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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="XP.ii" class="div2">
2 <a href="summa.XP.i.html"></a>
3 <a href="summa.XP_Q1.html"></a>
4 <div id="XP_Q1" class="div3">
5 <a href="summa.XP.ii.html"></a>
6 <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A1.html"></a>
7 <h3 id="XP_Q1-p0.1">OF THE PARTS OF PENANCE, IN PARTICULAR, AND FIRST OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
8 <p id="XP_Q1-p1"></p>
9 <p id="XP_Q1-p2"> We must now consider each single part of Penance, and (1) Contrition; (2) Confession; (3) Satisfaction. The consideration
10 about Contrition will be fourfold: (1) What is it? (2) What should it be about? (3) How great should it be? (4) Of its duration;
11 (5) Of its effect.
12 </p>
13 <p id="XP_Q1-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
14 <p id="XP_Q1-p4"> (1) Whether Contrition is suitably defined?</p>
15 <p id="XP_Q1-p5"> (2) Whether it is an act of virtue?</p>
16 <p id="XP_Q1-p6"> (3) Whether attrition can become contrition?</p>
17 <div id="XP_Q1_A1" class="div4">
18 <a href="summa.XP_Q1.html"></a>
19 <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A2.html"></a>
20 <h4 id="XP_Q1_A1-p0.1">Whether contrition is an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of confessing them and of making satisfaction
21 for them?
22 </h4>
23 <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p1"></p>
24 <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p2">
25 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that contrition is not "an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of confessing them and of making
26 satisfaction for them," as some define it. For, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6), "sorrow is for those things that
27 happen against our will." But this does not apply to sin. Therefore contrition is not sorrow for sins.
28 </p>
29 <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p3">
30 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contrition is given us by God. But what is given is not assumed. Therefore contrition is not an assumed sorrow.
31 </p>
32 <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p4">
33 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, satisfaction and confession are necessary for the remission of the punishment which was not remitted by contrition.
34 But sometimes the whole punishment is remitted in contrition. Therefore it is not always necessary for the contrite person
35 to have the purpose of confessing and of making satisfaction.
36 </p>
37 <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p5">
38 <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the definition.
39 </p>
40 <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p6">
41 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in
42 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q1_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv"> Ecclus. 10:15, </a> "pride is the beginning of all sin," because thereby man clings to his own judgment, and strays from the Divine commandments.
43 Consequently that which destroys sin must needs make man give up his own judgment. Now he that persists in his own judgment,
44 is called metaphorically rigid and hard: wherefore anyone is said to be broken when he is torn from his own judgment. But,
45 in material things, whence these
46 expressions are transferred to spiritual things, there is a difference between breaking and crushing or contrition, as stated
47 in Meteor. iv, in that we speak of breaking when a thing is sundered into large parts, but of crushing or contrition when
48 that which was in itself solid is reduced to minute particles. And since, for the remission of sin, it is necessary that man
49 should put aside entirely his attachment to sin, which implies a certain state of continuity and solidity in his mind,
50 therefore it is that the act through which sin is cast aside is called contrition metaphorically.
51 </p>
52 <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p7"> In this contrition several things are to be observed, viz. the very substance of the act, the way of acting, its origin and
53 its effect: in respect of which we find that contrition has been defined in various ways. For, as regards the substance of
54 the act, we have the definition given above: and since the act of contrition is both an act of virtue, and a part of the sacrament
55 of Penance, its nature as an act of virtue is explained in this definition by mentioning its genus, viz.
56 "sorrow," its object by the words "for sins," and the act of choice which is necessary for an act of virtue, by the word "assumed":
57 while, as a part of the sacrament, it is made manifest by pointing out its relation to the other parts, in the words "together
58 with the purpose of confessing and of making satisfaction."
59 </p>
60 <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p8"> There is another definition which defines contrition, only as an act of virtue; but at the same time including the difference
61 which confines it to a special virtue, viz. penance, for it is thus expressed: "Contrition is voluntary sorrow for sin whereby
62 man punishes in himself that which he grieves to have done," because the addition of the word "punishes" defines the definition
63 to a special virtue. Another definition is given by Isidore (De Sum. Bono ii, 12) as follows:
64 "Contrition is a tearful sorrow and humility of mind, arising from remembrance of sin and fear of the Judgment." Here we have
65 an allusion to the derivation of the word, when it is said that it is "humility of the mind," because just as pride makes
66 the mind rigid, so is a man humbled, when contrition leads him to give up his mind. Also the external manner is indicated
67 by the word "tearful," and the origin of contrition, by the words, "arising from remembrance of sin," etc. Another definition
68 is
69 taken from the words of Augustine [*Implicitly on
70 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q1_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.46" target="asv">Ps. 46</a>], and indicates the effect of contrition. It runs thus: "Contrition is the sorrow which takes away sin." Yet another is gathered
71 from the words of Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 11) as follows: "Contrition is humility of the soul, crushing sin between hope and
72 fear." Here the derivation is indicated by saying that contrition is "humility of the soul"; the effect, by the words, "crushing
73 sin"; and the origin, by the words, "between hope and
74 fear." Indeed, it includes not only the principal cause, which is fear, but also its joint cause, which is hope, without which,
75 fear might lead to despair.
76 </p>
77 <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p9">
78 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although sins, when committed, were voluntary, yet when we are contrite for them, they are no longer voluntary, so that they
79 occur against our will; not indeed in respect of the will that we had when we consented to them, but in respect of that which
80 we have now, so as to wish they had never been.
81 </p>
82 <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p10">
83 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Contrition is from God alone as to the form that quickens it, but as to the substance of the act, it is from the free-will
84 and from God, Who operates in all works both of nature and of will.
85 </p>
86 <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p11">
87 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the entire punishment may be remitted by contrition, yet confession and satisfaction are still necessary, both because
88 man cannot be sure that his contrition was sufficient to take away all, and because confession and satisfaction are a matter
89 of precept: wherefore he becomes a transgressor, who confesses not and makes not satisfaction.
90 </p>
91 <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p12"></p>
92 <p id="XP_Q1_A1-p13"></p>
93 <a href="summa.XP_Q1.html"></a>
94 <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A2.html"></a>
95 </div>
96 <div id="XP_Q1_A2" class="div4">
97 <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A1.html"></a>
98 <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A3.html"></a>
99 <h4 id="XP_Q1_A2-p0.1">Whether contrition is an act of virtue?</h4>
100 <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p1"></p>
101 <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p2">
102 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that contrition is not an act of virtue. For passions are not acts of virtue, since "they bring us neither
103 praise nor blame" (Ethic. ii, 5). But sorrow is a passion. As therefore contrition is sorrow, it seems that it is not an act
104 of virtue.
105 </p>
106 <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p3">
107 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as contrition is so called from its being a crushing, so is attrition. Now all agree in saying that attrition is
108 not an act of virtue. Neither, therefore, is contrition an act of virtue.
109 </p>
110 <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p4">
111 <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but an act of virtue is meritorious. But contrition is a meritorious act. Therefore it is an act of virtue.
112 </p>
113 <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p5">
114 <b>I answer that,</b> Contrition as to the literal signification of the word, does not denote an act of virtue, but a corporeal passion. But the
115 question in point does not refer to contrition in this sense, but to that which the word is employed to signify by way of
116 metaphor. For just as the inflation of one's own will unto wrong-doing implies, in itself, a generic evil, so the utter undoing
117 and crushing of that same will implies something generically good, for this is to detest
118 one's own will whereby sin was committed. Wherefore contrition, which signifies this, implies rectitude of the will; and so
119 it is the act of that virtue to which it belongs to detest and destroy past sins, the act, to wit, of penance, as is evident
120 from what was said above (Sent. iv, D, 14, Q[1], A[1];
121 <a id="XP_Q1_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q85_A2.html">TP, Q[85], AA[2]</a>,3).
122 </p>
123 <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p6">
124 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Contrition includes a twofold sorrow for sin. One is in the sensitive part, and is a passion. This does not belong essentially
125 to contrition as an act of virtue, but is rather its effect. For just as the virtue of penance inflicts outward punishment
126 on the body, in order to compensate for the offense done to God through the instrumentality of the bodily members, so does
127 it inflict on the concupiscible part of the soul a punishment, viz. the aforesaid
128 sorrow, because the concupiscible also co-operated in the sinful deeds. Nevertheless this sorrow may belong to contrition
129 taken as part of the sacrament, since the nature of a sacrament is such that it consists not only of internal but also of
130 external acts and sensible things. The other sorrow is in the will, and is nothing else save displeasure for some evil, for
131 the emotions of the will are named after the passions, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 26, Q[1], A[5];
132 <a id="XP_Q1_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html">FS,
133 Q[22], A[3]
134 </a>, ad 3). Accordingly, contrition is essentially a kind of sorrow, and is an act of the virtue of penance.
135 </p>
136 <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p7">
137 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Attrition denotes approach to perfect contrition, wherefore in corporeal matters, things are said to be attrite, when they
138 are worn away to a certain extent, but not altogether crushed to pieces; while they are said to be contrite, when all the
139 parts are crushed [tritae] minutely. Wherefore, in spiritual matters, attrition signifies a certain but not a perfect displeasure
140 for sins committed, whereas contrition denotes perfect displeasure.
141 </p>
142 <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p8"></p>
143 <p id="XP_Q1_A2-p9"></p>
144 <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A1.html"></a>
145 <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A3.html"></a>
146 </div>
147 <div id="XP_Q1_A3" class="div4">
148 <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A2.html"></a>
149 <a href="summa.XP_Q2.html"></a>
150 <h4 id="XP_Q1_A3-p0.1">Whether attrition can become contrition?</h4>
151 <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p1"></p>
152 <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p2">
153 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that attrition can become contrition. For contrition differs from attrition, as living from dead. Now dead
154 faith becomes living. Therefore attrition can become contrition.
155 </p>
156 <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p3">
157 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, matter receives perfection when privation is removed. Now sorrow is to grace, as matter to form, because grace quickens
158 sorrow. Therefore the sorrow that was previously lifeless, while guilt remained, receives perfection through being quickened
159 by grace: and so the same conclusion follows as above.
160 </p>
161 <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p4">
162 <b>On the contrary,</b> Things which are caused by principles altogether diverse cannot be changed, one into the other. Now the principle of attrition
163 is servile fear, while filial fear is the cause of contrition. Therefore attrition cannot become contrition.
164 </p>
165 <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p5">
166 <b>I answer that,</b> There are two opinions on this question: for some say that attrition may become contrition, even as lifeless faith becomes
167 living faith. But, seemingly, this is impossible; since, although the habit of lifeless faith becomes living, yet never does
168 an act of lifeless faith become an act of living faith, because the lifeless act passes away and remains no more, as soon
169 as charity comes. Now attrition and contrition do not denote a habit, but an act only: and
170 those habits of infused virtue which regard the will cannot be lifeless, since they result from charity, as stated above (Sent.
171 iii, D, 27, Q[2], A[4];
172 <a id="XP_Q1_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q65_A4.html">FS, Q[65], A[4]</a>). Wherefore until grace be infused, there is no habit by which afterwards the act of contrition may be elicited; so that
173 attrition can nowise become attrition: and this is the other opinion.
174 </p>
175 <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p6">
176 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is no comparison between faith and contrition, as stated above.
177 </p>
178 <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p7">
179 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the privation is removed from matter, the matter is quickened if it remains when the perfection comes. But the sorrow
180 which was lifeless, does not remain when charity comes, wherefore it cannot be quickened.
181 </p>
182 <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p8"> It may also be replied that matter does not take its origin from the form essentially, as an act takes its origin from the
183 habit which quickens it. Wherefore nothing hinders matter being quickened anew by some form, whereby it was not quickened
184 previously: whereas this cannot be said of an act, even as it is impossible for the identically same thing to arise from a
185 cause wherefrom it did not arise before, since a thing is brought into being but once.
186 </p>
187 <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p9"></p>
188 <p id="XP_Q1_A3-p10"></p>
189 <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A2.html"></a>
190 <a href="summa.XP_Q2.html"></a>
191 </div>
192 <a href="summa.XP.ii.html"></a>
193 <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A1.html"></a>
194 </div>
195 <div id="XP_Q2" class="div3">
196 <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A3.html"></a>
197 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A1.html"></a>
198 <h3 id="XP_Q2-p0.1">OF THE OBJECT OF CONTRITION (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
199 <p id="XP_Q2-p1"></p>
200 <p id="XP_Q2-p2"> We must now consider the object of contrition. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
201 <p id="XP_Q2-p3"> (1) Whether a man should be contrite on account of his punishment?</p>
202 <p id="XP_Q2-p4"> (2) Whether, on account of original sin?</p>
203 <p id="XP_Q2-p5"> (3) Whether, for every actual sin he has committed?</p>
204 <p id="XP_Q2-p6"> (4) Whether, for actual sins he will commit?</p>
205 <p id="XP_Q2-p7"> (5) Whether, for the sins of others?</p>
206 <p id="XP_Q2-p8"> (6) Whether, for each single mortal sin?</p>
207 <div id="XP_Q2_A1" class="div4">
208 <a href="summa.XP_Q2.html"></a>
209 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A2.html"></a>
210 <h4 id="XP_Q2_A1-p0.1">Whether man should be contrite on account of the punishment, and not only on account of his sin?</h4>
211 <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p1"></p>
212 <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p2">
213 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man should be contrite on account of the punishment, and not only on account of his sin. For Augustine
214 says in De Poenitentia [*Cf. Hom. 50 inter 1]: "No man desires life everlasting unless he repent of this mortal life." But
215 the morality of this life is a punishment. Therefore the penitent should be contrite on account of his punishments also.
216 </p>
217 <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p3">
218 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 16, cap. i), quoting Augustine (De vera et falsa Poenitentia [*Work of an unknown
219 author]), that the penitent should be sorry for having deprived himself of virtue. But privation of virtue is a punishment.
220 Therefore contrition is sorrow for punishments also.
221 </p>
222 <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p4">
223 <b>On the contrary,</b> No one holds to that for which he is sorry. But a penitent, by the very signification of the word, is one who holds to his
224 punishment [*"Poenitens," i.e. "poenam tenens"]. Therefore he is not sorry on account of his punishment, so that contrition
225 which is penitential sorrow is not on account of punishment.
226 </p>
227 <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p5">
228 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
229 <a id="XP_Q2_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>), contrition implies the crushing of something hard and whole. Now this wholeness and hardness is found in the evil of fault,
230 since the will, which is the cause thereof in the evil-doer, sticks to its own ground*, and refuses to yield to the precept
231 of the law, wherefore displeasure at a suchlike evil is called metaphorically "contrition." [*There is a play on the words
232 here---'integer' (whole) and 'in suis
233 terminis' (to its own ground)]. But this metaphor cannot be applied to evil of punishment, because punishment simply denotes
234 a lessening, so that it is possible to have sorrow for punishment but not contrition.
235 </p>
236 <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p6">
237 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to St. Augustine, penance should be on account of this mortal life, not by reason of its mortality (unless penance
238 be taken broadly for every kind of sorrow); but by reason of sins, to which we are prone on account of the weakness of this
239 life.
240 </p>
241 <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p7">
242 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sorrow for the loss of virtue through sin is not essentially the same as contrition, but is its principle. For just as we
243 are moved to desire a thing on account of the good we expect to derive from it, so are we moved to be sorry for something
244 on account of the evil accruing to us therefrom.
245 </p>
246 <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p8"></p>
247 <p id="XP_Q2_A1-p9"></p>
248 <a href="summa.XP_Q2.html"></a>
249 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A2.html"></a>
250 </div>
251 <div id="XP_Q2_A2" class="div4">
252 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A1.html"></a>
253 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A3.html"></a>
254 <h4 id="XP_Q2_A2-p0.1">Whether contrition should be on account of original sin?</h4>
255 <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p1"></p>
256 <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p2">
257 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that contrition should be on account of original sin. For we ought to be contrite on account of actual sin;
258 not by reason of the act, considered as a kind of being, but by reason of its deformity, since the act, regarded in its substance,
259 is a good, and is from God. Now original sin has a deformity, even as actual sin has. Therefore we should be contrite on its
260 account also.
261 </p>
262 <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p3">
263 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by original sin man has been turned away from God, since in punishment thereof he was to be deprived of seeing God.
264 But every man should be displeased at having been turned away from God. Therefore man should be displeased at original sin;
265 and so he ought to have contrition for it.
266 </p>
267 <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p4">
268 <b>On the contrary,</b> The medicine should be proportionate to the disease. Now we contracted original sin without willing to do so. Therefore it
269 is not necessary that we should be cleansed from it by an act of the will, such as contrition is.
270 </p>
271 <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p5">
272 <b>I answer that,</b> Contrition is sorrow, as stated above (
273 <a id="XP_Q2_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], AA[1]</a>,2), respecting and, so to speak, crushing the hardness of the will. Consequently it can regard those sins only which result
274 in us through the hardness of our will. And as original sin was not brought upon us by our own will, but contracted from the
275 origin of our infected nature, it follows that, properly speaking, we cannot have contrition on its account, but only displeasure
276 or
277 sorrow.
278 </p>
279 <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p6">
280 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Contrition is for sin, not by reason of the mere substance of the act, because it does not derive the character of evil therefrom;
281 nor again, by reason of its deformity alone, because deformity, of itself, does not include the notion of guilt, and sometimes
282 denotes a punishment. But contrition ought to be on account of sin, as implying deformity resulting from an act of the will;
283 and this does not apply to original sin, so that contrition does not
284 apply to it.
285 </p>
286 <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p7"> The same Reply avails for the Second Objection, because contrition is due to aversion of the will.</p>
287 <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p8"></p>
288 <p id="XP_Q2_A2-p9"></p>
289 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A1.html"></a>
290 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A3.html"></a>
291 </div>
292 <div id="XP_Q2_A3" class="div4">
293 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A2.html"></a>
294 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A4.html"></a>
295 <h4 id="XP_Q2_A3-p0.1">Whether we should have contrition for every actual sin?</h4>
296 <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p1"></p>
297 <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p2">
298 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we have no need to have contrition for every actual sin we have committed. For contraries are healed by
299 their contraries. Now some sins are committed through sorrow, e.g. sloth and envy. Therefore their remedy should not be sorrow,
300 such as contrition is, but joy.
301 </p>
302 <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p3">
303 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contrition is an act of the will, which cannot refer to that which is not known. But there are sins of which we
304 have no knowledge, such as those we have forgotten. Therefore we cannot have contrition for them.
305 </p>
306 <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p4">
307 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by voluntary contrition those sins are blotted out which we committed voluntarily. But ignorance takes away voluntariness,
308 as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iii, 1). Therefore contrition need not cover things which have occurred through ignorance.
309 </p>
310 <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p5">
311 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we need not be contrite for a sin which is not removed by contrition. Now some sins are not removed by contrition,
312 e.g. venial sins, that remain after the grace of contrition. Therefore there is no need to have contrition for all one's past
313 sins.
314 </p>
315 <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p6">
316 <b>On the contrary,</b> Penance is a remedy for all actual sins. But penance cannot regard some sins, without contrition regarding them also, for
317 it is the first part of Penance. Therefore contrition should be for all one's past sins.
318 </p>
319 <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p7"> Further, no sin is forgiven a man unless he be justified. But justification requires contrition, as stated above (Q[1], A[1];
320
321 <a id="XP_Q2_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113.html">FS, Q[113])</a>. Therefore it is necessary to have contrition for all one's sins.
322 </p>
323 <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p8">
324 <b>I answer that,</b> Every actual sin is caused by our will not yielding to God's law, either by transgressing it, or by omitting it, or by acting
325 beside it: and since a hard thing is one that is disposed not to give way easily, hence it is that a certain hardness of the
326 will is to be found in every actual sin. Wherefore, if a sin is to be remedied, it needs to be taken away by contrition which
327 crushes it.
328 </p>
329 <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p9">
330 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As clearly shown above (A[2], ad 1), contrition is opposed to sin, in so far as it proceeds from the choice of the will that
331 had failed to obey the command of God's law, and not as regards the material part of sin: and it is on this that the choice
332 of the will falls. Now the will's choice falls not only on the acts of the other powers, which the will uses for its own end,
333 but also on the will's own proper act: for the will wills to will something.
334 Accordingly the will's choice falls on that pain or sadness which is to be found in the sin of envy and the like, whether
335 such pain be in the senses or in the will itself. Consequently the sorrow of contrition is opposed to those sins.
336 </p>
337 <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p10">
338 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One may forget a thing in two ways, either so that it escapes the memory altogether, and then one cannot search for it; or
339 so that it escapes from the memory in part, and in part remains, as when I remember having heard something in general, but
340 know not what it was in particular, and then I search my memory in order to discover it. Accordingly a sin also may be forgotten
341 in two ways, either so as to remain in a general, but not in a particular
342 remembrance, and then a man is bound to bethink himself in order to discover the sin, because he is bound to have contrition
343 for each individual mortal sin. And if he is unable to discover it, after applying himself with due care, it is enough that
344 he be contrite for it, according as it stands in his knowledge, and indeed he should grieve not only for the sin, but also
345 for having forgotten it, because this is owing to his neglect. If, however, the sin has escaped from his memory altogether,
346 then he is excused from his duty through being unable to fulfill it, and it is enough that he be contrite in general for everything
347 wherein he has offended God. But when this inability is removed, as when the sin is recalled to his memory, then he is bound
348 to have contrition for that sin in particular, even as a poor man, who cannot pay a debt, is excused, and yet is bound to,
349 as soon as he can.
350 </p>
351 <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p11">
352 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If ignorance were to remove altogether the will to do evil, it will excuse, and there would be no sin: and sometimes it does
353 not remove the will altogether, and then it does not altogether excuse, but only to a certain extent: wherefore a man is bound
354 to be contrite for a sin committed through ignorance.
355 </p>
356 <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p12">
357 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A venial sin can remain after contrition for a mortal sin, but not after contrition for the venial sin: wherefore contrition
358 should also cover venial sins even as penance does, as stated above (Sent. iv, D, 16, Q[2], A[2], qu. 2;
359 <a id="XP_Q2_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q87_A1.html">XP, Q[87], A[1]</a>).
360 </p>
361 <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p13"></p>
362 <p id="XP_Q2_A3-p14"></p>
363 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A2.html"></a>
364 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A4.html"></a>
365 </div>
366 <div id="XP_Q2_A4" class="div4">
367 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A3.html"></a>
368 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A5.html"></a>
369 <h4 id="XP_Q2_A4-p0.1">Whether a man is bound to have contrition for his future sins?</h4>
370 <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p1"></p>
371 <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p2">
372 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man is bound to have contrition for his future sins also. For contrition is an act of the free-will:
373 and the free-will extends to the future rather than to the past, since choice, which is an act of the free-will, is about
374 future contingents, as stated in Ethic. iii. Therefore contrition is about future sins rather than about past sins.
375 </p>
376 <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p3">
377 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is aggravated by the result that ensues from it: wherefore Jerome says [*St. Basil asserts this implicitly in
378 De Vera Virgin.] that the punishment of Arius is not yet ended, for it is yet possible for some to be ruined through his heresy,
379 by reason of whose ruin his punishment would be increased: and the same applies to a man who is judged guilty of murder, if
380 he has committed a murderous assault, even before his victim dies. Now the sinner ought
381 to be contrite during that intervening time. Therefore the degree of his contrition ought to be proportionate not only to
382 his past act, but also to its eventual result: and consequently contrition regards the future.
383 </p>
384 <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p4">
385 <b>On the contrary,</b> Contrition is a part of penance. But penance always regards the past: and therefore contrition does also, and consequently
386 is not for a future sin.
387 </p>
388 <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p5">
389 <b>I answer that,</b> In every series of things moving and moved ordained to one another, we find that the inferior mover has its proper movement,
390 and besides this, it follows, in some respect, the movement of the superior mover: this is seen in the movement of the planets,
391 which, in addition to their proper movements, follow the movement of the first heaven. Now, in all the moral virtues, the
392 first mover is prudence, which is called the charioteer of the virtues. Consequently
393 each moral virtue, in addition to its proper movement, has something of the movement of prudence: and therefore, since penance
394 is a moral virtue, as it is a part of justice, in addition to its own act, it acquires the movement of prudence. Now its proper
395 movement is towards its proper object, which is a sin committed. Wherefore its proper and principal act, viz. contrition,
396 essentially regards past sins alone; but, inasmuch as it acquires something of the act of prudence, it regards future sins
397 indirectly, although it is not essentially moved towards those future sins. For this reason, he that is contrite, is sorry
398 for his past sins, and is cautious of future sins. Yet we do not speak of contrition for future sins, but of caution, which
399 is a part of prudence conjoined to penance.
400 </p>
401 <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p6">
402 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The free-will is said to regard future contingents, in so far as it is concerned with acts, but not with the object of acts:
403 because, of his own free-will, a man can think about past and necessary things, and yet the very act of thinking, in so far
404 as it is subject to the free-will, is a future contingent. Hence the act the contrition also is a future contingent, in so
405 far as it is subject to the free-will; and yet its object can be something
406 past.
407 </p>
408 <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p7">
409 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The consequent result which aggravates a sin was already present in the act as in its cause; wherefore when the sin was committed,
410 its degree of gravity was already complete, and no further guilt accrued to it when the result took place. Nevertheless some
411 accidental punishment accrues to it, in the respect of which the damned will have the more motives of regret for the more
412 evils that have resulted from their sins. It is in this sense that Jerome
413 [*Basil] speaks. Hence there is not need for contrition to be for other than past sins.
414 </p>
415 <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p8"></p>
416 <p id="XP_Q2_A4-p9"></p>
417 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A3.html"></a>
418 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A5.html"></a>
419 </div>
420 <div id="XP_Q2_A5" class="div4">
421 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A4.html"></a>
422 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A6.html"></a>
423 <h4 id="XP_Q2_A5-p0.1">Whether a man ought to have contrition for another's sin? </h4>
424 <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p1"></p>
425 <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p2">
426 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man ought to have contrition for another's sin. For one should not ask forgiveness for a sin unless
427 one is contrite for it. Now forgiveness is asked for another's sin in
428 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q2_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.13" target="asv"> Ps. 18:13</a>: "From those of others spare thy servant." Therefore a man ought to be contrite for another's sins.
429 </p>
430 <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p3">
431 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man is bound, ought of charity, to love his neighbor as himself. Now, through love of himself, he both grieves for
432 his ills, and desires good things. Therefore, since we are bound to desire the goods of grace for our neighbor, as for ourselves,
433 it seems that we ought to grieve for his sins, even as for our own. But contrition is nothing else than sorrow for sins. Therefore
434 man should be contrite for the sins of others.
435 </p>
436 <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p4">
437 <b>On the contrary,</b> Contrition is an act of the virtue of penance. But no one repents save for what he has done himself. Therefore no one is
438 contrite for others' sins.
439 </p>
440 <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p5">
441 <b>I answer that,</b> The same thing is crushed [conteritur] which hitherto was hard and whole. Hence contrition for sin must needs be in the same
442 subject in which the hardness of sin was hitherto: so that there is no contrition for the sins of others.
443 </p>
444 <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p6">
445 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The prophet prays to be spared from the sins of others, in so far as, through fellowship with sinners, a man contracts a
446 stain by consenting to their sins: thus it is written (
447 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q2_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.17.27" target="asv">Ps. 17:27</a>): "With the perverse thou wilt be perverted."
448 </p>
449 <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p7">
450 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We ought to grieve for the sins of others, but not to have contrition for them, because not all sorrow for past sins is contrition,
451 as is evident for what has been said already.
452 </p>
453 <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p8"></p>
454 <p id="XP_Q2_A5-p9"></p>
455 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A4.html"></a>
456 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A6.html"></a>
457 </div>
458 <div id="XP_Q2_A6" class="div4">
459 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A5.html"></a>
460 <a href="summa.XP_Q3.html"></a>
461 <h4 id="XP_Q2_A6-p0.1">Whether it is necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin?</h4>
462 <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p1"></p>
463 <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p2">
464 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin. For the movement of contrition in justification
465 is instantaneous: whereas a man cannot think of every mortal sin in an instant. Therefore it is not necessary to have contrition
466 for each mortal sin.
467 </p>
468 <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p3">
469 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contrition should be for sins, inasmuch as they turn us away from God, because we need not be contrite for turning
470 to creatures without turning away from God. Now all mortal sins agree in turning us away from God. Therefore one contrition
471 for all is sufficient.
472 </p>
473 <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p4">
474 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, mortal sins have more in common with one another, than actual and original sin. Now one Baptism blots out all sins
475 both actual and original. Therefore one general contrition blots out all mortal sins.
476 </p>
477 <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p5">
478 <b>On the contrary,</b> For diverse diseases there are diverse remedies, since "what heals the eye will not heal the foot," as Jerome says (Super
479 Marc. ix, 28). But contrition is the special remedy for one mortal sin. Therefore one general contrition for all mortal sins
480 does not suffice.
481 </p>
482 <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p6"> Further, contrition is expressed by confession. But it is necessary to confess each mortal sin. Therefore it is necessary
483 to have contrition for each mortal sin.
484 </p>
485 <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p7">
486 <b>I answer that,</b> Contrition may be considered in two ways, as to its origin, and as to its term. By origin of contrition I mean the process
487 of thought, when a man thinks of his sin and is sorry for it, albeit not with the sorrow of contrition, yet with that of attrition.
488 The term of contrition is when that sorrow is already quickened by grace. Accordingly, as regards the origin of contrition,
489 a man needs to be contrite for each sin that he calls to mind; but as regards its
490 term, it suffices for him to have one general contrition for all, because then the movement of his contrition acts in virtue
491 of all his preceding dispositions.
492 </p>
493 <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
494 <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p9">
495 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although all mortal sins agree in turning man away from God, yet they differ in the cause and mode of aversion, and in the
496 degree of separation from God; and this regards the different ways in which they turn us to creatures.
497 </p>
498 <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p10">
499 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Baptism acts in virtue of Christ's merit, Who had infinite power for the blotting out of all sins; and so for all sins one
500 Baptism suffices. But in contrition, in addition to the merit of Christ, an act of ours is requisite, which must, therefore,
501 correspond to each sin, since it has not infinite power for contrition.
502 </p>
503 <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p11"> It may also be replied that Baptism is a spiritual generation; whereas Penance, as regards contrition and its other parts,
504 is a kind of spiritual healing by way of some alteration. Now it is evident in the generation of a body, accompanied by corruption
505 of another body, that all the accidents contrary to the thing generated, and which were the accidents of the thing corrupted,
506 are removed by the one generation: whereas in alteration, only that accident is removed which was
507 contrary to the accident which is the term of the alteration. In like manner, one Baptism blots out all sins together and
508 introduces a new life; whereas Penance does not blot out each sin, unless it be directed to each. For this reason it is necessary
509 to be contrite for, and to confess each sin.
510 </p>
511 <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p12"></p>
512 <p id="XP_Q2_A6-p13"></p>
513 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A5.html"></a>
514 <a href="summa.XP_Q3.html"></a>
515 </div>
516 <a href="summa.XP_Q1_A3.html"></a>
517 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A1.html"></a>
518 </div>
519 <div id="XP_Q3" class="div3">
520 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A6.html"></a>
521 <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A1.html"></a>
522 <h3 id="XP_Q3-p0.1">OF THE DEGREE OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
523 <p id="XP_Q3-p1"></p>
524 <p id="XP_Q3-p2"> We must now consider the degree of contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
525 <p id="XP_Q3-p3"> (1) Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?</p>
526 <p id="XP_Q3-p4"> (2) Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?</p>
527 <p id="XP_Q3-p5"> (3) Whether sorrow for one sin ought to be greater than for another?</p>
528 <div id="XP_Q3_A1" class="div4">
529 <a href="summa.XP_Q3.html"></a>
530 <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A2.html"></a>
531 <h4 id="XP_Q3_A1-p0.1">Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?</h4>
532 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p1"></p>
533 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p2">
534 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that contrition is not the greatest possible sorrow in the world. For sorrow is the sensation of hurt. But
535 some hurts are more keenly felt than the hurt of sin, e.g. the hurt of a wound. Therefore contrition is not the greatest sorrow.
536 </p>
537 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p3">
538 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we judge of a cause according to its effect. Now the effect of sorrow is tears. Since therefore sometimes a contrite
539 person does not shed outward tears for his sins, whereas he weeps for the death of a friend, or for a blow, or the like, it
540 seems that contrition is not the greatest sorrow.
541 </p>
542 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p4">
543 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more a thing is mingled with its contrary, the less its intensity. But the sorrow of contrition has a considerable
544 admixture of joy, because the contrite man rejoices in his delivery, in the hope of pardon, and in many like things. Therefore
545 his sorrow is very slight.
546 </p>
547 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p5">
548 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the sorrow of contrition is a kind of displeasure. But there are many things more displeasing to the contrite than
549 their past sins; for they would not prefer to suffer the pains of hell rather than to sin. nor to have suffered, nor yet to
550 suffer all manner of temporal punishment; else few would be found contrite. Therefore the sorrow of contrition is not the
551 greatest.
552 </p>
553 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p6">
554 <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), "all sorrow is based on love." Now the love of charity, on which the sorrow
555 of contrition is based, is the greatest love. Therefore the sorrow of contrition is the greatest sorrow.
556 </p>
557 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p7"> Further, sorrow is for evil. Therefore the greater the evil, the greater the sorrow. But the fault is a greater evil than
558 its punishment. Therefore contrition which is sorrow for fault, surpasses all other sorrow.
559 </p>
560 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p8">
561 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
562 <a id="XP_Q3_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q1_A2.html">Q[1], A[2]</a>, ad 1), there is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the will, and is the very essence of contrition, being nothing
563 else than displeasure at past sin, and this sorrow, in contrition, surpasses all other sorrows. For the more pleasing a thing
564 is, the more displeasing is its contrary. Now the last end is above all things pleasing: wherefore sin, which turns us away
565 from the last end, should be, above
566 all things, displeasing. The other sorrow is in the sensitive part, and is caused by the former sorrow either from natural
567 necessity, in so far as the lower powers follow the movements of the higher, or from choice, in so far as a penitent excites
568 in himself this sorrow for his sins. In neither of these ways is such sorrow, of necessity, the greatest, because the lower
569 powers are more deeply moved by their own objects than through redundance from the higher powers. Wherefore the nearer the
570 operation of the higher powers approaches to the objects of the lower powers, the more do the latter follow the movement of
571 the former. Consequently there is greater pain in the sensitive part, on account of a sensible hurt, than that which redounds
572 into the sensitive part from the reason; and likewise, that which redounds from the reason when it deliberates on corporeal
573 things, is greater than that which redounds from the reason in considering spiritual things. Therefore the sorrow which
574 results in the sensitive part from the reason's displeasure at sin, is not greater than the other sorrows of which that same
575 part is the subject: and likewise, neither is the sorrow which is assumed voluntarily greater than other sorrows---both because
576 the lower appetite does not obey the higher appetite infallibly, as though in the lower appetite there should arise a passion
577 of such intensity and of such a kind as the higher appetite might ordain---and because the passions are employed by the
578 reason, in acts of virtue, according to a certain measure, which the sorrow that is without virtue sometimes does not observe,
579 but exceeds.
580 </p>
581 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p9">
582 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as sensible sorrow is on account of the sensation of hurt, so interior sorrow is on account of the thought of something
583 hurtful. Therefore, although the hurt of sin is not perceived by the external sense, yet it is perceived to be the most grievous
584 hurt by the interior sense or reason.
585 </p>
586 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p10">
587 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Affections of the body are the immediate result of the sensitive passions and, through them, of the emotions of the higher
588 appetite. Hence it is that bodily tears flow more quickly from sensible sorrow, or even from a thing that hurts the senses,
589 than from the spiritual sorrow of contrition.
590 </p>
591 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p11">
592 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The joy which a penitent has for his sorrow does not lessen his displeasure (for it is not contrary to it), but increases
593 it, according as every operation is increased by the delight which it causes, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Thus he who delights
594 in learning a science, learns the better, and, in like manner, he who rejoices in his displeasure, is the more intensely displeased.
595 But it may well happen that this joy tempers the sorrow that results from
596 the reason in the sensitive part.
597 </p>
598 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p12">
599 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The degree of displeasure at a thing should be proportionate to the degree of its malice. Now the malice of mortal sin is
600 measured from Him against Whom it is committed, inasmuch as it is offensive to Him; and from him who sins, inasmuch as it
601 is hurtful to him. And, since man should love God more than himself, therefore he should hate sin, as an offense against God,
602 more than as being hurtful to himself. Now it is hurtful to him chiefly because it
603 separates him from God; and in this respect the separation from God which is a punishment, should be more displeasing than
604 the sin itself, as causing this hurt (since what is hated on account of something else, is less hated), but less than the
605 sin, as an offense against God. Again, among all the punishments of malice a certain order is observed according to the degree
606 of the hurt. Consequently, since this is the greatest hurt, inasmuch as it consists in privation of the greatest good, the
607 greatest of all punishments will be separation from God.
608 </p>
609 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p13"> Again, with regard to this displeasure, it is necessary to observe that there is also an accidental degree of malice, in
610 respect of the present and the past; since what is past, is no more, whence it has less of the character of malice or goodness.
611 Hence it is that a man shrinks from suffering an evil at the present, or at some future time, more than he shudders at the
612 past evil: wherefore also, no passion of the soul corresponds directly to the past, as sorrow corresponds to
613 present evil, and fear to future evil. Consequently, of two past evils, the mind shrinks the more from that one which still
614 produces a greater effect at the present time, or which, it fears, will produce a greater effect in the future, although in
615 the past it was the lesser evil. And, since the effect of the past sin is sometimes not so keenly felt as the effect of the
616 past punishment, both because sin is more perfectly remedied than punishment, and because bodily defect is more manifest than
617 spiritual defect, therefore even a man, who is well disposed, sometimes feels a greater abhorrence of his past punishment
618 than of his past sin, although he would be ready to suffer the same punishment over again rather than commit the same sin.
619 </p>
620 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p14"> We must also observe, in comparing sin with punishment, that some punishments are inseparable from offense of God, e.g. separation
621 from God; and some also are everlasting, e.g. the punishment of hell. Therefore the punishment to which is connected offense
622 of God is to be shunned in the same way as sin; whereas that which is everlasting is simply to be shunned more than sin. If,
623 however, we separate from these punishments the notion of offense, and consider only the notion of
624 punishment, they have the character of malice, less than sin has as an offense against God: and for this reason should cause
625 less displeasure.
626 </p>
627 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p15"> We must, however, take note that, although the contrite should be thus disposed, yet he should not be questioned about his
628 feelings, because man cannot easily measure them. Sometimes that which displeases least seems to displease most, through being
629 more closely connected with some sensible hurt, which is more known to us.
630 </p>
631 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p16"></p>
632 <p id="XP_Q3_A1-p17"></p>
633 <a href="summa.XP_Q3.html"></a>
634 <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A2.html"></a>
635 </div>
636 <div id="XP_Q3_A2" class="div4">
637 <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A1.html"></a>
638 <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
639 <h4 id="XP_Q3_A2-p0.1">Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?</h4>
640 <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p1"></p>
641 <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p2">
642 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sorrow of contrition cannot be too great. For no sorrow can be more immoderate than that which destroys
643 its own subject. But the sorrow of contrition, if it be so great as to cause death or corruption of the body, is praiseworthy.
644 For Anselm says (Orat. lii): "Would that such were the exuberance of my inmost soul, as to dry up the marrow of my body";
645 and Augustine [*De Contritione Cordis, work of an unknown author] confesses that "he
646 deserves to blind his eyes with tears." Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot be too great.
647 </p>
648 <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p3">
649 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sorrow of contrition results from the love of charity. But the love of charity cannot be too great. Neither,
650 therefore, can the sorrow of contrition be too great.
651 </p>
652 <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p4">
653 <b>Objection 3:</b> On the contrary, Every moral virtue is destroyed by excess and deficiency. But contrition is an act of a moral virtue, viz.
654 penance, since it is a part of justice. Therefore sorrow for sins can be too great.
655 </p>
656 <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p5">
657 <b>I answer that,</b> Contrition, as regards the sorrow in the reason, i.e. the displeasure, whereby the sin is displeasing through being an offense
658 against God, cannot be too great; even as neither can the love of charity be too great, for when this is increased the aforesaid
659 displeasure is increased also. But, as regards the sensible sorrow, contrition may be too great, even as outward affliction
660 of the body may be too great. In all these things the rule should be the
661 safeguarding of the subject, and of that general well-being which suffices for the fulfillment of one's duties; hence it is
662 written (
663 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q3_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.1" target="asv">Rom. 12:1</a>): "Let your sacrifice be reasonable [*Vulg.: 'Present your bodies . . . a reasonable sacrifice']."
664 </p>
665 <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p6">
666 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Anselm desired the marrow of his body to be dried up by the exuberance of his devotion, not as regards the natural humor,
667 but as to his bodily desires and concupiscences. And, although Augustine acknowledged that he deserved to lose the use of
668 his bodily eyes on account of his sins, because every sinner deserves not only eternal, but also temporal death, yet he did
669 not wish his eyes to be blinded.
670 </p>
671 <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p7">
672 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection considers the sorrow which is in the reason: while the Third considers the sorrow of the sensitive part.
673 </p>
674 <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p8"></p>
675 <p id="XP_Q3_A2-p9"></p>
676 <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A1.html"></a>
677 <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
678 </div>
679 <div id="XP_Q3_A3" class="div4">
680 <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A2.html"></a>
681 <a href="summa.XP_Q4.html"></a>
682 <h4 id="XP_Q3_A3-p0.1">Whether sorrow for one sin should be greater than for another?</h4>
683 <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p1"></p>
684 <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p2">
685 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow for one sin need not be greater than for another. For Jerome (Ep. cviii) commends Paula for that
686 "she deplored her slightest sins as much as great ones." Therefore one need not be more sorry for one sin than for another.
687 </p>
688 <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p3">
689 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the movement of contrition is instantaneous. Now one instantaneous movement cannot be at the same time more intense
690 and more remiss. Therefore contrition for one sin need not be greater than for another.
691 </p>
692 <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p4">
693 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contrition is for sin chiefly as turning us away from God. But all mortal sins agree in turning us away from God,
694 since they all deprive us of grace whereby the soul is united to God. Therefore we should have equal contrition for all mortal
695 sins.
696 </p>
697 <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p5">
698 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
699 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q3_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv">Dt. 25:2</a>): "According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now, in contrition, the stripes are measured
700 according to the sins, because to contrition is united the purpose of making satisfaction. Therefore contrition should be
701 for one sin more than for another.
702 </p>
703 <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p6"> Further, man should be contrite for that which he ought to have avoided. But he ought to avoid one sin more than another,
704 if that sin is more grievous, and it be necessary to do one or the other. Therefore, in like manner, he ought to be more sorry
705 for one, viz. the more grievous, than for the other.
706 </p>
707 <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p7">
708 <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of contrition in two ways: first, in so far as it corresponds to each single sin, and thus, as regards the sorrow
709 in the higher appetite, a man ought to be more sorry for a more grievous sin, because there is more reason for sorrow, viz.
710 the offense against God, in such a sin than in another, since the more inordinate the act is, the more it offends God. In
711 like manner, since the greater sin deserves a greater punishment, the sorrow also of the
712 sensitive part, in so far as it is voluntarily undergone for sin, as the punishment thereof, ought to be greater where the
713 sin is greater. But in so far as the emotions of the lower appetite result from the impression of the higher appetite, the
714 degree of sorrow depends on the disposition of the lower faculty to the reception of impressions from the higher faculty,
715 and not on the greatness of the sin.
716 </p>
717 <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p8"> Secondly, contrition may be taken in so far as it is directed to all one's sins together, as in the act of justification.
718 Such contrition arises either from the consideration of each single sin, and thus although it is but one act, yet the distinction
719 of the sins remains virtually therein; or, at least, it includes the purpose of thinking of each sin; and in this way too
720 it is habitually more for one than for another.
721 </p>
722 <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p9">
723 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Paula is commended, not for deploring all her sins equally, but because she grieved for her slight sins as much as though
724 they were grave sins, in comparison with other persons who grieve for their sins: but for graver sins she would have grieved
725 much more.
726 </p>
727 <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p10">
728 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In that instantaneous movement of contrition, although it is not possible to find an actually distinct intensity in respect
729 of each individual sin, yet it is found in the way explained above; and also in another way, in so far as, in this general
730 contrition, each individual sin is related to that particular motive of sorrow which occurs to the contrite person, viz. the
731 offense against God. For he who loves a whole, loves its parts potentially although
732 not actually, and accordingly he loves some parts more and some less, in proportion to their relation to the whole; thus he
733 who loves a community, virtually loves each one more or less according to their respective relations to the common good. In
734 like manner he who is sorry for having offended God, implicitly grieves for his different sins in different ways, according
735 as by them he offended God more or less.
736 </p>
737 <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p11">
738 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although each mortal sin turns us away from God and deprives us of His grace, yet some remove us further away than others,
739 inasmuch as through their inordinateness they become more out of harmony with the order of the Divine goodness, than others
740 do.
741 </p>
742 <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p12"></p>
743 <p id="XP_Q3_A3-p13"></p>
744 <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A2.html"></a>
745 <a href="summa.XP_Q4.html"></a>
746 </div>
747 <a href="summa.XP_Q2_A6.html"></a>
748 <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A1.html"></a>
749 </div>
750 <div id="XP_Q4" class="div3">
751 <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
752 <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
753 <h3 id="XP_Q4-p0.1">OF THE TIME FOR CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
754 <p id="XP_Q4-p1"></p>
755 <p id="XP_Q4-p2"> We must now consider the time for contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
756 <p id="XP_Q4-p3"> (1) Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?</p>
757 <p id="XP_Q4-p4"> (2) Whether it is expedient to grieve continually for our sins?</p>
758 <p id="XP_Q4-p5"> (3) Whether souls grieve for their sins even after this life?</p>
759 <div id="XP_Q4_A1" class="div4">
760 <a href="summa.XP_Q4.html"></a>
761 <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
762 <h4 id="XP_Q4_A1-p0.1">Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?</h4>
763 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p1"></p>
764 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p2">
765 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the time for contrition is not the whole of this life. For as we should be sorry for a sin committed,
766 so should we be ashamed of it. But shame for sin does not last all one's life, for Ambrose says (De Poenit. ii) that "he whose
767 sin is forgiven has nothing to be ashamed of." Therefore it seems that neither should contrition last all one's life, since
768 it is sorrow for sin.
769 </p>
770 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p3">
771 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
772 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q4_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.18" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:18</a>) that "perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain." But sorrow also has pain. Therefore the sorrow of contrition
773 cannot remain in the state of perfect charity.
774 </p>
775 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p4">
776 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there cannot be any sorrow for the past (since it is, properly speaking, about a present evil) except in so far
777 as something of the past sin remains in the present time. Now, in this life, sometimes one attains to a state in which nothing
778 remains of a past sin, neither disposition, nor guilt, nor any debt of punishment. Therefore there is no need to grieve any
779 more for that sin.
780 </p>
781 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p5">
782 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (
783 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q4_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>) that "to them that love God all things work together unto good," even sins as a gloss declares [*Augustine, De Correp. et
784 Grat.]. Therefore there is no need for them to grieve for sin after it has been forgiven.
785 </p>
786 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p6">
787 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, contrition is a part of Penance, condivided with satisfaction. But there is no need for continual satisfaction.
788 Therefore contrition for sin need not be continual.
789 </p>
790 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p7">
791 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author] says that "when sorrow ceases, penance
792 fails, and when penance fails, no pardon remains." Therefore, since it behooves one not to lose the forgiveness which has
793 been granted, it seems that one ought always to grieve for one's sins.
794 </p>
795 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p8"> Further, it is written (
796 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q4_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.5.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 5:5</a>): "Be not without fear about sin forgiven." Therefore man should always grieve, that his sins may be forgiven him.
797 </p>
798 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p9">
799 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
800 <a id="XP_Q4_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>), there is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the reason, and is detestation of the sin committed; the other is in
801 the sensitive part, and results from the former: and as regards both, the time for contrition is the whole of the present
802 state of life. For as long as one is a wayfarer, one detests the obstacles which retard or hinder one from reaching the end
803 of the way. Wherefore, since past sin
804 retards the course of our life towards God (because the time which was given to us for the course cannot be recovered), it
805 follows that the state of contrition remains during the whole of this lifetime, as regards the detestation of sin. The same
806 is to be said of the sensible sorrow, which is assumed by the will as a punishment: for since man, by sinning, deserved everlasting
807 punishment, and sinned against the eternal God, the everlasting punishment being commuted into a temporal one, sorrow
808 ought to remain during the whole of man's eternity, i.e. during the whole of the state of this life. For this reason Hugh
809 of St. Victor says [*Richard of St. Victor, De Pot. Lig. et Solv. 3,5,13] that "when God absolves a man from eternal guilt
810 and punishment, He binds him with a chain of eternal detestation of sin."
811 </p>
812 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p10">
813 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Shame regards sin only as a disgraceful act; wherefore after sin has been taken away as to its guilt, there is no further
814 motive for shame; but there does remain a motive of sorrow, which is for the guilt, not only as being something disgraceful,
815 but also as having a hurt connected with it.
816 </p>
817 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p11">
818 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Servile fear which charity casts out, is opposed to charity by reason of its servility, because it regards the punishment.
819 But the sorrow of contrition results from charity, as stated above (
820 <a id="XP_Q4_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>): wherefore the comparison fails.
821 </p>
822 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p12">
823 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although, by penance, the sinner returns to his former state of grace and immunity from the debt of punishment, yet he never
824 returns to his former dignity of innocence, and so something always remains from his past sin.
825 </p>
826 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p13">
827 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Just as a man ought not to do evil that good may come of it, so he ought not to rejoice in evil, for the reason that good
828 may perchance come from it through the agency of Divine grace or providence, because his sins did not cause but hindered those
829 goods; rather was it Divine providence that was their cause, and in this man should rejoice, whereas he should grieve for
830 his sins.
831 </p>
832 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p14">
833 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Satisfaction depends on the punishment appointed, which should be enjoined for sins; hence it can come to an end, so that
834 there be no further need of satisfaction. But that punishment is proportionate to sin chiefly on the part of its adherence
835 to a creature whence it derives its finiteness. On the other hand, the sorrow of contrition corresponds to sin on the part
836 of the aversion, whence it derives a certain infinity; wherefore contrition ought to
837 continue always; nor is it unreasonable if that which precedes remains, when that which follows is taken away.
838 </p>
839 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p15"></p>
840 <p id="XP_Q4_A1-p16"></p>
841 <a href="summa.XP_Q4.html"></a>
842 <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
843 </div>
844 <div id="XP_Q4_A2" class="div4">
845 <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
846 <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
847 <h4 id="XP_Q4_A2-p0.1">Whether it is expedient to grieve for sin continually?</h4>
848 <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p1"></p>
849 <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p2">
850 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not expedient to grieve for sin continually. For it is sometimes expedient to rejoice, as is evident
851 from
852 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q4_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.4.4" target="asv"> Phil. 4:4, </a> where the gloss on the words, "Rejoice in the Lord always," says that "it is necessary to rejoice." Now it is not possible
853 to rejoice and grieve at the same time. Therefore it is not expedient to grieve for sin continually.
854 </p>
855 <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p3">
856 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which, in itself, is an evil and a thing to be avoided should not be taken upon oneself, except in so far as
857 it is necessary as a remedy against something, as in the case of burning or cutting a wound. Now sorrow is in itself an evil;
858 wherefore it is written (
859 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q4_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.24" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:24</a>): "Drive away sadness far from thee," and the reason is given (
860 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q4_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.25" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:25</a>): "For sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit
861 in it." Moreover the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. vii, 13,14; x, 5). Therefore one should not grieve for sin any longer
862 than suffices for the sin to be blotted out. Now sin is already blotted out after the first sorrow of contrition. Therefore
863 it is not expedient to grieve any longer.
864 </p>
865 <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p4">
866 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Bernard says (Serm. xi in Cant.): "Sorrow is a good thing, if it is not continual; for honey should be mingled with
867 wormwood." Therefore it seems that it is inexpedient to grieve continually.
868 </p>
869 <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p5">
870 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author] says: "The penitent should always grieve, and rejoice
871 in his grief."
872 </p>
873 <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p6"> Further, it is expedient always to continue, as far as it is possible, those acts in which beatitude consists. Now such is
874 sorrow for sin, as is shown by the words of
875 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q4_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.5" target="asv"> Mat. 5:5, </a> "Blessed are they that mourn." Therefore it is expedient for sorrow to be as continual as possible.
876 </p>
877 <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p7">
878 <b>I answer that,</b> We find this condition in the acts of the virtues, that in them excess and defect are not possible, as is proved in Ethic.
879 ii, 6,7. Wherefore, since contrition, so far as it is a kind of displeasure seated in the rational appetite, is an act of
880 the virtue of penance, there can never be excess in it, either as to its intensity, or as to its duration, except in so far
881 as the act of one virtue hinders the act of another which is more urgent for the time being.
882 Consequently the more continually a man can perform acts of this displeasure, the better it is, provided he exercises the
883 acts of other virtues when and how he ought to. On the other hand, passions can have excess and defect, both in intensity
884 and in duration. Wherefore, as the passion of sorrow, which the will takes upon itself, ought to be moderately intense, so
885 ought it to be of moderate duration, lest, if it should last too long, man fall into despair, cowardice, and such like vices.
886 </p>
887 <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p8">
888 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sorrow of contrition is a hindrance to worldly joy, but not to the joy which is about God, and which has sorrow itself
889 for object.
890 </p>
891 <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p9">
892 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The words of Ecclesiasticus refer to worldly joy: and the Philosopher is referring to sorrow as a passion, of which we should
893 make moderate use, according as the end, for which it is assumed, demands.
894 </p>
895 <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p10">
896 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bernard is speaking of sorrow as a passion.
897 </p>
898 <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p11"></p>
899 <p id="XP_Q4_A2-p12"></p>
900 <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
901 <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
902 </div>
903 <div id="XP_Q4_A3" class="div4">
904 <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
905 <a href="summa.XP_Q5.html"></a>
906 <h4 id="XP_Q4_A3-p0.1">Whether our souls are contrite for sins even after this life?</h4>
907 <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p1"></p>
908 <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p2">
909 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our souls are contrite for sins even after this life. For the love of charity causes displeasure at sin.
910 Now, after this life, charity remains in some, both as to its act and as to its habit, since "charity never falleth away."
911 Therefore the displeasure at the sin committed, which is the essence of contrition, remains.
912 </p>
913 <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p3">
914 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we should grieve more for sin than for punishment. But the souls in purgatory grieve for their sensible punishment
915 and for the delay of glory. Much more, therefore, do they grieve for the sins they committed.
916 </p>
917 <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p4">
918 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the pain of purgatory satisfies for sin. But satisfaction derives its efficacy from the power of contrition. Therefore
919 contrition remains after this life.
920 </p>
921 <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p5">
922 <b>On the contrary,</b> contrition is a part of the sacrament of Penance. But the sacraments do not endure after this life. Neither, therefore, does
923 contrition.
924 </p>
925 <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p6"> Further, contrition can be so great as to blot out both guilt and punishment. If therefore the souls in purgatory could have
926 contrition, it would be possible for their debt of punishment to be remitted through the power of their contrition, so that
927 they would be delivered from their sensible pain, which is false.
928 </p>
929 <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p7">
930 <b>I answer that,</b> Three things are to be observed in contrition: first, its genus, viz. sorrow; secondly, its form, for it is an act of virtue
931 quickened by charity; thirdly, its efficacy, for it is a meritorious and sacramental act, and, to a certain extent, satisfactory.
932 Accordingly, after this life, those souls which dwell in the heavenly country, cannot have contrition, because they are void
933 of sorrow by reason of the fulness of their joy: those which are in hell, have no
934 contrition, for although they have sorrow, they lack the grace which quickens sorrow; while those which are in purgatory have
935 a sorrow for their sins, that is quickened by grace; yet it is not meritorious, for they are not in the state of meriting.
936 In this life, however, all these three can be found.
937 </p>
938 <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p8">
939 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity does not cause this sorrow, save in those who are capable of it; but the fulness of joy in the Blessed excludes all
940 capability of sorrow from them: wherefore, though they have charity, they have no contrition.
941 </p>
942 <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p9">
943 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The souls in purgatory grieve for their sins; but their sorrow is not contrition, because it lacks the efficacy of contrition.
944 </p>
945 <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p10">
946 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The pain which the souls suffer in purgatory, cannot, properly speaking, be called satisfaction, because satisfaction demands
947 a meritorious work; yet, in a broad sense, the payment of the punishment due may be called satisfaction.
948 </p>
949 <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p11"></p>
950 <p id="XP_Q4_A3-p12"></p>
951 <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A2.html"></a>
952 <a href="summa.XP_Q5.html"></a>
953 </div>
954 <a href="summa.XP_Q3_A3.html"></a>
955 <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A1.html"></a>
956 </div>
957 <div id="XP_Q5" class="div3">
958 <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
959 <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
960 <h3 id="XP_Q5-p0.1">OF THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
961 <p id="XP_Q5-p1"></p>
962 <p id="XP_Q5-p2"> We must now consider the effect of contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
963 <p id="XP_Q5-p3"> (1) Whether the remission of sin is the effect of contrition?</p>
964 <p id="XP_Q5-p4"> (2) Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?</p>
965 <p id="XP_Q5-p5"> (3) Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?</p>
966 <div id="XP_Q5_A1" class="div4">
967 <a href="summa.XP_Q5.html"></a>
968 <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
969 <h4 id="XP_Q5_A1-p0.1">Whether the forgiveness of sin is the effect of contrition?</h4>
970 <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p1"></p>
971 <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p2">
972 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the forgiveness of sin is not the effect of contrition. For God alone forgives sins. But we are somewhat
973 the cause of contrition, since it is an act of our own. Therefore contrition is not the cause of forgiveness.
974 </p>
975 <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p3">
976 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contrition is an act of virtue. Now virtue follows the forgiveness of sin: because virtue and sin are not together
977 in the soul. Therefore contrition is not the cause of the forgiveness of sin.
978 </p>
979 <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p4">
980 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing but sin is an obstacle to receiving the Eucharist. But the contrite should not go to Communion before going
981 to confession. Therefore they have not yet received the forgiveness of their sins.
982 </p>
983 <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p5">
984 <b>On the contrary,</b> a gloss on
985 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q5_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.50.19" target="asv"> Ps. 50:19, </a> "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit," says: "A hearty contrition is the sacrifice by which sins are loosed."
986 </p>
987 <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p6"> Further, virtue and vice are engendered and corrupted by the same causes, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2. Now sin is committed
988 through the heart's inordinate love. Therefore it is destroyed by sorrow caused by the heart's ordinate love; and consequently
989 contrition blots out sin.
990 </p>
991 <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p7">
992 <b>I answer that,</b> Contrition can be considered in two ways, either as part of a sacrament, or as an act of virtue, and in either case it is
993 the cause of the forgiveness of sin, but not in the same way. Because, as part of a sacrament, it operates primarily as an
994 instrument for the forgiveness of sin, as is evident with regard to the other sacraments (cf. Sent. iv, D, 1, Q[1], A[4]:
995
996 <a id="XP_Q5_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q62_A1.html">TP, Q[62], A[1]</a>); while, as an act of virtue, it is the quasi-material
997 cause of sin's forgiveness. For a disposition is, as it were, a necessary condition for justification, and a disposition is
998 reduced to a material cause, if it be taken to denote that which disposes matter to receive something. It is otherwise in
999 the case of an agent's disposition to act, because this is reduced to the genus of efficient cause.
1000 </p>
1001 <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p8">
1002 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God alone is the principal efficient cause of the forgiveness of sin: but the dispositive cause can be from us also, and
1003 likewise the sacramental cause, since the sacramental forms are words uttered by us, having an instrumental power of conferring
1004 grace whereby sins are forgiven.
1005 </p>
1006 <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p9">
1007 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The forgiveness of sin precedes virtue and the infusion of grace, in one way, and, in another, follows: and in so far as
1008 it follows, the act elicited by the virtue can be a cause of the forgiveness of sin.
1009 </p>
1010 <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p10">
1011 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The dispensation of the Eucharist belongs to the ministers of the Church: wherefore a man should not go to Communion until
1012 his sin has been forgiven through the ministers of the Church, although his sin may be forgiven him before God.
1013 </p>
1014 <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p11"></p>
1015 <p id="XP_Q5_A1-p12"></p>
1016 <a href="summa.XP_Q5.html"></a>
1017 <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
1018 </div>
1019 <div id="XP_Q5_A2" class="div4">
1020 <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
1021 <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
1022 <h4 id="XP_Q5_A2-p0.1">Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?</h4>
1023 <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p1"></p>
1024 <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p2">
1025 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that contrition cannot take away the debt of punishment entirely. For satisfaction and confession are ordained
1026 for man's deliverance from the debt of punishment. Now no man is so perfectly contrite as not to be bound to confession and
1027 satisfaction. Therefore contrition is never so great as to blot out the entire debt of punishment.
1028 </p>
1029 <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p3">
1030 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in Penance the punishment should in some way compensate for the sin. Now some sins are accomplished by members of
1031 the body. Therefore, since it is for the due compensation for sin that "by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he
1032 is tormented" (
1033 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q5_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.17" target="asv">Wis. 11:17</a>), it seems that the punishment for suchlike sins can never be remitted by contrition.
1034 </p>
1035 <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p4">
1036 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sorrow of contrition is finite. Now an infinite punishment is due for some, viz. mortal, sins. Therefore contrition
1037 can never be so great as to remit the whole punishment.
1038 </p>
1039 <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p5">
1040 <b>On the contrary,</b> The affections of the heart are more acceptable to God than external acts. Now man is absolved from both punishment and guilt
1041 by means of external actions; and therefore he is also by means of the heart's affections, such as contrition is.
1042 </p>
1043 <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p6"> Further, we have an example of this in the thief, to whom it was said (
1044 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q5_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.23.43" target="asv">Lk. 23:43</a>): "This day shalt thou be with Me in paradise," on account of his one act of repentance.
1045 </p>
1046 <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p7"> As to whether the whole debt of punishment is always taken away by contrition, this question has already been considered
1047 above (Sent. iv, D, 14, Q[2], AA[1],2;
1048 <a id="XP_Q5_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q86_A4.html">TP, Q[86], A[4]</a>), where the same question was raised with regard to Penance.
1049 </p>
1050 <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p8">
1051 <b>I answer that,</b> The intensity of contrition may be regarded in two ways. First, on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure, and
1052 in this way it may happen that the act of charity is so intense that the contrition resulting therefrom merits not only the
1053 removal of guilt, but also the remission of all punishment. Secondly, on the part of the sensible sorrow, which the will excites
1054 in contrition: and since this sorrow is also a kind of punishment, it may be so intense
1055 as to suffice for the remission of both guilt and punishment.
1056 </p>
1057 <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p9">
1058 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man cannot be sure that his contrition suffices for the remission of both punishment and guilt: wherefore he is bound to
1059 confess and to make satisfaction, especially since his contrition would not be true contrition, unless he had the purpose
1060 of confessing united thereto: which purpose must also be carried into effect, on account of the precept given concerning confession.
1061 </p>
1062 <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p10">
1063 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as inward joy redounds into the outward parts of the body, so does interior sorrow show itself in the exterior members:
1064 wherefore it is written (
1065 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q5_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.17.22" target="asv">Prov. 17:22</a>): "A sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones."
1066 </p>
1067 <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p11">
1068 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the sorrow of contrition is finite in its intensity, even as the punishment due for mortal sin is finite; yet it
1069 derives infinite power from charity, whereby it is quickened, and so it avails for the remission of both guilt and punishment.
1070 </p>
1071 <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p12"></p>
1072 <p id="XP_Q5_A2-p13"></p>
1073 <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
1074 <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
1075 </div>
1076 <div id="XP_Q5_A3" class="div4">
1077 <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
1078 <a href="summa.XP_Q6.html"></a>
1079 <h4 id="XP_Q5_A3-p0.1">Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?</h4>
1080 <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p1"></p>
1081 <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p2">
1082 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that slight contrition does not suffice to blot out great sins. For contrition is the remedy for sin. Now a
1083 bodily remedy, that heals a lesser bodily infirmity, does not suffice to heal a greater. Therefore the least contrition does
1084 not suffice to blot out very great sins.
1085 </p>
1086 <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p3">
1087 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it was stated above (
1088 <a id="XP_Q5_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>) that for greater sins one ought to have greater contrition. Now contrition does not blot out sin, unless it fulfills the
1089 requisite conditions. Therefore the least contrition does not blot out all sins.
1090 </p>
1091 <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p4">
1092 <b>On the contrary,</b> Every sanctifying grace blots out every mortal sin, because it is incompatible therewith. Now every contrition is quickened
1093 by sanctifying grace. Therefore, however slight it be, it blots out all sins.
1094 </p>
1095 <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p5">
1096 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have often said (
1097 <a id="XP_Q5_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q1_A2.html">Q[1], A[2]</a>, ad 1;
1098 <a id="XP_Q5_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q3_A1.html"> Q[3], A[1]</a>;
1099 <a id="XP_Q5_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q4_A1.html"> Q[4] , A[1]</a>), contrition includes a twofold sorrow. One is in the reason, and is displeasure at the sin committed. This can be so slight
1100 as not to suffice for real contrition, e.g. if a sin were less displeasing to a man, than separation from his last end ought
1101 to be; just as love can be so slack as not to suffice for real charity. The
1102 other sorrow is in the senses, and the slightness of this is no hindrance to real contrition, because it does not, of itself,
1103 belong essentially to contrition, but is connected with it accidentally: nor again is it under our control. Accordingly we
1104 must say that sorrow, however slight it be, provided it suffice for true contrition, blots out all sin.
