage debt even after the marriage has been consummated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p12"> We may also reply that it is through her own fault in refusing to be converted that the wife suffers prejudice.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Disparity of worship makes a person simply unfit for lawful marriage, whereas the condition of bondage does not, but only
+                     where it is unknown. Hence there is no comparison between an unbeliever and a bondswoman.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Either the child has reached a perfect age, and then it is free to follow either the believing father or the unbelieving
+                     mother, or else it is under age, and then it should be given to the believer notwithstanding that it needs the mother's care
+                     for its education.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> By doing penance the adulterer does not enter another life as an unbeliever by being baptized. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q59_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q59_A5-p0.1">Whether the believer who leaves his unbelieving wife can take another wife?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the believer who leaves his unbelieving wife cannot take another wife. For indissolubility is of the nature
+                     of marriage, since it is contrary to the natural law to divorce one's wife. Now there was true marriage between them as unbelievers.
+                     Therefore their marriage can nowise be dissolved. But as long as a man is bound by marriage to one woman he cannot marry another.
+                     Therefore a believer who leaves his unbelieving wife cannot take another
+                     wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a crime subsequent to marriage does not dissolve the marriage. Now, if the wife be willing to cohabit without insult
+                     to the Creator, the marriage tie is not dissolved, since the husband cannot marry another. Therefore the sin of the wife who
+                     refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator does not dissolve the marriage so that her husband be free to take another
+                     wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, husband and wife are equal in the marriage tie. Since, then, it is unlawful for the unbelieving wife to marry again
+                     while her husband lives, it would seem that neither can the believing husband do so.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the vow of continence is more favorable than the marriage contract. Now seemingly it is not lawful for the believing
+                     husband to take a vow of continence without the consent of his unbelieving wife, since then the latter would be deprived of
+                     marriage if she were afterwards converted. Much less therefore is it lawful for him to take another wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the son who persists in unbelief after his father's conversion loses the right to inherit from his father: and yet
+                     if he be afterwards converted, the inheritance is restored to him even though another should have entered into possession
+                     thereof. Therefore it would seem that in like manner, if the unbelieving wife be converted, her husband ought to be restored
+                     to her even though he should have married another wife: yet this would be impossible if the
+                     second marriage were valid. Therefore he cannot take another wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Matrimony is not ratified without the sacrament of Baptism. Now what is not ratified can be annulled. Therefore marriage
+                     contracted in unbelief can be annulled, and consequently, the marriage tie being dissolved, it is lawful for the husband to
+                     take another wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p8"> Further, a husband ought not to cohabit with an unbelieving wife who refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator. If
+                     therefore it were unlawful for him to take another wife he would be forced to remain continent, which would seem unreasonable,
+                     since then he would be at a disadvantage through his conversion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> When either husband or wife is converted to the faith the other remaining in unbelief, a distinction must be made. For if
+                     the unbeliever be willing to cohabit without insult to the Creator---that is without drawing the other to unbelief---the believer
+                     is free to part from the other, but by parting is not permitted to marry again. But if the unbeliever refuse to cohabit without
+                     insult to the Creator, by making use of blasphemous words and refusing to hear
+                     Christ's name, then if she strive to draw him to unbelief, the believing husband after parting from her may be united to another
+                     in marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q59_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the marriage of unbelievers is imperfect, whereas the marriage of believers is perfect and consequently binds more firmly.
+                     Now the firmer tie always looses the weaker if it is contrary to it, and therefore the subsequent marriage contracted in the
+                     faith of Christ dissolves the marriage previously contracted in unbelief. Therefore the marriage of unbelievers is not altogether
+                     firm and ratified, but is
+                     ratified afterwards by Christ's faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sin of the wife who refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator frees the husband from the tie whereby he was bound
+                     to his wife so as to be unable to marry again during her lifetime. It does not however dissolve the marriage at once, since
+                     if she were converted from her blasphemy before he married again, her husband would be restored to her. But the marriage is
+                     dissolved by the second marriage which the believing husband would be unable to
+                     accomplish unless he were freed from his obligation to his wife by her own fault.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> After the believer has married, the marriage tie is dissolved on either side, because the marriage is not imperfect as to
+                     the bond, although it is sometimes imperfect as to its effect. Hence it is in punishment of the unbelieving wife rather than
+                     by virtue of the previous marriage that she is forbidden to marry again. If however she be afterwards converted, she may be
+                     allowed by dispensation to take another husband, should her husband have taken
+                     another wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The husband ought not to take a vow of continence nor enter into a second marriage, if after his conversion there be a reasonable
+                     hope of the conversion of his wife, because the wife's conversion would be more difficult if she knew she was deprived of
+                     her husband. If however there be no hope of her conversion, he can take Holy orders or enter religion, having first besought
+                     his wife to be converted. And then if the wife be converted after her husband
+                     has received Holy orders, her husband must not be restored to her, but she must take it as a punishment of her tardy conversion
+                     that she is deprived of her husband.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The bond of fatherhood is not dissolved by disparity of worship, as the marriage bond is: wherefore there is no comparison
+                     between an inheritance and a wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q59_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q60.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q59_A6-p0.1">Whether other sins dissolve marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that other sins besides unbelief dissolve marriage. For adultery is seemingly more directly opposed to marriage
+                     than unbelief is. But unbelief dissolves marriage in a certain case so that it is lawful to marry again. Therefore adultery
+                     has the same effect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as unbelief is spiritual fornication, so is any kind of sin. If, then unbelief dissolves marriage because it
+                     is spiritual fornication, for the same reason any kind of sin will dissolve marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.30" target="asv">Mat. 5:30</a>): "If thy right hand scandalize thee, pluck it off and cast it from thee," and a gloss of Jerome says that "by the hand and
+                     the right eye we may understand our brother, wife, relatives and children." Now these become obstacles to us by any kind of
+                     sin. Therefore marriage can be dissolved on account of any kind of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, covetousness is idolatry according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.5" target="asv">Eph. 5:5</a>. Now a wife may be put away on account of idolatry. Therefore in like manner she can be put away on account of covetousness,
+                     as also on account of other sins graver than covetousness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Master says this expressly (Sent. iv, D, 30).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.32" target="asv">Mat. 5:32</a>): "Whosoever shall put away his wife, excepting for the cause of fornication, maketh her to commit adultery."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p8"> Further, if this were true, divorces would be made all day long, since it is rare to find a marriage wherein one of the parties
+                     does not fall into sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Bodily fornication and unbelief have a special contrariety to the goods of marriage, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q59_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Hence they are specially effective in dissolving marriages. Nevertheless it must be observed that marriage is dissolved
+                     in two ways. In one way as to the marriage tie, and thus marriage cannot be dissolved after it is ratified, neither by unbelief
+                     nor by adultery. But if it be not ratified, the tie is dissolved, if the one
+                     party remain in unbelief, and the other being converted to the faith has married again. On the other hand the aforesaid tie
+                     is not dissolved by adultery, else the unbeliever would be free to give a bill of divorce to his adulterous wife, and having
+                     put her away, could take another wife, which is false. In another way marriage is dissolved as to the act, and thus it can
+                     be dissolved on account of either unbelief or fornication. But marriage cannot be dissolved even as to the act on account
+                     of
+                     other sins, unless perchance the husband wish to cease from intercourse with his wife in order to punish her by depriving
+                     her of the comfort of his presence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although adultery is opposed to marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, more directly than unbelief, it is the other
+                     way about if we consider marriage as a sacrament of the Church, from which source it derives perfect stability, inasmuch as
+                     it signifies the indissoluble union of Christ with the Church. Wherefore the marriage that is not ratified can be dissolved
+                     as to the marriage tie on account of unbelief rather than on account of adultery.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The primal union of the soul to God is by faith, and consequently the soul is thereby espoused to God as it were, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A6-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.2.20" target="asv"> Osee 2:20, </a> "I will espouse thee to Me in faith." Hence in Holy Writ idolatry and unbelief are specially designated by the name of fornication:
+                     whereas other sins are called spiritual fornications by a more remote signification.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This applies to the case when the wife proves a notable occasion of sin to her husband, so that he has reason to fear his
+                     being in danger: for then the husband can withdraw from living with her, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q59_A6-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A5.html">(A[5])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Covetousness is said to be idolatry on account of a certain likeness of bondage, because both the covetous and the idolater
+                     serve the creature rather than the Creator; but not on account of likeness of unbelief, since unbelief corrupts the intellect
+                     whereas covetousness corrupts the affections.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The words of the Master refer to betrothal, because a betrothal can be rescinded on account of a subsequent crime. Or, if
+                     he is speaking of marriage, they must be referred to the severing of mutual companionship for a time, as stated above, or
+                     to the case when the wife is unwilling to cohabit except on the condition of sinning, for instance, if she were to say: "I
+                     will not remain your wife unless you amass wealth for me by theft," for then he ought to
+                     leave her rather than thieve.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q60.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q60" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q60-p0.1">OF WIFE-MURDER (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q60-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q60-p2"> We must now consider wife-murder, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q60-p3"> (1) Whether in a certain case it is lawful to kill one's wife?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q60-p4"> (2) Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q60_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q60.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q60_A1-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery. For the Divine law commanded
+                     adulterous wives to be stoned. Now it is not a sin to fulfill the Divine law. Neither therefore is it a sin to kill one's
+                     own wife if she be an adulteress.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which the law can rightly do, can be rightly done by one whom the law has commissioned to do it. But the law
+                     can rightly kill an adulterous wife or any other person deserving of death. Since then the law has commissioned the husband
+                     to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery, it would seem that he can rightly do so.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the husband has greater power over his adulterous wife than over the man who committed adultery with her. Now if
+                     the husband strike a cleric whom he found with his wife he is not excommunicated. Therefore it would seem lawful for him even
+                     to kill his own wife if she be discovered in adultery.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the husband is bound to correct his wife. But correction is given by inflicting a just punishment. Since then the
+                     just punishment of adultery is death, because it is a capital sin, it would seem lawful for a husband to kill his adulterous
+                     wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 37) that "the Church of God is never bound by the laws of this world, for she has
+                     none but a spiritual sword." Therefore it would seem that he who wishes to belong to the Church cannot rightly take advantage
+                     of the law which permits a man to kill his wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p7"> Further, husband and wife are judged on a par. But it is not lawful for a wife to kill her husband if he be discovered in
+                     adultery. Neither therefore may a husband kill his wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It happens in two ways that a husband kills his wife. First, by a civil judgment; and thus there is no doubt that a husband,
+                     moved by zeal for justice and not by vindictive anger or hatred can, without sin, bring a criminal accusation of adultery
+                     upon his wife before a secular court, and demand that she receive capital punishment as appointed by the law; just as it is
+                     lawful to accuse a person of murder or any other crime. Such an accusation however cannot
+                     be made in an ecclesiastical court, because, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 37), the Church does not wield a material
+                     sword. Secondly, a husband can kill his wife himself without her being convicted in court, and thus to kill her outside of
+                     the act of adultery is not lawful, neither according to civil law nor according to the law of conscience, whatever evidence
+                     he may have of her adultery. The civil law however considers it, as though it were lawful, that he should kill her in the
+                     very
+                     act, not by commanding him to do so, but by not inflicting on him the punishment for murder, on account of the very great
+                     provocation which the husband receives by such a deed to kill his wife. But the Church is not bound in this matter by human
+                     laws, neither does she acquit him of the debt of eternal punishment, nor of such punishment as may be awarded him by an ecclesiastical
+                     tribunal for the reason that he is quit of any punishment to be inflicted by a secular court. Therefore in no case is
+                     it lawful for a husband to kill his wife on his own authority.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The law has committed the infliction of this punishment not to private individuals, but to public persons, who are deputed
+                     to this by their office. Now the husband is not his wife's judge: wherefore he may not kill her, but may accuse her in the
+                     judge's presence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The civil law has not commissioned the husband to kill his wife by commanding him to do so, for thus he would not sin, just
+                     as the judge's deputy does not sin by killing the thief condemned to death: but it has permitted this by not punishing it.
+                     For which reason it has raised certain obstacles to prevent the husband from killing his wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This does not prove that it is lawful simply, but that it is lawful as regards immunity from a particular kind of punishment,
+                     since excommunication is also a kind of punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There are two kinds of community: the household, such as a family; and the civil community, such as a city or kingdom. Accordingly,
+                     he who presides over the latter kind of community, a king for instance, can punish an individual both by correcting and by
+                     exterminating him, for the betterment of the community with whose care he is charged. But he who presides over a community
+                     of the first kind, can inflict only corrective punishment, which does not
+                     extend beyond the limits of amendment, and these are exceeded by the punishment of death. Wherefore the husband who exercises
+                     this kind of control over his wife may not kill her, but he may accuse or chastise her in some other way.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q60.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q60_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q61.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q60_A2-p0.1">Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wife-murder is not an impediment to marriage. For adultery is more directly opposed to marriage than murder
+                     is. Now adultery is not an impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is wife-murder.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is a more grievous sin to kill one's mother than one's wife, for it is never lawful to strike one's mother, whereas
+                     it is sometimes lawful to strike one's wife. But matricide is not an impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is wife-murder.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is a greater sin for a man to kill another man's wife on account of adultery than to kill his own wife, inasmuch
+                     as he has less motive and is less concerned with her correction. But he who kills another man's wife is not hindered from
+                     marrying. Neither therefore is he who kills his own wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. But the sin of murder can be removed by repentance. Therefore the
+                     consequent impediment to marriage can be removed also: and consequently it would seem that after he has done penance he is
+                     not forbidden to marry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A canon (caus. xxxiii, qu. ii, can. Interfectores) says: "The slayers of their own wives must be brought back to penance,
+                     and they are absolutely forbidden to marry." Further, in whatsoever a man sins, in that same must he be punished. But he who
+                     kills his wife sins against marriage. Therefore he must be punished by being deprived of marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> By the Church's decree wife-murder is an impediment to marriage. Sometimes however it forbids the contracting of marriage
+                     without voiding the contract, when to wit the husband kills his wife on account of adultery or even through hatred; nevertheless
+                     if there be fear lest he should prove incontinent, he may be dispensed by the Church so as to marry lawfully. Sometimes it
+                     also voids the contract, as when a man kills his wife in order to marry her with whom he
+                     has committed adultery, for then the law declares him simply unfit to marry her, so that if he actually marry her his marriage
+                     is void. He is not however hereby rendered simply unfit by law in relation to other women: wherefore if he should have married
+                     another, although he sin by disobeying the Church's ordinance, the marriage is nevertheless not voided for this reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Murder and adultery in certain cases forbid the contracting of marriage and void the contract, as we say here in regard to
+                     wife-murder, and shall say further on (Sent. iv
+                     <a id="XP_Q60_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q62_A2.html">, Q[62], A[2]</a>) in regard to adultery. We may also reply that wife-murder is contrary to the substance of wedlock, whereas adultery is contrary
+                     to the good of fidelity due to marriage. Hence adultery is not more opposed to marriage than wife-murder, and the
+                     argument is based on a false premiss.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Simply speaking it is a more grievous sin to kill one's mother than one's wife, as also more opposed to nature, since a man
+                     reveres his mother naturally. Consequently he is less inclined to matricide and more prone to wife-murder; and it is to repress
+                     this proneness that the Church has forbidden marriage to the man who has murdered his wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such a man does not sin against marriage as he does who kills his own wife; wherefore the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It does not follow that because guilt has been remitted therefore the entire punishment is remitted, as evidenced by irregularity.
+                     For repentance does not restore a man to his former dignity, although it can restore him to his former state of grace, as
+                     stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q60_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q38_A1.html">Q[38], A[1]</a>, ad 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q61.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q61" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q61-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE, ARISING FROM A SOLEMN VOW (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q61-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q61-p2"> We must next consider the impediments which supervene to marriage. We shall consider (1) the impediment which affects an
+                  unconsummated marriage, namely a solemn vow: (2) the impediment which affects a consummated marriage, namely fornication.
+                  Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q61-p3"> (1) Whether either party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion without the other's consent?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q61-p4"> (2) Whether they can enter religion before the consummation of the marriage?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q61-p5"> (3) Whether the wife can take another husband if her former husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q61_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q61.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q61_A1-p0.1">Whether one party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion without the other's consent?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that even after the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter religion without the other's consent.
+                     For the Divine law ought to be more favorable to spiritual things than human law. Now human law has allowed this. Therefore
+                     much more should the Divine law permit it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lesser good does not hinder the greater. But the married state is a lesser good than the religious state, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q61_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.38" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:38.</a> Therefore marriage ought not to hinder a man from being able to enter religion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in every form of religious life there is a kind of spiritual marriage. Now it is lawful to pass from a less strict
+                     religious order to one that is stricter. Therefore it is also allowable to pass from a less strict---namely a carnal---marriage
+                     to a stricter marriage, namely that of the religious life, even without the wife's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Married persons are forbidden (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q61_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:5</a>) to abstain from the use of marriage even for a time without one another's consent, in order to have time for prayer.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p6"> Further, no one can lawfully do that which is prejudicial to another without the latter's consent. Now the religious vow
+                     taken by one consort is prejudicial to the other, since the one has power over the other's body. Therefore one of them cannot
+                     take a religious vow without the other's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> No one can make an offering to God of what belongs to another. Wherefore since by a consummated marriage the husband's body
+                     already belongs to his wife, he cannot by a vow of continence offer it to God without her consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Human law considers marriage merely as fulfilling an office of nature: whereas the Divine law considers it as a sacrament,
+                     by reason of which it is altogether indissoluble. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not unreasonable that a greater good be hindered by a lesser which is contrary to it, just as good is hindered by evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In every form of religious life marriage is contracted with one person, namely Christ; to Whom, however, a person contracts
+                     more obligations in one religious order than in another. But in carnal marriage and religious marriage the contract is not
+                     with the same person: wherefore that comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q61.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q61_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q61_A2-p0.1">Whether before the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter religion without the other's consent?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that even before the marriage has been consummated one consort cannot enter religion without the other's consent.
+                     For the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the sacrament of matrimony, inasmuch, namely, as it signifies the union of
+                     Christ with the Church. Now marriage is a true sacrament before its consummation, and after consent has been expressed in
+                     words of the present. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by one of them entering religion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by virtue of the consent expressed in words of the present, the one consort has given power over his body to the
+                     other. Therefore the one can forthwith ask for the marriage debt, and the other is bound to pay: and so the one cannot enter
+                     religion without the other's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q61_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.6" target="asv">Mat. 19:6</a>): "What God hath joined together let no man put asunder." But the union which precedes marital intercourse was made by God.