1105 </p>
1106 <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p6">
1107 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spiritual remedies derive infinite efficacy from the infinite power which operates in them: wherefore the remedy which suffices
1108 for healing a slight sin, suffices also to heal a great sin. This is seen in Baptism which looses great and small: and the
1109 same applies to contrition provided it fulfill the necessary conditions.
1110 </p>
1111 <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p7">
1112 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It follows of necessity that a man grieves more for a greater sin than for a lesser, according as it is more repugnant to
1113 the love which causes his sorrow. But if one has the same degree of sorrow for a greater sin, as another has for a lesser,
1114 this would suffice for the remission of the sin.
1115 </p>
1116 <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p8"></p>
1117 <p id="XP_Q5_A3-p9"></p>
1118 <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A2.html"></a>
1119 <a href="summa.XP_Q6.html"></a>
1120 </div>
1121 <a href="summa.XP_Q4_A3.html"></a>
1122 <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A1.html"></a>
1123 </div>
1124 <div id="XP_Q6" class="div3">
1125 <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
1126 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
1127 <h3 id="XP_Q6-p0.1">OF CONFESSION, AS REGARDS ITS NECESSITY (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
1128 <p id="XP_Q6-p1"></p>
1129 <p id="XP_Q6-p2"> We must now consider confession, about which there are six points for our consideration: (1) The necessity of confession;
1130 (2) Its nature; (3) Its minister; (4) Its quality; (5) Its effect; (6) The seal of confession.
1131 </p>
1132 <p id="XP_Q6-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
1133 <p id="XP_Q6-p4"> (1) Whether confession is necessary for salvation?</p>
1134 <p id="XP_Q6-p5"> (2) Whether confession is according to the natural law?</p>
1135 <p id="XP_Q6-p6"> (3) Whether all are bound to confession?</p>
1136 <p id="XP_Q6-p7"> (4) Whether it is lawful to confess a sin of which one is not guilty?</p>
1137 <p id="XP_Q6-p8"> (5) Whether one is bound to confess at once?</p>
1138 <p id="XP_Q6-p9"> (6) Whether one can be dispensed from confessing to another man?</p>
1139 <div id="XP_Q6_A1" class="div4">
1140 <a href="summa.XP_Q6.html"></a>
1141 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
1142 <h4 id="XP_Q6_A1-p0.1">Whether confession is necessary for salvation?</h4>
1143 <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p1"></p>
1144 <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p2">
1145 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession is not necessary for salvation. For the sacrament of Penance is ordained for the sake of the
1146 remission of sin. But sin is sufficiently remitted by the infusion of grace. Therefore confession is not necessary in order
1147 to do penance for one's sins.
1148 </p>
1149 <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p3">
1150 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we read of some being forgiven their sins without confession, e.g. Peter, Magdalen and Paul. But the grace that
1151 remits sins is not less efficacious now than it was then. Therefore neither is it necessary for salvation now that man should
1152 confess.
1153 </p>
1154 <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p4">
1155 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a sin which is contracted from another, should receive its remedy from another. Therefore actual sin, which a man
1156 has committed through his own act, must take its remedy from the man himself. Now Penance is ordained against such sins. Therefore
1157 confession is not necessary for salvation.
1158 </p>
1159 <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p5">
1160 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, confession is necessary for a judicial sentence, in order that punishment may be inflicted in proportion to the
1161 offense. Now a man is able to inflict on himself a greater punishment than even that which might be inflicted on him by another.
1162 Therefore it seems that confession is not necessary for salvation.
1163 </p>
1164 <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p6">
1165 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. i): "If you want the physician to be of assistance to you, you must make your disease known to
1166 him." But it is necessary for salvation that man should take medicine for his sins. Therefore it is necessary for salvation
1167 that man should make his disease known by means of confession.
1168 </p>
1169 <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p7"> Further, in a civil court the judge is distinct from the accused. Therefore the sinner who is the accused ought not to be
1170 his own judge, but should be judged by another and consequently ought to confess to him.
1171 </p>
1172 <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p8">
1173 <b>I answer that,</b> Christ's Passion, without whose power, neither original nor actual sin is remitted, produces its effect in us through the
1174 reception of the sacraments which derive their efficacy from it. Wherefore for the remission of both actual and original sin,
1175 a sacrament of the Church is necessary, received either actually, or at least in desire, when a man fails to receive the sacrament
1176 actually, through an unavoidable obstacle, and not through contempt. Consequently
1177 those sacraments which are ordained as remedies for sin which is incompatible with salvation, are necessary for salvation:
1178 and so just as Baptism, whereby original sin is blotted out, is necessary for salvation, so also is the sacrament of Penance.
1179 And just as a man through asking to be baptized, submits to the ministers of the Church, to whom the dispensation of that
1180 sacrament belongs, even so, by confessing his sin, a man submits to a minister of the Church, that, through the sacrament
1181 of
1182 Penance dispensed by him, he may receive the pardon of his sins: nor can the minister apply a fitting remedy, unless he be
1183 acquainted with the sin, which knowledge he acquires through the penitent's confession. Wherefore confession is necessary
1184 for the salvation of a man who has fallen into a mortal actual sin.
1185 </p>
1186 <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p9">
1187 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The infusion of grace suffices for the remission of sin; but after the sin has been forgiven, the sinner still owes a debt
1188 of temporal punishment. Moreover, the sacraments of grace are ordained in order that man may receive the infusion of grace,
1189 and before he receives them, either actually or in his intention, he does not receive grace. This is evident in the case of
1190 Baptism, and applies to Penance likewise. Again, the penitent expiates his temporal
1191 punishment by undergoing the shame of confession, by the power of the keys to which he submits, and by the enjoined satisfaction
1192 which the priest moderates according to the kind of sins made known to him in confession. Nevertheless the fact that confession
1193 is necessary for salvation is not due to its conducing to the satisfaction for sins, because this punishment to which one
1194 remains bound after the remission of sin, is temporal, wherefore the way of salvation remains open, without such
1195 punishment being expiated in this life: but it is due to its conducing to the remission of sin, as explained above.
1196 </p>
1197 <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p10">
1198 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although we do not read that they confessed, it may be that they did; for many things were done which were not recorded in
1199 writing. Moreover Christ has the power of excellence in the sacraments; so that He could bestow the reality of the sacrament
1200 without using the things which belong to the sacrament.
1201 </p>
1202 <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p11">
1203 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sin that is contracted from another, viz. original sin, can be remedied by an entirely extrinsic cause, as in the case
1204 of infants: whereas actual sin, which a man commits of himself, cannot be expiated, without some operation on the part of
1205 the sinner. Nevertheless man is not sufficient to expiate his sin by himself, though he was sufficient to sin by himself,
1206 because sin is finite on the part of the thing to which it turns, in which respect the
1207 sinner returns to self; while, on the part of the aversion, sin derives infinity, in which respect the remission of sin must
1208 needs begin from someone else, because "that which is last in order of generation is first in the order of intention" (Ethic.
1209 iii). Consequently actual sin also must needs take its remedy from another.
1210 </p>
1211 <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p12">
1212 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Satisfaction would not suffice for the expiation of sin's punishment, by reason of the severity of the punishment which is
1213 enjoined in satisfaction, but it does suffice as being a part of the sacrament having the sacramental power; wherefore it
1214 ought to be imposed by the dispensers of the sacraments, and consequently confession is necessary.
1215 </p>
1216 <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p13"></p>
1217 <p id="XP_Q6_A1-p14"></p>
1218 <a href="summa.XP_Q6.html"></a>
1219 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
1220 </div>
1221 <div id="XP_Q6_A2" class="div4">
1222 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
1223 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
1224 <h4 id="XP_Q6_A2-p0.1">Whether confession is according to the natural law?</h4>
1225 <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p1"></p>
1226 <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p2">
1227 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession is according to the natural law. For Adam and Cain were bound to none but the precepts of the
1228 natural law, and yet they are reproached for not confessing their sin. Therefore confession of sin is according to the natural
1229 law.
1230 </p>
1231 <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p3">
1232 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those precepts which are common to the Old and New Law are according to the natural law. But confession was prescribed
1233 in the Old Law, as may be gathered from
1234 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.43.26" target="asv"> Is. 43:26</a>: "Tell, if thou hast anything to justify thyself." Therefore it is according to the natural law.
1235 </p>
1236 <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p4">
1237 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Job was subject only to the natural law. But he confessed his sins, as appears from his words (
1238 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.31.33" target="asv">Job 31:33</a>) "If, as a man, I have hid my sin." Therefore confession is according to the natural law.
1239 </p>
1240 <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p5">
1241 <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v.) that the natural law is the same in all. But confession is not in all in the same way. Therefore
1242 it is not according to the natural law. Further, confession is made to one who has the keys. But the keys of the Church are
1243 not an institution of the natural law; neither, therefore, is confession.
1244 </p>
1245 <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p6">
1246 <b>I answer that,</b> The sacraments are professions of faith, wherefore they ought to be proportionate to faith. Now faith surpasses the knowledge
1247 of natural reason, whose dictate is therefore surpassed by the sacraments. And since "the natural law is not begotten of opinion,
1248 but a product of a certain innate power," as Tully states (De Inv. Rhet. ii), consequently the sacraments are not part of
1249 the natural law, but of the Divine law which is above nature. This latter, however,
1250 is sometimes called natural, in so far as whatever a thing derives from its Creator is natural to it, although, properly speaking,
1251 those things are said to be natural which are caused by the principles of nature. But such things are above nature as God
1252 reserves to Himself; and these are wrought either through the agency of nature, or in the working of miracles, or in the revelation
1253 of mysteries, or in the institution of the sacraments. Hence confession, which is of sacramental necessity, is
1254 according to Divine, but not according to natural law.
1255 </p>
1256 <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p7">
1257 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adam is reproached for not confessing his sin before God: because the confession which is made to God by the acknowledgment
1258 of one's sin, is according to the natural law. whereas here we are speaking of confession made to a man. We may also reply
1259 that in such a case confession of one's sin is according to the natural law, namely when one is called upon by the judge to
1260 confess in a court of law, for then the sinner should not lie by excusing or denying
1261 his sin, as Adam and Cain are blamed for doing. But confession made voluntarily to a man in order to receive from God the
1262 forgiveness of one's sins, is not according to the natural law.
1263 </p>
1264 <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p8">
1265 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precepts of the natural law avail in the same way in the law of Moses and in the New Law. But although there was a kind
1266 of confession in the law of Moses, yet it was not after the same manner as in the New Law, nor as in the law of nature; for
1267 in the law of nature it was sufficient to acknowledge one's sin inwardly before God; while in the law of Moses it was necessary
1268 for a man to declare his sin by some external sign, as by making a
1269 sin-offering, whereby the fact of his having sinned became known to another man; but it was not necessary for him to make
1270 known what particular sin he had committed, or what were its circumstances, as in the New Law.
1271 </p>
1272 <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p9">
1273 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Job is speaking of the man who hides his sin by denying it or excusing himself when he is accused thereof, as we may gather
1274 from a gloss [*Cf. Gregory, Moral. xxii, 9] on the passage.
1275 </p>
1276 <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p10"></p>
1277 <p id="XP_Q6_A2-p11"></p>
1278 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
1279 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
1280 </div>
1281 <div id="XP_Q6_A3" class="div4">
1282 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
1283 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
1284 <h4 id="XP_Q6_A3-p0.1">Whether all are bound to confession?</h4>
1285 <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p1"></p>
1286 <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p2">
1287 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all are bound to confession, for Jerome says on
1288 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.9" target="asv"> Is. 3:9 </a>("They have proclaimed abroad"), "their sin," etc.: "Penance is the second plank after shipwreck." But some have not suffered
1289 shipwreck after Baptism. Therefore Penance is not befitting them, and consequently neither is confession which is a part of
1290 Penance.
1291 </p>
1292 <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p3">
1293 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is to the judge that confession should be made in any court. But some have no judge over them. Therefore they
1294 are not bound to confession.
1295 </p>
1296 <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p4">
1297 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some have none but venial sins. Now a man is not bound to confess such sins. Therefore not everyone is bound to
1298 confession.
1299 </p>
1300 <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p5">
1301 <b>On the contrary,</b> Confession is condivided with satisfaction and contrition. Now all are bound to contrition and satisfaction. Therefore all
1302 are bound to confession also.
1303 </p>
1304 <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p6"> Further, this appears from the Decretals (De Poenit. et Remiss. xii), where it is stated that "all of either sex are bound
1305 to confess their sins as soon as they shall come to the age of discretion."
1306 </p>
1307 <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p7">
1308 <b>I answer that,</b> We are bound to confession on two counts: first, by the Divine law, from the very fact that confession is a remedy, and in
1309 this way not all are bound to confession, but those only who fall into mortal sin after Baptism; secondly, by a precept of
1310 positive law, and in this way all are bound by the precept of the Church laid down in the general council (Lateran iv, Can.
1311 21) under Innocent III, both in order that everyone may acknowledge himself to be a sinner,
1312 because "all have sinned and need the grace of God" (
1313 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.23" target="asv">Rom. 3:23</a>); and that the Eucharist may be approached with greater reverence; and lastly, that parish priests may know their flock,
1314 lest a wolf may hide therein.
1315 </p>
1316 <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p8">
1317 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is possible for a man, in this mortal life, to avoid shipwreck, i.e. mortal sin, after Baptism, yet he cannot
1318 avoid venial sins, which dispose him to shipwreck, and against which also Penance is ordained; wherefore there is still room
1319 for Penance, and consequently for confession, even in those who do not commit mortal sins.
1320 </p>
1321 <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p9">
1322 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All must acknowledge Christ as their judge, to Whom they must confess in the person of His vicar; and although the latter
1323 may be the inferior if the penitent be a prelate, yet he is the superior, in so far as the penitent is a sinner, while the
1324 confessor is the minister of Christ.
1325 </p>
1326 <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p10">
1327 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A man is bound to confess his venial sins, not in virtue of the sacrament, but by the institution of the Church, and that,
1328 when he has no other sins to confess. We may also, with others, answer that the Decretal quoted above does not bind others
1329 than those who have mortal sins to confess. This is evident from the fact that it orders all sins to be confessed, which cannot
1330 apply to venial sins, because no one can confess all his venial sins.
1331 Accordingly, a man who has no mortal sins to confess, is not bound to confess his venial sins, but it suffices for the fulfillment
1332 of the commandment of the Church that he present himself before the priest, and declare himself to be unconscious of any mortal
1333 sin: and this will count for his confession.
1334 </p>
1335 <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p11"></p>
1336 <p id="XP_Q6_A3-p12"></p>
1337 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A2.html"></a>
1338 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
1339 </div>
1340 <div id="XP_Q6_A4" class="div4">
1341 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
1342 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A5.html"></a>
1343 <h4 id="XP_Q6_A4-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed?</h4>
1344 <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p1"></p>
1345 <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p2">
1346 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed. For, as Gregory says (Regist. xii),
1347 "it is the mark of a good conscience to acknowledge a fault where there is none." Therefore it is the mark of a good conscience
1348 to accuse oneself of those sins which one has not committed.
1349 </p>
1350 <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p3">
1351 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by humility a man deems himself worse than another, who is known to be a sinner, and in this he is to be praised.
1352 But it is lawful for a man to confess himself to be what he thinks he is. Therefore it is lawful to confess having committed
1353 a more grievous sin than one has.
1354 </p>
1355 <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p4">
1356 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sometimes one doubts about a sin, whether it be mortal or venial, in which case, seemingly, one ought to confess
1357 it as mortal. Therefore a person must sometimes confess a sin which he has not committed.
1358 </p>
1359 <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p5">
1360 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, satisfaction originates from confession. But a man can do satisfaction for a sin which he has not committed. Therefore
1361 he can also confess a sin which he has not done.
1362 </p>
1363 <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p6">
1364 <b>On the contrary,</b> Whosoever says he has done what he did not, tells an untruth. But no one ought to tell an untruth in confession, since every
1365 untruth is a sin. Therefore no one should confess a sin which he has not committed.
1366 </p>
1367 <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p7"> Further, in the public court of justice, no one should be accused of a crime which cannot be proved by means of proper witnesses.
1368 Now the witness, in the tribunal of Penance, is the conscience. Therefore a man ought not to accuse himself of a sin which
1369 is not on his conscience.
1370 </p>
1371 <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p8">
1372 <b>I answer that,</b> The penitent should, by his confession, make his state known to his confessor. Now he who tells the priest something other
1373 than what he has on his conscience, whether it be good or evil, does not make his state known to the priest, but hides it;
1374 wherefore his confession is unavailing: and in order for it to be effective his words must agree with his thoughts, so that
1375 his words accuse him only of what is on his conscience.
1376 </p>
1377 <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p9">
1378 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To acknowledge a fault where there is none, may be understood in two ways: first, as referring to the substance of the act,
1379 and then it is untrue; for it is a mark, not of a good, but of an erroneous conscience, to acknowledge having done what one
1380 has not done. Secondly, as referring to the circumstances of the act, and thus the saying of Gregory is true, because a just
1381 man fears lest, in any act which is good in itself, there should be any defect on
1382 his part. thus it is written (
1383 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Job.9.28" target="asv">Job 9:28</a>): "I feared all my works." Wherefore it is also the mark of a good conscience that a man should accuse himself in words of
1384 this fear which he holds in his thoughts.
1385 </p>
1386 <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p10"> From this may be gathered the Reply to the Second Objection, since a just man, who is truly humble, deems himself worse not
1387 as though he had committed an act generically worse, but because he fears lest in those things which he seems to do well,
1388 he may by pride sin more grievously.
1389 </p>
1390 <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p11">
1391 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a man doubts whether a certain sin be mortal, he is bound to confess it, so long as he remains in doubt, because he
1392 sins mortally by committing or omitting anything, while doubting of its being a mortal sin, and thus leaving the matter to
1393 chance; and, moreover, he courts danger, if he neglect to confess that which he doubts may be a mortal sin. He should not,
1394 however, affirm that it was a mortal sin, but speak doubtfully, leaving the verdict to
1395 the priest, whose business it is to discern between what is leprosy and what is not.
1396 </p>
1397 <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p12">
1398 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A man does not commit a falsehood by making satisfaction for a sin which he did not commit, as when anyone confesses a sin
1399 which he thinks he has not committed. And if he mentions a sin that he has not committed, believing that he has, he does not
1400 lie; wherefore he does not sin, provided his confession thereof tally with his conscience.
1401 </p>
1402 <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p13"></p>
1403 <p id="XP_Q6_A4-p14"></p>
1404 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A3.html"></a>
1405 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A5.html"></a>
1406 </div>
1407 <div id="XP_Q6_A5" class="div4">
1408 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
1409 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A6.html"></a>
1410 <h4 id="XP_Q6_A5-p0.1">Whether one is bound to confess at once?</h4>
1411 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p1"></p>
1412 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p2">
1413 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one is bound to confess at once. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii): "The contempt of confession
1414 is inexcusable, unless there be an urgent reason for delay." But everyone is bound to avoid contempt. Therefore everyone is
1415 bound to confess as soon as possible.
1416 </p>
1417 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p3">
1418 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everyone is bound to do more to avoid spiritual disease than to avoid bodily disease. Now if a man who is sick in
1419 body were to delay sending for the physician, it would be detrimental to his health. Therefore it seems that it must needs
1420 be detrimental to a man's health if he omits to confess immediately to a priest if there be one at hand.
1421 </p>
1422 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p4">
1423 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is due always, is due at once. But man owes confession to God always. Therefore he is bound to confess
1424 at once.
1425 </p>
1426 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p5">
1427 <b>On the contrary,</b> A fixed time both for confession and for receiving the Eucharist is determined by the Decretals (Cap. Omnis utriusque sexus:
1428 De Poenit. et Remiss.). Now a man does not sin by failing to receive the Eucharist before the fixed time. Therefore he does
1429 not sin if he does not confess before that time.
1430 </p>
1431 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p6"> Further, it is a mortal sin to omit doing what a commandment bids us to do. If therefore a man is bound to confess at once,
1432 and omits to do so, with a priest at hand, he would commit a mortal sin; and in like manner at any other time, and so on,
1433 so that he would fall into many mortal sins for the delay in confessing one, which seems unreasonable.
1434 </p>
1435 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p7">
1436 <b>I answer that,</b> As the purpose of confessing is united to contrition, a man is bound to have this purpose when he is bound to have contrition,
1437 viz. when he calls his sins to mind, and chiefly when he is in danger of death, or when he is so circumstanced that unless
1438 his sin be forgiven, he must fall into another sin: for instance, if a priest be bound to say Mass, and a confessor is at
1439 hand, he is bound to confess or, if there be no confessor, he is bound at least to
1440 contrition and to have the purpose of confessing.
1441 </p>
1442 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p8"> But to actual confession a man is bound in two ways. First, accidentally, viz. when he is bound to do something which he
1443 cannot do without committing a mortal sin, unless he go to confession first: for then he is bound to confess; for instance,
1444 if he has to receive the Eucharist, to which no one can approach, after committing a mortal sin, without confessing first,
1445 if a priest be at hand, and there be no urgent necessity. Hence it is that the Church obliges all to confess once a
1446 year; because she commands all to receive Holy Communion once a year, viz. at Easter, wherefore all must go to confession
1447 before that time.
1448 </p>
1449 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p9"> Secondly, a man is bound absolutely to go to confession; and here the same reason applies to delay of confession as to delay
1450 of Baptism, because both are necessary sacraments. Now a man is not bound to receive Baptism as soon as he makes up his mind
1451 to be baptized; and so he would not sin mortally, if he were not baptized at once: nor is there any fixed time beyond which,
1452 if he defer Baptism, he would incur a mortal sin. Nevertheless the delay of Baptism may amount to a mortal
1453 sin, or it may not, and this depends on the cause of the delay, since, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, text. 15), the
1454 will does not defer doing what it wills to do, except for a reasonable cause. Wherefore if the cause of the delay of Baptism
1455 has a mortal sin connected with it, e.g. if a man put off being baptized through contempt, or some like motive, the delay
1456 will be a mortal sin, but otherwise not: and the same seems to apply to confession which is not more necessary than Baptism.
1457 Moreover, since man is bound to fulfill in this life those things that are necessary for salvation, therefore, if he be in
1458 danger of death, he is bound, even absolutely, then and there to make his confession or to receive Baptism. For this reason
1459 too, James proclaimed at the same time the commandment about making confession and that about receiving Extreme Unction (
1460 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.14" target="asv">James 5:14</a>,
1461 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.16" target="asv">16</a>). Therefore the opinion seems probable of those who say that a man is not bound to confess at
1462 once, though it is dangerous to delay.
1463 </p>
1464 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p10"> Others, however, say that a contrite man is bound to confess at once, as soon as he has a reasonable and proper opportunity.
1465 Nor does it matter that the Decretal fixes the time limit to an annual confession, because the Church does not favor delay,
1466 but forbids the neglect involved in a further delay. Wherefore by this Decretal the man who delays is excused, not from sin
1467 in the tribunal of conscience; but from punishment in the tribunal of the Church; so that such a person would
1468 not be deprived of proper burial if he were to die before that time. But this seems too severe, because affirmative precepts
1469 bind, not at once, but at a fixed time; and this, not because it is most convenient to fulfill them then (for in that case
1470 if a man were not to give alms of his superfluous goods, whenever he met with a man in need, he would commit a mortal sin,
1471 which is false), but because the time involves urgency. Consequently, if he does not confess at the very first opportunity,
1472 it
1473 does not follow that he commits a mortal sin, even though he does not await a better opportunity. unless it becomes urgent
1474 for him to confess through being in danger of death. Nor is it on account of the Church's indulgence that he is not bound
1475 to confess at once, but on account of the nature of an affirmative precept, so that before the commandment was made, there
1476 was still less obligation.
1477 </p>
1478 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p11"> Others again say that secular persons are not bound to confess before Lent, which is the time of penance for them; but that
1479 religious are bound to confess at once, because, for them, all time is a time for penance. But this is not to the point; for
1480 religious have no obligations besides those of other men, with the exception of such as they are bound to by vow.
1481 </p>
1482 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p12">
1483 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hugh is speaking of those who die without this sacrament.
1484 </p>
1485 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p13">
1486 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not necessary for bodily health that the physician be sent for at once, except when there is necessity for being healed:
1487 and the same applies to spiritual disease.
1488 </p>
1489 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p14">
1490 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The retaining of another's property against the owner's will is contrary to a negative precept, which binds always and for
1491 always, and therefore one is always bound to make immediate restitution. It is not the same with the fulfillment of an affirmative
1492 precept, which binds always, but not for always, wherefore one is not bound to fulfill it at once.
1493 </p>
1494 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p15"></p>
1495 <p id="XP_Q6_A5-p16"></p>
1496 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A4.html"></a>
1497 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A6.html"></a>
1498 </div>
1499 <div id="XP_Q6_A6" class="div4">
1500 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A5.html"></a>
1501 <a href="summa.XP_Q7.html"></a>
1502 <h4 id="XP_Q6_A6-p0.1">Whether one can be dispensed from confession?</h4>
1503 <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p1"></p>
1504 <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p2">
1505 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one can be dispensed from confessing his sins to a man. For precepts of positive law are subject to dispensation
1506 by the prelates of the Church. Now such is confession, as appears from what was said above
1507 <a id="XP_Q6_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q6_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore one may be dispensed from confession.
1508 </p>
1509 <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p3">
1510 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man can grant a dispensation in that which was instituted by a man. But we read of confession being instituted,
1511 not by God, but by a man (
1512 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q6_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.16" target="asv">James 5:16</a>): "Confess your sins, one to another." Now the Pope has the power of dispensation in things instituted by the apostles, as
1513 appears in the matter of bigamists. Therefore he can also dispense a man from confessing.
1514 </p>
1515 <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p4">
1516 <b>On the contrary,</b> Penance, whereof confession is a part, is a necessary sacrament, even as Baptism is. Since therefore no one can be dispensed
1517 from Baptism, neither can one be dispensed from confession.
1518 </p>
1519 <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p5">
1520 <b>I answer that,</b> The ministers of the Church are appointed in the Church which is founded by God. Wherefore they need to be appointed by the
1521 Church before exercising their ministry, just as the work of creation is presupposed to the work of nature. And since the
1522 Church is founded on faith and the sacraments, the ministers of the Church have no power to publish new articles of faith,
1523 or to do away with those which are already published, or to institute new sacraments, or to
1524 abolish those that are instituted, for this belongs to the power of excellence, which belongs to Christ alone, Who is the
1525 foundation of the Church. Consequently, the Pope can neither dispense a man so that he may be saved without Baptism, nor that
1526 he be saved without confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of the sacrament. He can, however, dispense from confession,
1527 in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of the commandment of the Church; so that a man may delay confession longer
1528 than the limit prescribed by the Church.
1529 </p>
1530 <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p6">
1531 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The precepts of the Divine law do not bind less than those of the natural law: wherefore, just as no dispensation is possible
1532 from the natural law, so neither can there be from positive Divine law.
1533 </p>
1534 <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p7">
1535 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precept about confession was not instituted by a man first of all, though it was promulgated by James: it was instituted
1536 by God, and although we do not read it explicitly, yet it was somewhat foreshadowed in the fact that those who were being
1537 prepared by John's Baptism for the grace of Christ, confessed their sins to him, and that the Lord sent the lepers to the
1538 priests, and though they were not priests of the New Testament, yet the priesthood of
1539 the New Testament was foreshadowed in them.
1540 </p>
1541 <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p8"></p>
1542 <p id="XP_Q6_A6-p9"></p>
1543 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A5.html"></a>
1544 <a href="summa.XP_Q7.html"></a>
1545 </div>
1546 <a href="summa.XP_Q5_A3.html"></a>
1547 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A1.html"></a>
1548 </div>
1549 <div id="XP_Q7" class="div3">
1550 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A6.html"></a>
1551 <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
1552 <h3 id="XP_Q7-p0.1">OF THE NATURE OF CONFESSION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
1553 <p id="XP_Q7-p1"></p>
1554 <p id="XP_Q7-p2"> We must now consider the nature of confession, under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
1555 <p id="XP_Q7-p3"> (1) Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?</p>
1556 <p id="XP_Q7-p4"> (2) Whether confession is an act of virtue?</p>
1557 <p id="XP_Q7-p5"> (3) Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?</p>
1558 <div id="XP_Q7_A1" class="div4">
1559 <a href="summa.XP_Q7.html"></a>
1560 <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
1561 <h4 id="XP_Q7_A1-p0.1">Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?</h4>
1562 <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p1"></p>
1563 <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p2">
1564 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Augustine defines confession unfittingly, when he says (Super
1565 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q7_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.21" target="asv">Ps. 21</a>) that confession "lays bare the hidden disease by the hope of pardon." For the disease against which confession is ordained,
1566 is sin. Now sin is sometimes manifest. Therefore it should not be said that confession is the remedy for a "hidden" disease.
1567 </p>
1568 <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p3">
1569 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the beginning of penance is fear. But confession is a part of Penance. Therefore fear rather than "hope" should
1570 be set down as the cause of confession.
1571 </p>
1572 <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p4">
1573 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is placed under a seal, is not laid bare, but closed up. But the sin which is confessed is placed under
1574 the seal of confession. Therefore sin is not laid bare in confession, but closed up.
1575 </p>
1576 <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p5">
1577 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, other definitions are to be found differing from the above. For Gregory says (Hom. xl in Evang.) that confession
1578 is "the uncovering of sins, and the opening of the wound." Others say that "confession is a legal declaration of our sins
1579 in the presence of a priest." Others define it thus: "Confession is the sinner's sacramental self-accusation through shame
1580 for what he has done, which through the keys of the Church makes satisfaction for his sins, and
1581 binds him to perform the penance imposed on him." Therefore it seems that the definition in question is insufficient, since
1582 it does not include all that these include.
1583 </p>
1584 <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p6">
1585 <b>I answer that,</b> Several things offer themselves to our notice in the act of confession: first, the very substance or genus of the act, which
1586 is a kind of manifestation; secondly, the matter manifested, viz. sin; thirdly, the person to whom the manifestation is made,
1587 viz. the priest; fourthly, its cause, viz. hope of pardon; fifthly, its effect, viz. release from part of the punishment,
1588 and the obligation to pay the other part. Accordingly the first definition, given by
1589 Augustine, indicates the substance of the act, by saying that "it lays bare"---the matter of confession, by saying that it
1590 is a "hidden disease"---its cause, which is "the hope of pardon"; while the other definitions include one or other of the
1591 five things aforesaid, as may be seen by anyone who considers the matter.
1592 </p>
1593 <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p7">
1594 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the priest, as a man, may sometimes have knowledge of the penitent's sin, yet he does not know it as a vicar of
1595 Christ (even as a judge sometimes knows a thing, as a man, of which he is ignorant, as a judge), and in this respect it is
1596 made known to him by confession. or we may reply that although the external act may be in the open, yet the internal act,
1597 which is the cause of the external act, is hidden; so that it needs to be revealed by
1598 confession.
1599 </p>
1600 <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p8">
1601 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Confession presupposes charity, which gives us life, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Now it is in contrition that
1602 charity is given; while servile fear, which is void of hope, is previous to charity: yet he that has charity is moved more
1603 by hope than by fear. Hence hope rather than fear is set down as the cause of confession.
1604 </p>
1605 <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p9">
1606 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In every confession sin is laid bare to the priest, and closed to others by the seal of confession.
1607 </p>
1608 <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p10">
1609 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is not necessary that every definition should include everything connected with the thing defined: and for this reason
1610 we find some definitions or descriptions that indicate one cause, and some that indicate another.
1611 </p>
1612 <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p11"></p>
1613 <p id="XP_Q7_A1-p12"></p>
1614 <a href="summa.XP_Q7.html"></a>
1615 <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
1616 </div>
1617 <div id="XP_Q7_A2" class="div4">
1618 <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
1619 <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
1620 <h4 id="XP_Q7_A2-p0.1">Whether confession is an act of virtue?</h4>
1621 <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p1"></p>
1622 <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p2">
1623 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession is not an act of virtue. For every act of virtue belongs to the natural law, since "we are
1624 naturally capable of virtue," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). But confession does not belong to the natural law. Therefore
1625 it is not an act of virtue.
1626 </p>
1627 <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p3">
1628 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an act of virtue is more befitting one who is innocent than one who has sinned. But the confession of a sin, which
1629 is the confession of which we are speaking now, cannot be befitting an innocent man. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.
1630 </p>
1631 <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p4">
1632 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the grace which is in the sacraments differs somewhat from the grace which is in the virtues and gifts. But confession
1633 is part of a sacrament. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.
1634 </p>
1635 <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p5">
1636 <b>On the contrary,</b> The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. But confession comes under a precept. Therefore it is an act of virtue.
1637 </p>
1638 <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p6"> Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. But confession is meritorious, for "it opens the gate of heaven," as the
1639 Master says (Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore it seems that it is an act of virtue.
1640 </p>
1641 <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p7">
1642 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
1643 <a id="XP_Q7_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">FS, Q[18], AA[6]</a>,7;
1644 <a id="XP_Q7_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q80.html">SS, Q[80];</a>
1645 <a id="XP_Q7_A2-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q85_A3.html">SS, Q[85] , A[3]</a>;
1646 <a id="XP_Q7_A2-p7.4" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q109_A3.html">SS, Q[109], A[3]</a>), for an act to belong to a virtue it suffices that it be of such a nature as to imply some condition belonging to virtue.
1647 Now, although confession does not include everything that is required for virtue, yet its very name implies the manifestation
1648 of that which a man has on his
1649 conscience: for thus his lips and heart agree. For if a man professes with his lips what he does not hold in his heart, it
1650 is not a confession but a fiction. Now to express in words what one has in one's thoughts is a condition of virtue; and, consequently,
1651 confession is a good thing generically, and is an act of virtue: yet it can be done badly, if it be devoid of other due circumstances.
1652 </p>
1653 <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p8">
1654 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Natural reason, in a general way, inclines a man to make confession in the proper way, to confess as he ought, what he ought,
1655 and when he ought, and in this way confession belongs to the natural law. But it belongs to the Divine law to determine the
1656 circumstances, when, how, what, and to whom, with regard to the confession of which we are speaking now. Accordingly it is
1657 evident that the natural law inclines a man to confession, by means of the Divine
1658 law, which determines the circumstances, as is the case with all matters belonging to the positive law.
1659 </p>
1660 <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p9">
1661 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although an innocent man may have the habit of the virtue whose object is a sin already committed, he has not the act, so
1662 long as he remains innocent. Wherefore the confession of sins, of which confession we are speaking now, is not befitting an
1663 innocent man, though it is an act of virtue.
1664 </p>
1665 <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p10">
1666 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though the grace of the sacraments differs from the grace of the virtues, they are not contrary but disparate; hence there
1667 is nothing to prevent that which is an act of virtue, in so far as it proceeds from the free-will quickened by grace, from
1668 being a sacrament, or part of a sacrament, in so far as it is ordained as a remedy for sin.
1669 </p>
1670 <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p11"></p>
1671 <p id="XP_Q7_A2-p12"></p>
1672 <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
1673 <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
1674 </div>
1675 <div id="XP_Q7_A3" class="div4">
1676 <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
1677 <a href="summa.XP_Q8.html"></a>
1678 <h4 id="XP_Q7_A3-p0.1">Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?</h4>
1679 <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p1"></p>
1680 <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p2">
1681 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession is not an act of the virtue of penance. For an act belongs to the virtue which is its cause.
1682 Now the cause of confession is the hope of pardon, as appears from the definition given above
1683 <a id="XP_Q7_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q7_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it seems that it is an act of hope and not of penance.
1684 </p>
1685 <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p3">
1686 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, shame is a part of temperance. But confession arises from shame, as appears in the definition given above (A[1],
1687 OBJ[4]). Therefore it is an act of temperance and not of penance.
1688 </p>
1689 <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p4">
1690 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of penance leans on Divine mercy. But confession leans rather on Divine wisdom, by reason of the truth which
1691 is required in it. Therefore it is not an act of penance.
1692 </p>
1693 <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p5">
1694 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we are moved to penance by the article of the Creed which is about the Judgment, on account of fear, which is the
1695 origin of penance. But we are moved to confession by the article which is about life everlasting, because it arises from hope
1696 of pardon. Therefore it is not an act of penance.
1697 </p>
1698 <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p6">
1699 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it belongs to the virtue of truth that a man shows himself to be what he is. But this is what a man does when he
1700 goes to confession. Therefore confession is an act of that virtue which is called truth, and not of penance.
1701 </p>
1702 <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p7">
1703 <b>On the contrary,</b> Penance is ordained for the destruction of sin. Now confession is ordained to this also. Therefore it is an act of penance.
1704 </p>
1705 <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p8">
1706 <b>I answer that,</b> It must be observed with regard to virtues, that when a special reason of goodness or difficulty is added over and above
1707 the object of a virtue, there is need of a special virtue: thus the expenditure of large sums is the object of magnificence,
1708 although the ordinary kind of average expenditure and gifts belongs to liberality, as appears from Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1. The
1709 same applies to the confession of truth, which, although it belongs to the virtue of truth
1710 absolutely, yet, on account of the additional reason of goodness, begins to belong to another kind of virtue. Hence the Philosopher
1711 says (Ethic. iv, 7) that a confession made in a court of justice belongs to the virtue of justice rather than to truth. In
1712 like manner the confession of God's favors in praise of God, belongs not to truth, but to religion: and so too the confession
1713 of sins, in order to receive pardon for them, is not the elicited act of the virtue of truth, as some say, but of the
1714 virtue of penance. It may, however, be the commanded act of many virtues, in so far as the act of confession can be directed
1715 to the end of many virtues.
1716 </p>
1717 <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p9">
1718 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope is the cause of confession, not as eliciting but as commanding.
1719 </p>
1720 <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p10">
1721 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In that definition shame is not mentioned as the cause of confession, since it is more of a nature to hinder the act of confession,
1722 but rather as the joint cause of delivery from punishment (because shame is in itself a punishment), since also the keys of
1723 the Church are the joint cause with confession, to the same effect.
1724 </p>
1725 <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p11">
1726 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By a certain adaptation the parts of Penance can be ascribed to three Personal Attributes, so that contrition may correspond
1727 to mercy or goodness, by reason of its being sorrow for evil---confession to wisdom, by reason of its being a manifestation
1728 of the truth---and satisfaction to power, on account of the labor it entails. And since contrition is the first part of Penance,
1729 and renders the other parts efficacious, for this reason the same is to be
1730 said of Penance as a whole, as of contrition.
1731 </p>
1732 <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p12">
1733 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since confession results from hope rather than from fear, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), it is based on the article about
1734 eternal life which hope looks to, rather than on the article about the Judgment, which fear considers; although penance, in
1735 its aspect of contrition, is the opposite.
1736 </p>
1737 <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p13"> The Reply to the Fifth Objection is to be gathered from what has been said.</p>
1738 <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p14"></p>
1739 <p id="XP_Q7_A3-p15"></p>
1740 <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A2.html"></a>
1741 <a href="summa.XP_Q8.html"></a>
1742 </div>
1743 <a href="summa.XP_Q6_A6.html"></a>
1744 <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A1.html"></a>
1745 </div>
1746 <div id="XP_Q8" class="div3">
1747 <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
1748 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
1749 <h3 id="XP_Q8-p0.1">OF THE MINISTER OF CONFESSION (SEVEN ARTICLES)</h3>
1750 <p id="XP_Q8-p1"></p>
1751 <p id="XP_Q8-p2"> We must now consider the minister of confession, under which head there are seven points of inquiry:</p>
1752 <p id="XP_Q8-p3"> (1) Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?</p>
1753 <p id="XP_Q8-p4"> (2) Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?</p>
1754 <p id="XP_Q8-p5"> (3) Whether outside a case of necessity one who is not a priest can hear the confession of venial sins?</p>
1755 <p id="XP_Q8-p6"> (4) Whether it is necessary for a man to confess to his own priest?</p>
1756 <p id="XP_Q8-p7"> (5) Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, in virtue of a privilege or of the command
1757 of a superior?
1758 </p>
1759 <p id="XP_Q8-p8"> (6) Whether a penitent, in danger of death can be absolved by any priest?</p>
1760 <p id="XP_Q8-p9"> (7) Whether the temporal punishment should be enjoined in proportion to the sin?</p>
1761 <div id="XP_Q8_A1" class="div4">
1762 <a href="summa.XP_Q8.html"></a>
1763 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
1764 <h4 id="XP_Q8_A1-p0.1">Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?</h4>
1765 <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p1"></p>
1766 <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p2">
1767 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary to confess to a priest. For we are not bound to confession, except in virtue of its
1768 Divine institution. Now its Divine institution is made known to us (
1769 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.16" target="asv">James 5:16</a>): "Confess your sins, one to another," where there is no mention of a priest. Therefore it is not necessary to confess to
1770 a priest.
1771 </p>
1772 <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p3">
1773 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Penance is a necessary sacrament, as is also Baptism. But any man is the minister of Baptism, on account of its
1774 necessity. Therefore any man is the minister of Penance. Now confession should be made to the minister of Penance. Therefore
1775 it suffices to confess to anyone.
1776 </p>
1777 <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p4">
1778 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, confession is necessary in order that the measure of satisfaction should be imposed on the penitent. Now, sometimes
1779 another than a priest might be more discreet than many priests are in imposing the measure of satisfaction on the penitent.
1780 Therefore it is not necessary to confess to a priest.
1781 </p>
1782 <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p5">
1783 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, confession was instituted in the Church in order that the rectors might know their sheep by sight. But sometimes
1784 a rector or prelate is not a priest. Therefore confession should not always be made to a priest.
1785 </p>
1786 <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p6">
1787 <b>On the contrary,</b> The absolution of the penitent, for the sake of which he makes his confession, is imparted by none but priests to whom the
1788 keys are intrusted. Therefore confession should be made to a priest.
1789 </p>
1790 <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p7"> Further, confession is foreshadowed in the raising of the dead Lazarus to life. Now our Lord commanded none but the disciples
1791 to loose Lazarus (
1792 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.11.44" target="asv">Jn. 11:44</a>). Therefore confession should be made to a priest.
1793 </p>
1794 <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p8">
1795 <b>I answer that,</b> The grace which is given in the sacraments, descends from the Head to the members. Wherefore he alone who exercises a ministry
1796 over Christ's true body is a minister of the sacraments, wherein grace is given; and this belongs to a priest alone, who can
1797 consecrate the Eucharist. Therefore, since grace is given in the sacrament of Penance, none but a priest is the minister of
1798 the sacrament: and consequently sacramental confession which should be made to a
1799 minister of the Church, should be made to none but a priest.
1800 </p>
1801 <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p9">
1802 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> James speaks on the presupposition of the Divine institutions: and since confession had already been prescribed by God to
1803 be made to a priest, in that He empowered them, in the person of the apostles, to forgive sins, as related in
1804 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.23" target="asv"> Jn. 20:23, </a> we must take the words of James as conveying an admonishment to confess to priests.
1805 </p>
1806 <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p10">
1807 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Baptism is a sacrament of greater necessity than Penance, as regards confession and absolution, because sometimes Baptism
1808 cannot be omitted without loss of eternal salvation, as in the case of children who have not come to the use of reason: whereas
1809 this cannot be said of confession and absolution, which regard none but adults, in whom contrition, together with the purpose
1810 of confessing and the desire of absolution, suffices to deliver them from
1811 everlasting death. Consequently there is no parity between Baptism and confession.
1812 </p>
1813 <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p11">
1814 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In satisfaction we must consider not only the quantity of the punishment but also its power, inasmuch as it is part of a
1815 sacrament. In this way it requires a dispenser of the sacraments, though the quantity of the punishment may be fixed by another
1816 than a priest.
1817 </p>
1818 <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p12">
1819 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It may be necessary for two reasons to know the sheep by sight. First, in order to register them as members of Christ's flock,
1820 and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the pastoral charge and care, which is sometimes the duty of those who are
1821 not priests. Secondly, that they may be provided with suitable remedies for their health; and to know the sheep by sight thus
1822 belongs to the man, i.e. the priest, whose business it is to provide remedies
1823 conducive to health, such as the sacrament of the Eucharist, and other like things. It is to this knowledge of the sheep that
1824 confession is ordained.
1825 </p>
1826 <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p13"></p>
1827 <p id="XP_Q8_A1-p14"></p>
1828 <a href="summa.XP_Q8.html"></a>
1829 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
1830 </div>
1831 <div id="XP_Q8_A2" class="div4">
1832 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
1833 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
1834 <h4 id="XP_Q8_A2-p0.1">Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?</h4>
1835 <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p1"></p>
1836 <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p2">
1837 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is never lawful to confess to another than a priest. For confession is a sacramental accusation, as
1838 appears from the definition given above (
1839 <a id="XP_Q8_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). But the dispensing of a sacrament belongs to none but the minister of a sacrament. Since then the proper minister of Penance
1840 is a priest, it seems that confession should be made to no one else.
1841 </p>
1842 <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p3">
1843 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every court of justice confession is ordained to the sentence. Now in a disputed case the sentence is void if
1844 pronounced by another than the proper judge; so that confession should be made to none but a judge. But, in the court of conscience,
1845 the judge is none but a priest, who has the power of binding and loosing. Therefore confession should be made to no one else.
1846 </p>
1847 <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p4">
1848 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the case of Baptism, since anyone can baptize, if a layman has baptized, even without necessity, the Baptism
1849 should not be repeated by a priest. But if anyone confess to a layman in a case of necessity, he is bound to repeat his confession
1850 to a priest, when the cause for urgency has passed. Therefore confession should not be made to a layman in a case of necessity.
1851 </p>
1852 <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p5">
1853 <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).
1854 </p>
1855 <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p6">
1856 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as Baptism is a necessary sacrament, so is Penance. And Baptism, through being a necessary sacrament has a twofold minister:
1857 one whose duty it is to baptize, in virtue of his office, viz. the priest, and another, to whom the conferring of Baptism
1858 is committed, in a case of necessity. In like manner the minister of Penance, to whom, in virtue of his office, confession
1859 should be made, is a priest; but in a case of necessity even a layman may take the
1860 place of a priest, and hear a person's confession.
1861 </p>
1862 <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p7">
1863 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the sacrament of Penance there is not only something on the part of the minister, viz. the absolution and imposition of
1864 satisfaction, but also something on the part of the recipient, which is also essential to the sacrament, viz. contrition and
1865 confession. Now satisfaction originates from the minister in so far as he enjoins it, and from the penitent who fulfills it;
1866 and, for the fulness of the sacrament, both these things should concur when
1867 possible. But when there is reason for urgency, the penitent should fulfill his own part, by being contrite and confessing
1868 to whom he can; and although this person cannot perfect the sacrament, so as to fulfill the part of the priest by giving absolution,
1869 yet this defect is supplied by the High Priest. Nevertheless confession made to a layman, through lack* of a priest, is quasi-sacramental,
1870 although it is not a perfect sacrament, on account of the absence of the part which belongs to the
1871 priest. [*Here and in the Reply to OBJ[2] the Leonine edition reads "through desire for a priest".]
1872 </p>
1873 <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p8">
1874 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a layman is not the judge of the person who confesses to him, yet, on account of the urgency, he does take the place
1875 of a judge over him, absolutely speaking, in so far as the penitent submits to him, through lack of a priest.
1876 </p>
1877 <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p9">
1878 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By means of the sacraments man must needs be reconciled not only to God, but also to the Church. Now he cannot be reconciled
1879 to the Church, unless the hallowing of the Church reach him. In Baptism the hallowing of the Church reaches a man through
1880 the element itself applied externally, which is sanctified by "the word of life" (
1881 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.26" target="asv">Eph. 5:26</a>), by whomsoever it is conferred: and so when once a man has been baptized, no matter by whom,
1882 he must not be baptized again. On the other hand, in Penance the hallowing of the Church reaches man by the minister alone,
1883 because in that sacrament there is no bodily element applied externally, through the hallowing of which grace may be conferred.
1884 Consequently although the man who, in a case of necessity, has confessed to a layman, has received forgiveness from God, for
1885 the reason that he fulfilled, so far as he could, the purpose which he conceived in accordance with God's command, he is
1886 not yet reconciled to the Church, so as to be admitted to the sacraments, unless he first be absolved by a priest, even as
1887 he who has received the Baptism of desire, is not admitted to the Eucharist. Wherefore he must confess again to a priest,
1888 as soon as there is one at hand, and the more so since, as stated above (ad 1), the sacrament of Penance was not perfected,
1889 and so it needs yet to be perfected, in order that by receiving the sacrament, the penitent may receive a more plentiful effect,
1890 and that he may fulfill the commandment about receiving the sacrament of Penance.
1891 </p>
1892 <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p10"></p>
1893 <p id="XP_Q8_A2-p11"></p>
1894 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
1895 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
1896 </div>
1897 <div id="XP_Q8_A3" class="div4">
1898 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
1899 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
1900 <h4 id="XP_Q8_A3-p0.1">Whether, outside a case of necessity, anyone who is not a priest may hear the confession of venial sins?</h4>
1901 <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p1"></p>
1902 <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p2">
1903 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that, outside a case of necessity, no one but a priest may hear the confession of venial sins. For the dispensation
1904 of a sacrament is committed to a layman by reason of necessity. But the confession of venial sins is not necessary. Therefore
1905 it is not committed to a layman.
1906 </p>
1907 <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p3">
1908 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Extreme Unction is ordained against venial sin, just as Penance is. But the former may not be given by a layman,
1909 as appears from
1910 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.14" target="asv"> James 5:14.</a> Therefore neither can the confession of venial sins be made to a layman.
1911 </p>
1912 <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p4">
1913 <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of Bede (on
1914 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.16" target="asv"> James 5:16, </a> "Confess . . . one to another") quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).
1915 </p>
1916 <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p5">
1917 <b>I answer that,</b> By venial sin man is separated neither from God nor from the sacraments of the Church: wherefore he does not need to receive
1918 any further grace for the forgiveness of such a sin, nor does he need to be reconciled to the Church. Consequently a man does
1919 not need to confess his venial sins to a priest. And since confession made to a layman is a sacramental, although it is not
1920 a perfect sacrament, and since it proceeds from charity, it has a natural aptitude to
1921 remit sins, just as the beating of one's breast, or the sprinkling of holy water (cf.
1922 <a id="XP_Q8_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q87_A3.html">TP, Q[87], A[3]</a>).
1923 </p>
1924 <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p6"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection, because there is no need to receive a sacrament for the forgiveness of
1925 venial sins. and a sacramental, such as holy water or the like, suffices for the purpose.
1926 </p>
1927 <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p7">
1928 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Extreme Unction is not given directly as a remedy for venial sin, nor is any other sacrament.
1929 </p>
1930 <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p8"></p>
1931 <p id="XP_Q8_A3-p9"></p>
1932 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A2.html"></a>
1933 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
1934 </div>
1935 <div id="XP_Q8_A4" class="div4">
1936 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
1937 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A5.html"></a>
1938 <h4 id="XP_Q8_A4-p0.1">Whether it is necessary for one to confess to one's own priest?</h4>
1939 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p1"></p>
1940 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p2">
1941 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is nol necessary to confess to one's own priest. For Gregory [*Cf. Can. Ex auctoritate xvi, Q[1]] says:
1942 "By our apostolic authority and in discharge of our solicitude we have decreed that priests, who as monks imitate the ex.
1943 ample of the apostles, may preach, baptize, give communion, pray for sinners, impose penances, and absolve from sins." Now
1944 monks are not the proper priests of anyone, since they have not the care of souls. Since,
1945 therefore confession is made for the sake of absolution it suffices for it to be made to any priest.
1946 </p>
1947 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p3">
1948 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the minister of this sacrament is a priest, as also of the Eucharist. But any priest can perform the Eucharist.
1949 Therefore any priest can administer the sacrament of Penance. Therefore there is no need to confess to one's own priest.
1950 </p>
1951 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p4">
1952 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when we are bound to one thing in particular it is not left to our choice. But the choice of a discreet priest is
1953 left to us as appears from the authority of Augustine quoted in the text (Sent. ix, D, 17): for he says in De vera et falsa
1954 Poenitentia [*Work of an unknown author]: "He who wishes to confess his sins, in order to find grace, must seek a priest who
1955 knows how to loose and to bind." Therefore it seems unnecessary to confess to one's own
1956 priest.
1957 </p>
1958 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p5">
1959 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are some, such as prelates, who seem to have no priest of their own, since they have no superior: yet they
1960 are bound to confession. Therefore a man is not always bound to confess to his own priest.
1961 </p>
1962 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p6">
1963 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, "That which is instituted for the sake of charity, does not militate against charity," as Bernard observes (De Praecept.
1964 et Dispens. ii). Now confession, which was instituted for the sake of charity, would militate against charity, if a man were
1965 bound to confess to any particular priest: e.g. if the sinner know that his own priest is a heretic, or a man of evil influence,
1966 or weak and prone to the very sin that he wishes to confess to him, or
1967 reasonably suspected of breaking the seal of confession, or if the penitent has to confess a sin committed against his confessor.
1968 Therefore it seems that one need not always confess to one's own priest.
1969 </p>
1970 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p7">
1971 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, men should not be straitened in matters necessary for salvation, lest they be hindered in the way of salvation.
1972 But it seems a great inconvenience to be bound of necessity to confess to one particular man, and many might be hindered from
1973 going to confession, through either fear, shame, or something else of the kind. Therefore, since confession is necessary for
1974 salvation, men should not be straitened, as apparently they would be, by having to confess
1975 to their own priest.
1976 </p>
1977 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p8">
1978 <b>On the contrary,</b> stands a decree of Pope Innocent III in the Fourth Lateran Council (Can. 21), who appointed "all of either sex to confess
1979 once a year to their own priest."
1980 </p>
1981 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p9"> Further, as a bishop is to his diocese, so is a priest to his parish. Now it is unlawful, according to canon law (Can. Nullus
1982 primas ix
1983 <a id="XP_Q8_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q2.html">, Q[2];</a> Can. Si quis episcoporum xvi
1984 <a id="XP_Q8_A4-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q5.html">, Q[5])</a>, for a bishop to exercise the episcopal office in another diocese. Therefore it is not lawful for one priest to hear the
1985 confession of another's parishioner.
1986 </p>
1987 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p10">
1988 <b>I answer that,</b> The other sacraments do not consist in an action of the recipient, but only in his receiving something, as is evident with
1989 regard to Baptism and so forth. though the action of the recipient is required as removing an obstacle, i.e. insincerity,
1990 in order that he may receive the benefit of the sacrament, if he has come to the use of his free-will. On the other hand,
1991 the action of the man who approaches the sacrament of Penance is essential to the sacrament,
1992 since contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are acts of the penitent, are parts of Penance. Now our actions, since
1993 they have their origin in us, cannot be dispensed by others, except through their command. Hence whoever is appointed a dispenser
1994 of this sacrament, must be such as to be able to command something to be done. Now a man is not competent to command another
1995 unless he have jurisdiction over him. Consequently it is essential to this sacrament, not only for the minister to be
1996 in orders, as in the case of the other sacraments, but also for him to have jurisdiction: wherefore he that has no jurisdiction
1997 cannot administer this sacrament any more than one who is not a priest. Therefore confession should be made not only to a
1998 priest, but to one's own priest; for since a priest does not absolve a man except by binding him to do something, he alone
1999 can absolve, who, by his command, can bind the penitent to do something.
2000 </p>
2001 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p11">
2002 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking of those monks who have jurisdiction, through having charge of a parish; about whom some had maintained
2003 that from the very fact that they were monks, they could not absolve or impose penance, which is false.
2004 </p>
2005 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p12">
2006 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sacrament of the Eucharist does not require the power of command over a man, whereas this sacrament does, as stated above:
2007 and so the argument proves nothing. Nevertheless it is not lawful to receive the Eucharist from another than one's own priest,
2008 although it is a real sacrament that one receives from another.
2009 </p>
2010 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p13">
2011 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The choice of a discreet priest is not left to us in such a way that we can do just as we like; but it is left to the permission
2012 of a higher authority, if perchance one's own priest happens to be less suitable for applying a salutary remedy to our sins.
2013 </p>
2014 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p14">
2015 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since it is the duty of prelates to dispense the sacraments, which the clean alone should handle, they are allowed by law
2016 (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Ne pro dilatione) to choose a priest for their confessor; who in this respect is the prelate's
2017 superior; even as one physician is cured by another, not as a physician but as a patient.
2018 </p>
2019 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p15">
2020 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In those cases wherein the penitent has reason to fear some harm to himself or to the priest by reason of his confessing
2021 to him, he should have recourse to the higher authority, or ask permission of the priest himself to confess to another; and
2022 if he fails to obtain permission, the case is to be decided as for a man who has no priest at hand; so that he should rather
2023 choose a layman and confess to him. Nor does he disobey the law of the Church by so
2024 doing, because the precepts of positive law do not extend beyond the intention of the lawgiver, which is the end of the precept,
2025 and in this case, is charity, according to the Apostle (
2026 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A4-p15.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>). Nor is any slur cast on the priest, for he deserves to forfeit his privilege, for abusing the power intrusted to him.
2027 </p>
2028 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p16">
2029 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The necessity of confessing to one's own priest does not straiten the way of salvation, but determines it sufficiently. A
2030 priest, however, would sin if he were not easy in giving permission to confess to another, because many are so weak that they
2031 would rather die without confession than confess to such a priest. Wherefore those priests who are too anxious to probe the
2032 consciences of their subjects by means of confession, lay a snare of damnation for
2033 many, and consequently for themselves.
2034 </p>
2035 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p17"></p>
2036 <p id="XP_Q8_A4-p18"></p>
2037 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A3.html"></a>
2038 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A5.html"></a>
2039 </div>
2040 <div id="XP_Q8_A5" class="div4">
2041 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
2042 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A6.html"></a>
2043 <h4 id="XP_Q8_A5-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, in virtue of a privilege or a command given by
2044 a superior?
2045 </h4>
2046 <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p1"></p>
2047 <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p2">
2048 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, even in virtue of a privilege or
2049 command given by a superior. For no privilege should be given that wrongs a third party. Now it would be prejudicial to the
2050 subject's own priest, if he were to confess to another. Therefore this cannot be allowed by a superior's privilege, permission,
2051 or command.
2052 </p>
2053 <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p3">
2054 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which hinders the observance of a Divine command cannot be the subject of a command or privilege given by man.
2055 Now it is a Divine command to the rectors of churches to "know the countenance of their own cattle" (
2056 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.23" target="asv">Prov. 27:23</a>); and this is hindered if another than the rector hear the confession of his subjects. Therefore this cannot be prescribed
2057 by any human privilege or command.
2058 </p>
2059 <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p4">
2060 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he that hears another's confession is the latter's own judge, else he could not bind or loose him. Now one man cannot
2061 have several priests or judges of his own, for then he would be bound to obey several men, which would be impossible, if their
2062 commands were contrary or incompatible. Therefore one may not confess to another than one's own priest, even with the superior's
2063 permission.
2064 </p>
2065 <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p5">
2066 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is derogatory to a sacrament, or at least useless, to repeat a sacrament over the same matter. But he who has
2067 confessed to another priest, is bound to confess again to his own priest, if the latter requires him to do so, because he
2068 is not absolved from his obedience, whereby he is bound to him in this respect. Therefore it cannot be lawful for anyone to
2069 confess to another than his own priest.
2070 </p>
2071 <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p6">
2072 <b>On the contrary,</b> He that can perform the actions of an order can depute the exercise thereof to anyone who has the same order. Now a superior,
2073 such as a bishop, can hear the confession of anyone belonging to a priest's parish, for sometimes he reserves certain cases
2074 to himself, since he is the chief rector. Therefore he can also depute another priest to hear that man.
2075 </p>
2076 <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p7"> Further, a superior can do whatever his subject can do. But the priest himself can give his parishioner permission to confess
2077 to another. Much more, therefore, can his superior do this.
2078 </p>
2079 <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p8"> Further, the power which a priest has among his people, comes to him from the bishop. Now it is through that power that he
2080 can hear confessions. Therefore, in like manner, another can do so, to whom the bishop gives the same power.
2081 </p>
2082 <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p9">
2083 <b>I answer that,</b> A priest may be hindered in two ways from hearing a man's confession: first, through lack of jurisdiction; secondly, through
2084 being prevented from exercising his order, as those who are excommunicate, degraded, and so forth. Now whoever has jurisdiction,
2085 can depute to another whatever comes under his jurisdiction; so that if a priest is hindered from hearing a man's confession
2086 through want of jurisdiction, anyone who has immediate jurisdiction over that man,
2087 priest, bishop, or Pope, can depute that priest to hear his confession and absolve him. If, on the other hand, the priest
2088 cannot hear the confession, on account of an impediment to the exercise of his order, anyone who has the power to remove that
2089 impediment can permit him to hear confessions.
2090 </p>
2091 <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p10">
2092 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No wrong is done to a person unless what is taken away from him was granted for his own benefit. Now the power of jurisdiction
2093 is not granted a man for his own benefit, but for the good of the people and for the glory of God. Wherefore if the higher
2094 prelates deem it expedient for the furthering of the people's salvation and God's glory, to commit matters of jurisdiction
2095 to others, no wrong is done to the inferior prelates, except to those who "seek
2096 the things that are their own; not the things that are Jesus Christ's" (
2097 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A5-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.21" target="asv">Phil. 2:21</a>), and who rule their flock, not by feeding it, but by feeding on it.
2098 </p>
2099 <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p11">
2100 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The rector of a church should "know the countenance of his own cattle" in two ways. First, by an assiduous attention to their
2101 external conduct, so as to watch over the flock committed to his care: and in acquiring this knowledge he should not believe
2102 his subject, but, as far as possible, inquire into the truth of facts. Secondly, by the manifestation of confession; and with
2103 regard to this knowledge, he cannot arrive at any greater certainty than by
2104 believing his subject, because this is necessary that he may help his subject's conscience. Consequently in the tribunal of
2105 confession, the penitent is believed whether he speak for himself or against himself, but not in the court of external judgment:
2106 wherefore it suffices for this knowledge that he believe the penitent when he says that he has confessed to one who could
2107 absolve him. It is therefore clear that this knowledge of the flock is not hindered by a privilege granted to another to
2108 hear confessions.
2109 </p>
2110 <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p12">
2111 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It would be inconvenient, if two men were placed equally over the same people, but there is no inconvenience if over the
2112 same people two are placed one of whom is over the other. In this way the parish priest, the bishop, and the Pope are placed
2113 immediately over the same people, and each of them can commit matters of jurisdiction to some other. Now a higher superior
2114 delegates a man in two ways: first, so that the latter takes the superior's place, as
2115 when the Pope or a bishop appoints his penitentiaries; and then the man thus delegated is higher than the inferior prelate,
2116 as the Pope's penitentiary is higher than a bishop, and the bishop's penitentiary than a parish priest, and the penitent is
2117 bound to obey the former rather than the latter. Secondly, so that the delegate is appointed the coadjutor of this other priest;
2118 and since a co-adjutor is subordinate to the person he is appointed to help, he holds a lower rank, and the penitent is
2119 not so bound to obey him as his own priest.
2120 </p>
2121 <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p13">
2122 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No man is bound to confess sins that he has no longer. Consequently, if a man has confessed to the bishop's penitentiary,
2123 or to someone else having faculties from the bishop, his sins are forgiven both before the Church and before God, so that
2124 he is not bound to confess them to his own priest, however much the latter may insist: but on account of the Ecclesiastical
2125 precept (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Omnis utriusque) which prescribes confession to be
2126 made once a year to one's own priest, he is under the same obligation as one who has committed none but venial sins. For such
2127 a one, according to some, is bound to confess none but venial sins, or he must declare that he is free from mortal sin, and
2128 the priest, in the tribunal of conscience, ought, and is bound, to believe him. If, however, he were bound to confess again,
2129 his first confession would not be useless, because the more priests one confesses to, the more is the punishment remitted,
2130 both by reason of the shame in confessing, which is reckoned as a satisfactory punishment, and by reason of the power of the
2131 keys: so that one might confess so often as to be delivered from all punishment. Nor is repetition derogatory to a sacrament,
2132 except in those wherein there is some kind of sanctification, either by the impressing of a character, or by the consecration
2133 of the matter, neither of which applies to Penance. Hence it would be well for him who hears confessions by the bishop's
2134 authority, to advise the penitent to confess to his own priest, yet he must absolve him, even if he declines to do so.
2135 </p>
2136 <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p14"></p>
2137 <p id="XP_Q8_A5-p15"></p>
2138 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A4.html"></a>
2139 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A6.html"></a>
2140 </div>
2141 <div id="XP_Q8_A6" class="div4">
2142 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A5.html"></a>
2143 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A7.html"></a>
2144 <h4 id="XP_Q8_A6-p0.1">Whether a penitent, at the point of death, can be absolved by any priest?</h4>
2145 <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p1"></p>
2146 <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p2">
2147 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a penitent, at the point of death, cannot be absolved by any priest. For absolution requires jurisdiction,
2148 as stated above
2149 <a id="XP_Q8_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q8_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Now a priest does not acquire jurisdiction over a man who repents at the point of death. Therefore he cannot absolve him.
2150 </p>
2151 <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p3">
2152 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he that receives the sacrament of Baptism, when in danger of death, from another than his own priest, does not need
2153 to be baptized again by the latter. If, therefore, any priest can absolve, from any sin, a man who is in danger of death,
2154 the penitent, if he survive the danger, need not go to his own priest; which is false, since otherwise the priest would not
2155 "know the countenance of his cattle."
2156 </p>
2157 <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p4">
2158 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when there is danger of death, Baptism can be conferred not only by a strange priest, but also by one who is not
2159 a priest. But one who is not a priest can never absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Therefore neither can a priest absolve
2160 a man who is not his subject, when he is in danger of death.
2161 </p>
2162 <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p5">
2163 <b>On the contrary,</b> Spiritual necessity is greater than bodily necessity. But it is lawful in a case of extreme necessity, for a man to make
2164 use of another's property, even against the owner's will, in order to supply a bodily need. Therefore in danger of death,
2165 a man may be absolved by another than his own priest, in order to supply his spiritual need.
2166 </p>
2167 <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p6"> Further, the authorities quoted in the text prove the same (Sent. iv, D, 20, Cap. Non Habet).</p>
2168 <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p7">
2169 <b>I answer that,</b> If we consider the power of the keys, every priest has power over all men equally and over all sins: and it is due to the
2170 fact that by the ordination of the Church, he has a limited jurisdiction or none at all, that he cannot absolve all men from
2171 all sins. But since "necessity knows no law" [*Cap. Consilium, De observ. jejun.; De reg. jur. (v, Decretal)] in cases of
2172 necessity the ordination of the Church does not hinder him from being able to absolve, since
2173 he has the keys sacramentally: and the penitent will receive as much benefit from the absolution of this other priest as if
2174 he had been absolved by his own. Moreover a man can then be absolved by any priest not only from his sins, but also from excommunication,
2175 by whomsoever pronounced, because such absolution is also a matter of that jurisdiction which by the ordination of the Church
2176 is con. fined within certain limits.
2177 </p>
2178 <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p8">
2179 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One person may act on the jurisdiction of another according to the latter's will, since matters of jurisdiction can be deputed.
2180 Since, therefore, the Church recognizes absolution granted by any priest at the hour of death, from this very fact a priest
2181 has the use of jurisdiction though he lack the power of jurisdiction.
2182 </p>
2183 <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p9">
2184 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He needs to go to his own priest, not that he may be absolved again from the sins, from which he was absolved when in danger
2185 of death, but that his own priest may know that he is absolved. In like manner, he who has been absolved from excommunication
2186 needs to go to the judge, who in other circumstances could have absolved him, not in order to seek absolution, but in order
2187 to offer satisfaction.
2188 </p>
2189 <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p10">
2190 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Baptism derives its efficacy from the sanctification of the matter itself, so that a man receives the sacrament whosoever
2191 baptizes him: whereas the sacramental power of Penance consists in a sanctification pronounced by the minister, so that if
2192 a man confess to a layman, although he fulfills his own part of the sacramental confession, he does not receive sacramental
2193 absolution. Wherefore his confession avails him somewhat, as to the lessening of his
2194 punishment, owing to the merit derived from his confession and to his repentance. but he does not receive that diminution
2195 of his punishment which results from the power of the keys; and consequently he must confess again to a priest; and one who
2196 has confessed thus, is more punished hereafter than if he had confessed to a priest.
2197 </p>
2198 <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p11"></p>
2199 <p id="XP_Q8_A6-p12"></p>
2200 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A5.html"></a>
2201 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A7.html"></a>
2202 </div>
2203 <div id="XP_Q8_A7" class="div4">
2204 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A6.html"></a>
2205 <a href="summa.XP_Q9.html"></a>
2206 <h4 id="XP_Q8_A7-p0.1">Whether the temporal punishment is imposed according to the degree of the fault?</h4>
2207 <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p1"></p>
2208 <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p2">
2209 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the temporal punishment, the debt of which remains after Penance, is not imposed according to the degree
2210 of fault. For it is imposed according to the degree of pleasure derived from the sin, as appears from
2211 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.18.7" target="asv"> Apoc. 18:7</a>: "As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye her." Yet sometimes where
2212 there is greater pleasure, there is less fault, since "carnal sins, which afford
2213 more pleasure than spiritual sins, are less guilty," according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 2). Therefore the punishment is
2214 not imposed according to the degree of fault.
2215 </p>
2216 <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p3">
2217 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the New Law one is bound to punishment for mortal sins, in the same way as in the Old Law. Now in the Old Law
2218 the punishment for sin was due to last seven days, in other words, they had to remain unclean seven days for one mortal sin.
2219 Since therefore, in the New Testament, a punishment of seven years is imposed for one mortal sin, it seems that the quantity
2220 of the punishment does not answer to the degree of fault.
2221 </p>
2222 <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p4">
2223 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sin of murder in a layman is more grievous than that of fornication in a priest, because the circumstance which
2224 is taken from the species of a sin, is more aggravating than that which is taken from the person of the sinner. Now a punishment
2225 of seven years' duration is appointed for a layman guilty of murder, while for fornication a priest is punished for ten years,
2226 according to Can. Presbyter, Dist. lxxxii. Therefore punishment is not imposed
2227 according to the degree of fault.
2228 </p>
2229 <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p5">
2230 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a sin committed against the very body of Christ is most grievous, because the greater the person sinned against,
2231 the more grievous the sin. Now for spilling the blood of Christ in the sacrament of the altar a punishment of forty days or
2232 a little more is enjoined, while a punishment of seven years is prescribed for fornication, according to the Canons (Can.
2233 Presbyter, Dist. lxxxii). Therefore the quantity of the punishment does not answer to the degree
2234 of fault.
2235 </p>
2236 <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p6">
2237 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
2238 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.8" target="asv">Is. 27:8</a>): "In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Therefore the quantity of punishment adjudicated
2239 for sin answers the degree of fault.
2240 </p>
2241 <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p7"> Further, man is reduced to the equality of justice by the punishment inflicted on him. But this would not be so if the quantity
2242 of the fault and of the punishment did not mutually correspond. Therefore one answers to the other.
2243 </p>
2244 <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p8">
2245 <b>I answer that,</b> After the forgiveness of sin, a punishment is required for two reasons, viz. to pay the debt, and to afford a remedy. Hence
2246 the punishment may be imposed in consideration of two things. First, in consideration of the debt, and in this way the quantity
2247 of the punishment corresponds radically to the quantity of the fault, before anything of the latter is forgiven: yet the more
2248 there is remitted by the first of those things which are of a nature to remit
2249 punishment, the less there remains to be remitted or paid by the other, because the more contrition remits of the punishment,
2250 the less there remains to be remitted by confession. Secondly, in consideration of the remedy, either as regards the one who
2251 sinned, or as regards others: and thus sometimes a greater punishment is enjoined for a lesser sin; either because one man's
2252 sin is more difficult to resist than another's (thus a heavier punishment is imposed on a young man for fornication, than
2253 on an old man, though the former's sin be less grievous), or because one man's sin; for instance, a priest's, is more dangerous
2254 to others, than another's sin, or because the people are more prone to that particular sin, so that it is necessary by the
2255 punishment of the one man to deter others. Consequently, in the tribunal of Penance, the punishment has to be imposed with
2256 due regard to both these things: and so a greater punishment is not always imposed for a greater sin. on the other hand, the
2257 punishment of Purgatory is only for the payment of the debt, because there is no longer any possibility of sinning, so that
2258 this punishment is meted only according to the measure of sin, with due consideration however for the degree of contrition,
2259 and for confession and absolution, since all these lessen the punishment somewhat: wherefore the priest in enjoining satisfaction
2260 should bear them in mind.
2261 </p>
2262 <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p9">
2263 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the words quoted two things are mentioned with regard to the sin, viz. "glorification" and "delicacies" or "delectation";
2264 the first of which regards the uplifting of the sinner, whereby he resists God; while the second regards the pleasure of sin:
2265 and though sometimes there is less pleasure in a greater sin, yet there is greater uplifting; wherefore the argument does
2266 not prove.
2267 </p>
2268 <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p10">
2269 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This punishment of seven days did not expiate the punishment due for the sin, so that even if the sinner died after that
2270 time, he would be punished in Purgatory: but it was in expiation of the irregularity incurred, from which all the legal sacrifices
2271 expiated. Nevertheless, other things being equal, a man sins more grievously under the New Law than under the Old, on account
2272 of the more plentiful sanctification received in Baptism, and on account of
2273 the more powerful blessings bestowed by God on the human race. This is evident from
2274 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q8_A7-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.29" target="asv">Heb. 29</a>: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments," etc. And yet it is not universally true that a seven years'
2275 penance is exacted for every mortal sin: but it is a kind of general rule applicable to the majority of cases, which must,
2276 nevertheless, be disregarded, with due consideration for the various circumstances of sins and penitents.
2277 </p>
2278 <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p11">
2279 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A bishop or priest sins with greater danger to others or to himself; wherefore the canons are more anxious to withdraw him
2280 from sin, by inflicting a greater punishment, in as much as it is intended as a remedy; although sometimes so great a punishment
2281 is not strictly due. Hence he is punished less in Purgatory.
2282 </p>
2283 <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p12">
2284 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This punishment refers to the case when this happens against the priest's will: for if he spilled it willingly he would deserve
2285 a much heavier punishment.
2286 </p>
2287 <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p13"></p>
2288 <p id="XP_Q8_A7-p14"></p>
2289 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A6.html"></a>
2290 <a href="summa.XP_Q9.html"></a>
2291 </div>
2292 <a href="summa.XP_Q7_A3.html"></a>
2293 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A1.html"></a>
2294 </div>
2295 <div id="XP_Q9" class="div3">
2296 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A7.html"></a>
2297 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
2298 <h3 id="XP_Q9-p0.1">OF THE QUALITY OF CONFESSION (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3>
2299 <p id="XP_Q9-p1"></p>
2300 <p id="XP_Q9-p2"> We must now consider the quality of confession: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
2301 <p id="XP_Q9-p3"> (1) Whether confession can be lacking in form?</p>
2302 <p id="XP_Q9-p4"> (2) Whether confession ought to be entire?</p>
2303 <p id="XP_Q9-p5"> (3) Whether one can confess through another, or by writing?</p>
2304 <p id="XP_Q9-p6"> (4) Whether the sixteen conditions, which are assigned by the masters, are necessary for confession?</p>
2305 <div id="XP_Q9_A1" class="div4">
2306 <a href="summa.XP_Q9.html"></a>
2307 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
2308 <h4 id="XP_Q9_A1-p0.1">Whether confession can be lacking in form?</h4>
2309 <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p1"></p>
2310 <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p2">
2311 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession cannot be lacking in form. For it is written (
2312 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q9_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.26" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:26</a>): "Praise [confession] perisheth from the dead as nothing." But a man without charity is dead, because charity is the life
2313 of the soul. Therefore there can be no confession without charity.
2314 </p>
2315 <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p3">
2316 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, confession is condivided with contrition and satisfaction. But contrition and satisfaction are impossible without
2317 charity. Therefore confession is also impossible without charity.
2318 </p>
2319 <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p4">
2320 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is necessary in confession that the word should agree with the thought for the very name of confession requires
2321 this. Now if a man confess while remaining attached to sin, his word is not in accord with his thought, since in his heart
2322 he holds to sin, while he condemns it with his lips. Therefore such a man does not confess.
2323 </p>
2324 <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p5">
2325 <b>On the contrary,</b> Every man is bound to confess his mortal sins. Now if a man in mortal sin has confessed once, he is not bound to confess
2326 the same sins again, because, as no man knows himself to have charity, no man would know of him that he had confessed. Therefore
2327 it is not necessary that confession should be quickened by charity.
2328 </p>
2329 <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p6">
2330 <b>I answer that,</b> Confession is an act of virtue, and is part of a sacrament. In so far as it is an act of virtue, it has the property of being
2331 meritorious, and thus is of no avail without charity, which is the principle of merit. But in so far as it is part of a sacrament,
2332 it subordinates the penitent to the priest who has the keys of the Church, and who by means of the confession knows the conscience
2333 of the person confessing. In this way it is possible for confession to be
2334 in one who is not contrite, for he can make his sins known to the priest, and subject himself to the keys of the Church: and
2335 though he does not receive the fruit of absolution then, yet he will begin to receive it, when he is sincerely contrite, as
2336 happens in the other sacraments: wherefore he is not bound to repeat his confession, but to confess his lack of sincerity.
2337 </p>
2338 <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p7">
2339 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words must be understood as referring to the receiving of the fruit of confession, which none can receive who is not
2340 in the state of charity.
2341 </p>
2342 <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p8">
2343 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Contrition and satisfaction are offered to God: but confession is made to man: hence it is essential to contrition and satisfaction,
2344 but not to confession, that man should be united to God by charity.
2345 </p>
2346 <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p9">
2347 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who declares the sins which he has, speaks the truth; and thus his thought agrees with his lips or words, as to the substance
2348 of confession, though it is discordant with the purpose of confession.
2349 </p>
2350 <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p10"></p>
2351 <p id="XP_Q9_A1-p11"></p>
2352 <a href="summa.XP_Q9.html"></a>
2353 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
2354 </div>
2355 <div id="XP_Q9_A2" class="div4">
2356 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
2357 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A3.html"></a>
2358 <h4 id="XP_Q9_A2-p0.1">Whether confession should be entire?</h4>
2359 <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p1"></p>
2360 <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p2">
2361 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not necessary for confession to be entire, namely, for a man to confess all his sins to one priest.
2362 For shame conduces to the diminution of punishment. Now the greater the number of priests to whom a man confesses, the greater
2363 his shame. Therefore confession is more fruitful if it be divided among several priests.
2364 </p>
2365 <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p3">
2366 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, confession is necessary in Penance in order that punishment may be enjoined for sin according to the judgment of
2367 the priest. Now a sufficient punishment for different sins can be imposed by different priests. Therefore it is not necessary
2368 to confess all one's sins to one priest.
2369 </p>
2370 <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p4">
2371 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it may happen that a man after going to confession and performing his penance, remembers a mortal sin, which escaped
2372 his memory while confessing, and that his own priest to whom he confessed first is no longer available, so that he can only
2373 confess that sin to another priest, and thus he will confess different sins to different priests.
2374 </p>
2375 <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p5">
2376 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the sole reason for confessing one's sins to a priest is in order to receive absolution. Now sometimes, the priest
2377 who hears a confession can absolve from some of the sins, but not from all. Therefore in such a case at all events the confession
2378 need not be entire.
2379 </p>
2380 <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p6">
2381 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hypocrisy is an obstacle to Penance. But it savors of hypocrisy to divide one's confession, as Augustine says [*De vera et
2382 falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author]. Therefore confession should be entire. Further, confession is a part of Penance.
2383 But Penance should be entire. Therefore confession also should be entire.
2384 </p>
2385 <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p7">
2386 <b>I answer that,</b> In prescribing medicine for the body, the physician should know not only the disease for which he is prescribing, but also
2387 the general constitution of the sick person, since one disease is aggravated by the addition of another, and a medicine which
2388 would be adapted to one disease, would be harmful to another. The same is to be said in regard to sins, for one is aggravated
2389 when another is added to it; and a remedy which would be suitable for one sin, might
2390 prove an incentive to another, since sometimes a man is guilty of contrary sins, as Gregory says (Pastoral. iii, 3). Hence
2391 it is necessary for confession that man confess all the sins that he calls to mind, and if he fails to do this, it is not
2392 a confession, but a pretense of confession.
2393 </p>
2394 <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p8">
2395 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although a man's shame is multiplied when he makes a divided confession to different confessors, yet all his different shames
2396 together are not so great as that with which he confesses all his sins together: because one sin considered by itself does
2397 not prove the evil disposition of the sinner, as when it is considered in conjunction with several others, for a man may fall
2398 into one sin through ignorance or weakness, but a number of sins proves the
2399 malice of the sinner, or his great corruption.
2400 </p>
2401 <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p9">
2402 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The punishment imposed by different priests would not be sufficient, because each would only consider one sin by itself,
2403 and not the gravity which it derives from being in conjunction with another. Moreover sometimes the punishment which would
2404 be given for one sin would foster another. Again the priest in hearing a confession takes the place of God, so that confession
2405 should be made to him just as contrition is made to God: wherefore as there would be
2406 no contrition unless one were contrite for all the sins which one calls to mind, so is there no confession unless one confess
2407 all the sins that one remembers committing.
2408 </p>
2409 <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p10">
2410 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some say that when a man remembers a sin which he had previously forgotten, he ought to confess again the sins which he had
2411 confessed before, especially if he cannot go to the same priest to whom his previous confession was made, in order that the
2412 total quantity of his sins may be made known to one priest. But this does not seem necessary, because sin takes its quantity
2413 both from itself and from the conjunction of another; and as to the sins which he
2414 confessed he had already manifested their quantity which they have of themselves, while as to the sin which he had forgotten,
2415 in order that the priest may know the quantity which it has under both the above heads, it is enough that the penitent declare
2416 it explicitly, and confess the others in general, saying that he had confessed many sins in his previous confession, but had
2417 forgotten this particular one.
2418 </p>
2419 <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p11">
2420 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the priest may be unable to absolve the penitent from all his sins, yet the latter is bound to confess all to him,
2421 that he may know the total quantity of his guilt, and refer him to the superior with regard to the sins from which he cannot
2422 absolve him.
2423 </p>
2424 <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p12"></p>
2425 <p id="XP_Q9_A2-p13"></p>
2426 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
2427 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A3.html"></a>
2428 </div>
2429 <div id="XP_Q9_A3" class="div4">
2430 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
2431 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A4.html"></a>
2432 <h4 id="XP_Q9_A3-p0.1">Whether one may confess through another, or by writing?</h4>
2433 <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p1"></p>
2434 <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p2">
2435 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one may confess through another, or by writing. For confession is necessary in order that the penitent's
2436 conscience may be made known to the priest. But a man can make his conscience known to the priest, through another or by writing.
2437 Therefore it is enough to confess through another or by writing.
2438 </p>
2439 <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p3">
2440 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some are not understood by their own priests on account of a difference of language, and consequently cannot confess
2441 save through others. Therefore it is not essential to the sacrament that one should confess by oneself, so that if anyone
2442 confesses through another in any way whatever, it suffices for his salvation.
2443 </p>
2444 <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p4">
2445 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is essential to the sacrament that a man should confess to his own priest, as appears from what has been said
2446 (
2447 <a id="XP_Q9_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q8_A5.html">Q[8], A[5]</a> ). Now sometimes a man's own priest is absent, so that the penitent cannot speak to him with his own voice. But he could
2448 make his conscience known to him by writing. Therefore it seems that he ought to manifest his conscience to him by writing
2449 to him.
2450 </p>
2451 <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p5">
2452 <b>On the contrary,</b> Man is bound to confess his sins even as he is bound to confess his faith. But confession of faith should be made "with the
2453 mouth," as appears from
2454 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q9_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.10" target="asv"> Rom. 10:10</a>: therefore confession of sins should also.
2455 </p>
2456 <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p6"> Further, who sinned by himself should, by himself, do penance. But confession is part of penance. Therefore the penitent
2457 should confess his own sins.
2458 </p>
2459 <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p7">
2460 <b>I answer that,</b> Confession is not only an act of virtue, but also part of a sacrament. Now, though, in so far as it is an act of virtue it
2461 matters not how it is done, even if it be easier to do it in one way than in another, yet, in so far as it is part of a sacrament,
2462 it has a determinate act, just as the other sacraments have a determinate matter. And as in Baptism, in order to signify the
2463 inward washing, we employ that element which is chiefly used in washing, so in the
2464 sacramental act which is intended for manifestation we generally make use of that act which is most commonly employed for
2465 the purpose of manifestation, viz. our own words; for other ways have been introduced as supplementary to this.
2466 </p>
2467 <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p8">
2468 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as in Baptism it is not enough to wash with anything, but it is necessary to wash with a determinate element, so neither
2469 does it suffice, in Penance, to manifest one's sins anyhow, but they must be declared by a determinate act.
2470 </p>
2471 <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p9">
2472 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is enough for one who is ignorant of a language, to confess by writing, or by signs, or by an interpreter, because a man
2473 is not bound to do more than he can: although a man is not able or obliged to receive Baptism, except with water, which is
2474 from an entirely external source and is applied to us by another: whereas the act of confession is from within and is performed
2475 by ourselves, so that when we cannot confess in one way, we must confess as we
2476 can.
2477 </p>
2478 <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p10">
2479 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the absence of one's own priest, confession may be made even to a layman, so that there is no necessity to confess in
2480 writing, because the act of confession is more essential than the person to whom confession is made.
2481 </p>
2482 <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p11"></p>
2483 <p id="XP_Q9_A3-p12"></p>
2484 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A2.html"></a>
2485 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A4.html"></a>
2486 </div>
2487 <div id="XP_Q9_A4" class="div4">
2488 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A3.html"></a>
2489 <a href="summa.XP_Q10.html"></a>
2490 <h4 id="XP_Q9_A4-p0.1">Whether the sixteen conditions usually assigned are necessary for confession?</h4>
2491 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p1"></p>
2492 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p2">
2493 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the conditions assigned by masters, and contained in the following lines, are not requisite for confession:
2494 </p>
2495 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p3"> Simple, humble, pure, faithful,</p>
2496 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p4"> Frequent, undisguised, discreet, voluntary,</p>
2497 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p5"> shamefaced,</p>
2498 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p6"> Entire, secret, tearful, not delayed,</p>
2499 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p7"> Courageously accusing, ready to obey.</p>
2500 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p8">For fidelity, simplicity, and courage are virtues by themselves, and therefore should not be reckoned as conditions of confession.</p>
2501 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p9">
2502 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is "pure" when it is not mixed with anything else: and "simplicity," in like manner, removes composition
2503 and admixture. Therefore one or the other is superfluous.
2504 </p>
2505 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p10">
2506 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one is bound to confess more than once a sin which he has committed but once. Therefore if a man does not commit
2507 a sin again, his penance need not be "frequent."
2508 </p>
2509 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p11">
2510 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, confession is directed to satisfaction. But satisfaction is sometimes public. Therefore confession should not always
2511 be "secret."
2512 </p>
2513 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p12">
2514 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, that which is not in our power is not required of us. But it is not in our power to shed "tears." Therefore it is
2515 not required of those who confess.
2516 </p>
2517 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p13">
2518 <b>On the contrary,</b> We have the authority of the masters who assigned the above.
2519 </p>
2520 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p14">
2521 <b>I answer that,</b> Some of the above conditions are essential to confession, and some are requisite for its well-being. Now those things which
2522 are essential to confession belong to it either as to an act of virtue, or as to part of a sacrament. If in the first way,
2523 it is either by reason of virtue in general, or by reason of the special virtue of which it is the act, or by reason of the
2524 act itself. Now there are four conditions of virtue in general, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4.
2525 The first is knowledge, in respect of which confession is said to be "discreet," inasmuch as prudence is required in every
2526 act of virtue: and this discretion consists in giving greater weight to greater sins. The second condition is choice, because
2527 acts of virtue should be voluntary, and in this respect confession is said to be "voluntary." The third condition is that
2528 the act be done for a particular purpose, viz. the due end, and in this respect confession is said to be "pure," i.e. with
2529 a
2530 right intention. The fourth condition is that one should act immovably, and in this respect it is said that confession should
2531 be "courageous," viz. that the truth should not be forsaken through shame.
2532 </p>
2533 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p15"> Now confession is an act of the virtue of penance. First of all it takes its origin in the horror which one conceives for
2534 the shamefulness of sin, and in this respect confession should be "full of shame," so as not to be a boastful account of one's
2535 sins, by reason of some worldly vanity accompanying it. Then it goes on to deplore the sin committed, and in this respect
2536 it is said to be "tearful." Thirdly, it culminates in self-abjection, and in this respect it should be "humble,"
2537 so that one confesses one's misery and weakness.
2538 </p>
2539 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p16"> By reason of its very nature, viz. confession, this act is one of manifestation: which manifestation can be hindered by four
2540 things: first, by falsehood, and in this respect confession is said to be "faithful," i.e. true. Secondly, by the use of vague
2541 words, and against this confession is said to be "open," so as not to be wrapped up in vague words; thirdly, by "multiplicity"
2542 of words, in which respect it is said to be "simple" indicating that the penitent should relate only
2543 such matters as affect the gravity of the sin; fourthly none of those things should be suppressed which should be made known,
2544 and in this respect confession should be "entire."
2545 </p>
2546 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p17"> In so far as confession is part of a sacrament it is subject to the judgment of the priest who is the minister of the sacrament.
2547 Wherefore it should be an "accusation" on the part of the penitent, should manifest his "readiness to obey" the priest, should
2548 be "secret" as regards the nature of the court wherein the hidden affairs of conscience are tried.
2549 </p>
2550 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p18"> The well-being of confession requires that it should be "frequent"; and "not delayed," i.e. that the sinner should confess
2551 at once.
2552 </p>
2553 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p19">
2554 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing unreasonable in one virtue being a condition of the act of another virtue, through this act being commanded
2555 by that virtue; or through the mean which belongs to one virtue principally, belonging to other virtues by participation.
2556 </p>
2557 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p20">
2558 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The condition "pure" excludes perversity of intention, from which man is cleansed: but the condition "simple" excludes the
2559 introduction of unnecessary matter.
2560 </p>
2561 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p21">
2562 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This is not necessary for confession, but is a condition of its well-being.
2563 </p>
2564 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p22">
2565 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Confession should be made not publicly but privately, lest others be scandalized, and led to do evil through hearing the
2566 sins confessed. On the other hand, the penance enjoined in satisfaction does not give rise to scandal, since like works of
2567 satisfaction are done sometimes for slight sins, and sometimes for none at all.
2568 </p>
2569 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p23">
2570 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> We must understand this to refer to tears of the heart.
2571 </p>
2572 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p24"></p>
2573 <p id="XP_Q9_A4-p25"></p>
2574 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A3.html"></a>
2575 <a href="summa.XP_Q10.html"></a>
2576 </div>
2577 <a href="summa.XP_Q8_A7.html"></a>
2578 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A1.html"></a>
2579 </div>
2580 <div id="XP_Q10" class="div3">
2581 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A4.html"></a>
2582 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
2583 <h3 id="XP_Q10-p0.1">OF THE EFFECT OF CONFESSION (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
2584 <p id="XP_Q10-p1"></p>
2585 <p id="XP_Q10-p2"> We must now consider the effect of confession: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
2586 <p id="XP_Q10-p3"> (1) Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin?</p>
2587 <p id="XP_Q10-p4"> (2) Whether confession delivers one in any way from punishment?</p>
2588 <p id="XP_Q10-p5"> (3) Whether confession opens Paradise to us?</p>
2589 <p id="XP_Q10-p6"> (4) Whether confession gives hope of salvation?</p>
2590 <p id="XP_Q10-p7"> (5) Whether a general confession blots out mortal sins that one has forgotten?</p>
2591 <div id="XP_Q10_A1" class="div4">
2592 <a href="summa.XP_Q10.html"></a>
2593 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
2594 <h4 id="XP_Q10_A1-p0.1">Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin?</h4>
2595 <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p1"></p>
2596 <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p2">
2597 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession does not deliver one from the death of sin. For confession follows contrition. But contrition
2598 sufficiently blots out guilt. Therefore confession does not deliver one from the death of sin.
2599 </p>
2600 <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p3">
2601 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as mortal sin is a fault, so is venial. Now confession renders venial that which was mortal before, as stated
2602 in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore confession does not blot out guilt, but one guilt is changed into another.
2603 </p>
2604 <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p4">
2605 <b>On the contrary,</b> Confession is part of the sacrament of Penance. But Penance deliver from guilt. Therefore confession does also.
2606 </p>
2607 <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p5">
2608 <b>I answer that,</b> Penance, as a sacrament, is perfected chiefly in confession, because by the latter a man submits to the ministers of the
2609 Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments: for contrition has the desire of confession united thereto, and satisfaction
2610 is enjoined according to the judgment of the priest who hears the confession. And since in the sacrament of Penance, as in
2611 Baptism, that grace is infused whereby sins are forgiven, therefore confession in virtue of
2612 the absolution granted remits guilt, even as Baptism does. Now Baptism delivers one from the death of sin, not only by being
2613 received actually, but also by being received in desire, as is evident with regard to those who approach the sacrament of
2614 Baptism after being already sanctified. And unless a man offers an obstacle, he receives, through the very fact of being baptized,
2615 grace whereby his sins are remitted, if they are not already remitted. The same is to be said of confession, to which
2616 absolution is added because it delivered the penitent from guilt through being previously in his desire. Afterwards at the
2617 time of actual confession and absolution he receives an increase of grace, and forgiveness of sins would also be granted to
2618 him, if his previous sorrow for sin was not sufficient for contrition, and if at the time he offered no obstacle to grace.
2619 Consequently just as it is said of Baptism that it delivers from death, so can it be said of confession.
2620 </p>
2621 <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p6">
2622 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Contrition has the desire of confession attached to it, and therefore it delivers penitents from death in the same way as
2623 the desire of Baptism delivers those who are going to be baptized.
2624 </p>
2625 <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p7">
2626 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the text venial does not designate guilt, but punishment that is easily expiated. and so it does not follow that one guilt
2627 is changed into another but that it is wholly done away. For "venial" is taken in three senses [*Cf.
2628 <a id="XP_Q10_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q88_A2.html">FS, Q[88], A[2]</a>]: first, for what is venial generically, e.g. an idle word: secondly, for what is venial in its cause, i.e. having within
2629 itself a motive of pardon, e.g. sins due to weakness: thirdly,
2630 for what is venial in the result, in which sense it is understood here, because the result of confession is that man's past
2631 guilt is pardoned.
2632 </p>
2633 <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p8"></p>
2634 <p id="XP_Q10_A1-p9"></p>
2635 <a href="summa.XP_Q10.html"></a>
2636 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
2637 </div>
2638 <div id="XP_Q10_A2" class="div4">
2639 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
2640 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
2641 <h4 id="XP_Q10_A2-p0.1">Whether confession delivers from punishment in some way?</h4>
2642 <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p1"></p>
2643 <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p2">
2644 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession nowise delivers from punishment. For sin deserves no punishment but what is either eternal
2645 or temporal. Now eternal punishment is remitted by contrition, and temporal punishment by satisfaction. Therefore nothing
2646 of the punishment is remitted by confession.
2647 </p>
2648 <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p3">
2649 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "the will is taken for the deed" [*Cf. Can. Magna Pietas, De Poenit., Dist. i], as stated in the text (Sent. iv,
2650 D, 17). Now he that is contrite has the intention to confess. wherefore his intention avails him as though he had already
2651 confessed, and so the confession which he makes afterwards remits no part of the punishment.
2652 </p>
2653 <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p4">
2654 <b>On the contrary,</b> Confession is a penal work. But all penal works expiate the punishment due to sin. Therefore confession does also.
2655 </p>
2656 <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p5">
2657 <b>I answer that,</b> Confession together with absolution has the power to deliver from punishment, for two reasons. First, from the power of absolution
2658 itself: and thus the very desire of absolution delivers a man from eternal punishment, as also from the guilt. Now this punishment
2659 is one of condemnation and total banishment: and when a man is delivered therefrom he still remains bound to a temporal punishment,
2660 in so far as punishment is a cleansing and perfecting remedy; and so
2661 this punishment remains to be suffered in Purgatory by those who also have been delivered from the punishment of hell. Which
2662 temporal punishment is beyond the powers of the penitent dwelling in this world, but is so far diminished by the power of
2663 the keys, that it is within the ability of the penitent, and he is able, by making satisfaction, to cleanse himself in this
2664 life. Secondly, confession diminishes the punishment in virtue of the very nature of the act of the one who confesses, for
2665 this
2666 act has the punishment of shame attached to it, so that the oftener one confesses the same sins, the more is the punishment
2667 diminished.
2668 </p>
2669 <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p6"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
2670 <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p7">
2671 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will is not taken for the deed, if this is done by another, as in the case of Baptism: for the will to receive Baptism
2672 is not worth as much as the reception of Baptism. But a man's will is taken for the deed, when the latter is something done
2673 by him, entirely. Again, this is true of the essential reward, but not of the removal of punishment and the like, which come
2674 under the head of accidental and secondary reward. Consequently one who has
2675 confessed and received absolution will be less punished in Purgatory than one who has gone no further than contrition.
2676 </p>
2677 <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p8"></p>
2678 <p id="XP_Q10_A2-p9"></p>
2679 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
2680 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
2681 </div>
2682 <div id="XP_Q10_A3" class="div4">
2683 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
2684 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
2685 <h4 id="XP_Q10_A3-p0.1">Whether confession opens paradise?</h4>
2686 <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p1"></p>
2687 <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p2">
2688 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that confession does not open Paradise. For different sacraments have different effects. But it is the effect
2689 of Baptism to open Paradise. Therefore it is not the effect of confession.
2690 </p>
2691 <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p3">
2692 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is impossible to enter by a closed door before it be opened. But a dying man can enter heaven before making his
2693 confession. Therefore confession does not open Paradise.
2694 </p>
2695 <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p4">
2696 <b>On the contrary,</b> Confession makes a man submit to the keys of the Church. But Paradise is opened by those keys. Therefore it is opened by
2697 confession.
2698 </p>
2699 <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p5">
2700 <b>I answer that,</b> Guilt and the debt of punishment prevent a man from entering into Paradise: and since confession removes these obstacles,
2701 as shown above (
2702 <a id="XP_Q10_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q10_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), it is said to open Paradise.
2703 </p>
2704 <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p6">
2705 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although Baptism and Penance are different sacraments, they act in virtue of Christ's one Passion, whereby a way was opened
2706 unto Paradise.
2707 </p>
2708 <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p7">
2709 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the dying man was in mortal sin Paradise was closed to him before he conceived the desire to confess his sin, although
2710 afterwards it was opened by contrition implying a desire for confession, even before he actually confessed. Nevertheless the
2711 obstacle of the debt of punishment was not entirely removed before confession and satisfaction.
2712 </p>
2713 <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p8"></p>
2714 <p id="XP_Q10_A3-p9"></p>
2715 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A2.html"></a>
2716 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
2717 </div>
2718 <div id="XP_Q10_A4" class="div4">
2719 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
2720 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
2721 <h4 id="XP_Q10_A4-p0.1">Whether confession gives hope of salvation?</h4>
2722 <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p1"></p>
2723 <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p2">
2724 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope of salvation should not be reckoned an effect of confession. For hope arises from all meritorious
2725 acts. Therefore, seemingly, it is not the proper effect of confession.
2726 </p>
2727 <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p3">
2728 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we arrive at hope through tribulation, as appears from
2729 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q10_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.3" target="asv"> Rom. 5:3,4.</a> Now man suffers tribulation chiefly in satisfaction. Therefore, satisfaction rather than confession gives hope of salvation.
2730 </p>
2731 <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p4">
2732 <b>On the contrary,</b>" Confession makes a man more humble and more wary," as the Master states in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). But the result of
2733 this is that man conceives a hope of salvation. Therefore it is the effect of confession to give hope of salvation.
2734 </p>
2735 <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p5">
2736 <b>I answer that,</b> We can have no hope for the forgiveness of our sins except through Christ: and since by confession a man submits to the keys
2737 of the Church which derive their power from Christ's Passion, therefore do we say that confession gives hope of salvation.
2738 </p>
2739 <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p6">
2740 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not our actions, but the grace of our Redeemer, that is the principal cause of the hope of salvation: and since confession
2741 relies upon the grace of our Redeemer, it gives hope of salvation, not only as a meritorious act, but also as part of a sacrament.
2742 </p>
2743 <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p7">
2744 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Tribulation gives hope of salvation, by making us exercise our own virtue, and by paying off the debt of punishment: while
2745 confession does so also in the way mentioned above.
2746 </p>
2747 <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p8"></p>
2748 <p id="XP_Q10_A4-p9"></p>
2749 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A3.html"></a>
2750 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
2751 </div>
2752 <div id="XP_Q10_A5" class="div4">
2753 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
2754 <a href="summa.XP_Q11.html"></a>
2755 <h4 id="XP_Q10_A5-p0.1">Whether a general confession suffices to blot out forgotten mortal sins?</h4>
2756 <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p1"></p>
2757 <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p2">
2758 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a general confession does not suffice to blot out forgotten mortal sins. For there is no necessity to
2759 confess again a sin which has been blotted out by confession. If, therefore, forgotten sins were forgiven by a general confession,
2760 there would be no need to confess them when they are called to mind.
2761 </p>
2762 <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p3">
2763 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever is not conscious of sin, either is not guilty of sin, or has forgotten his sin. If, therefore, mortal sins
2764 are forgiven by a general confession, whoever is not conscious of a mortal sin, can be certain that he is free from mortal
2765 sin, whenever he makes a general confession: which is contrary to what the Apostle says (
2766 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q10_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:4</a>), "I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justified."
2767 </p>
2768 <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p4">
2769 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man profits by neglect. Now a man cannot forget a mortal sin without neglect, before it is forgiven him. Therefore
2770 he does not profit by his forgetfulness so that the sin is forgiven him without special mention thereof in confession.
2771 </p>
2772 <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p5">
2773 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which the penitent knows nothing about is further from his knowledge than that which he has forgotten. Now
2774 a general confession does not blot out sins committed through ignorance, else heretics, who are not aware that certain things
2775 they have done are sinful, and certain simple people, would be absolved by a general confession, which is false. Therefore
2776 a general confession does not take away forgotten sins.
2777 </p>
2778 <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p6">
2779 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
2780 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q10_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.6" target="asv">Ps. 33:6</a>): "Come ye to Him and be enlightened, and your faces shall not be confounded." Now he who confesses all the sins of which
2781 he is conscious, approaches to God as much as he can: nor can more be required for him. Therefore he will not be confounded
2782 by being repelled, but will be forgiven.
2783 </p>
2784 <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p7"> Further, he that confesses is pardoned unless he be insincere. But he who confesses all the sins that he calls to mind, is
2785 not insincere through forgetting some, because he suffers from ignorance of fact, which excuses from sin. Therefore he receives
2786 forgiveness, and then the sins which he has forgotten, are loosened, since it is wicked to hope for half a pardon.
2787 </p>
2788 <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p8">
2789 <b>I answer that,</b> Confession produces its effect, on the presupposition that there is contrition which blots out guilt: so that confession
2790 is directly ordained to the remission of punishment, which it causes in virtue of the shame which it includes, and by the
2791 power of the keys to which a man submits by confessing. Now it happens sometimes that by previous contrition a sin has been
2792 blotted out as to the guilt, either in a general way (if it was not remembered at the time) or
2793 in particular (and yet is forgotten before confession): and then general sacramental confession works for the remission of
2794 the punishment in virtue of the keys, to which man submits by confessing, provided he offers no obstacle so far as he is concerned:
2795 but so far as the shame of confessing a sin diminishes its punishment, the punishment for the sin for which a man does not
2796 express his shame, through failing to confess it to the priest, is not diminished.
2797 </p>
2798 <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p9">
2799 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In sacramental confession, not only is absolution required, but also the judgment of the priest who imposes satisfaction
2800 is awaited. Wherefore although the latter has given absolution, nevertheless the penitent is bound to confess in order to
2801 supply what was wanting to the sacramental confession.
2802 </p>
2803 <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p10">
2804 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above, confession does not produce its effect, unless contrition be presupposed; concerning which no man can know
2805 whether it be true contrition, even as neither can one know for certain if he has grace. Consequently a man cannot know for
2806 certain whether a forgotten sin has been forgiven him in a general confession, although he may think so on account of certain
2807 conjectural signs.
2808 </p>
2809 <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p11">
2810 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He does not profit by his neglect, since he does not receive such full pardon, as he would otherwise have received, nor is
2811 his merit so great. Moreover he is bound to confess the sin when he calls it to mind.
2812 </p>
2813 <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p12">
2814 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Ignorance of the law does not excuse, because it is a sin by itself: but ignorance of fact does excuse. Therefore if a man
2815 omits to confess a sin, because he does not know it to be a sin, through ignorance of the Divine law, he is not excused from
2816 insincerity. on the other hand, he would be excused, if he did not know it to be a sin, through being unaware of some particular
2817 circumstance, for instance, if he had knowledge of another's wife, thinking
2818 her his own. Now forgetfulness of an act of sin comes under the head of ignorance of fact, wherefore it excuses from the sin
2819 of insincerity in confession, which is an obstacle to the fruit of absolution and confession.
2820 </p>
2821 <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p13"></p>
2822 <p id="XP_Q10_A5-p14"></p>
2823 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A4.html"></a>
2824 <a href="summa.XP_Q11.html"></a>
2825 </div>
2826 <a href="summa.XP_Q9_A4.html"></a>
2827 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A1.html"></a>
2828 </div>
2829 <div id="XP_Q11" class="div3">
2830 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
2831 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
2832 <h3 id="XP_Q11-p0.1">OF THE SEAL OF CONFESSION (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
2833 <p id="XP_Q11-p1"></p>
2834 <p id="XP_Q11-p2"> We must now inquire about the seal of confession, about which there are five points of inquiry:</p>
2835 <p id="XP_Q11-p3"> (1) Whether in every case a man is bound to hide what he knows under the seal of confession?</p>
2836 <p id="XP_Q11-p4"> (2) Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which have reference to confession?</p>
2837 <p id="XP_Q11-p5"> (3) Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession?</p>
2838 <p id="XP_Q11-p6"> (4) Whether, by permission of the penitent, the priest can make known to another, a sin of his which he knew under the seal
2839 of confession?
2840 </p>
2841 <p id="XP_Q11-p7"> (5) Whether he is bound to hide even what he knows through other sources besides?</p>
2842 <div id="XP_Q11_A1" class="div4">
2843 <a href="summa.XP_Q11.html"></a>
2844 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
2845 <h4 id="XP_Q11_A1-p0.1">Whether in every case the priest is bound to hide the sins which he knows under the seal of confession?</h4>
2846 <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p1"></p>
2847 <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p2">
2848 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the priest is not bound in every case to hide the sins which he knows under the seal of confession. For,
2849 as Bernard says (De Proecep. et Dispens. ii), "that which is instituted for the sake of charity does not militate against
2850 charity." Now the secret of confession would militate against charity in certain cases: for instance, if a man knew through
2851 confession that a certain man was a heretic, whom he cannot persuade to desist from misleading
2852 the people; or, in like manner, if a man knew, through confession, that certain people who wish to marry are related to one
2853 another. Therefore such ought to reveal what they know through confession.
2854 </p>
2855 <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p3">
2856 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is obligatory solely on account of a precept of the Church need not be observed, if the commandment be
2857 changed to the contrary. Now the secret of confession was introduced solely by a precept of the Church. If therefore the Church
2858 were to prescribe that anyone who knows anything about such and such a sin must make it known, a man that had such knowledge
2859 through confession would be bound to speak.
2860 </p>
2861 <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p4">
2862 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man is bound to safeguard his conscience rather than the good name of another, because there is order in charity.
2863 Now it happens sometimes that a man by hiding a sin injures his own conscience---for instance, if he be called upon to give
2864 witness of a sin of which he has knowledge through confession, and is forced to swear to tell the truth---or when an abbot
2865 knows through confession the sin of a prior who is subject to him, which sin would be an
2866 occasion of ruin to the latter, if he suffers him to retain his priorship, wherefore he is bound to deprive him of the dignity
2867 of his pastoral charge, and yet in depriving him he seem to divulge the secret of confession. Therefore it seems that in certain
2868 cases it is lawful to reveal a confession.
2869 </p>
2870 <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p5">
2871 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is possible for a priest through hearing a man's confession to be conscious that the latter is unworthy of ecclesiastical
2872 preferment. Now everyone is bound to prevent the promotion of the unworthy, if it is his business. Since then by raising an
2873 objection he seems to raise a suspicion of sin, and so to reveal the confession somewhat, it seems that it is necessary sometimes
2874 to divulge a confession.
2875 </p>
2876 <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p6">
2877 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Decretal says (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Omnis utriusque): "Let the priest beware lest he betray the sinner, by word,
2878 or sign, or in any other way whatever."
2879 </p>
2880 <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p7"> Further, the priest should conform himself to God, Whose minister he is. But God does not reveal the sins which are made
2881 known to Him in confession, but hides them. Neither, therefore, should the priest reveal them.
2882 </p>
2883 <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p8">
2884 <b>I answer that,</b> Those things which are done outwardly in the sacraments are the signs of what takes place inwardly: wherefore confession,
2885 whereby a man subjects himself to a priest, is a sign of the inward submission, whereby one submits to God. Now God hides
2886 the sins of those who submit to Him by Penance; wherefore this also should be signified in the sacrament of Penance, and consequently
2887 the sacrament demands that the confession should remain hidden, and he who divulges
2888 a confession sins by violating the sacrament. Besides this there are other advantages in this secrecy, because thereby men
2889 are more attracted to confession, and confess their sins with greater simplicity.
2890 </p>
2891 <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p9">
2892 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some say that the priest is not bound by the seal of confession to hide other sins than those in respect of which the penitent
2893 promises amendment; otherwise he may reveal them to one who can be a help and not a hindrance. But this opinion seems erroneous,
2894 since it is contrary to the truth of the sacrament; for just as, though the person baptized be insincere, yet his Baptism
2895 is a sacrament, and there is no change in the essentials of the sacrament on
2896 that account, so confession does not cease to be sacramental although he that confesses, does not purpose amendment. Therefore,
2897 this notwithstanding, it must be held secret; nor does the seal of confession militate against charity on that account, because
2898 charity does not require a man to find a remedy for a sin which he knows not: and that which is known in confession, is, as
2899 it were, unknown, since a man knows it, not as man, but as God knows it. Nevertheless in the cases quoted one should
2900 apply some kind of remedy, so far as this can be done without divulging the confession, e.g. by admonishing the penitent,
2901 and by watching over the others lest they be corrupted by heresy. He can also tell the prelate to watch over his flock with
2902 great care, yet so as by neither word nor sign to betray the penitent.
2903 </p>
2904 <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p10">
2905 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precept concerning the secret of confession follows from the sacrament itself. Wherefore just as the obligation of making
2906 a sacramental confession is of Divine law, so that no human dispensation or command can absolve one therefrom, even so, no
2907 man can be forced or permitted by another man to divulge the secret of confession. Consequently if he be commanded under pain
2908 of excommunication to be incurred "ipso facto," to say whether he knows anything
2909 about such and such a sin, he ought not to say it, because he should assume that the intention of the person in commanding
2910 him thus, was that he should say what he knew as man. And even if he were expressly interrogated about a confession, he ought
2911 to say nothing, nor would he incur the excommunication, for he is not subject to his superior, save as a man, and he knows
2912 this not as a man, but as God knows it.
2913 </p>
2914 <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p11">
2915 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A man is not called upon to witness except as a man, wherefore without wronging his conscience he can swear that he knows
2916 not, what he knows only as God knows it. In like manner a superior can, without wronging his conscience, leave a sin unpunished
2917 which he knows only as God knows it, or he may forbear to apply a remedy, since he is not bound to apply a remedy, except
2918 according as it comes to his knowledge. Wherefore with regard to matters which come
2919 to his knowledge in the tribunal of Penance, he should apply the remedy, as far as he can, in the same court: thus as to the
2920 case in point, the abbot should advise the prior to resign his office, and if the latter refuse, he can absolve him from the
2921 priorship on some other occasion, yet so as to avoid all suspicion of divulging the confession.
2922 </p>
2923 <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p12">
2924 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A man is rendered unworthy of ecclesiastical preferment, by many other causes besides sin, for instance, by lack of knowledge,
2925 age, or the like: so that by raising an objection one does not raise a suspicion of crime or divulge the secret of confession.
2926 </p>
2927 <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p13"></p>
2928 <p id="XP_Q11_A1-p14"></p>
2929 <a href="summa.XP_Q11.html"></a>
2930 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
2931 </div>
2932 <div id="XP_Q11_A2" class="div4">
2933 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
2934 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
2935 <h4 id="XP_Q11_A2-p0.1">Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which have reference to confession?</h4>
2936 <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p1"></p>
2937 <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p2">
2938 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the seal of confession extends to other matters besides those which have reference to confession. For
2939 sins alone have reference to confession. Now sometimes besides sins other matters are told which have no reference to confession.
2940 Therefore, since such things are told to the priest, as to God, it seems that the seal of confession extends to them also.
2941 </p>
2942 <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p3">
2943 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sometimes one person tells another a secret, which the latter receives under the seal of confession. Therefore the
2944 seal of confession extends to matters having no relation to confession.
2945 </p>
2946 <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p4">
2947 <b>On the contrary,</b> The seal of confession is connected with sacramental confession. But those things which are connected with a sacrament, do
2948 not extend outside the bounds of the sacrament. Therefore the seal of confession does not extend to matters other than those
2949 which have reference to sacramental confession.
2950 </p>
2951 <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p5">
2952 <b>I answer that,</b> The seal of confession does not extend directly to other matters than those which have reference to sacramental confession,
2953 yet indirectly matters also which are not connected with sacramental confession are affected by the seal of confession, those,
2954 for instance, which might lead to the discovery of a sinner or of his sin. Nevertheless these matters also must be most carefully
2955 hidden, both on account of scandal, and to avoid leading others into sin through
2956 their becoming familiar with it.
2957 </p>
2958 <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p6"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
2959 <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p7">
2960 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A confidence ought not easily to be accepted in this way: but if it be done the secret must be kept in the way promised,
2961 as though one had the secret through confession, though not through the seal of confession.
2962 </p>
2963 <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p8"></p>
2964 <p id="XP_Q11_A2-p9"></p>
2965 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
2966 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
2967 </div>
2968 <div id="XP_Q11_A3" class="div4">
2969 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
2970 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
2971 <h4 id="XP_Q11_A3-p0.1">Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession?</h4>
2972 <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p1"></p>
2973 <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p2">
2974 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession. For sometimes a priest hears a confession through
2975 an interpreter, if there be an urgent reason for so doing. But it seems that the interpreter is bound to keep the confession
2976 secret. Therefore one who is not a priest knows something under the seal of confession.
2977 </p>
2978 <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p3">
2979 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is possible sometimes in cases of urgency for a layman to hear a confession. But he is bound to secrecy with
2980 regard to those sins, since they are told to him as to God. Therefore not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession.
2981 </p>
2982 <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p4">
2983 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it may happen that a man pretends to be a priest, so that by this deceit he may know what is on another's conscience:
2984 and it would seem that he also sins if he divulges the confession. Therefore not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession.
2985 </p>
2986 <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p5">
2987 <b>On the contrary,</b> A priest alone is the minister of this sacrament. But the seal of confession is connected with this sacrament. Therefore
2988 the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession.
2989 </p>
2990 <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p6"> Further, the reason why a man is bound to keep secret what he hears in confession, is because he knows them, not as man but
2991 as God knows them. But the priest alone is God's minister. Therefore he alone is bound to secrecy.
2992 </p>
2993 <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p7">
2994 <b>I answer that,</b> The seal of confession affects the priest as minister of this sacrament: which seal is nothing else than the obligation of
2995 keeping the confession secret, even as the key is the power of absolving. Yet, as one who is not a priest, in a particular
2996 case has a kind of share in the act of the keys, when he hears a confession in a case of urgency, so also does he have a certain
2997 share in the act of the seal of confession, and is bound to secrecy, though, properly
2998 speaking, he is not bound by the seal of confession.
2999 </p>
3000 <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
3001 <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p9"></p>
3002 <p id="XP_Q11_A3-p10"></p>
3003 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A2.html"></a>
3004 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
3005 </div>
3006 <div id="XP_Q11_A4" class="div4">
3007 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
3008 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A5.html"></a>
3009 <h4 id="XP_Q11_A4-p0.1">Whether by the penitent's permission, a priest may reveal to another a sin which he knows under the seal of confession?</h4>
3010 <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p1"></p>
3011 <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p2">
3012 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a priest may not, by the penitent's permission, reveal to another a sin which he knows under the seal
3013 of confession. For an inferior may not do what his superior may not. Now the Pope cannot give permission for anyone to divulge
3014 a sin which he knows through confession. Neither therefore can the penitent give him such a permission.
3015 </p>
3016 <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p3">
3017 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is instituted for the common good of the Church cannot be changed at the will of an individual. Now the
3018 secrecy of confession was instituted for the good of the whole Church, in order that men might have greater confidence in
3019 approaching the confessional. Therefore the penitent cannot allow the priest to divulge his confession.
3020 </p>
3021 <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p4">
3022 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the priest could grant such a permission, this would seem to palliate the wickedness of bad priests, for they
3023 might pretend to have received the permission and so they might sin with impunity, which would be unbecoming. Therefore it
3024 seems that the penitent cannot grant this permission.
3025 </p>
3026 <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p5">
3027 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the one to whom this sin is divulged does not know that sin under the seal of confession, so that he may publish
3028 a sin which is already blotted out, which is unbecoming. Therefore this permission cannot be granted.
3029 </p>
3030 <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p6">
3031 <b>On the contrary,</b> If the sinner consent, a superior may refer him by letter to an inferior priest. Therefore with the consent of the penitent,
3032 the priest may reveal a sin of his to another.
3033 </p>
3034 <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p7"> Further, whosoever can do a thing of his own authority, can do it through another. But the penitent can by his own authority
3035 reveal his sin to another. Therefore he can do it through the priest.
3036 </p>
3037 <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p8"> I answer that There are two reasons for which the priest is bound to keep a sin secret: first and chiefly, because this very
3038 secrecy is essential to the sacrament, in so far as the priest knows that sin, as it is known to God, Whose place he holds
3039 in confession: secondly, in order to avoid scandal. Now the penitent can make the priest know, as a man, what he knew before
3040 only as God knows it, and he does this when he allows him to divulge it: so that if the priest does reveal it,
3041 he does not break the seal of confession. Nevertheless he should beware of giving scandal by revealing the sin, lest he be
3042 deemed to have broken the seal.
3043 </p>
3044 <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p9">
3045 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Pope cannot permit a priest to divulge a sin, because he cannot make him to know it as a man, whereas he that has confessed
3046 it, can.
3047 </p>
3048 <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p10">
3049 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When that is told which was known through another source, that which is instituted for the common good is not done away with,
3050 because the seal of confession is not broken.
3051 </p>
3052 <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p11">
3053 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This does not bestow impunity on wicked priests, because they are in danger of having to prove that they had the penitent's
3054 permission to reveal the sin, if they should be accused of the contrary.
3055 </p>
3056 <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p12">
3057 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> He that is informed of a sin through the priest with the penitent's consent, shares in an act of the priest's, so that the
3058 same applies to him as to an interpreter, unless perchance the penitent wish him to know it unconditionally and freely.
3059 </p>
3060 <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p13"></p>
3061 <p id="XP_Q11_A4-p14"></p>
3062 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A3.html"></a>
3063 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A5.html"></a>
3064 </div>
3065 <div id="XP_Q11_A5" class="div4">
3066 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
3067 <a href="summa.XP_Q12.html"></a>
3068 <h4 id="XP_Q11_A5-p0.1">Whether a man may reveal that which he knows through confession and through some other source besides?</h4>
3069 <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p1"></p>
3070 <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p2">
3071 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man may not reveal what he knows through confession and through some other source besides. For the seal
3072 of confession is not broken unless one reveals a sin known through confession. If therefore a man divulges a sin which he
3073 knows through confession, no matter how he knows it otherwise, he seems to break the seal.
3074 </p>
3075 <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p3">
3076 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever hears someone's confession, is under obligation to him not to divulge his sins. Now if one were to promise
3077 someone to keep something secret, he would be bound to do so, even if he knew it through some other source. Therefore a man
3078 is bound to keep secret what he knows through the confession, no matter how he knows it otherwise.
3079 </p>
3080 <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p4">
3081 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the stronger of two things draws the other to itself. Now the knowledge whereby a man knows a sin as God knows it,
3082 is stronger and more excellent than the knowledge whereby he knows a sin as man. Therefore it draws the latter to itself:
3083 and consequently a man cannot reveal that sin, because this is demanded by his knowing it as God knows it.
3084 </p>
3085 <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p5">
3086 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the secrecy of confession was instituted in order to avoid scandal, and to prevent men being shy of going to confession.
3087 But if a man might say what he had heard in confession, though he knew it otherwise, scandal would result all the same. Therefore
3088 he can nowise say what he has heard.
3089 </p>
3090 <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p6">
3091 <b>On the contrary,</b> No one can put another under a new obligation, unless he be his superior, who can bind him by a precept. Now he who knew
3092 of a sin by witnessing it was not bound to keep it secret. Therefore he that confesses to him, not being his superior, cannot
3093 put him under an obligation of secrecy by confessing to him.
3094 </p>
3095 <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p7"> Further, the justice of the Church would be hindered if a man, in order to escape a sentence of excommunication, incurred
3096 on account of some sin, of which he has been convicted, were to confess to the person who has to sentence him. Now the execution
3097 of justice falls under a precept. Therefore a man is not bound to keep a sin secret, which he has heard in confession, but
3098 knows from some other source.
3099 </p>
3100 <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p8">
3101 <b>I answer that,</b> There are three opinions about this question. For some say that a man can by no means tell another what he has heard in confession,
3102 even if he knew it from some other source either before or after the confession: while others assert that the confession debars
3103 him from speaking of what he knew already, but not from saying what he knew afterwards and in another way. Now both these
3104 opinions, by exaggerating the seal of confession, are prejudicial to the truth
3105 and to the safeguarding of justice. For a man might be more inclined to sin, if he had no fear of being accused by his confessor
3106 supposing that he repeated the sin in his presence: and furthermore it would be most prejudicial to justice if a man could
3107 not bear witness to a deed which he has seen committed again after being confessed to him. Nor does it matter that, as some
3108 say, he ought to declare that he cannot keep it secret, for he cannot make such a declaration until the sin has already
3109 been confessed to him, and then every priest could, if he wished, divulge a sin, by making such a declaration, if this made
3110 him free to divulge it. Consequently there is a third and truer opinion, viz. that what a man knows through another source
3111 either before or after confession, he is not bound to keep secret, in so far as he knows it as a man, for he can say: "I know
3112 so end so since I saw it." But he is bound to keep it secret in so far as he knows it as God knows it, for he cannot say:
3113 "I
3114 heard so and so in confession." Nevertheless, on account of the scandal he should refrain from speaking of it unless there
3115 is an urgent reason.
3116 </p>
3117 <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p9">
3118 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If a man says that he has seen what he has heard in the confessional, he does not reveal what he heard in confession, save
3119 indirectly: even as one who knows something through hearing and seeing it, does not, properly speaking, divulge what he saw,
3120 if he says he heard it, but only indirectly, because he says he has heard what he incidentally saw. Wherefore he does not
3121 break the seal of confession.
3122 </p>
3123 <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p10">
3124 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The confessor is not forbidden to reveal a sin simply, but to reveal it as heard in confession: for in no case is he allowed
3125 to say that he has heard it in the confessional.
3126 </p>
3127 <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p11">
3128 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This is true of things that are in opposition to one another: whereas to know a sin as God knows it, and to know it as man
3129 knows it, are not in opposition; so that the argument proves nothing.
3130 </p>
3131 <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p12">
3132 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It would not be right to avoid scandal so as to desert justice: for the truth should not be gainsayed for fear of scandal.
3133 Wherefore when justice and truth are in the balance, a man should not be deterred by the fear of giving scandal, from divulging
3134 what he has heard in confession, provided he knows it from some other source: although he ought to avoid giving scandal, as
3135 far as he is able.
3136 </p>
3137 <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p13"></p>
3138 <p id="XP_Q11_A5-p14"></p>
3139 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A4.html"></a>
3140 <a href="summa.XP_Q12.html"></a>
3141 </div>
3142 <a href="summa.XP_Q10_A5.html"></a>
3143 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A1.html"></a>
3144 </div>
3145 <div id="XP_Q12" class="div3">
3146 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A5.html"></a>
3147 <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
3148 <h3 id="XP_Q12-p0.1">OF SATISFACTION, AS TO ITS NATURE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
3149 <p id="XP_Q12-p1"></p>
3150 <p id="XP_Q12-p2"> We must now consider satisfaction; about which four things have to be considered: (1) Its nature; (2) Its possibility; (3)
3151 Its quality; (4) The means whereby man offers satisfaction to God.
3152 </p>
3153 <p id="XP_Q12-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
3154 <p id="XP_Q12-p4"> (1) Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue?</p>
3155 <p id="XP_Q12-p5"> (2) Whether it is an act of justice?</p>
3156 <p id="XP_Q12-p6"> (3) Whether the definition of satisfaction contained in the text is suitable?</p>
3157 <div id="XP_Q12_A1" class="div4">
3158 <a href="summa.XP_Q12.html"></a>
3159 <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
3160 <h4 id="XP_Q12_A1-p0.1">Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue?</h4>
3161 <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p1"></p>
3162 <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p2">
3163 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that satisfaction is neither a virtue nor an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is meritorious; whereas,
3164 seemingly, satisfaction is not, since merit is gratuitous, while satisfaction answers to a debt. Therefore satisfaction is
3165 not an act of virtue.
3166 </p>
3167 <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p3">
3168 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every act of virtue is voluntary. But sometimes a man has to make satisfaction for something against his will, as
3169 when anyone is punished by the judge for an offense against another. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of virtue.
3170 </p>
3171 <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p4">
3172 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13): "Choice holds the chief place in moral virtue." But satisfaction
3173 is not an act of choice but regards chiefly external works. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.
3174 </p>
3175 <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p5">
3176 <b>On the contrary,</b> Satisfaction belongs to penance. Now penance is a virtue. Therefore satisfaction is also an act of virtue.
3177 </p>
3178 <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p6"> Further, none but an act of virtue has the effect of blotting out sin, for one contrary is destroyed by the other. Now satisfaction
3179 destroys sin altogether. Therefore it is an act of virtue.
3180 </p>
3181 <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p7">
3182 <b>I answer that,</b> An act is said to be the act of a virtue in two ways. First, materially; and thus any act which implies no malice, or defect
3183 of a due circumstance, may be called an act of virtue, because virtue can make use of any such act for its end, e.g. to walk,
3184 to speak, and so forth. Secondly, an act is said to belong to a virtue formally, because its very name implies the form and
3185 nature of virtue; thus to suffer courageously is an act of courage. Now the formal
3186 element in every moral virtue is the observance of a mean. wherefore every act that implies the observance of a mean is formally
3187 an act of virtue. And since equality is the mean implied in the name of satisfaction (for a thing is said to be satisfied
3188 by reason of an equal proportion to something), it is evident that satisfaction also is formally an act of virtue.
3189 </p>
3190 <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p8">
3191 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although to make satisfaction is due in itself, yet, in so far as the deed is done voluntarily by the one who offers satisfaction,
3192 it becomes something gratuitous on the part of the agent, so that he makes a virtue of necessity. For debt diminishes merit
3193 through being necessary and consequently against the will, so that if the will consent to the necessity, the element of merit
3194 is not forfeited.
3195 </p>
3196 <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p9">
3197 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of virtue demands voluntariness not in the patient but in the agent, for it is his act. Consequently since he on whom
3198 the judge wreaks vengeance is the patient and not the agent as regards satisfaction, it follows that satisfaction should be
3199 voluntary not in him but in the judge as agent.
3200 </p>
3201 <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p10">
3202 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The chief element of virtue can be understood in two ways. First, as being the chief element of virtue as virtue, and thus
3203 the chief element of virtue denotes whatever belongs to the nature of virtue or is most akin thereto; thus choice and other
3204 internal acts hold the chief place in virtue. Secondly, the chief element of virtue may be taken as denoting that which holds
3205 the first place in such and such a virtue; and then the first place belongs to
3206 that which gives its determination. Now the interior act, in certain virtues, is determined by some external act, since choice,
3207 which is common to all virtues, becomes proper to such and such a virtue through being directed to such and such an act. Thus
3208 it is that external acts hold the chief place in certain virtues; and this is the case with satisfaction.
3209 </p>
3210 <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p11"></p>
3211 <p id="XP_Q12_A1-p12"></p>
3212 <a href="summa.XP_Q12.html"></a>
3213 <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
3214 </div>
3215 <div id="XP_Q12_A2" class="div4">
3216 <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
3217 <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
3218 <h4 id="XP_Q12_A2-p0.1">Whether satisfaction is an act of justice?</h4>
3219 <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p1"></p>
3220 <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p2">
3221 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that satisfaction is not an act of justice. Because the purpose of satisfaction is that one may be reconciled
3222 to the person offended. But reconciliation, being an act of love, belongs to charity. Therefore satisfaction is an act of
3223 charity and not of justice.
3224 </p>
3225 <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p3">
3226 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the causes of sin in us are the passions of the soul, which incline us to evil. But justice, according to the Philosopher
3227 (Ethic. v, 2,3), is not about passions, but about operations. Since therefore satisfaction aims at removing the causes of
3228 sin, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), it seems that it is not an act of justice.
3229 </p>
3230 <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p4">
3231 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to be careful about the future is not an act of justice but of prudence of which caution is a part. But it belongs
3232 to satisfaction, "to give no opening to the suggestions of sin" [*Cf. XP/Q[12]/A[3]/OBJ[1]]. Therefore satisfaction is not
3233 an act of justice.