+                     Therefore it cannot be dissolved by the will of man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Jerome [*Prolog. in Joan.] our Lord called John from his wedding.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Before marital intercourse there is only a spiritual bond between husband and wife, but afterwards there is a carnal bond
+                     between them. Wherefore, just as after marital intercourse marriage is dissolved by carnal death, so by entering religion
+                     the bond which exists before the consummation of the marriage is dissolved, because religious life is a kind of spiritual
+                     death, whereby a man dies to the world and lives to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Before consummation marriage signifies the union of Christ with the soul by grace, which is dissolved by a contrary spiritual
+                     disposition, namely mortal sin. But after consummation it signifies the union of Christ with the Church, as regards the assumption
+                     of human nature into the unity of person, which union is altogether indissoluble.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Before consummation the body of one consort is not absolutely delivered into the power of the other, but conditionally, provided
+                     neither consort meanwhile seek the fruit of a better life. But by marital intercourse the aforesaid delivery is completed,
+                     because then each of them enters into bodily possession of the power transferred to him. Wherefore also before consummation
+                     they are not bound to pay the marriage debt forthwith after contracting
+                     marriage by words of the present, but a space of two months is allowed them for three reasons. First that they may deliberate
+                     meanwhile about entering religion; secondly, to prepare what is necessary for the solemnization of the wedding. thirdly, lest
+                     the husband think little of a gift he has not longed to possess (cap. Institutum, caus. xxvi, qu. ii).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The marriage union, before consummation, is indeed perfect as to its primary being, but is not finally perfect as to its
+                     second act which is operation. It is like bodily possession and consequently is not altogether indissoluble.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q61_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q61_A3-p0.1">Whether the wife may take another husband if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the wife may not take another husband, if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of
+                     the marriage. For that which is consistent with marriage does not dissolve the marriage tie. Now the marriage tie still remains
+                     between those who equally take religious vows. Therefore by the fact that one enters religion, the other is not freed from
+                     the marriage tie. But as long as she remains tied to one by marriage, she cannot marry
+                     another. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, after entering religion and before making his profession the husband can return to the world. If then the wife can
+                     marry again when her husband enters religion, he also can marry again when he returns to the world: which is absurd.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by a new decree (cap. Non solum, de regular. et transeunt.) a profession, if made before the expiry of a year, is
+                     accounted void. Therefore if he return to his wife after making such a profession, she is bound to receive him. Therefore
+                     neither by her husband's entry into religion, nor by his taking a vow, does the wife receive the power to marry again.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No one can bind another to those things which belong to perfection. Now continence is of those things that belong to perfection.
+                     Therefore a wife is not bound to continence on account of her husband entering religion, and consequently she can marry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as bodily death of the husband dissolves the marriage tie in such a way that the wife may marry whom she will, according
+                     to the statement of the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q61_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.39" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:39</a>); so too after the husband's spiritual death by entering religion, she can marry whom she will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When both consorts take a like vow of continence, neither renounces the marriage tie, wherefore it still remains: but when
+                     only one takes the vow, then for his own part he renounces the marriage tie, wherefore the other is freed therefrom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A person is not accounted dead to the world by entering religion until he makes his profession, and consequently his wife
+                     is bound to wait for him until that time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We must judge of a profession thus made before the time fixed by law, as of a simple vow. Wherefore just as when the husband
+                     has taken a simple vow his wife is not bound to pay him the marriage debt, and yet has not the power to marry again, so is
+                     it in this case.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q62" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q62-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT THAT SUPERVENES TO MARRIAGE AFTER ITS CONSUMMATION, NAMELY FORNICATION (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q62-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q62-p2"> We must now consider the impediment that supervenes upon marriage after its consummation, namely fornication, which is an
+                  impediment to a previous marriage as regards the act, although the marriage tie remains. Under this head there are six points
+                  of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q62-p3"> (1) Whether it is lawful for a husband to put his wife away on account of fornication?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q62-p4"> (2) Whether he is bound to do so?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q62-p5"> (3) Whether he may put her away at his own judgment?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q62-p6"> (4) Whether in this matter husband and wife are of equal condition?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q62-p7"> (5) Whether, after being divorced, they must remain unmarried?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q62-p8"> (6) Whether they can be reconciled after being divorced?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q62_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q62_A1-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for a husband to put away his wife on account of fornication?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful for a husband to put away his wife on account of fornication. For we must not return evil for evil.
+                     But the husband, by putting away his wife on account of fornication, seemingly returns evil for evil. Therefore this is not
+                     lawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sin is greater if both commit fornication, than if one only commits it. But if both commit fornication, they
+                     cannot be divorced on that account. Neither therefore can they be, if only one commits fornication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, spiritual fornication and certain other sins are more grievous than carnal fornication. But separation from bed
+                     cannot be motived by those sins. Neither therefore can it be done on account of fornication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the unnatural vice is further removed from the marriage goods than fornication is, the manner of which is natural.
+                     Therefore it ought to have been a cause of separation rather than fornication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> are the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.32" target="asv"> Mat. 5:32.</a>
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p7"> Further, one is not bound to keep faith with one who breaks his faith. But a spouse by fornication breaks the faith due to
+                     the other spouse. Therefore one can put the other away on account of fornication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Our Lord permitted a man to put away his wife on account of fornication, in punishment of the unfaithful party and in favor
+                     of the faithful party, so that the latter is not bound to marital intercourse with the unfaithful one. There are however seven
+                     cases to be excepted in which it is not lawful to put away a wife who has committed fornication, when either the wife is not
+                     to be blamed, or both parties are equally blameworthy. The first is if the husband
+                     also has committed fornication; the second is if he has prostituted his wife; the third is if the wife, believing her husband
+                     dead on account of his long absence, has married again; the fourth is if another man has fraudulently impersonated her husband
+                     in the marriage-bed; the fifth is if she be overcome by force; the sixth is if he has been reconciled to her by having carnal
+                     intercourse with her after she has committed adultery; the seventh is if both having been married in the state of
+                     unbelief, the husband has given his wife a bill of divorce and she has married again; for then if both be converted the husband
+                     is bound to receive her back again.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A husband sins if through vindictive anger he puts away his wife who has committed fornication, but he does not sin if he
+                     does so in order to avoid losing his good name, lest he seem to share in her guilt, or in order to correct his wife's sin,
+                     or in order to avoid the uncertainty of her offspring.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Divorce on account of fornication is effected by the one accusing the other. And since no one can accuse who is guilty of
+                     the same crime, a divorce cannot be pronounced when both have committed fornication, although marriage is more sinned against
+                     when both are guilty of fornication that when only one is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fornication is directly opposed to the good of marriage, since by it the certainty of offspring is destroyed, faith is broken,
+                     and marriage ceases to have its signification when the body of one spouse is given to several others. Wherefore other sins,
+                     though perhaps they be more grievous than fornication, are not motives for a divorce. Since, however, unbelief which is called
+                     spiritual fornication, is also opposed to the good of marriage consisting in
+                     the rearing of the offspring to the worship of God, it is also a motive for divorce, yet not in the same way as bodily fornication.
+                     Because one may take steps for procuring a divorce on account of one act of carnal fornication, not, however, on account of
+                     one act of unbelief, but on account of inveterate unbelief which is a proof of obstinacy wherein unbelief is perfected.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Steps may be taken to procure a divorce on account also of the unnatural vice: but this is not mentioned in the same way,
+                     both because it is an unmentionable passion, and because it does not so affect the certainty of offspring.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q62_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q62_A2-p0.1">Whether the husband is bound by precept to put away his wife when she is guilty of fornication?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the husband is bound by precept to put away his wife who is guilty of fornication. For since the husband
+                     is the head of his wife, he is bound to correct his wife. Now separation from bed is prescribed as a correction of the wife
+                     who is guilty of fornication. Therefore he is bound to separate from her.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who consents with one who sins mortally, is also guilty of mortal sin. Now the husband who retains a wife guilty
+                     of fornication would seem to consent with her, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 35). Therefore he sins unless he puts her
+                     away.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.16" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:16</a>): "He who is joined to a harlot is made one body." Now a man cannot at once be a member of a harlot and a member of Christ
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:15</a>). Therefore the husband who is joined to a wife guilty of fornication ceases to be a member of Christ, and therefore sins
+                     mortally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as relationship voids the marriage tie, so does fornication dissolve the marriage-bed. Now after the husband
+                     becomes cognizant of his consanguinity with his wife, he sins mortally if he has carnal intercourse with her. Therefore he
+                     also sins mortally if he does so after knowing her to be guilty of fornication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> On the contrary, A gloss on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:11, </a> "Let not the husband put away his wife" says that "Our Lord permitted a wife to be put away on account of fornication." Therefore
+                     it is not a matter of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, one can always pardon the sin that another has committed against oneself. Now the wife, by committing fornication,
+                     sinned against her husband. Therefore the husband may spare her by not putting her away.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The putting away of a wife guilty of fornication was prescribed in order that the wife might be corrected by means of that
+                     punishment. Now a corrective punishment is not required when amendment has already taken place. Wherefore, if the wife repent
+                     of her sin, her husband is not bound to put her away: whereas if she repent not, he is bound to do so, lest he seem to consent
+                     to her sin, by not having recourse to her due correction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The wife can be corrected for her sin of fornication not only by this punishment but also by words and blows; wherefore if
+                     she be ready to be corrected otherwise, her husband is not bound to have recourse to the aforesaid punishment in order to
+                     correct her.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The husband seems to consent with her when he retains her, notwithstanding that she persists in her past sin: if, however,
+                     she has mended her ways, he does not consent with her.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> She can no longer be called a harlot since she has repented of her sin. Wherefore her husband, by being joined to her, does
+                     not become a member of a harlot. We might also reply that he is joined to her not as a harlot but as his wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is no parallel, because the effect of consanguinity is that there is no marriage tie between them, so that carnal intercourse
+                     between them becomes unlawful. Whereas fornication does not remove the said tie, so that the act remains, in itself, lawful,
+                     unless it become accidentally unlawful, in so far as the husband seems to consent to his wife's lewdness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> This permission is to be understood as an absence of prohibition: and thus it is not in contradistinction with a precept,
+                     for that which is a matter of precept is also not forbidden.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The wife sins not only against her husband, but also against herself and against God, wherefore her husband cannot entirely
+                     remit the punishment, unless amendment has followed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q62_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q62_A3-p0.1">Whether the husband can on his own judgment put away his wife on account of fornication?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the husband can on his own judgment put away his wife on account of fornication. For when sentence has
+                     been pronounced by the judge, it is lawful to carry it out without any further judgment. But God, the just Judge, has pronounced
+                     this judgment, that a husband may put his wife away on account of fornication. Therefore no further judgment is required for
+                     this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.19" target="asv">Mat. 1:19</a>) that Joseph . . . being a just man . . . "was minded to put" Mary "away privately." Therefore it would seem that a husband
+                     may privately pronounce a divorce without the judgment of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if after becoming cognizant of his wife's fornication a husband has marital intercourse with his wife, he forfeits
+                     the action which he had against the adulteress. Therefore the refusal of the marriage debt, which pertains to a divorce, ought
+                     to precede the judgment of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which cannot be proved ought not to be submitted to the judgment of the Church. Now the crime of fornication
+                     cannot be proved, since "the eye of the adulterer observeth darkness" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.24.15" target="asv">Job 24:15</a>). Therefore the divorce in question ought not to be made on the judgment of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, accusation should be preceded by inscription [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q62_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A7.html">SS, Q[33], A[7]</a>], whereby a person binds himself under the pain of retaliation, if he fails to bring proof. But this is impossible in this
+                     matter, because then, in every event the husband would obtain his end, whether he put his wife away, or his wife put him away.
+                     Therefore she ought not to be summoned by accusation to receive the judgment of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, a man is more bound to his wife than to a stranger. Now a man ought not to refer to the Church the crime of another,
+                     even though he be a stranger, without previously admonishing him privately (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.15" target="asv">Mat. 18:15</a>). Much less therefore may the husband bring his wife's crime before the Church, unless he has previously rebuked her in private.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p8">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No one should avenge himself. But if a husband were by his own judgment to put away his wife on account of fornication, he
+                     would avenge himself. Therefore this should not be done.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p9"> Further, no man is prosecutor and judge in the same cause. But the husband is the prosecutor by suing his wife for the offense
+                     she has committed against him. Therefore he cannot be the judge, and consequently he cannot put her away on his own judgment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p10">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A husband can put away his wife in two ways. First as to bed only, and thus he may put her away on his own judgment, as soon
+                     as he has evidence of her fornication: nor is he bound to pay her the marriage debt at her demand, unless he be compelled
+                     by the Church, and by paying it thus he nowise prejudices his own case. Secondly, as to bed and board, and in this way she
+                     cannot be put away except at the judgment of the Church; and if she has been put away
+                     otherwise, he must be compelled to cohabit with her unless the husband can at once prove the wife's fornication. Now this
+                     putting away is called a divorce: and consequently it must be admitted that a divorce cannot be pronounced except at the judgment
+                     of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sentence is an application of the general law to a particular fact. Wherefore God gave out the law according to which
+                     the sentence of the court has to be pronounced.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Joseph was minded to put away the Blessed Virgin not as suspected of fornication, but because in reverence for her sanctity,
+                     he feared to cohabit with her. Moreover there is no parallel, because then the sentence at law was not only divorce but also
+                     stoning, but not now when the case is brought to the Church for judgment. The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what
+                     has been said.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes when the husband suspects his wife of adultery he watches her secretly that together with witnesses he may discover
+                     her in the sin of fornication, and so proceed to accusation. Moreover, if he has no evidence of the fact, there may be strong
+                     suspicions of fornication, which suspicions being proved the fornication seems to be proved: for instance if they be found
+                     together alone, at a time and place which are open to suspicion, or "nudas cum
+                     nuda."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A husband may accuse his wife of adultery in two ways. First, he may seek a separation from bed before a spiritual judge,
+                     and then there is no need for an inscription to be made under the pain of retaliation, since thus the husband would gain his
+                     end, as the objection proves. Secondly, he may seek for the crime to be punished in a secular court, and then it is necessary
+                     for inscription to precede, whereby he binds himself under pain of retaliation if
+                     he fail to prove his case.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> According to a Decretal (Extra, De Simonia, cap. Licet), "there are three modes of procedure in criminal cases. First, by
+                     inquisition, which should be preceded by notoriety; secondly, by accusation, which should be preceded by inscription; [*Cf.
+                     
+                     <a id="XP_Q62_A3-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A7.html">SS, Q[33], A[7]</a>] thirdly, by denunciation, which should be preceded by fraternal correction." Accordingly the saying of our Lord refers to
+                     the case where the process is by way of
+                     denunciation, and not by accusation, because then the end in view is not only the correction of the guilty party, but also
+                     his punishment, for the safeguarding of the common good, which would be destroyed if justice were lacking.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q62_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q62_A4-p0.1">Whether in a case of divorce husband and wife should be judged on a par with each other?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that, in a case of divorce, husband and wife ought not to be judged on a par with each other. For divorce under
+                     the New Law takes the place of the divorce [repudium] recognized by the Old Law (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.31" target="asv">Mat. 5:31,32</a>). Now in the "repudium" husband and wife were not judged on a par with each other, since the husband could put away his wife,
+                     but not "vice versa." Therefore neither in divorce ought they to be judged on a par with each other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is more opposed to the natural law that a wife have several husbands than that a husband have several wives:
+                     wherefore the latter has been sometimes lawful, but the former never. Therefore the wife sins more grievously in adultery
+                     than the husband, and consequently they ought not to be judged on a par with each other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where there is greater injury to one's neighbor, there is a greater sin. Now the adulterous wife does a greater
+                     injury to her husband, than does the adulterous husband to his wife, since a wife's adultery involves uncertainty of the offspring,
+                     whereas the husband's adultery does not. Therefore the wife's sin is the greater, and so they ought not to be judged on a
+                     par with each other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, divorce is prescribed in order to punish the crime of adultery. Now it belongs to the husband who is the head of
+                     the wife (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:3</a>) to correct his wife, rather than "vice versa." Therefore they should not be judged on a par with each other for the purpose
+                     of divorce, but the husband ought to have the preference.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> On the contrary, It would seem in this matter the wife ought to have the preference. For the more frail the sinner the more
+                     is his sin deserving of pardon. Now there is greater frailty in women than in men, for which reason Chrysostom [*Hom. xl in
+                     the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that "lust is a passion proper to women," and the Philosopher
+                     says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "properly speaking women are not said to be continent on
+                     account of their being easily inclined to concupiscence," for neither can dumb animals be continent, because they have nothing
+                     to stand in the way of their desires. Therefore women are rather to be spared in the punishment of divorce.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the husband is placed as the head of the woman in order to correct her. Therefore his sin is greater than the woman's
+                     and so he should be punished the more.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In a case of divorce husband and wife are judged on a par with each other, in the sense that the same things are lawful or
+                     unlawful to the one as to the other: but they are not judged on a par with each other in reference to those things, since
+                     the reason for divorce is greater in one spouse than in the other, although there is sufficient reason for divorce in both.
+                     For divorce is a punishment of adultery, in so far as it is opposed to the marriage goods.
+                     Now as regards the good of fidelity to which husband and wife are equally bound towards each other, the adultery of one is
+                     as great a sin against marriage as the adultery of the other, and this is in either of them a sufficient reason for divorce.