3234 </p>
3235 <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p5">
3236 <b>On the contrary,</b> No virtue but justice considers the notion of that which is due. But satisfaction gives due honor to God, as Anselm states
3237 (Cur Deus Homo i). Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.
3238 </p>
3239 <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p6"> Further, no virtue save justice establishes equality between external things. But this is done by satisfaction which establishes
3240 equality between amendment and the previous offense. Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.
3241 </p>
3242 <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p7">
3243 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3,4), the mean of justice is considered with regard to an equation between thing
3244 and thing according to a certain proportion. Wherefore, since the very name of satisfaction implies an equation of the kind,
3245 because the adverb "satis" [enough] denotes an equality of proportion, it is evident that satisfaction is formally an act
3246 of justice. Now the act of justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,4), is either an
3247 act done by one man to another, as when a man pays another what he owes him, or an act done by one man between two others,
3248 as when a judge does justice between two men. When it is an act of justice of one man to another, the equality is set up in
3249 the agent, while when it is something done between two others, the equality is set up in the subject that has suffered an
3250 injustice. And since satisfaction expresses equality in the agent, it denotes, properly speaking, an act of justice of one
3251 man to
3252 another. Now a man may do justice to another either in actions and passions or in external things; even as one may do an injustice
3253 to another, either by taking something away, or by a hurtful action. And since to give is to use an external thing, the act
3254 of justice, in so far as it establishes equality between external things, signifies, properly speaking, a giving back: but
3255 to make satisfaction clearly points to equality between actions, although sometimes one is put for the other. Now
3256 equalization concerns only such things as are unequal, wherefore satisfaction presupposes inequality among actions, which
3257 inequality constitutes an offense; so that satisfaction regards a previous offense. But no part of justice regards a previous
3258 offense, except vindictive justice, which establishes equality indifferently, whether the patient be the same subject as the
3259 agent, as when anyone punishes himself, or whether they be distinct, as when a judge punishes another man, since vindictive
3260 justice deals with both cases. The same applies to penance, which implies equality in the agent only, since it is the penitent
3261 who holds to the penance [poenam tenet], so that penance is in a way a species of vindictive justice. This proves that satisfaction,
3262 which implies equality in the agent with respect to a previous offense, is a work of justice, as to that part which is called
3263 penance.
3264 </p>
3265 <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p8">
3266 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Satisfaction, as appears from what has been said, is compensation for injury inflicted. Wherefore as the injury inflicted
3267 entailed of itself an inequality of justice, and consequently an inequality opposed to friendship, so satisfaction brings
3268 back directly equality of justice, and consequently equality of friendship. And since an act is elicited by the habit to whose
3269 end it is immediately directed, but is commanded by that habit to whose end it is
3270 directed ultimately, hence satisfaction is elicited by justice but is commanded by charity.
3271 </p>
3272 <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p9">
3273 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although justice is chiefly about operations, yet it is consequently about passions, in so far as they are the causes of
3274 operations. Wherefore as justice curbs anger, lest it inflict an unjust injury on another, and concupiscence from invading
3275 another's marriage right, so satisfaction removes the causes of other sins.
3276 </p>
3277 <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p10">
3278 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Each moral virtue shares in the act of prudence, because this virtue completes in it the conditions essential to virtue,
3279 since each moral virtue takes its mean according to the ruling of prudence, as is evident from the definition of virtue given
3280 in Ethic. ii, 6.
3281 </p>
3282 <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p11"></p>
3283 <p id="XP_Q12_A2-p12"></p>
3284 <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
3285 <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
3286 </div>
3287 <div id="XP_Q12_A3" class="div4">
3288 <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
3289 <a href="summa.XP_Q13.html"></a>
3290 <h4 id="XP_Q12_A3-p0.1">Whether the definition of satisfaction given in the text is suitable?</h4>
3291 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p1"></p>
3292 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p2">
3293 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the definition of satisfaction given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15) and quoted from Augustine [*Gennadius
3294 Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv] is unsuitable---viz. that "satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sins, and to give no
3295 opening to the suggestions thereof." For the cause of actual sin is the fomes. [*"Fomes" signifies literally "fuel," and metaphorically,
3296 "incentive." As used by the theologian, it denotes the quasi-material element and
3297 effect of original sin, and sometimes goes under the name of "concupiscence," Cf.
3298 <a id="XP_Q12_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q82_A3.html">FS, Q[82], A[3]</a>.] But we cannot remove the "fomes" in this life. Therefore satisfaction does not consist in removing the causes of sins.
3299 </p>
3300 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p3">
3301 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the cause of sin is stronger than sin itself. But man by himself cannot remove sin. Much less therefore can he remove
3302 the cause of sin; and so the same conclusion follows.
3303 </p>
3304 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p4">
3305 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since satisfaction is a part of Penance, it regards the past and not the future. Now "to give no opening to the
3306 suggestions of sin" regards the future. Therefore it should not be put in the definition of satisfaction.
3307 </p>
3308 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p5">
3309 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, satisfaction regards a past offense. Yet no mention is made of this. Therefore the definition of satisfaction is
3310 unsuitable.
3311 </p>
3312 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p6">
3313 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Anselm gives another definition (Cur Deus homo i): "Satisfaction consists in giving God due honor," wherein no reference
3314 is made to the things mentioned by Augustine [*Gennadius, OBJ[1]] in this definition. Therefore one or the other is unsuitable.
3315 </p>
3316 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p7">
3317 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, an innocent man can give due honor to God: whereas satisfaction is not compatible with innocence. Therefore Anselm's
3318 definition is faulty.
3319 </p>
3320 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p8">
3321 <b>I answer that,</b> Justice aims not only at removing inequality already existing, by punishing the past fault, but also at safeguarding equality
3322 for the future, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) "punishments are medicinal." Wherefore satisfaction which
3323 is the act of justice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins and preserving from future sins: so that when
3324 one man makes satisfaction to another, he offers compensation for the past, and takes
3325 heed for the future. Accordingly satisfaction may be defined in two ways, first with regard to past sin, which it heals by
3326 making compensation, and thus it is defined as "compensation for an inflicted injury according to the equality of justice."
3327 The definition of Anselm amounts to the same, for he says that "satisfaction consists in giving God due honor"; where duty
3328 is considered in respect of the sin committed. Secondly, satisfaction may be defined, considered as preserving us from future
3329 sins; and as Augustine (Cf. OBJ[1]) defines it. Now preservation from bodily sickness is assured by removing the causes from
3330 which the sickness may ensue, for if they be taken away the sickness cannot follow. But it is not thus in spiritual diseases,
3331 for the free-will cannot be forced, so that even in the presence of their causes, they can, though with difficulty, be avoided,
3332 while they can be incurred even when their causes are removed. Hence he puts two things in the definition of
3333 satisfaction, viz. removal of the causes, as to the first, and the free-will's refusal to sin.
3334 </p>
3335 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p9">
3336 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By "causes" we must understand the proximate causes of actual sin, which are twofold: viz. the lust of sin through the habit
3337 or act of a sin that has been given up, and those things which are called the remnants of past sin; and external occasions
3338 of sin, such as place, bad company and so forth. Such causes are removed by satisfaction in this life, albeit the "fomes,"
3339 which is the remote cause of actual sin, is not entirely removed by satisfaction in
3340 this life though it is weakened.
3341 </p>
3342 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p10">
3343 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the cause of evil or of privation (according as it has a cause) is nothing else than a defective good, and since it
3344 is easier to destroy good than to set it up, it follows that it is easier to uproot the causes of privation and of evil than
3345 to remove the evil itself, which can only be removed by setting up good, as may be seen in the case of blindness and its causes.
3346 Yet the aforesaid are not sufficient causes of sin, for sin does not, of
3347 necessity, ensue therefrom, but they are occasions of sin. Nor again can satisfaction be made without God's help, since it
3348 is not possible without charity, as we shall state further on (
3349 <a id="XP_Q12_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>).
3350 </p>
3351 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p11">
3352 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although Penance was primarily instituted and intended with a view to the past, yet, as a consequence, it regards the future,
3353 in so far as it is a safeguarding remedy; and the same applies to satisfaction.
3354 </p>
3355 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p12">
3356 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine [*Gennadius Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv] defined satisfaction, as made to God, from Whom, in reality, nothing
3357 can be taken, though the sinner, for his own part, takes something away. Consequently in such like satisfaction, amendment
3358 for future time is of greater weight than compensation for the past. Hence Augustine defines satisfaction from this point
3359 of view. And yet it is possible to gauge the compensation for the past from the heed
3360 taken for the future, for the latter regards the same object as the former, but in the opposite way: since when looking at
3361 the past we detest the causes of sins on account of the sins themselves, which are the starting-point of the movement of detestation:
3362 whereas when taking heed of the future, we begin from the causes, that by their removal we may avoid sins the more easily.
3363 </p>
3364 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p13">
3365 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> There is no reason why the same thing should not be described in different ways according to the various things found in
3366 it: and such is the case here, as explained above.
3367 </p>
3368 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p14">
3369 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> By debt is meant the debt we owe to God by reason of the sins we have committed, because Penance regards a debt, as stated
3370 above
3371 <a id="XP_Q12_A3-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q12_A2.html">(A[2])</a>.
3372 </p>
3373 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p15"></p>
3374 <p id="XP_Q12_A3-p16"></p>
3375 <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A2.html"></a>
3376 <a href="summa.XP_Q13.html"></a>
3377 </div>
3378 <a href="summa.XP_Q11_A5.html"></a>
3379 <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A1.html"></a>
3380 </div>
3381 <div id="XP_Q13" class="div3">
3382 <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
3383 <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
3384 <h3 id="XP_Q13-p0.1">OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SATISFACTION (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
3385 <p id="XP_Q13-p1"></p>
3386 <p id="XP_Q13-p2"> We must now consider the possibility of satisfaction, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
3387 <p id="XP_Q13-p3"> (1) Whether man can make satisfaction to God?</p>
3388 <p id="XP_Q13-p4"> (2) Whether one man can make satisfaction for another?</p>
3389 <div id="XP_Q13_A1" class="div4">
3390 <a href="summa.XP_Q13.html"></a>
3391 <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
3392 <h4 id="XP_Q13_A1-p0.1">Whether man can make satisfaction to God?</h4>
3393 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p1"></p>
3394 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p2">
3395 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man cannot make satisfaction to God. For satisfaction should balance the offense, as shown above (
3396 <a id="XP_Q13_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q12_A2.html">Q[12], AA[2]</a>,3). But an offense against God is infinite, since it is measured by the person against whom it is committed, for it is a
3397 greater offense to strike a prince than anyone else. Therefore, as no action of man can be infinite, it seems that he cannot
3398 make satisfaction to God.
3399 </p>
3400 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p3">
3401 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a slave cannot make compensation for a debt, since all that he has is his master's. But we are the slaves of God,
3402 and whatever good we have, we owe to Him. Therefore, as satisfaction is compensation for a past offense, it seems that we
3403 cannot offer it to God.
3404 </p>
3405 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p4">
3406 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if all that a man has suffices not to pay one debt, he cannot pay another debt. Now all that man is, all that he
3407 can do, and all that he has, does not suffice to pay what he owes for the blessing of creation, wherefore it is written (
3408 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q13_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.16" target="asv">Is. 40:16</a>) that "the wood of Libanus shall not be enough for a burnt offering [*Vulg.: 'Libanus shall not be enough to burn, nor the
3409 beasts thereof for a burnt offering']." Therefore by no means can
3410 he make satisfaction for the debt resulting from the offense committed.
3411 </p>
3412 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p5">
3413 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man is bound to spend all his time in the service of God. Now time once lost cannot be recovered, wherefore, as
3414 Seneca observes (Lib. i, Ep. i, ad Lucilium) loss of time is a very grievous matter. Therefore man cannot make compensation
3415 to God, and the same conclusion follows as before.
3416 </p>
3417 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p6">
3418 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, mortal actual sin is more grievous than original sin. But none could satisfy for original sin unless he were both
3419 God and man. Neither, therefore, can he satisfy for actual sin.
3420 </p>
3421 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p7">
3422 <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Fidei ad Damasum] says: "Whoever maintains that God has commanded anything impossible to man, let
3423 him be anathema." But satisfaction is commanded (
3424 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q13_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.3.8" target="asv">Lk. 3:8</a>): "Bring forth . . . fruits worthy of penance." Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to God.
3425 </p>
3426 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p8"> Further, God is more merciful than any man. But it is possible to make satisfaction to a man. Therefore it is possible to
3427 make satisfaction to God.
3428 </p>
3429 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p9"> Further, there is due satisfaction when the punishment balances the fault, since "justice is the same as counterpassion,"
3430 as the Pythagoreans said [*Aristotle, Ethic. v, 5; Cf.
3431 <a id="XP_Q13_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q61_A4.html">SS, Q[61], A[4]</a>]. Now punishment may equal the pleasure contained in a sin committed. Therefore satisfaction can be made to God.
3432 </p>
3433 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p10">
3434 <b>I answer that,</b> Man becomes God's debtor in two ways; first, by reason of favors received, secondly, by reason of sin committed: and just
3435 as thanksgiving or worship or the like regard the debt for favors received, so satisfaction regards the debt for sin committed.
3436 Now in giving honor to one's parents or to the gods, as indeed the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14), it is impossible to
3437 repay them measure for measure, but it suffices that man repay as much as he can, for
3438 friendship does not demand measure for measure, but what is possible. Yet even this is equal somewhat, viz. according to proportion,
3439 for as the debt due to God is, in comparison with God, so is what man can do, in comparison with himself, so that in another
3440 way the form of justice is preserved. It is the same as regards satisfaction. Consequently man cannot make satisfaction to
3441 God if "satis" [enough] denotes quantitative equality; but he can, if it denote proportionate equality, as explained
3442 above, and as this suffices for justice, so does it suffice for satisfaction.
3443 </p>
3444 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p11">
3445 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the offense derived a certain infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, so does satisfaction derive a certain
3446 infinity from the infinity of Divine mercy, in so far as it is quickened by grace, whereby whatever man is able to repay becomes
3447 acceptable. Others, however, say that the offense is infinite as regards the aversion, and in this respect it is pardoned
3448 gratuitously, but that it is finite as turning to a mutable good, in which
3449 respect it is possible to make satisfaction for it. But this is not to the point, since satisfaction does not answer to sin,
3450 except as this is an offense against God, which is a matter, not of turning to a creature but of turning away from God. Others
3451 again say that even as regards the aversion it is possible to make satisfaction for sin in virtue of Christ's merit, which
3452 was, in a way, infinite. And this comes to the same as what we said before, since grace is given to believers through faith
3453 in the Mediator. If, however, He were to give grace otherwise, satisfaction would suffice in the way explained above.
3454 </p>
3455 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p12">
3456 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man, who was made to God's image, has a certain share of liberty, in so far as he is master of his actions through his free-will;
3457 so that, through acting by his free-will, he can make satisfaction to God, for though it belongs to God, in so far as it was
3458 bestowed on him by God, yet it was freely bestowed on him, that he might be his own master, which cannot be said of a slave.
3459 </p>
3460 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p13">
3461 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that it is impossible to make equivalent satisfaction to God, but not that it is impossible to make
3462 sufficient satisfaction to Him. For though man owes God all that he is able to give Him, yet it is not necessary for his salvation
3463 that he should actually do the whole of what he is able to do, for it is impossible for him, according to his present state
3464 of life, to put forth his whole power into any one single thing, since he has
3465 to be heedful about many things. And so his conduct is subject to a certain measure, viz. the fulfillment of God's commandments,
3466 over and above which he can offer something by way of satisfaction.
3467 </p>
3468 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p14">
3469 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Though man cannot recover the time that is past, he can in the time that follows make compensation for what he should have
3470 done in the past, since the commandment did not exact from him the fulfillment of his whole power, as stated above (ad 3).
3471 </p>
3472 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p15">
3473 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Though original sin has less of the nature of sin than actual sin has, yet it is a more grievous evil, because it is an infection
3474 of human nature itself, so that, unlike actual sin, it could not be expiated by the satisfaction of a mere man.
3475 </p>
3476 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p16"></p>
3477 <p id="XP_Q13_A1-p17"></p>
3478 <a href="summa.XP_Q13.html"></a>
3479 <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
3480 </div>
3481 <div id="XP_Q13_A2" class="div4">
3482 <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
3483 <a href="summa.XP_Q14.html"></a>
3484 <h4 id="XP_Q13_A2-p0.1">Whether one man can fulfill satisfactory punishment for another? </h4>
3485 <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p1"></p>
3486 <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p2">
3487 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one man cannot fulfill satisfactory punishment for another. Because merit is requisite for satisfaction.
3488 Now one man cannot merit or demerit for another, since it is written (
3489 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q13_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.61.12" target="asv">Ps. 61:12</a>): "Thou wilt render to every man according to his works." Therefore one man cannot make satisfaction for another.
3490 </p>
3491 <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p3">
3492 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, satisfaction is condivided with contrition and confession. But one man cannot be contrite or confess for another.
3493 Neither therefore can one make satisfaction for another.
3494 </p>
3495 <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p4">
3496 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by praying for another one merits also for oneself. If therefore a man can make satisfaction for another, he satisfies
3497 for himself by satisfying for another, so that if a man satisfy for another he need not make satisfaction for his own sins.
3498 </p>
3499 <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p5">
3500 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if one can satisfy for another, as soon as he takes the debt of punishment on himself, this other is freed from
3501 his debt. Therefore the latter will go straight to heaven, if he die after the whole of his debt of punishment has been taken
3502 up by another; else, if he be punished all the same, a double punishment will be paid for the same sin, viz. by him who has
3503 begun to make satisfaction, and by him who is punished in Purgatory.
3504 </p>
3505 <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p6">
3506 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
3507 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q13_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.6.2" target="asv">Gal. 6:2</a>): "Bear ye one another's burdens." Therefore it seems that one can bear the burden of punishment laid upon another.
3508 </p>
3509 <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p7"> Further, charity avails more before God than before man. Now before man, one can pay another's debt for love of him. Much
3510 more, therefore, can this be done before the judgment seat of God.
3511 </p>
3512 <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p8">
3513 <b>I answer that,</b> Satisfactory punishment has a twofold purpose, viz. to pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for the avoidance of sin. Accordingly,
3514 as a remedy against future sin, the satisfaction of one does not profit another, for the flesh of one man is not tamed by
3515 another's fast; nor does one man acquire the habit of well-doing, through the actions of another, except accidentally, in
3516 so far as a man, by his good actions, may merit an increase of grace for another,
3517 since grace is the most efficacious remedy for the avoidance of sin. But this is by way of merit rather than of satisfaction.
3518 on the other hand, as regards the payment of the debt, one man can satisfy for another, provided he be in a state of charity,
3519 so that his works may avail for satisfaction. Nor is it necessary that he who satisfies for another should undergo a greater
3520 punishment than the principal would have to undergo (as some maintain, who argue that a man profits more by his own
3521 punishment than by another's), because punishment derives its power of satisfaction chiefly from charity whereby man bears
3522 it. And since greater charity is evidenced by a man satisfying for another than for himself, less punishment is required of
3523 him who satisfies for another, than of the principal: wherefore we read in the Lives of the Fathers (v, 5) of one who for
3524 love of his brother did penance for a sin which his brother had not committed, and that on account of his charity his brother
3525 was
3526 released from a sin which he had committed. Nor is it necessary that the one for whom satisfaction is made should be unable
3527 to make satisfaction himself, for even if he were able, he would be released from his debt when the other satisfied in his
3528 stead. But this is necessary in so far as the satisfactory punishment is medicinal: so that a man is not to be allowed to
3529 do penance for another, unless there be evidence of some defect in the penitent, either bodily, so that he is unable to bear
3530 it,
3531 or spiritual, so that he is not ready to undergo it.
3532 </p>
3533 <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p9">
3534 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The essential reward is bestowed on a man according to his disposition, because the fulness of the sight of God will be according
3535 to the capacity of those who see Him. Wherefore just as one man is not disposed thereto by another's act, so one man does
3536 not merit the essential reward for another, unless his merit has infinite efficacy, as the merit of Christ, whereby children
3537 come to eternal life through Baptism. On the other hand, the temporal
3538 punishment due to sin after the guilt has been forgiven is not measured according to the disposition of the man to whom it
3539 is due, since sometimes the better man owes a greater debt of punishment. Consequently one man can merit for another as regards
3540 release from punishment, and one man's act becomes another's, by means of charity whereby we are "all one in Christ" (
3541 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q13_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.28" target="asv">Gal. 3:28</a>).
3542 </p>
3543 <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p10">
3544 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Contrition is ordained against the guilt which affects a man's disposition to goodness or malice, so that one man is not
3545 freed from guilt by another's contrition. In like manner by confession a man submits to the sacraments of the Church: nor
3546 can one man receive a sacrament instead of another, since in a sacrament grace is given to the recipient, not to another.
3547 Consequently there is no comparison between satisfaction and contrition and
3548 confession.
3549 </p>
3550 <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p11">
3551 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the payment of the debt we consider the measure of the punishment, whereas in merit we regard the root which is charity:
3552 wherefore he that, through charity, merits for another, at least congruously, merits more for himself; yet he that satisfies
3553 for another does not also satisfy for himself, because the measure of the punishment does not suffice for the sins of both,
3554 although by satisfying for another he merits something greater than the release
3555 from punishment, viz. eternal life.
3556 </p>
3557 <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p12">
3558 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If this man bound himself to undergo a certain punishment, he would not be released from the debt before paying it: wherefore
3559 he himself will suffer the punishment, as long as the other makes satisfaction for him: and if he do not this, then both are
3560 debtors in respect of fulfilling this punishment, one for the sin committed, the other for his omission, so that it does not
3561 follow that one sin is twice punished.
3562 </p>
3563 <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p13"></p>
3564 <p id="XP_Q13_A2-p14"></p>
3565 <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
3566 <a href="summa.XP_Q14.html"></a>
3567 </div>
3568 <a href="summa.XP_Q12_A3.html"></a>
3569 <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A1.html"></a>
3570 </div>
3571 <div id="XP_Q14" class="div3">
3572 <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
3573 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
3574 <h3 id="XP_Q14-p0.1">OF THE QUALITY OF SATISFACTION (FIVE ARTICLES) </h3>
3575 <p id="XP_Q14-p1"></p>
3576 <p id="XP_Q14-p2"> We must now consider the quality of satisfaction, under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
3577 <p id="XP_Q14-p3"> (1) Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another?</p>
3578 <p id="XP_Q14-p4"> (2) Whether if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for
3579 his other sins which were pardoned him through his contrition?
3580 </p>
3581 <p id="XP_Q14-p5"> (3) Whether a man's previous satisfaction begins to avail when he recovers charity?</p>
3582 <p id="XP_Q14-p6"> (4) Whether works done without charity merit any good?</p>
3583 <p id="XP_Q14-p7"> (5) Whether such works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?</p>
3584 <div id="XP_Q14_A1" class="div4">
3585 <a href="summa.XP_Q14.html"></a>
3586 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
3587 <h4 id="XP_Q14_A1-p0.1">Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another?</h4>
3588 <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p1"></p>
3589 <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p2">
3590 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another. Because when several things are not connected
3591 together one can be taken away without another. Now sins are not connected together, else whoever had one would have them
3592 all. Therefore one sin can be expiated by satisfaction, without another.
3593 </p>
3594 <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p3">
3595 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is more merciful than man. But man accepts the payment of one debt without the payment of another. Therefore
3596 God accepts satisfaction for one sin without the other.
3597 </p>
3598 <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p4">
3599 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), "satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sin, and give no opening to the
3600 suggestions thereof." Now this can be done with regard to one sin and not another, as when a mall curbs his lust and perseveres
3601 in covetousness. Therefore we can make satisfaction for one sin without satisfying for another.
3602 </p>
3603 <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p5">
3604 <b>On the contrary,</b> The fast of those who fasted "for debates and strifes" (
3605 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.58.4" target="asv">Is. 58:4,5</a>) was not acceptable to God, though fasting be a work of satisfaction. Now satisfaction cannot be made save by works that
3606 are acceptable to God. Therefore he that has a sin on his conscience cannot make satisfaction to God.
3607 </p>
3608 <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p6"> Further, satisfaction is a remedy for the healing of past sins, and for preserving from future sins, as stated above (
3609 <a id="XP_Q14_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q12_A3.html">Q[12], A[3]</a>). But without grace it is impossible to avoid sins. Therefore, since each sin excludes grace, it is not possible to make
3610 satisfaction for one sin and not for another.
3611 </p>
3612 <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p7">
3613 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that it is possible to make satisfaction for one sin and not for another, as the Master states (Sent. iv,
3614 D, 15). But this cannot be. For since the previous offense has to be removed by satisfaction, the mode of satisfaction must
3615 needs be consistent with the removal of the offense. Now removal of offense is renewal of friendship: wherefore if there be
3616 anything to hinder the renewal of friendship there can be no satisfaction. Since, therefore,
3617 every sin is a hindrance to the friendship of charity, which is the friendship of man for God, it is impossible for man to
3618 make satisfaction for one sin while holding to another: even as neither would a man make satisfaction to another for a blow,
3619 if while throwing himself at his feet he were to give him another.
3620 </p>
3621 <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p8">
3622 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As sins are not connected together in some single one, a man can incur one without incurring another; whereas all sins are
3623 remitted by reason of one same thing, so that the remissions of various sins are connected together. Consequently satisfaction
3624 cannot be made for one and not for another.
3625 </p>
3626 <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p9">
3627 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man is under obligation to another by reason of a debt, the only inequality between them is that which is opposed
3628 to justice, so that for restitution nothing further is required than that the equality of justice should be reinstated, and
3629 this can be done in respect of one debt without another. But when the obligation is based on an offense, there is inequality
3630 not only of justice but also of friendship, so that for the offense to be removed by
3631 satisfaction, not only must the equality of justice be restored by the payment of a punishment equal to the offense, but also
3632 the equality of friendship must be reinstated, which is impossible so long as an obstacle to friendship remains.
3633 </p>
3634 <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p10">
3635 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By its weight, one sin drags us down to another, as Gregory says (Moral. xxv): so that when a man holds to one sin, he does
3636 not sufficiently cut himself off from the causes of further sin.
3637 </p>
3638 <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p11"></p>
3639 <p id="XP_Q14_A1-p12"></p>
3640 <a href="summa.XP_Q14.html"></a>
3641 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
3642 </div>
3643 <div id="XP_Q14_A2" class="div4">
3644 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
3645 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
3646 <h4 id="XP_Q14_A2-p0.1">Whether, when deprived of charity, a man can make satisfaction for sins for which he was previously contrite?</h4>
3647 <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p1"></p>
3648 <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p2">
3649 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy
3650 for his other sins which were already pardoned him through his contrition. For Daniel said to Nabuchodonosor (
3651 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.4.24" target="asv">Dan. 4:24</a>): "Redeem thou thy sins with alms." Yet he was still a sinner, as is shown by his subsequent punishment. Therefore a man
3652 can make satisfaction while in a state of sin.
3653 </p>
3654 <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p3">
3655 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred" (
3656 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.9.1" target="asv">Eccles. 9:1</a>). If therefore one cannot make satisfaction unless one be in a state of charity, it would be impossible to know whether one
3657 had made satisfaction, which would be unseemly.
3658 </p>
3659 <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p4">
3660 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man's entire action takes its form from the intention which he had at the beginning. But a penitent is in a state
3661 of charity when he begins to repent. Therefore his whole subsequent satisfaction will derive its efficacy from the charity
3662 which quickens his intention.
3663 </p>
3664 <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p5">
3665 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, satisfaction consists in a certain equalization of guilt to punishment. But these things can be equalized even in
3666 one who is devoid of charity. Therefore, etc.
3667 </p>
3668 <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p6">
3669 <b>On the contrary,</b> "Charity covereth all sins" (
3670 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.10.12" target="asv">Prov. 10:12</a>). But satisfaction has the power of blotting out sins. Therefore it is powerless without charity.
3671 </p>
3672 <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p7"> Further, the chief work of satisfaction is almsdeeds. But alms given by one who is devoid of charity avail nothing, as is
3673 clearly stated
3674 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:3</a>, "If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore there
3675 can be no satisfaction with mortal sin.
3676 </p>
3677 <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p8">
3678 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that if, when all a man's sins have been pardoned through contrition, and before he has made satisfaction
3679 for them, he falls into sin, and then makes satisfaction, such satisfaction will be valid, so that if he die in that sin,
3680 he will not be punished in hell for the other sins.
3681 </p>
3682 <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p9"> But this cannot be, because satisfaction requires the reinstatement of friendship and the restoration of the equality of
3683 justice, the contrary of which destroys friendship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 1,3). Now in satisfaction made to
3684 God, the equality is based, not on equivalence but rather on God's acceptation: so that, although the offense be already removed
3685 by previous contrition, the works of satisfaction must be acceptable to God, and for this they are dependent
3686 on charity. Consequently works done without charity are not satisfactory.
3687 </p>
3688 <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p10">
3689 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Daniel's advice meant that he should give up sin and repent, and so make satisfaction by giving alms.
3690 </p>
3691 <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p11">
3692 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even as man knows not for certain whether he had charity when making satisfaction, or whether he has it now, so too he knows
3693 not for certain whether he made full satisfaction: wherefore it is written (
3694 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.5.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 5:5</a>): "Be not without fear about sin forgiven." And yet man need not, on account of that fear, repeat the satisfaction made,
3695 if he is not conscious of a mortal sin. For although he may not have expiated his punishment by that
3696 satisfaction, he does not incur the guilt of omission through neglecting to make satisfaction; even as he who receives the
3697 Eucharist without being conscious of a mortal sin of which he is guilty, does not incur the guilt of receiving unworthily.
3698 </p>
3699 <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p12">
3700 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> His intention was interrupted by his subsequent sin, so that it gives no virtue to the works done after that sin.
3701 </p>
3702 <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p13">
3703 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sufficient equalization is impossible both as to the Divine acceptation and as to equivalence: so that the argument proves
3704 nothing.
3705 </p>
3706 <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p14"></p>
3707 <p id="XP_Q14_A2-p15"></p>
3708 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
3709 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
3710 </div>
3711 <div id="XP_Q14_A3" class="div4">
3712 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
3713 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
3714 <h4 id="XP_Q14_A3-p0.1">Whether previous satisfaction begins to avail after man is restored to charity? </h4>
3715 <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p1"></p>
3716 <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p2">
3717 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that when a man has recovered charity his previous satisfaction begins to avail, because a gloss on
3718 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.25.25" target="asv"> Lev. 25:25, </a> "If thy brother being impoverished," etc., says that "the fruit of a man's good works should be counted from the time when
3719 he sinned." But they would not be counted, unless they derived some efficacy from his subsequent charity. Therefore they begin
3720 to avail after he recovers charity.
3721 </p>
3722 <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p3">
3723 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the efficacy of satisfaction is hindered by sin, so the efficacy of Baptism is hindered by insincerity. Now Baptism
3724 begins to avail when insincerity ceases. Therefore satisfaction begins to avail when sin is taken away.
3725 </p>
3726 <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p4">
3727 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a man is given as a penance for the sins he has committed, to fast for several days, and then, after falling
3728 again into sin, he completes his penance, he is not told, when he goes to confession a second time, to fast once again. But
3729 he would be told to do so, if he did not fulfill his duty of satisfaction by them. Therefore his previous works become valid
3730 unto satisfaction, through his subsequent repentance.
3731 </p>
3732 <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p5">
3733 <b>On the contrary,</b> Works done without charity were not satisfactory, through being dead works. But they are not quickened by penance. Therefore
3734 they do not begin to be satisfactory.
3735 </p>
3736 <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p6"> Further, charity does not quicken a work, unless in some way that work proceeds therefrom. But works cannot be acceptable
3737 to God, and therefore cannot be satisfactory, unless they be quickened by charity. Since then the works done without charity,
3738 in no way proceeded from charity, nor ever can proceed therefrom, they can by no means count towards satisfaction.
3739 </p>
3740 <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p7">
3741 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that works done while in a state of charity, which are called living works, are meritorious in respect of
3742 eternal life, and satisfactory in respect of paying off the debt of punishment; and that by subsequent charity, works done
3743 without charity are quickened so as to be satisfactory, but not so as to be meritorious of eternal life. But this is impossible,
3744 because works done in charity produce both these effects for the same reason, viz.
3745 because they are pleasing to God: wherefore just as charity by its advent cannot make works done without charity to be pleasing
3746 in one respect, so neither can it make them pleasing in the other respect.
3747 </p>
3748 <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p8">
3749 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This means that the fruits are reckoned, not from the time when he was first in sin, but from the time when he ceased to
3750 sin, when, to wit, he was last in sin; unless he was contrite as soon as he had sinned, and did many good actions before he
3751 confessed. Or we may say that the greater the contrition the more it alleviates the punishment, and the more good actions
3752 a man does while in sin, the more he disposes himself to the grace of contrition, so
3753 that it is probable that he owes a smaller debt of punishment. For this reason the priest should use discretion in taking
3754 them into account, so as to give him a lighter penance, according as he finds him better disposed.
3755 </p>
3756 <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p9">
3757 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Baptism imprints a character on the soul, whereas satisfaction does not. Hence on the advent of charity, which removes both
3758 insincerity and sin, it causes Baptism to have its effect, whereas it does not do this for satisfaction. Moreover Baptism
3759 confers justification in virtue of the deed [ex opere operato] which is not man's deed but God's, wherefore it does not become
3760 a lifeless deed as satisfaction does, which is a deed of man.
3761 </p>
3762 <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p10">
3763 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes satisfaction is such as to leave an effect in the person who makes satisfaction, even after the act of satisfaction
3764 has been done; thus fasting leaves the body weak, and almsdeeds result in a diminution of a person's substance, and so on.
3765 In such cases there is no need to repeat the works of satisfaction if they have been done while in a state of sin, because
3766 through penance they are acceptable to God in the result they leave behind. But
3767 when a work of satisfaction leaves behind no effect in the person that does satisfaction, it needs to be repeated, as in the
3768 case of prayer and so forth. Interior works, since they pass away altogether, are nowise quickened, and must be repeated.
3769 </p>
3770 <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p11"></p>
3771 <p id="XP_Q14_A3-p12"></p>
3772 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A2.html"></a>
3773 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
3774 </div>
3775 <div id="XP_Q14_A4" class="div4">
3776 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
3777 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
3778 <h4 id="XP_Q14_A4-p0.1">Whether works done without charity merit any, at least temporal, good?</h4>
3779 <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p1"></p>
3780 <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p2">
3781 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that works done without charity merit some, at least a temporal, good. For as punishment is to the evil act,
3782 so is reward to a good act. Now no evil deed is unpunished by God the just judge. Therefore no good deed is unrewarded, and
3783 so every good deed merits some good.
3784 </p>
3785 <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p3">
3786 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, reward is not given except for merit. Now some reward is given for works done without charity, wherefore it is written
3787 (
3788 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.2" target="asv">Mat. 6:2</a>,
3789 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.5" target="asv">5</a>,
3790 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A4-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.16" target="asv">16</a>) of those who do good actions for the sake of human glory, that "they have received their reward." Therefore those works
3791 merit some good.
3792 </p>
3793 <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p4">
3794 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there be two men both in sin, one of whom does many deeds that are good in themselves and in their circumstances,
3795 while the other does none, they are not equally near to the reception of good things from Gods else the latter need not be
3796 advised to do any good deeds. Now he that is nearer to God receives more of His good things. Therefore the former, on account
3797 of his good works, merits some good from God.
3798 </p>
3799 <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p5">
3800 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says that "the sinner is not worthy of the bread he eats." Therefore he cannot merit anything from God.
3801 </p>
3802 <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p6"> Further, he that is nothing, can merit nothing. But a sinner, through not having charity, is nothing in respect of spiritual
3803 being, according to
3804 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2.</a> Therefore he can merit nothing.
3805 </p>
3806 <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p7">
3807 <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking a merit is an action on account of which it is just that the agent should be given something. Now justice
3808 is twofold: first, there is justice properly so called, which regards something due on the part of the recipient. Secondly,
3809 there is metaphorical justice, so to speak, which regards something due on the part of the giver, for it may be right for
3810 the giver to give something to which the receiver has no claim. In this sense the "fitness
3811 of the Divine goodness" is justice; thus Anselm says (Proslog. x) that "God is just when He spares the sinner, because this
3812 is befitting." And in this way merit is also twofold. The first is an act in respect of which the agent himself has a claim
3813 to receive something, and this is called merit of "condignity." The second is an act the result of which is that there is
3814 a duty of giving in the giver by reason of fittingness, wherefore it is called merit of "congruity." Now since in all gratuitous
3815 givings, the primary reason of the giving is love, it is impossible for anyone, properly speaking, to lay claim to a gift,
3816 if he lack friendship. Wherefore, as all things, whether temporal or eternal, are bestowed on us by the bounty of God, no
3817 one can acquire a claim to any of them, save through charity towards God: so that works done without charity are not condignly
3818 meritorious of any good from God either eternal or temporal. But since it is befitting the goodness of God, that wherever
3819 He
3820 finds a disposition He should grant the perfection, a man is said to merit congruously some good by means of good works done
3821 without charity. Accordingly suchlike works avail for a threefold good, acquisition of temporal goods, disposition to grace,
3822 habituation to good works. Since, however, this is not merit properly so called, we should grant that such works are not meritorious
3823 of any good, rather than that they are.
3824 </p>
3825 <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p8">
3826 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), since no matter what a son may do, he can never give back to his father the
3827 equal of what he has received from him a father can never become his son's debtor: and much less can man make God his debtor
3828 on account of equivalence of work. Consequently no work of ours can merit a reward by reason of its measure of goodness, but
3829 it can by reason of charity, which makes friends hold their possessions in common.
3830 Therefore, no matter how good a work may be, if it be done without charity, it does not give man a claim to receive anything
3831 from God. On the other hand, an evil deed deserves an equivalent punishment according to the measure of its malice, because
3832 no evil has been done to us on the part of God, like the good which He has done. Therefore, although an evil deed deserves
3833 condign punishment, nevertheless a good deed without charity does not merit condign reward.
3834 </p>
3835 <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p9"> Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These arguments consider merit of congruity; while the other arguments consider merit of condignity.</p>
3836 <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p10"></p>
3837 <p id="XP_Q14_A4-p11"></p>
3838 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A3.html"></a>
3839 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
3840 </div>
3841 <div id="XP_Q14_A5" class="div4">
3842 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
3843 <a href="summa.XP_Q15.html"></a>
3844 <h4 id="XP_Q14_A5-p0.1">Whether the aforesaid works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?</h4>
3845 <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p1"></p>
3846 <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p2">
3847 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the aforesaid works do not avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell. For the measure of punishment
3848 in hell will answer to the measure of guilt. But works done without charity do not diminish the measure of guilt. Neither,
3849 therefore, do they lessen the pains of hell.
3850 </p>
3851 <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p3">
3852 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the pain of hell, though infinite in duration, is nevertheless finite in intensity. Now anything finite is done
3853 away with by finite subtraction. If therefore works done without charity canceled any of the punishment due for sins, those
3854 works might be so numerous, that the pain of hell would be done away with altogether: which is false.
3855 </p>
3856 <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p4">
3857 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the suffrages of the Church are more efficacious than works done without charity. But, according to Augustine (Enchiridion
3858 cx), "the suffrages of the Church do not profit the damned in hell." Much less therefore are those pains mitigated by works
3859 done without charity.
3860 </p>
3861 <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p5">
3862 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine also says (Enchiridion cx): "Whomsoever they profit, either receive a full pardon, or at least find damnation itself
3863 more tolerable."
3864 </p>
3865 <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p6"> Further, it is a greater thing to do a good deed than to omit an evil deed. But the omission of an evil deed always avoids
3866 a punishment, even in one who lacks charity. Much more, therefore, do good deeds void punishment.
3867 </p>
3868 <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p7">
3869 <b>I answer that,</b> Mitigation of the pains of hell can be understood in two ways: first, as though one were delivered from the punishment which
3870 he already deserved, and thus, since no one is delivered from punishment unless he be absolved from guilt, (for an effect
3871 is not diminished or taken away unless its cause be diminished or taken away), the pain of hell cannot be mitigated by works
3872 done without charity, since they are unable to remove or diminish guilt. Secondly, so that
3873 the demerit of punishment is hindered; and thus the aforesaid works diminish the pain of hell---first because he who does
3874 such works escapes being guilty of omitting them---secondly, because such works dispose one somewhat to good, so that a man
3875 sins from less contempt, and indeed is drawn away from many sins thereby.
3876 </p>
3877 <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p8"> These works do, however merit a diminution or postponement of temporal punishment, as in the case of Achab (
3878 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q14_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 21:27, </a> seqq.), as also the acquisition of temporal goods.
3879 </p>
3880 <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p9"> Some, however, say that they mitigate the pains of hell, not by subtracting any of their substance, but by strengthening
3881 the subject, so that he is more able to bear them. But this is impossible, because there is no strengthening without a diminution
3882 of passibility. Now passibility is according to the measure of guilt, wherefore if guilt is not removed, neither can the subject
3883 be strengthened.
3884 </p>
3885 <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p10"> Some again say that the punishment is mitigated as to the remorse of conscience, though not as to the pain of fire. But neither
3886 will this stand, because as the pain of fire is equal to the guilt, so also is the pain of the remorse of conscience: so that
3887 what applies to one applies to the other.
3888 </p>
3889 <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p11"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
3890 <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p12"></p>
3891 <p id="XP_Q14_A5-p13"></p>
3892 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A4.html"></a>
3893 <a href="summa.XP_Q15.html"></a>
3894 </div>
3895 <a href="summa.XP_Q13_A2.html"></a>
3896 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A1.html"></a>
3897 </div>
3898 <div id="XP_Q15" class="div3">
3899 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
3900 <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
3901 <h3 id="XP_Q15-p0.1">OF THE MEANS OF MAKING SATISFACTION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
3902 <p id="XP_Q15-p1"></p>
3903 <p id="XP_Q15-p2"> We must now consider the means of making satisfaction, under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
3904 <p id="XP_Q15-p3"> (1) Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?</p>
3905 <p id="XP_Q15-p4"> (2) Whether the scourges whereby God punishes man in this life, are satisfactory?</p>
3906 <p id="XP_Q15-p5"> (3) Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably reckoned, by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and
3907 prayer?
3908 </p>
3909 <div id="XP_Q15_A1" class="div4">
3910 <a href="summa.XP_Q15.html"></a>
3911 <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
3912 <h4 id="XP_Q15_A1-p0.1">Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?</h4>
3913 <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p1"></p>
3914 <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p2">
3915 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that satisfaction need not be made by means of penal works. For satisfaction should make compensation for the
3916 offense committed against God. Now, seemingly, no compensation is given to God by penal works, for God does not delight in
3917 our sufferings, as appears from
3918 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.3.22" target="asv"> Tob. 3:22.</a> Therefore satisfaction need not be made by means of penal works.
3919 </p>
3920 <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p3">
3921 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the charity from which a work proceeds, the less penal is that work, for "charity hath no pain [*Vulg.:
3922 'Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain']" according to
3923 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.18" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:18</a>. If therefore works of satisfaction need to be penal, the more they proceed from charity, the less satisfactory will they
3924 be: which is false.
3925 </p>
3926 <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p4">
3927 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Satisfaction," as Anselm states (Cur Deus homo i) "consists in giving due honor to God." But this can be done by
3928 other means than penal works. Therefore satisfaction needs not to be made by means of penal works.
3929 </p>
3930 <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p5">
3931 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xx): "It is just that the sinner, by his repentance, should inflict on himself so much the greater
3932 suffering, as he has brought greater harm on himself by his sin."
3933 </p>
3934 <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p6"> Further, the wound caused by sin should be perfectly healed by satisfaction. Now punishment is the remedy for sins, as the
3935 Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3). Therefore satisfaction should be made by means of penal works.
3936 </p>
3937 <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p7">
3938 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
3939 <a id="XP_Q15_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q12_A3.html">Q[12], A[3]</a>), satisfaction regards both the past offense, for which compensation is made by its means, and also future sin wherefrom
3940 we are preserved thereby: and in both respects satisfaction needs to be made by means of penal works. For compensation for
3941 an offense implies equality, which must needs be between the offender and the person whom he offends. Now equalization in
3942 human justice consists in taking away from
3943 one that which he has too much of, and giving it to the person from whom something has been taken. And, although nothing can
3944 be taken away from God, so far as He is concerned, yet the sinner, for his part, deprives Him of something by sinning as stated
3945 above (
3946 <a id="XP_Q15_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q12_A3.html">Q[12], AA[3]</a>,4). Consequently, in order that compensation be made, something by way of satisfaction that may conduce to the glory of God
3947 must be taken away from the sinner. Now a good work, as such, does not
3948 deprive the agent of anything, but perfects him: so that the deprivation cannot be effected by a good work unless it be penal.
3949 Therefore, in order that a work be satisfactory it needs to be good that it may conduce to God's honor, and it must be penal,
3950 so that something may be taken away from the sinner thereby.
3951 </p>
3952 <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p8"> Again punishment preserves from future sin, because a man does not easily fall back into sin when he has had experience of
3953 the punishment. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) punishments are medicinal.
3954 </p>
3955 <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p9">
3956 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though God does not delight in our punishments as such, yet He does, in so far as they are just, and thus they can be satisfactory.
3957 </p>
3958 <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p10">
3959 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as, in satisfaction, we have to note the penality of the work, so, in merit, we must observe its difficulty. Now if
3960 the difficulty of the work itself be diminished, other things being equal, the merit is also diminished; but if the difficulty
3961 be diminished on the part of the promptitude of the will, this does not diminish the merit, but increases it; and, in like
3962 manner, diminution of the penality of a work, on account of the will being made more
3963 prompt by charity, does not lessen the efficacy of satisfaction, but increases it.
3964 </p>
3965 <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p11">
3966 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which is due for sin is compensation for the offense, and this cannot be done without punishment of the sinner. It is
3967 of this debt that Anselm speaks.
3968 </p>
3969 <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p12"></p>
3970 <p id="XP_Q15_A1-p13"></p>
3971 <a href="summa.XP_Q15.html"></a>
3972 <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
3973 </div>
3974 <div id="XP_Q15_A2" class="div4">
3975 <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
3976 <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
3977 <h4 id="XP_Q15_A2-p0.1">Whether the scourges of the present life are satisfactory?</h4>
3978 <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p1"></p>
3979 <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p2">
3980 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the scourges whereby we are punished by God in this life, cannot be satisfactory. For nothing but what
3981 is meritorious can be satisfactory, as is clear from what has been said (
3982 <a id="XP_Q15_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>). But we do not merit except by what is in our own power. Since therefore the scourges with which God punishes us are not
3983 in our power, it seems that they cannot be satisfactory.
3984 </p>
3985 <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p3">
3986 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, only the good make satisfaction. But these scourges are inflicted on the wicked also, and are deserved by them most
3987 of all. Therefore they cannot be satisfactory.
3988 </p>
3989 <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p4">
3990 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, satisfaction regards past sins. But these scourges are sometimes inflicted on those who have no sins, as in the
3991 case of Job. Therefore it seems that they are not satisfactory.
3992 </p>
3993 <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p5">
3994 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
3995 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.3" target="asv">Rom. 5:3,4</a>): "Tribulation worketh patience, and patience trial, i.e. deliverance from sin," as a gloss explains it.
3996 </p>
3997 <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p6"> Further, Ambrose says (Super
3998 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a>): "Although faith," i.e. the consciousness of sin, "be lacking, the punishment satisfies." Therefore the scourges of this
3999 life are satisfactory.
4000 </p>
4001 <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p7">
4002 <b>I answer that,</b> Compensation for a past offense can be enforced either by the offender or by another. When it is enforced by another, such
4003 compensation is of a vindictive rather than of a satisfactory nature, whereas when it is made by the offender, it is also
4004 satisfactory. Consequently, if the scourges, which are inflicted by God on account of sin, become in some way the act of the
4005 sufferer they acquire a satisfactory character. Now they become the act of the sufferer in
4006 so far as he accepts them for the cleansing of his sins, by taking advantage of them patiently. If, however, he refuse to
4007 submit to them patiently, then they do not become his personal act in any way, and are not of a satisfactory, but merely of
4008 a vindictive character.
4009 </p>
4010 <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p8">
4011 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although these scourges are not altogether in our power, yet in some respect they are, in so far as we use them patiently.
4012 In this way man makes a virtue of necessity, so that such things can become both meritorious and satisfactory.
4013 </p>
4014 <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p9">
4015 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i, 8), even as "the same fire makes gold glisten and straw reek," so by the same scourges
4016 are the good cleansed and the wicked worsened on account of their impatience. Hence, though the scourges are common to both,
4017 satisfaction is only on the side of the good.
4018 </p>
4019 <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p10">
4020 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These scourges always regard past guilt, not always the guilt of the person, but sometimes the guilt of nature. For had there
4021 not been guilt in human nature, there would have been no punishment. But since guilt preceded in nature, punishment is inflicted
4022 by God on a person without the person's fault, that his virtue may be meritorious, and that he may avoid future sin. Moreover,
4023 these two things are necessary in satisfaction. For the work needs to be
4024 meritorious, that honor may be given to God, and it must be a safeguard of virtue, that we may be preserved from future sins.
4025 </p>
4026 <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p11"></p>
4027 <p id="XP_Q15_A2-p12"></p>
4028 <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
4029 <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
4030 </div>
4031 <div id="XP_Q15_A3" class="div4">
4032 <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
4033 <a href="summa.XP_Q16.html"></a>
4034 <h4 id="XP_Q15_A3-p0.1">Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably enumerated?</h4>
4035 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p1"></p>
4036 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p2">
4037 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the works of satisfaction are unsuitably enumerated by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting,
4038 and prayer. For a work of satisfaction should be penal. But prayer is not penal, since it is a remedy against penal sorrow,
4039 and is a source of pleasure, wherefore it is written (
4040 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.13" target="asv">James 5:13</a>): "Is any of you sad? Let him pray. Is he cheerful in mind? Let him sing." Therefore prayer should not be reckoned among
4041 the
4042 works of satisfaction.
4043 </p>
4044 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p3">
4045 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is either carnal or spiritual. Now, as Jerome says on
4046 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.9.28" target="asv"> Mk. 9:28, </a> "This kind" of demons "can go out by nothing, but by prayer and fasting: Diseases of the body are healed by fasting, diseases
4047 of the mind, by prayer." Therefore no other work of satisfaction is necessary.
4048 </p>
4049 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p4">
4050 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, satisfaction is necessary in order for us to be cleansed from our sins. But almsgiving cleanses from all sins, according
4051 to
4052 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.11.41" target="asv">Lk. 11:41</a>: "Give alms, and behold all things are clean unto you." Therefore the other two are in excess.
4053 </p>
4054 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p5">
4055 <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, it seems that there should be more. For contrary heals contrary. But there are many more than three kinds
4056 of sin. Therefore more works of satisfaction should be enumerated.
4057 </p>
4058 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p6">
4059 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, pilgrimages and scourgings are also enjoined as works of satisfaction, and are not included among the above. Therefore
4060 they are not sufficiently enumerated.
4061 </p>
4062 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p7">
4063 <b>I answer that,</b> Satisfaction should be of such a nature as to involve something taken away from us for the honor of God. Now we have but
4064 three kinds of goods, bodily, spiritual, and goods of fortune, or external goods. By alms-deeds we deprive ourselves of some
4065 goods of fortune, and by fasting we retrench goods of the body. As to goods of the soul, there is no need to deprive ourselves
4066 of any of them, either in whole or in part, since thereby we become acceptable to God,
4067 but we should submit them entirely to God, which is done by prayer.
4068 </p>
4069 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p8"> This number is shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction uproots the causes of sin, for these are reckoned to be three
4070 (
4071 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>), viz. "concupiscence of the flesh," "concupiscence of the eyes," and "pride of life." Fasting is directed against concupiscence
4072 of the "flesh," alms-deeds against concupiscence of the "eyes," and "prayer" against "pride of life," as Augustine says (Enarr.
4073 in
4074 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.42" target="asv">Ps. 42</a>).
4075 </p>
4076 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p9"> This number is also shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction does not open a way to the suggestions of sin, because
4077 every sin is committed either against God, and this is prevented by "prayer," or against our neighbor, and this is remedied
4078 by "alms-deeds," or against ourselves, and this is forestalled by "fasting."
4079 </p>
4080 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p10">
4081 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to some, prayer is twofold. There is the prayer of contemplatives whose "conversation is in heaven": and this,
4082 since it is altogether delightful, is not a work of satisfaction. The other is a prayer which pours forth sighs for sin; this
4083 is penal and a part of satisfaction.
4084 </p>
4085 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p11"> It may also be replied, and better, that every prayer has the character of satisfaction, for though it be sweet to the soul
4086 it is painful to the body, since, as Gregory says (Super Ezech., Hom. xiv), "doubtless, when our soul's love is strengthened,
4087 our body's strength is weakened"; hence we read (
4088 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q15_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.25" target="asv">Gn. 32:25</a>) that the sinew of Jacob's thigh shrank through his wrestling with the angel.
4089 </p>
4090 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p12">
4091 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Carnal sin is twofold; one which is completed in carnal delectation, as gluttony and lust. and, another which is completed
4092 in things relating to the flesh, though it be completed in the delectation of the soul rather than of the flesh, as covetousness.
4093 Hence such like sins are between spiritual and carnal sins, so that they need a satisfaction proper to them, viz. almsdeeds.
4094 </p>
4095 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p13">
4096 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although each of these three, by a kind of likeness, is appropriated to some particular kind of sin because it is reasonable
4097 that, whereby a man sins, in that he should be punished, and that satisfaction should cut out the very root of the sin committed,
4098 yet each of them can satisfy for any kind of sin. Hence if a man is unable to perform one of the above, another is imposed
4099 on him, chiefly almsdeeds, which can take the place of the others, in so far
4100 as in those to whom a man gives alms he purchases other works of satisfaction thereby. Consequently even if almsgiving washes
4101 all sins away, it does not follow that other works are in excess.
4102 </p>
4103 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p14">
4104 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Though there are many kinds of sins, all are reduced to those three roots or to those three kinds of sin, to which, as we
4105 have said, the aforesaid works of satisfaction correspond.
4106 </p>
4107 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p15">
4108 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Whatever relates to affliction of the body is all referred to fasting, and whatever is spent for the benefit of one's neighbor
4109 is a kind of alms, and whatever act of worship is given to God becomes a kind of prayer, so that even one work can be satisfactory
4110 in several ways.
4111 </p>
4112 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p16"></p>
4113 <p id="XP_Q15_A3-p17"></p>
4114 <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A2.html"></a>
4115 <a href="summa.XP_Q16.html"></a>
4116 </div>
4117 <a href="summa.XP_Q14_A5.html"></a>
4118 <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A1.html"></a>
4119 </div>
4120 <div id="XP_Q16" class="div3">
4121 <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
4122 <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
4123 <h3 id="XP_Q16-p0.1">OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
4124 <p id="XP_Q16-p1"></p>
4125 <p id="XP_Q16-p2"> We must now consider the recipients of the sacrament of Penance: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
4126 <p id="XP_Q16-p3"> (1) Whether penance can be in the innocent?</p>
4127 <p id="XP_Q16-p4"> (2) Whether it can be in the saints in glory?</p>
4128 <p id="XP_Q16-p5"> (3) Whether in the good or bad angels?</p>
4129 <div id="XP_Q16_A1" class="div4">
4130 <a href="summa.XP_Q16.html"></a>
4131 <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
4132 <h4 id="XP_Q16_A1-p0.1">Whether penance can be in the innocent?</h4>
4133 <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p1"></p>
4134 <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p2">
4135 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that penance cannot be in the innocent. For penance consists in bewailing one's evil deeds: whereas the innocent
4136 have done no evil. Therefore penance cannot be in them.
4137 </p>
4138 <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p3">
4139 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the very name of penance [poenitentia] implies punishment [poena]. But the innocent do not deserve punishment. Therefore
4140 penance is not in them.
4141 </p>
4142 <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p4">
4143 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, penance coincides with vindictive justice. But if all were innocent, there would be no room for vindictive justice.
4144 Therefore there would be no penance, so that there is none in the innocent.
4145 </p>
4146 <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p5">
4147 <b>On the contrary,</b> All the virtues are infused together. But penance is a virtue. Since, therefore, other virtues are infused into the innocent
4148 at Baptism, penance is infused with them.
4149 </p>
4150 <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p6"> Further, a man is said to be curable though he has never been sick in body: therefore in like manner, one who has never been
4151 sick spiritually. Now even as there can be no actual cure from the wound of sin without an act of penance, so is there no
4152 possibility of cure without the habit of penance. Therefore one who has never had the disease of sin, has the habit of penance.
4153 </p>
4154 <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p7">
4155 <b>I answer that,</b> Habit comes between power and act: and since the removal of what precedes entails the removal of what follows, but not conversely,
4156 the removal of the habit ensues from the removal of the power to act, but not from the removal of the act. And because removal
4157 of the matter entails the removal of the act, since there can be no act without the matter into which it passes, hence the
4158 habit of a virtue is possible in one for whom the matter is not available, for
4159 the reason that it can be available, so that the habit can proceed to its act---thus a poor man can have the habit of magnificence,
4160 but not the act, because he is not possessed of great wealth which is the matter of magnificence, but he can be possessed
4161 thereof.
4162 </p>
4163 <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p8">
4164 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the innocent have committed no sin, nevertheless they can, so that they are competent to have the habit of penance.
4165 Yet this habit can never proceed to its act, except perhaps with regard to their venial sins, because mortal sins destroy
4166 the habit. Nevertheless it is not without its purpose, because it is a perfection of the natural power.
4167 </p>
4168 <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p9">
4169 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although they deserve no punishment actually, yet it is possible for something to be in them for which they would deserve
4170 to be punished.
4171 </p>
4172 <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p10">
4173 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> So long as the power to sin remains, there would be room for vindictive justice as to the habit, though not as to the act,
4174 if there were no actual sins.
4175 </p>
4176 <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p11"></p>
4177 <p id="XP_Q16_A1-p12"></p>
4178 <a href="summa.XP_Q16.html"></a>
4179 <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
4180 </div>
4181 <div id="XP_Q16_A2" class="div4">
4182 <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
4183 <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
4184 <h4 id="XP_Q16_A2-p0.1">Whether the saints in glory have penance?</h4>
4185 <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p1"></p>
4186 <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p2">
4187 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the saints in glory have not penance. For, as Gregory says (Moral. iv), "the blessed remember their sins,
4188 even as we, without grief, remember our griefs after we have been healed." But penance is grief of the heart. Therefore the
4189 saints in heaven have not penance.
4190 </p>
4191 <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p3">
4192 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the saints in heaven are conformed to Christ. But there was no penance in Christ, since there was no faith which
4193 is the principle of penance. Therefore there will be no penance in the saints in heaven.
4194 </p>
4195 <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p4">
4196 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a habit is useless if it is not reduced to its act. But the saints in heaven will not repent actually, because,
4197 if they did, there would be something in them against their wish. Therefore the habit of penance will not be in them.
4198 </p>
4199 <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p5">
4200 <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, penance is a part of justice. But justice is "perpetual and immortal" (
4201 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q16_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.15" target="asv">Wis. 1:15</a>), and will remain in heaven. Therefore penance will also.
4202 </p>
4203 <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p6">
4204 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, we read in the Lives of the Fathers, that one of them said that even Abraham will repent of not having done more
4205 good. But one ought to repent of evil done more than of good left undone, and which one was not bound to do, for such is the
4206 good in question. Therefore repentance will be there of evil done.
4207 </p>
4208 <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p7">
4209 <b>I answer that,</b> The cardinal virtues will remain in heaven, but only as regards the acts which they exercise in respect of their end. Wherefore,
4210 since the virtue of penance is a part of justice which is a cardinal virtue, whoever has the habit of penance in this life,
4211 will have it in the life to come: but he will not have the same act as now, but another, viz. thanksgiving to God for His
4212 mercy in pardoning his sins.
4213 </p>
4214 <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p8">
4215 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that they do not have the same act as penance has now; and we grant this.
4216 </p>
4217 <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p9">
4218 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Christ could not sin, wherefore the matter of this virtue was lacking in His respect both actually and potentially: so that
4219 there is no comparison between Him and others.
4220 </p>
4221 <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p10">
4222 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Repentance, properly speaking, considered as that act of penance which is in this life, will not be in heaven: and yet the
4223 habit will not be without its use, for it will have another act.
4224 </p>
4225 <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p11"> Reply OBJ 4,5: We grant the Fourth argument. But since the Fifth Objection proves that there will be the same act of penance
4226 in heaven as now, we answer the latter by saying that in heaven one will be altogether conformed to the will of God. Wherefore,
4227 as God, by His antecedent will, but not by His consequent will, wishes that all things should be good, and therefore that
4228 there should be no evil, so is it with the blessed. It is this will that this holy father improperly calls
4229 penance.
4230 </p>
4231 <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p12"></p>
4232 <p id="XP_Q16_A2-p13"></p>
4233 <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
4234 <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
4235 </div>
4236 <div id="XP_Q16_A3" class="div4">
4237 <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
4238 <a href="summa.XP_Q17.html"></a>
4239 <h4 id="XP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Whether an angel can be the subject of penance?</h4>
4240 <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p1"></p>
4241 <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p2">
4242 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that even a good or bad angel can be a subject of penance. For fear is the beginning of penance. But fear is
4243 in the angels, according to
4244 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q16_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.19" target="asv"> James 2:19</a>: "The devils . . . believe and tremble." Therefore there can be penance in them.
4245 </p>
4246 <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p3">
4247 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that "evil men are full of repentance, and this is a great punishment for them."
4248 Now the devils are exceeding evil, nor is there any punishment that they lack. Therefore they can repent.
4249 </p>
4250 <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p4">
4251 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is more easily moved to that which is according to its nature than to that which is against its nature:
4252 thus water which has by violence been heated, of itself returns to its natural property. Now angels can be moved to sin which
4253 is contrary to their common nature. Much more therefore can they return to that which is in accord with their nature. But
4254 this is done by penance. Therefore they are susceptible to penance.
4255 </p>
4256 <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p5">
4257 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what applies to angels, applies equally to separated souls, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). But there can
4258 be penance in separated souls, as some say, as in the souls of the blessed in heaven. Therefore there can be penance in the
4259 angels.
4260 </p>
4261 <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p6">
4262 <b>On the contrary,</b> By penance man obtains pardon for the sin he has committed. But this is impossible in the angels. Therefore they are not
4263 subjects of penance.
4264 </p>
4265 <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p7"> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that man is subject to penance on account of the weakness of his body. But
4266 the angels are not united to a body. Therefore no penance can be in them.
4267 </p>
4268 <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p8">
4269 <b>I answer that,</b> In us, penance is taken in two senses; first, as a passion, and thus it is nothing but pain or sorrow on account of a sin
4270 committed: and though, as a passion it is only in the concupiscible part, yet, by way of comparison, the name of penance is
4271 given to that act of the will, whereby a man detests what he has done, even as love and other passions are spoken of as though
4272 they were in the intellectual appetite. Secondly, penance is taken as a virtue, and in
4273 this way its act consists in the detestation of evil done, together with the purpose of amendment and the intention of expiating
4274 the evil, or of placating God for the offense committed. Now detestation of evil befits a person according as he is naturally
4275 ordained to good. And since this order or inclination is not entirely destroyed in any creature, it remains even in the damned,
4276 and consequently the passion of repentance, or something like it, remains in them too, as stated in
4277 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q16_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.5.3" target="asv"> Wis.
4278 5:3
4279 </a>"(saying) within themselves, repenting," etc. This repentance, as it is not a habit, but a passion or act, can by no means
4280 be in the blessed angels, who have not committed any sins: but it is in the wicked angels, since the same applies to them
4281 as to the lost souls, for, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4), "death is to men what sin is to an angel." But no
4282 forgiveness is possible for the sin of an angel. Now sin is the proper object of the virtue itself which we call
4283 penance, in so far as it can be pardoned or expiated. Therefore, since the wicked angels cannot have the matter, they have
4284 not the power to produce the act, so that neither can they have the habit. Hence the angels cannot be subjects of the virtue
4285 of penance.
4286 </p>
4287 <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p9">
4288 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A certain movement of penance is engendered in them from fear, but not such as is a virtue.
4289 </p>
4290 <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p10"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
4291 <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p11">
4292 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whatever is natural in them is entirely good, and inclines to good: but their free-will is fixed on evil. And since the movement
4293 of virtue and vice follows the inclination, not of nature, but of the free-will, there is no need that there should be movements
4294 of virtue in them either actually or possibly, although they are inclined to good by nature.
4295 </p>
4296 <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p12">
4297 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is no parity between the holy angels and the beatified souls, because in the latter there has been or could have been
4298 a sin that could be pardoned, but not in the former: so that though they are like as to their present state, they differ as
4299 to their previous states, which penance regards directly.
4300 </p>
4301 <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p13"></p>
4302 <p id="XP_Q16_A3-p14"></p>
4303 <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A2.html"></a>
4304 <a href="summa.XP_Q17.html"></a>
4305 </div>
4306 <a href="summa.XP_Q15_A3.html"></a>
4307 <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A1.html"></a>
4308 </div>
4309 <div id="XP_Q17" class="div3">
4310 <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
4311 <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
4312 <h3 id="XP_Q17-p0.1">OF THE POWER OF THE KEYS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
4313 <p id="XP_Q17-p1"></p>
4314 <p id="XP_Q17-p2"> We must now consider the power of the ministers of this sacrament, which power depends on the keys. As to this matter, in
4315 the first place we shall treat of the keys, secondly, of excommunication, thirdly, of indulgences, since these two things
4316 are connected with the power of the keys. The first of these considerations will be fourfold: (1) the nature and meaning of
4317 the keys. (2) the use of the keys; (3) the ministers of the keys; (4) those on whom the use of the keys can be
4318 exercised.
4319 </p>
4320 <p id="XP_Q17-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
4321 <p id="XP_Q17-p4"> (1) Whether there ought to be keys in the Church?</p>
4322 <p id="XP_Q17-p5"> (2) Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.?</p>
4323 <p id="XP_Q17-p6"> (3) Whether there are two keys or only one?</p>
4324 <div id="XP_Q17_A1" class="div4">
4325 <a href="summa.XP_Q17.html"></a>
4326 <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
4327 <h4 id="XP_Q17_A1-p0.1">Whether there should be keys in the Church?</h4>
4328 <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p1"></p>
4329 <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p2">
4330 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no necessity for keys in the Church. For there is no need for keys that one may enter a house
4331 the door of which is open. But it is written (
4332 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q17_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.4.1" target="asv">Apoc. 4:1</a>): "I looked and behold a door was opened in heaven," which door is Christ, for He said of Himself (
4333 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q17_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#John.10.7" target="asv">Jn. 10:7</a>): "I am the door." Therefore the Church needs no keys for the entrance into heaven.
4334 </p>
4335 <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p3">
4336 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a key is needed for opening and shutting. But this belongs to Christ alone, "Who openeth and no man shutteth, shutteth
4337 and no man openeth" (
4338 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q17_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.7" target="asv">Apoc. 3:7</a>). Therefore the Church has no keys in the hands of her ministers.
4339 </p>
4340 <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p4">
4341 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hell is opened to whomever heaven is closed, and vice versa. Therefore whoever has the keys of heaven, has the keys
4342 of hell. But the Church is not said to have the keys of hell. Therefore neither has she the keys of heaven.
4343 </p>
4344 <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p5">
4345 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
4346 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q17_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>): "To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven."
4347 </p>
4348 <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p6"> Further, every dispenser should have the keys of the things that he dispenses. But the ministers of the Church are the dispensers
4349 of the divine mysteries, as appears from
4350 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q17_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:1.</a> Therefore they ought to have the keys.
4351 </p>
4352 <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p7">
4353 <b>I answer that,</b> In material things a key is an instrument for opening a door. Now the door of the kingdom is closed to us through sin, both
4354 as to the stain and as to the debt of punishment. Wherefore the power of removing this obstacle is called a key. Now this
4355 power is in the Divine Trinity by authority; hence some say that God has the key of "authority." But Christ Man had the power
4356 to remove the above obstacle, through the merit of His Passion, which also is said to open
4357 the door; hence some say that He has the keys of "excellence." And since "the sacraments of which the Church is built, flowed
4358 from the side of Christ while He lay asleep on the cross" [*Augustine, Enarr. in
4359 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q17_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.138" target="asv">Ps. 138</a>], the efficacy of the Passion abides in the sacraments of the Church. Wherefore a certain power for the removal of the aforesaid
4360 obstacle is bestowed on the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments, not by their own, but by a
4361 Divine power and by the Passion
4362 of Christ. This power is called metaphorically the Church's key, and is the key of "ministry."
4363 </p>
4364 <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p8">
4365 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The door of heaven, considered in itself, is ever open, but it is said to be closed to someone, on account of some obstacle
4366 against entering therein, which is in himself. The obstacle which the entire human nature inherited from the sin of the first
4367 man was removed by Christ's Passion; hence, after the Passion, John saw an opened door in heaven. Yet that door still remains
4368 closed to this or that man, on account of the original sin which he has
4369 contracted, or the actual sin which he has committed: hence we need the sacraments and the keys of the Church.
4370 </p>
4371 <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p9">
4372 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This refers to His closing Limbo, so that thenceforth no one should go there, and to His opening of Paradise, the obstacle
4373 of nature being removed by His Passion.
4374 </p>
4375 <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p10">
4376 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The key whereby hell is opened and closed, is the power of bestowing grace, whereby hell is opened to man, so that he is
4377 taken out from sin which is the door of hell, and closed, so that by the help of grace man should no more fall into sin. Now
4378 the power of bestowing grace belongs to God alone, wherefore He kept this key to Himself. But the key of the kingdom is also
4379 the power to remit the debt of temporal punishment, which debt prevents man from
4380 entering the kingdom Consequently the key of the kingdom can be given to man rather than the key of hell, for they are not
4381 the same, as is clear from what has been said. For a man may be set free from hell by the remission of the debt of eternal
4382 punishment, without being at once admitted to the kingdom, on account of his yet owing a debt of temporal punishment.
4383 </p>
4384 <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p11"> It may also be replied, as some state, that the key of heaven is also the key of hell, since if one is opened to a man, the
4385 other, for that very reason, is closed to him, but it takes its name from the better of the two.
4386 </p>
4387 <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p12"></p>
4388 <p id="XP_Q17_A1-p13"></p>
4389 <a href="summa.XP_Q17.html"></a>
4390 <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
4391 </div>
4392 <div id="XP_Q17_A2" class="div4">
4393 <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
4394 <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
4395 <h4 id="XP_Q17_A2-p0.1">Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.?</h4>
4396 <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p1"></p>
4397 <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p2">
4398 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the key is not the power of binding and loosing, whereby "the ecclesiastical judge has to admit the worthy
4399 to the kingdom and exclude the unworthy" therefrom, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 16). For the spiritual power conferred
4400 in a sacrament is the same as the character. But the key and the character do not seem to be the same, since by the character
4401 man is referred to God, whereas by the key he is referred to his subjects. Therefore
4402 the key is not a power.
4403 </p>
4404 <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p3">
4405 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an ecclesiastical judge is only one who has jurisdiction, which is not given at the same time as orders. But the
4406 keys are given in the conferring of orders. Therefore there should have been no mention of the ecclesiastical judge in the
4407 definition of the keys.
4408 </p>
4409 <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p4">
4410 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when a man has something of himself, he needs not to be reduced to act by some active power. Now a man is admitted
4411 to the kingdom from the very fact that he is worthy. Therefore it does not concern the power of the keys to admit the worthy
4412 to the kingdom.
4413 </p>
4414 <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p5">
4415 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sinners are unworthy of the kingdom. But the Church prays for sinners, that they may go to heaven. Therefore she
4416 does not exclude the unworthy, but admits them, so far as she is concerned.
4417 </p>
4418 <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p6">
4419 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, in every ordered series of agents, the last end belongs to the principal and not to the instrumental agent. But
4420 the principal agent in view of man's salvation is God. Therefore admission to the kingdom, which is the last end, belongs
4421 to Him, and not to those who have the keys, who are as instrumental or ministerial agents.
4422 </p>
4423 <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p7">
4424 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text. 33), "powers are defined from their acts." Wherefore, since the key is a
4425 kind of power, it should be defined from its act or use, and reference to the act should include its object from which it
4426 takes its species, and the mode of acting whereby the power is shown to be well-ordered. Now the act of the spiritual power
4427 is to open heaven, not absolutely, since it is already open, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), but
4428 for this or that man; and this cannot be done in an orderly manner without due consideration of the worthiness of the one
4429 to be admitted to heaven. Hence the aforesaid definition of the key gives the genus, viz. "power," the subject of the power,
4430 viz. the "ecclesiastical judge," and the act, viz. "of excluding or admitting," corresponding to the two acts of a material
4431 key which are to open and shut; the object of which act is referred to in the words "from the kingdom," and the mode, in the
4432 words, "worthy" and "unworthy," because account is taken of the worthiness or unworthiness of those on whom the act is exercised.
4433 </p>
4434 <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p8">
4435 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same power is directed to two things, of which one is the cause of the other, as heat, in fire, is directed to make a
4436 thing hot and to melt it. And since every grace and remission in a mystical body comes to it from its head, it seems that
4437 it is essentially the same power whereby a priest can consecrate, and whereby he can loose and bind, if he has jurisdiction,
4438 and that there is only a logical difference, according as it is referred to different
4439 effects, even as fire in one respect is said to have the power of heating, and in another, the power of melting. And because
4440 the character of the priestly order is nothing else than the power of exercising that act to which the priestly order is chiefly
4441 ordained (if we maintain that it is the same as a spiritual power), therefore the character, the power of consecrating, and
4442 the power of the keys are one and the same essentially, but differ logically.
4443 </p>
4444 <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p9">
4445 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All spiritual power is conferred by some kind of consecration. Therefore the key is given together with the order: yet the
4446 use of the key requires due matter, i.e. a people subject through jurisdiction, so that until he has jurisdiction, the priest
4447 has the keys, but he cannot exercise the act of the keys. And since the key is defined from its act, its definition contains
4448 a reference to jurisdiction.
4449 </p>
4450 <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p10">
4451 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A person may be worthy to have something in two ways, either so as to have a right to possess it, and thus whoever is worthy
4452 has heaven already opened to him---or so that it is meet that he should receive it, and thus the power of the keys admits
4453 those who are worthy, but to whom heaven is not yet altogether opened.
4454 </p>
4455 <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p11">
4456 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even as God hardens not by imparting malice, but by withholding grace, so a priest is said to exclude, not as though he placed
4457 an obstacle to entrance, but because he does not remove an obstacle which is there, since he cannot remove it unless God has
4458 already removed it. [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he
4459 altered his opinion. Cf.
4460 <a id="XP_Q17_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q62_A1.html">TP, Q[62], A[1]</a>;
4461
4462 <a id="XP_Q17_A2-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q64_A1.html">TP, Q[64], A[1]</a>;
4463 <a id="XP_Q17_A2-p11.3" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q86_A6.html">TP, Q[86], A[6]</a>.] Hence God is prayed that He may absolve, so that there may be room for the priest's absolution.
4464 </p>
4465 <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p12">
4466 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The priest's act does not bear immediately on the kingdom, but on the sacraments, by means of which man wins to the kingdom.
4467 </p>
4468 <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p13"></p>
4469 <p id="XP_Q17_A2-p14"></p>
4470 <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
4471 <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
4472 </div>
4473 <div id="XP_Q17_A3" class="div4">
4474 <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
4475 <a href="summa.XP_Q18.html"></a>
4476 <h4 id="XP_Q17_A3-p0.1">Whether there are two keys or only one?</h4>
4477 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p1"></p>
4478 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p2">
4479 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not two keys but only one. For one lock requires but one key. Now the lock for the removal of
4480 which the keys of the Church are required, is sin. Therefore the Church does not require two keys for one sin.
4481 </p>
4482 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p3">
4483 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the keys are given when orders are conferred. But knowledge is not always due to infusion, but sometimes is acquired,
4484 nor is it possessed by all those who are ordained, and is possessed by some who are not ordained. Therefore knowledge is not
4485 a key, so that there is but one key, viz. the power of judging.
4486 </p>
4487 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p4">
4488 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the power which the priest has over the mystic body of Christ flows from the power which he has over Christ's true
4489 body. Now the power of consecrating Christ's true body is but one. Therefore the power which regards Christ's mystic body
4490 is but one. But this is a key. Therefore, etc.
4491 </p>
4492 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p5">
4493 <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, It seems that there are more than two keys. For just as knowledge and power are requisite for man to act,
4494 so is will. But the knowledge of discretion is reckoned as a key, and so is the power of judging. Therefore the will to absolve
4495 should be counted as a key.
4496 </p>
4497 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p6">
4498 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, all three Divine Persons remit sins. Now the priest, through the keys, is the minister for the remission of sins.
4499 Therefore he should have three keys, so that he may be conformed to the Trinity.
4500 </p>
4501 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p7">
4502 <b>I answer that,</b> Whenever an act requires fitness on the part of the recipient, two things are necessary in the one who has to perform the
4503 act, viz. judgment of the fitness of the recipient, and accomplishment of the act. Therefore in the act of justice whereby
4504 a man is given what he deserves, there needs to be a judgment in order to discern whether he deserves to receive. Again, an
4505 authority or power is necessary for both these things, for we cannot give save what we have
4506 in our power; nor can there be judgment, without the right to enforce it, since judgment is determined to one particular thing,
4507 which determination it derives, in speculative matters, from the first principles which cannot be gainsaid, and, in practical
4508 matters, from the power of command vested in the one who judges. And since the act of the key requires fitness in the person
4509 on whom it is exercised---because the ecclesiastical judge, by means of the key, "admits the worthy and excludes the
4510 unworthy," as may be seen from the definition given above
4511 <a id="XP_Q17_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a>---therefore the judge requires both judgment of discretion whereby he judges a man to be worthy, and also the very act of
4512 receiving (that man's confession); and for both these things a certain power or authority is necessary. Accordingly we may
4513 distinguish two keys, the first of which regards the judgment about the worthiness of the person to be absolved, while the
4514 other regards the absolution.
4515 </p>
4516 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p8"> These two keys are distinct, not in the essence of authority, since both belong to the minister by virtue of his office,
4517 but in comparison with their respective acts, one of which presupposes the other.
4518 </p>
4519 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p9">
4520 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One key is ordained immediately to the opening of one lock, but it is not unfitting that one key should be ordained to the
4521 act of another. Thus it is in the case in point. For it is the second key, which is the power of binding and loosing, that
4522 opens the lock of sin immediately, but the key of knowledge shows to whom that lock should be opened.
4523 </p>
4524 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p10">
4525 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two opinions about the key of knowledge. For some say that knowledge considered as a habit, acquired or infused,
4526 is the key in this case, and that it is not the principal key, but is called a key through being subordinate to another key:
4527 so that it is not called a key when the other key is wanting, for instance, in an educated man who is not a priest. And although
4528 priests lack this key at times, through being without knowledge, acquired or
4529 infused, of loosing and binding, yet sometimes they make use of their natural endeavors, which they who hold this opinion
4530 call a little key, so that although knowledge be not bestowed together with orders, yet with the conferring of orders the
4531 knowledge becomes a key which it was not before. This seems to have been the opinion of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 19).
4532 </p>
4533 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p11"> But this does not seem to agree with the words of the Gospel, whereby the keys are promised to Peter (
4534 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q17_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>), so that not only one but two are given in orders. For which reason the other opinion holds that the key is not knowledge
4535 considered as a habit, but the authority to exercise the act of knowledge, which authority is sometimes without knowledge,
4536 while the knowledge is sometimes present without the authority. This may be seen even in secular courts,
4537 for a secular judge may have the authority to judge, without having the knowledge of the law, while another man, on the contrary,
4538 has knowledge of the law without having the authority to judge. And since the act of judging to which a man is bound through
4539 the authority which is vested in him, and not through his habit of knowledge, cannot be well performed without both of the
4540 above, the authority to judge, which is the key of knowledge, cannot be accepted without sin by one who lacks knowledge;
4541 whereas knowledge void of authority can be possessed without sin.
4542 </p>
4543 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p12">
4544 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of consecrating is directed to only one act of another kind, wherefore it is not numbered among the keys, nor is
4545 it multiplied as the power of the keys, which is directed to different acts, although as to the essence of power and authority
4546 it is but one, as stated above.
4547 </p>
4548 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p13">
4549 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Everyone is free to will, so that no one needs authority to will; wherefore will is not reckoned as a key.
4550 </p>
4551 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p14">
4552 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> All three Persons remit sins in the same way as one Person, wherefore there is no need for the priest, who is the minister
4553 of the Trinity, to have three keys: and all the more, since the will, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, requires no
4554 key, as stated above (ad 4).
4555 </p>
4556 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p15"></p>
4557 <p id="XP_Q17_A3-p16"></p>
4558 <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html"></a>
4559 <a href="summa.XP_Q18.html"></a>
4560 </div>
4561 <a href="summa.XP_Q16_A3.html"></a>
4562 <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A1.html"></a>
4563 </div>
4564 <div id="XP_Q18" class="div3">
4565 <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
4566 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
4567 <h3 id="XP_Q18-p0.1">OF THE EFFECT OF THE KEYS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
4568 <p id="XP_Q18-p1"></p>
4569 <p id="XP_Q18-p2"> We must now consider the effect of the keys under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
4570 <p id="XP_Q18-p3"> (1) Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt?</p>
4571 <p id="XP_Q18-p4"> (2) Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment?</p>
4572 <p id="XP_Q18-p5"> (3) Whether a priest can bind in virtue of the power of the keys?</p>
4573 <p id="XP_Q18-p6"> (4) Whether he can loose and bind according to his own judgment?</p>
4574 <div id="XP_Q18_A1" class="div4">
4575 <a href="summa.XP_Q18.html"></a>
4576 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
4577 <h4 id="XP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt? [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and
4578 replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. TP, Q[62], A[1]; TP, Q[64], A[1]; TP, Q[86], A[6]]
4579 </h4>
4580 <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p1"></p>
4581 <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p2">
4582 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt. For it was said to the disciples (
4583 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q18_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.23" target="asv">Jn. 20:23</a>): "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them." Now this was not said in reference to the declaration only, as
4584 the Master states (Sent. iv, D, 18), for in that case the priest of the New Testament would have no more power than the priest
4585 of the Old Testament. Therefore he exercises a power over the remission of
4586 the guilt.
4587 </p>
4588 <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p3">
4589 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in Penance grace is given for the remission of sin. Now the priest is the dispenser of this sacrament by virtue
4590 of the keys. Therefore, since grace is opposed to sin, not on the part of the punishment, but on the part of the guilt, it
4591 seems that the priest operates unto the remission of sin by virtue of the keys.
4592 </p>
4593 <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p4">
4594 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the priest receives more power by his consecration than the baptismal water by its sanctification. Now the baptismal
4595 water receives the power "to touch the body and cleanse the heart," as Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.). Much more, therefore,
4596 does the priest, in his consecration, receive the power to cleanse the heart from the stain of sin.
4597 </p>
4598 <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p5">
4599 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Master stated above (Sent. iv, D, 18) that God has not bestowed on the minister the power to co-operate with Him in the
4600 inward cleansing. Now if he remitted sins as to the guilt, he would co-operate with God in the inward cleansing. Therefore
4601 the power of the keys does not extend to the remission of guilt.
4602 </p>
4603 <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p6"> Further, sin is not remitted save by the Holy Ghost. But no man has the power to give the Holy Ghost, as the Master said
4604 above (Sent. i, D, 14). Neither therefore can he remit sins as to their guilt.
4605 </p>
4606 <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p7">
4607 <b>I answer that,</b> According to Hugh (De Sacram. ii), "the sacraments, by virtue of their sanctification, contain an invisible grace." Now this
4608 sanctification is sometimes essential to the sacrament both as regards the matter and as regards the minister, as may be seen
4609 in Confirmation, and then the sacramental virtue is in both together. Sometimes, however, the essence of the sacrament requires
4610 only sanctification of the matter, as in Baptism, which has no fixed minister on
4611 whom it depends necessarily, and then the whole virtue of the sacrament is in the matter. Again, sometimes the essence of
4612 the sacrament requires the consecration or sanctification of the minister without any sanctification of the matter, and then
4613 the entire sacramental virtue is in the minister, as in Penance. Hence the power of the keys which is in the priest, stands
4614 in the same relation to the effect of Penance, as the virtue in the baptismal water does to the effect of Baptism. Now Baptism
4615 and the sacrament of Penance agree somewhat in their effect, since each is directly ordained against guilt, which is not the
4616 case in the other sacraments: yet they differ in this, that the sacrament of Penance, since the acts of the recipient are
4617 as its matter, cannot be given save to adults, who need to be disposed for the reception of the sacramental effect; whereas
4618 Baptism is given, sometimes to adults, sometimes to children and others who lack the use of reason, so that by Baptism children
4619 receive grace and remission of sin without any previous disposition, while adults do not, for they require to be disposed
4620 by the removal of insincerity. This disposition sometimes precedes their Baptism by priority of time, being sufficient for
4621 the reception of grace, before they are actually baptized, but not before they have come to the knowledge of the truth and
4622 have conceived the desire for Baptism. At other times this disposition does not precede the reception of Baptism by a priority
4623 of
4624 time, but is simultaneous with it, and then the grace of the remission of guilt is bestowed through the reception of Baptism.
4625 On the other hand, grace is never given through the sacrament of Penance unless the recipient be disposed either simultaneously
4626 or before. Hence the power of the keys operates unto the remission of guilt, either through being desired or through being
4627 actually exercised, even as the waters of Baptism. But just as Baptism acts, not as a principal agent but as an
4628 instrument, and does not go so far as to cause the reception itself of grace, even instrumentally [*See note at beginning
4629 of this article], but merely disposes the recipient to the grace whereby his guilt is remitted, so is it with the power of
4630 the keys. Wherefore God alone directly remits guilt, and Baptism acts through His power instrumentally, as an inanimate instrument,
4631 and the priest as an animate instrument, such as a servant is, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11): and
4632 consequently the priest acts as a minister. Hence it is clear that the power of the keys is ordained, in a manner, to the
4633 remission of guilt, not as causing that remission, but as disposing thereto. Consequently if a man, before receiving absolution,
4634 were not perfectly disposed for the reception of grace, he would receive grace at the very time of sacramental confession
4635 and absolution, provided he offered no obstacle. For if the key were in no way ordained to the remission of guilt, but only
4636 to
4637 the remission of punishment, as some hold, it would not be necessary to have a desire of receiving the effect of the keys
4638 in order to have one's sins forgiven, just as it is not necessary to have a desire of receiving the other sacraments which
4639 are ordained, not to the remission of guilt, but against punishment. But this enables us to see that it is not ordained unto
4640 the remission of guilt, because the use of the keys, in order to be effective, always requires a disposition on the part of
4641 the
4642 recipient of the sacrament. And the same would apply to Baptism, were it never given save to adults.
4643 </p>
4644 <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p8">
4645 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Master says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 18), the power of forgiving sins was entrusted to priests, not that they may
4646 forgive them, by their own power, for this belongs to God, but that, as ministers, they may declare [*See note at the beginning
4647 of this article] the operation of God Who forgives. Now this happens in three ways. First, by a declaration, not of present,
4648 but of future forgiveness, without co-operating therein in any way: and thus the
4649 sacraments of the Old Law signified the Divine operation, so that the priest of the Old Law did but declare and did not operate
4650 the forgiveness of sins. Secondly, by a declaration of present forgiveness without co-operating in it at all: and thus some
4651 say that the sacraments of the New Law signify the bestowal of grace, which God gives when the sacraments are conferred, without
4652 the sacraments containing any power productive of grace, according to which opinion, even the power of the keys would
4653 merely declare the Divine operation that has its effect in the remission of guilt when the sacrament is conferred. Thirdly,
4654 by signifying the Divine operation causing then and there the remission of guilt, and by co-operating towards this effect
4655 dispositively and instrumentally: and then, according to another and more common opinion, the sacraments of the New Law declare
4656 the cleansing effected by God. In this way also the priest of the New Testament declares the recipient to be absolved from
4657 guilt, because in speaking of the sacraments, what is ascribed to the power of the ministers must be consistent with the sacrament.
4658 Nor is it unreasonable that the keys of the Church should dispose the penitent to the remission of his guilt, from the fact
4659 that the guilt is already remitted, even as neither is it unreasonable that Baptism, considered in itself, causes a disposition
4660 in one who is already sanctified.
4661 </p>
4662 <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p9">
4663 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Neither the sacrament of Penance, nor the sacrament of Baptism, by its operation, causes grace, or the remission of guilt,
4664 directly, but only dispositively [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later
4665 in life he altered his opinion. Cf.
4666 <a id="XP_Q18_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q62_A1.html">TP, Q[62], A[1]</a>;
4667 <a id="XP_Q18_A1-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q64_A1.html">TP, Q[64], A[1]</a>;
4668 <a id="XP_Q18_A1-p9.3" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q86_A6.html">TP, Q[86], A[6]</a>]. Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is
4669 evident.
4670 </p>
4671 <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p10"> The other arguments show that the power of the keys does not effect the remission of guilt directly, and this is to be granted.</p>
4672 <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p11"></p>
4673 <p id="XP_Q18_A1-p12"></p>
4674 <a href="summa.XP_Q18.html"></a>
4675 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
4676 </div>
4677 <div id="XP_Q18_A2" class="div4">
4678 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
4679 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
4680 <h4 id="XP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment?</h4>
4681 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p1"></p>
4682 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p2">
4683 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a priest cannot remit sin as to the punishment. For sin deserves eternal and temporal punishment. But
4684 after the priest's absolution the penitent is still obliged to undergo temporal punishment either in Purgatory or in this
4685 world. Therefore the priest does not remit the punishment in any way.
4686 </p>
4687 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p3">
4688 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the priest cannot anticipate the judgment of God. But Divine justice appoints the punishment which penitents have
4689 to undergo. Therefore the priest cannot remit any part of it.
4690 </p>
4691 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p4">
4692 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man who has committed a slight sin, is not less susceptible to the power of the keys, than one who has committed
4693 a graver sin. Now if the punishment for the graver sin be lessened in any way through the priestly administrations, it would
4694 be possible for a sin to be so slight that the punishment which it deserves is no greater than that which has been remitted
4695 for the graver sin. Therefore the priest would be able to remit the entire punishment due
4696 for the slight sin: which is false.
4697 </p>
4698 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p5">
4699 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the whole of the temporal punishment due for a sin is of one kind. If, therefore, by a first absolution something
4700 is taken away from the punishment, it will be possible for something more to be taken away by a second absolution, so that
4701 the absolution can be so often repeated, that by virtue of the keys the whole punishment will be taken away, since the second
4702 absolution is not less efficacious than the first: and consequently that sin will be
4703 altogether unpunished, which is absurd.
4704 </p>
4705 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p6">
4706 <b>On the contrary,</b> The key is the power of binding and loosing. But the priest can enjoin a temporal punishment. Therefore he can absolve from
4707 punishment.
4708 </p>
4709 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p7"> Further, the priest cannot remit sin either as to the guilt [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies
4710 in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf.
4711 <a id="XP_Q18_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q62_A1.html">TP, Q[62], A[1]</a>;
4712 <a id="XP_Q18_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q64_A1.html">TP, Q[64], A[1]</a>;
4713 <a id="XP_Q18_A2-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q86_A6.html">TP, Q[86], A[6]</a>], as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 18), or as to the eternal punishment, for a like reason. If therefore he cannot remit
4714 sin as to the temporal punishment, he would be
4715 unable to remit sin in any way, which is altogether contrary to the words of the Gospel.
4716 </p>
4717 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p8">
4718 <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever may be said of the effect of Baptism conferred on one who has already received grace, applies equally to the effect
4719 of the actual exercise of the power of the keys on one who has already been contrite. For a man may obtain the grace of the
4720 remission of his sins as to their guilt, through faith and contrition, previous to Baptism; but when, afterwards, he actually
4721 receives Baptism, his grace is increased, and he is entirely absolved from the debt of
4722 punishment, since he is then made a partaker of the Passion of Christ. In like manner when a man, through contrition, has
4723 received the pardon of his sins as to their guilt, and consequently as to the debt of eternal punishment, (which is remitted
4724 together with the guilt) by virtue of the keys which derive their efficacy from the Passion of Christ, his grace is increased
4725 and the temporal punishment is remitted, the debt of which remained after the guilt had been forgiven. However, this temporal
4726 punishment is not entirely remitted, as in Baptism, but only partly, because the man who is regenerated in Baptism is conformed
4727 to the Passion of Christ, by receiving into himself entirely the efficacy of Christ's Passion, which suffices for the blotting
4728 out of all punishment, so that nothing remains of the punishment due to his preceding actual sins. For nothing should be imputed
4729 to a man unto punishment, save what he has done himself, and in Baptism man begins a new life, and by the baptismal
4730 water becomes a new man, as that no debt for previous sin remains in him. on the other hand, in Penance, a man does not take
4731 on a new life, since therein he is not born again, but healed. Consequently by virtue of the keys which produce their effect
4732 in the sacrament of Penance, the punishment is not entirely remitted, but something is taken off the temporal punishment,
4733 the debt of which could remain after the eternal punishment had been remitted. Nor does this apply only to the temporal
4734 punishment which the penitent owes at the time of confession, as some hold, (for then confession and sacramental absolution
4735 would be mere burdens, which cannot be said of the sacraments of the New Law), but also to the punishment due in Purgatory,
4736 so that one who has been absolved and dies before making satisfaction, is less punished in Purgatory, than if he had died
4737 before receiving absolution.
4738 </p>
4739 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p9">
4740 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The priest does not remit the entire temporal punishment, but part of it; wherefore the penitent still remains obliged to
4741 undergo satisfactory punishment.
4742 </p>
4743 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p10">
4744 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Christ's Passion was sufficiently satisfactory for the sins of the whole world, so that without prejudice to Divine justice
4745 something can be remitted from the punishment which a sinner deserves, in so far as the effect of Christ's Passion reaches
4746 him through the sacraments of the Church.
4747 </p>
4748 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p11">
4749 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some satisfactory punishment must remain for each sin, so as to provide a remedy against it. Wherefore though, by virtue
4750 of the absolution some measure of the punishment due to a grave sin is remitted, it does not follow that the same measure
4751 of punishment is remitted for each sin, because in that case some sin would remain without any punishment at all: but, by
4752 virtue of the keys, the punishments due to various sins are remitted in due
4753 proportion.
4754 </p>
4755 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p12">
4756 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some say that at the first absolution, as much as possible is remitted by virtue of the keys, and that, nevertheless, the
4757 second confession is valid, on account of the instruction received, on account of the additional surety, on account of the
4758 prayers of the priest or confessor, and lastly on account of the merit of the shame.
4759 </p>
4760 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p13"> But this does not seem to be true, for though there might be a reason for repeating the confession, there would be no reason
4761 for repeating the absolution, especially if the penitent has no cause to doubt about his previous absolution; for he might
4762 just as well doubt after the second as after the first absolution: even as we see that the sacrament of Extreme Unction is
4763 not repeated during the same sickness, for the reason that all that could be done through the sacrament, has
4764 been done once. Moreover, in the second confession, there would be no need for the confessor to have the keys, if the power
4765 of the keys had no effect therein.
4766 </p>
4767 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p14"> For these reasons others say that even in the second absolution something of the punishment is remitted by virtue of the
4768 keys, because when absolution is given a second time, grace is increased, and the greater the grace received, the less there
4769 remains of the blemish of the previous sin, and the less punishment is required to remove that blemish. Wherefore even when
4770 a man is first absolved, his punishment is more or less remitted by virtue of the keys, according as he disposes
4771 himself more or less to receive grace; and this disposition may be so great, that even by virtue of his contrition the whole
4772 punishment is remitted, as we have already stated (
4773 <a id="XP_Q18_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q5_A2.html">Q[5], A[2]</a>). Consequently it is not unreasonable, if by frequent confession even the whole punishment be remitted, that a sin remain
4774 altogether unpunished, since Christ made satisfaction for its punishment.
4775 </p>
4776 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p15"></p>
4777 <p id="XP_Q18_A2-p16"></p>
4778 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
4779 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
4780 </div>
4781 <div id="XP_Q18_A3" class="div4">
4782 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
4783 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
4784 <h4 id="XP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Whether the priest can bind through the power of the keys?</h4>
4785 <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p1"></p>
4786 <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p2">
4787 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the priest cannot bind by virtue of the power of the keys. For the sacramental power is ordained as a
4788 remedy against sin. Now binding is not a remedy for sin, but seemingly is rather conducive to an aggravation of the disease.
4789 Therefore, by the power of the keys, which is a sacramental power, the priest cannot bind.
4790 </p>
4791 <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p3">
4792 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as to loose or to open is to remove an obstacle, so to bind is to place an obstacle. Now an obstacle to heaven
4793 is sin, which cannot be placed on us by an extrinsic cause, since no sin is committed except by the will. Therefore the priest
4794 cannot bind.
4795 </p>
4796 <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p4">
4797 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the keys derive their efficacy from Christ's Passion. But binding is not an effect of the Passion. Therefore the
4798 priest cannot bind by the power of the keys.
4799 </p>
4800 <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p5">
4801 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
4802 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q18_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>): "Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound also in heaven."
4803 </p>
4804 <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p6"> Further, rational powers are directed to opposites. But the power of the keys is a rational power, since it has discretion
4805 connected with it. Therefore it is directed to opposites. Therefore if it can loose, it can bind.
4806 </p>
4807 <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p7">
4808 <b>I answer that,</b> The operation of the priest in using the keys, is conformed to God's operation, Whose minister he is. Now God's operation
4809 extends both to guilt and to punishment; to the guilt indeed, so as to loose it directly. but to bind it indirectly, in so
4810 far as He is said to harden, when He withholds His grace; whereas His operation extends to punishment directly, in both respects,
4811 because He both spares and inflicts it. In like manner, therefore, although the priest,
4812 in absolving, exercises an operation ordained to the remission of guilt, in the way mentioned above
4813 <a id="XP_Q18_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q18_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, nevertheless, in binding, he exercises no operation on the guilt; (unless he be said to bind by not absolving the penitent
4814 and by declaring him to be bound), but he has the power both of binding and of loosing with regard to the punishment. For
4815 he looses from the punishment which he remits, while he binds as to the punishment which remains. This he does in two
4816 ways---first as regards the quantity of the punishment considered in general, and thus he does not bind save by not loosing,
4817 and declaring the penitent to be bound, secondly, as regards this or that particular punishment, and thus he binds to punishment
4818 by imposing it.
4819 </p>
4820 <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p8">
4821 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The remainder of the punishment to which the priest binds the penitent, is the medicine which cleanses the latter from the
4822 blemish of sin.
4823 </p>
4824 <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p9">
4825 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only sin, but also punishment is an obstacle to heaven: and how the latter is enjoined by the priest, has been said in
4826 the article.
4827 </p>
4828 <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p10">
4829 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even the Passion of Christ binds us to some punishment whereby we are conformed to Him.
4830 </p>
4831 <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p11"></p>
4832 <p id="XP_Q18_A3-p12"></p>
4833 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A2.html"></a>
4834 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
4835 </div>
4836 <div id="XP_Q18_A4" class="div4">
4837 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
4838 <a href="summa.XP_Q19.html"></a>
4839 <h4 id="XP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Whether the priest can bind and loose according to his own judgment?</h4>
4840 <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p1"></p>
4841 <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p2">
4842 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the priest can bind and loose according to his own judgment. For Jerome [*Cf. Can. 86, Mensuram, De Poenit.
4843 Dist. i] says: "The canons do not fix the length of time for doing penance so precisely as to say how each sin is to be amended,
4844 but leave the decision of this matter to the judgment of a discreet priest." Therefore it seems that he can bind and loose
4845 according to his own judgment.
4846 </p>
4847 <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p3">
4848 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "The Lord commended the unjust steward, forasmuch as he had done wisely" (
4849 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q18_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.5" target="asv">Lk. 16:5</a>), because he had allowed a liberal discount to his master's debtors. But God is more inclined to mercy than any temporal
4850 lord. Therefore it seems that the more punishment the priest remits, the more he is to be commended.
4851 </p>
4852 <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p4">
4853 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Christ's every action is our instruction. Now on some sinners He imposed no punishment, but only amendment of life,
4854 as in the case of the adulterous woman (
4855 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q18_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.8" target="asv">Jn. 8</a>). Therefore it seems that the priest also, who is the vicar of Christ, can, according to his own judgment, remit the punishment,
4856 either wholly or in part.
4857 </p>
4858 <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p5">
4859 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory VII [*Cf. Act. Concil. Rom. v, Can. 5] says: "We declare it a mock penance if it is not imposed according to the
4860 authority of the holy fathers in proportion to the sin." Therefore it seems that it does not altogether depend on the priest's
4861 judgment.
4862 </p>
4863 <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p6"> Further, the act of the keys requires discretion. Now if the priest could remit and impose as much as he liked of a penance,
4864 he would have no need of discretion, because there would be no room for indiscretion. Therefore it does not altogether depend
4865 on the priest's judgment.
4866 </p>
4867 <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p7">
4868 <b>I answer that,</b> In using the keys, the priest acts as the instrument and minister of God. Now no instrument can have an efficacious act,
4869 except in so far as it is moved by the principal agent. Wherefore, Dionysius says (Hier. Eccl. cap. ult.) that "priests should
4870 use their hierarchical powers, according as they are moved by God." A sign of this is that before the power of the keys was
4871 conferred on Peter (
4872 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q18_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>) mention is made of the revelation
4873 vouchsafed to him of the Godhead; and the gift of the Holy Ghost, whereby "the sons of God are led" (
4874 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q18_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.14" target="asv">Rom. 8:14</a>), is mentioned before power was given to the apostles to forgive sins. Consequently if anyone were to presume to use his
4875 power against that Divine motion, he would not realize the effect, as Dionysius states (Hier. Eccl., cap. ult.), and, besides,
4876 he would be turned away from the Divine order, and consequently would be guilty of a sin. Moreover, since satisfactory
4877 punishments are medicinal, just as the medicines prescribed by the medical art are not suitable to all, but have to be changed
4878 according to the judgment of a medical man, who follows not his own will, but his medical science, so the satisfactory punishments
4879 appointed by the canons are not suitable to all, but have to be varied according to the judgment of the priest guided by the
4880 Divine instinct. Therefore just as sometimes the physician prudently refrains from giving a medicine sufficiently
4881 efficacious to heal the disease, lest a greater danger should arise on account of the weakness of nature so the priest, moved
4882 by Divine instinct, some times refrains from enjoining the entire punishment due to one sin, lest by the severity of the punishment,
4883 the sick man come to despair and turn away altogether from repentance.
4884 </p>
4885 <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p8">
4886 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This judgment should be guided entirely by the Divine instinct.
4887 </p>
4888 <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p9">
4889 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The steward is commended also for having done wisely. Therefore in the remission of the due punishment, there is need for
4890 discretion.
4891 </p>
4892 <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p10">
4893 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ had the power of "excellence" in the sacraments, so that, by His own authority, He could remit the punishment wholly
4894 or in part, just as He chose. Therefore there is no comparison between Him and those who act merely as ministers.
4895 </p>
4896 <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p11"></p>
4897 <p id="XP_Q18_A4-p12"></p>
4898 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A3.html"></a>
4899 <a href="summa.XP_Q19.html"></a>
4900 </div>
4901 <a href="summa.XP_Q17_A3.html"></a>
4902 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A1.html"></a>
4903 </div>
4904 <div id="XP_Q19" class="div3">
4905 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
4906 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
4907 <h3 id="XP_Q19-p0.1">OF THE MINISTERS OF THE KEYS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
4908 <p id="XP_Q19-p1"></p>
4909 <p id="XP_Q19-p2"> We must now consider the ministers and the use of the keys: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
4910 <p id="XP_Q19-p3"> (1) Whether the priest of the Law had the keys?</p>
4911 <p id="XP_Q19-p4"> (2) Whether Christ had the keys?</p>
4912 <p id="XP_Q19-p5"> (3) Whether priests alone have the keys?</p>
4913 <p id="XP_Q19-p6"> (4) Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys or their use?</p>
4914 <p id="XP_Q19-p7"> (5) Whether wicked priests have the effective use of the keys?</p>
4915 <p id="XP_Q19-p8"> (6) Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded, have the use of the keys?</p>
4916 <div id="XP_Q19_A1" class="div4">
4917 <a href="summa.XP_Q19.html"></a>
4918 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
4919 <h4 id="XP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether the priest of the Law had the keys?</h4>
4920 <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p1"></p>
4921 <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p2">
4922 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the priests of the Law had the keys. For the possession of the keys results from having orders. But they
4923 had orders since they were called priests. Therefore the priests of the Law had the keys.
4924 </p>
4925 <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p3">
4926 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D, 18), there are two keys, knowledge of discretion, and power of judgment. But
4927 the priests of the Law had authority for both of these: therefore they had the keys.
4928 </p>
4929 <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p4">
4930 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the priests of the Law had some power over the rest of the people, which power was not temporal, else the kingly
4931 power would not have differed from the priestly power. Therefore it was a spiritual power; and this is the key. Therefore
4932 they had the key.
4933 </p>
4934 <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p5">
4935 <b>On the contrary,</b> The keys are ordained to the opening of the heavenly kingdom, which could not be opened before Christ's Passion. Therefore
4936 the priest of the Law had not the keys. Further, the sacraments of the old Law did not confer grace. Now the gate of the heavenly
4937 kingdom could not be opened except by means of grace. Therefore it could not be opened by means of those sacraments, so that
4938 the priests who administered them, had not the keys of the heavenly kingdom.
4939 </p>
4940 <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p6">
4941 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that, under the Old Law, the keys of the kingdom were in the hands of the priests, because the right of imposing
4942 punishment for sin was conferred on them, as related in
4943 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.5" target="asv">Lev. 5</a>, which right seems to belong to the keys; but that these keys were incomplete then, whereas now they are complete as bestowed
4944 by Christ on the priests of the New Law.
4945 </p>
4946 <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p7"> But this seems to be contrary to the intent of the Apostle in the Epistle to the Hebrews (
4947 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.11" target="asv">Heb. 9:11-12</a>). For there the priesthood of Christ is given the preference over the priesthood of the Law, inasmuch as Christ came, "a
4948 high priest of the good things to come," and brought us "by His own blood" into a tabernacle not made with hand, whither the
4949 priesthood of the Old Law brought men "by the blood of goats and of oxen." Hence it is clear that the power of
4950 that priesthood did not reach to heavenly things but to the shadow of heavenly things: and so, we must say with others that
4951 they had not the keys, but that the keys were foreshadowed in them.
4952 </p>
4953 <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p8">
4954 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The keys of the kingdom go with the priesthood whereby man is brought into the heavenly kingdom, but such was not the priesthood
4955 of Levi; hence it had the keys, not of heaven, but of an earthly tabernacle.
4956 </p>
4957 <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p9">
4958 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The priests of the Old Law had authority to discern and judge, but not to admit those they judged into heaven, but only into
4959 the shadow of heavenly things.
4960 </p>
4961 <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p10">
4962 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> They had no spiritual power, since, by the sacraments of the Law, they cleansed men not from their sins but from irregularities,
4963 so that those who were cleansed by them could enter into a tabernacle which was "made with hand."
4964 </p>
4965 <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p11"></p>
4966 <p id="XP_Q19_A1-p12"></p>
4967 <a href="summa.XP_Q19.html"></a>
4968 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
4969 </div>
4970 <div id="XP_Q19_A2" class="div4">
4971 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
4972 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
4973 <h4 id="XP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether Christ had the key?</h4>
4974 <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p1"></p>
4975 <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p2">
4976 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Christ did not have the key. For the key goes with the character of order. But Christ did not have a character.
4977 Therefore He had not the key.
4978 </p>
4979 <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p3">
4980 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Christ had power of "excellence" in the sacraments, so that He could produce the sacramental effect without the
4981 sacramental rite. Now the key is something sacramental. Therefore He needed no key, and it would have been useless to Him
4982 to have it.
4983 </p>
4984 <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p4">
4985 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
4986 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.7" target="asv">Apoc. 3:7</a>): "These things saith . . . He that hath the key of David," etc.
4987 </p>
4988 <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p5">
4989 <b>I answer that,</b> The power to do a thing is both in the instrument and in the principal agent, but not in the same way since it is more perfectly
4990 in the latter. Now the power of the keys which we have, like other sacramental powers, is instrumental: whereas it is in Christ
4991 as principal agent in the matter of our salvation, by authority, if we consider Him as God, by merit, if we consider Him as
4992 man [*For St. Thomas' later teaching on this point, Cf.
4993 <a id="XP_Q19_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q48_A6.html">TP,
4994 Q[48], A[6]
4995 </a>;
4996 <a id="XP_Q19_A2-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q112_A1.html">FS, Q[112], A[1]</a>, AD 1]. But the very notion of a key expresses a power to open and shut, whether this be done by the principal agent or by
4997 an instrument. Consequently we must admit that Christ had the key, but in a higher way than His ministers, wherefore He is
4998 said to have the key of "excellence."
4999 </p>
5000 <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p6">
5001 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A character implies the notion of something derived from another, hence the power of the keys which we receive from Christ
5002 results from the character whereby we are conformed to Christ, whereas in Christ it results not from a character, but from
5003 the principal form.
5004 </p>
5005 <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p7">
5006 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The key, which Christ had was not sacramental, but the origin of the sacramental key.
5007 </p>
5008 <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p8"></p>
5009 <p id="XP_Q19_A2-p9"></p>
5010 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
5011 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
5012 </div>
5013 <div id="XP_Q19_A3" class="div4">
5014 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
5015 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
5016 <h4 id="XP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether priests alone have the keys?</h4>
5017 <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p1"></p>
5018 <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p2">
5019 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not only priests have the keys. For Isidore says (Etym. vii, 12) that the "doorkeepers have to tell the
5020 good from the bad, so as to admit the good and keep out the bad." Now this is the definition of the keys, as appears from
5021 what has been said (
5022 <a id="XP_Q19_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html">Q[17], A[2]</a>). Therefore not only priests but even doorkeepers have the keys.
5023 </p>
5024 <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p3">
5025 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the keys are conferred on priests when by being anointed they receive power from God. But kings of Christian peoples
5026 also receive power from God and are consecrated by being anointed. Therefore not only priests have the keys.
5027 </p>
5028 <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p4">
5029 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the priesthood is an order belonging to an individual person. But sometimes a number of people together seem to
5030 have the key, because certain Chapters can pass a sentence of excommunication, which pertains to the power of the keys. Therefore
5031 not only priests have the key.
5032 </p>
5033 <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p5">
5034 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a woman is not capable of receiving the priesthood, since she is not competent to teach, according to the Apostle
5035 (
5036 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.34" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:34</a>). But some women (abbesses, for instance, who exercise a spiritual power over their subjects), seem to have the keys. Therefore
5037 not only priests have the keys.
5038 </p>
5039 <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p6">
5040 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Poenit. i): "This right," viz. of binding and loosing, "is granted to priests alone."
5041 </p>
5042 <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p7"> Further, by receiving the power of the keys, a man is set up between the people and God. But this belongs to the priest alone,
5043 who is "ordained . . . in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins" (
5044 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.1" target="asv">Heb. 5:1</a>). Therefore only priests have the keys.
5045 </p>
5046 <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p8">
5047 <b>I answer that,</b> There are two kinds of key. one reaches to heaven itself directly, by remitting sin and thus removing the obstacles to the
5048 entrance into heaven; and this is called the key of "order." Priests alone have this key, because they alone are ordained
5049 for the people in the things which appertain to God directly. The other key reaches to heaven, not directly but through the
5050 medium of the Church Militant. By this key a man goes to heaven, since, by its means, a man
5051 is shut out from or admitted to the fellowship of the Church Militant, by excommunication or absolution. This is called the
5052 key of "jurisdiction" in the external court, wherefore even those who are not priests can have this key, e.g. archdeacons,
5053 bishops elect, and others who can excommunicate. But it is not properly called a key of heaven, but a disposition thereto.
5054 </p>
5055 <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p9">
5056 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The doorkeepers have the key for taking care of those things which are contained in a material temple, and they have to judge
5057 whether a person should be excluded from or admitted to that temple; which judgment they pronounce, not by their own authority,
5058 but in pursuance to the priest's judgment, so that they appear to be the administrators of the priestly power.
5059 </p>
5060 <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p10">
5061 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Kings have no power in spiritual matters, so that they do not receive the key of the heavenly kingdom. Their power is confined
5062 to temporal matters, and this too can only come to them from God, as appears from
5063 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv"> Rom. 13:1.</a> Nor are they consecrated by the unction of a sacred order: their anointing is merely a sign that the excellence of their
5064 power comes down to them from Christ, and that, under Christ, they reign over the Christian
5065 people.
5066 </p>
5067 <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p11">
5068 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in civil matters the whole power is sometimes vested in a judge, as in a kingdom, whereas sometimes it is vested
5069 in many exercising various offices but acting together with equal rights (Ethic. viii, 10,11), so too, spiritual jurisdiction
5070 may be exercised both by one alone, e.g. a bishop, and by many together, e.g. by a Chapter, and thus they have the key of
5071 jurisdiction, but they have not all together the key of order.
5072 </p>
5073 <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p12">
5074 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to the Apostle (
5075 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.11" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:11</a>;
5076 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A3-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Titus.2.5" target="asv"> Titus 2:5</a>), woman is in a state of subjection: wherefore she can have no spiritual jurisdiction, since the Philosopher also says (Ethic.
5077 viii) that it is a corruption of public life when the government comes into the hands of a woman. Consequently a woman has
5078 neither the key of order nor the key of jurisdiction. Nevertheless a certain use of the keys is allowed to women,
5079 such as the right to correct other women who are under them, on account of the danger that might threaten if men were to dwell
5080 under the same roof.
5081 </p>
5082 <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p13"></p>
5083 <p id="XP_Q19_A3-p14"></p>
5084 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A2.html"></a>
5085 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
5086 </div>
5087 <div id="XP_Q19_A4" class="div4">
5088 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
5089 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
5090 <h4 id="XP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys?</h4>
5091 <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p1"></p>
5092 <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p2">
5093 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that holy men, even those who are not priests, have the use of the keys. For loosing and binding, which are
5094 the effects of the keys, derive their efficacy from the merit of Christ's Passion. Now those are most conformed to Christ's
5095 Passion, who follow Christ, suffering by patience and other virtues. Therefore it seems that even if they have not the priestly
5096 order, they can bind and loose.
5097 </p>
5098 <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p3">
5099 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
5100 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.7" target="asv">Heb. 7:7</a>): "Without all contradiction, that which is less is blessed by the greater [Vulg.: 'better']." Now "in spiritual matters,"
5101 according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), "to be better is to be greater." Therefore those who are better, i.e. who have more
5102 charity, can bless others by absolving them. Hence the same conclusion follows.
5103 </p>
5104 <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p4">
5105 <b>On the contrary,</b> "Action belongs to that which has the power," as the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil. i). But the key which is a spiritual
5106 power belongs to priests alone. Therefore priests alone are competent to have the use of the keys.
5107 </p>
5108 <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p5">
5109 <b>I answer that,</b> There is this difference between a principal and an instrumental agent, that the latter does not produce, in the effect,
5110 its own likeness, but the likeness of the principal agent, whereas the principal agent produces its own likeness. Consequently
5111 a thing becomes a principal agent through having a form, which it can reproduce in another, whereas an instrumental agent
5112 is not constituted thus, but through being applied by the principal agent in order to
5113 produce a certain effect. Since therefore in the act of the keys the principal agent by authority is Christ as God, and by
5114 merit is Christ as man,* it follows that on account of the very fulness of Divine goodness in Him, and of the perfection of
5115 His grace, He is competent to exercise the act of the keys. [*For St. Thomas' later teaching on this point, cf.
5116 <a id="XP_Q19_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q48_A6.html">TP, Q[48], A[6]</a>;
5117 <a id="XP_Q19_A4-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q112_A1.html">FS, Q[112], A[1]</a>, ad 1]. But another man is not competent to exercise
5118 this act as principal agent, since neither can he give another man grace whereby sins are remitted, nor can he merit sufficiently,
5119 so that he is nothing more than an instrumental agent. Consequently the recipient of the effect of the keys, is likened, not
5120 to the one who uses the keys, but to Christ. Therefore, no matter how much grace a man may have, he cannot produce the effect
5121 of the keys, unless he be appointed to that purpose by receiving orders.
5122 </p>
5123 <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p6">
5124 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as between instrument and effect there is need or likeness, not of a similar form, but of aptitude in the instrument
5125 for the effect, so is it as regards the instrument and the principal agent. The former is the likeness between holy men and
5126 the suffering Christ, nor does it bestow on them the use of the keys.
5127 </p>
5128 <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p7">
5129 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a mere man cannot merit grace for another man condignly, yet the merit of one man can co-operate in the salvation
5130 of another. Hence there is a twofold blessing. One proceeds from a mere man, as meriting by his own act: this blessing can
5131 be conferred by any holy person in whom Christ dwells by His grace, in so far as he excels in goodness the person whom he
5132 blesses. The other blessing is when a man blesses, as applying a blessing
5133 instrumentally through the merit of Christ, and this requires excellence of order and not of virtue.
5134 </p>
5135 <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p8"></p>
5136 <p id="XP_Q19_A4-p9"></p>
5137 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A3.html"></a>
5138 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
5139 </div>
5140 <div id="XP_Q19_A5" class="div4">
5141 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
5142 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
5143 <h4 id="XP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether wicked priests have the use of the keys?</h4>
5144 <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p1"></p>
5145 <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p2">
5146 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wicked priests have not the use of the keys. For in the passage where the use of the keys is bestowed
5147 on the apostles (
5148 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q19_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.22" target="asv">Jn. 20:22,23</a>), the gift of the Holy Ghost is promised. But wicked men have not the Holy Ghost. Therefore they have not the use of the
5149 keys.
5150 </p>
5151 <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p3">
5152 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no wise king entrusts his enemy with the dispensation of his treasure. Now the use of the keys consists in dispensing
5153 the treasure of the King of heaven, Who is Wisdom itself. Therefore the wicked, who are His enemies on account of sin, have
5154 not the use of the keys.
5155 </p>
5156 <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p4">
5157 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Bapt. v, 21) that God "gives the sacrament of grace even through wicked men, but grace itself
5158 only by Himself or through His saints." Hence He forgives sin by Himself, or by those who are members of the Dove. But the
5159 remission of sins is the use of the keys. Therefore sinners, who are not "members of the Dove," have not the use of the keys.
5160 </p>
5161 <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p5">
5162 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the prayer of a wicked priest cannot effect reconciliation, for, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 11), "if an unacceptable
5163 person is sent to intercede, anger is provoked to yet greater severity." But the use of the keys implies a kind of intercession,
5164 as appears in the form of absolution. Therefore wicked priests cannot use the keys effectively.
5165 </p>
5166 <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p6">
5167 <b>On the contrary,</b> No man can know whether another man is in the state of grace. If, therefore, no one could use the keys in giving absolution
5168 unless he were in a state of grace, no one would know that he had been absolved, which would be very unfitting.
5169 </p>
5170 <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p7"> Further, the wickedness of the minister cannot void the liberality of his lord. But the priest is no more than a minister.
5171 Therefore he cannot by his wickedness take away from us the gift which God has given through him.
5172 </p>
5173 <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p8">
5174 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as participation of a form to be induced into an effect does not make a thing to be an instrument, so neither does the
5175 loss of that form prevent that thing being used as an instrument. Consequently, since man is merely an instrument in the use
5176 of the keys, however much he may through sin be deprived of grace, whereby sins are forgiven, yet he is by no means deprived
5177 of the use of the keys.
5178 </p>
5179 <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p9">
5180 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gift of the Holy Ghost is requisite for the use of the keys, not as being indispensable for the purpose, but because
5181 it is unbecoming for the user to use them without it, though he that submits to them receives their effect.
5182 </p>
5183 <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p10">
5184 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An earthly king can be cheated and deceived in the matter of his treasure, and so he does not entrust his enemy with the
5185 dispensation thereof. But the King of heaven cannot be cheated, because all tends to His own glory, even the abuse of the
5186 keys by some, for He can make good come out of evil, and produce many good effects through evil men. Hence the comparison
5187 fails.
5188 </p>
5189 <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p11">
5190 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine speaks of the remission of sins in so far as holy men co-operate therein, not by virtue of the keys, but by merit
5191 of congruity. Hence He says that God confers the sacraments even through evil men, and among the other sacraments, absolution
5192 which is the use of the keys should be reckoned: but that through "members of the Dove," i.e. holy men, He grants forgiveness
5193 of sins, in so far as He remits sins on account of their intercession.
5194 </p>
5195 <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p12"> We might also reply that by "members of the Dove" he means all who are not cut off from the Church, for those who receive
5196 the sacraments from them, receive grace, whereas those who receive the sacraments from those who are cut off from the Church,
5197 do not receive grace, because they sin in so doing, except in the case of Baptism, which, in cases of necessity, may be received
5198 even from one who is excommunicate.
5199 </p>
5200 <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p13">
5201 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The prayer which the wicked priest proffers on his own account, is not efficacious: but that which he makes as a minister
5202 of the Church, is efficacious through the merit of Christ. Yet in both ways the priest's prayer should profit those who are
5203 subject to him.
5204 </p>
5205 <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p14"></p>
5206 <p id="XP_Q19_A5-p15"></p>
5207 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A4.html"></a>
5208 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
5209 </div>
5210 <div id="XP_Q19_A6" class="div4">
5211 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
5212 <a href="summa.XP_Q20.html"></a>
5213 <h4 id="XP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys?</h4>
5214 <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p1"></p>
5215 <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p2">
5216 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys. For
5217 just as the power of the keys results from orders, so does the power of consecration. But the above cannot lose the use of
5218 the power of consecration, since if they do consecrate it is valid, though they sin in doing so. Therefore neither can they
5219 lose the use of the keys.
5220 </p>
5221 <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p3">
5222 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, any active spiritual power in one who has the use of his free-will can be exercised by him when he wills. Now the
5223 power of the keys remains in the aforesaid, for, since it is only conferred with orders, they would have to be reordained
5224 when they return to the Church. Therefore, since it is an active power, they can exercise it when they will.
5225 </p>
5226 <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p4">
5227 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, spiritual grace is hindered by guilt more than by punishment. Now excommunication, suspension and degradation are
5228 punishments. Therefore, since a man does not lose the use of the keys on account of guilt, it seems that he does not lose
5229 it on account of the aforesaid.
5230 </p>
5231 <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p5">
5232 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. cxxi in Joan.) that the "charity of the Church forgives sins." Now it is the charity of the Church
5233 which unites its members. Since therefore the above are disunited from the Church, it seems that they have not the use of
5234 the keys in remitting sins.
5235 </p>
5236 <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p6"> Further, no man is absolved from sin by sinning. Now it is a sin for anyone to seek absolution of his sins from the above,
5237 for he disobeys the Church in so doing. Therefore he cannot be absolved by them: and so the same conclusion follows.
5238 </p>
5239 <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p7">
5240 <b>I answer that,</b> In all the above the power of the keys remains as to its essence, but its use is hindered on account of the lack of matter.
5241 For since the use of the keys requires in the user authority over the person on whom they are used, as stated above (
5242 <a id="XP_Q19_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html">Q[17], A[2]</a>, ad 2), the proper matter on whom one can exercise the use of the keys is a man under one's authority. And since it is by
5243 appointment of the Church that one man has authority over
5244 another, so a man may be deprived of his authority over another by his ecclesiastical superiors. Consequently, since the Church
5245 deprives heretics, schismatics and the like, by withdrawing their subjects from them either altogether or in some respect,
5246 in so far as they are thus deprived, they cannot have the use of the keys.
5247 </p>
5248 <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p8">
5249 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist, on which the priest exercises his power, is not a man but wheaten bread, and
5250 in Baptism, the matter is simply a man. Wherefore, just as, were a heretic to be without wheaten bread, he could not consecrate,
5251 so neither can a prelate absolve if he be deprived of his authority, yet he can baptize and consecrate, albeit to his own
5252 damnation.
5253 </p>
5254 <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p9">
5255 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The assertion is true, provided matter be not lacking as it is in the case in point.
5256 </p>
5257 <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p10">
5258 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sin, of itself, does not remove matter, as certain punishments do: so that punishment is a hindrance not because it is contrary
5259 to the effect, but for the reason stated.
5260 </p>
5261 <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p11"></p>
5262 <p id="XP_Q19_A6-p12"></p>
5263 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A5.html"></a>
5264 <a href="summa.XP_Q20.html"></a>
5265 </div>
5266 <a href="summa.XP_Q18_A4.html"></a>
5267 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A1.html"></a>
5268 </div>
5269 <div id="XP_Q20" class="div3">
5270 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
5271 <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
5272 <h3 id="XP_Q20-p0.1">OF THOSE ON WHOM THE POWER OF THE KEYS CAN BE EXERCISED (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
5273 <p id="XP_Q20-p1"></p>
5274 <p id="XP_Q20-p2"> We must now consider those on whom the power of the keys can be exercised. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
5275 <p id="XP_Q20-p3"> (1) Whether a priest can use the key, which he has, on any man?</p>
5276 <p id="XP_Q20-p4"> (2) Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?</p>
5277 <p id="XP_Q20-p5"> (3) Whether anyone can use the keys on his superior?</p>
5278 <div id="XP_Q20_A1" class="div4">
5279 <a href="summa.XP_Q20.html"></a>
5280 <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
5281 <h4 id="XP_Q20_A1-p0.1">Whether a priest can use the key which he has, on any man?</h4>
5282 <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p1"></p>
5283 <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p2">
5284 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a priest can use the key which he has, on any man. For the power of the keys was bestowed on priests by
5285 Divine authority in the words: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them" (
5286 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q20_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.22" target="asv">Jn. 20:22,23</a>). But this was said without any restriction. Therefore he that has the key, can use it on any without restriction.
5287 </p>
5288 <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p3">
5289 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a material key that opens one lock, opens all locks of the same pattern. Now every sin of every man is the same
5290 kind of obstacle against entering into heaven. Therefore if a priest can, by means of the key which he has, absolve one man,
5291 he can do the same for all others.
5292 </p>
5293 <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p4">
5294 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the priesthood of the New Testament is more perfect than that of the Old Testament. But the priest of the Old Testament
5295 could use the power which he had of discerning between different kinds of leprosy, with regard to all indiscriminately. Much
5296 more therefore can the priest of the Gospel use his power with regard to all.
5297 </p>
5298 <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p5">
5299 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in the Appendix of Gratian: "It is not lawful for every priest to loose or bind another priest's parishioner."
5300 Therefore a priest cannot absolve everybody.
5301 </p>
5302 <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p6"> Further, judgment in spiritual matters should be better regulated than in temporal matters. But in temporal matters a judge
5303 cannot judge everybody. Therefore, since the use of the keys is a kind of judgment, it is not within the competency of a priest
5304 to use his key with regard to everyone.
5305 </p>
5306 <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p7">
5307 <b>I answer that,</b> That which has to do with singular matters is not equally in the power of all. Thus, even as besides the general principles
5308 of medicine, it is necessary to have physicians, who adapt those general principles to individual patients or diseases, according
5309 to their various requirements, so in every kingdom, besides that one who proclaims the universal precepts of law, there is
5310 need for others to adapt those precepts to individual cases, according as each case
5311 demands. For this reason, in the heavenly hierarchy also, under the Powers who rule indiscriminately, a place is given to
5312 the Principalities, who are appointed to individual kingdoms, and to the Angels who are given charge over individual men,
5313 as we have explained above (
5314 <a id="XP_Q20_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q113_A1.html">FP, Q[113], AA[1]</a>,2). Consequently there should be a like order of authority in the Church Militant, so that an indiscriminate authority over
5315 all should be vested in one individual, and that there
5316 should be others under him, having distinct authority over various people. Now the use of the keys implies a certain power
5317 to exercise authority, whereby the one on whom the keys are used, becomes the proper matter of that act. Therefore he that
5318 has power over all indiscriminately, can use the keys on all, whereas those who have received authority over distinct persons,
5319 cannot use the keys on everyone, but only on those over whom they are appointed, except in cases of necessity, when the
5320 sacraments should be refused to no one.
5321 </p>
5322 <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p8">
5323 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A twofold power is required in order to absolve from sins, namely, power of order and power of jurisdiction. The former power
5324 is equally in all priests, but not the latter. And therefore, when our Lord (
5325 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q20_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.23" target="asv">Jn. 20:23</a>) gave all the apostles in general, the power of forgiving sins, this is to be understood of the power which results from
5326 receiving orders, wherefore these words are addressed to priests when they are ordained. But to
5327 Peter in particular He gave the power of forgiving sins (
5328 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q20_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>), that we may understand that he has the power of jurisdiction before the others. But the power of orders, considered in
5329 itself, extends to all who can be absolved: wherefore our Lord said indeterminately, "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are
5330 forgiven them," on the understanding that this power should be used in dependence on the power given to Peter, according to
5331 His appointment.
5332 </p>
5333 <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p9">
5334 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A material key can open only its own lock. nor can any active force act save on its own matter. Now a man becomes the matter
5335 of the power of order by jurisdiction: and consequently no one can use the key in respect of another over whom he has not
5336 jurisdiction.
5337 </p>
5338 <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p10">
5339 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The people of Israel were one people, and had but one temple, so that there was no need for a distinction in priestly jurisdiction,
5340 as there is now in the Church which comprises various peoples and nations.
5341 </p>
5342 <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p11"></p>
5343 <p id="XP_Q20_A1-p12"></p>
5344 <a href="summa.XP_Q20.html"></a>
5345 <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
5346 </div>
5347 <div id="XP_Q20_A2" class="div4">
5348 <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
5349 <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
5350 <h4 id="XP_Q20_A2-p0.1">Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?</h4>
5351 <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p1"></p>
5352 <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p2">
5353 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a priest cannot always absolve his subject. For, as Augustine says (De vera et false Poenitentia [*Work
5354 of an unknown author]), "no man should exercise the priestly office, unless he be free from those things which he condemns
5355 in others." But a priest might happen to share in a sin committed by his subject, e.g. by knowledge of a woman who is his
5356 subject. Therefore it seems that he cannot always use the power of the keys on his subjects.