+                     But as regards the good of the offspring the wife's adultery is a greater sin against marriage than the husband's wherefore
+                     it is a greater reason for divorce in the wife than in the husband: and thus they are under an equal obligation, but not for
+                     equal reasons. Nor is this unjust for on either hand there is sufficient reason for the punishment in question, just as there
+                     is in two persons condemned to the punishment of death, although one of them may have sinned more grievously than the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The only reason why divorce was permitted, was to avoid murder. And since there was more danger of this in men than in women,
+                     the husband was allowed to put away his wife by a bill of divorce, but not "vice versa."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p10"> Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These arguments are based on the fact that in comparison with the good of the offspring there is more
+                     reason for divorce in an adulterous wife than in an adulterous husband. It does not follow, however, that they are not judged
+                     on a par with each other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the husband is the head of the wife, he is her pilot as it were, and is no more her judge than she is his. Consequently
+                     in matters that have to be submitted to a judge, the husband has no more power over his wife, than she over him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In adultery there is the same sinful character as in simple fornication, and something more which aggravates it, namely the
+                     lesion to marriage. Accordingly if we consider that which is common to adultery and fornication, the sin of the husband and
+                     that of the wife are compared the one to the other as that which exceeds to that which is exceeded, for in women the humors
+                     are more abundant, wherefore they are more inclined to be led by their
+                     concupiscences, whereas in man there is abundance of heat which excites concupiscence. Simply speaking, however, other things
+                     being equal, a man sins more grievously in simple fornication than a woman, because he has more of the good of reason, which
+                     prevails over all movements of bodily passions. But as regards the lesion to marriage which adultery adds to fornication and
+                     for which reason it is an occasion for divorce, the woman sins more grievously than the man, as appears from what we have
+                     said above. And since it is more grievous than simple fornication, it follows that, simply speaking, the adulterous wife sins
+                     more grievously than the adulterous husband, other things being equal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Although the control which the husband receives over his wife is an aggravating circumstance, nevertheless the sin is yet
+                     more aggravated by this circumstance which draws the sin to another species, namely by the lesion to marriage, which lesion
+                     becomes a kind of injustice, through the fraudulent substitution of another's child.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q62_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q62_A5-p0.1">Whether a husband can marry again after having a divorce?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a husband can marry again after having a divorce. For no one is bound to perpetual continence. Now in
+                     some cases the husband is bound to put away his wife forever on account of fornication, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q62_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q62_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore seemingly at least in this case he can marry again.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a sinner should not be given a greater occasion of sin. But if she who is put away on account of the sin of fornication
+                     is not allowed to seek another marriage, she is given a greater occasion of sin: for it is improbable that one who was not
+                     continent during marriage will be able to be continent afterwards. Therefore it would seem lawful for her to marry again.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the wife is not bound to the husband save as regards the payment of the marriage debt and cohabitation. But she
+                     is freed from both obligations by divorce. Therefore "she is loosed from the law of her husband" [*
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.2" target="asv">Rom. 7:2</a>]. Therefore she can marry again; and the same applies to her husband.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.9" target="asv">Mat. 19:9</a>): "Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another committeth adultery." Therefore
+                     seemingly he does not commit adultery if he marry again after putting away his wife on account of fornication, and consequently
+                     this will be a true marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:10,11</a>): "Not I, but the Lord, commandeth that the wife depart not from her husband. and, if she depart, that she remain unmarried."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p7"> Further, no one should gain advantage from sin. But the adulteress would if she were allowed to contract another and more
+                     desired marriage; and an occasion of adultery would be afforded those who wish to marry again. Therefore it is unlawful both
+                     to the wife and to the husband to contract a second marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing supervenient to marriage can dissolve it: wherefore adultery does not make a marriage cease to be valid. For, according
+                     to Augustine (De Nup. et Concup. i, 10), "as long as they live they are bound by the marriage tie, which neither divorce nor
+                     union with another can destroy." Therefore it is unlawful for one, while the other lives, to marry again.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although no one is absolutely bound to continence, he may be bound accidentally; for instance, if his wife contract an incurable
+                     disease that is incompatible with carnal intercourse. And it is the same if she labor under a spiritual disease, namely fornication,
+                     so as to be incorrigible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The very shame of having been divorced ought to keep her from sin: and if it cannot keep her from sin, it is a lesser evil
+                     that she alone sin than that her husband take part in her sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although after divorce the wife is not bound to her husband as regards paying him the marriage debt and cohabiting with him,
+                     the marriage tie, whereby she was bound to this, remains, and consequently she cannot marry again during her husband's lifetime.
+                     She can, however, take a vow of continence, against her husband's will, unless it seem that the Church has been deceived by
+                     false witnesses in pronouncing the divorce; for in that case, even if she has
+                     made her vow of profession she ought to be restored to her husband, and would be bound to pay the marriage debt, but it would
+                     be unlawful for her to demand it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The exception expressed in our Lord's words refers to the putting away of the wife. Hence the objection is based on a false
+                     interpretation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q62_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q63.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q62_A6-p0.1">Whether husband and wife may be reconciled after being divorced?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that husband and wife may not be reconciled after being divorced. For the law contains the rule (Can. Quod
+                     bene semel, Caus. vi, qu. iv): "That which has been once well decided must not be subsequently withdrawn." Now it has been
+                     decided by the judgment of the Church that they ought to be separated. Therefore they cannot subsequently be reconciled.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it were allowable for them to be reconciled, the husband would seem bound to receive his wife, especially after
+                     she has repented. But he is not bound, for the wife, in defending herself before the judge, cannot allege her repentance against
+                     her husband's accusation of fornication. Therefore in no way is reconciliation allowable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if reconciliation were allowable, it would seem that the adulterous wife is bound to return to her husband if her
+                     husband asks her. But she is not bound, since they are separated by the Church. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if it were lawful to be reconciled to an adulterous wife, this would especially be the case when the husband is
+                     found to have committed adultery after the divorce. But in this case the wife cannot compel him to be reconciled, since the
+                     divorce has been justly pronounced. Therefore she may nowise be reconciled.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if a husband whose adultery is unknown put away his wife, who is convicted of adultery by the sentence of the Church,
+                     the divorce would seem to have been pronounced unjustly. And yet the husband is not bound to be reconciled to his wife, because
+                     she is unable to prove his adultery in court. Much less, therefore, is reconciliation allowable when the divorce has been
+                     granted justly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:11</a>): "And if she depart, that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p8"> Further, it is allowable for the husband not to put her away after fornication. Therefore, for the same reason, he can be
+                     reconciled to her after divorce.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> If the wife has mended her ways by repenting of her sin after the divorce, her husband may become reconciled to her; but
+                     if she remain incorrigible in her sin, he must not take her back, for the same reason which forbade him to retain her while
+                     she refused to desist from sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sentence of the Church in pronouncing the divorce did not bind them to separate, but allowed them to do so. Therefore
+                     reconciliation may be effected or ensue without any withdrawal of the previous sentence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The wife's repentance should induce the husband not to accuse or put away the wife who is guilty of fornication. He cannot,
+                     however, be compelled to this course of action, nor can his wife oppose her repentance to his accusation, because although
+                     she is no longer guilty, neither in act nor in the stain of sin, there still remains something of the debt of punishment,
+                     and though this has been taken away in the sight of God, there still remains the debt
+                     of punishment to be inflicted by the judgment of man, because man sees not the heart as God does.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which is done in a person's favor does him no prejudice. Wherefore since the divorce has been granted in favor of the
+                     husband, it does not deprive him of the right of asking for the marriage debt, or of asking his wife to return to him. Hence
+                     his wife is bound to pay the debt, and to return to him, if he ask her, unless with his consent she has taken a vow of continence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to strict law, a husband who was previously innocent should not be compelled to receive an adulterous wife on account
+                     of his having committed adultery after the divorce. But according to equity, the judge is bound by virtue of his office first
+                     of all to admonish him to beware of imperiling his own soul and of scandalizing others; although the wife may not herself
+                     seek reconciliation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q63.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q63" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q63-p0.1">OF SECOND MARRIAGES (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q63-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q63-p2"> In the next place we must consider second marriage. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q63-p3"> (1) Whether it is lawful?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q63-p4"> (2) Whether it is a sacrament?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q63_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q63.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q63_A1-p0.1">Whether a second marriage is lawful?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a second marriage is unlawful. Because we should judge of things according to truth. Now Chrysostom [*Hom.
+                     xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that "to take a second husband is in truth fornication,"
+                     which is unlawful. Therefore neither is a second marriage lawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is not good is unlawful. Now Ambrose [*On 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q63_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.40" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:40 </a>and De Viduis] says that a second marriage is not good. Therefore it is unlawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one should be debarred from being present at such things as are becoming and lawful. Yet priests are debarred
+                     from being present at second marriages, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42). Therefore they are unlawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no one incurs a penalty save for sin. Now a person incurs the penalty of irregularity on account of being married
+                     twice. Therefore a second marriage is unlawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> We read of Abraham having contracted a second marriage (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q63_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.25.1" target="asv">Gn. 25:1</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p7"> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q63_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:14</a>): "I will . . . that the younger," namely widows, "should marry, bear children." Therefore second marriages are lawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The marriage tie lasts only until death (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q63_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.2" target="asv">Rom. 7:2</a>), wherefore at the death of either spouse the marriage tie ceases: and consequently when one dies the other is not hindered
+                     from marrying a second time on account of the previous marriage. Therefore not only second marriages are lawful, but even
+                     third and so on.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chrysostom is speaking in reference to the cause which is wont at times to incite a person to a second marriage, namely concupiscence
+                     which incites also to fornication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A second marriage is stated not to be good, not that it is unlawful, but because it lacks the honor of the signification
+                     which is in a first marriage, where one husband has one wife, as in the case of Christ and the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Men who are consecrated to Divine things are debarred not only from unlawful things, but even from things which have any
+                     appearance of turpitude; and consequently they are debarred from second marriages, which lack the decorum which was in a first
+                     marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Irregularity is not always incurred on account of a sin, and may be incurred through a defect in a sacrament [*"Defectus
+                     sacramenti," i.e. defect of signification; Cf. A[2], OBJ[3]]. Hence the argument is not to the point.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q63.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q63_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q63_A2-p0.1">Whether a second marriage is a sacrament?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a second marriage is not a sacrament. For he who repeats a sacrament injures the sacrament. But no sacrament
+                     should be done an injury. Therefore if a second marriage were a sacrament, marriage ought nowise to be repeated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every sacrament some kind of blessing is given. But no blessing is given in a second marriage, as stated in the
+                     text (Sent. iv, D, 42). Therefore no sacrament is conferred therein.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, signification is essential to a sacrament. But the signification of marriage is not preserved in a second marriage,
+                     because there is not a union of only one woman with only one man, as in the case of Christ and the Church. Therefore it is
+                     not a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, one sacrament is not an impediment to receiving another. But a second marriage is an impediment to receiving orders.
+                     Therefore it is not a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Marital intercourse is excused from sin in a second marriage even as in a first marriage. Now marital intercourse is excused
+                     [*Cf.
+                     <a id="XP_Q63_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q69_A1.html"> Q[69], A[1]</a>] by the marriage goods which are fidelity, offspring, and sacrament. Therefore a second marriage is a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p7"> Further, irregularity is not contracted through a second and non-sacramental union, such as fornication. Yet irregularity
+                     is contracted through a second marriage. Therefore it is a sacramental union.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Wherever we find the essentials of a sacrament, there is a true sacrament. Wherefore, since in a second marriage we find
+                     all the essentials of the sacrament of marriage (namely the due matter---which results from the parties having the conditions
+                     prescribed by law---and the due form, which is the expression of the inward consent by words of the present), it is clear
+                     that a second marriage is a sacrament even as a first.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This is true of a sacrament which causes an everlasting effect: for then, if the sacrament be repeated, it is implied that
+                     the first was not effective, and thus an injury is done to the first, as is clear in all those sacraments which imprint a
+                     character. But those sacraments which have not an everlasting effect can be repeated without injury to the sacrament, as in
+                     the case of Penance. And, since the marriage tie ceases with death, no injury is done
+                     to the sacrament if a woman marry again after her husband's death.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the second marriage, considered in itself, is a perfect sacrament, yet if we consider it in relation to the first
+                     marriage, it is somewhat a defective sacrament, because it has not its full signification, since there is not a union of only
+                     one woman with only one man as in the marriage of Christ with the Church. And on account of this defect the blessing is omitted
+                     in a second marriage. This, however, refers to the case when it is a second
+                     marriage on the part of both man and woman, or on the part of the woman only. For if a virgin marry a man who has had another
+                     wife, the marriage is blessed nevertheless. Because the signification is preserved to a certain extent even in relation to
+                     the former marriage, since though Christ has but one Church for His spouse, there are many persons espoused to Him in the
+                     one Church. But the soul cannot be espoused to another besides Christ, else it commits fornication with the devil. Nor is
+                     there
+                     a spiritual marriage. For this reason when a woman marries a second time the marriage is not blessed on account of the defect
+                     in the sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfect signification is found in a second marriage considered in itself, not however if it be considered in relation
+                     to the previous marriage, and it is thus that it is a defective sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A second marriage in so far as there is a defect in the sacrament, but not as a sacrament, is an impediment to the sacrament
+                     of Order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q64" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q64-p0.1">OF THE THINGS ANNEXED TO MARRIAGE, AND FIRST OF THE PAYMENT OF THE MARRIAGE DEBT (TEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q64-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q64-p2"> In the next place we must consider those things which are annexed to marriage: (1) the payment of the marriage debt; (2)
+                  plurality of wives; (3) bigamy; (4) the bill of divorce; (5) illegitimate children.
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q64-p3"> Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q64-p4"> (1) Whether one spouse is bound to pay the marriage debt to the other?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q64-p5"> (2) Whether one is sometimes bound to pay without being asked?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q64-p6"> (3) Whether a wife may demand the debt during the menses?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q64-p7"> (4) Whether she is bound to pay it at that time?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q64-p8"> (5) Whether husband and wife are equal in this matter?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q64-p9"> (6) Whether the one without the other's consent may take a vow that prohibits the payment of the debt?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q64-p10"> (7) Whether it is forbidden to ask for the debt at any particular time?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q64-p11"> (8) Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for it at a holy time?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q64-p12"> (9) Whether it is an obligation to pay it at the time of a festival?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q64-p13"> (10) Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q64_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q64_A1-p0.1">Whether husband and wife are mutually bound to the payment of the marriage debt?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that husband and wife are not mutually bound, under the obligation of a precept, to the payment of the marriage
+                     debt. For no one is forbidden to receive the Eucharist on account of fulfilling a precept. Yet he who has had intercourse
+                     with his wife cannot partake of the flesh of the Lamb according to Jerome [*Serm. de Esu Agni viii] quoted in the text (Sent.
+                     iv, D, 32). Therefore the payment of the debt does not come under the obligation of a
+                     precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is lawful to everyone to abstain from what is hurtful to his person. But it is sometimes harmful to a person
+                     to pay the debt when asked, whether on account of sickness, or because they have already paid it. Therefore it would seem
+                     allowable to refuse the one who asks.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is a sin to render oneself unfit to fulfill an obligation of precept. If, therefore, the payment of the debt
+                     comes under the obligation of a precept, it would seem sinful to render oneself unfit for paying the debt, by fasting or otherwise
+                     weakening the body: but apparently this is untrue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12), marriage is directed to the begetting and rearing of children, as
+                     well as to the community of life. Now leprosy is opposed to both these ends of marriage, for since it is a contagious disease,
+                     the wife is not bound to cohabit with a leprous husband; and besides this disease is often transmitted to the offspring. Therefore
+                     it would seem that a wife is not bound to pay the debt to a leprous husband.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> As the slave is in the power of his master, so is one spouse in the power of the other (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:4</a>). But a slave is bound by an obligation of precept to pay his master the debt of his service according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.7" target="asv"> Rom. 13:7, </a> "Render . . . to all men their dues, tribute to whom tribute is due," etc. Therefore husband and wife are mutually bound
+                     to the payment of the marriage debt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p7"> Further, marriage is directed to the avoiding of fornication (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:2</a>). But this could not be the effect of marriage, if the one were not bound to pay the debt to the other when the latter is
+                     troubled with concupiscence. Therefore the payment of the debt is an obligation of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Marriage was instituted especially as fulfilling an office of nature. Wherefore in its act the movement of nature must be
+                     observed according to which the nutritive power administers to the generative power that alone which is in excess of what
+                     is required for the preservation of the individual: for the natural order requires that a thing should be first perfected
+                     in itself, and that afterwards it should communicate of its perfection to others: and this is
+                     also the order of charity which perfects nature. And therefore, since the wife has power over her husband only in relation
+                     to the generative power and not in relation to things directed to the preservation of the individual, the husband is bound
+                     to pay the debt to his wife, in matters pertaining to the begetting of children, with due regard however to his own welfare.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is possible through fulfilling a precept to render oneself unfit for the exercise of a sacred duty: thus a judge becomes
+                     irregular by sentencing a man to death. In like manner he who pays the marriage debt, in fulfillment of the precept, becomes
+                     unfit for the exercise of divine offices, not because the act in question is sinful, but on account of its carnal nature.
+                     And so, according to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 32), Jerome is speaking only of the
+                     ministers of the Church, and not of others who should be left to use their own discretion, because without sin they may either
+                     abstain out of reverence or receive Christ's body out of devotion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The wife has no power over her husband's body, except as is consistent with the welfare of his person, as stated above. Wherefore
+                     if she go beyond this in her demands, it is not a request for the debt, but an unjust exaction; and for this reason the husband
+                     is not bound to satisfy her.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the husband be rendered incapable of paying the debt through a cause consequent upon marriage, for instance through having
+                     already paid the debt and being unable to pay it, the wife has no right to ask again, and in doing so she behaves as a harlot
+                     rather than as a wife. But if he be rendered incapable through some other cause, then if this be a lawful cause, he is not
+                     bound, and she cannot ask, but if it be an unlawful cause, then he sins, and his
+                     wife's sin, should she fall into fornication on this account, is somewhat imputable to him. Hence he should endeavor to do
+                     his best that his wife may remain continent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Leprosy voids a betrothal but not a marriage. Wherefore a wife is bound to pay the debt even to a leprous husband. But she
+                     is not bound to cohabit with him, because she is not so liable to infection from marital intercourse as from continual cohabitation.
+                     And though the child begotten of them be diseased, it is better to be thus than not at all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q64_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q64_A2-p0.1">Whether a husband is bound to pay the debt if his wife does not ask for it?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the husband is not bound to pay the marriage debt if his wife does not ask for it. For an affirmative
+                     precept is binding only at a certain time. But the time fixed for the payment of the debt can only be when it is asked for.
+                     Therefore he is not bound to payment otherwise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we ought to presume the better things of everyone. Now even for married people it is better to be continent than
+                     to make use of marriage. Therefore unless she ask expressly for the debt, the husband should presume that it pleases her to
+                     be continent, and so he is not bound to pay her the debt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the wife has power over her husband, so has a master over his slave. Now a slave is not bound to serve his master
+                     save when the latter commands him. Therefore neither is a husband bound to pay the debt to his wife except when she demands
+                     it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the husband can sometimes request his wife not to exact the debt when she asks for it. Much more therefore may he
+                     not pay it when he is not asked.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> By the payment of the debt a remedy is afforded against the wife's concupiscence. Now a physician who has the care of a sick
+                     person is bound to remedy the disease without being asked. Therefore the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife although
+                     she ask not for it. Further, a superior is bound to apply a remedy for the sins of his subjects even though they rebel against
+                     it. But the payment of the debt on the husband's part is directed against the
+                     sins of his wife. Therefore sometimes the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife even though she ask it not of him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The debt may be demanded in two ways. First, explicitly, as when they ask one another by words; secondly, implicitly, when
+                     namely the husband knows by certain signs that the wife would wish him to pay the debt, but is silent through shame. And so
+                     even though she does not ask for the debt explicitly in words, the husband is bound to pay it, whenever his wife shows signs
+                     of wishing him to do so.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The appointed time is not only when it is demanded but also when on account of certain signs there is fear of danger (to
+                     avoid which is the purpose of the payment of the debt) unless it be paid then.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The husband may presume this of his wife when he perceives in her no signs of the contrary; but it would be foolish of him
+                     to admit this presumption if he does see such signs.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The master is not ashamed to demand of his slave the duty of his service, as a wife is to ask the marriage debt of her husband.