5357 </p>
5358 <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p3">
5359 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by the power of the keys a man is healed of all his shortcomings. Now it happens sometimes that a sin has attached
5360 to it a defect of irregularity or a sentence of excommunication, from which a simple priest cannot absolve. Therefore it seems
5361 that he cannot use the power of the keys on such as are shackled by these things in the above manner.
5362 </p>
5363 <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p4">
5364 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the judgment and power of our priesthood was foreshadowed by the judgment of the ancient priesthood. Now according
5365 to the Law, the lesser judges were not competent to decide all cases, and had recourse to the higher judges, according to
5366 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q20_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.24.14" target="asv"> Ex. 24:14</a>: "If any question shall arise" among you, "you shall refer it to them." It seems, therefore, that a priest cannot absolve
5367 his subject from graver sins, but should refer him to his
5368 superior.
5369 </p>
5370 <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p5">
5371 <b>On the contrary,</b> Whoever has charge of the principal has charge of the accessory. Now priests are charged with the dispensation of the Eucharist
5372 to their subjects, to which sacrament the absolution of sins is subordinate [*Cf.
5373 <a id="XP_Q20_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html"> Q[17], A[2]</a>, ad 1]. Therefore, as far as the power of the keys is concerned, a priest can absolve his subject from any sins whatever.
5374 </p>
5375 <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p6"> Further, grace, however small, removes all sin. But a priest dispenses sacraments whereby grace is given. Therefore, as far
5376 as the power of the keys is concerned, he can absolve from all sins.
5377 </p>
5378 <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p7">
5379 <b>I answer that,</b> The power of order, considered in itself, extends to the remission of all sins. But since, as stated above, the use of this
5380 power requires jurisdiction which inferiors derive from their superiors, it follows that the superior can reserve certain
5381 matters to himself, the judgment of which he does not commit to his inferior; otherwise any simple priest who has jurisdiction
5382 can absolve from any sin. Now there are five cases in which a simple priest must refer
5383 his penitent to his superior. The first is when a public penance has to be imposed, because in that case the bishop is the
5384 proper minister of the sacrament. The second is the case of those who are excommunicated when the inferior priest cannot absolve
5385 a penitent through the latter being excommunicated by his superior. The third case is when he finds that an irregularity has
5386 been contracted, for the dispensation of which he has to have recourse to his superior. The fourth is the case of arson.
5387 The fifth is when it is the custom in a diocese for the more heinous crimes to be reserved to the bishop, in order to inspire
5388 fear, because custom in these cases either gives the power or takes it away.
5389 </p>
5390 <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p8">
5391 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this case the priest should not hear the confession of his accomplice, with regard to that particular sin, but must refer
5392 her to another: nor should she confess to him but should ask permission to go to another, or should have recourse to his superior
5393 if he refused, both on account of the danger, and for the sake of less shame. If, however, he were to absolve her it would
5394 be valid*: because when Augustine says that they should not be guilty of the
5395 same sin, he is speaking of what is congruous, not of what is essential to the sacrament. [*Benedict XIV declared the absolution
5396 of an accomplice "in materia turpi" to be invalid.]
5397 </p>
5398 <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p9">
5399 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Penance delivers man from all defects of guilt, but not from all defects of punishment, since even after doing penance for
5400 murder, a man remains irregular. Hence a priest can absolve from a crime, but for the remission of the punishment he must
5401 refer the penitent to the superior, except in the case of excommunication, absolution from which should precede absolution
5402 from sin, for as long as a man is excommunicated, he cannot receive any sacrament of
5403 the Church.
5404 </p>
5405 <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p10">
5406 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers those cases in which superiors reserve the power of jurisdiction to themselves.
5407 </p>
5408 <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p11"></p>
5409 <p id="XP_Q20_A2-p12"></p>
5410 <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
5411 <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
5412 </div>
5413 <div id="XP_Q20_A3" class="div4">
5414 <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
5415 <a href="summa.XP_Q21.html"></a>
5416 <h4 id="XP_Q20_A3-p0.1">Whether a man can use the keys with regard to his superior?</h4>
5417 <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p1"></p>
5418 <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p2">
5419 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man cannot use the keys in respect of a superior. For every sacramental act requires its proper matter.
5420 Now the proper matter for the use of the keys, is a person who is subject, as stated above (
5421 <a id="XP_Q20_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q19_A6.html">Q[19], A[6]</a>). Therefore a priest cannot use the keys in respect of one who is not his subject.
5422 </p>
5423 <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p3">
5424 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Church Militant is an image of the Church Triumphant. Now in the heavenly Church an inferior angel never cleanses,
5425 enlightens or perfects a higher angel. Therefore neither can an inferior priest exercise on a superior a hierarchical action
5426 such as absolution.
5427 </p>
5428 <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p4">
5429 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the judgment of Penance should be better regulated than the judgment of an external court. Now in the external court
5430 an inferior cannot excommunicate or absolve his superior. Therefore, seemingly, neither can he do so in the penitential court.
5431 </p>
5432 <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p5">
5433 <b>On the contrary,</b> The higher prelate is also "compassed with infirmity," and may happen to sin. Now the power of the keys is the remedy for
5434 sin. Therefore, since he cannot use the key on himself, for he cannot be both judge and accused at the same time, it seems
5435 that an inferior can use the power of the keys on him.
5436 </p>
5437 <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p6"> Further, absolution which is given through the power of the keys, is ordained to the reception of the Eucharist. But an inferior
5438 can give Communion to his superior, if the latter asks him to. Therefore he can use the power of the keys on him if he submit
5439 to him.
5440 </p>
5441 <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p7">
5442 <b>I answer that,</b> The power of the keys, considered in itself, is applicable to all, as stated above
5443 <a id="XP_Q20_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q20_A2.html">(A[2])</a>: and that a priest is unable to use the keys on some particular person is due to his power being limited to certain individuals.
5444 Therefore he who limited his power can extend it to whom he wills, so that he can give him power over himself, although he
5445 cannot use the power of the keys on himself, because this power requires to be exercised on a
5446 subject, and therefore on someone else, for no man can be subject to himself.
5447 </p>
5448 <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p8">
5449 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the bishop whom a simple priest absolves is his superior absolutely speaking, yet he is beneath him in so far as
5450 he submits himself as a sinner to him.
5451 </p>
5452 <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p9">
5453 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the angels there can be no defect by reason of which the higher angel can submit to the lower, such as there can happen
5454 to be among men; and so there is no comparison.
5455 </p>
5456 <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p10">
5457 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> External judgment is according to men, whereas the judgment of confession is according to God, in Whose sight a man is lessened
5458 by sinning, which is not the case in human prelacy. Therefore just as in external judgment no man can pass sentence of excommunication
5459 on himself, so neither can he empower another to excommunicate him. On the other hand, in the tribunal of conscience he can
5460 give another the power to absolve him, though he cannot use that
5461 power himself.
5462 </p>
5463 <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p11"> It may also be replied that absolution in the tribunal of the confessional belongs principally to the power of the keys and
5464 consequently to the power of jurisdiction, whereas excommunication regards jurisdiction exclusively. And, as to the power
5465 of orders, all are equal, but not as to jurisdiction. Wherefore there is no comparison.
5466 </p>
5467 <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p12"></p>
5468 <p id="XP_Q20_A3-p13"></p>
5469 <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A2.html"></a>
5470 <a href="summa.XP_Q21.html"></a>
5471 </div>
5472 <a href="summa.XP_Q19_A6.html"></a>
5473 <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A1.html"></a>
5474 </div>
5475 <div id="XP_Q21" class="div3">
5476 <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
5477 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
5478 <h3 id="XP_Q21-p0.1">OF THE DEFINITION, CONGRUITY AND CAUSE OF EXCOMMUNICATION (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
5479 <p id="XP_Q21-p1"></p>
5480 <p id="XP_Q21-p2"> We must now treat of excommunication: we shall consider: (1) the definition, congruity and cause of excommunication; (2)
5481 who has the power to excommunicate; (3) communication with excommunicated persons; (4) absolution from excommunication.
5482 </p>
5483 <p id="XP_Q21-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
5484 <p id="XP_Q21-p4"> (1) Whether excommunication is suitably defined?</p>
5485 <p id="XP_Q21-p5"> (2) Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?</p>
5486 <p id="XP_Q21-p6"> (3) Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm?</p>
5487 <p id="XP_Q21-p7"> (4) Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?</p>
5488 <div id="XP_Q21_A1" class="div4">
5489 <a href="summa.XP_Q21.html"></a>
5490 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
5491 <h4 id="XP_Q21_A1-p0.1">Whether excommunication is suitably defined as separation from the communion of the Church, etc?</h4>
5492 <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p1"></p>
5493 <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p2">
5494 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that excommunication is unsuitably defined by some thus: "Excommunication is separation from the communion
5495 of the Church, as to fruit and general suffrages." For the suffrages of the Church avail for those for whom they are offered.
5496 But the Church prays for those who are outside the Church, as, for instance, for heretics and pagans. Therefore she prays
5497 also for the excommunicated, since they are outside the Church, and so the suffrages of the
5498 Church avail for them.
5499 </p>
5500 <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p3">
5501 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one loses the suffrages of the Church except by his own fault. Now excommunication is not a fault, but a punishment.
5502 Therefore excommunication does not deprive a man of the general suffrages of the Church.
5503 </p>
5504 <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p4">
5505 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fruit of the Church seems to be the same as the Church's suffrages, for it cannot mean the fruit of temporal
5506 goods, since excommunication does not deprive a man of these. Therefore there is no reason for mentioning both.
5507 </p>
5508 <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p5">
5509 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there is a kind of excommunication called minor*, by which man is not deprived of the suffrages of the Church. [*Minor
5510 excommunication is no longer recognized by Canon Law.] Therefore this definition is unsuitable.
5511 </p>
5512 <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p6">
5513 <b>I answer that,</b> When a man enters the Church by Baptism, he is admitted to two things, viz. the body of the faithful and the participation
5514 of the sacraments: and this latter presupposes the former, since the faithful are united together in the participation of
5515 the sacraments. Consequently a person may be expelled from the Church in two ways. First, by being deprived merely of the
5516 participation of the sacraments, and this is the minor excommunication. Secondly, by being
5517 deprived of both, and this is the major excommunication, of which the above is the definition. Nor can there be a third, consisting
5518 in the privation of communion with the faithful, but not of the participation of the sacraments, for the reason already given,
5519 because, to wit, the faithful communicate together in the sacraments. Now communion with the faithful is twofold. One consists
5520 in spiritual things, such as their praying for one another, and meeting together for the reception of sacred
5521 things; while another consists in certain legitimate bodily actions. These different manners of communion are signified in
5522 the verse which declares that those who are excommunicate are deprived of---
5523 </p>
5524 <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p7"> "os, orare, vale, communio, mensa."</p>
5525 <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p8">"Os," i.e. we must not give them tokens of goodwill; "orare," i.e. we must not pray with them; "vale," we must not give them
5526 marks of respect; "communio," i.e. we must not communicate with them in the sacraments; "mensa," i.e. we must not take meals
5527 with them. Accordingly the above definition includes privation of the sacraments in the words "as to the fruit," and from
5528 partaking together with the faithful in spiritual things, in the words, "and the general prayers of the
5529 Church."
5530 </p>
5531 <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p9"> Another definition is given which expresses the privation of both kinds of acts, and is as follows: "Excommunication is the
5532 privation of all lawful communion with the faithful."
5533 </p>
5534 <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p10">
5535 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prayers are said for unbelievers, but they do not receive the fruit of those prayers unless they be converted to the faith.
5536 In like manner prayers may be offered up for those who are excommunicated, but not among the prayers that are said for the
5537 members of the Church. Yet they do not receive the fruit so long as they remain under the excommunication, but prayers are
5538 said for them that they may receive the spirit of repentance, so that they may be
5539 loosed from excommunication.
5540 </p>
5541 <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p11">
5542 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One man's prayers profit another in so far as they can reach to him. Now the action of one man may reach to another in two
5543 ways. First, by virtue of charity which unites all the faithful, making them one in God, according to
5544 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.63" target="asv"> Ps. 118:63</a>: "I am a partaker with all them that fear Thee." Now excommunication does not interrupt this union, since no man can be justly
5545 excommunicated except for a mortal sin, whereby a man is already
5546 separated from charity, even without being excommunicated. An unjust excommunication cannot deprive a man of charity, since
5547 this is one of the greatest of all goods, of which a man cannot be deprived against his will. Secondly, through the intention
5548 of the one who prays, which intention is directed to the person he prays for, and this union is interrupted by excommunication,
5549 because by passing sentence of excommunication, the Church severs a man from the whole body of the faithful, for whom she
5550 prays. Hence those prayers of the Church which are offered up for the whole Church, do not profit those who are excommunicated.
5551 Nor can prayers be said for them among the members of the Church as speaking in the Church's name, although a private individual
5552 may say a prayer with the intention of offering it for their conversion.
5553 </p>
5554 <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p12">
5555 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The spiritual fruit of the Church is derived not only from her prayers, but also from the sacraments received and from the
5556 faithful dwelling together.
5557 </p>
5558 <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p13">
5559 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The minor excommunication does not fulfill all the conditions of excommunication but only a part of them, hence the definition
5560 of excommunication need not apply to it in every respect, but only in some.
5561 </p>
5562 <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p14"></p>
5563 <p id="XP_Q21_A1-p15"></p>
5564 <a href="summa.XP_Q21.html"></a>
5565 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
5566 </div>
5567 <div id="XP_Q21_A2" class="div4">
5568 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
5569 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
5570 <h4 id="XP_Q21_A2-p0.1">Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?</h4>
5571 <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p1"></p>
5572 <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p2">
5573 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Church ought not to excommunicate anyone, because excommunication is a kind of curse, and we are forbidden
5574 to curse (
5575 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.14" target="asv">Rom. 12:14</a>). Therefore the Church should not excommunicate.
5576 </p>
5577 <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p3">
5578 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Church Militant should imitate the Church Triumphant. Now we read in the epistle of Jude (verse 9) that "when
5579 Michael the Archangel disputing with the devil contended about the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment
5580 of railing speech, but said: The Lord command thee." Therefore the Church Militant ought not to judge any man by cursing or
5581 excommunicating him.
5582 </p>
5583 <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p4">
5584 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man should be given into the hands of his enemies, unless there be no hope for him. Now by excommunication a
5585 man is given into the hands of Satan, as is clear from
5586 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:5.</a> Since then we should never give up hope about anyone in this life, the Church should not excommunicate anyone.
5587 </p>
5588 <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p5">
5589 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle (
5590 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:5</a>) ordered a man to be excommunicated.
5591 </p>
5592 <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p6"> Further, it is written (
5593 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.17" target="asv">Mat. 18:17</a>) about the man who refuses to hear the Church: "Let him be to thee as the heathen or publican." But heathens are outside
5594 the Church. Therefore they also who refuse to hear the Church, should be banished from the Church by excommunication.
5595 </p>
5596 <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p7">
5597 <b>I answer that,</b> The judgment of the Church should be conformed to the judgment of God. Now God punishes the sinner in many ways, in order
5598 to draw him to good, either by chastising him with stripes, or by leaving him to himself so that being deprived of those helps
5599 whereby he was kept out of evil, he may acknowledge his weakness, and humbly return to God Whom he had abandoned in his pride.
5600 In both these respects the Church by passing sentence of excommunication imitates the
5601 judgment of God. For by severing a man from the communion of the faithful that he may blush with shame, she imitates the judgment
5602 whereby God chastises man with stripes; and by depriving him of prayers and other spiritual things, she imitates the judgment
5603 of God in leaving man to himself, in order that by humility he may learn to know himself and return to God.
5604 </p>
5605 <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p8">
5606 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A curse may be pronounced in two ways: first, so that the intention of the one who curses is fixed on the evil which he invokes
5607 or pronounces, and cursing in this sense is altogether forbidden. Secondly, so that the evil which a man invokes in cursing
5608 is intended for the good of the one who is cursed, and thus cursing is sometimes lawful and salutary: thus a physician makes
5609 a sick man undergo pain, by cutting him, for instance, in order to deliver him
5610 from his sickness.
5611 </p>
5612 <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p9">
5613 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The devil cannot be brought to repentance, wherefore the pain of excommunication cannot do him any good.
5614 </p>
5615 <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p10">
5616 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the very fact that a man is deprived of the prayers of the Church, he incurs a triple loss, corresponding to the three
5617 things which a man acquires through the Church's prayers. For they bring an increase of grace to those who have it, or merit
5618 grace for those who have it not; and in this respect the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. iv, D, 18): "The grace of God
5619 is taken away by excommunication." They also prove a safeguard of virtue; and in
5620 this respect he says that "protection is taken away," not that the excommunicated person is withdrawn altogether from God's
5621 providence, but that he is excluded from that protection with which He watches over the children of the Church in a more special
5622 way. Moreover, they are useful as a defense against the enemy, and in this respect he says that "the devil receives greater
5623 power of assaulting the excommunicated person, both spiritually and corporally." Hence in the early Church, when men had
5624 to be enticed to the faith by means of outward signs (thus the gift of the Holy Ghost was shown openly by a visible sign),
5625 so too excommunication was evidenced by a person being troubled in his body by the devil. Nor is it unreasonable that one,
5626 for whom there is still hope, be given over to the enemy, for he is surrendered, not unto damnation, but unto correction,
5627 since the Church has the power to rescue him from the hands of the enemy, whenever he is willing.
5628 </p>
5629 <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p11"></p>
5630 <p id="XP_Q21_A2-p12"></p>
5631 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
5632 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
5633 </div>
5634 <div id="XP_Q21_A3" class="div4">
5635 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
5636 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
5637 <h4 id="XP_Q21_A3-p0.1">Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm?</h4>
5638 <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p1"></p>
5639 <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p2">
5640 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no man should be excommunicated for inflicting a temporal harm. For the punishment should not exceed the
5641 fault. But the punishment of excommunication is the privation of a spiritual good, which surpasses all temporal goods. Therefore
5642 no man should be excommunicated for temporal injuries.
5643 </p>
5644 <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p3">
5645 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we should render to no man evil for evil, according to the precept of the Apostle (
5646 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.17" target="asv">Rom. 12:17</a>). But this would be rendering evil for evil, if a man were to be excommunicated for doing such an injury. Therefore this
5647 ought by no means to be done.
5648 </p>
5649 <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p4">
5650 <b>On the contrary,</b> Peter sentenced Ananias and Saphira to death for keeping back the price of their piece of land (
5651 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.1" target="asv">Acts 5:1-10</a>). Therefore it is lawful for the Church to excommunicate for temporal injuries.
5652 </p>
5653 <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p5">
5654 <b>I answer that,</b> By excommunication the ecclesiastical judge excludes a man, in a sense, from the kingdom. Wherefore, since he ought not to
5655 exclude from the kingdom others than the unworthy, as was made clear from the definition of the keys (
5656 <a id="XP_Q21_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q17_A2.html">Q[17], A[2]</a>), and since no one becomes unworthy, unless, through committing a mortal sin, he lose charity which is the way leading to
5657 the kingdom, it follows that no man should be excommunicated except for a
5658 mortal sin. And since by injuring a man in his body or in his temporalities, one may sin mortally and act against charity,
5659 the Church can excommunicate a man for having inflicted temporal injury on anyone. Yet, as excommunication is the most severe
5660 punishment, and since punishments are intended as remedies, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii), and again since a prudent
5661 physician begins with lighter and less risky remedies, therefore excommunication should not be inflicted, even for a
5662 mortal sin, unless the sinner be obstinate, either by not coming up for judgment, or by going away before judgment is pronounced,
5663 or by failing to obey the decision of the court. For then, if, after due warning, he refuse to obey, he is reckoned to be
5664 obstinate, and the judge, not being able to proceed otherwise against him, must excommunicate him.
5665 </p>
5666 <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p6">
5667 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A fault is not measured by the extent of the damage a man does, but by the will with which he does it, acting against charity.
5668 Wherefore, though the punishment of excommunication exceeds the harm done, it does not exceed the measure of the sin.
5669 </p>
5670 <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p7">
5671 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man is corrected by being punished, evil is not rendered to him, but good: since punishments are remedies, as stated
5672 above.
5673 </p>
5674 <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p8"></p>
5675 <p id="XP_Q21_A3-p9"></p>
5676 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A2.html"></a>
5677 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
5678 </div>
5679 <div id="XP_Q21_A4" class="div4">
5680 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
5681 <a href="summa.XP_Q22.html"></a>
5682 <h4 id="XP_Q21_A4-p0.1">Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?</h4>
5683 <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p1"></p>
5684 <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p2">
5685 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an excommunication which is pronounced unjustly has no effect at all. Because excommunication deprives
5686 a man of the protection and grace of God, which cannot be forfeited unjustly. Therefore excommunication has no effect if it
5687 be unjustly pronounced.
5688 </p>
5689 <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p3">
5690 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Jerome says (on
5691 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q21_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv"> Mat. 16:19</a>: "I will give to thee the keys"): "It is a pharisaical severity to reckon as really bound or loosed, that which is bound
5692 or loosed unjustly." But that severity was proud and erroneous. Therefore an unjust excommunication has no effect.
5693 </p>
5694 <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p4">
5695 <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.), "the sentence of the pastor is to be feared whether it be just or unjust." Now
5696 there would be no reason to fear an unjust excommunication if it did not hurt. Therefore, etc.
5697 </p>
5698 <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p5">
5699 <b>I answer that,</b> An excommunication may be unjust for two reasons. First, on the part of its author, as when anyone excommunicates through
5700 hatred or anger, and then, nevertheless, the excommunication takes effect, though its author sins, because the one who is
5701 excommunicated suffers justly, even if the author act wrongly in excommunicating him. Secondly, on the part of the excommunication,
5702 through there being no proper cause, or through the sentence being passed without the
5703 forms of law being observed. In this case, if the error, on the part of the sentence, be such as to render the sentence void,
5704 this has no effect, for there is no excommunication; but if the error does not annul the sentence, this takes effect, and
5705 the person excommunicated should humbly submit (which will be credited to him as a merit), and either seek absolution from
5706 the person who has excommunicated him, or appeal to a higher judge. If, however, he were to contemn the sentence, he would
5707 "ipso
5708 facto" sin mortally.
5709 </p>
5710 <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p6"> But sometimes it happens that there is sufficient cause on the part of the excommunicator, but not on the part of the excommunicated,
5711 as when a man is excommunicated for a crime which he has not committed, but which has been proved against him: in this case,
5712 if he submit humbly, the merit of his humility will compensate him for the harm of excommunication.
5713 </p>
5714 <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p7">
5715 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although a man cannot lose God's grace unjustly, yet he can unjustly lose those things which on our part dispose us to receive
5716 grace. for instance, a man may be deprived of the instruction which he ought to have. It is in this sense that excommunication
5717 is said to deprive a man of God's grace, as was explained above (A[2], ad 3).
5718 </p>
5719 <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p8">
5720 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Jerome is speaking of sin not of its punishments, which can be inflicted unjustly by ecclesiastical superiors.
5721 </p>
5722 <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p9"></p>
5723 <p id="XP_Q21_A4-p10"></p>
5724 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A3.html"></a>
5725 <a href="summa.XP_Q22.html"></a>
5726 </div>
5727 <a href="summa.XP_Q20_A3.html"></a>
5728 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A1.html"></a>
5729 </div>
5730 <div id="XP_Q22" class="div3">
5731 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
5732 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
5733 <h3 id="XP_Q22-p0.1">OF THOSE WHO CAN EXCOMMUNICATE OR BE EXCOMMUNICATED (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
5734 <p id="XP_Q22-p1"></p>
5735 <p id="XP_Q22-p2"> We must now consider those who can excommunicate or be excommunicated. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
5736 <p id="XP_Q22-p3"> (1) Whether every priest can excommunicate?</p>
5737 <p id="XP_Q22-p4"> (2) Whether one who is not a priest can excommunicate?</p>
5738 <p id="XP_Q22-p5"> (3) Whether one who is excommunicated or suspended, can excommunicate?</p>
5739 <p id="XP_Q22-p6"> (4) Whether anyone can excommunicate himself, or an equal, or a superior?</p>
5740 <p id="XP_Q22-p7"> (5) Whether a multitude can be excommunicated?</p>
5741 <p id="XP_Q22-p8"> (6) Whether one who is already excommunicated can be excommunicated again?</p>
5742 <div id="XP_Q22_A1" class="div4">
5743 <a href="summa.XP_Q22.html"></a>
5744 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
5745 <h4 id="XP_Q22_A1-p0.1">Whether every priest can excommunicate?</h4>
5746 <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p1"></p>
5747 <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p2">
5748 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every priest can excommunicate. For excommunication is an act of the keys. But every priest has the keys.
5749 Therefore every priest can excommunicate.
5750 </p>
5751 <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p3">
5752 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is a greater thing to loose and bind in the tribunal of penance than in the tribunal of judgment. But every priest
5753 can loose and bind his subjects in the tribunal of Penance. Therefore every priest can excommunicate his subjects.
5754 </p>
5755 <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p4">
5756 <b>On the contrary,</b> Matters fraught with danger should be left to the decision of superiors. Now the punishment of excommunication is fraught
5757 with many dangers, unless it be inflicted with moderation. Therefore it should not be entrusted to every priest.
5758 </p>
5759 <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p5">
5760 <b>I answer that,</b> In the tribunal of conscience the plea is between man and God, whereas in the outward tribunal it is between man and man.
5761 Wherefore the loosing or binding of one man in relation to God alone, belongs to the tribunal of Penance, whereas the binding
5762 or loosing of a man in relation to other men, belongs to the public tribunal of external judgment. And since excommunication
5763 severs a man from the communion of the faithful, it belongs to the external tribunal.
5764 Consequently those alone can excommunicate who have jurisdiction in the judicial tribunal. Hence, of their own authority,
5765 only bishops and higher prelates, according to the more common opinion can excommunicate, whereas parish priests can do so
5766 only by commission or in certain cases, as those of theft, rapine and the like, in which the law allows them to excommunicate.
5767 Others, however, have maintained that even parish priests can excommunicate: but the former opinion is more reasonable.
5768 </p>
5769 <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p6">
5770 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Excommunication is an act of the keys not directly, but with respect to the external judgment. The sentence of excommunication,
5771 however, though it is promulgated by an external verdict, still, as it belongs somewhat to the entrance to the kingdom, in
5772 so far as the Church Militant is the way to the Church Triumphant, this jurisdiction whereby a man is competent to excommunicate,
5773 can be called a key. It is in this sense that some distinguish between the
5774 key of orders, which all priests have, and the key of jurisdiction in the tribunal of judgment, which none have but the judges
5775 of the external tribunal. Nevertheless God bestowed both on Peter (
5776 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q22_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>), from whom they are derived by others, whichever of them they have.
5777 </p>
5778 <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p7">
5779 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Parish priests have jurisdiction indeed over their subjects, in the tribunal of conscience, but not in the judicial tribunal,
5780 for they cannot summons them in contentious cases. Hence they cannot excommunicate, but they can absolve them in the tribunal
5781 of Penance. And though the tribunal of Penance is higher, yet more solemnity is requisite in the judicial tribunal, because
5782 therein it is necessary to make satisfaction not only to God but also to
5783 man.
5784 </p>
5785 <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p8"></p>
5786 <p id="XP_Q22_A1-p9"></p>
5787 <a href="summa.XP_Q22.html"></a>
5788 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
5789 </div>
5790 <div id="XP_Q22_A2" class="div4">
5791 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
5792 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
5793 <h4 id="XP_Q22_A2-p0.1">Whether those who are not priests can excommunicate? </h4>
5794 <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p1"></p>
5795 <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p2">
5796 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those who are not priests cannot excommunicate. Because excommunication is an act of the keys, as stated
5797 in Sent. iv, D, 18. But those who are not priests have not the keys. Therefore they cannot excommunicate.
5798 </p>
5799 <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p3">
5800 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, more is required for excommunication than for absolution in the tribunal of Penance. But one who is not a priest
5801 cannot absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Neither therefore can he excommunicate.
5802 </p>
5803 <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p4">
5804 <b>On the contrary,</b> Archdeacons, legates and bishops-elect excommunicate, and yet sometimes they are not priests. Therefore not only priests
5805 can excommunicate.
5806 </p>
5807 <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p5">
5808 <b>I answer that,</b> Priests alone are competent to dispense the sacraments wherein grace is given: wherefore they alone can loose and bind in
5809 the tribunal of Penance. On the other hand excommunication regards grace, not directly but consequently, in so far as it deprives
5810 a man of the Church's prayers, by which he is disposed for grace or preserved therein. Consequently even those who are not
5811 priests, provided they have jurisdiction in a contentious court, can excommunicate.
5812 </p>
5813 <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p6">
5814 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though they have not the key of orders, they have the key of jurisdiction.
5815 </p>
5816 <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p7">
5817 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These two are related to one another as something exceeding and something exceeded [*Cf. A[1], a[2];
5818 <a id="XP_Q22_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q24_A1.html"> Q[24], A[1]</a>, ad 1], and consequently one of them may be within the competency of someone while the other is not.
5819 </p>
5820 <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p8"></p>
5821 <p id="XP_Q22_A2-p9"></p>
5822 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
5823 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
5824 </div>
5825 <div id="XP_Q22_A3" class="div4">
5826 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
5827 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
5828 <h4 id="XP_Q22_A3-p0.1">Whether a man who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate another?</h4>
5829 <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p1"></p>
5830 <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p2">
5831 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate another. For such a one has lost neither orders
5832 nor jurisdiction, since neither is he ordained anew when he is absolved, nor is his jurisdiction renewed. But excommunication
5833 requires nothing more than orders or jurisdiction. Therefore even one who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate.
5834 </p>
5835 <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p3">
5836 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further. it is a greater thing to consecrate the body of Christ than to excommunicate. But such persons can consecrate. Therefore
5837 they can excommunicate.
5838 </p>
5839 <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p4">
5840 <b>On the contrary,</b> one whose body is bound cannot bind another. But spiritual gyves are stronger than bodily fetters. Therefore one who is excommunicated
5841 cannot excommunicate another, since excommunication is a spiritual chain.
5842 </p>
5843 <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p5">
5844 <b>I answer that,</b> Jurisdiction can only be used in relation to another man. Consequently, since every excommunicated person is severed from
5845 the communion of the faithful, he is deprived of the use of jurisdiction. And as excommunication requires jurisdiction, an
5846 excommunicated person cannot excommunicate, and the same reason applies to one who is suspended from jurisdiction. For if
5847 he be suspended from orders only, then he cannot exercise his order, but he can use his
5848 jurisdiction, while, on the other hand, if he be suspended from jurisdiction and not from orders. he cannot use his jurisdiction,
5849 though he can exercise his order: and if he be suspended from both, he can exercise neither.
5850 </p>
5851 <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p6">
5852 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although an excommunicated or suspended person does not lose his jurisdiction, yet he does lose its use.
5853 </p>
5854 <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p7">
5855 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of consecration results from the power of the character which is indelible, wherefore, from the very fact that
5856 a man has the character of order, he can always consecrate, though not always lawfully. It is different with the power of
5857 excommunication which results from jurisdiction, for this can be taken away and bound.
5858 </p>
5859 <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p8"></p>
5860 <p id="XP_Q22_A3-p9"></p>
5861 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A2.html"></a>
5862 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
5863 </div>
5864 <div id="XP_Q22_A4" class="div4">
5865 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
5866 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A5.html"></a>
5867 <h4 id="XP_Q22_A4-p0.1">Whether a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or his superior?</h4>
5868 <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p1"></p>
5869 <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p2">
5870 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or his superior. For an angel of God was greater than Paul,
5871 according to
5872 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q22_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>: "He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater then he, a greater" than whom "hath not risen among men that are
5873 born of women." Now Paul excommunicated an angel from heaven (
5874 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q22_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.1.8" target="asv">Gal. 1:8</a>). Therefore a man can excommunicate his superior.
5875 </p>
5876 <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p3">
5877 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sometimes a priest pronounces a general excommunication for theft or the like. But it might happen that he, or his
5878 equal, or a superior has done such things. Therefore a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or a superior.
5879 </p>
5880 <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p4">
5881 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man can absolve his superior or his equal in the tribunal of Penance, as when a bishop confesses to his subject,
5882 or one priest confesses venial sins to another. Therefore it seems that a man may also excommunicate his superior, or his
5883 equal.
5884 </p>
5885 <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p5">
5886 <b>On the contrary,</b> Excommunication is an act of jurisdiction. But no man has jurisdiction over himself (since one cannot be both judge and defendant
5887 in the same trial), or over his superior, or over an equal. Therefore a man cannot excommunicate his superior, or his equal,
5888 or himself.
5889 </p>
5890 <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p6">
5891 <b>I answer that,</b> Since, by jurisdiction, a man is placed above those over whom he has jurisdiction, through being their judge, it follows
5892 that no man has jurisdiction over himself, his superior, or his equal, and that, consequently, no one can excommunicate either
5893 himself, or his superior, or his equal.
5894 </p>
5895 <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p7">
5896 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking hypothetically, i.e. supposing an angel were to sin, for in that case he would not be higher than
5897 the Apostle, but lower. Nor is it absurd that, if the antecedent of a conditional sentence be impossible, the consequence
5898 be impossible also.
5899 </p>
5900 <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p8">
5901 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In that case no one would be excommunicated, since no man has power over his peer.
5902 </p>
5903 <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p9">
5904 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Loosing and binding in the tribunal of confession affects our relation to God only, in Whose sight a man from being above
5905 another sinks below him through sin; while on the other hand excommunication is the affair of an external tribunal in which
5906 a man does not forfeit his superiority on account of sin. Hence there is no comparison between the two tribunals. Nevertheless,
5907 even in the tribunal of confession, a man cannot absolve himself, or his
5908 superior, or his equal, unless the power to do so be committed to him. This does not apply to venial sins, because they can
5909 be remitted through any sacraments which confer grace, hence remission of venial sins follows the power of orders.
5910 </p>
5911 <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p10"></p>
5912 <p id="XP_Q22_A4-p11"></p>
5913 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A3.html"></a>
5914 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A5.html"></a>
5915 </div>
5916 <div id="XP_Q22_A5" class="div4">
5917 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
5918 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A6.html"></a>
5919 <h4 id="XP_Q22_A5-p0.1">Whether a sentence of excommunication can be passed on a body of men?</h4>
5920 <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p1"></p>
5921 <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p2">
5922 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sentence of excommunication can be passed on a body of men. Because it is possible for a number of people
5923 to be united together in wickedness. Now when a man is obstinate in his wickedness he should be excommunicated. Therefore
5924 a body of men can be excommunicated.
5925 </p>
5926 <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p3">
5927 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the most grievous effect of an excommunication is privation of the sacraments of the Church. But sometimes a whole
5928 country is laid under an interdict. Therefore a body of people can be excommunicated.
5929 </p>
5930 <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p4">
5931 <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Ep. ccl] on
5932 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q22_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12" target="asv">Mat. 12</a> asserts that the sovereign and a body of people cannot be excommunicated.
5933 </p>
5934 <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p5">
5935 <b>I answer that,</b> No man should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. Now sin consists in an act: and acts do not belong to communities,
5936 but, generally speaking, to individuals. Wherefore individual members of a community can be excommunicated, but not the community
5937 itself. And although sometimes an act belongs to a whole multitude, as when many draw a boat, which none of them could draw
5938 by himself, yet it is not probable that a community would so wholly consent to evil
5939 that there would be no dissentients. Now God, Who judges all the earth, does not condemn the just with the wicked (
5940 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q22_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.18.25" target="asv">Gn. 18:25</a>). Therefore the Church, who should imitate the judgments of God, prudently decided that a community should not be excommunicated,
5941 lest the wheat be uprooted together with the tares and cockle.
5942 </p>
5943 <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p6"> The Reply to the First Objection is evident from what has been said.</p>
5944 <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p7">
5945 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Suspension is not so great a punishment as excommunication, since those who are suspended are not deprived of the prayers
5946 of the Church, as the excommunicated are. Wherefore a man can be suspended without having committed a sin himself, just as
5947 a whole kingdom is laid under an interdict on account of the king's crime. Hence there is no comparison between excommunication
5948 and suspension.
5949 </p>
5950 <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p8"></p>
5951 <p id="XP_Q22_A5-p9"></p>
5952 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A4.html"></a>
5953 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A6.html"></a>
5954 </div>
5955 <div id="XP_Q22_A6" class="div4">
5956 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A5.html"></a>
5957 <a href="summa.XP_Q23.html"></a>
5958 <h4 id="XP_Q22_A6-p0.1">Whether a man can be excommunicated who is already under sentence of excommunication?</h4>
5959 <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p1"></p>
5960 <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p2">
5961 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man who is already under sentence of excommunication cannot be excommunicated any further. For the Apostle
5962 says (
5963 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q22_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:12</a>): "What have I to do to judge them that are without?" Now those who are excommunicated are already outside the Church. Therefore
5964 the Church cannot exercise any further judgment on them, so as to excommunicate them again.
5965 </p>
5966 <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p3">
5967 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, excommunication is privation of divine things and of the communion of the faithful. But when a man has been deprived
5968 of a thing, he cannot be deprived of it again. Therefore one who is excommunicated cannot be excommunicated again
5969 </p>
5970 <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p4">
5971 <b>On the contrary,</b> Excommunication is a punishment and a healing medicine. Now punishments and medicines are repeated when necessary. Therefore
5972 excommunication can be repeated.
5973 </p>
5974 <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p5">
5975 <b>I answer that,</b> A man who is under sentence of one excommunication, can be excommunicated again, either by a repetition of the same excommunication,
5976 for his greater confusion, so that he may renounce sin, or for some other cause. And then there are as many principal excommunications,
5977 as there are causes for his being excommunicated.
5978 </p>
5979 <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p6">
5980 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking of heathens and of other unbelievers who have no (sacramental) character, whereby they are numbered
5981 among the people of God. But since the baptismal character whereby a man is numbered among God's people, is indelible, one
5982 who is baptized always belongs to the Church in some way, so that the Church is always competent to sit in judgment on him.
5983 </p>
5984 <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p7">
5985 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although privation does not receive more or less in itself, yet it can, as regards its cause. In this way an excommunication
5986 can be repeated, and a man who has been excommunicated several times is further from the Church's prayers than one who has
5987 been excommunicated only once.
5988 </p>
5989 <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p8"></p>
5990 <p id="XP_Q22_A6-p9"></p>
5991 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A5.html"></a>
5992 <a href="summa.XP_Q23.html"></a>
5993 </div>
5994 <a href="summa.XP_Q21_A4.html"></a>
5995 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A1.html"></a>
5996 </div>
5997 <div id="XP_Q23" class="div3">
5998 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A6.html"></a>
5999 <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
6000 <h3 id="XP_Q23-p0.1">OF COMMUNICATION WITH EXCOMMUNICATED PERSONS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
6001 <p id="XP_Q23-p1"></p>
6002 <p id="XP_Q23-p2"> We must now consider communication with those who are excommunicated. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
6003 <p id="XP_Q23-p3"> (1) Whether it is lawful to communicate in matters purely corporal with one who is excommunicated?</p>
6004 <p id="XP_Q23-p4"> (2) Whether one who communicates with an excommunicated person is excommunicated?</p>
6005 <p id="XP_Q23-p5"> (3) Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated person in matters not permitted by law?</p>
6006 <div id="XP_Q23_A1" class="div4">
6007 <a href="summa.XP_Q23.html"></a>
6008 <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
6009 <h4 id="XP_Q23_A1-p0.1">Whether it is lawful, in matters purely corporal, to communicate with an excommunicated person?</h4>
6010 <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p1"></p>
6011 <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p2">
6012 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is lawful, in matters purely corporal, to communicate with an excommunicated person. For excommunication
6013 is an act of the keys. But the power of the keys extends only to spiritual matters. Therefore excommunication does not prevent
6014 one from communicating with another in matters corporal.
6015 </p>
6016 <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p3">
6017 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "What is instituted for the sake of charity, does not militate against charity" (Cf.
6018 <a id="XP_Q23_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q11_A1.html"> Q[11], A[1]</a>, OBJ[1]). But we are bound by the precept of charity to succor our enemies, which is impossible without some sort of communication.
6019 Therefore it is lawful to communicate with an excommunicated person in corporal matters.
6020 </p>
6021 <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p4">
6022 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
6023 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q23_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:11</a>): "With such an one not so much as to eat."
6024 </p>
6025 <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p5">
6026 <b>I answer that,</b> Excommunication is twofold: there is minor excommunication, which deprives a man merely of a share in the sacraments, but
6027 not of the communion of the faithful. Wherefore it is lawful to communicate with a person lying under an excommunication of
6028 this kind, but not to give him the sacraments. The other is major excommunication which deprives a man of the sacraments of
6029 the Church and of the communion of the faithful. Wherefore it is not lawful to communicate
6030 with one who lies under such an excommunication. But, since the Church resorts to excommunication to repair and not to destroy,
6031 exception is made from this general law, in certain matters wherein communication is lawful, viz. in those which concern salvation,
6032 for one is allowed to speak of such matters with an excommunicated person; and one may even speak of other matters so as to
6033 put him at his ease and to make the words of salvation more acceptable. Moreover exception is made in favor of
6034 certain people whose business it is to be in attendance on the excommunicated person, viz. his wife, child, slave, vassal
6035 or subordinate. This, however, is to be understood of children who have not attained their majority, else they are forbidden
6036 to communicate with their father: and as to the others, the exception applies to them if they have entered his service before
6037 his excommunication, but not if they did so afterwards.
6038 </p>
6039 <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p6"> Some understand this exception to apply in the opposite way, viz. that the master can communicate with his subjects: while
6040 others hold the contrary. At any rate it is lawful for them to communicate with others in matters wherein they are under an
6041 obligation to them, for just as subjects are bound to serve their master, so is the master bound to look after his subjects.
6042 Again certain cases are excepted; as when the fact of the excommunication is unknown, or in the case of
6043 strangers or travelers in the country of those who are excommunicated, for they are allowed to buy from them, or to receive
6044 alms from them. Likewise if anyone were to see an excommunicated person in distress: for then he would be bound by the precept
6045 of charity to assist him. These are all contained in the following line: "Utility, law, lowliness, ignorance of fact, necessity,"
6046 where "utility" refers to salutary words, "law" to marriage, "lowliness" to subjection. The others need no
6047 explanation.
6048 </p>
6049 <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p7">
6050 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Corporal matters are subordinate to spiritual matters. Wherefore the power which extends to spiritual things, can also extend
6051 to matters touching the body: even as the art which considers the end commands in matters ordained to the end.
6052 </p>
6053 <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p8">
6054 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In a case where one is bound by the precept of charity to hold communication, the prohibition ceases, as is clear from what
6055 has been said.
6056 </p>
6057 <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p9"></p>
6058 <p id="XP_Q23_A1-p10"></p>
6059 <a href="summa.XP_Q23.html"></a>
6060 <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
6061 </div>
6062 <div id="XP_Q23_A2" class="div4">
6063 <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
6064 <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
6065 <h4 id="XP_Q23_A2-p0.1">Whether a person incurs excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated?</h4>
6066 <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p1"></p>
6067 <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p2">
6068 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a person does not incur excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated. For a heathen
6069 or a Jew is more separated from the Church than a person who is excommunicated. But one does not incur excommunication for
6070 communicating with a heathen or a Jew. Neither, therefore, does one for communicating with an excommunicated Christian.
6071 </p>
6072 <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p3">
6073 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a man incurs excommunication for communicating with an excommunicated person, for the same reason a third would
6074 incur excommunication for communicating with him, and thus one might go on indefinitely, which would seem absurd. Therefore
6075 one does not incur excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated.
6076 </p>
6077 <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p4">
6078 <b>On the contrary,</b> An excommunicated person is banished from communion. Therefore whoever communicates with him leaves the communion of the
6079 Church: and hence he seems to be excommunicated.
6080 </p>
6081 <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p5">
6082 <b>I answer that,</b> A person may incur excommunication in two ways. First, so that the excommunication includes both himself and whosoever communicates
6083 with him: and then, without any doubt, whoever communicates with him, incurs a major excommunication. Secondly, so that the
6084 excommunication is simply pronounced on him; and then a man may communicate with him either in his crime, by counsel, help
6085 or favor, in which case again he incurs the major excommunication, or he may
6086 communicate with him in other things by speaking to him, greeting him, or eating with him, in which case he incurs the minor
6087 excommunication.
6088 </p>
6089 <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p6">
6090 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Church has no intention of correcting unbelievers as well as the faithful who are under her care: hence she does not
6091 sever those, whom she excommunicates, from the fellowship of unbelievers, as she does from the communion of the faithful over
6092 whom she exercises a certain power.
6093 </p>
6094 <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p7">
6095 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is lawful to hold communion with one who has incurred a minor excommunication, so that excommunication does not pass on
6096 to a third person.
6097 </p>
6098 <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p8"></p>
6099 <p id="XP_Q23_A2-p9"></p>
6100 <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
6101 <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
6102 </div>
6103 <div id="XP_Q23_A3" class="div4">
6104 <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
6105 <a href="summa.XP_Q24.html"></a>
6106 <h4 id="XP_Q23_A3-p0.1">Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated person in other cases than those in which it is allowed?</h4>
6107 <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p1"></p>
6108 <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p2">
6109 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person in other cases than those in
6110 which it is allowed. Because a certain decretal (Cap. Sacris: De his quae vi, metuve, etc.) declares that "not even through
6111 fear of death should anyone hold communion with an excommunicated person, since one ought to die rather than commit a mortal
6112 sin." But this would be no reason unless it were always a mortal sin to hold communion with
6113 an excommunicated person. Therefore, etc.
6114 </p>
6115 <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p3">
6116 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is a mortal sin to act against a commandment of the Church. But the Church forbids anyone to hold communion with
6117 an excommunicated person. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated.
6118 </p>
6119 <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p4">
6120 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man is debarred from receiving the Eucharist on account of a venial sin. But a man who holds communion with an
6121 excommunicated person, outside those cases in which it is allowed, is debarred from receiving the Eucharist, since he incurs
6122 a minor excommunication. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person, save in those cases
6123 in which it is allowed.
6124 </p>
6125 <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p5">
6126 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no one should incur a major excommunication save for a mortal sin. Now according to the law (Can. Praecipue, seqq.,
6127 caus. xi) a man may incur a major excommunication for holding communion with an excommunicated person. Therefore it is a mortal
6128 sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated.
6129 </p>
6130 <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p6">
6131 <b>On the contrary,</b> None can absolve a man from mortal sin unless he have jurisdiction over him. But any priest can absolve a man for holding
6132 communion with those who are excommunicated. Therefore it is not a mortal sin.
6133 </p>
6134 <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p7"> Further, the measure of the penalty should be according to the measure of the sin, as stated in
6135 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q23_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.3" target="asv"> Dt. 25:3.</a> Now the punishment appointed by common custom for holding communion with an excommunicated person is not that which is inflicted
6136 for mortal sin, but rather that which is due for venial sin. Therefore it is not a mortal sin.
6137 </p>
6138 <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p8">
6139 <b>I answer that,</b> Some hold that it is always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person, by word or in any of the forbidden
6140 ways mentioned above
6141 <a id="XP_Q23_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q23_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, except in those cases allowed by law (Cap. Quoniam). But since it seems very hard that a man should be guilty of a mortal
6142 sin by uttering just a slight word to an excommunicated person, and that by excommunicating a person one would endanger the
6143 salvation of many, and lay a snare
6144 which might turn to one's own hurt, it seems to others more probable that he is not always guilty of a mortal sin, but only
6145 when he holds communion with him in a criminal deed, or in an act of Divine worship, or through contempt of the Church.
6146 </p>
6147 <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p9">
6148 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This decretal is speaking of holding communion in Divine worship. It may also be replied that the same reason applies both
6149 to mortal and venial sin, since just as one cannot do well by committing a mortal sin, so neither can one by committing a
6150 venial sin: so that just as it is a man's duty to suffer death rather than commit a mortal sin, so is it his duty to do so
6151 sooner than commit a venial sin, inasmuch as it is his duty to avoid venial sin.
6152 </p>
6153 <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p10">
6154 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The commandment of the Church regards spiritual matters directly, and legitimate actions as a consequence: hence by holding
6155 communion in Divine worship one acts against the commandment, and commits a mortal sin; but by holding communion in other
6156 matters, one acts beside the commandment, and sins venially.
6157 </p>
6158 <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p11">
6159 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes a man is debarred from the Eucharist even without his own fault, as in the case of those who are suspended or under
6160 an interdict, because these penalties are sometimes inflicted on one person for the sin of another who is thus punished.
6161 </p>
6162 <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p12">
6163 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although it is a venial sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated, yet to do so obstinately is a mortal sin: and
6164 for this reason one may be excommunicated according to the law.
6165 </p>
6166 <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p13"></p>
6167 <p id="XP_Q23_A3-p14"></p>
6168 <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A2.html"></a>
6169 <a href="summa.XP_Q24.html"></a>
6170 </div>
6171 <a href="summa.XP_Q22_A6.html"></a>
6172 <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A1.html"></a>
6173 </div>
6174 <div id="XP_Q24" class="div3">
6175 <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
6176 <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
6177 <h3 id="XP_Q24-p0.1">OF ABSOLUTION FROM EXCOMMUNICATION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
6178 <p id="XP_Q24-p1"></p>
6179 <p id="XP_Q24-p2"> We must now consider absolution from excommunication: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
6180 <p id="XP_Q24-p3"> (1) Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication?</p>
6181 <p id="XP_Q24-p4"> (2) Whether a man can be absolved from excommunication against his will?</p>
6182 <p id="XP_Q24-p5"> (3) Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from another?</p>
6183 <div id="XP_Q24_A1" class="div4">
6184 <a href="summa.XP_Q24.html"></a>
6185 <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
6186 <h4 id="XP_Q24_A1-p0.1">Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication? </h4>
6187 <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p1"></p>
6188 <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p2">
6189 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication. For the chains of sin are stronger than those
6190 of excommunication. But any priest can absolve his subject from sin. Therefore much more can he absolve him from excommunication.
6191 </p>
6192 <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p3">
6193 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the cause is removed the effect is removed. But the cause of excommunication is a mortal sin. Therefore since
6194 any priest can absolve (his subject) from that mortal sin, he is able likewise to absolve him from the excommunication.
6195 </p>
6196 <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p4">
6197 <b>On the contrary,</b> It belongs to the same power to excommunicate as to absolve from excommunication. But priests of inferior degree cannot excommunicate
6198 their subjects. Neither, therefore, can they absolve them.
6199 </p>
6200 <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p5">
6201 <b>I answer that,</b> Anyone can absolve from minor excommunication who can absolve from the sin of participation in the sin of another. But in
6202 the case of a major excommunication, this is pronounced either by a judge, and then he who pronounced sentence or his superior
6203 can absolve---or it is pronounced by law, and then the bishop or even a priest can absolve except in the six cases which the
6204 Pope, who is the maker of laws, reserves to himself: the first is the case of a man who
6205 lays hands on a cleric or a religious; the second is of one who breaks into a church and is denounced for so doing; the third
6206 is of the man who sets fire to a church and is denounced for the deed; the fourth is of one who knowingly communicates in
6207 the Divine worship with those whom the Pope has excommunicated by name; the fifth is the case of one who tampers with the
6208 letters of the Holy See; the sixth is the case of one who communicates in a crime of one who is excommunicated. For he should
6209 not
6210 be absolved except by the person who excommunicated him, even though he be not subject to him, unless, by reason of the difficulty
6211 of appearing before him, he be absolved by the bishop or by his own priest, after binding himself by oath to submit to the
6212 command of the judge who pronounced the excommunication on him.
6213 </p>
6214 <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p6"> There are however eight exceptions to the first case: (1) In the hour of death, when a person can be absolved by any priest
6215 from any excommunication; (2) if the striker be the doorkeeper of a man in authority, and the blow be given neither through
6216 hatred nor of set purpose; (3) if the striker be a woman; (4) if the striker be a servant, whose master is not at fault and
6217 would suffer from his absence; (5) if a religious strike a religious, unless he strike him very grievously; (6)
6218 if the striker be a poor man; (7) if he be a minor, an old man, or an invalid; (8) if there be a deadly feud between them.
6219 </p>
6220 <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p7"> There are, besides, seven cases in which the person who strikes a cleric does not incur excommunication: (1) if he do it
6221 for the sake of discipline, as a teacher or a superior; (2) if it be done for fun; (3) if the striker find the cleric behaving
6222 with impropriety towards his wife his mother, his sister or his daughter; (4) if he return blow for blow at once; (5) if the
6223 striker be not aware that he is striking a cleric; (6) if the latter be guilty of apostasy after the triple
6224 admonition; (7) if the cleric exercise an act which is altogether contrary to the clerical life, e.g. if he become a soldier,
6225 or if he be guilty of bigamy [*Namely, that which is known by canonists as "similar bigamy"].
6226 </p>
6227 <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p8">
6228 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the chains of sin are in themselves greater than those of excommunication, yet in a certain respect the chains of
6229 excommunication are greater, inasmuch as they bind a man not only in the sight of God, but also in the eye of the Church.
6230 Hence absolution from excommunication requires jurisdiction in the external forum, whereas absolution from sin does not. Nor
6231 is there need of giving one's word by oath, as in the case of absolution from
6232 excommunication, because, as the Apostle declares (
6233 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q24_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.16" target="asv">Heb. 6:16</a>), controversies between men are decided by oath.
6234 </p>
6235 <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p9">
6236 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As an excommunicated person has no share in the sacraments of the Church, a priest cannot absolve him from his guilt, unless
6237 he be first absolved from excommunication.
6238 </p>
6239 <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p10"></p>
6240 <p id="XP_Q24_A1-p11"></p>
6241 <a href="summa.XP_Q24.html"></a>
6242 <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
6243 </div>
6244 <div id="XP_Q24_A2" class="div4">
6245 <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
6246 <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
6247 <h4 id="XP_Q24_A2-p0.1">Whether anyone can be absolved against his will?</h4>
6248 <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p1"></p>
6249 <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p2">
6250 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no man can be absolved against his will. For spiritual things are not conferred on anyone against his
6251 will. Now absolution from excommunication is a spiritual favor. Therefore it cannot be granted to a man against his will.
6252 </p>
6253 <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p3">
6254 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the cause of excommunication is contumacy. But when, through contempt of the excommunication, a man is unwilling
6255 to be absolved, he shows a high degree of contumacy. Therefore he cannot be absolved.
6256 </p>
6257 <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p4">
6258 <b>On the contrary,</b> Excommunication can be pronounced on a man against his will. Now things that happen to a man against his will, can be removed
6259 from him against his will, as in the case of the goods of fortune. Therefore excommunication can be removed from a man against
6260 his will.
6261 </p>
6262 <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p5">
6263 <b>I answer that,</b> Evil of fault and evil of punishment differ in this, that the origin of fault is within us, since all sin is voluntary, whereas
6264 the origin of punishment is sometimes without, since punishment does not need to be voluntary, in fact the nature of punishment
6265 is rather to be against the will. Wherefore, just as a man commits no sin except willingly, so no sin is forgiven him against
6266 his will. On the other hand just as a person can be excommunicated against his
6267 will, so can he be absolved therefrom.
6268 </p>
6269 <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p6">
6270 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The assertion is true of those spiritual goods which depend on our will, such as the virtues, which we cannot lose unwillingly;
6271 for knowledge, although a spiritual good, can be lost by a man against his will through sickness. Hence the argument is not
6272 to the point.
6273 </p>
6274 <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p7">
6275 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is possible for excommunication to be removed from a man even though he be contumacious, if it seem to be for the good
6276 of the man for whom the excommunication was intended as a medicine.
6277 </p>
6278 <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p8"></p>
6279 <p id="XP_Q24_A2-p9"></p>
6280 <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
6281 <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
6282 </div>
6283 <div id="XP_Q24_A3" class="div4">
6284 <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
6285 <a href="summa.XP_Q25.html"></a>
6286 <h4 id="XP_Q24_A3-p0.1">Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from all?</h4>
6287 <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p1"></p>
6288 <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p2">
6289 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man cannot be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from all. For an effect should
6290 be proportionate to its cause. Now the cause of excommunication is a sin. Since then a man cannot be absolved from one sin
6291 without being absolved from all, neither can this happen as regards excommunication.
6292 </p>
6293 <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p3">
6294 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, absolution from excommunication is pronounced in the Church. But a man who is under the ban of one excommunication
6295 is outside the Church. Therefore so long as one remains, a man cannot be loosed from another.
6296 </p>
6297 <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p4">
6298 <b>On the contrary,</b> Excommunication is a punishment. Now a man can be loosed from one punishment, while another remains. Therefore a man can
6299 be loosed from one excommunication and yet remain under another.
6300 </p>
6301 <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p5">
6302 <b>I answer that,</b> Excommunications are not connected together in any way, and so it is possible for a man to be absolved from one, and yet
6303 remain under another.
6304 </p>
6305 <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p6"> It must be observed however that sometimes a man lies under several excommunications pronounced by one judge; and then, when
6306 he is absolved from one, he is understood to be absolved from all, unless the contrary be expressed, or unless he ask to be
6307 absolved from excommunication on one count only, whereas he was excommunicated under several. On the other hand sometimes
6308 a man lies under several sentences of excommunication pronounced by several judges; and then, when absolved from
6309 one excommunication, he is not therefore absolved from the others, unless at his prayer they all confirm his absolution, or
6310 unless they all depute one to absolve him.
6311 </p>
6312 <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p7">
6313 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All sins are connected together in aversion from God, which is incompatible with the forgiveness of sin: wherefore one sin
6314 cannot be forgiven without another. But excommunications have no such connection. Nor again is absolution from excommunication
6315 hindered by contrariety of the will, as stated above
6316 <a id="XP_Q24_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q24_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Hence the argument does not prove.
6317 </p>
6318 <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p8">
6319 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as such a man was for several reasons outside the Church so is it possible for his separation to be removed on one count
6320 and to remain on another.
6321 </p>
6322 <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p9"></p>
6323 <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p10"></p>
6324 <p id="XP_Q24_A3-p11"></p>
6325 <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A2.html"></a>
6326 <a href="summa.XP_Q25.html"></a>
6327 </div>
6328 <a href="summa.XP_Q23_A3.html"></a>
6329 <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A1.html"></a>
6330 </div>
6331 <div id="XP_Q25" class="div3">
6332 <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
6333 <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
6334 <h3 id="XP_Q25-p0.1">OF INDULGENCES (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
6335 <p id="XP_Q25-p1"></p>
6336 <p id="XP_Q25-p2"> We must now consider indulgence: (1) in itself; (2) those who grant indulgence; (3) those who receive it.</p>
6337 <p id="XP_Q25-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
6338 <p id="XP_Q25-p4"> (1) Whether an indulgence remits any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins?</p>
6339 <p id="XP_Q25-p5"> (2) Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be?</p>
6340 <p id="XP_Q25-p6"> (3) Whether an indulgence should be granted for temporal assistance?</p>
6341 <div id="XP_Q25_A1" class="div4">
6342 <a href="summa.XP_Q25.html"></a>
6343 <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
6344 <h4 id="XP_Q25_A1-p0.1">Whether an indulgence can remit any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins?</h4>
6345 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p1"></p>
6346 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p2">
6347 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an indulgence cannot remit any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins. Because a gloss
6348 on
6349 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13</a>, "He cannot deny Himself," says: "He would do this if He did not keep His word." Now He said (
6350 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv">Dt. 25:2</a>): "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." Therefore nothing can be remitted from
6351 the satisfactory punishment which is appointed according to the measure of
6352 sin.
6353 </p>
6354 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p3">
6355 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an inferior cannot absolve from an obligation imposed by his superior. But when God absolves us from sin He binds
6356 us to temporal punishment, as Hugh of St. Victor declares (Tract. vi Sum. Sent. [*Of doubtful authenticity]). Therefore no
6357 man can absolve from that punishment, by remitting any part of it.
6358 </p>
6359 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p4">
6360 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the granting of the sacramental effect without the sacraments belongs to the power of excellence. Now none but Christ
6361 has the power of excellence in the sacraments. Since then satisfaction is a part of the sacrament of Penance, conducing to
6362 the remission of the punishment due, it seems that no mere man can remit the debt of punishment without satisfaction.
6363 </p>
6364 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p5">
6365 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the power of the ministers of the Church was given them, not "unto destruction," but "unto edification" (
6366 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.10.8" target="asv">2 Cor. 10:8</a>). But it would be conducive to destruction, if satisfaction, which was intended for our good, inasmuch as it serves for a
6367 remedy, were done away with. Therefore the power of the ministers of the Church does not extend to this.
6368 </p>
6369 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p6">
6370 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
6371 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.2.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 2:10</a>): "For, what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ," and a
6372 gloss adds: i.e. "as though Christ Himself had pardoned." But Christ could remit the punishment of a sin without any satisfaction,
6373 as evidenced in the case of the adulterous woman (
6374 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.8" target="asv">Jn. 8</a>). Therefore Paul could do so likewise. Therefore the Pope can too, since his power in the Church is not
6375 less than Paul's.
6376 </p>
6377 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p7"> Further, the universal Church cannot err; since He Who "was heard for His reverence" (
6378 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.7" target="asv">Heb. 5:7</a>) said to Peter, on whose profession of faith the Church was founded (
6379 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.32" target="asv">Lk. 22:32</a>): "I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not." Now the universal Church approves and grants indulgences. Therefore indulgences
6380 have some value.
6381 </p>
6382 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p8">
6383 <b>I answer that,</b> All admit that indulgences have some value, for it would be blasphemy to say that the Church does anything in vain. But some
6384 say that they do not avail to free a man from the debt of punishment which he has deserved in Purgatory according to God's
6385 judgment, and that they merely serve to free him from the obligation imposed on him by the priest as a punishment for his
6386 sins, or from the canonical penalties he has incurred. But this opinion does not seem to be
6387 true. First, because it is expressly opposed to the privilege granted to Peter, to whom it was said (
6388 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>) that whatsoever he should loose on earth should be loosed also in heaven. Wherefore whatever remission is granted in the
6389 court of the Church holds good in the court of God. Moreover the Church by granting such indulgences would do more harm than
6390 good, since, by remitting the punishment she had enjoined on a man, she would deliver him to be punished more severely
6391 in Purgatory.
6392 </p>
6393 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p9"> Hence we must say on the contrary that indulgences hold good both in the Church's court and in the judgment of God, for the
6394 remission of the punishment which remains after contrition, absolution, and confession, whether this punishment be enjoined
6395 or not. The reason why they so avail is the oneness of the mystical body in which many have performed works of satisfaction
6396 exceeding the requirements of their debts; in which, too, many have patiently borne unjust tribulations whereby
6397 a multitude of punishments would have been paid, had they been incurred. So great is the quantity of such merits that it exceeds
6398 the entire debt of punishment due to those who are living at this moment: and this is especially due to the merits of Christ:
6399 for though He acts through the sacraments, yet His efficacy is nowise restricted to them, but infinitely surpasses their efficacy.
6400 </p>
6401 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p10"> Now one man can satisfy for another, as we have explained above (
6402 <a id="XP_Q25_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q13_A2.html">Q[13], A[2]</a>). And the saints in whom this super-abundance of satisfactions is found, did not perform their good works for this or that
6403 particular person, who needs the remission of his punishment (else he would have received this remission without any indulgence
6404 at all), but they performed them for the whole Church in general, even as the Apostle declares that he fills up "those things
6405 that
6406 are wanting of the sufferings of Christ . . . for His body, which is the Church" to whom he wrote (
6407 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Col.1.24" target="asv">Col. 1:24</a>). These merits, then, are the common property of the whole Church. Now those things which are the common property of a number
6408 are distributed to the various individuals according to the judgment of him who rules them all. Hence, just as one man would
6409 obtain the remission of his punishment if another were to satisfy for him, so would he too if another's satisfactions
6410 be applied to him by one who has the power to do so.
6411 </p>
6412 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p11">
6413 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The remission which is granted by means of indulgences does not destroy the proportion between punishment and sin, since
6414 someone has spontaneously taken upon himself the punishment due for another's guilt, as explained above.
6415 </p>
6416 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p12">
6417 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He who gains an indulgence is not, strictly speaking, absolved from the debt of punishment, but is given the means whereby
6418 he may pay it.
6419 </p>
6420 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p13">
6421 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The effect of sacramental absolution is the removal of a man's guilt, an effect which is not produced by indulgences. But
6422 he who grants indulgences pays the debt of punishment which a man owes, out of the common stock of the Church's goods, as
6423 explained above.
6424 </p>
6425 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p14">
6426 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Grace affords a better remedy for the avoidance of sin than does habituation to (good) works. And since he who gains an indulgence
6427 is disposed to grace through the love which he conceives for the cause for which the indulgence is granted, it follows that
6428 indulgences provide a remedy against sin. Consequently it is not harmful to grant indulgences unless this be done without
6429 discretion. Nevertheless those who gain indulgences should be advised, not, on
6430 this account, to omit the penitential works imposed on them, so that they may derive a remedy from these also, even though
6431 they may be quit of the debt of punishment; and all the more, seeing that they are often more in debt than they think.