+                     Yet if the master were not to demand it, either through ignorance or some other cause, the slave would nevertheless be bound
+                     to fulfill his duty, if some danger were threatening. For this is what is meant by "not serving to the eye" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.6" target="asv">Eph. 6:6</a>; 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Col.3.22" target="asv">Col. 3:22</a>) which is the Apostle's command to servants.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A husband should not dissuade his wife from asking for the debt, except for a reasonable cause; and even then he should not
+                     be too insistent, on account of the besetting danger.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q64_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q64_A3-p0.1">Whether it is allowable for a menstruous wife to ask for the marriage debt? [*This and the Fourth Article are omitted in the
+                     Leonine edition.]
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem lawful for a menstruous wife to ask for the marriage debt. For in the Law a man who had an issue of seed was
+                     unclean, even as a menstruous woman. Yet a man who has an issue of seed may ask for the debt. Therefore a menstruous wife
+                     may also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, leprosy is a worse complaint than suffering from monthly periods, and would seem to cause a greater corruption in
+                     the offspring. Yet a leper can ask for the debt. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a menstruous wife is not allowed to ask for the debt, this can only be because it is feared this may be detrimental
+                     to the offspring. Yet if the wife be unfruitful there is no such fear. Therefore, seemingly, at least an unfruitful wife may
+                     ask for the debt during her menses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "Thou shalt not approach to a woman having her flowers" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.19" target="asv">Lev. 18:19</a>) where Augustine observes: "Although he has already sufficiently forbidden this he repeats the prohibition here lest he seem
+                     to have spoken figuratively."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p6"> Further, "All our justices" are become "as the rag of a menstruous woman" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.64.6" target="asv">Is. 64:6</a>) where Jerome observes: "Men ought then to keep away from their wives because thus is a deformed blind lame leprous offspring
+                     conceived: so that those parents who are not ashamed to come together in sexual intercourse have their sin made obvious to
+                     all": and thus the same conclusion follows.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It was forbidden in the Law to approach to a menstruous woman, for two reasons both on account of her uncleanness, and on
+                     account of the harm that frequently resulted to the offspring from such intercourse. With regard to the first reason, it was
+                     a ceremonial precept, but with regard to the second it was a moral precept. For since marriage is chiefly directed to the
+                     good of the offspring, all use of marriage which is intended for the good of the offspring is
+                     in order. Consequently this precept is binding even in the New Law on account of the second reason, although not on account
+                     of the first. Now, the menstrual issue may be natural or unnatural. The natural issue is that to which women are subject at
+                     stated periods when they are in good health; and it is unnatural when they suffer from an issue of blood through some disorder
+                     resulting from sickness. Accordingly if the menstrual flow be unnatural it is not forbidden in the New Law to approach to
+                     a
+                     menstruous woman both on account of her infirmity since a woman in that state cannot conceive, and because an issue of this
+                     kind is lasting and continuous, so that the husband would have to abstain for always. When however the woman is subject to
+                     a natural issue of the menstruum, she can conceive; moreover, the said issue lasts only a short time, wherefore it is forbidden
+                     to approach to her. In like manner a woman is forbidden to ask for the debt during the period of that issue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The issue of seed in a man is the result of infirmity, nor is the seed in this case apt for generation. Moreover a complaint
+                     of this kind is continual or lasting like leprosy: wherefore the comparison falls.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p9"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As long as a woman is subject to the menses it cannot be certain that she is sterile. For some are sterile in youth, and
+                     in course of time become fruitful, and "vice versa," as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Anim. xvi).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q64_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q64_A4-p0.1">Whether a menstruous woman should or may lawfully pay the marriage debt to her husband if he ask for it? [*This and the previous
+                     article are omitted in the Leonine edition.]
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a menstruous wife may not pay the marriage debt to her husband at his asking. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.20.18" target="asv">Lev. 20:18</a>) that if any man approach to a menstruous woman both shall be put to death. Therefore it would seem that both he who asks
+                     and she who grants are guilty of mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Not only they that do them but they also that consent to them are worthy of death" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.32" target="asv">Rom. 1:32</a>). Now he who knowingly asks for the debt from a menstruous woman sins mortally. Therefore she also sins mortally by consenting
+                     to pay the debt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a madman must not be given back his sword lest he kill himself or another. Therefore in like manner neither should
+                     a wife give her body to her husband during her menses, lest he be guilty of spiritual murder.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:4</a>). Therefore at his asking his wife must pay the debt even during her menses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p6"> Further, the menstruous wife should not be an occasion of sin to her husband. But she would give her husband an occasion
+                     of sin, if she paid him not the debt at his asking; since he might commit fornication. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In this regard some have asserted that a menstruous woman may not pay the debt even as she may not ask for it. For just as
+                     she would not be bound to pay it if she had some personal ailment so as to make it dangerous for herself, so is she not bound
+                     to pay for fear of danger to the offspring. But this opinion would seem to derogate from marriage, by which the husband is
+                     given entire power of his wife's body with regard to the marriage act. Nor is there any
+                     parallel between bodily affliction of the offspring and the danger to her own body: since, if the wife be ailing, it is quite
+                     certain that she would be endangered by the carnal act, whereas this is by no means so certain with regard to the offspring
+                     which perhaps would not be forthcoming.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p8"> Wherefore others say that a menstruous woman is never allowed to ask for the debt; and that if her husband ask, he does so
+                     either knowingly or in ignorance. If knowingly, she ought to dissuade him by her prayers and admonitions; yet not so insistently
+                     as possibly to afford him an occasion of falling into other, and those sinful, practices, if he be deemed that way inclined.
+                     If however, he ask in ignorance, the wife may put forward some motive, or allege sickness as a reason for
+                     not paying the debt, unless there be fear of danger to her husband. If, however, the husband ultimately persists in his request,
+                     she must yield to his demand. But it would not be safe for her to make known [*"Indicare," as in the commentary on the Sentences;
+                     the Leonine edition reads "judicare."] her disaffection, lest this make her husband entertain a repulsion towards her, unless
+                     his prudence may be taken for granted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This refers to the case when both willingly consent, but not when the woman pays the debt by force as it were.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since there is no consent without the concurrence of the will, the woman is not deemed to consent in her husband's sin unless
+                     she pay the debt willingly. For when she is unwilling she is passive rather than consenting.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A madman should be given back his sword if a greater danger were feared from its not being returned to him: and thus it is
+                     in the case in point.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q64_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q64_A5-p0.1">Whether husband and wife are equal in the marriage act?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that husband and wife are not equal in the marriage act. For according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) the
+                     agent is more noble than the patient. But in the marriage act the husband is as agent and the wife as patient. Therefore they
+                     are not equal in that act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the wife is not bound to pay her husband the debt without being asked; whereas he is so bound, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q64_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q64_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore they are not equal in the marriage act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the woman was made on the man's account in reference to marriage according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.18" target="asv"> Gn. 2:18, </a> "Let us make him a help like unto himself." But that on account of which another thing is, is always the principal. Therefore,
+                     etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the marriage act. But in marriage "the husband is the head of the wife" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.23" target="asv">Eph. 5:23</a>). Therefore they are not equal in the aforesaid act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:4</a>): "The husband . . . hath not power of his own body," and the same is said of the wife. Therefore they are equal in the marriage
+                     act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p7"> Further, Marriage is a relation of equiparence, since it is a kind of union, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q64_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,3). Therefore husband and wife are equal in the marriage act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Equality is twofold, of quantity and of proportion. Equality of quantity is that which is observed between two quantities
+                     of the same measure, for instance a thing two cubits long and another two cubits in length. But equality of proportion is
+                     that which is observed between two proportions of the same kind as double to double. Accordingly, speaking of the first equality,
+                     husband and wife are not equal in marriage; neither as regards the marriage act, wherein
+                     the more noble part is due to the husband, nor as regards the household management, wherein the wife is ruled and the husband
+                     rules. But with reference to the second kind of equality, they are equal in both matters, because just as in both the marriage
+                     act and in the management of the household the husband is bound to the wife in all things pertaining to the husband, so is
+                     the wife bound to the husband in all things pertaining to the wife. It is in this sense that it is stated in the text
+                     (Sent. iv, D, 32) that they are equal in paying and demanding the debt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is more noble to be active than passive, there is the same proportion between patient and passivity as between
+                     agent and activity; and accordingly there is equality of proportion between them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This is accidental. For the husband having the more noble part in the marriage act, it is natural that he should be less
+                     ashamed than the wife to ask for the debt. Hence it is that the wife is not bound to pay the debt to her husband without being
+                     asked, whereas the husband is bound to pay it to the wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This proves that they are not equal absolutely, but not that they are not equal in proportion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the head is the principal member, yet just as the members are bound to the head in their own respective capacities,
+                     so is the head in its own capacity bound to the members: and thus there is equality of proportion between them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q64_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q64_A6-p0.1">Whether husband and wife can take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that husband and wife may take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent. For husband
+                     and wife are equally bound to pay the debt, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q64_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q64_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Now it is lawful for the husband, even if his wife be unwilling, to take the cross in defense of the Holy Land: and consequently
+                     this is also lawful to the wife. Therefore, since this prevents the payment of the debt, either husband or wife may
+                     without the other's consent take the aforesaid vow.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in taking a vow one should not await the consent of another who cannot dissent without sin. Now the husband or wife
+                     cannot, without sin, refuse their consent to the other's taking a vow of continence whether absolutely or for a time; because
+                     to prevent a person's spiritual progress is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore the one can take a vow of continence either
+                     absolutely or for a time, without the other's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the marriage act, the debt has to be demanded just as it has to be paid. Now the one can, without the other's
+                     consent, vow not to demand the debt, since in this he is within his own rights. Therefore he can equally take a vow not to
+                     pay the debt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no one can be bound by the command of a superior to do what he cannot lawfully vow or do simply, since one must
+                     not obey in what is unlawful. Now the superior authority might command the husband not to pay the debt to his wife for a time,
+                     by occupying him in some service. Therefore he might, of his own accord, do or vow that which would hinder him from paying
+                     the debt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:5</a>): "Defraud not one another, except . . . by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p7"> Further, no one can vow that which belongs to another. Now "the husband . . . hath not power of his own body, but the wife"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:4</a>). Therefore, without her consent, the husband cannot take a vow of continence whether absolutely or for a time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A vow is a voluntary act, as its very name implies: and consequently a vow can only be about those goods which are subject
+                     to our will, and those in which one person is bound to another do not come under this head. Therefore in matters of this kind
+                     one person cannot take a vow without the consent of the one to whom he is bound. Consequently, since husband and wife are
+                     mutually bound as regards the payment of the debt which is an obstacle to continence, the
+                     one cannot vow continence without the other's consent; and if he take the vow he sins, and must not keep the vow, but must
+                     do penance for an ill-taken vow [*Cf.
+                     <a id="XP_Q64_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q53_A1.html"> Q[53], AA[1]</a>,4;
+                     <a id="XP_Q64_A6-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q61_A1.html"> Q[61], A[1]</a>].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is sufficiently probable that the wife ought to be willing to remain continent for a time, in order to succor the need
+                     of the universal Church. Hence in favor of the business for which the cross is given to him, it is laid down that the husband
+                     may take the cross without his wife's consent, even as he might go fighting without the consent of his landlord whose land
+                     he has leased. And yet the wife is not entirely deprived of her right, since she can
+                     follow him. Nor is there a parallel between wife and husband: because, since the husband has to rule the wife and not "vice
+                     versa," the wife is bound to follow her husband rather than the husband the wife. Moreover there would be more danger to the
+                     wife's chastity as a result of wandering from country to country, than to the husband's, and less profit to the Church. Wherefore
+                     the wife cannot take this vow without her husband's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The one spouse, by refusing to consent to the other's vow of continence, does not sin, because the object of his dissent
+                     is to hinder not the other's good, but the harm to himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two opinions on this point. For some say that one can without the other's consent vow not to demand the debt, not
+                     however not to pay it, because in the former case they are both within their own rights, but not in the second. Seeing, however,
+                     that if one were never to ask for the debt, marriage would become too burdensome to the other who would always have to undergo
+                     the shame of asking for the debt, others assert with greater probability
+                     that neither vow can be lawfully taken by one spouse without the other's consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Just as the wife receives power over her husband's body, without prejudice to the husband's duty to his own body, so also
+                     is it without prejudice to his duty to his master. Hence just as a wife cannot ask her husband for the debt to the detriment
+                     of his bodily health, so neither can she do this so as to hinder him in his duty to his master. And yet the master cannot
+                     for this reason prevent her from paying the debt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q64_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q64_A7-p0.1">Whether it is forbidden to demand the debt on holy days?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a person ought not to be forbidden to ask for the debt on holy days. For the remedy should be applied
+                     when the disease gains strength. Now concupiscence may possibly gain strength on a feast day. Therefore the remedy should
+                     be applied then by asking for the debt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the only reason why the debt should not be demanded on feast days is because they are devoted to prayer. Yet on
+                     those days certain hours are appointed for prayer. Therefore one may ask for the debt at some other time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Just as certain places are holy because they are devoted to holy things, so are certain times holy for the same reason. But
+                     it is not lawful to demand the debt in a holy place. Therefore neither is it lawful at a holy time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Although the marriage act is void of sin, nevertheless since it oppresses the reason on account of the carnal pleasure, it
+                     renders man unfit for spiritual things. Therefore, on those days when one ought especially to give one's time to spiritual
+                     things, it is not lawful to ask for the debt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> At such a time other means may be employed for the repression of concupiscence; for instance, prayer and many similar things,
+                     to which even those who observe perpetual continence have recourse.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although one is not bound to pray at all hours, one is bound throughout the day to keep oneself fit for prayer.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q64_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q64_A8-p0.1">Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time. For Gregory says (Dial. i) that the devil took
+                     possession of a woman who had intercourse with her husband at night and came in the morning to the procession. But this would
+                     not have happened had she not sinned mortally. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever disobeys a Divine command commits a mortal sin. Now the Lord commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.19.15" target="asv">Ex. 19:15</a>): "Come not near your wives," when namely they were about to receive the Law. Much more therefore do husbands sin mortally
+                     if they have intercourse with their wives at a time when they should be intent on the sacred observances of the New Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No circumstance aggravates infinitely. But undue time is a circumstance. Therefore it does not aggravate a sin infinitely,
+                     so as to make mortal what was otherwise venial.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> To ask for the debt on a feast day is not a circumstance drawing a sin into another species; wherefore it cannot aggravate
+                     infinitely. Consequently a wife or husband does not sin mortally by asking for the debt on a feast day. It is however a more
+                     grievous sin to ask for the sake of mere pleasure, than through fear of the weakness of the flesh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This woman was punished not because she paid the debt, but because afterwards she rashly intruded into the divine service
+                     against her conscience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The authority quoted shows not that it is a mortal sin but that it is unbecoming. For under the Old Law which was given to
+                     a carnal people many things were required under an obligation of precept, for the sake of bodily cleanness, which are not
+                     required in the New Law which is the law of the spirit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q64_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q64_A9-p0.1">Whether one spouse is bound to pay the debt to the other at a festal time?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that neither are they bound to pay the debt at a festal time. For those who commit a sin as well as those who
+                     consent thereto are equally punished (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.32" target="asv">Rom. 1:32</a>). But the one who pays the debt consents with the one that asks, who sins. Therefore he sins also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is an affirmative precept that binds us to pray, and therefore we are bound to do so at a fixed time. Therefore
+                     one ought not to pay the debt at a time when one is bound to pray, as neither ought one at a time when one is bound to fulfill
+                     a special duty towards a temporal master.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A9-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:5</a>): "Defraud not one another, except by consent, for a time," etc. Therefore when one spouse asks the other must pay.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since the wife has power of her husband's body, and "vice versa," with regard to the act of procreation, the one is bound
+                     to pay the debt to the other, at any season or hour, with due regard to the decorum required in such matters, for this must
+                     not be done at once openly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As far as he is concerned he does not consent, but grants unwillingly and with grief that which is exacted of him; and consequently
+                     he does not sin. For it is ordained by God, on account of the weakness of the flesh, that the debt must always be paid to
+                     the one who asks lest he be afforded an occasion of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No hour is fixed for praying, but that compensation can be made at some other hour; wherefore the argument is not cogent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q64_A10" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q64_A10-p0.1">Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times? [*This article is omitted in the Leonine edition.]</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that weddings ought not to be forbidden at certain times. For marriage is a sacrament: and the celebration
+                     of the others sacraments is not forbidden at those times. Therefore neither should the celebration of marriage be forbidden
+                     then.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, asking for the marriage debt is more unbecoming on feast days than the celebration of marriage. Yet the debt may
+                     be asked for on those days. Therefore also marriages may be solemnized.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, marriages that are contracted in despite of the law of the Church ought to be dissolved. Yet marriages are not dissolved
+                     if they be contracted at those times. Therefore it should not be forbidden by a commandment of the Church.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A10-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.5" target="asv">Eccles. 3:5</a>): "A time to embrace, and a time to be far from embraces."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> When the newly married spouse is given to her husband, the minds of husband and wife are taken up with carnal preoccupations
+                     by reason of the very newness of things, wherefore weddings are wont to be signalized by much unrestrained rejoicing. On this
+                     account it is forbidden to celebrate marriages at those times when men ought especially to arise to spiritual things. Those
+                     times are from Advent until the Epiphany because of the Communion which, according to
+                     the ancient Canons, is wont to be made at Christmas (as was observed in its proper place, 
+                     <a id="XP_Q64_A10-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q30.html">TP, Q[30])</a>, from Septuagesima until the octave day of Easter, on account of the Easter Communion, and from the three days before the
+                     Ascension until the octave day of Pentecost, on account of the preparation for Communion to be received at that time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The celebration of marriage has a certain worldly and carnal rejoicing connected with it, which does not apply to the other
+                     sacraments. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is not such a distraction of minds caused by the payment of a request for the debt as by the celebration of a marriage;
+                     and consequently the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since time is not essential to a marriage contracted within the forbidden seasons, the marriage is nevertheless a true sacrament.
+                     Nor is the marriage dissolved absolutely, but for a time, that they may do penance for having disobeyed the commandment of
+                     the Church. It is thus that we are to understand the statement of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 33), namely that should a marriage
+                     have been contracted or a wedding celebrated at the aforesaid times, those
+                     who have done so "ought to be separated." Nor does he say this on his own authority, but in reference to some canonical ordinance,
+                     such as that of the Council of Lerida, which decision is quoted by the Decretals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q65" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A10.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q65-p0.1">OF PLURALITY OF WIVES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q65-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q65-p2"> We must now consider the plurality of wives. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q65-p3"> (1) Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q65-p4"> (2) Whether this was ever lawful?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q65-p5"> (3) Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q65-p6"> (4) Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q65-p7"> (5) Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q65_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q65_A1-p0.1">Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not against the natural law to have several wives. For custom does not prejudice the law of nature.
+                     But "it was not a sin" to have several wives "when this was the custom," according to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xv) as quoted
+                     in the text (Sent. iv, D, 33). Therefore it is not contrary to the natural law to have several wives.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever acts in opposition to the natural law, disobeys a commandment, for the law of nature has its commandments
+                     even as the written law has. Now Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xv; De Civ. Dei xv, 38) that "it was not contrary to a commandment"
+                     to have several wives, "because by no law was it forbidden." Therefore it is not against the natural law to have several wives.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the begetting of offspring. But one man may get children of several women, by causing
+                     them to be pregnant. Therefore It is not against the natural law to have several wives.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "Natural right is that which nature has taught all animals," as stated at the beginning of the Digests (1, i, ff.
+                     De just. et jure). Now nature has not taught all animals that one male should be united to but one female, since with many
+                     animals the one male is united to several females. Therefore it is not against the natural law to have several wives.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i, 20), in the begetting of offspring the male is to the female
+                     as agent to patient, and as the craftsman is to his material. But it is not against the order of nature for one agent to act
+                     on several patients, or for one craftsman to work in several materials. Therefore neither is it contrary to the law of nature
+                     for one husband to have many wives.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> On the contrary, That which was instilled into man at the formation of human nature would seem especially to belong to the
+                     natural law. Now it was instilled into him at the very formation of human nature that one man should have one wife, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.24" target="asv"> Gn. 2:24, </a> "They shall be two in one flesh." Therefore it is of natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, it is contrary to the law of nature that man should bind himself to the impossible, and that what is given to one
+                     should be given to another. Now when a man contracts with a wife, he gives her the power of his body, so that he is bound
+                     to pay her the debt when she asks. Therefore it is against the law of nature that he should afterwards give the power of his
+                     body to another, because it would be impossible for him to pay both were both to ask at the
+                     same time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, "Do not to another what thou wouldst not were done to thyself" [*Cf.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.4.16" target="asv"> Tob. 4:16</a>] is a precept of the natural law. But a husband would by no means be willing for his wife to have another husband. Therefore
+                     he would be acting against the law of nature, were he to have another wife in addition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, whatever is against the natural desire is contrary to the natural law. Now a husband's jealousy of his wife and
+                     the wife's jealousy of her husband are natural, for they are found in all. Therefore, since jealousy is "love impatient of
+                     sharing the beloved," it would seem to be contrary to the natural law that several wives should share one husband.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p11">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> All natural things are imbued with certain principles whereby they are enabled not only to exercise their proper actions,
+                     but also to render those actions proportionate to their end, whether such actions belong to a thing by virtue of its generic
+                     nature, or by virtue of its specific nature: thus it belongs to a magnet to be borne downwards by virtue of its generic nature,
+                     and to attract iron by virtue of its specific nature. Now just as in those things which
+                     act from natural necessity the principle of action is the form itself, whence their proper actions proceed proportionately
+                     to their end, so in things which are endowed with knowledge the principles of action are knowledge and appetite. Hence in
+                     the cognitive power there needs to be a natural concept, and in the appetitive power a natural inclination, whereby the action
+                     befitting the genus or species is rendered proportionate to the end. Now since man, of all animals, knows the aspect of the
+                     end, and the proportion of the action to the end, it follows that he is imbued with a natural concept, whereby he is directed
+                     to act in a befitting manner, and this is called "the natural law" or "the natural right," but in other animals "the natural
+                     instinct." For brutes are rather impelled by the force of nature to do befitting actions, than guided to act on their own
+                     judgment. Therefore the natural law is nothing else than a concept naturally instilled into man, whereby he is guided to act
+                     in a befitting manner in his proper actions, whether they are competent to him by virtue of his generic nature, as, for instance,
+                     to beget, to eat, and so on, or belong to him by virtue of his specific nature, as, for instance, to reason and so forth.
+                     Now whatever renders an action improportionate to the end which nature intends to obtain by a certain work is said to be contrary
+                     to the natural law. But an action may be improportionate either to the principal or to the secondary end, and in
+                     either case this happens in two ways. First, on account of something which wholly hinders the end; for instance a very great
+                     excess or a very great deficiency in eating hinders both the health of the body, which is the principal end of food, and aptitude
+                     for conducting business, which is its secondary end. Secondly, on account of something that renders the attainment of the
+                     principal or secondary end difficult, or less satisfactory, for instance eating inordinately in respect of undue time.
+                     Accordingly if an action be improportionate to the end, through altogether hindering the principal end directly, it is forbidden
+                     by the first precepts of the natural law, which hold the same place in practical matters, as the general concepts of the mind
+                     in speculative matters. If, however, it be in any way improportionate to the secondary end, or again to the principal end,
+                     as rendering its attainment difficult or less satisfactory, it is forbidden, not indeed by the first precepts of the
+                     natural law, but by the second which are derived from the first even as conclusions in speculative matters receive our assent
+                     by virtue of self-known principles: and thus the act in question is said to be against the law of nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p12"> Now marriage has for its principal end the begetting and rearing of children, and this end is competent to man according
+                     to his generic nature, wherefore it is common to other animals (Ethic. viii, 12), and thus it is that the "offspring" is assigned
+                     as a marriage good. But for its secondary end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), it has, among men alone, the community
+                     of works that are a necessity of life, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q65_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html">Q[41], A[1]</a>). And in
+                     reference to this they owe one another "fidelity" which is one of the goods of marriage. Furthermore it has another end, as
+                     regards marriage between believers, namely the signification of Christ and the Church: and thus the "sacrament" is said to
+                     be a marriage good. Wherefore the first end corresponds to the marriage of man inasmuch as he is an animal: the second, inasmuch
+                     as he is a man; the third, inasmuch as he is a believer. Accordingly plurality of wives neither wholly destroys nor in any
+                     way hinders the first end of marriage, since one man is sufficient to get children of several wives, and to rear the children
+                     born of them. But though it does not wholly destroy the second end, it hinders it considerably for there cannot easily be
+                     peace in a family where several wives are joined to one husband, since one husband cannot suffice to satisfy the requisitions
+                     of several wives, and again because the sharing of several in one occupation is a cause of strife: thus "potters quarrel with
+                     one another" [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 4], and in like manner the several wives of one husband. The third end, it removes altogether,
+                     because as Christ is one, so also is the Church one. It is therefore evident from what has been said that plurality of wives
+                     is in a way against the law of nature, and in a way not against it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Custom does not prejudice the law of nature as regards the first precepts of the latter, which are like the general concepts
+                     of the mind in speculative matters. But those which are drawn like conclusions from these custom enforces, as Tully declares
+                     (De Inv. Rhet. ii), or weakens. Such is the precept of nature in the matter of having one wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii), "fear of the law and religion have sanctioned those things that come from nature and are
+                     approved by custom." Wherefore it is evident that those dictates of the natural law, which are derived from the first principles
+                     as it were of the natural law, have not the binding force of an absolute commandment, except when they have been sanctioned
+                     by Divine or human law. This is what Augustine means by saying that "they did
+                     not disobey the commandments of the law, since it was not forbidden by any law."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p15"> The Reply to the Third Objection follows from what has been said.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Natural right has several significations. First a right is said to be natural by its principle, because it is instilled by
+                     nature: and thus Tully defines it (De Inv. Rhet. ii) when he says: "Natural right is not the result of opinion but the product
+                     of an innate force." And since even in natural things certain movements are called natural, not that they be from an intrinsic
+                     principle, but because they are from a higher moving principle---thus the
+                     movements that are caused in the elements by the impress of heavenly bodies are said to be natural, as the Commentator states
+                     (De Coelo et Mundo iii, 28), therefore those things that are of Divine right are said to be of natural right, because they
+                     are caused by the impress and influence of a higher principle, namely God. Isidore takes it in this sense, when he says (Etym.
+                     v) that "the natural right is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." Thirdly, right is said to be natural not
+                     only from its principle but also from its matter, because it is about natural things. And since nature is contradistinguished
+                     with reason, whereby man is a man, it follows that if we take natural right in its strictest sense, those things which are
+                     dictated by natural reason and pertain to man alone are not said to be of natural right, but only those which are dictated
+                     by natural reason and are common to man and other animals. Thus we have the aforesaid definition, namely: "Natural right is
+                     what nature has taught all animals." Accordingly plurality of wives, though not contrary to natural right taken in the third
+                     sense, is nevertheless against natural right taken in the second sense, because it is forbidden by the Divine law. It is also
+                     against natural right taken in the first sense, as appears from what has been said, for such is nature's dictate to every
+                     animal according to the mode befitting its nature. Wherefore also certain animals, the rearing of whose offspring demands
+                     the
+                     care of both, namely the male and female, by natural instinct cling to the union of one with one, for instance the turtle-dove,
+                     the dove, and so forth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p17"> The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what has been said.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p18"> Since, however, the arguments adduced "on the contrary side" would seem to show that plurality of wives is against the first
+                     principles of the natural law, we must reply to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p19"> Accordingly we reply to the Sixth Objection that human nature was founded without any defect, and consequently it is endowed
+                     not only with those things without which the principal end of marriage is impossible of attainment, but also with those without
+                     which the secondary end of marriage could not be obtained without difficulty: and in this way it sufficed man when he was
+                     first formed to have one wife, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p20">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> In marriage the husband gives his wife power of his body, not in all respects, but only in those things that are required
+                     by marriage. Now marriage does not require the husband to pay the debt every time his wife asks for it, if we consider the
+                     principal end for which marriage was instituted, namely the good of the offspring, but only as far as is necessary for impregnation.
+                     But in so far as it is instituted as a remedy (which is its secondary end),
+                     marriage does require the debt to be paid at all times on being asked for. Hence it is evident that by taking several wives
+                     a man does not bind himself to the impossible, considering the principal end of marriage; and therefore plurality of wives
+                     is not against the first principles of the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p21">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> This precept of the natural law, "Do not to another what thou wouldst not were done to thyself," should be understood with
+                     the proviso that there be equal proportion. For if a superior is unwilling to be withstood by his subject, he is not therefore
+                     bound not to withstand his subject. Hence it does not follow in virtue of this precept that as a husband is unwilling for
+                     his wife to have another husband, he must not have another wife: because for one
+                     man to have several wives is not contrary to the first principles of the natural law, as stated above: whereas for one wife
+                     to have several husbands is contrary to the first principles of the natural law, since thereby the good of the offspring which
+                     is the principal end of marriage is, in one respect, entirely destroyed, and in another respect hindered. For the good of
+                     the offspring means not only begetting, but also rearing. Now the begetting of offspring, though not wholly voided (since
+                     a
+                     woman may be impregnated a second time after impregnation has already taken place, as stated in De Gener. Animal. vii. 4),
+                     is nevertheless considerably hindered, because this can scarcely happen without injury either to both fetus or to one of them.
+                     But the rearing of the offspring is altogether done away, because as a result of one woman having several husbands there follows
+                     uncertainty of the offspring in relation to its father, whose care is necessary for its education. Wherefore the
+                     marriage of one wife with several husbands has not been sanctioned by any law or custom, whereas the converse has been.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p22">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> The natural inclination in the appetitive power follows the natural concept in the cognitive power. And since it is not so
+                     much opposed to the natural concept for a man to have several wives as for a wife to have several husbands, it follows that
+                     a wife's love is not so averse to another sharing the same husband with her, as a husband's love is to another sharing the
+                     same wife with him. Consequently both in man and in other animals the male is more
+                     jealous of the female than "vice versa."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p23"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p24"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q65_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q65_A2-p0.1">Whether it was ever lawful to have several wives?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it can never have been lawful to have several wives. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7),
+                     "The natural law has the same power at all times and places." Now plurality of wives is forbidden by the natural law, as stated
+                     above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q65_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore as it is unlawful now, it was unlawful at all times.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it was ever lawful, this could only be because it was lawful either in itself, or by dispensation. If the former,
+                     it would also be lawful now; if the latter, this is impossible, for according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3), "as God
+                     is the founder of nature, He does nothing contrary to the principles which He has planted in nature." Since then God has planted
+                     in our nature the principle that one man should be united to one wife, it would seem
+                     that He has never dispensed man from this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a thing be lawful by dispensation, it is only lawful for those who receive the dispensation. Now we do not read
+                     in the Law of a general dispensation having been granted to all. Since then in the Old Testament all who wished to do so,
+                     without any distinction, took to themselves several wives, nor were reproached on that account, either by the law or by the
+                     prophets, it would seem that it was not made lawful by dispensation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where there is the same reason for dispensation, the same dispensation should be given. Now we cannot assign any
+                     other reason for dispensation than the multiplying of the offspring for the worship of God, and this is necessary also now.
+                     Therefore this dispensation would be still in force, especially as we read nowhere of its having been recalled.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, in granting a dispensation the greater good should not be overlooked for the sake of a lesser good. Now fidelity
+                     and the sacrament, which it would seem impossible to safeguard in a marriage where one man is joined to several wives, are
+                     greater goods than the multiplication of the offspring. Therefore this dispensation ought not to have been granted with a
+                     view to this multiplication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.19" target="asv">Gal. 3:19</a>) that the Law "was set because of transgressors [Vulg.: 'transgressions']," namely in order to prohibit them. Now the Old
+                     Law mentions plurality of wives without any prohibition thereof, as appears from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.15" target="asv"> Dt. 21:15, </a> "If a man have two wives," etc. Therefore they were not transgressors through having two wives; and so it was lawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p8"> Further, this is confirmed by the example of the holy patriarchs, who are stated to have had several wives, and yet were
+                     most pleasing to God, for instance Jacob, David, and several others. Therefore at one time it was lawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8), plurality of wives is said to be against the natural law, not as regards its first precepts,
+                     but as regards the secondary precepts, which like conclusions are drawn from its first precepts. Since, however, human acts
+                     must needs vary according to the various conditions of persons, times, and other circumstances, the aforesaid conclusions
+                     do not proceed from the first precepts of the natural law, so as to be binding in all
+                     cases, but only in the majority. for such is the entire matter of Ethics according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3,7). Hence,
+                     when they cease to be binding, it is lawful to disregard them. But because it is not easy to determine the above variations,
+                     it belongs exclusively to him from whose authority he derives its binding force to permit the non-observance of the law in
+                     those cases to which the force of the law ought not to extend, and this permission is called a dispensation. Now the law
+                     prescribing the one wife was framed not by man but by God, nor was it ever given by word or in writing, but was imprinted
+                     on the heart, like other things belonging in any way to the natural law. Consequently a dispensation in this matter could
+                     be granted by God alone through an inward inspiration, vouchsafed originally to the holy patriarchs, and by their example
+                     continued to others, at a time when it behooved the aforesaid precept not to be observed, in order to ensure the multiplication
+                     of
+                     the offspring to be brought up in the worship of God. For the principal end is ever to be borne in mind before the secondary
+                     end. Wherefore, since the good of the offspring is the principal end of marriage, it behooved to disregard for a time the
+                     impediment that might arise to the secondary ends, when it was necessary for the offspring to be multiplied; because it was
+                     for the removal of this impediment that the precept forbidding a plurality of wives was framed, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="XP_Q65_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html">(A[1])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The natural law, considered in itself, has the same force at all times and places; but accidentally on account of some impediment
+                     it may vary at certain times and places, as the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3,7) instances in the case of other natural things.
+                     For at all times and places the right hand is better than the left according to nature, but it may happen accidentally that
+                     a person is ambidextrous, because our nature is variable; and the same applies
+                     to the natural, just as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 3,7).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In a Decretal (De divortiis, cap. Gaudemus) it is asserted that is was never lawful to have several wives without having
+                     a dispensation received through Divine inspiration. Nor is the dispensation thus granted a contradiction to the principles
+                     which God has implanted in nature, but an exception to them, because those principles are not intended to apply to all cases
+                     but to the majority, as stated. Even so it is not contrary to nature when certain
+                     occurrences take place in natural things miraculously, by way of exception to more frequent occurrences.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Dispensation from a law should follow the quality of the law. Wherefore, since the law of nature is imprinted on the heart,
+                     it was not necessary for a dispensation from things pertaining to the natural law to be given under the form of a written
+                     law but by internal inspiration.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When Christ came it was the time of the fulness of the grace of Christ, whereby the worship of God was spread abroad among
+                     all nations by a spiritual propagation. Hence there is not the same reason for a dispensation as before Christ's coming, when
+                     the worship of God was spread and safeguarded by a carnal propagation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The offspring, considered as one of the marriage goods, includes the keeping of faith with God, because the reason why it
+                     is reckoned a marriage good is because it is awaited with a view to its being brought up in the worship of God. Now the faith
+                     to be kept with God is of greater import than the faith to be kept with a wife, which is reckoned a marriage good, and than
+                     the signification which pertains to the sacrament, since the signification is
+                     subordinate to the knowledge of faith. Hence it is not unfitting if something is taken from the two other goods for the sake
+                     of the good of the offspring. Nor are they entirely done away, since there remains faith towards several wives; and the sacrament
+                     remains after a fashion, for though it did not signify the union of Christ with the Church as one, nevertheless the plurality
+                     of wives signified the distinction of degrees in the Church, which distinction is not only in the Church militant but
+                     also in the Church triumphant. Consequently their marriages signified somewhat the union of Christ not only with the Church
+                     militant, as some say, but also with the Church triumphant where there are "many mansions" [*
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A2-p14.1" href="./asv.html#John.19.2" target="asv">Jn. 19:2</a>].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q65_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q65_A3-p0.1">Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to have a concubine is not against the natural law. For the ceremonies of the Law are not of the natural
+                     law. But fornication is forbidden (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.29" target="asv">Acts 15:29</a>) in conjunction with ceremonies of the law which for the time were being imposed on those who were brought to the faith from
+                     among the heathens. Therefore simple fornication which is intercourse with a concubine is not against the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, positive law is an outcome of the natural law, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Now fornication was not forbidden
+                     by positive law; indeed according to the ancient laws women used to be sentenced to be taken to brothels. Therefore it is
+                     not against the natural law to have a concubine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the natural law does not forbid that which is given simply, to be given for a time or under certain restrictions.
+                     Now one unmarried woman may give the power of her body for ever to an unmarried man, so that he may use her when he will.