6432 </p>
6433 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p15"></p>
6434 <p id="XP_Q25_A1-p16"></p>
6435 <a href="summa.XP_Q25.html"></a>
6436 <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
6437 </div>
6438 <div id="XP_Q25_A2" class="div4">
6439 <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
6440 <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
6441 <h4 id="XP_Q25_A2-p0.1">Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be?</h4>
6442 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p1"></p>
6443 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p2">
6444 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that indulgences are not as effective as they claim to be. For indulgences have no effect save from the power
6445 of the keys. Now by the power of the keys, he who has that power can only remit some fixed part of the punishment due for
6446 sin, after taking into account the measure of the sin and of the penitent's sorrow. Since then indulgences depend on the mere
6447 will of the grantor, it seems that they are not as effective as they claim to be.
6448 </p>
6449 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p3">
6450 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the debt of punishment keeps man back from the attainment of glory, which he ought to desire above all things. Now,
6451 if indulgences are as effective as they claim to be, a man by setting himself to gain indulgences might become immune from
6452 all debt of temporal punishment. Therefore it would seem that a man ought to put aside all other kinds of works, and devote
6453 himself to gain indulgences.
6454 </p>
6455 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p4">
6456 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sometimes an indulgence whereby a man is remitted a third part of the punishment due for his sins is granted if
6457 he contribute towards the erection of a certain building. If, therefore, indulgences produce the effect which is claimed for
6458 them, he who gives a penny, and then another, and then again another, would obtain a plenary absolution from all punishment
6459 due for his sins, which seems absurd.
6460 </p>
6461 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p5">
6462 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sometimes an indulgence is granted, so that for visiting a church a man obtains a seven years' remission. If, then,
6463 an indulgence avails as much as is claimed for it a man who lives near that church, or the clergy attached thereto who go
6464 there every day, obtain as much indulgence as one who comes from a distance (which would appear unjust); moreover, seemingly,
6465 they would gain the indulgence several times a day, since they go there repeatedly.
6466 </p>
6467 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p6">
6468 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, to remit a man's punishment beyond a just estimate seems to amount to the same as to remit it without reason; because
6469 in so far as he exceeds that estimate, he limits the compensation. Now he who grants an indulgence cannot without cause remit
6470 a man's punishment either wholly or partly, even though the Pope were to say to anyone: "I remit to all the punishment you
6471 owe for your sins." Therefore it seems that he cannot remit anything beyond the just
6472 estimate. Now indulgences are often published which exceed that just estimate. Therefore they do not avail as much as is claimed
6473 for them.
6474 </p>
6475 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p7">
6476 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
6477 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.13.7" target="asv">Job 13:7</a>): "Hath God any need of your lie, that you should speak deceitfully for Him?" Therefore the Church, in publishing indulgences,
6478 does not lie; and so they avail as much as is claimed for them.
6479 </p>
6480 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p8"> Further, the Apostle says (
6481 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q25_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.14" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:14</a>): "If . . . our preaching is vain, your faith is also vain." Therefore whoever utters a falsehood in preaching, so far as
6482 he is concerned, makes faith void. and so sins mortally. If therefore indulgences are not as effective as they claim to be,
6483 all who publish indulgences would commit a mortal sin: which is absurd.
6484 </p>
6485 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p9">
6486 <b>I answer that,</b> on this point there are many opinions. For some maintain that indulgences have not the efficacy claimed for them, but that
6487 they simply avail each individual in proportion to his faith and devotion. And consequently those who maintain this, say that
6488 the Church publishes her indulgences in such a way as, by a kind of pious fraud, to induce men to do well, just as a mother
6489 entices her child to walk by holding out an apple. But this seems a very dangerous
6490 assertion to make. For as Augustine states (Ep. ad Hieron. lxxviii), "if any error were discovered in Holy Writ, the authority
6491 of Holy Writ would perish." In like manner, if any error were to be found in the Church's preaching, her doctrine would have
6492 no authority in settling questions of faith.
6493 </p>
6494 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p10"> Hence others have maintained that indulgences avail as much as is claimed for them, according to a just estimate, not of
6495 him who grants it---who perhaps puts too high a value on it---nor of the recipient---for he may prize too highly the gift
6496 he receives, but a just estimate according to the estimate of good men who consider the condition of the person affected,
6497 and the utility and needs of the Church, for the Church's needs are greater at one time than at another. Yet, neither,
6498 seemingly, can this opinion stand. First, because in that case indulgences would no longer be a remission, but rather a mere
6499 commutation. Moreover the preaching of the Church would not be excused from untruth, since, at times, indulgences are granted
6500 far in excess of the requirements of this just estimate, taking into consideration all the aforesaid conditions, as, for example,
6501 when the Pope granted to anyone who visited a certain church, an indulgence of seven years, which indulgence was
6502 granted by Blessed Gregory for the Roman Stations.
6503 </p>
6504 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p11"> Hence others say that the quantity of remission accorded in an indulgence is not to be measured by the devotion of the recipient,
6505 as the first opinion suggested, nor according to the quantity of what is given, as the second opinion held; but according
6506 to the cause for which the indulgence is granted, and according to which a person is held deserving of obtaining such an indulgence.
6507 Thus according as a man approached near to that cause, so would he obtain remission in whole or in
6508 part. But neither will this explain the custom of the Church, who assigns, now a greater, now a lesser indulgence, for the
6509 same cause: thus, under the same circumstances, now a year's indulgence, now one of only forty days, according to the graciousness
6510 of the Pope, who grants the indulgence, is granted to those who visit a church. Wherefore the amount of the remission granted
6511 by the indulgence is not to be measured by the cause for which a person is worthy of an indulgence.
6512 </p>
6513 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p12"> We must therefore say otherwise that the quantity of an effect is proportionate to the quantity of the cause. Now the cause
6514 of the remission of punishment effected by indulgences is no other than the abundance of the Church's merits, and this abundance
6515 suffices for the remission of all punishment. The effective cause of the remission is not the devotion, or toil, or gift of
6516 the recipient; nor, again, is it the cause for which the indulgence was granted. We cannot, then, estimate
6517 the quantity of the remission by any of the foregoing, but solely by the merits of the Church---and these are always superabundant.
6518 Consequently, according as these merits are applied to a person so does he obtain remission. That they should be so applied
6519 demands, firstly, authority to dispense this treasure. secondly, union between the recipient and Him Who merited it---and
6520 this is brought about by charity; thirdly, there is required a reason for so dispensing this treasury, so that the
6521 intention, namely, of those who wrought these meritorious works is safeguarded, since they did them for the honor of God and
6522 for the good of the Church in general. Hence whenever the cause assigned tends to the good of the Church and the honor of
6523 God, there is sufficient reason for granting an indulgence.
6524 </p>
6525 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p13"> Hence, according to others, indulgences have precisely the efficacy claimed for them, provided that he who grants them have
6526 the authority, that the recipient have charity, and that, as regards the cause, there be piety which includes the honor of
6527 God and the profit of our neighbor. Nor in this view have we "too great a market of the Divine mercy" [*St. Bonaventure, Sent.
6528 iv, D, 20], as some maintain, nor again does it derogate from Divine justice, for no punishment is remitted,
6529 but the punishment of one is imputed to another.
6530 </p>
6531 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p14">
6532 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
6533 <a id="XP_Q25_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>) there are two keys, the key of orders and the key of jurisdiction. The key of orders is a sacramental: and as the effects
6534 of the sacraments are fixed, not by men but by God, the priest cannot decide in the tribunal of confession how much shall
6535 be remitted by means of the key of orders from the punishment due; it is God Who appoints the amount to be remitted. On the
6536 other hand the key of
6537 jurisdiction is not something sacramental, and its effect depends on a man's decision. The remission granted through indulgences
6538 is the effect of this key, since it does not belong to the dispensation of the sacraments, but to the distribution of the
6539 common property of the Church: hence it is that legates, even though they be not priests, can grant indulgences. Consequently
6540 the decision of how much punishment is to be remitted by an indulgence depends on the will of the one who grants that
6541 indulgence. If, however, he remits punishment without sufficient reason, so that men are enticed to substitute mere nothings,
6542 as it were, for works of penance, he sins by granting such indulgences, although the indulgence is gained fully.
6543 </p>
6544 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p15">
6545 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although indulgences avail much for the remission of punishment, yet works of satisfaction are more meritorious in respect
6546 of the essential reward, which infinitely transcends the remission of temporal punishment.
6547 </p>
6548 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p16">
6549 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When an indulgence is granted in a general way to anyone that helps towards the building of a church, we must understand
6550 this to mean a help proportionate to the giver: and in so far as he approaches to this, he will gain the indulgence more or
6551 less fully. Consequently a poor man by giving one penny would gain the full indulgence, not so a rich man, whom it would not
6552 become to give so little to so holy and profitable a work; Just as a king would not
6553 be said to help a man if he gave him an "obol."
6554 </p>
6555 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p17">
6556 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A person who lives near the church, and the priest and clergy of the church, gain the indulgence as much as those who come
6557 perhaps a distance of a thousand days' journey: because the remission, as stated above, is proportionate, not to the toil,
6558 but to the merits which are applied. Yet he who toils most gains most merit. This, however, is to be understood of those cases
6559 in which an indulgence is given in an undeterminate manner. For sometimes a
6560 distinction is expressed: thus the Pope at the time of general absolution grants an indulgence of five years to those who
6561 come from across the seas, and one of three years to those who come from across the mountains, to others an indulgence of
6562 one year. Nor does a person gain the indulgence each time he visits the church during the term of indulgence, because sometimes
6563 it is granted for a fixed time; thus when it is said, "Whoever visits such and such a church until such and such a day, shall
6564 gain so much indulgence," we must understand that it can be gained only once. on the other hand if there be a continual indulgence
6565 in a certain church, as the indulgence of forty days to be gained in the church of the Blessed Peter, then a person gains
6566 the indulgence as often as he visits the church.
6567 </p>
6568 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p18">
6569 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> An indulgence requires a cause, not as a measure of the remission of punishment, but in order that the intention of those
6570 whose merits are applied, may reach to this particular individual. Now one person's good is applied to another in two ways:
6571 first, by charity; and in this way, even without indulgences, a person shares in all the good deeds done, provided he have
6572 charity: secondly, by the intention of the person who does the good action; and in
6573 this way, provided there be a lawful cause, the intention of a person who has done something for the profit of the Church,
6574 may reach to some individual through indulgences.
6575 </p>
6576 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p19"></p>
6577 <p id="XP_Q25_A2-p20"></p>
6578 <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
6579 <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
6580 </div>
6581 <div id="XP_Q25_A3" class="div4">
6582 <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
6583 <a href="summa.XP_Q26.html"></a>
6584 <h4 id="XP_Q25_A3-p0.1">Whether an indulgence ought to be granted for temporal help?</h4>
6585 <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p1"></p>
6586 <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p2">
6587 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an indulgence ought not to be granted for temporal help. Because the remission of sins is something spiritual.
6588 Now to exchange a spiritual for a temporal thing is simony. Therefore this ought not to be done.
6589 </p>
6590 <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p3">
6591 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, spiritual assistance is more necessary than temporal. But indulgences do not appear to be granted for spiritual
6592 assistance. Much less therefore ought they to be granted for temporal help.
6593 </p>
6594 <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p4">
6595 <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the common custom of the Church in granting indulgences for pilgrimages and almsgiving.
6596 </p>
6597 <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p5">
6598 <b>I answer that,</b> Temporal things are subordinate to spiritual matters, since we must make use of temporal things on account of spiritual things.
6599 Consequently an indulgence must not be granted for the sake of temporal matters as such, but in so far as they are subordinate
6600 to spiritual things: such as the quelling of the Church's enemies, who disturb her peace; or such as the building of a church,
6601 of a bridge, and other forms of almsgiving. It is therefore evident that there
6602 is no simony in these transactions, since a spiritual thing is exchanged, not for a temporal but for a spiritual commodity.
6603 </p>
6604 <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p6"> Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.</p>
6605 <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p7">
6606 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Indulgences can be, and sometimes are, granted even for purely spiritual matters. Thus Pope Innocent IV granted an indulgence
6607 of ten days to all who prayed for the king of France; and in like manner sometimes the same indulgence is granted to those
6608 who preach a crusade as to those who take part in it.
6609 </p>
6610 <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p8"></p>
6611 <p id="XP_Q25_A3-p9"></p>
6612 <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A2.html"></a>
6613 <a href="summa.XP_Q26.html"></a>
6614 </div>
6615 <a href="summa.XP_Q24_A3.html"></a>
6616 <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A1.html"></a>
6617 </div>
6618 <div id="XP_Q26" class="div3">
6619 <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
6620 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A1.html"></a>
6621 <h3 id="XP_Q26-p0.1">OF THOSE WHO CAN GRANT INDULGENCES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
6622 <p id="XP_Q26-p1"></p>
6623 <p id="XP_Q26-p2"> We must now consider those who can grant indulgences: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
6624 <p id="XP_Q26-p3"> (1) Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences?</p>
6625 <p id="XP_Q26-p4"> (2) Whether a deacon or another, who is not a priest, can grant indulgences?</p>
6626 <p id="XP_Q26-p5"> (3) Whether a bishop can grant them?</p>
6627 <p id="XP_Q26-p6"> (4) Whether they can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?</p>
6628 <div id="XP_Q26_A1" class="div4">
6629 <a href="summa.XP_Q26.html"></a>
6630 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
6631 <h4 id="XP_Q26_A1-p0.1">Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences?</h4>
6632 <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p1"></p>
6633 <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p2">
6634 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every parish priest can grant indulgences. For an indulgence derives its efficacy from the superabundance
6635 of the Church's merits. Now there is no congregation without some superabundance of merits. Therefore every priest, who has
6636 charge of a congregation, can grant indulgences, and, in like manner, so can every prelate.
6637 </p>
6638 <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p3">
6639 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every prelate stands for a multitude, just as an individual stands for himself. But any individual can assign his
6640 own goods to another and thus offer satisfaction for a third person. Therefore a prelate can assign the property of the multitude
6641 subject to him, and so it seems that he can grant indulgences.
6642 </p>
6643 <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p4">
6644 <b>On the contrary,</b> To excommunicate is less than to grant indulgences. But a parish priest cannot do the former. Therefore he cannot do the
6645 latter.
6646 </p>
6647 <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p5">
6648 <b>I answer that,</b> Indulgences are effective, in as much as the works of satisfaction done by one person are applied to another, not only by
6649 virtue of charity, but also by the intention of the person who did them being directed in some way to the person to whom they
6650 are applied. Now a person's intention may be directed to another in three ways, specifically, generically and individually.
6651 Individually, as when one person offers satisfaction for another particular person; and
6652 thus anyone can apply his works to another. Specifically, as when a person prays for the congregation to which he belongs,
6653 for the members of his household, or for his benefactors, and directs his works of satisfaction to the same intention: in
6654 this way the superior of a congregation can apply those works to some other person, by applying the intention of those who
6655 belong to his congregation to some fixed individual. Generically, as when a person directs his works for the good of the Church
6656 in
6657 general; and thus he who presides over the whole Church can communicate those works, by applying his intention to this or
6658 that individual. And since a man is a member of a congregation, and a congregation is a part of the Church, hence the intention
6659 of private good includes the intention of the good of the congregation, and of the good of the whole Church. Therefore he
6660 who presides over the Church can communicate what belongs to an individual congregation or to an individual man: and he who
6661 presides over a congregation can communicate what belongs to an individual man, but not conversely. Yet neither the first
6662 nor the second communication is called an indulgence, but only the third; and this for two reasons. First, because, although
6663 those communications loose man from the debt of punishment in the sight of God, yet he is not freed from the obligation of
6664 fulfilling the satisfaction enjoined, to which he is bound by a commandment of the Church; whereas the third communication
6665 frees
6666 man even from this obligation. Secondly, because in one person or even in one congregation there is not such an unfailing
6667 supply of merits as to be sufficient both for the one person or congregation and for all others; and consequently the individual
6668 is not freed from the entire debt of punishment unless satisfaction is offered for him individually, to the very amount that
6669 he owes. On the other hand, in the whole Church there is an unfailing supply of merits, chiefly on account of the merit of
6670 Christ. Consequently he alone who is at the head of the Church can grant indulgences. Since, however, the Church is the congregation
6671 of the faithful, and since a congregation of men is of two kinds, the domestic, composed of members of the same family, and
6672 the civil, composed of members of the same nationality, the Church is like to a civil congregation, for the people themselves
6673 are called the Church; while the various assemblies, or parishes of one diocese are likened to a congregation in the
6674 various families and services. Hence a bishop alone is properly called a prelate of the Church, wherefore he alone, like a
6675 bridegroom, receives the ring of the Church. Consequently full power in the dispensation of the sacraments, and jurisdiction
6676 in the public tribunal, belong to him alone as the public person, but to others by delegation from him. Those priests who
6677 have charge of the people are not prelates strictly speaking, but assistants, hence, in consecrating priests the bishop says:
6678 "The more fragile we are, the more we need these assistants": and for this reason they do not dispense all the sacraments.
6679 Hence parish priests, or abbots or other like prelates cannot grant indulgences.
6680 </p>
6681 <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p6"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
6682 <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p7"></p>
6683 <p id="XP_Q26_A1-p8"></p>
6684 <a href="summa.XP_Q26.html"></a>
6685 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
6686 </div>
6687 <div id="XP_Q26_A2" class="div4">
6688 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A1.html"></a>
6689 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A3.html"></a>
6690 <h4 id="XP_Q26_A2-p0.1">Whether a deacon or another who is not a priest can grant an indulgence?</h4>
6691 <p id="XP_Q26_A2-p1"></p>
6692 <p id="XP_Q26_A2-p2">
6693 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a deacon, or one that is not a priest cannot grant an indulgence. Because remission of sins is an effect
6694 of the keys. Now none but a priest has the keys. Therefore a priest alone can grant indulgences.
6695 </p>
6696 <p id="XP_Q26_A2-p3">
6697 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a fuller remission of punishment is granted by indulgences than by the tribunal of Penance. But a priest alone has
6698 power in the latter, and, therefore, he alone has power in the former.
6699 </p>
6700 <p id="XP_Q26_A2-p4">
6701 <b>On the contrary,</b> The distribution of the Church's treasury is entrusted to the same person as the government of the Church. Now this is entrusted
6702 sometimes to one who is not a priest. Therefore he can grant indulgences, since they derive their efficacy from the distribution
6703 of the Church's treasury.
6704 </p>
6705 <p id="XP_Q26_A2-p5">
6706 <b>I answer that,</b> The power of granting indulgences follows jurisdiction, as stated above (
6707 <a id="XP_Q26_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>). And since deacons and others, who are not priests, can have jurisdiction either delegated, as legates, or ordinary, as
6708 bishops-elect, it follows that even those who are not priests can grant indulgences, although they cannot absolve in the tribunal
6709 of Penance, since this follows the reception of orders. This suffices for the Replies to the
6710 Objections, because the granting of indulgences belongs to the key of jurisdiction and not to the key of orders.
6711 </p>
6712 <p id="XP_Q26_A2-p6"></p>
6713 <p id="XP_Q26_A2-p7"></p>
6714 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A1.html"></a>
6715 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A3.html"></a>
6716 </div>
6717 <div id="XP_Q26_A3" class="div4">
6718 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
6719 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A4.html"></a>
6720 <h4 id="XP_Q26_A3-p0.1">Whether a bishop can grant indulgences?</h4>
6721 <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p1"></p>
6722 <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p2">
6723 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that even a bishop cannot grant indulgences. Because the treasury of the Church is the common property of the
6724 whole Church. Now the common property of the whole Church cannot be distributed save by him who presides over the whole Church.
6725 Therefore the Pope alone can grant indulgences.
6726 </p>
6727 <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p3">
6728 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, none can remit punishments fixed by law, save the one who has the power to make the law. Now punishments in satisfaction
6729 for sins are fixed by law. Therefore the Pope alone can remit these punishments, since he is the maker of the law.
6730 </p>
6731 <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p4">
6732 <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the custom of the Church in accordance with which bishops grant indulgences.
6733 </p>
6734 <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p5">
6735 <b>I answer that,</b> The Pope has the plenitude of pontifical power, being like a king in his kingdom: whereas the bishops are appointed to a
6736 share in his solicitude, like judges over each city. Hence them alone the Pope, in his letters, addresses as "brethren," whereas
6737 he calls all others his "sons." Therefore the plenitude of the power of granting indulgences resides in the Pope, because
6738 he can grant them, as he lists, provided the cause be a lawful one: while, in bishops,
6739 this power resides subject to the Pope's ordination, so that they can grant them within fixed limits and not beyond.
6740 </p>
6741 <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p6"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
6742 <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p7"></p>
6743 <p id="XP_Q26_A3-p8"></p>
6744 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A2.html"></a>
6745 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A4.html"></a>
6746 </div>
6747 <div id="XP_Q26_A4" class="div4">
6748 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A3.html"></a>
6749 <a href="summa.XP_Q27.html"></a>
6750 <h4 id="XP_Q26_A4-p0.1">Whether indulgences can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?</h4>
6751 <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p1"></p>
6752 <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p2">
6753 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that indulgences cannot be granted by one who is in mortal sin. For a stream can no longer flow if cut off
6754 from its source. Now the source of grace which is the Holy Ghost is cut off from one who is in mortal sin. Therefore such
6755 a one can convey nothing to others by granting indulgences.
6756 </p>
6757 <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p3">
6758 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is a greater thing to grant an indulgence than to receive one. But one who is in mortal sin cannot receive an
6759 indulgence, as we shall show presently (
6760 <a id="XP_Q26_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q27_A1.html">Q[27], A[1]</a>). Neither, therefore, can he grant one.
6761 </p>
6762 <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p4">
6763 <b>On the contrary,</b> Indulgences are granted in virtue of the power conferred on the prelates of the Church. Now mortal sin takes away, not power
6764 but goodness. Therefore one who is in mortal sin can grant indulgences.
6765 </p>
6766 <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p5">
6767 <b>I answer that,</b> The granting of indulgences belongs to jurisdiction. But a man does not, through sin, lose jurisdiction. Consequently indulgences
6768 are equally valid, whether they be granted by one who is in mortal sin, or by a most holy person; since he remits punishment,
6769 not by virtue of his own merits, but by virtue of the merits laid up in the Church's treasury.
6770 </p>
6771 <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p6">
6772 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The prelate who, while in a state of mortal sin, grants an indulgence, does not pour forth anything of his own, and so it
6773 is not necessary that he should receive an inflow from the source, in order that he may grant a valid indulgence.
6774 </p>
6775 <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p7">
6776 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Further, to grant an indulgence is more than to receive one, if we consider the power, but it is less, if we consider the
6777 personal profit.
6778 </p>
6779 <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p8"></p>
6780 <p id="XP_Q26_A4-p9"></p>
6781 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A3.html"></a>
6782 <a href="summa.XP_Q27.html"></a>
6783 </div>
6784 <a href="summa.XP_Q25_A3.html"></a>
6785 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A1.html"></a>
6786 </div>
6787 <div id="XP_Q27" class="div3">
6788 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A4.html"></a>
6789 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A1.html"></a>
6790 <h3 id="XP_Q27-p0.1">OF THOSE WHOM INDULGENCES AVAIL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
6791 <p id="XP_Q27-p1"></p>
6792 <p id="XP_Q27-p2"> We must now consider those whom indulgences avail: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
6793 <p id="XP_Q27-p3"> (1) Whether indulgences avail those who are in mortal sin?</p>
6794 <p id="XP_Q27-p4"> (2) Whether they avail religious?</p>
6795 <p id="XP_Q27-p5"> (3) Whether they avail a person who does not fulfill the conditions for which the indulgence is given?</p>
6796 <p id="XP_Q27-p6"> (4) Whether they avail him who grants them?</p>
6797 <div id="XP_Q27_A1" class="div4">
6798 <a href="summa.XP_Q27.html"></a>
6799 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A2.html"></a>
6800 <h4 id="XP_Q27_A1-p0.1">Whether an indulgence avails those who are in mortal sin?</h4>
6801 <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p1"></p>
6802 <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p2">
6803 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an indulgence avails those who are in mortal sin. For one person can merit grace and many other good things
6804 for another, even though he be in mortal sin. Now indulgences derive their efficacy from the application of the saints' merits
6805 to an individual. Therefore they are effective in one who is in mortal sin.
6806 </p>
6807 <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p3">
6808 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greater the need, the more room there is for pity. Now a man who is in mortal sin is in very great need. Therefore
6809 all the more should pity be extended to him by indulgence.
6810 </p>
6811 <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p4">
6812 <b>On the contrary,</b> A dead member receives no inflow from the other members that are living. But one who is in mortal sin, is like a dead member.
6813 Therefore he receives no inflow, through indulgences, from the merits of living members.
6814 </p>
6815 <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p5">
6816 <b>I answer that,</b> Some hold that indulgences avail those even who are in mortal sin, for the acquiring of grace, but not for the remission
6817 of their punishment, since none can be freed from punishment who is not yet freed from guilt. For he who has not yet been
6818 reached by God's operation unto the remission of guilt, cannot receive the remission of his punishment from the minister of
6819 the Church neither by indulgences nor in the tribunal of Penance.
6820 </p>
6821 <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p6"> But this opinion seems to be untrue. Because, although those merits which are applied by means of an indulgence, might possibly
6822 avail a person so that he could merit grace (by way of congruity and impetration), yet it is not for this reason that they
6823 are applied, but for the remission of punishment. Hence they do not avail those who are in mortal sin, and consequently, true
6824 contrition and confession are demanded as conditions for gaining all indulgences. If however the merits
6825 were applied by such a form as this: "I grant you a share in the merits of the whole Church---or of one congregation, or of
6826 one specified person," then they might avail a person in mortal sin so that he could merit something, as the foregoing opinion
6827 holds.
6828 </p>
6829 <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
6830 <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p8">
6831 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although he who is in mortal sin is in greater need of help, yet he is less capable of receiving it.
6832 </p>
6833 <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p9"></p>
6834 <p id="XP_Q27_A1-p10"></p>
6835 <a href="summa.XP_Q27.html"></a>
6836 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A2.html"></a>
6837 </div>
6838 <div id="XP_Q27_A2" class="div4">
6839 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A1.html"></a>
6840 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A3.html"></a>
6841 <h4 id="XP_Q27_A2-p0.1">Whether indulgences avail religious?</h4>
6842 <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p1"></p>
6843 <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p2">
6844 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that indulgences do not avail religious. For there is no reason to bring supplies to those who supply others
6845 out of their own abundance. Now indulgences are derived from the abundance of works of satisfaction to be found in religious.
6846 Therefore it is unreasonable for them to profit by indulgences.
6847 </p>
6848 <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p3">
6849 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing detrimental to religious life should be done in the Church. But, if indulgences were to avail religious,
6850 this would be detrimental to regular discipline, because religious would become lax on account of indulgences, and would neglect
6851 the penances imposed in chapter. Therefore indulgences do not avail religious.
6852 </p>
6853 <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p4">
6854 <b>On the contrary,</b> Good brings harm to no man. But the religious life is a good thing. Therefore it does not take away from religious the profit
6855 to be derived from indulgences.
6856 </p>
6857 <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p5">
6858 <b>I answer that,</b> Indulgences avail both seculars and religious, provided they have charity and satisfy the conditions for gaining the indulgences:
6859 for religious can be helped by indulgences no less than persons living in the world.
6860 </p>
6861 <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p6">
6862 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although religious are in the state of perfection, yet they cannot live without sin: and so if at times they are liable to
6863 punishment on account of some sin, they can expiate this debt by means of indulgences. For it is not unreasonable that one
6864 who is well off absolutely speaking, should be in want at times and in some respect, and thus need to be supplied with what
6865 he lacks. Hence it is written (
6866 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q27_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.6.2" target="asv">Gal. 6:2</a>): "Bear ye one another's burdens."
6867 </p>
6868 <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p7">
6869 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is no reason why indulgences should be detrimental to religious observance, because, as to the reward of eternal life,
6870 religious merit more by observing their rule than by gaining indulgences; although, as to the remission of punishment, which
6871 is a lesser good, they merit less. Nor again do indulgences remit the punishment enjoined in chapter, because the chapter
6872 is a judicial rather than a penitential tribunal. hence even those who are not
6873 priests hold chapter. Absolution from punishment enjoined or due for sin is given in the tribunal of Penance.
6874 </p>
6875 <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p8"></p>
6876 <p id="XP_Q27_A2-p9"></p>
6877 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A1.html"></a>
6878 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A3.html"></a>
6879 </div>
6880 <div id="XP_Q27_A3" class="div4">
6881 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A2.html"></a>
6882 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A4.html"></a>
6883 <h4 id="XP_Q27_A3-p0.1">Whether an indulgence can ever be granted to one who does not fulfill the conditions required?</h4>
6884 <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p1"></p>
6885 <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p2">
6886 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an indulgence can sometimes be granted to one who does not fulfill the required conditions. Because when
6887 a person is unable to perform a certain action his will is taken for the deed. Now sometimes an indulgence is to be gained
6888 by giving an alms, which a poor man is unable to do, though he would do so willingly. Therefore he can gain the indulgence.
6889 </p>
6890 <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p3">
6891 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one man can make satisfaction for another. Now an indulgence is directed to the remission of punishment, just as
6892 satisfaction is. Therefore one man can gain an indulgence for another; and so a man can gain an indulgence without doing that
6893 for which the indulgence is given.
6894 </p>
6895 <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p4">
6896 <b>On the contrary,</b> If the cause is removed, the effect is removed. If therefore a person fails to do that for which an indulgence is granted,
6897 and which is the cause of the indulgence, he does not gain the indulgence.
6898 </p>
6899 <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p5">
6900 <b>I answer that,</b> Failing the condition of a grant, no grant ensues. Hence, as an indulgence is granted on the condition that a person does
6901 or gives a certain thing, if he fails in this, he does not gain the indulgence.
6902 </p>
6903 <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p6">
6904 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This is true of the essential reward, but not of certain accidental rewards, such as the remission of punishment and the
6905 like.
6906 </p>
6907 <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p7">
6908 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A person can by his intention apply his own action to whomever he lists, and so he can make satisfaction for whomever he
6909 chooses. On the other hand, an indulgence cannot be applied to someone, except in accordance with the intention of the grantor.
6910 Hence, since he applies it to the doer or giver of a particular action or thing, the doer cannot transfer this intention to
6911 another. If, however, the indulgence were expressed thus: "Whosoever does this, or
6912 for whomsoever this is done, shall gain so much indulgence," it would avail the person for whom it is done. Nor would the
6913 person who does this action, give the indulgence to another, but he who grants the indulgence in this form.
6914 </p>
6915 <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p8"></p>
6916 <p id="XP_Q27_A3-p9"></p>
6917 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A2.html"></a>
6918 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A4.html"></a>
6919 </div>
6920 <div id="XP_Q27_A4" class="div4">
6921 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A3.html"></a>
6922 <a href="summa.XP_Q28.html"></a>
6923 <h4 id="XP_Q27_A4-p0.1">Whether an indulgence avails the person who grants it?</h4>
6924 <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p1"></p>
6925 <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p2">
6926 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an indulgence does not avail him who grants it. For the granting of an indulgence belongs to jurisdiction.
6927 Now no one can exercise jurisdiction on himself. thus no one can excommunicate himself. Therefore no one can participate in
6928 an indulgence granted by himself.
6929 </p>
6930 <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p3">
6931 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if this were possible, he who grants an indulgence might gain the remission of the punishment of all his sins for
6932 some small deed, so that he would sin with impunity, which seems senseless.
6933 </p>
6934 <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p4">
6935 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to grant indulgences and to excommunicate belong to the same power. Now a man cannot excommunicate himself. Therefore
6936 he cannot share in the indulgence of which he is the grantor.
6937 </p>
6938 <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p5">
6939 <b>On the contrary,</b> He would be worse off than others if he could not make use of the Church's treasury which he dispenses to others.
6940 </p>
6941 <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p6">
6942 <b>I answer that,</b> An indulgence should be given for some reason, in order for anyone to be enticed by the indulgence to perform some action
6943 that conduces to the good of the Church and to the honor of God. Now the prelate to whom is committed the care of the Church's
6944 good and of the furthering of God's honor, does not need to entice himself thereto. Therefore he cannot grant an indulgence
6945 to himself alone; but he can avail himself of an indulgence that he grants for others,
6946 since it is based on a cause for granting it to them.
6947 </p>
6948 <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p7">
6949 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man cannot exercise an act of jurisdiction on himself, but a prelate can avail himself of those things which are granted
6950 to others by the authority of his jurisdiction, both in temporal and in spiritual matters: thus also a priest gives himself
6951 the Eucharist which he gives to others. And so a bishop too can apply to himself the suffrages of the Church which he dispenses
6952 to others, the immediate effect of which suffrages, and not of his jurisdiction,
6953 is the remission of punishment by means of indulgences.
6954 </p>
6955 <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p8"> The Reply to the Second Objection is clear from what had been said.</p>
6956 <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p9">
6957 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Excommunication is pronounced by way of sentence, which no man can pronounce on himself, for the reason that in the tribunal
6958 of justice the same man cannot be both judge and accused. On the other hand an indulgence is not given under the form of a
6959 sentence, but by way of dispensation, which a man can apply to himself.
6960 </p>
6961 <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p10"></p>
6962 <p id="XP_Q27_A4-p11"></p>
6963 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A3.html"></a>
6964 <a href="summa.XP_Q28.html"></a>
6965 </div>
6966 <a href="summa.XP_Q26_A4.html"></a>
6967 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A1.html"></a>
6968 </div>
6969 <div id="XP_Q28" class="div3">
6970 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A4.html"></a>
6971 <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A1.html"></a>
6972 <h3 id="XP_Q28-p0.1">OF THE SOLEMN RITE OF PENANCE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
6973 <p id="XP_Q28-p1"></p>
6974 <p id="XP_Q28-p2"> We must now consider the solemn rite of Penance: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
6975 <p id="XP_Q28-p3"> (1) Whether a penance can be published or solemnized?</p>
6976 <p id="XP_Q28-p4"> (2) Whether a solemn penance can be repeated?</p>
6977 <p id="XP_Q28-p5"> (3) Whether public penance should be imposed on women?</p>
6978 <div id="XP_Q28_A1" class="div4">
6979 <a href="summa.XP_Q28.html"></a>
6980 <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A2.html"></a>
6981 <h4 id="XP_Q28_A1-p0.1">Whether a penance should be published or solemnized?</h4>
6982 <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p1"></p>
6983 <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p2">
6984 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a penance should not be published or solemnized. Because it is not lawful for a priest, even through fear,
6985 to divulge anyone's sin, however notorious it may be. Now a sin is published by a solemn penance. Therefore a penance should
6986 not be solemnized.
6987 </p>
6988 <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p3">
6989 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the judgment should follow the nature of the tribunal. Now penance is a judgment pronounced in a secret tribunal.
6990 Therefore it should not be published or solemnized.
6991 </p>
6992 <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p4">
6993 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Every deficiency is made good by penance" as Ambrose [*Cf. Hypognost. iii, among the spurious works ascribed to
6994 St. Augustine] states. Now solemnization has a contrary effect, since it involves the penitent in many deficiencies: for a
6995 layman cannot be promoted to the ranks of the clergy nor can a cleric be promoted to higher orders, after doing solemn penance.
6996 Therefore Penance should not be solemnized.
6997 </p>
6998 <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p5">
6999 <b>On the contrary,</b> Penance is a sacrament. Now some kind of solemnity is observed in every sacrament. Therefore there should be some solemnity
7000 in Penance.
7001 </p>
7002 <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p6"> Further, the medicine should suit the disease. Now a sin is sometimes public, and by its example draws many to sin. Therefore
7003 the penance which is its medicine should also be public and solemn so as to give edification to many.
7004 </p>
7005 <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p7">
7006 <b>I answer that,</b> Some penances should be public and solemn for four reasons. First, so that a public sin may have a public remedy; secondly,
7007 because he who has committed a very grave crime deserves the greatest confusion even in this life; thirdly, in order that
7008 it may deter others; fourthly, that he may be an example of repentance, lest those should despair, who have committed grievous
7009 sins.
7010 </p>
7011 <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p8">
7012 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The priest does not divulge the confession by imposing such a penance, though people may suspect the penitent of having committed
7013 some great sin. For a man is not certainly taken to be guilty, because he is punished, since sometimes one does penance for
7014 another: thus we read in the Lives of the Fathers of a certain man who, in order to incite his companion to do penance, did
7015 penance together with him. And if the sin be public, the penitent, by
7016 fulfilling his penance, shows that he has been to confession.
7017 </p>
7018 <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p9">
7019 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A solemn penance, as to its imposition, does not go beyond the limits of a secret tribunal, since, just as the confession
7020 is made secretly, so the penance is imposed secretly. It is the execution of the penance, that goes beyond the limits of the
7021 secret tribunal: and there is nothing objectionable in this.
7022 </p>
7023 <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p10">
7024 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although Penance cancels all deficiencies, by restoring man to his former state of grace, yet it does not always restore
7025 him to his former dignity. Hence women after doing penance for fornication are not given the veil, because they do not recover
7026 the honor of virginity. In like manner, after doing public penance, a sinner does not recover his former dignity so as to
7027 be eligible for the clerical state and a bishop who would ordain such a one ought to
7028 be deprived of the power of ordaining, unless perhaps the needs of the Church or custom require it. In that case such a one
7029 would be admitted to minor orders by way of exception, but not to the sacred orders. First, on account of the dignity of the
7030 latter; secondly, for fear of relapse; thirdly, in order to avoid the scandal which the people might take through recollection
7031 of his former sins; fourthly, because he would not have the face to correct others, by reason of the publicity of his own
7032 sin.
7033 </p>
7034 <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p11"></p>
7035 <p id="XP_Q28_A1-p12"></p>
7036 <a href="summa.XP_Q28.html"></a>
7037 <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A2.html"></a>
7038 </div>
7039 <div id="XP_Q28_A2" class="div4">
7040 <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A1.html"></a>
7041 <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A3.html"></a>
7042 <h4 id="XP_Q28_A2-p0.1">Whether a solemn penance can be repeated?</h4>
7043 <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p1"></p>
7044 <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p2">
7045 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a solemn penance can be repeated. For those sacraments which do not imprint a character, can be solemnized
7046 a second time, such as the Eucharist, Extreme Unction and the like. But Penance does not imprint a character, therefore it
7047 can be solemnized over again.
7048 </p>
7049 <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p3">
7050 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, penance is solemnized on account of the gravity and publicity of the sin. Now, after doing penance, a person may
7051 commit the same sins over again, or even more grievous sins. Therefore the solemn penance should be imposed again.
7052 </p>
7053 <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p4">
7054 <b>On the contrary,</b> Solemn penance signifies the expulsion of the first man from paradise. Now this was done but once. Therefore solemn penance
7055 should be imposed once only.
7056 </p>
7057 <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p5">
7058 <b>I answer that,</b> Solemn penance ought not to be repeated, for three reasons. First, lest frequency bring it into contempt. Secondly, on account
7059 of its signification; for it signifies the expulsion of the first man from paradise, which happened only once; thirdly, because
7060 the solemnization indicates, in a way, that one makes profession of continual repentance. Wherefore repetition is inconsistent
7061 with solemnization. And if the sinner fall again, he is not precluded from doing
7062 penance, but a solemn penance should not be imposed on him again.
7063 </p>
7064 <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p6">
7065 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In those sacraments which are solemnized again and again, repetition is not inconsistent with solemnity, as it is in the
7066 present case. Hence the comparison fails.
7067 </p>
7068 <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p7">
7069 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although, if we consider his crime, he ought to do the same penance again, yet the repeated solemnization is not becoming,
7070 for the reasons stated above.
7071 </p>
7072 <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p8"></p>
7073 <p id="XP_Q28_A2-p9"></p>
7074 <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A1.html"></a>
7075 <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A3.html"></a>
7076 </div>
7077 <div id="XP_Q28_A3" class="div4">
7078 <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A2.html"></a>
7079 <a href="summa.XP_Q29.html"></a>
7080 <h4 id="XP_Q28_A3-p0.1">Whether solemn penance should be imposed on women and clerics, and whether any priest can impose it?</h4>
7081 <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p1"></p>
7082 <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p2">
7083 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that solemn penance should not be imposed on women. Because, when this penance is imposed on a man, he has
7084 to cut his hair off. But this becomes not a woman, according to
7085 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q28_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:15.</a> Therefore she should not do solemn penance.
7086 </p>
7087 <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p3">
7088 <b>Objection 2:</b> It also seems that it ought to be imposed on clerics. For it is enjoined on account of a grievous crime. Now the same sin
7089 is more grievous in a cleric than in a layman. Therefore it ought to be imposed on a cleric more than on a layman.
7090 </p>
7091 <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p4">
7092 <b>Objection 3:</b> It also seems that it can be imposed by any priest. Because to absolve in the tribunal of Penance belongs to one who has
7093 the keys. Now an ordinary priest has the keys. Therefore he can administer this penance.
7094 </p>
7095 <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p5">
7096 <b>I answer that,</b> Every solemn penance is public, but not vice versa. For solemn penance is done as follows: "On the first day of Lent, these
7097 penitents clothed in sackcloth, with bare feet, their faces to the ground, and their hair shorn away, accompanied by their
7098 priests, present themselves to the bishop of the city at the door of the church. Having brought them into the church the bishop
7099 with all his clergy recites the seven penitential psalms, and then imposes his hand on
7100 them, sprinkles them with holy water, puts ashes on their heads, covers their shoulders with a hairshirt, and sorrowfully
7101 announces to them that as Adam was expelled from paradise, so are they expelled from the church. He then orders the ministers
7102 to put them out of the church, and the clergy follow reciting the responsory: 'In the sweat of thy brow,' etc. Every year
7103 on the day of our Lord's Supper they are brought back into the church by their priests, and there shall they be until the
7104 octave
7105 day of Easter, without however being admitted to Communion or to the kiss of peace. This shall be done every year as long
7106 as entrance into the church is forbidden them. The final reconciliation is reserved to the bishop, who alone can impose solemn
7107 penance" [*Cap. lxiv, dist. 50].
7108 </p>
7109 <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p6"> This penance can be imposed on men and women; but not on clerics, for fear of scandal. Nor ought such a penance to be imposed
7110 except for a crime which has disturbed the whole of the city.
7111 </p>
7112 <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p7"> On the other hand public but not solemn penance is that which is done in the presence of the Church, but without the foregoing
7113 solemnity, such as a pilgrimage throughout the world with a staff. A penance of this kind can be repeated, and can be imposed
7114 by a mere priest, even on a cleric. Sometimes however a solemn penance is taken to signify a public one: so that authorities
7115 speak of solemn penance in different senses.
7116 </p>
7117 <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p8">
7118 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The woman's hair is a sign of her subjection, a man's is not. Hence it is not proper for a woman to put aside her hair when
7119 doing penance, as it is for a man.
7120 </p>
7121 <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p9">
7122 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although in the same kind of sin, a cleric offends more grievously than a layman, yet a solemn penance is not imposed on
7123 him, lest his orders should be an object of contempt. Thus deference is given not to the person but to his orders.
7124 </p>
7125 <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p10">
7126 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Grave sins need great care in their cure. Hence the imposition of a solemn penance, which is only applied for the most grievous
7127 sins, is reserved to the bishop.
7128 </p>
7129 <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p11"></p>
7130 <p id="XP_Q28_A3-p12"></p>
7131 <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A2.html"></a>
7132 <a href="summa.XP_Q29.html"></a>
7133 </div>
7134 <a href="summa.XP_Q27_A4.html"></a>
7135 <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A1.html"></a>
7136 </div>
7137 <div id="XP_Q29" class="div3">
7138 <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A3.html"></a>
7139 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A1.html"></a>
7140 <h3 id="XP_Q29-p0.1">EXTREME UNCTION (QQ[29]-33)</h3>
7141 <p id="XP_Q29-p1"></p>
7142 <p id="XP_Q29-p2">OF EXTREME UNCTION, AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE AND INSTITUTION (NINE ARTICLES)</p>
7143 <p id="XP_Q29-p3"> We must now consider the sacrament of Extreme Unction: in respect of which five points have to be considered: (1) Its essentials
7144 and institution; (2) Its effect; (3) Its minister; (4) on whom should it be conferred and in what parts; (5) Its repetition.
7145 </p>
7146 <p id="XP_Q29-p4"> Under the first head there are nine points of inquiry:</p>
7147 <p id="XP_Q29-p5"> (1) Whether Extreme Unction is a sacrament?</p>
7148 <p id="XP_Q29-p6"> (2) Whether it is one sacrament?</p>
7149 <p id="XP_Q29-p7"> (3) Whether this sacrament was instituted by Christ?</p>
7150 <p id="XP_Q29-p8"> (4) Whether olive oil is a suitable matter for this sacrament?</p>
7151 <p id="XP_Q29-p9"> (5) Whether the oil ought to be consecrated?</p>
7152 <p id="XP_Q29-p10"> (6) Whether the matter of this sacrament should be consecrated by a bishop?</p>
7153 <p id="XP_Q29-p11"> (7) Whether this sacrament has any form?</p>
7154 <p id="XP_Q29-p12"> (8) Whether the form of this sacrament should take the shape of a deprecatory phrase?</p>
7155 <p id="XP_Q29-p13"> (9) Whether this is a suitable form for this sacrament?</p>
7156 <div id="XP_Q29_A1" class="div4">
7157 <a href="summa.XP_Q29.html"></a>
7158 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A2.html"></a>
7159 <h4 id="XP_Q29_A1-p0.1">Whether Extreme Unction is a sacrament?</h4>
7160 <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p1"></p>
7161 <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p2">
7162 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Extreme Unction is not a sacrament. For just as oil is used on sick people, so is it on catechumens. But
7163 anointing of catechumens with oil is not a sacrament. Therefore neither is the Extreme Unction of the sick with oil.
7164 </p>
7165 <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p3">
7166 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. But there was no figure of Extreme
7167 Unction in the Old Law. Therefore it is not a sacrament of the New Law.
7168 </p>
7169 <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p4">
7170 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii, v) every sacrament aims at either cleansing, or enlightening, or perfecting.
7171 Now Extreme Unction does not aim at either cleansing, or enlightening, for this is ascribed to Baptism alone, or perfecting,
7172 for according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii), this belongs to Confirmation and the Eucharist. Therefore Extreme Unction is
7173 not a sacrament.
7174 </p>
7175 <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p5">
7176 <b>On the contrary,</b> The sacraments of the Church supply man's defects sufficiently with respect to every state of life. Now no other than Extreme
7177 Unction does this for those who are departing from this life. Therefore it is a sacrament.
7178 </p>
7179 <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p6"> Further, the sacraments are neither more nor less than spiritual remedies. Now Extreme Unction is a spiritual remedy, since
7180 it avails for the remission of sins, according to
7181 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.15" target="asv"> James 5:15.</a> Therefore it is a sacrament.
7182 </p>
7183 <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p7">
7184 <b>I answer that,</b> Among the visible operations of the Church, some are sacraments, as Baptism, some are sacramentals, as Exorcism. The difference
7185 between these is that a sacrament is an action of the Church that reaches to the principal effect intended in the administration
7186 of the sacraments, whereas a sacramental is an action which, though it does not reach to that effect, is nevertheless directed
7187 towards that principal action. Now the effect intended in the administration
7188 of the sacraments is the healing of the disease of sin: wherefore it is written (
7189 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.9" target="asv">Is. 27:9</a>): "This is all the fruit, that the sin . . . should be taken away." Since then Extreme Unction reaches to this effect, as
7190 is clear from the words of James, and is not ordained to any other sacrament as an accessory thereto, it is evident that Extreme
7191 Unction is not a sacramental but a sacrament.
7192 </p>
7193 <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p8">
7194 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The oil with which catechumens are anointed does not convey the remission of sins to them by its unction, for that belongs
7195 to Baptism. It does, however, dispose them to receive Baptism, as stated above (
7196 <a id="XP_Q29_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q71_A3.html">TP, Q[71], A[3]</a>). Hence that unction is not a sacrament as Extreme Unction is.
7197 </p>
7198 <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p9">
7199 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This sacrament prepares man for glory immediately, since it is given to those who are departing from this life. And as, under
7200 the Old Law, it was not yet time to enter into glory, because "the Law brought nobody [Vulg.: 'nothing'] to perfection" (
7201 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.19" target="asv">Heb. 7:19</a>), so this sacrament had not to be foreshadowed therein by some corresponding sacrament, as by a figure of the same kind.
7202 Nevertheless it was somewhat foreshadowed remotely by
7203 all the healings related in the Old Testament.
7204 </p>
7205 <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p10">
7206 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Dionysius makes no mention of Extreme Unction, as neither of Penance, nor of Matrimony, because he had no intention to decide
7207 any question about the sacraments, save in so far as they serve to illustrate the orderly disposition of the ecclesiastical
7208 hierarchy, as regards the ministers, their actions, and the recipients. Nevertheless since Extreme Unction confers grace and
7209 remission of sins, there is no doubt that it possesses an enlightening and
7210 cleansing power, even as Baptism, though not so copious.
7211 </p>
7212 <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p11"></p>
7213 <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p12"></p>
7214 <p id="XP_Q29_A1-p13"></p>
7215 <a href="summa.XP_Q29.html"></a>
7216 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A2.html"></a>
7217 </div>
7218 <div id="XP_Q29_A2" class="div4">
7219 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A1.html"></a>
7220 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A3.html"></a>
7221 <h4 id="XP_Q29_A2-p0.1">Whether Extreme Unction is one sacrament?</h4>
7222 <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p1"></p>
7223 <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p2">
7224 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Extreme Unction is not one sacrament. Because the oneness of a thing depends on its matter and form, since
7225 being and oneness are derived from the same source. Now the form of this sacrament is said several times during the one administration,
7226 and the matter is applied to the person anointed in respect of various parts of his body. Therefore it is not one sacrament.
7227 </p>
7228 <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p3">
7229 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the unction itself is a sacrament, for it would be absurd to say that the oil is a sacrament. But there are several
7230 unctions. Therefore there are several sacraments.
7231 </p>
7232 <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p4">
7233 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one sacrament should be performed by one minister. But the case might occur that Extreme Unction could not be conferred
7234 by one minister: thus if the priest die after the first unction, another priest would have to proceed with the others. Therefore
7235 Extreme Unction is not one sacrament.
7236 </p>
7237 <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p5">
7238 <b>On the contrary,</b> As immersion is in relation to Baptism, so is unction to this sacrament. But several immersions are but one sacrament of
7239 Baptism. Therefore the several unctions in Extreme Unction are also one sacrament.
7240 </p>
7241 <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p6"> Further, if it were not one sacrament, then after the first unction, it would not be essential for the perfection of the
7242 sacrament that the second unction should be performed, since each sacrament has perfect being of itself. But that is not true.
7243 Therefore it is one sacrament.
7244 </p>
7245 <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p7">
7246 <b>I answer that,</b> Strictly speaking, a thing is one numerically in three ways. First, as something indivisible, which is neither actually nor
7247 potentially several---as a point, and unity. Secondly, as something continuous, which is actually one, but potentially several---as
7248 a line. Thirdly, as something complete, that is composed of several parts---as a house, which is, in a way, several things,
7249 even actually, although those several things go together towards making one. In
7250 this way each sacrament is said to be one thing, in as much as the many things which are contained in one sacrament, are united
7251 together for the purpose of signifying or causing one thing, because a sacrament is a sign of the effect it produces. Hence
7252 when one action suffices for a perfect signification, the unity of the sacrament consists in that action only, as may be seen
7253 in Confirmation. When, however, the signification of the sacrament can be both in one and in several actions, then the
7254 sacrament can be complete both in one and in several actions, even as Baptism in one immersion and in three, since washing
7255 which is signified in Baptism, can be completed by one immersion and by several. But when the perfect signification cannot
7256 be expressed except by means of several actions, then these several actions are essential for the perfection of the sacrament,
7257 as is exemplified in the Eucharist, for the refreshment of the body which signifies that of the soul, can only be attained
7258 by
7259 means of meat and drink. It is the same in this sacrament, because the healing of the internal wounds cannot be perfectly
7260 signified save by the application of the remedy to the various sources of the wounds. Hence several actions are essential
7261 to the perfection of this sacrament.
7262 </p>
7263 <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p8">
7264 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The unity of a complete whole is not destroyed by reason of a diversity of matter or form in the parts of that whole. Thus
7265 it is evident that there is neither the same matter nor the same form in the flesh and in the bones of which one man is composed.
7266 In like manner too, in the sacrament of the Eucharist, and in this sacrament, the diversity of matter and form does not destroy
7267 the unity of the sacrament.
7268 </p>
7269 <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p9">
7270 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although those actions are several simply, yet they are united together in one complete action, viz. the anointing of all
7271 the external senses, whence arises the infernal malady.
7272 </p>
7273 <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p10">
7274 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although, in the Eucharist, if the priest die after the consecration of the bread, another priest can go on with the consecration
7275 of the wine, beginning where the other left off, or can begin over again with fresh matter, in Extreme Unction he cannot begin
7276 over again, but should always go on, because to anoint the same part a second time would produce as much effect as if one
7277 were to consecrate a host a second time, which ought by no means to be done.
7278 Nor does the plurality of ministers destroy the unity of this sacrament, because they only act as instruments, and the unity
7279 of a smith's work is not destroyed by his using several hammers.
7280 </p>
7281 <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p11"></p>
7282 <p id="XP_Q29_A2-p12"></p>
7283 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A1.html"></a>
7284 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A3.html"></a>
7285 </div>
7286 <div id="XP_Q29_A3" class="div4">
7287 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A2.html"></a>
7288 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A4.html"></a>
7289 <h4 id="XP_Q29_A3-p0.1">Whether this sacrament was instituted by Christ?</h4>
7290 <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p1"></p>
7291 <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p2">
7292 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament was not instituted by Christ. For mention is made in the Gospel of the institution of those
7293 sacraments which Christ instituted, for instance the Eucharist and Baptism. But no mention is made of Extreme Unction. Therefore
7294 it was not instituted by Christ.
7295 </p>
7296 <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p3">
7297 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master says explicitly (Sent. iv, D, 23) that it was instituted by the apostles. Therefore Christ did not institute
7298 it Himself.
7299 </p>
7300 <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p4">
7301 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Christ showed forth the sacraments which He instituted, as in the case of the Eucharist and Baptism. But He did
7302 not bestow this sacrament on anyone. Therefore He did not institute it Himself.
7303 </p>
7304 <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p5">
7305 <b>On the contrary,</b> The sacraments of the New Law are more excellent than those of the Old Law. But all the sacraments of the Old Law were instituted
7306 by God. Therefore much more do all the sacraments of the New Law owe their institution to Christ Himself.
7307 </p>
7308 <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p6"> Further, to make an institution and to remove it belongs to the same authority. Now the Church, who enjoys the same authority
7309 in the successors of the apostles, as the apostles themselves possessed, cannot do away with the sacrament of Extreme Unction.
7310 Therefore the apostles did not institute it, but Christ Himself.
7311 </p>
7312 <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p7">
7313 <b>I answer that,</b> There are two opinions on this point. For some hold that this sacrament and Confirmation were not instituted by Christ Himself,
7314 but were left by Him to be instituted by the apostles; for the reason that these two sacraments, on account of the plenitude
7315 of grace conferred in them, could not be instituted before the mission of the Holy Ghost in perfect plenitude. Hence they
7316 are sacraments of the New Law in such a way as not to be foreshadowed in the Old Law.
7317 But this argument is not very cogent, since, just as Christ, before His Passion, promised the mission of the Holy Ghost in
7318 His plenitude, so could He institute these sacraments.
7319 </p>
7320 <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p8"> Wherefore others hold that Christ Himself instituted all the sacraments, but that He Himself published some, which present
7321 greater difficulty to our belief, while he reserved some to be published by the apostles, such as Extreme Unction and Confirmation.
7322 This opinion seems so much the more probable, as the sacraments belong to the foundation of the Law, wherefore their institution
7323 pertains to the lawgiver; besides, they derive their efficacy from their institution, which
7324 efficacy is given them by God alone.
7325 </p>
7326 <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p9">
7327 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord did and said many things which are not related in the Gospel. For the evangelists were intent on handing down chiefly
7328 those things that were necessary for salvation or concerned the building of the ecclesiastical edifice. Hence they related
7329 the institution by Christ of Baptism, Penance, the Eucharist and orders, rather than of Extreme Unction and Confirmation,
7330 which are not necessary for salvation, nor do they concern the building or division
7331 of the Church. As a matter of fact however an anointing done by the apostles is mentioned in the Gospel (
7332 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.6.13" target="asv">Mk. 6:13</a>) where it is said that they "anointed the sick with oil."
7333 </p>
7334 <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p10">
7335 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Master says it was instituted by the apostles because its institution was made known to us by the teaching of the apostles.
7336 </p>
7337 <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p11">
7338 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ did not show forth any sacrament except such as He received by way of example: but He could not be a recipient of
7339 Penance and Extreme Unction, since there was no sin in Him: hence He did not show them forth.
7340 </p>
7341 <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p12"></p>
7342 <p id="XP_Q29_A3-p13"></p>
7343 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A2.html"></a>
7344 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A4.html"></a>
7345 </div>
7346 <div id="XP_Q29_A4" class="div4">
7347 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A3.html"></a>
7348 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A5.html"></a>
7349 <h4 id="XP_Q29_A4-p0.1">Whether olive oil is a suitable matter for this sacrament?</h4>
7350 <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p1"></p>
7351 <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p2">
7352 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that olive oil is not a suitable matter for this sacrament. For this sacrament is ordained immediately to the
7353 state of incorruption. Now incorruption is signified by balsam which is contained in chrism. Therefore chrism would be a more
7354 suitable matter for this sacrament.
7355 </p>
7356 <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p3">
7357 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, this sacrament is a spiritual healing. Now spiritual healing is signified by the use of wine, as may be gathered
7358 from the parable of the wounded man (
7359 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.34" target="asv">Lk. 10:34</a>). Therefore wine also would be more suitable a matter for this sacrament.
7360 </p>
7361 <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p4">
7362 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where there is the greater danger, the remedy should be a common one. But olive oil is not a common remedy, since
7363 the olive is not found in every country. Therefore, since this sacrament is given to the dying, who are in the greatest danger,
7364 it seems that olive oil is not a suitable matter.
7365 </p>
7366 <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p5">
7367 <b>On the contrary,</b> oil is appointed (
7368 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.14" target="asv">James 5:14</a>) as the matter of this sacrament. Now, properly speaking, oil is none but olive oil. Therefore this is the matter of this
7369 sacrament.
7370 </p>
7371 <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p6"> Further, spiritual healing is signified by anointing with oil, as is evident from
7372 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.1.6" target="asv"> Is. 1:6 </a>where we read: " . . . swelling sores: they are not . . . dressed nor fomented with oil." Therefore the suitable matter for
7373 this sacrament is oil.
7374 </p>
7375 <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p7">
7376 <b>I answer that,</b> The spiritual healing, which is given at the end of life, ought to be complete, since there is no other to follow; it ought
7377 also to be gentle, lest hope, of which the dying stand in utmost need, be shattered rather than fostered. Now oil has a softening
7378 effect, it penetrates to the very heart of a thing, and spreads over it. Hence, in both the foregoing respects, it is a suitable
7379 matter for this sacrament. And since oil is, above all, the name of the liquid
7380 extract of olives, for other liquids are only called oil from their likeness to it, it follows that olive oil is the matter
7381 which should be employed in this sacrament.
7382 </p>
7383 <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p8">
7384 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The incorruption of glory is something not contained in this sacrament: and there is no need for the matter to signify such
7385 a thing. Hence it is not necessary for balsam to be included in the matter of this sacrament, because on account of its fragrance
7386 it is indicative of a good name, which is no longer necessary, for its own sake, to those who are dying; they need only a
7387 clear conscience which is signified by oil.
7388 </p>
7389 <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p9">
7390 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wine heals by its roughness, oil by its softness, wherefore healing with wine pertains to Penance rather than to this sacrament.
7391 </p>
7392 <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p10">
7393 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though olive oil is not produced everywhere, yet it can easily be transported from one place to another. Moreover this sacrament
7394 is not so necessary that the dying cannot obtain salvation without it.
7395 </p>
7396 <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p11"></p>
7397 <p id="XP_Q29_A4-p12"></p>
7398 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A3.html"></a>
7399 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A5.html"></a>
7400 </div>
7401 <div id="XP_Q29_A5" class="div4">
7402 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A4.html"></a>
7403 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A6.html"></a>
7404 <h4 id="XP_Q29_A5-p0.1">Whether the oil ought to be consecrated?</h4>
7405 <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p1"></p>
7406 <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p2">
7407 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the oil need not be consecrated. Because there is a sanctification in the use of this sacrament, through
7408 the form of words. Therefore another sanctification is superfluous if it be applied to the matter.
7409 </p>
7410 <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p3">
7411 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the efficacy and signification of the sacraments are in their very matter. But the signification of the effect of
7412 this sacrament, is suitable to oil on account of its natural properties, and the efficacy thereof is due to the Divine institution.
7413 Therefore its matter does not need to be sanctified.
7414 </p>
7415 <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p4">
7416 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Baptism is a more perfect sacrament than Extreme Unction. But, so far as the essentials of the sacrament are concerned,
7417 the baptismal matter needs no sanctification. Neither therefore does the matter of Extreme Unction need to be sanctified.
7418 </p>
7419 <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p5">
7420 <b>On the contrary,</b> In all other anointings the matter is previously consecrated. Therefore since this sacrament is an anointing, it requires
7421 consecrated matter.
7422 </p>
7423 <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p6">
7424 <b>I answer that,</b> Some hold that mere oil is the matter of this sacrament, and that the sacrament itself is perfected in the consecration of
7425 the oil by the bishop. But this is clearly false since we proved when treating of the Eucharist that that sacrament alone
7426 consists in the consecration of the matter (
7427 <a id="XP_Q29_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q2_A1.html">Q[2], A[1]</a>, ad 2).
7428 </p>
7429 <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p7"> We must therefore say that this sacrament consists in the anointing itself, just as Baptism consists in the washing, and
7430 that the matter of this sacrament is consecrated oil. Three reasons may be assigned why consecrated matter is needed in this
7431 sacrament and in certain others. The first is that all sacramental efficacy is derived from Christ: wherefore those sacraments
7432 which He Himself used, derived their efficacy from His use of them, even as, by the contact of His flesh, He
7433 bestowed the force of regeneration on the waters. But He did not use this sacrament, nor any bodily anointing, wherefore in
7434 all anointings a consecrated matter is required. The second reason is that this sacrament confers a plenitude of grace, so
7435 as to take away not only sin but also the remnants of sin, and bodily sickness. The third reason is that its effect on the
7436 body, viz. bodily health, is not caused by a natural property of the matter. wherefore it has to derive this efficacy from
7437 being
7438 consecrated.
7439 </p>
7440 <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p8">
7441 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first consecration sanctifies the matter in itself, but the second regards rather the use of the matter considered as
7442 actually producing its effect. Hence neither is superfluous, because instruments also receive their efficacy from the craftsman,
7443 both when they are made, and when they are used for action.
7444 </p>
7445 <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p9">
7446 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The efficacy which the sacrament derives from its institution, is applied to this particular matter when it is consecrated.
7447 </p>
7448 <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p10"> The Reply to the Third Objection is gathered from what has been said.</p>
7449 <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p11"></p>
7450 <p id="XP_Q29_A5-p12"></p>
7451 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A4.html"></a>
7452 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A6.html"></a>
7453 </div>
7454 <div id="XP_Q29_A6" class="div4">
7455 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A5.html"></a>
7456 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A7.html"></a>
7457 <h4 id="XP_Q29_A6-p0.1">Whether the matter of this sacrament need be consecrated by a bishop?</h4>
7458 <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p1"></p>
7459 <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p2">
7460 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the matter of this sacrament need not be consecrated by a bishop. Because the consecration of the Eucharistic
7461 elements surpasses that of the matter in this sacrament. But a priest can consecrate the matter in the Eucharist. Therefore
7462 he can do so in this sacrament also.
7463 </p>
7464 <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p3">
7465 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in material works the higher art never prepares the matter for the lower, because the art which applies the matter
7466 is more excellent than that which prepares it, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 25. Now a bishop is above a priest. Therefore
7467 he does not prepare the matter of a sacrament which is applied by a priest. But a priest dispenses this sacrament, as we shall
7468 state further on (
7469 <a id="XP_Q29_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q31.html">Q[31])</a>. Therefore the consecration of the matter
7470 does not belong to a bishop.
7471 </p>
7472 <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p4">
7473 <b>On the contrary,</b> In other anointings also the matter is consecrated by a bishop. Therefore the same applies to this.
7474 </p>
7475 <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p5">
7476 <b>I answer that,</b> The minister of a sacrament produces the effect, not by his own power, as though he were the principal agent, but by the
7477 efficacy of the sacrament which he dispenses. This efficacy comes, in the first place, from Christ, and from Him flows down
7478 to others in due order, viz. to the people through the medium of the ministers who dispense the sacraments, and to the lower
7479 ministers through the medium of the higher ministers who sanctify the matter. Wherefore, in
7480 all the sacraments which require a sanctified matter, the first consecration of the matter is performed by a bishop, and the
7481 application thereof sometimes by a priest, in order to show that the priest's power is derived from the bishop's, according
7482 to
7483 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.132.2" target="asv"> Ps. 132:2</a>: "Like the precious ointment on the head," i.e. Christ, "that ran down upon the beard of Aaron" first, and then "to the skirt
7484 of his garment."