+                     Therefore it is not against the law of nature, if she give him power of her body for a time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever uses his own property as he will, injures no one. But a bondswoman is her master's property. Therefore if
+                     her master use her as he will, he injures no one: and consequently it is not against the natural law to have a concubine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, everyone may give his own property to another. Now the wife has power of her husband's body (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:4</a>). Therefore if his wife be willing, the husband can have intercourse with another woman without sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to all laws the children born of a concubine are children of shame. But this would not be so unless the union of
+                     which they are born were naturally shameful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p8"> Further, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q65_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html">Q[41], A[1]</a>), marriage is natural. But this would not be so if without prejudice to the natural law a man could be united to a woman
+                     otherwise than by marriage. Therefore it is against the natural law to have a concubine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q65_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, an action is said to be against the natural law, if it is not in keeping with the due end intended by nature, whether through
+                     not being directed thereto by the action of the agent, or through being directed thereto by the action of the agent, or through
+                     being in itself improportionate to that end. Now the end which nature intends in sexual union is the begetting and rearing
+                     of the offspring. and that this good
+                     might be sought after, it attached pleasure to the union; as Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 8). Accordingly to make
+                     use of sexual intercourse on account of its inherent pleasure, without reference to the end for which nature intended it,
+                     is to act against nature, as also is it if the intercourse be not such as may fittingly be directed to that end. And since,
+                     for the most part, things are denominated from their end, as being that which is of most consequence to them, just as the
+                     marriage
+                     union took its name from the good of the offspring [*Cf. Q[44], A[2]], which is the end chiefly sought after in marriage,
+                     so the name of concubine is expressive of that union where sexual intercourse is sought after for its own sake. Moreover even
+                     though sometimes a man may seek to have offspring of such an intercourse, this is not befitting to the good of the offspring,
+                     which signifies not only the begetting of children from which they take their being, but also their rearing and instruction,
+                     by which means they receive nourishment and learning from their parents, in respect of which three things the parents are
+                     bound to their children, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12). Now since the rearing and teaching of the children
+                     remain a duty of the parents during a long period of time, the law of nature requires the father and mother to dwell together
+                     for a long time, in order that together they may be of assistance to their children. Hence birds that unite together in
+                     rearing their young do not sever their mutual fellowship from the time when they first come together until the young are fully
+                     fledged. Now this obligation which binds the female and her mate to remain together constitutes matrimony. Consequently it
+                     is evident that it is contrary to the natural law for a man to have intercourse with a woman who is not married to him, which
+                     is the signification of a concubine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Among the Gentiles the natural law was obscured in many points: and consequently they did not think it wrong to have intercourse
+                     with a concubine, and in many cases practiced fornication as though it were lawful, as also other things contrary to the ceremonial
+                     laws of the Jews, though not contrary to the law of nature. Wherefore the apostles inserted the prohibition of fornication
+                     among that of other ceremonial observances, because in both cases there
+                     was a difference of opinion between Jews and Gentiles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This law was the result of the darkness just mentioned, into which the Gentiles had fallen, by not giving due honor to God
+                     as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.21" target="asv"> Rom. 1:21, </a> and did not proceed from the instinct of the natural law. Hence, when the Christian religion prevailed, this law was abolished.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In certain cases no evil results ensue if a person surrenders his right to a thing whether absolutely or for a time, so that
+                     in neither case is the surrender against the natural law. But that does not apply to the case in point, wherefore the argument
+                     does not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Injury is opposed to justice. Now the natural law forbids not only injustice, but also whatever is opposed to any of the
+                     virtues: for instance it is contrary to the natural law to eat immoderately, although by doing so a man uses his own property
+                     without injury to anyone. Moreover although a bondswoman is her master's property that she may serve him, she is not his that
+                     she may be his concubine. And again it depends how a person makes use of his
+                     property. For such a man does an injury to the offspring he begets, since such a union is not directed to its good, as stated
+                     above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The wife has power of her husband's body, not simply and in all respects, but only in relation to marriage, and consequently
+                     she cannot transfer her husband's body to another to the detriment of the good of marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q65_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q65_A4-p0.1">Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine. For a lie is a greater sin than simple fornication:
+                     and a proof of this is that Juda, who did not abhor to commit fornication with Thamar, recoiled from telling a lie, saying
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.38.23" target="asv">Gn. 38:23</a>): "Surely she cannot charge us with a lie." But a lie is not always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is simple fornication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a deadly sin should be punished with death. But the Old Law did not punish with death intercourse with a concubine,
+                     save in a certain case (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.25" target="asv">Dt. 22:25</a>). Therefore it is not a deadly sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), the sins of the flesh are less blameworthy than spiritual sins. Now pride
+                     and covetousness, which are spiritual sins, are not always mortal sins. Therefore fornication, which is a sin of the flesh,
+                     is not always a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where the incentive is greater the sin is less grievous, because he sins more who is overcome by a lighter temptation.
+                     But concupiscence is the greatest incentive to lust. Therefore since lustful actions are not always mortal sins, neither is
+                     simple fornication a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but mortal sin excludes from the kingdom of God. But fornicators are excluded from the kingdom of God (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:9,10</a>). Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p7"> Further, mortal sins alone are called crimes. Now all fornication is a crime according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.4.13" target="asv"> Tob. 4:13, </a> "Take heed to keep thyself . . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know crime." Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As we have already stated (Sent. ii, D, 42
+                     <a id="XP_Q65_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q1_A4.html">, Q[1], A[4]</a>), those sins are mortal in their genus which violate the bond of friendship between man and God, and between man and man;
+                     for such sins are against the two precepts of charity which is the life of the soul. Wherefore since the intercourse of fornication
+                     destroys the due relations of the parent with the offspring that is nature's aim in sexual intercourse, there can be no doubt
+                     that simple fornication by its very nature is a mortal sin even though there were no written law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It often happens that a man who does not avoid a mortal sin, avoids a venial sin to which he has not so great an incentive.
+                     Thus, too, Juda avoided a lie while he avoided not fornication. Nevertheless that would have been a pernicious lie, for it
+                     would have involved an injury if he had not kept his promise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A sin is called deadly, not because it is punished with temporal, but because it is punished with eternal death. Hence also
+                     theft, which is a mortal sin, and many other sins are sometimes not punished with temporal death by the law. The same applies
+                     to fornication.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as not every movement of pride is a mortal sin, so neither is every movement of lust, because the first movements of
+                     lust and the like are venial sins, even sometimes marriage intercourse. Nevertheless some acts of lust are mortal sins, while
+                     some movements of pride are venial: since the words quoted from Gregory are to be understood as comparing vices in their genus
+                     and not in their particular acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A circumstance is the more effective in aggravating a sin according as it comes nearer to the nature of sin. Hence although
+                     fornication is less grave on account of the greatness of its incentive, yet on account of the matter about which it is, it
+                     has a greater gravity than immoderate eating, because it is about those things which tighten the bond of human fellowship,
+                     as stated above. Hence the argument does not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q65_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q65_A5-p0.1">Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it has been sometimes lawful to have a concubine. For just as the natural law requires a man to have but
+                     one wife, so does it forbid him to have a concubine. Yet at times it has been lawful to have several wives. Therefore it has
+                     also been lawful to have a concubine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a woman cannot be at the same time a slave and a wife; wherefore according to the Law (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.11" target="asv">Dt. 21:11, </a> seqq.) a bondswoman gained her freedom by the very fact of being taken in marriage. Now we read that certain men who were
+                     most beloved of God, for instance Abraham and Jacob, had intercourse with their bondswomen. Therefore these were not wives,
+                     and consequently it was sometime lawful to have a concubine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a woman who is taken in marriage cannot be cast out, and her son should have a share in the inheritance. Yet Abraham
+                     sent Agar away, and her son was not his heir (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.21.14" target="asv">Gn. 21:14</a>). Therefore she was not Abraham's wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Things opposed to the precepts of the decalogue were never lawful. Now to have a concubine is against a precept of the decalogue,
+                     namely, "Thou shalt not commit adultery." Therefore it was never lawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p6"> Further, Ambrose says in his book on the patriarchs (De Abraham i, 4): "What is unlawful to a wife is unlawful to a husband."
+                     But it is never lawful for a wife to put aside her own husband and have intercourse with another man. Therefore it was never
+                     lawful for a husband to have a concubine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) that before the time of the Law fornication was not a sin; and he proved his assertion
+                     from the fact that Juda had intercourse with Thamar. But this argument is not conclusive. For there is no need to excuse Jacob's
+                     sons from mortal sin, since they were accused to their father of a most wicked crime (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.37.2" target="asv">Gn. 37:2</a>), and consented kill Joseph and to sell him. Wherefore we must say that since it is against the natural law to
+                     have a concubine outside wedlock, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q65_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, it was never lawful either in itself or by dispensation. For as we have shown (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) intercourse with a woman
+                     outside wedlock is an action improportionate to the good of the offspring which is the principal end of marriage: and consequently
+                     it is against the first precepts of the natural law which admit of no dispensation. Hence wherever in the Old Testament we
+                     read of concubines being taken by such
+                     men as we ought to excuse from mortal sin, we must needs understand them to have been taken in marriage, and yet to have been
+                     called concubines, because they had something of the character of a wife and something of the character of a concubine. In
+                     so far as marriage is directed to its principal end, which is the good of the offspring, the union of wife and husband is
+                     indissoluble or at least of a lasting nature, as shown above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q65_A5-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, and in regard to this there is no
+                     dispensation. But in regard to the secondary end, which is the management of the household and community of works, the wife
+                     is united to the husband as his mate: and this was lacking in those who were known as concubines. For in this respect a dispensation
+                     was possible, since it is the secondary end of marriage. And from this point of view they bore some resemblance to concubines,
+                     and for this reason they were known as such.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8) to have several wives is not against the first precepts of the natural law, as it is to have
+                     a concubine; wherefore the argument does not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The patriarchs of old by virtue of the dispensation which allowed them several wives, approached their bondswomen with the
+                     disposition of a husband towards his wife. For these women were wives as to the principal and first end of marriage, but not
+                     as to the other union which regards the secondary end, to which bondage is opposed since a woman cannot be at once mate and
+                     slave.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As in the Mosaic law it was allowable by dispensation to grant a bill of divorce in order to avoid wife-murder (as we shall
+                     state further on
+                     <a id="XP_Q65_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q67_A6.html">, Q[67], A[6]</a>), so by the same dispensation Abraham was allowed to send Agar away, in order to signify the mystery which the Apostle explains
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.22" target="asv">Gal. 4:22, </a> seqq.). Again, that this son did not inherit belongs to the mystery, as explained in the same place. Even so Esau,
+                     the son of a free woman, did not inherit (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A5-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.13" target="asv">Rom. 9:13, </a> seqq.). In like manner on account of the mystery it came about that the sons of Jacob born of bond and free women inherited,
+                     as Augustine says (Tract. xi in Joan.) because "sons and heirs are born to Christ both of good ministers denoted by the free
+                     woman and of evil ministers denoted by the bondswoman."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A10.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q66" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q66-p0.1">OF BIGAMY AND OF THE IRREGULARITY CONTRACTED THEREBY (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q66-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q66-p2"> In the next place we must consider bigamy and the irregularity contracted thereby. Under this head there are five points
+                  of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="XP_Q66-p3"> (1) Whether irregularity attaches to the bigamy that consists in having two successive wives?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q66-p4"> (2) Whether irregularity is contracted by one who has two wives at once?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q66-p5"> (3) Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q66-p6"> (4) Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q66-p7"> (5) Whether a dispensation can be granted to a bigamous person?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q66_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q66_A1-p0.1">Whether irregularity attaches to bigamy?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that irregularity is not attached to the bigamy that consists in having two wives successively. For multitude
+                     and unity are consequent upon being. Since then non-being does not cause plurality, a man who has two wives successively,
+                     the one in being, the other in non-being, does not thereby become the husband of more than one wife, so as to be debarred,
+                     according to the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.3.2" target="asv">1 Tim. 3:2</a>;
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Titus.1.6" target="asv"> Titus 1:6</a>),
+                     from the episcopate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man who commits fornication with several women gives more evidence of incontinence than one who has several wives
+                     successively. Yet in the first case a man does not become irregular. Therefore neither in the second should he become irregular.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if bigamy causes irregularity, this is either because of the sacrament, or because of the carnal intercourse. Now
+                     it is not on account of the former, for if a man had contracted marriage by words of the present and, his wife dying before
+                     the consummation of the marriage, he were to marry another, he would become irregular, which is against the decree of Innocent
+                     III (cap. Dubium, De bigamia). Nor again is it on account of the second, for then a man
+                     who had committed fornication with several women would become irregular: which is false. Therefore bigamy nowise causes irregularity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> By the sacrament of order a man is appointed to the ministry of the sacraments; and he who has to administer the sacraments
+                     to others must suffer from no defect in the sacraments. Now there is a defect in a sacrament when the entire signification
+                     of the sacrament is not found therein. And the sacrament of marriage signifies the union of Christ with the Church, which
+                     is the union of one with one. Therefore the perfect signification of the sacrament requires
+                     the husband to have only one wife, and the wife to have but one husband; and consequently bigamy, which does away with this,
+                     causes irregularity. And there are four kinds of bigamy: the first is when a man has several lawful wives successively; the
+                     second is when a man has several wives at once, one in law, the other in fact; the third, when he has several successively,
+                     one in law, the other in fact; the fourth, when a man marries a widow. Accordingly irregularity attaches to all of these.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p6"> There is another consequent reason assigned, since those who receive the sacrament of order should be signalized by the greatest
+                     spirituality, both because they administer spiritual things, namely the sacraments, and because they teach spiritual things,
+                     and should be occupied in spiritual matters. Wherefore since concupiscence is most incompatible with spirituality, inasmuch
+                     as it makes a man to be wholly carnal, they should give no sign of persistent concupiscence, which does
+                     indeed show itself in bigamous persons, seeing that they were unwilling to be content with one wife. The first reason however
+                     is the better.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multitude of several wives at the same time is a multitude simply, wherefore a multitude of this kind is wholly inconsistent
+                     with the signification of the sacrament, so that the sacrament is voided on that account. But the multitude of several successive
+                     wives is a multitude relatively, wherefore it does not entirely destroy the signification of the sacrament, nor does it void
+                     the sacrament in its essence but in its perfection, which is required
+                     of those who are the dispensers of sacraments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although those who are guilty of fornication give proof of greater concupiscence, theirs is not a so persistent concupiscence,
+                     since by fornication one party is not bound to the other for ever; and consequently no defect attaches to the sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above, bigamy causes irregularity, because it destroys the perfect signification of the sacrament: which signification
+                     is seated both in the union of minds, as expressed by the consent, and in the union of bodies. Wherefore bigamy must affect
+                     both of these at the same time in order to cause irregularity. Hence the decree of Innocent III disposes of the statement
+                     of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 27), namely that consent alone by words of the
+                     present is sufficient to cause irregularity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q66_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q66_A2-p0.1">Whether irregularity results from bigamy, when one husband has two wives, one in law, the other in fact?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that irregularity does not result from bigamy when one husband has two wives at the same time, one in law and
+                     one in fact. For when the sacrament is void there can be no defect in the sacrament. Now when a man marries a woman in fact
+                     but not in law there is no sacrament, since such a union does not signify the union of Christ with the Church. Therefore since
+                     irregularity does not result from bigamy except on account of a defect in the sacrament,
+                     it would seem that no irregularity attaches to bigamy of this kind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a man has intercourse with a woman whom he has married in fact and not in law, he commits fornication if he has
+                     not a lawful wife, or adultery if he has. But a man does not become irregular by dividing his flesh among several women by
+                     fornication or adultery. Therefore neither does he by the aforesaid kind of bigamy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it may happen that a man, before knowing carnally the woman he has married in law, marries another in fact and not
+                     in law, and knows her carnally, whether the former woman be living or dead. Now this man has contracted marriage with several
+                     women either in law or in fact, and yet he is not irregular, since he has not divided his flesh among several women. Therefore
+                     irregularity is not contracted by reason of the aforesaid kind of bigamy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Irregularity is contracted in the two second kinds of bigamy, for although in the one there is no sacrament, there is a certain
+                     likeness to a sacrament. Wherefore these two kinds are secondary, and the first is the principal kind in causing irregularity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although there is no sacrament in this case there is a certain likeness to a sacrament, whereas there is no such likeness
+                     in fornication or adultery. Hence the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In this case the man is not reckoned a bigamist, because the first marriage lacked its perfect signification. Nevertheless
+                     if, by the judgment of the Church, he be compelled to return to his first wife and carnally to know her, he becomes irregular
+                     forthwith, because the irregularity is the result not of the sin but of imperfect signification.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q66_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q66_A3-p0.1">Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that irregularity is not contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin. For a man's own defect is a greater
+                     impediment to him than the defect of another. But if the man himself who marries is not a virgin he does not become irregular.
+                     Therefore much less does he if his wife is not a virgin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it may happen that a man marries a woman after corrupting her. Now, seemingly, such a man does not become irregular,
+                     since he has not divided his flesh among several, nor has his wife done so, and yet he marries a woman who is not a virgin.
+                     Therefore this kind of bigamy does not cause irregularity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man can become irregular except voluntarily. But sometimes a man marries involuntarily one who is not a virgin,
+                     for instance when he thinks her a virgin and afterwards, by knowing her carnally, finds that she is not. Therefore this kind
+                     does not always cause irregularity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, unlawful intercourse after marriage is more guilty than before marriage. Now if a wife, after the marriage has been
+                     consummated, has intercourse with another man, her husband does not become irregular, otherwise he would be punished for his
+                     wife's sin. Moreover, it might happen that, after knowing of this, he pays her the debt at her asking, before she is accused
+                     and convicted of adultery. Therefore it would seem that this kind of bigamy does not
+                     cause irregularity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Regist. ii, ep. 37): "We command thee never to make unlawful ordinations, nor to admit to holy orders a bigamist,
+                     or one who has married a woman that is not a virgin, or one who is unlettered, or one who is deformed in his limbs, or bound
+                     to do penance or to perform some civil duty, or who is in any state of subjection."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In the union of Christ with the Church unity is found on either side. Consequently whether we find division of the flesh
+                     on the part of the husband, or on the part of the wife, there is a defect of sacrament. There is, however, a difference, because
+                     on the part of the husband it is required that he should not have married another wife, but not that he should be a virgin,
+                     whereas on the part of the wife it is also required that she be a virgin. The reason
+                     assigned by those versed in the Decretals is because the bridegroom signifies the Church militant which is entrusted to the
+                     care of a bishop, and in which there are many corruptions, while the spouse signifies Christ Who was a virgin: wherefore virginity
+                     on the part of the spouse, but not on the part of the bridegroom, is required in order that a man be made a bishop. This reason,
+                     however, is expressly contrary to the words of the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.25" target="asv">Eph. 5:25</a>): "Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also
+                     loved the Church," which show that the bride signifies the Church, and the bridegroom Christ; and again he says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.23" target="asv">Eph. 5:23</a>): "Because the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church." Wherefore others say that Christ is
+                     signified by the bridegroom, and that the bride signifies the Church triumphant in which there is no stain. Also that the
+                     synagogue was first united to Christ as a concubine; so that the sacrament loses nothing of its signification
+                     if the bridegroom previously had a concubine. But this is most absurd, since just as the faith of ancients and of moderns
+                     is one, so is the Church one. Wherefore those who served God at the time of the synagogue belonged to the unity of the Church
+                     in which we serve God. Moreover this is expressly contrary to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A3-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Jer.3.14" target="asv"> Jer. 3:14, </a> 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A3-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Ezek.16.8" target="asv">Ezech. 16:8, </a> 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A3-p7.5" href="./asv.html#Hos.2.16" target="asv">Osee 2:16, </a> where the espousals of the synagogue are mentioned explicitly: so that she was not as a
+                     concubine but as a wife. Again, according to this, fornication would be the sacred sign [sacramentum] of that union, which
+                     is absurd. Wherefore heathendom, before being espoused to Christ in the faith of the Church, was corrupted by the devil through
+                     idolatry. Hence we must say otherwise that irregularity is caused by a defect in the sacrament itself. Now when corruption
+                     of the flesh occurs outside wedlock on account of a preceding marriage, it causes no defect in the sacrament on the part of
+                     the person corrupted, but it causes a defect in the other person, because the act of one who contracts marriage terminates
+                     not in himself, but in the other party, wherefore it takes its species from its term, which, moreover, in regard to that act,
+                     is the matter as it were of the sacrament. Consequently if a woman were able to receive orders, just as her husband becomes
+                     irregular through marrying one who is not a virgin, but not through his not being a virgin when he marries, so also would
+                     a
+                     woman become irregular if she were to marry a man who is not a virgin, but not if she were no longer a virgin when she married
+                     ---unless she had been corrupted by reason of a previous marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In this case opinions differ. It is, however, more probable that he is not irregular, because he has not divided his flesh
+                     among several women.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Irregularity is not the infliction of a punishment, but the defect of a sacrament. Consequently it is not always necessary
+                     for bigamy to be voluntary in order to cause irregularity. Hence a man who marries a woman, thinking her to be a virgin, whereas
+                     she is not, becomes irregular by knowing her carnally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If a woman commits fornication after being married, her husband does not become irregular on that account, unless he again
+                     knows her carnally after she has been corrupted by adultery, since otherwise the corruption of the wife nowise affects the
+                     marriage act of the husband. But though he be compelled by law to pay her the debt, or if he do so at her request, being compelled
+                     by his own conscience, even before she is convicted of adultery, he becomes
+                     irregular, albeit opinions differ on this point. However, what we have said is more probable, since here it is not a question
+                     of sin, but of signification only.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q66_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q66_A4-p0.1">Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that bigamy is removed by Baptism. For Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to Titus (1:6, "the husband
+                     of one wife") that if a man has had several wives before receiving Baptism, or one before and another after Baptism, he is
+                     not a bigamist. Therefore bigamy is removed by Baptism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who does what is more, does what is less. Now Baptism removes all sin, and sin is a greater thing than irregularity.
+                     Therefore it removes irregularity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Baptism takes away all punishment resulting from an act. Now such is the irregularity of bigamy. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a bigamist is irregular because he is deficient in the representation of Christ. Now by Baptism we are fully conformed
+                     to Christ. Therefore this irregularity is removed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the sacraments of the New Law are more efficacious than the sacraments of the Old Law. But the sacraments of the
+                     Old Law removed irregularities according to the Master's statement (Sent. iv,). Therefore Baptism also, being the most efficacious
+                     of the sacraments of the New Law, removes the irregularity consequent upon bigamy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii): "Those understand the question more correctly who maintain that a man who has married
+                     a second wife, though he was a catechumen or even a pagan at the time, cannot be ordained, because it is a question of a sacrament,
+                     not of a sin."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p8"> Further, according to the same authority (De Bono Conjug. xviii) "a woman who has been corrupted while a catechumen or a
+                     pagan cannot after Baptism be consecrated among God's virgins." Therefore in like manner one who was a bigamist before Baptism
+                     cannot be ordained.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Baptism removes sin, but does not dissolve marriage. Wherefore since irregularity results from marriage, it cannot be removed
+                     by Baptism, as Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this case Jerome's opinion is not followed: unless perhaps he wished to explain that he means that a dispensation should
+                     be more easily granted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It does not follow that what does a greater thing, does a lesser, unless it be directed to the latter. This is not so in
+                     the case in point, because Baptism is not directed to the removal of an irregularity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This must be understood of punishments consequent upon actual sin, which are, or have yet to be, inflicted: for one does
+                     not recover virginity by Baptism, nor again undivision of the flesh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Baptism conforms a man to Christ as regards the virtue of the mind, but not as to the condition of the body, which is effected
+                     by virginity or division of the flesh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Those irregularities were contracted through slight and temporary causes, and consequently they could be removed by those
+                     sacraments. Moreover the latter were ordained for that purpose, whereas Baptism is not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q66_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q66_A5-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for a bigamist to receive a dispensation?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful for a bigamist to be granted a dispensation. For it is said (Extra, De bigamis, cap. Nuper): "It is
+                     not lawful to grant a dispensation to clerics who, as far as they could do so, have taken to themselves a second wife."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is not lawful to grant a dispensation from the Divine law. Now whatever is in the canonical writings belongs
+                     to the Divine law. Since then in canonical Scripture the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.3.2" target="asv">1 Tim. 3:2</a>): "It behooveth . . . a bishop to be . . . the husband of one wife," it would seem that a dispensation cannot be granted
+                     in this matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one can receive a dispensation in what is essential to a sacrament. But it is essential to the sacrament of order
+                     that the recipient be not irregular, since the signification which is essential to a sacrament is lacking in one who is irregular.
+                     Therefore he cannot be granted a dispensation in this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is reasonably done cannot be reasonably undone. If, therefore, a bigamist can lawfully receive a dispensation,
+                     it was unreasonable that he should be irregular: which is inadmissible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Pope Lucius granted a dispensation to the bishop of Palermo who was a bigamist, as stated in the gloss on can. Lector, dist.
+                     34.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p7"> Further, Pope Martin [*Martinus Bracarensis: cap. xliii] says: "If a Reader marry a widow, let him remain a Reader, or if
+                     there be need for it, he may receive the Subdiaconate, but no higher order: and the same applies if he should be a bigamist."
+                     Therefore he may at least receive a dispensation as far as the Subdiaconate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Irregularity attaches to bigamy not by natural, but by positive law; nor again is it one of the essentials of order that
+                     a man be not a bigamist, which is evident from the fact that if a bigamist present himself for orders, he receives the character.
+                     Wherefore the Pope can dispense altogether from such an irregularity; but a bishop, only as regards the minor orders, though
+                     some say that in order to prevent religious wandering abroad he can dispense therefrom
+                     as regards the major orders in those who wish to serve God in religion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This Decretal shows that there is the same difficulty against granting a dispensation in those who have married several wives
+                     in fact, as if they had married them in law; but it does not prove that the Pope has no power to grant a dispensation in such
+                     cases.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This is true as regards things belonging to the natural law, and those which are essential to the sacraments, and to faith.
+                     But in those which owe their institution to the apostles, since the Church has the same power now as then of setting up and
+                     of putting down, she can grant a dispensation through him who holds the primacy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not every signification is essential to a sacrament, but that alone which belongs to the sacramental effect,* and this is
+                     not removed by irregularity. [*Leonine edition reads "officium," some read "effectum"; the meaning is the same, and is best
+                     rendered as above.]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In particular cases there is no ratio that applies to all equally, on account of their variety. Hence what is reasonably
+                     established for all, in consideration of what happens in the majority of cases, can be with equal reason done away in a certain
+                     definite case.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q67" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q67-p0.1">OF THE BILL OF DIVORCE (SEVEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q67-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q67-p2"> We must now consider the bill of divorce, under which head there are seven points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q67-p3"> (1) Whether the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q67-p4"> (2) Whether by dispensation it may become lawful to put away a wife?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q67-p5"> (3) Whether it was lawful under the Mosaic law?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q67-p6"> (4) Whether a wife who has been divorced may take another husband?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q67-p7"> (5) Whether the husband can marry again the wife whom he has divorced?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q67-p8"> (6) Whether the cause of divorce was hatred of the wife?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q67-p9"> (7) Whether the reasons for divorce had to be written on the bill?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q67_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q67_A1-p0.1">Whether inseparableness of the wife is of natural law?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that inseparableness of the wife is not of natural law. For the natural law is the same for all. But no law
+                     save Christ's has forbidden the divorcing of a wife. Therefore inseparableness of a wife is not of natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sacraments are not of the natural law. But the indissolubility of marriage is one of the marriage goods. Therefore
+                     it is not of the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the union of man and woman in marriage is chiefly directed to the begetting, rearing, and instruction of the offspring.
+                     But all things are complete by a certain time. Therefore after that time it is lawful to put away a wife without prejudice
+                     to the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the good of the offspring is the principal end of marriage. But the indissolubility of marriage is opposed to the
+                     good of the offspring, because, according to philosophers, a certain man cannot beget offspring of a certain woman, and yet
+                     he might beget of another, even though she may have had intercourse with another man. Therefore the indissolubility of marriage
+                     is against rather than according to the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Those things which were assigned to nature when it was well established in its beginning belong especially to the law of
+                     nature. Now the indissolubility of marriage is one of these things according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.4" target="asv"> Mat. 19:4,6.</a> Therefore it is of natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p7"> Further, it is of natural law that man should not oppose himself to God. Yet man would, in a way, oppose himself to God if
+                     he were to sunder "what God hath joined together." Since then the indissolubility of marriage is gathered from this passage
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.6" target="asv">Mat. 19:6</a>) it would seem that it is of natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> By the intention of nature marriage is directed to the rearing of the offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its
+                     whole life. Hence it is of natural law that parents should lay up for their children, and that children should be their parents'
+                     heirs (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:14</a>). Therefore, since the offspring is the common good of husband and wife, the dictate of the natural law requires the latter
+                     to live together for ever inseparably: and so the indissolubility
+                     of marriage is of natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Christ's law alone brought mankind "to perfection" [*Cf. 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.19" target="asv"> Heb. 7:19</a>] by bringing man back to the state of the newness of nature. Wherefore neither Mosaic nor human laws could remove all that
+                     was contrary to the law of nature, for this was reserved exclusively to "the law of the spirit of life" [*Cf.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.2" target="asv"> Rom. 8:2</a>].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Indissolubility belongs to marriage in so far as the latter is a sign of the perpetual union of Christ with the Church, and
+                     in so far as it fulfills an office of nature that is directed to the good of the offspring, as stated above. But since divorce
+                     is more directly incompatible with the signification of the sacrament than with the good of the offspring, with which it is
+                     incompatible consequently, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q67_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A2.html">Q[65],
+                        A[2]
+                     </a>, ad 5), the indissolubility of marriage is implied in the good of the sacrament rather than in the good of the offspring,
+                     although it may be connected with both. And in so far as it is connected with the good of the offspring, it is of the natural
+                     law, but not as connected with the good of the sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p11"> The Reply to the Third Objection may be gathered from what has been said.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Marriage is chiefly directed to the common good in respect of its principal end, which is the good of the offspring; although
+                     in respect of its secondary end it is directed to the good of the contracting party, in so far as it is by its very nature
+                     a remedy for concupiscence. Hence marriage laws consider what is expedient for all rather than what may be suitable for one.
+                     Therefore although the indissolubility of marriage hinder the good of the
+                     offspring with regard to some individual, it is proportionate with the good of the offspring absolutely speaking: and for
+                     this reason the argument does not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q67_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q67_A2-p0.1">Whether it may have been lawful by dispensation to put away a wife?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it could not be lawful by dispensation to put away a wife. For in marriage anything that is opposed to the
+                     good of the offspring is against the first precepts of the natural law, which admit of no dispensation. Now such is the putting
+                     away of a wife, as stated above 
+                     <a id="XP_Q67_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q67_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a concubine differs from a wife especially in the fact that she is not inseparably united. But by no dispensation
+                     could a man have a concubine. Therefore by no dispensation could he put his wife away.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, men are as fit to receive a dispensation now as of old. But now a man cannot receive a dispensation to divorce his
+                     wife. Neither, therefore, could he in olden times.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Abraham carnally knew Agar with the disposition of a husband towards his wife, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q67_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A5.html">Q[65], A[5]</a>, ad 2,3). Now by Divine command he sent her away, and yet sinned not. Therefore it could be lawful by dispensation for a
+                     man to put away his wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In the commandments, especially those which in some way are of natural law, a dispensation is like a change in the natural
+                     course of things: and this course is subject to a twofold change. First, by some natural cause whereby another natural cause
+                     is hindered from following its course: it is thus in all things that happen by chance less frequently in nature. In this way,
+                     however, there is no variation in the course of those natural things which happen
+                     always, but only in the course of those which happen frequently. Secondly, by a cause altogether supernatural, as in the case
+                     of miracles: and in this way there can be a variation in the course of nature, not only in the course which is appointed for
+                     the majority of cases, but also in the course which is appointed for all cases, as instanced by the sun standing still at
+                     the time of Josue, and by its turning back at the time of Ezechias, and by the miraculous eclipse at the time of Christ's
+                     Passion [*
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Josh.10.14" target="asv">Jos. 10:14</a>;  
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 20:10</a>;
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.8" target="asv"> Is. 38:8</a>;
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A2-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.27.15" target="asv"> Mat. 27:15</a>]. In like manner the reason for a dispensation from a precept of the law of nature is sometimes found in the lower causes,
+                     and in this way a dispensation may bear upon the secondary precepts of the natural law, but not on the first precepts because
+                     these are always existent as it were, as stated above (
+                     <a id="XP_Q67_A2-p6.5" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html">Q[65], A[1]</a>) in reference to
+                     the plurality of wives and so forth. But sometimes this reason is found in the higher causes, and then a dispensation may
+                     be given by God even from the first precepts of the natural law, for the sake of signifying or showing some Divine mystery,
+                     as instanced in the dispensation vouchsafed to Abraham in the slaying of his innocent son. Such dispensations, however, are
+                     not granted to all generally, but to certain individual persons, as also happens in regard to miracles. Accordingly, if the
+                     indissolubility of marriage is contained among the first precepts of the natural law, it could only be a matter of dispensation
+                     in this second way; but, if it be one of the second precepts of the natural law, it could be a matter of dispensation even
+                     in the first way. Now it would seem to belong rather to the secondary precepts of the natural law. For the indissolubility
+                     of marriage is not directed to the good of the offspring, which is the principal end of marriage, except in so far as parents
+                     have to provide for their children for their whole life, by due preparation of those things that are necessary in life. Now
+                     this preparation does not pertain to the first intention of nature, in respect of which all things are common. And therefore
+                     it would seem that to put away one's wife is not contrary to the first intention of nature, and consequently that it is contrary
+                     not to the first but to the second precepts of the natural law. Therefore, seemingly, it can be a matter of dispensation
+                     even in the first way.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good of the offspring, in so far as it belongs to the first intention of nature, includes procreation, nourishment, and
+                     instruction, until the offspring comes to perfect age. But that provision be made for the children by bequeathing to them
+                     the inheritance or other goods belongs seemingly to the second intention of the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To have a concubine is contrary to the good of the offspring, in respect of nature's first intention in that good, namely
+                     the rearing and instruction of the child, for which purpose it is necessary that the parents remain together permanently;
+                     which is not the case with a concubine, since she is taken for a time. Hence the comparison fails. But in respect of nature's
+                     second intention, even the having of a concubine may be a matter of dispensation as
+                     evidenced by 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.1" target="asv">Osee 1</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although indissolubility belongs to the second intention of marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, it belongs to its
+                     first intention as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, from the moment it was made a sacrament of the Church, as long as it
+                     remains such it cannot be a matter of dispensation, except perhaps by the second kind of dispensation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q67_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q67_A3-p0.1">Whether it was lawful to divorce a wife under the Mosaic law?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it was lawful to divorce a wife under the Mosaic law. For one way of giving consent is to refrain from
+                     prohibiting when one can prohibit. It is also unlawful to consent to what is unlawful. Since then the Mosaic law did not forbid
+                     the putting away of a wife and did no wrong by not forbidding it, for "the law . . . is holy" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.12" target="asv">Rom. 7:12</a>), it would seem that divorce was at one time lawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the prophets spoke inspired by the Holy Ghost, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.21" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:21.</a> Now it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Mal.2.16" target="asv">Malachi 2:16</a>): "When thou shalt hate her, put her away." Since then that which the Holy Ghost inspires is not unlawful, it would seem
+                     that it was not always unlawful to divorce a wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that even as the apostles
+                     permitted second marriages, so Moses allowed the bill of divorce. But second marriages are not sinful. Therefore neither was
+                     it sinful under the Mosaic law to divorce a wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.8" target="asv">Mat. 19:8</a>) that Moses granted the Jews the bill of divorce by reason of the hardness of their heart. But their hardness of heart did
+                     not excuse them from sin. Neither therefore did the law about the bill of divorce.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Chrysostom says [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "Moses, by granting
+                     the bill of divorce, did not indicate the justice of God, but deprived their sin of its guilt, for while the Jews acted as
+                     though they were keeping the law, their sin seemed to be no sin."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> on this point there are two opinions. For some say that under the Law those who put away their wives, after giving them a
+                     bill of divorce, were not excused from sin, although they were excused from the punishment which they should have suffered
+                     according to the Law: and that for this reason Moses is stated to have permitted the bill of divorce. Accordingly they reckon
+                     four kinds of permission: one by absence of precept, so that when a greater good is not
+                     prescribed, a lesser good is said to be permitted: thus the Apostle by not prescribing virginity, permitted marriage (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 7</a>). The second is by absence of prohibition: thus venial sins are said to be permitted because they are not forbidden. The
+                     third is by absence of prevention, and thus all sins are said to be permitted by God, in so far as He does not prevent them
+                     whereas He can. The fourth is by omission of punishment, and in this way the bill of divorce was permitted in the Law, not
+                     indeed for the sake of obtaining a greater good, as was the dispensation to have several wives, but for the sake of preventing
+                     a greater evil, namely wife-murder to which the Jews were prone on account of the corruption of their irascible appetite.
+                     Even so they were allowed to lend money for usury to strangers, on account of corruption in their concupiscible appetite,
+                     lest they should exact usury of their brethren; and again on account of the corruption of suspicion in the reason they were
+                     allowed the sacrifice of jealousy, lest mere suspicion should corrupt their judgment. But because the Old Law, though it did
+                     not confer grace, was given that it might indicate sin, as the saints are agreed in saying, others are of opinion that if
+                     it had been a sin for a man to put away his wife, this ought to have been indicated to him, at least by the law or the prophets:
+                     "Show My people their wicked doings" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.58.1" target="asv">Is. 58:1</a>): else they would seem to have been neglected, if those
+                     things which are necessary for salvation and which they knew not were never made known to them: and this cannot be admitted,
+                     because the righteousness of the Law observed at the time of the Law would merit eternal life. For this reason they say that
+                     although to put away one's wife is wrong in itself, it nevertheless became lawful by God's permitting it, and they confirm
+                     this by the authority of Chrysostom, who says [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]
+                     that "the Lawgiver by permitting divorce removed the guilt from the sin." Although this opinion has some probability the former
+                     is more generally held: wherefore we must reply to the arguments on both sides [*Cf. 
+                     <a id="XP_Q67_A3-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q105_A4.html">FS, Q[105], A[4]</a>, ad 8; 
+                     <a id="XP_Q67_A3-p7.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q108_A3.html">FS, Q[108], A[3]</a>, ad 2; Contra Gentes iii, cap. 123].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who can forbid, sins not by omitting to forbid if he has no hope of correcting, but fears by forbidding to furnish the
+                     occasion of a greater evil. Thus it happened to Moses: wherefore acting on Divine authority he did not forbid the bill of
+                     divorce.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The prophets, inspired by the Holy Ghost, said that a wife ought to be put away, not as though this were a command of the
+                     Holy Ghost, but as being permitted lest greater evils should be perpetrated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This likeness of permission must not be applied to every detail, but only to the cause which was the same in both cases,
+                     since both permissions were granted in order to avoid some form of wickedness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although their hardness of heart excused them not from sin, the permission given on account of that hardness excused them.
+                     For certain things are forbidden those who are healthy in body, which are not forbidden the sick, and yet the sick sin not
+                     by availing themselves of the permission granted to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A good may be omitted in two ways. First, in order to obtain a greater good, and then the omission of that good becomes virtuous
+                     by being directed to a greater good; thus Jacob rightly omitted to have only one wife, on account of the good of the offspring.
+                     In another way a good is omitted in order to avoid a greater evil, and then if this is done with the authority of one who
+                     can grant a dispensation, the omission of that good is not sinful, and yet
+                     it does not also become virtuous. In this way the indissolubility of marriage was suspended in the law of Moses in order to
+                     avoid a greater evil, namely wife-murder. Hence Chrysostom says that "he removed the guilt from the sin." For though divorce
+                     remained inordinate, for which reason it is called a sin, it did not incur the debt of punishment, either temporal or eternal,
+                     in so far as it was done by Divine permission: and thus its guilt was taken away from it. And therefore he says again
+                     [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "divorce was permitted, an evil indeed,
+                     yet lawful." Those who hold the first opinion understand by this only that divorce incurred the debt of temporal punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q67_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q67_A4-p0.1">Whether it was lawful for a divorced wife to have another husband?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it was lawful for a divorced wife to have another husband. For in divorce the husband did a greater wrong
+                     by divorcing his wife than the wife by being divorced. But the husband could, without sin, marry another wife. Therefore the
+                     wife could without sin, marry another husband.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine, speaking about bigamy, says (De Bono Conjug. xv, xviii) that "when it was the manner it was no sin."
+                     Now at the time of the Old Law it was the custom for a wife after divorce to marry another husband: "When she is departed
+                     and marrieth another husband," etc. Therefore the wife sinned not by marrying another husband.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our Lord showed that the justice of the New Testament is superabundant in comparison with the justice of the Old
+                     Testament (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Mat. 5</a>). Now He said that it belongs to the superabundant justice of the New Testament that the divorced wife marry not another
+                     husband (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.32" target="asv">Mat. 5:32</a>). Therefore it was lawful in the Old Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, are the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.32" target="asv"> Mat. 5:32, </a> "He that shall marry her that is put away committeth adultery." Now adultery was never permitted in the Old Law. Therefore
+                     it was not lawful for the divorced wife to have another husband.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.3" target="asv">Dt. 24:3</a>) that a divorced woman who marries another husband "is defiled, and is become abominable before the Lord." Therefore she
+                     sinned by marrying another husband.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> According to the first above mentioned opinion 
+                     <a id="XP_Q67_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q67_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, she sinned by marrying another husband after being divorced, because her first marriage still held good. For "the woman
+                     . . . whilst her husband liveth, is bound to the law of her husband" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.2" target="asv">Rom. 7:2</a>): and she could not have several husbands at one time. But according to the second opinion, just as it was lawful by virtue
+                     of the Divine dispensation for a
+                     husband to divorce his wife, so could the wife marry another husband, because the indissolubility of marriage was removed
+                     by reason of the divine dispensation: and as long as that indissolubility remains the saying of the Apostle holds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p8"> Accordingly to reply to the arguments on either side:</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It was lawful for a husband to have several wives at one time by virtue of the divine dispensation: wherefore having put
+                     one away he could marry another even though the former marriage were not dissolved. But it was never lawful for a wife to
+                     have several husbands. Wherefore the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In this saying of Augustine manner [mos] does not signify custom but good manners; in the same sense a person is said to
+                     have manners [morigeratus] because he has good manners; and "moral" philosophy takes its name from the same source.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our Lord shows the superabundance of the New Law over the Old in respect of the counsels, not only as regards those things
+                     which the Old Law permitted, but also as regards those things which were forbidden in the Old Law, and yet were thought by
+                     many to be permitted on account of the precepts being incorrectly explained---for instance that of the hatred towards our
+                     enemies. and so is it in the matter of divorce.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The saying of our Lord refers to the time of the New Law, when the aforesaid permission was recalled. In the same way we
+                     are to understand the statement of Chrysostom [*Hom. xii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom],
+                     who says that "a man who divorces his wife according to the law is guilty of four crimes: for in God's sight he is a murderer,"
+                     in so far as he has the purpose of killing his wife unless he divorce her; "and
+                     because he divorces her without her having committed fornication," in which case alone the law of the Gospel allows a man
+                     to put away his wife; "and again, because he makes her an adulteress, and the man whom she marries an adulterer."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A gloss observes here: "She is defiled and abominable, namely in the judgment of him who first put her away as being defiled,"
+                     and consequently it does not follow that she is defiled absolutely speaking; or she is said to be defiled just as a person
+                     who had touched a dead or leprous body was said to be unclean with the uncleanness, not of sin, but of a certain legal irregularity.
+                     Wherefore a priest could not marry a widow or a divorced woman.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q67_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q67_A5-p0.1">Whether a husband could lawfully take back the wife he had divorced?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a husband could lawfully take back the wife he had divorced. For it is lawful to undo what was ill done.
+                     But for the husband to divorce his wife was ill done. Therefore it was lawful for him to undo it, by taking back his wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it has always been lawful to be indulgent to the sinner, because this is a moral precept, which obtains in every
+                     law. Now the husband by taking back the wife he had divorced was indulgent to one who had sinned. Therefore this also was
+                     lawful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the reason given (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.4" target="asv">Dt. 24:4</a>) for its being unlawful to take back a divorced wife was "because she is defiled." But the divorced wife is not defiled except
+                     by marrying another husband. Therefore at least it was lawful to take back a divorced wife before she married again.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.4" target="asv">Dt. 24:4</a>) that "the former husband cannot take her again," etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In the law concerning the bill of divorce two things were permitted, namely for the husband to put away the wife, and for
+                     the divorced wife to take another husband; and two things were commanded, namely that the bill of divorce should be written,
+                     and secondly that the husband who divorced his wife could not take her back. According to those who hold the first opinion
+                     
+                     <a id="XP_Q67_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q67_A3.html">(A[3])</a> this was done in punishment of the woman who married again,
+                     and that it was by this sin that she was defiled: but according to the others it was done that a husband might not be too
+                     ready to divorce his wife if he could nowise take her back afterwards.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In order to prevent the evil committed by a man in divorcing his wife, it was ordered that the husband could not take back
+                     his divorced wife, as stated above: and for this reason it was ordered by God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It was always lawful to be indulgent to the sinner as regards the unkindly feelings of the heart, but not as regards the
+                     punishment appointed by God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two opinions on this point. For some say that it was lawful for a divorced wife to be reconciled to her husband,
+                     unless she were joined in marriage to another husband. For then, on account of the adultery to which she had voluntarily yielded,
+                     it was assigned to her in punishment that she should not return to her former husband. Since, however, the law makes no distinction
+                     in its prohibition, others say that from the moment that she was put
+                     away she could not be taken back, even before marrying again, because the defilement must be understood not in reference to
+                     sin, but as explained above (A[4], ad 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q67_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q67_A6-p0.1">Whether the reason for divorce was hatred for the wife?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason for divorce was hatred for the wife. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.2.16" target="asv">Malachi 2:16</a>): "When thou shalt hate her put her away." Therefore, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.1" target="asv">Dt. 24:1</a>): "If . . . she find not favor in his eyes, for some uncleanness," etc. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> On the contrary, Barrenness and fornication are more opposed to marriage than hatred. Therefore they ought to have been reasons
+                     for divorce rather than hatred.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, hatred may be caused by the virtue of the person hated. Therefore, if hatred is a sufficient reason, a woman could
+                     be divorced on account of her virtue, which is absurd.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, "If a man marry a wife and afterwards hate her, and seek occasions to put her away"* alleging that she was not a
+                     virgin when he married her, should he fail to prove this, he shall be beaten, and shall be condemned in a hundred sicles of
+                     silver, and he shall be unable to put her away all the days of his life (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.13" target="asv">Dt. 22:13-19</a>). [*The rest of the passage is apparently quoted from memory.] Therefore hatred is not a sufficient reason for
+                     divorce.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is the general opinion of holy men that the reason for permission being given to divorce a wife was the avoidance of wife-murder.
+                     Now the proximate cause of murder is hatred: wherefore the proximate cause of divorce was hatred. But hatred proceeds, like
+                     love, from a cause. Wherefore we must assign to divorce certain remote causes which were a cause of hatred. For Augustine
+                     says in his gloss (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 14): "In the Law there were many
+                     causes for divorcing a wife: Christ admitted none but fornication: and He commands other grievances to be borne for conjugal
+                     fidelity and chastity." Such causes are imperfections either of body, as sickness or some notable deformity, or in soul as
+                     fornication or the like which amounts to moral depravity. Some, however, restrict these causes within narrower limits, saying
+                     with sufficient probability that it was not lawful to divorce a wife except for some cause subsequent to the marriage; and
+                     that not even then could it be done for any such cause, but only for such as could hinder the good of the offspring, whether
+                     in body as barrenness, or leprosy and the like, or in soul, for instance if she were a woman of wicked habits which her children
+                     through continual contact with her would imitate. There is however a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.1" target="asv"> Dt. 24:1, </a> "If . . . she find not favor in his eyes," which would seem to restrict them yet more, namely to sin, by saying that there
+                     "uncleanness"
+                     denotes sin: but "sin" in the gloss refers not only to the morality of the soul but also to the condition of the body. Accordingly
+                     we grant the first two objections.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Barrenness and other like things are causes of hatred, and so they are remote causes of divorce.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No one is hateful on account of virtue as such, because goodness is the cause of love. Wherefore the argument does not hold.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The husband was punished in that case by being unable to put away his wife for ever, just as in the case when he had corrupted
+                     a maid (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.28" target="asv">Dt. 22:28-30</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q67_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q68.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q67_A7-p0.1">Whether the causes of divorce had to be written in the bill?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the causes of divorce had to be written in the bill: because the husband was absolved from the punishment
+                     of the law by the written bill of divorce. But this would seem altogether unjust, unless sufficient causes were alleged for
+                     a divorce. Therefore it was necessary for them to be written in the bill.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, seemingly this document was of no use except to show the causes for divorce. Therefore, if they were not written
+                     down, the bill was delivered for no purpose.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Master says that it was so in the text (Sent. iv, D, 33).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The causes for divorce were either sufficient or not. If they were sufficient, the wife was debarred from a second marriage,
+                     though this was allowed her by the Law. If they were insufficient, the divorce was proved to be unjust, and therefore could
+                     not be effected. Therefore the causes for divorce were by no means particularized in the bill.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The causes for divorce were not particularized in the bill, but were indicated in a general way, so as to prove the justice
+                     of the divorce. According to Josephus (Antiq. iv, 6) this was in order that the woman, having the written bill of divorce,
+                     might take another husband, else she would not have been believed. Wherefore according to him it was written in this wise:
+                     "I promise never to have thee with me again." But according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xix,
+                     26) the bill was put into writing in order to cause a delay, and that the husband might be dissuaded by the counsel of the
+                     notaries to refrain from his purpose of divorce.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p7"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q68.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="XP_Q68" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A7.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="XP_Q68-p0.1">OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="XP_Q68-p1"></p>
+               <p id="XP_Q68-p2"> We must now consider children of illegitimate birth. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q68-p3"> (1) Whether those born out of true marriage are illegitimate?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q68-p4"> (2) Whether children should suffer any loss through being illegitimate?</p>
+               <p id="XP_Q68-p5"> (3) Whether they can be legitimized?</p>
+               <div id="XP_Q68_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q68.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q68_A1-p0.1">Whether children born out of true marriage are illegitimate?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that children born out of true marriage are legitimate. For he that is born according to law is called a legitimate
+                     son. Now everyone is born according to law, at least the law of nature, which has more force than any other. Therefore every
+                     child is to be called legitimate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is the common saying that a legitimate child is one born of a legitimate marriage, or of a marriage that is deemed
+                     legitimate in the eyes of the Church. Now it happens sometimes that a marriage is deemed legitimate in the eyes of the Church,
+                     whereas there is some impediment affecting its validity; which impediment may be known to the parties who marry in the presence
+                     of the Church: or they may marry in secret and be ignorant of the impediment, in
+                     which case their marriage would seem legitimate in the eyes of the Church, for the very reason that it is not prevented by
+                     the Church. Therefore children born out of true marriage are not illegitimate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Illegitimate is that which is against the law. Now those who are born out of wedlock are born contrary to the law. Therefore
+                     they are illegitimate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Children are of four conditions. Some are natural and legitimate, for instance those who are born of a true and lawful marriage;
+                     some are natural and illegitimate, as those who are born of fornication; some are legitimate and not natural, as adopted children;
+                     some are neither legitimate nor natural; such are those born of adultery or incest, for these are born not only against the
+                     positive law, but against the express natural law. Hence we must grant that
+                     some children are illegitimate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although those who are born of an unlawful intercourse are born according to the nature common to man and all animals, they
+                     are born contrary to the law of nature which is proper to man: since fornication, adultery, and the like are contrary to the
+                     law of nature. Hence the like are not legitimate by any law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Ignorance, unless it be affected, excuses unlawful intercourse from sin. Wherefore those who contract together in good faith
+                     in the presence of the Church, although there be an impediment, of which however they are ignorant, sin not, nor are their
+                     children illegitimate. If, however, they know of the impediment, although the Church upholds their marriage because she knows
+                     not of the impediment, they are not excused from sin, nor do their children avoid
+                     being illegitimate. Neither are they excused if they know not of the impediment and marry secretly, because such ignorance
+                     would appear to be affected.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q68.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q68_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q68_A2-p0.1">Whether children should suffer any loss through being illegitimate?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that children ought not to suffer any loss through being illegitimate. For a child should not be punished on
+                     account of his father's sin, according to the Lord's saying (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q68_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>). But it is not his own but his father's fault that he is born of an unlawful union. Therefore he should not incur a loss
+                     on this account.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human justice is copied from Divine. Now God confers natural goods equally on legitimate and illegitimate children.
+                     Therefore illegitimate should be equalled to legitimate children according to human laws.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q68_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.25.5" target="asv">Gn. 25:5,6</a>) that "Abraham gave all his possessions to Isaac, and that to the children of the concubines he gave gifts": and yet the
+                     latter were not born of an unlawful intercourse. Much more, therefore, ought those born of an unlawful intercourse to incur
+                     loss by not inheriting their father's property.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A person is said to incur a loss for some cause in two ways: First, because he is deprived of his due, and thus an illegitimate
+                     child incurs no loss. Secondly, because something is not due to him, which might have been due otherwise, and thus an illegitimate
+                     son incurs a twofold loss. First because he is excluded from legitimate acts such as offices and dignities, which require
+                     a certain respectability in those who perform them. Secondly, he incurs a loss by
+                     not succeeding to his father's inheritance. Nevertheless natural sons can inherit a sixth only, whereas spurious children
+                     cannot inherit any portion, although by natural law their parents are bound to provide for their needs. Hence it is part of
+                     a bishop's care to compel both parents to provide for them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To incur a loss in this second way is not a punishment. Hence we do not say that a person is punished by not succeeding to
+                     the throne through not being the king's son. In like manner it is no punishment to an illegitimate child that he has no right
+                     to that which belongs to the legitimate children.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Illegitimate intercourse is contrary to the law, not as an act of the generative power, but as proceeding from a wicked will.
+                     Hence an illegitimate son incurs a loss, not in those things which come to him by his natural origin, but in those things
+                     which are dependent on the will for being done or possessed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="XP_Q68_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP.iii.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="XP_Q68_A3-p0.1">Whether an illegitimate son can be legitimized?</h4>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an illegitimate son cannot be legitimized. For the legitimate child is as far removed from the illegitimate
+                     as the illegitimate from the legitimate. But a legitimate child is never made illegitimate. Neither, therefore, is an illegitimate
+                     child ever made legitimate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, illegitimate intercourse begets an illegitimate child. But illegitimate intercourse never becomes legitimate. Neither,
+                     therefore, can an illegitimate son become legitimate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> What is done by the law can be undone by the law. Now the illegitimacy of children is an effect of positive law. Therefore
+                     an illegitimate child can be legitimized by one who has legal authority.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> An illegitimate child can be legitimized, not so that he be born of a legitimate intercourse, because this intercourse is
+                     a thing of the past and can never be legitimized from the moment that it was once illegitimate. But the child is said to be
+                     legitimized, in so far as the losses which an illegitimate child ought to incur are withdrawn by the authority of the law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p6"> There are six ways of becoming legitimate: two according to the canons (Cap. Conquestus; Cap. Tanta), namely when a man marries
+                     the woman of whom he has an unlawful child (if it were not a case of adultery), and by special indulgence and dispensation
+                     of the lord Pope. The other four ways are according to the laws: (1) If the father offer his natural son to the emperor's
+                     court, for by this very fact the son is legitimate on account of the reputation of the court; (2) if the
+                     father designate him in his will as his legitimate heir, and the son afterwards offer the will to the emperor; (3) if there
+                     be no legitimate son and the son himself offer himself to the emperor; (4) if the father designate him as legitimate in a
+                     public document or in a document signed by three witnesses, without calling him natural.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A favor may be bestowed on a person without injustice, but a person cannot be damnified except for a fault. Hence an illegitimate
+                     child can be legitimized rather than "vice versa"; for although a legitimate son is sometimes deprived of his inheritance
+                     on account of his fault, he is not said to be illegitimate, because he was legitimately begotten.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Illegitimate intercourse has an inherent inseparable defect whereby it is opposed to the law: and consequently it cannot
+                     be legitimized. Nor is there any comparison with an illegitimate child who has no such defect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.XP.iii.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A7.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <a href="summa.XP.i.html"></a>
+            <a href="summa.XP_Q1.html"></a>
+         `
+     </div>
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