7485 </p>
7486 <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p6">
7487 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sacrament of the Eucharist consists in the consecration of the matter and not in its use. Consequently, strictly speaking,
7488 that which is the matter of the sacrament is not a consecrated thing. Hence no consecration of the matter by a bishop is required
7489 beforehand: but the altar and such like things, even the priest himself, need to be consecrated, all of which can be done
7490 by none but a bishop: so that in this sacrament also, the priest's power is
7491 shown to be derived from the bishop's, as Dionysius observes (Eccl. Hier. iii). The reason why a priest can perform that consecration
7492 of matter which is a sacrament by itself, and not that which, as a sacramental, is directed to a sacrament consisting in something
7493 used by the faithful, is that in respect of Christ's true body no order is above the priesthood, whereas, in respect of Christ's
7494 mystic body the episcopate is above the priesthood, as we shall state further on (
7495 <a id="XP_Q29_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q40_A4.html">Q[40], A[4]</a>).
7496 </p>
7497 <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p7">
7498 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sacramental matter is not one that is made into something else by him that uses it, as occurs in the mechanical arts:
7499 it is one, in virtue of which something is done, so that it partakes somewhat of the nature of an efficient cause, in so far
7500 as it is the instrument of a Divine operation. Hence the matter needs to acquire this virtue from a higher art or power, since
7501 among efficient causes, the more prior the cause the more perfect it is, whereas
7502 in material causes, the more prior the matter, the more imperfect it is.
7503 </p>
7504 <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p8"></p>
7505 <p id="XP_Q29_A6-p9"></p>
7506 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A5.html"></a>
7507 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A7.html"></a>
7508 </div>
7509 <div id="XP_Q29_A7" class="div4">
7510 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A6.html"></a>
7511 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A8.html"></a>
7512 <h4 id="XP_Q29_A7-p0.1">Whether this sacrament has a form?</h4>
7513 <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p1"></p>
7514 <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p2">
7515 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament has no form. Because, since the efficacy of the sacraments is derived from their institution,
7516 as also from their form, the latter must needs be appointed by the institutor of the sacrament. But there is no account of
7517 the form of this sacrament being instituted either by Christ or by the apostles. Therefore this sacrament has no form.
7518 </p>
7519 <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p3">
7520 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is essential to a sacrament is observed everywhere in the same way. Now nothing is so essential to a sacrament
7521 that has a form, as that very form. Therefore, as in this sacrament there is no form commonly used by all, since various words
7522 are in use, it seems that this sacrament has no form.
7523 </p>
7524 <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p4">
7525 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in Baptism no form is needed except for the sanctification of the matter, because the water is "sanctified by the
7526 word of life so as to wash sin away," as Hugh states (De Sacram. ii). Now the matter of this sacrament is already consecrated.
7527 Therefore it needs no form of words.
7528 </p>
7529 <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p5">
7530 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Master says (Sent. iv, D, 1) that every sacrament of the New Law consists in things and words. Now the words are the
7531 sacramental form. Therefore, since this is a sacrament of the New Law, it seems that it has a form.
7532 </p>
7533 <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p6"> Further, this is confirmed by the rite of the Universal Church, who uses certain words in the bestowal of this sacrament.</p>
7534 <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p7">
7535 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that no farm is essential to this sacrament. This, however, seems derogatory to the effect of this sacrament,
7536 since every sacrament signifies its effect. Now the matter is indifferent as regards its effect, and consequently cannot be
7537 determined to any particular effect save by the form of words. Hence in all the sacraments of the New Law, since they effect
7538 what they signify, there must needs be things and words. Moreover James (5:14,15) seems
7539 to ascribe the whole force of this sacrament to prayer, which is the form thereof, as we shall state further on (ad 2: AA[8],9).
7540 Wherefore the foregoing opinion seems presumptuous and erroneous; and for that reason we should hold with the common opinion
7541 that this, like all the other sacraments, has a fixed form.
7542 </p>
7543 <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p8">
7544 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Holy Writ is proposed to all alike: and so, the form of Baptism, which can be conferred by all, should be expressed in Holy
7545 Writ, as also the form of the Eucharist, which in regard to that sacrament, expresses faith which is necessary for salvation.
7546 Now the forms of the other sacraments are not contained in Holy Writ, but were handed down to the Church by the apostles,
7547 who received them from our Lord, as the Apostle declares (
7548 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.23" target="asv">1 Cor.
7549 11:23
7550 </a>): "For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered to you," etc.
7551 </p>
7552 <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p9">
7553 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The words which are essential to the form, viz. the prayer of deprecation, are said by all; but other words which pertain
7554 to the well-being thereof, are not said by all.
7555 </p>
7556 <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p10">
7557 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The matter of Baptism has a certain sanctification of its own from the very contact of our Saviour's flesh; but the form
7558 of words sanctifies it so that it has a sanctifying force. In like manner when the matter of this sacrament has been sanctified
7559 in itself, it requires sanctification in its use, so that it may sanctify actually.
7560 </p>
7561 <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p11"></p>
7562 <p id="XP_Q29_A7-p12"></p>
7563 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A6.html"></a>
7564 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A8.html"></a>
7565 </div>
7566 <div id="XP_Q29_A8" class="div4">
7567 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A7.html"></a>
7568 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A9.html"></a>
7569 <h4 id="XP_Q29_A8-p0.1">Whether the form of this sacrament should be expressed by way of assertion or of petition?</h4>
7570 <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p1"></p>
7571 <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p2">
7572 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the form of this sacrament should be expressed by way of assertion rather than of petition. Because all
7573 the sacraments of the New Law have a sure effect. But sureness of effect is not expressed in the sacramental forms except
7574 by way of assertion, as when we say: "This is My body" or "I baptize thee." Therefore the form of this sacrament should be
7575 expressed as an assertion.
7576 </p>
7577 <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p3">
7578 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intention of the minister should be expressed in the sacramental forms because it is essential to the sacrament.
7579 But the intention of conferring a sacrament is not expressed except by an assertion. Therefore, etc.
7580 </p>
7581 <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p4">
7582 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in some churches the following words are said in the conferring of this sacrament: "I anoint these eyes with consecrated
7583 oil in the name of the Father," etc., which is in keeping with the forms of the other sacraments. Therefore it seems that
7584 such is the form of this sacrament.
7585 </p>
7586 <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p5">
7587 <b>On the contrary,</b> The form of a sacrament must needs be one that is observed everywhere. Now the words employed according to the custom of
7588 all the churches are not those quoted above, but take the form of a petition viz.: "Through this holy unction, and His most
7589 tender mercy, may the Lord pardon thee whatever sins thou hast committed, by sight," etc. Therefore the form of this sacrament
7590 is expressed as a petition.
7591 </p>
7592 <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p6"> Further, this seems to follow from the words of James, who ascribes the effect of this sacrament to prayer: "The prayer of
7593 faith," says he (5:15), "shall save the sick man." Since then a sacrament takes its efficacy from its form, it seems that
7594 the form of this sacrament is expressed as a petition.
7595 </p>
7596 <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p7">
7597 <b>I answer that,</b> The form of this sacrament is expressed by way of a petition, as appears from the words of James, and from the custom of
7598 the Roman Church, who uses no other than words of supplication in conferring this sacrament. Several reasons are assigned
7599 for this: first, because the recipient of this sacrament is deprived of his strength, so that he needs to be helped by prayers;
7600 secondly, because it is given to the dying, who are on the point of quitting the courts of
7601 the Church, and rest in the hands of God alone, for which reason they are committed to Him by prayer; thirdly, because the
7602 effect of this sacrament is not such that it always results from the minister's prayer, even when all essentials have been
7603 duly observed, as is the case with the character in Baptism and Confirmation, transubstantiation in the Eucharist, remission
7604 of sin in Penance (given contrition) which remission is essential to the sacrament of Penance but not to this sacrament.
7605 Consequently the form of this sacrament cannot be expressed in the indicative mood, as in the sacraments just mentioned.
7606 </p>
7607 <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p8">
7608 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This sacrament, like the others mentioned, considered in itself, is sure of its effect. yet this effect can be hindered through
7609 the insincerity of the recipient (though by his intention he submit to the sacrament), so that he receives no effect at all.
7610 Hence there is no parity between this sacrament, and the others wherein some effect always ensues.
7611 </p>
7612 <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p9">
7613 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intention is sufficiently expressed by the act which is mentioned in the form, viz.: "By this holy unction."
7614 </p>
7615 <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p10">
7616 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These words in the indicative mood, which some are wont to say before the prayer, are not the sacramental form, but are a
7617 preparation for the form, in so far as they determine the intention of the minister.
7618 </p>
7619 <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p11"></p>
7620 <p id="XP_Q29_A8-p12"></p>
7621 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A7.html"></a>
7622 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A9.html"></a>
7623 </div>
7624 <div id="XP_Q29_A9" class="div4">
7625 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A8.html"></a>
7626 <a href="summa.XP_Q30.html"></a>
7627 <h4 id="XP_Q29_A9-p0.1">Whether the foregoing prayer is a suitable form for this sacrament?</h4>
7628 <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p1"></p>
7629 <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p2">
7630 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the foregoing prayer is not a suitable form for this sacrament. For in the forms of the other sacraments
7631 mention is made of the matter, for instance in Confirmation, whereas this is not done in the aforesaid words. Therefore it
7632 is not a suitable form.
7633 </p>
7634 <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p3">
7635 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the effect of this sacrament is bestowed on us by the mercy of God, so are the effects of the other sacraments.
7636 But mention is made in the forms of the other sacraments, not of the Divine mercy, but rather of the Trinity and of the Passion.
7637 Therefore the same should be done here.
7638 </p>
7639 <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p4">
7640 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this sacrament is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 23) to have a twofold effect. But in the foregoing words mention
7641 is made of only one effect, viz. the remission of sins, and not of the healing of the body to which end James directs the
7642 prayer of faith to be made (
7643 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q29_A9-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.15" target="asv">James 5:15</a>): "The prayer of faith shall save the sick man." Therefore the above form is unsuitable.
7644 </p>
7645 <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p5">
7646 <b>I answer that,</b> The prayer given above
7647 <a id="XP_Q29_A9-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q29_A8.html">(A[8])</a> is a suitable form for this sacrament, for it includes the sacrament by the words: "By this holy unction," and that which
7648 works in the sacrament, viz. "the mercy of God," and the effect, viz. "remission of sins."
7649 </p>
7650 <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p6">
7651 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The matter of this sacrament may be understood in the act of anointing, whereas the matter of Confirmation cannot be implied
7652 by the act expressed in the form. Hence there is no parity.
7653 </p>
7654 <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p7">
7655 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of mercy is misery: and because this sacrament is given when we are in a state of misery, i.e. of sickness, mention
7656 of mercy is made in this rather than in other sacraments.
7657 </p>
7658 <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p8">
7659 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The form should contain mention of the principal effect, and of that which always ensues in virtue of the sacrament, unless
7660 there be something lacking on the part of the recipient. Now bodily health is not an effect of this kind, as we shall state
7661 further on (
7662 <a id="XP_Q29_A9-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q30_A1.html">Q[30], AA[1]</a> ,2), though it does ensue at times, for which reason James ascribes this effect to the prayer which is the form of this sacrament.
7663 </p>
7664 <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p9"></p>
7665 <p id="XP_Q29_A9-p10"></p>
7666 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A8.html"></a>
7667 <a href="summa.XP_Q30.html"></a>
7668 </div>
7669 <a href="summa.XP_Q28_A3.html"></a>
7670 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A1.html"></a>
7671 </div>
7672 <div id="XP_Q30" class="div3">
7673 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A9.html"></a>
7674 <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A1.html"></a>
7675 <h3 id="XP_Q30-p0.1">OF THE EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
7676 <p id="XP_Q30-p1"></p>
7677 <p id="XP_Q30-p2"> We must now consider the effect of this sacrament: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
7678 <p id="XP_Q30-p3"> (1) Whether Extreme Unction avails for the remission of sins?</p>
7679 <p id="XP_Q30-p4"> (2) Whether bodily health is an effect of this sacrament?</p>
7680 <p id="XP_Q30-p5"> (3) Whether this sacrament imprints a character?</p>
7681 <div id="XP_Q30_A1" class="div4">
7682 <a href="summa.XP_Q30.html"></a>
7683 <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A2.html"></a>
7684 <h4 id="XP_Q30_A1-p0.1">Whether Extreme Unction avails for the remission of sins?</h4>
7685 <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p1"></p>
7686 <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p2">
7687 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Extreme Unction does not avail for the remission of sins. For when a thing can be attained by one means,
7688 no other is needed. Now repentance is required in the recipient of Extreme Unction for the remission of his sins. Therefore
7689 sins are not remitted by Extreme Unction.
7690 </p>
7691 <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p3">
7692 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there are no more than three things in sin, the stain, the debt of punishment, and the remnants of sin. Now Extreme
7693 Unction does not remit the stain without contrition, and this remits sin even without Unction; nor does it remit the punishment,
7694 for if the recipient recover, he is still bound to fulfill the satisfaction enjoined; nor does it take away the remnants of
7695 sin, since the dispositions remaining from preceding acts still remain, as may easily
7696 be seen after recovery. Therefore remission of sins is by no means the effect of Extreme Unction.
7697 </p>
7698 <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p4">
7699 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, remission of sins takes place, not successively, but instantaneously. On the other hand, Extreme Unction is not
7700 done all at once, since several anointings are required. Therefore the remission of sins is not its effect.
7701 </p>
7702 <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p5">
7703 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
7704 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q30_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.15" target="asv">James 5:15</a>): "If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him."
7705 </p>
7706 <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p6"> Further, every sacrament of the New Law confers grace. Now grace effects the forgiveness of sins. Therefore since Extreme
7707 Unction is a sacrament of the New Law, its effect is the remission of sins.
7708 </p>
7709 <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p7">
7710 <b>I answer that,</b> Each sacrament was instituted for the purpose of one principal effect, though it may, in consequence, produce other effects
7711 besides. And since a sacrament causes what it signifies, the principal effect of a sacrament must be gathered from its signification.
7712 Now this sacrament is conferred by way of a kind of medicament, even as Baptism is conferred by way of washing, and the purpose
7713 of a medicament is to expel sickness. Hence the chief object of the
7714 institution of this sacrament is to cure the sickness of sin. Therefore, just as Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, and
7715 Penance, a spiritual resurrection, so Extreme Unction is a spiritual healing or cure. Now just as a bodily cure presupposes
7716 bodily life in the one who is cured, so does a spiritual cure presuppose spiritual life. Hence this sacrament is not an antidote
7717 to those defects which deprive man of spiritual life, namely. original and mortal sin, but is a remedy for such defects as
7718 weaken man spiritually, so as to deprive him of perfect vigor for acts of the life of grace or of glory; which defects consist
7719 in nothing else but a certain weakness and unfitness, the result in us of actual or original sin. against which weakness man
7720 is strengthened by this sacrament. Since, however, this strength is given by grace, which is incompatible with sin, it follows
7721 that. in consequence, if it finds any sin, either mortal or venial, it removes it as far as the guilt is concerned,
7722 provided there be no obstacle on the part of the recipient; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the Eucharist
7723 and Confirmation (
7724 <a id="XP_Q30_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q73_A7.html">TP, Q[73], A[7]</a>;
7725 <a id="XP_Q30_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q79_A3.html">TP, Q[79], A[3]</a>). Hence, too, James speaks of the remission of sin as being conditional, for he says: "If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven
7726 him," viz. as to the guilt. Because it does not always blot out sin, since it does not always find any: but it always remits
7727 in respect of the
7728 aforesaid weakness which some call the remnants of sin. Some, however, maintain that it is instituted chiefly as a remedy
7729 for venial sin which cannot be cured perfectly in this lifetime: for which reason the sacrament of the dying is ordained specially
7730 against venial sin. But this does not seem to be true, since Penance also blots out venial sins sufficiently during this life
7731 as to their guilt, and that we cannot avoid them after doing penance, does not cancel the effect of the previous
7732 penance; moreover this is part of the weakness mentioned above.
7733 </p>
7734 <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p8"> Consequently we must say that the principal effect of this sacrament is the remission of sin, as to its remnants, and, consequently,
7735 even as to its guilt, if it find it.
7736 </p>
7737 <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p9">
7738 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the principal effect of a sacrament can be obtained without actually receiving that sacrament (either without any
7739 sacrament at all, or indirectly by means of some other sacrament), yet it never can be obtained without the purpose of receiving
7740 that sacrament. And so, since Penance was instituted chiefly against actual sin, whichever other sacrament may blot out sin
7741 indirectly, it does not exclude the necessity of Penance.
7742 </p>
7743 <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p10">
7744 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Extreme Unction remits sin in some way as to those three things. For, although the stain of sin is not washed out without
7745 contrition, yet this sacrament, by the grace which it bestows, makes the movement of the free will towards sin to be one of
7746 contrition, just as may occur in the Eucharist and Confirmation. Again it diminishes the debt of temporal punishment; and
7747 this indirectly, in as much as it takes away weakness, for a strong man bears the same
7748 punishment more easily than a weak man. Hence it does not follow that the measure of satisfaction is diminished. As to the
7749 remnants of sin, they do not mean here those dispositions which result from acts, and are inchoate habits so to speak, but
7750 a certain spiritual debility in the mind, which debility being removed, though such like habits or dispositions remain, the
7751 mind is not so easily prone to sin.
7752 </p>
7753 <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p11">
7754 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When many actions are ordained to one effect, the last is formal with respect to all the others that precede, and acts by
7755 virtue of them: wherefore by the last anointing is infused grace which gives the sacrament its effect.
7756 </p>
7757 <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p12"></p>
7758 <p id="XP_Q30_A1-p13"></p>
7759 <a href="summa.XP_Q30.html"></a>
7760 <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A2.html"></a>
7761 </div>
7762 <div id="XP_Q30_A2" class="div4">
7763 <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A1.html"></a>
7764 <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A3.html"></a>
7765 <h4 id="XP_Q30_A2-p0.1">Whether bodily health is an effect of this sacrament?</h4>
7766 <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p1"></p>
7767 <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p2">
7768 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that bodily health is not an effect of this sacrament. For every sacrament is a spiritual remedy. Now a spiritual
7769 remedy is ordained to spiritual health, just as a bodily remedy is ordained to health of the body. Therefore bodily health
7770 is not an effect of this sacrament.
7771 </p>
7772 <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p3">
7773 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sacraments always produce their effect in those who approach them in the proper dispositions. Now sometimes
7774 the recipient of this sacrament does not receive bodily health, no matter how devoutly he receives it. Therefore bodily health
7775 is not its effect.
7776 </p>
7777 <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p4">
7778 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the efficacy of this sacrament is notified to us in the fifth chapter of James. Now healing is ascribed there as
7779 the effect, not of the anointing, but of the prayer, for he says: "The prayer of faith shall save the sick man." Therefore
7780 bodily healing is not an effect of this sacrament.
7781 </p>
7782 <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p5">
7783 <b>On the contrary,</b> The operation of the Church is more efficacious since Christ's Passion than before. Now, before the Passion, those whom the
7784 apostles anointed with oil were healed (
7785 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q30_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.6.13" target="asv">Mk. 6:13</a>). Therefore unction has its effect now in healing bodies.
7786 </p>
7787 <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p6"> Further, the sacraments produce their effect by signifying it. Now Baptism signifies and effects a spiritual washing, through
7788 the bodily washing in which it consists outwardly. Therefore Extreme Unction signifies and causes a spiritual healing through
7789 the bodily healing which it effects externally.
7790 </p>
7791 <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p7">
7792 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as Baptism causes a spiritual cleansing from spiritual stains by means of a bodily washing, so this sacrament causes
7793 an inward healing by means of an outward sacramental healing: and even as the baptismal washing has the effect of a bodily
7794 washing, since it effects even a bodily cleansing, so too, Extreme Unction has the effect of a bodily remedy, namely a healing
7795 of the body. But there is a difference, for as much as the bodily washing causes a bodily
7796 cleansing by a natural property of the bodily element, and consequently always causes it, whereas Extreme Unction causes a
7797 bodily healing, not by a natural property of the matter, but by the Divine power which works reasonably. And since reasonable
7798 working never produces a secondary effect, except in so far as it is required for the principal effect, it follows that a
7799 bodily healing does not always ensue from this sacrament, but only when it is requisite for the spiritual healing: and then
7800 it
7801 produces it always, provided there be no obstacle on the part of the recipient.
7802 </p>
7803 <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p8">
7804 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection proves that bodily health is not the principal effect of this sacrament: and this is true.
7805 </p>
7806 <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p9"> The Reply to the Second Objection is clear from what has been said above (cf.
7807 <a id="XP_Q30_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q29_A8.html"> Q[29], A[8]</a>).
7808 </p>
7809 <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p10">
7810 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This prayer is the form of this sacrament as stated above (
7811 <a id="XP_Q30_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q29_A8.html">Q[29], AA[8]</a>,9). Hence, so far as its form is concerned, this sacrament derives from it its efficacy in healing the body.
7812 </p>
7813 <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p11"></p>
7814 <p id="XP_Q30_A2-p12"></p>
7815 <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A1.html"></a>
7816 <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A3.html"></a>
7817 </div>
7818 <div id="XP_Q30_A3" class="div4">
7819 <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A2.html"></a>
7820 <a href="summa.XP_Q31.html"></a>
7821 <h4 id="XP_Q30_A3-p0.1">Whether this sacrament imprints a character?</h4>
7822 <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p1"></p>
7823 <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p2">
7824 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament imprints a character. For a character is a distinctive sign. Now just as one who is baptized
7825 is distinguished from one who is not so is one who is anointed, from one who is not. Therefore, just as Baptism imprints a
7826 character so does Extreme Unction.
7827 </p>
7828 <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p3">
7829 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is an anointing in the sacraments or order and Confirmation, as there is in this sacrament. But a character
7830 is imprinted in those sacraments. Therefore a character is imprinted in this one also.
7831 </p>
7832 <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p4">
7833 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sacrament contains something that is a reality only, something that is a sacrament only, and something that
7834 is both reality and sacrament. Now nothing in this sacrament can be assigned as both reality and sacrament except a character.
7835 Therefore in this sacrament also, a character is imprinted.
7836 </p>
7837 <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p5">
7838 <b>On the contrary,</b> No sacrament that imprints a character is repeated. But this sacrament is repeated as we shall state further on (
7839 <a id="XP_Q30_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q33.html">Q[33])</a>. Therefore it does not imprint a character.
7840 </p>
7841 <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p6"> Further, a sacramental character causes a distinction among those who are in the present Church. But Extreme Unction is given
7842 to one who is departing from the present Church. Therefore it does not imprint a character.
7843 </p>
7844 <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p7">
7845 <b>I answer that,</b> A character is not imprinted except in those sacraments whereby man is deputed to some sacred duty. Now this sacrament is
7846 for no other purpose than a remedy, and man is not deputed thereby to do or receive anything holy. Therefore it does not imprint
7847 a character.
7848 </p>
7849 <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p8">
7850 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A character marks a distinction of . states with regard to duties which have to be performed in the Church, a distinction
7851 which a man does not receive by being anointed.
7852 </p>
7853 <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p9">
7854 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The unction of orders and Confirmation, is the unction of consecration whereby a man is deputed to some sacred duty, whereas
7855 this unction is remedial. Hence the comparison fails.
7856 </p>
7857 <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p10">
7858 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In this sacrament, that which is both reality and sacrament is not a character, but a certain inward devotion which is a
7859 kind of spiritual anointing.
7860 </p>
7861 <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p11"></p>
7862 <p id="XP_Q30_A3-p12"></p>
7863 <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A2.html"></a>
7864 <a href="summa.XP_Q31.html"></a>
7865 </div>
7866 <a href="summa.XP_Q29_A9.html"></a>
7867 <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A1.html"></a>
7868 </div>
7869 <div id="XP_Q31" class="div3">
7870 <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A3.html"></a>
7871 <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A1.html"></a>
7872 <h3 id="XP_Q31-p0.1">OF THE MINISTER OF THIS SACRAMENT (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
7873 <p id="XP_Q31-p1"></p>
7874 <p id="XP_Q31-p2"> We must now consider the minister of this sacrament: under which head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
7875 <p id="XP_Q31-p3"> (1) Whether a layman can confer this sacrament?</p>
7876 <p id="XP_Q31-p4"> (2) Whether a deacon can?</p>
7877 <p id="XP_Q31-p5"> (3) Whether none but a bishop can confer it?</p>
7878 <div id="XP_Q31_A1" class="div4">
7879 <a href="summa.XP_Q31.html"></a>
7880 <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A2.html"></a>
7881 <h4 id="XP_Q31_A1-p0.1">Whether a layman can confer this sacrament?</h4>
7882 <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p1"></p>
7883 <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p2">
7884 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that even a layman can confer this sacrament. For this sacrament derives its efficacy from prayer, as James
7885 declares (
7886 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q31_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.15" target="asv">James 5:15</a>). But a layman's prayer is sometimes as acceptable to God as a priest's. Therefore he can confer this sacrament.
7887 </p>
7888 <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p3">
7889 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we read of certain fathers in Egypt that they sent the oil to the sick, and that these were healed. It is also related
7890 of the Blessed Genevieve that she anointed the sick with oil. Therefore this sacrament can be conferred even by lay people.
7891 </p>
7892 <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p4">
7893 <b>On the contrary,</b> Remission of sins is given in this sacrament. But laymen have not the power to forgive sins. Therefore, etc.
7894 </p>
7895 <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p5">
7896 <b>I answer that,</b> According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) there are some who exercise hierarchical actions, and some who are recipients only.
7897 Hence laymen are officially incompetent to dispense any sacrament: and that they can baptize in cases of necessity, is due
7898 to the Divine dispensation, in order that no one may be deprived of spiritual regeneration.
7899 </p>
7900 <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p6">
7901 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This prayer is not said by the priest in his own person, for since sometimes he is in sin, he would not in that case be heard.
7902 But it is said in the person of the whole Church, in whose person he can pray as a public official, whereas a layman cannot,
7903 for he is a private individual.
7904 </p>
7905 <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p7">
7906 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These unctions were not sacramental. It was due to the devotion of the recipients of the unction, and to the merits of those
7907 who anointed them that they procured the effects of bodily health, through the "grace of healing" (
7908 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q31_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:9</a>) but not through sacramental grace.
7909 </p>
7910 <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p8"></p>
7911 <p id="XP_Q31_A1-p9"></p>
7912 <a href="summa.XP_Q31.html"></a>
7913 <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A2.html"></a>
7914 </div>
7915 <div id="XP_Q31_A2" class="div4">
7916 <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A1.html"></a>
7917 <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A3.html"></a>
7918 <h4 id="XP_Q31_A2-p0.1">Whether deacons can confer this sacrament?</h4>
7919 <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p1"></p>
7920 <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p2">
7921 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that deacons can confer this sacrament. For, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) "deacons have the power
7922 to cleanse." Now this sacrament was instituted precisely to cleanse from sickness of the mind and body. Therefore deacons
7923 also can confer it.
7924 </p>
7925 <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p3">
7926 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Baptism is a more excellent sacrament than the one of which we are speaking. But deacons can baptize, as instanced
7927 by the Blessed Laurence. Therefore they can confer this sacrament also.
7928 </p>
7929 <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p4">
7930 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
7931 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q31_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.14" target="asv">James 5:14</a>): "Let him bring in the priests of the Church."
7932 </p>
7933 <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p5">
7934 <b>I answer that,</b> A deacon has the power to cleanse but not to enlighten. Hence, since enlightenment is an effect of grace, no sacrament whereby
7935 grace is conferred can be given by a deacon in virtue of his office: and so he cannot confer this sacrament, since grace is
7936 bestowed therein.
7937 </p>
7938 <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p6">
7939 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This sacrament cleanses by enlightening through the bestowal of grace: wherefore a deacon is not competent to confer it.
7940 </p>
7941 <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p7">
7942 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This is not a necessary sacrament, as Baptism is. Hence its bestowal is not committed to all in cases of necessity, but only
7943 to those who are competent to do so in virtue of their office. Nor are deacons competent to baptize in virtue of their office.
7944 </p>
7945 <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p8"></p>
7946 <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p9"></p>
7947 <p id="XP_Q31_A2-p10"></p>
7948 <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A1.html"></a>
7949 <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A3.html"></a>
7950 </div>
7951 <div id="XP_Q31_A3" class="div4">
7952 <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A2.html"></a>
7953 <a href="summa.XP_Q32.html"></a>
7954 <h4 id="XP_Q31_A3-p0.1">Whether none but a bishop can confer this sacrament?</h4>
7955 <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p1"></p>
7956 <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p2">
7957 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that none but a bishop can confer this sacrament. For this sacrament consists in an anointing, just as Confirmation
7958 does. Now none but a bishop can confirm. Therefore only a bishop can confer this sacrament.
7959 </p>
7960 <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p3">
7961 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who cannot do what is less cannot do what is greater. Now the use of consecrated matter surpasses the act of
7962 consecrating the matter, since the former is the end of the latter. Therefore since a priest cannot consecrate the matter,
7963 neither can he use the matter after it has been consecrated.
7964 </p>
7965 <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p4">
7966 <b>On the contrary,</b> The minister of this sacrament has to be brought in to the recipient, as is clear from
7967 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q31_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.14" target="asv"> James 5:14.</a> Now a bishop cannot go to all the sick people of his diocese. Therefore the bishop is not the only one who can confer this
7968 sacrament.
7969 </p>
7970 <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p5">
7971 <b>I answer that,</b> According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), the office of perfecting belongs to a bishop, just as it belongs to a priest to enlighten.
7972 Wherefore those sacraments are reserved to a bishop's dispensation, which place the recipient in a state of perfection above
7973 others. But this is not the case with this sacrament, for it is given to all. Consequently it can be given by ordinary priests.
7974 </p>
7975 <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p6">
7976 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Confirmation imprints a character, whereby man is placed in a state of perfection, as stated above (
7977 <a id="XP_Q31_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q63_A1.html">TP, Q[63], AA[1]</a>, 2,6). But this does not take place in this sacrament; hence there is no comparison.
7978 </p>
7979 <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p7">
7980 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the use of consecrated matter is of more importance than the consecration of the matter, from the point of view
7981 of the final cause; nevertheless, from the point of view of efficient cause, the consecration of the matter is the more important,
7982 since the use of the matter is dependent thereon, as on its active cause: hence the consecration of the matter demands a higher
7983 power than the use of the matter does.
7984 </p>
7985 <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p8"></p>
7986 <p id="XP_Q31_A3-p9"></p>
7987 <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A2.html"></a>
7988 <a href="summa.XP_Q32.html"></a>
7989 </div>
7990 <a href="summa.XP_Q30_A3.html"></a>
7991 <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A1.html"></a>
7992 </div>
7993 <div id="XP_Q32" class="div3">
7994 <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A3.html"></a>
7995 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A1.html"></a>
7996 <h3 id="XP_Q32-p0.1">ON WHOM SHOULD THIS SACRAMENT BE CONFERRED AND ON WHAT PART OF THE BODY? (SEVEN ARTICLES)</h3>
7997 <p id="XP_Q32-p1"></p>
7998 <p id="XP_Q32-p2"> We must now consider on whom this sacrament should be conferred and on what part of the body: under which head there are
7999 seven points of inquiry:
8000 </p>
8001 <p id="XP_Q32-p3"> (1) Whether this sacrament should be conferred on those who are in good health?</p>
8002 <p id="XP_Q32-p4"> (2) Whether it should be conferred in any kind of sickness?</p>
8003 <p id="XP_Q32-p5"> (3) Whether it should be conferred on madmen and imbeciles?</p>
8004 <p id="XP_Q32-p6"> (4) Whether it should be given to children?</p>
8005 <p id="XP_Q32-p7"> (5) Whether, in this sacrament, the whole body should be anointed?</p>
8006 <p id="XP_Q32-p8"> (6) Whether certain parts are suitably assigned to be anointed?</p>
8007 <p id="XP_Q32-p9"> (7) Whether those who are deformed in the above parts ought to be anointed thereon?</p>
8008 <div id="XP_Q32_A1" class="div4">
8009 <a href="summa.XP_Q32.html"></a>
8010 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A2.html"></a>
8011 <h4 id="XP_Q32_A1-p0.1">Whether this sacrament ought to be conferred on those who are in good health?</h4>
8012 <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p1"></p>
8013 <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p2">
8014 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament should be conferred even on those who are in good health. For the healing of the mind is
8015 a more important effect of this sacrament than the healing of the body, as stated above (
8016 <a id="XP_Q32_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q30_A2.html">Q[30], A[2]</a>). Now even those who are healthy in body need to be healed in mind. Therefore this sacrament should be conferred on them
8017 also.
8018 </p>
8019 <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p3">
8020 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, this is the sacrament of those who are departing this life, just as Baptism is the sacrament of those who are entering
8021 this life. Now Baptism is given to all who enter. Therefore this sacrament should be given to all who are departing. But sometimes
8022 those who are near departure are in good health, for instance those who are to be beheaded. Therefore this sacrament should
8023 be conferred on them.
8024 </p>
8025 <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p4">
8026 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
8027 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q32_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.14" target="asv">James 5:14</a>): "Is any man sick among you," etc. Therefore none but the sick are competent to receive this sacrament.
8028 </p>
8029 <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p5">
8030 <b>I answer that,</b> This sacrament is a spiritual healing, as stated above (
8031 <a id="XP_Q32_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q30_A1.html">Q[30], AA[1]</a>,2), and is signified by way of a healing of the body. Hence this sacrament should not be conferred on those who are not subjects
8032 for bodily healing, those namely, who are in good health.
8033 </p>
8034 <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p6">
8035 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although spiritual health is the principal effect of this sacrament, yet this same spiritual healing needs to be signified
8036 by a healing of the body, although bodily health may not actually ensue. Consequently spiritual health can be conferred by
8037 this sacrament on those alone who are competent to receive bodily healing, viz. the sick; even as he alone can receive Baptism
8038 who is capable of a bodily washing, and not a child yet in its mother's womb.
8039 </p>
8040 <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p7">
8041 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even those who are entering into life cannot receive Baptism unless they are capable of a bodily washing. And so those who
8042 are departing this life cannot receive this sacrament, unless they be subjects for a bodily healing.
8043 </p>
8044 <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p8"></p>
8045 <p id="XP_Q32_A1-p9"></p>
8046 <a href="summa.XP_Q32.html"></a>
8047 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A2.html"></a>
8048 </div>
8049 <div id="XP_Q32_A2" class="div4">
8050 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A1.html"></a>
8051 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A3.html"></a>
8052 <h4 id="XP_Q32_A2-p0.1">Whether this sacrament ought to be given in any kind of sickness?</h4>
8053 <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p1"></p>
8054 <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p2">
8055 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament should be given in any kind of sickness. For no kind of sickness is determined in the fifth
8056 chapter of James where this sacrament is delivered to us. Therefore this sacrament should be given in all kinds of sickness.
8057 </p>
8058 <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p3">
8059 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more excellent a remedy is, the more generally should it be available. Now this sacrament is more excellent
8060 than bodily medicine. Since then bodily medicine is given to all manner of sick persons, it seems that this sacrament should
8061 be given in like manner to all.
8062 </p>
8063 <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p4">
8064 <b>On the contrary,</b> This sacrament is called by all Extreme Unction. Now it is not every sickness that brings man to the extremity of his life,
8065 since some ailments prolong life, according to the Philosopher (De Long. et Brev. Vitae i). Therefore this sacrament should
8066 not be given in every case of sickness.
8067 </p>
8068 <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p5">
8069 <b>I answer that,</b> This sacrament is the last remedy that the Church can give, since it is an immediate preparation for glory. Therefore it
8070 ought to be given to those only, who are so sick as to be in a state of departure from this life, through their sickness being
8071 of such a nature as to cause death, the danger of which is to be feared.
8072 </p>
8073 <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p6">
8074 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Any sickness can cause death, if it be aggravated. Hence if we consider the different kinds of disease, there is none in
8075 which this sacrament cannot be given; and for this reason the apostle does not determine any particular one. But if we consider
8076 the degree and the stage of the complaint, this sacrament should not be given to every sick person.
8077 </p>
8078 <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p7">
8079 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The principal effect of bodily medicine is bodily health, which all sick people lack, whatever be the stage of their sickness.
8080 But the principal effect of this sacrament is that immunity from disorder which is needed by those who are taking their departure
8081 from this life and setting out for the life of glory. Hence the comparison fails.
8082 </p>
8083 <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p8"></p>
8084 <p id="XP_Q32_A2-p9"></p>
8085 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A1.html"></a>
8086 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A3.html"></a>
8087 </div>
8088 <div id="XP_Q32_A3" class="div4">
8089 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A2.html"></a>
8090 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A4.html"></a>
8091 <h4 id="XP_Q32_A3-p0.1">Whether this sacrament ought to be given to madmen and imbeciles?</h4>
8092 <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p1"></p>
8093 <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p2">
8094 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament should be given to madmen and imbeciles. For these diseases are full of danger and cause
8095 death quickly. Now when there is danger it is the time to apply the remedy. Therefore this sacrament, which was intended as
8096 a remedy to human weakness, should be given to such people.
8097 </p>
8098 <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p3">
8099 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Baptism is a greater sacrament than this. Now Baptism is conferred on mad people as stated above (
8100 <a id="XP_Q32_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q68_A12.html">TP, Q[68], A[12]</a>). Therefore this sacrament also should be given to them.
8101 </p>
8102 <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p4">
8103 <b>On the contrary,</b> This sacrament should be given to none but such as acknowledge it. Now this does not apply to madmen and imbeciles. Therefore
8104 it should not be given to them.
8105 </p>
8106 <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p5">
8107 <b>I answer that,</b> The devotion of the recipient, the personal merit of the minister, and the general merits of the whole Church, are of great
8108 account towards the reception of the effect of this sacrament. This is evident from the fact that the form of this sacrament
8109 is pronounced by way of a prayer. Hence it should not be given those who cannot acknowledge it, and especially to madmen and
8110 imbeciles, who might dishonor the sacrament by their offensive conduct, unless they have
8111 lucid intervals, when they would be capable of acknowledging the sacrament, for then the sacrament should be given to children
8112 the same in that state.
8113 </p>
8114 <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p6">
8115 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although such people are sometimes in danger of death; yet the remedy cannot be applied to them, on account of their lack
8116 of devotion. Hence it should not be given to them.
8117 </p>
8118 <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p7">
8119 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Baptism does not require a movement of the free-will, because it is given chiefly as a remedy for original sin, which, in
8120 us, is not taken away by a movement of the free-will. On the other hand this sacrament requires a movement of the free-will;
8121 wherefore the comparison fails. Moreover Baptism is a necessary sacrament, while Extreme Unction is not.
8122 </p>
8123 <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p8"></p>
8124 <p id="XP_Q32_A3-p9"></p>
8125 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A2.html"></a>
8126 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A4.html"></a>
8127 </div>
8128 <div id="XP_Q32_A4" class="div4">
8129 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A3.html"></a>
8130 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A5.html"></a>
8131 <h4 id="XP_Q32_A4-p0.1">Whether this sacrament should be given to children?</h4>
8132 <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p1"></p>
8133 <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p2">
8134 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament ought to be given to children. Because children suffer from the same ailments sometimes
8135 as adults. Now the same disease requires the same remedy. Therefore this sacrament should be given to children the same as
8136 to adults.
8137 </p>
8138 <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p3">
8139 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, this sacrament is given in order to remove the remnants of sin, whether original or actual, as stated above (
8140 <a id="XP_Q32_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q30_A1.html">Q[30], A[1]</a>). Now the remnants of original sin are in children. Therefore this sacrament should be given to them.
8141 </p>
8142 <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p4">
8143 <b>On the contrary,</b> This sacrament should be given to none but those to whom the form applies. But the form of this sacrament does not apply
8144 to children, since they have not sinned by sight and hearing; as expressed in the form. Therefore this sacrament should not
8145 be given to them.
8146 </p>
8147 <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p5">
8148 <b>I answer that,</b> This sacrament, like the Eucharist, requires actual devotion in the recipient. Therefore, just as the Eucharist ought not
8149 to be given to children, so neither ought this sacrament to be given to them.
8150 </p>
8151 <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p6">
8152 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Children's infirmities are not caused by actual sin, as in adults, and this sacrament is given chiefly as a remedy for infirmities
8153 that result from sins, being the remnants of sin, as it were.
8154 </p>
8155 <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p7">
8156 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This sacrament is not given as a remedy for the remnants of original sin, except in so far as they gather strength, so to
8157 speak, from actual sins. Hence from the very form it appears that it is given chiefly as a remedy for actual sins, which are
8158 not in children.
8159 </p>
8160 <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p8"></p>
8161 <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p9"></p>
8162 <p id="XP_Q32_A4-p10"></p>
8163 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A3.html"></a>
8164 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A5.html"></a>
8165 </div>
8166 <div id="XP_Q32_A5" class="div4">
8167 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A4.html"></a>
8168 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A6.html"></a>
8169 <h4 id="XP_Q32_A5-p0.1">Whether the whole body should be anointed in this sacrament?</h4>
8170 <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p1"></p>
8171 <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p2">
8172 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the whole body should be anointed in this sacrament. For, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 6), "the
8173 whole soul is in every part of the body." Now this sacrament is given chiefly in order to heal the soul. Therefore the whole
8174 body ought to be anointed.
8175 </p>
8176 <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p3">
8177 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the remedy should be applied to the part affected by the disease. But sometimes the disease is general, and affects
8178 the whole body, as a fever does. Therefore the whole body should be anointed.
8179 </p>
8180 <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p4">
8181 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in Baptism the whole body is dipped under the water. Therefore in this sacrament the whole body should be anointed.
8182 </p>
8183 <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p5">
8184 <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the rite observed throughout the Church, according to which in this sacrament the sick man is anointed, only in certain
8185 fixed parts of the body.
8186 </p>
8187 <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p6">
8188 <b>I answer that,</b> This sacrament is shown to us under the form of a healing. Now bodily healing has to be effected, by applying the remedy,
8189 not to the whole body, but to those parts where the root of the disease is seated. Consequently the sacramental unction also
8190 ought to be applied to those parts only in which the spiritual sickness is rooted.
8191 </p>
8192 <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p7">
8193 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the whole soul is, as to its essence, in each part of the body, it is not as to its powers which are the roots of
8194 sinful acts. Hence certain fixed parts have to be anointed, those, namely, in which powers have their being.
8195 </p>
8196 <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p8">
8197 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The remedy is not always applied to the part affected by the disease, but, with greater reason, to the part where the root
8198 of the disease is seated.
8199 </p>
8200 <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p9">
8201 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Baptism is given under the form of washing: and a bodily washing cleanses only the part to which it is applied; for this
8202 reason Baptism is applied to the whole body. It is different with Extreme Unction for the reason given above.
8203 </p>
8204 <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p10"></p>
8205 <p id="XP_Q32_A5-p11"></p>
8206 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A4.html"></a>
8207 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A6.html"></a>
8208 </div>
8209 <div id="XP_Q32_A6" class="div4">
8210 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A5.html"></a>
8211 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A7.html"></a>
8212 <h4 id="XP_Q32_A6-p0.1">Whether the parts to be anointed are suitably assigned?</h4>
8213 <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p1"></p>
8214 <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p2">
8215 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that these parts are unsuitably assigned, namely, that the eyes, nose, ears, lips, hands, and feet should be
8216 anointed. For a wise physician heals the disease in its root. Now "from the heart come forth thoughts . . . that defile a
8217 man" (
8218 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q32_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.19" target="asv">Mat. 15:19,20</a>). Therefore the breast ought to be anointed.
8219 </p>
8220 <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p3">
8221 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, purity of mind is not less necessary to those who are departing this life than to those who are entering therein.
8222 Now those who are entering are anointed with chrism on the head by the priest, to signify purity of mind. Therefore in this
8223 sacrament those who are departing should be anointed on the head.
8224 </p>
8225 <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p4">
8226 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the remedy should be applied where the disease is most virulent. Now spiritual sickness is most virulent in the
8227 loins in men, and in the navel in women, according to
8228 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q32_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.40.11" target="asv"> Job 40:11</a>: "His strength is in his loins, and his force in the navel of his belly," as Gregory expounds the passage (Moral. xxxii,
8229 11). Therefore these parts should be anointed.
8230 </p>
8231 <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p5">
8232 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sins are committed with other parts of the body, no less than with the feet. Therefore, as the feet are anointed,
8233 so ought other members of the body to be anointed.
8234 </p>
8235 <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p6">
8236 <b>I answer that,</b> The principles of sinning are the same in us as the principles of action, for a sin is an act. Now there are in us three
8237 principles of action; the first is the directing principle, namely, the cognitive power; the second is the commanding principle,
8238 namely, the appetitive power; the third is the executive principle, namely, the motive power.
8239 </p>
8240 <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p7"> Now all our knowledge has its origin in the senses. And, since the remedy for sin should be applied where sin originates
8241 in us first, for that reason the places of the five senses are anointed. the eyes, to wit, on account of the sight, the ears
8242 on account of hearing, the nostrils on account of the smell, the mouth on account of the taste, the hands on account of the
8243 touch which is keenest in the finger tips, (in some places too the loins are anointed on account of the
8244 appetite), and the feet are anointed on account of the motive power of which they are the chief instrument. And since the
8245 cognitive power is the first principle of human activity, the anointing of the five senses is observed by all, as being essential
8246 to the sacrament. But some do not observe the other unctions---some also anoint the feet but not the loins---because the appetitive
8247 and motive powers are secondary principles.
8248 </p>
8249 <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p8">
8250 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No thought arises in the heart without an act of the imagination which is a movement proceeding from sensation (De Anima
8251 ii). Hence the primary root of thought is not the heart, but the sensory organs, except in so far as the heart is a principle
8252 of the whole body, albeit a remote principle.
8253 </p>
8254 <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p9">
8255 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who enter have to receive purity of the mind, whereas those who are departing have to cleanse the mind. Hence the latter
8256 need to be anointed in those parts in respect of which the mind's purity may be sullied.
8257 </p>
8258 <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p10">
8259 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some are wont to anoint the loins, because they are the chief seat of the concupiscible appetite: however, as stated above,
8260 the appetitive power is not the primary root.
8261 </p>
8262 <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p11">
8263 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The bodily organs which are the instruments of sin, are the feet, hands, and tongue, all of which are anointed, and the organs
8264 of generation which it would be unbecoming to anoint, on account of their uncleanliness, and out of respect for the sacrament.
8265 </p>
8266 <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p12"></p>
8267 <p id="XP_Q32_A6-p13"></p>
8268 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A5.html"></a>
8269 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A7.html"></a>
8270 </div>
8271 <div id="XP_Q32_A7" class="div4">
8272 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A6.html"></a>
8273 <a href="summa.XP_Q33.html"></a>
8274 <h4 id="XP_Q32_A7-p0.1">Whether those who are deformed in those parts should be anointed?</h4>
8275 <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p1"></p>
8276 <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p2">
8277 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those who are deformed should not be anointed in those parts. For just as this sacrament demands a certain
8278 disposition on the part of the recipient, viz. that he should be sick, so it demands that he should be anointed in a certain
8279 part of the body. Now he that is not sick cannot be anointed. Therefore neither can he be anointed who lacks the part to be
8280 anointed.
8281 </p>
8282 <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p3">
8283 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man born blind does not sin by his sight. Yet in the anointing of the eyes mention is made of sins by sight. Therefore
8284 this anointing ought not to be applied to one born blind, and in like manner as regards the other senses.
8285 </p>
8286 <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p4">
8287 <b>On the contrary,</b> Bodily deformity is not an impediment to any other sacrament. Therefore it should not be an impediment to this one. Now each
8288 of the anointings is essential to the sacrament. Therefore all should be applied to those who are deformed.
8289 </p>
8290 <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p5">
8291 <b>I answer that,</b> Even those who are deformed should be anointed, and that as near as possible to the part which ought to have been anointed.
8292 For though they have not the members, nevertheless, they have, at least radically, the powers of the soul, corresponding to
8293 those members, and they may commit inwardly the sins that pertain to those members, though they cannot outwardly.
8294 </p>
8295 <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p6"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
8296 <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p7"></p>
8297 <p id="XP_Q32_A7-p8"></p>
8298 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A6.html"></a>
8299 <a href="summa.XP_Q33.html"></a>
8300 </div>
8301 <a href="summa.XP_Q31_A3.html"></a>
8302 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A1.html"></a>
8303 </div>
8304 <div id="XP_Q33" class="div3">
8305 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A7.html"></a>
8306 <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A1.html"></a>
8307 <h3 id="XP_Q33-p0.1">OF THE REPETITION OF THIS SACRAMENT (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
8308 <p id="XP_Q33-p1"></p>
8309 <p id="XP_Q33-p2"> We must now consider the repetition of this sacrament: under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
8310 <p id="XP_Q33-p3"> (1) Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated?</p>
8311 <p id="XP_Q33-p4"> (2) Whether it ought to be repeated during the same sickness?</p>
8312 <div id="XP_Q33_A1" class="div4">
8313 <a href="summa.XP_Q33.html"></a>
8314 <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A2.html"></a>
8315 <h4 id="XP_Q33_A1-p0.1">Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated?</h4>
8316 <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p1"></p>
8317 <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p2">
8318 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament ought not to be repeated. For the anointing of a man is of greater import than the anointing
8319 of a stone. But the anointing of an altar is not repeated, unless the altar be shattered. Neither, therefore, should Extreme
8320 Unction, whereby a man is anointed, be repeated.
8321 </p>
8322 <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p3">
8323 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing comes after what is extreme. But this unction is called extreme. Therefore it should not be repeated.
8324 </p>
8325 <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p4">
8326 <b>On the contrary,</b> This sacrament is a spiritual healing applied under the form of a bodily cure. But a bodily cure is repeated. Therefore this
8327 sacrament also can be repeated.
8328 </p>
8329 <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p5">
8330 <b>I answer that,</b> No sacramental or sacrament, having an effect that lasts for ever, can be repeated, because this would imply that the sacrament
8331 had failed to produce that effect; and this would be derogatory to the sacrament. On the other hand a sacrament whose effect
8332 does not last for ever, can be repeated without disparaging that sacrament, in order that the lost effect may be recovered.
8333 And since health of body and soul, which is the effect of this sacrament, can be lost
8334 after it has been effected, it follows that this sacrament can, without disparagement thereto, be repeated.
8335 </p>
8336 <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p6">
8337 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The stone is anointed in order that the altar may be consecrated, and the stone remains consecrated, as long as the altar
8338 remains, hence it cannot be anointed again. But a man is not consecrated by being anointed, since it does not imprint a character
8339 on him. Hence there is no comparison.
8340 </p>
8341 <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p7">
8342 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What men think to be extreme is not always extreme in reality. It is thus that this sacrament is called Extreme Unction,
8343 because it ought not to be given save to those whose death men think to be nigh.
8344 </p>
8345 <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p8"></p>
8346 <p id="XP_Q33_A1-p9"></p>
8347 <a href="summa.XP_Q33.html"></a>
8348 <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A2.html"></a>
8349 </div>
8350 <div id="XP_Q33_A2" class="div4">
8351 <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A1.html"></a>
8352 <a href="summa.XP_Q34.html"></a>
8353 <h4 id="XP_Q33_A2-p0.1">Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated during the same sickness?</h4>
8354 <p id="XP_Q33_A2-p1"></p>
8355 <p id="XP_Q33_A2-p2">
8356 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament ought not to be repeated during the same sickness. For one disease demands one remedy.
8357 Now this sacrament is a spiritual remedy. Therefore it ought not to be repeated for one sickness.
8358 </p>
8359 <p id="XP_Q33_A2-p3">
8360 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a sick man could be anointed more than once during one disease, this might be done for a whole day: which is
8361 absurd.
8362 </p>
8363 <p id="XP_Q33_A2-p4">
8364 <b>On the contrary,</b> Sometimes a disease lasts long after the sacrament has been received, so that the remnants of sin, against which chiefly
8365 this sacrament is given, would be contracted. Therefore it ought to be given again.
8366 </p>
8367 <p id="XP_Q33_A2-p5">
8368 <b>I answer that,</b> This sacrament regards not only the sickness, but also the state of the sick man, because it ought not to be given except
8369 to those sick people who seem, in man's estimation, to be nigh to death. Now some diseases do not last long; so that if this
8370 sacrament is given at the time that the sick man is in a state of danger of death, he does not leave that state except the
8371 disease be cured, and thus he needs not to be anointed again. But if he has a relapse, it
8372 will be a second sickness, and he can be anointed again. on the other hand some diseases are of long duration, as hectic fever,
8373 dropsy and the like, and those who lie sick of them should not be anointed until they seem to be in danger of death. And if
8374 the sick man escape that danger while the disease continues, and be brought again thereby to the same state of danger, he
8375 can be anointed again, because it is, as it were, another state of sickness, although strictly speaking, it is not another
8376 sickness. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
8377 </p>
8378 <p id="XP_Q33_A2-p6"></p>
8379 <p id="XP_Q33_A2-p7"></p>
8380 <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A1.html"></a>
8381 <a href="summa.XP_Q34.html"></a>
8382 </div>
8383 <a href="summa.XP_Q32_A7.html"></a>
8384 <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A1.html"></a>
8385 </div>
8386 <div id="XP_Q34" class="div3">
8387 <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A2.html"></a>
8388 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A1.html"></a>
8389 <h3 id="XP_Q34-p0.1">HOLY ORDERS (QQ[34]-40)</h3>
8390 <p id="XP_Q34-p1"></p>
8391 <p id="XP_Q34-p2">OF THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER AS TO ITS ESSENCE AND ITS PARTS (FIVE ARTICLES)</p>
8392 <p id="XP_Q34-p3"> In the next place we must consider the sacrament of Order: (1) Order in general; (2) the difference of Orders; (3) those
8393 who confer Orders; (4) the impediments to receiving Orders; (5) things connected with Orders.
8394 </p>
8395 <p id="XP_Q34-p4"> Concerning Order in general three points have to be considered: (1) Its essence, quiddity, and parts; (2) Its effect; (3)
8396 The recipients of Orders.
8397 </p>
8398 <p id="XP_Q34-p5"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
8399 <p id="XP_Q34-p6"> (1) Whether there should be Order in the Church?</p>
8400 <p id="XP_Q34-p7"> (2) Whether it is fittingly defined?</p>
8401 <p id="XP_Q34-p8"> (3) Whether it is a sacrament?</p>
8402 <p id="XP_Q34-p9"> (4) Whether its form is expressed properly?</p>
8403 <p id="XP_Q34-p10"> (5) Whether this sacrament has any matter?</p>
8404 <div id="XP_Q34_A1" class="div4">
8405 <a href="summa.XP_Q34.html"></a>
8406 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A2.html"></a>
8407 <h4 id="XP_Q34_A1-p0.1">Whether there should be Order in the Church?</h4>
8408 <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p1"></p>
8409 <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p2">
8410 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there should not be Order in the Church. For Order requires subjection and preeminence. But subjection
8411 seemingly is incompatible with the liberty whereunto we are called by Christ. Therefore there should not be Order in the Church.
8412 </p>
8413 <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p3">
8414 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who has received an Order becomes another's superior. But in the Church everyone should deem himself lower than
8415 another (
8416 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q34_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.3" target="asv">Phil. 2:3</a>): "Let each esteem others better than themselves." Therefore Order should not be in the Church.
8417 </p>
8418 <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p4">
8419 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we find order among the angels on account of their differing in natural and gratuitous gifts. But all men are one
8420 in nature, and it is not known who has the higher gifts of grace. Therefore Order should not be in the Church.
8421 </p>
8422 <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p5">
8423 <b>On the contrary,</b> "Those things that are of God, are in order [*Vulg: 'Those (powers) that are, are ordained of God.']." Now the Church is
8424 of God, for He Himself built it with His blood. Therefore there ought to be Order in the Church.
8425 </p>
8426 <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p6"> Further, the state of the Church is between the state of nature and the state of glory. Now we find order in nature, in that
8427 some things are above others, and likewise in glory, as in the angels. Therefore there should be Order in the Church.
8428 </p>
8429 <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p7">
8430 <b>I answer that,</b> God wished to produce His works in likeness to Himself, as far as possible, in order that they might be perfect, and that
8431 He might be known through them. Hence, that He might be portrayed in His works, not only according to what He is in Himself,
8432 but also according as He acts on others, He laid this natural law on all things, that last things should be reduced and perfected
8433 by middle things, and middle things by the first, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v).
8434 Wherefore that this beauty might not be lacking to the Church, He established Order in her so that some should deliver the
8435 sacraments to others, being thus made like to God in their own way, as co-operating with God; even as in the natural body,
8436 some members act on others.
8437 </p>
8438 <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p8">
8439 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The subjection of slavery is incompatible with liberty; for slavery consists in lording over others and employing them for
8440 one's own profit. Such subjection is not required in Order, whereby those who preside have to seek the salvation of their
8441 subjects and not their own profit.
8442 </p>
8443 <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p9">
8444 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Each one should esteem himself lower in merit, not in office; and orders are a kind of office.
8445 </p>
8446 <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p10">
8447 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Order among the angels does not arise from difference of nature, unless accidentally, in so far as difference of grace results
8448 in them from difference of nature. But in them it results directly from their difference in grace; because their orders regard
8449 their participation of divine things, and their communicating them in the state of glory, which is according to the measure
8450 of grace, as being the end and effect, so to speak, of grace. on the other
8451 hand, the Orders of the Church militant regard the participation in the sacraments and the communication thereof, which are
8452 the cause of grace and, in a way, precede grace; and consequently our Orders do not require sanctifying grace, but only the
8453 power to dispense the sacraments; for which reason order does not correspond to the difference of sanctifying grace, but to
8454 the difference of power.
8455 </p>
8456 <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p11"></p>
8457 <p id="XP_Q34_A1-p12"></p>
8458 <a href="summa.XP_Q34.html"></a>
8459 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A2.html"></a>
8460 </div>
8461 <div id="XP_Q34_A2" class="div4">
8462 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A1.html"></a>
8463 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A3.html"></a>
8464 <h4 id="XP_Q34_A2-p0.1">Whether Order is properly defined?</h4>
8465 <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p1"></p>
8466 <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p2">
8467 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that order is improperly defined by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 53), where it is said "Order is a seal of the
8468 Church, whereby spiritual power is conferred on the person ordained." For a part should not be described as the genus of the
8469 whole. Now the character which is denoted by the seal in a subsequent definition is a part of order, since it is placed in
8470 contradistinction with that which is either reality only, or sacrament only, since it is both
8471 reality and sacrament. Therefore seal should not be mentioned as the genus of Order.
8472 </p>
8473 <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p3">
8474 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as a character is imprinted in the sacrament of order, so is it in the sacrament of Baptism. Now character
8475 was not mentioned in the definition of Baptism. Therefore neither should it be mentioned in the definition of Order.
8476 </p>
8477 <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p4">
8478 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in Baptism there is also given a certain spiritual power to approach the sacraments; and again it is a seal, since
8479 it is a sacrament. Therefore this definition is applicable to Baptism; and consequently it is improperly applied to Order.
8480 </p>
8481 <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p5">
8482 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Order is a kind of relation, and relation is realized in both its terms. Now the terms of the relation of order
8483 are the superior and the inferior. Therefore inferiors have order as well as superiors. Yet there is no power of preeminence
8484 in them, such as is mentioned here in the definition of Order, as appears from the subsequent explanation (Sent. iv, D, 53),
8485 where promotion to power is mentioned. Therefore Order is improperly defined there.
8486 </p>
8487 <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p6">
8488 <b>I answer that,</b> The Master's definition of Order applies to Order as a sacrament of the Church. Hence he mentions two things, namely the
8489 outward sign, a "kind of seal," i.e. a kind of sign, and the inward effect, "whereby spiritual power," etc.
8490 </p>
8491 <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p7">
8492 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Seal stands here, not for the inward character, but for the outward action, which is the sign and cause of inward power;
8493 and this is also the sense of character in the other definition. If, however, it be taken for the inward character, the definition
8494 would not be unsuitable; because the division of a sacrament into those three things is not a division into integral parts,
8495 properly speaking; since what is reality only is not essential to the
8496 sacrament, and that which is the sacrament is transitory; while that which is sacrament and reality is said to remain. Wherefore
8497 it follows that inward character itself is essentially and principally the sacrament of Order.
8498 </p>
8499 <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p8">
8500 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although in Baptism there is conferred a spiritual power to receive the other sacraments, for which reason it imprints a
8501 character, nevertheless this is not its principal effect, but the inward cleansing; wherefore Baptism would be given even
8502 though the former motive did not exist. On the other hand, order denotes power principally. Wherefore the character which
8503 is a spiritual power is included in the definition of Order, but not in that of
8504 Baptism.
8505 </p>
8506 <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p9">
8507 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In Baptism there is given a certain spiritual potentiality to receive, and consequently a somewhat passive potentiality.
8508 But power properly denotes active potentiality, together with some kind of preeminence. Hence this definition is not applicable
8509 to Baptism.
8510 </p>
8511 <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p10">
8512 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The word "order" is used in two ways. For sometimes it denotes the relation itself, and thus it is both in the inferior and
8513 in the superior, as the objection states; but it is not thus that we use the word here. On the other hand, it denotes the
8514 degree which results in the order taken in the first sense. And since the notion of order as relation is observed where we
8515 first meet with something higher than another, it follows that this degree of
8516 pre-eminence by spiritual power is called Order.
8517 </p>
8518 <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p11"></p>
8519 <p id="XP_Q34_A2-p12"></p>
8520 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A1.html"></a>
8521 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A3.html"></a>
8522 </div>
8523 <div id="XP_Q34_A3" class="div4">
8524 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A2.html"></a>
8525 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A4.html"></a>
8526 <h4 id="XP_Q34_A3-p0.1">Whether Order is a sacrament?</h4>
8527 <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p1"></p>
8528 <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p2">
8529 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Order is not a sacrament. For a sacrament, according to Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacram. i) "is a material
8530 element." Now Order denotes nothing of the kind, but rather relation or power; since Order is a part of power according to
8531 Isidore. Therefore it is not a sacrament.
8532 </p>
8533 <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p3">
8534 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sacraments do not concern the Church triumphant. Yet Order is there, as in the angels. Therefore it is not a
8535 sacrament.
8536 </p>
8537 <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p4">
8538 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as spiritual authority, which is Order, is given by means of consecration, so is secular authority, since kings
8539 also are anointed, as stated above (
8540 <a id="XP_Q34_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>, ad 2). But the kingly power is not a sacrament. Therefore neither is order of which we speak now.
8541 </p>
8542 <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p5">
8543 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is mentioned by all among the seven sacraments of the Church.
8544 </p>
8545 <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p6"> Further, "the cause of a thing being such, is still more so." Now Order is the cause of man being the dispenser of the other
8546 sacraments. Therefore Order has more reason for being a sacrament than the others.
8547 </p>
8548 <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p7">
8549 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[29], A[1];
8550 <a id="XP_Q34_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q60.html">TP, Q[60])</a>, a sacrament is nothing else than a sanctification conferred on man with some outward sign. Wherefore, since by receiving
8551 orders a consecration is conferred on man by visible signs, it is clear that Order is a sacrament.
8552 </p>
8553 <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p8">
8554 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although Order does not by its name express a material element, it is not conferred without some material element.
8555 </p>
8556 <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p9">
8557 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Power must needs be proportionate to the purpose for which it is intended. Now the communication of divine things, which
8558 is the purpose for which spiritual power is given, is not effected among the angels by means of sensible signs, as is the
8559 case among men. Hence the spiritual power that is Order is not bestowed on the angels by visible signs, as on men. Wherefore
8560 Order is a sacrament among men, but not among angels.
8561 </p>
8562 <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p10">
8563 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not every blessing or consecration given to men is a sacrament, for both monks and abbots are blessed, and yet such blessings
8564 are not sacraments, and in like manner neither is the anointing of a king; because by such blessings men are not ordained
8565 to the dispensing of the divine sacraments, as by the blessing of Order. Hence the comparison fails.
8566 </p>
8567 <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p11"></p>
8568 <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p12"></p>
8569 <p id="XP_Q34_A3-p13"></p>
8570 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A2.html"></a>
8571 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A4.html"></a>
8572 </div>
8573 <div id="XP_Q34_A4" class="div4">
8574 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A3.html"></a>
8575 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A5.html"></a>
8576 <h4 id="XP_Q34_A4-p0.1">Whether the form of this sacrament is suitably expressed?</h4>
8577 <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p1"></p>
8578 <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p2">
8579 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the form of this sacrament is unsuitably set forth in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Because the sacraments
8580 take their efficacy from their form. Now the efficacy of the sacraments is from the divine power, which works our salvation
8581 in them in a most hidden manner. Therefore the form of this sacrament should include a mention of the divine power by the
8582 invocation of the Trinity, as in the other sacraments.
8583 </p>
8584 <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p3">
8585 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to command pertains to one who has authority. Now the dispenser of the sacrament exercises no authority, but only
8586 ministry. Therefore he should not use the imperative mood by saying: "Do" or "Receive" this or that, or some similar expression.
8587 </p>
8588 <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p4">
8589 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, mention should not be made in the sacramental form, except of such things as are essential to the sacrament. But
8590 the use of the power received is not essential to this sacrament, but is consequent upon it. Therefore it should not be mentioned
8591 in the form of this sacrament.
8592 </p>
8593 <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p5">
8594 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all the sacraments direct us to an eternal reward. But the forms of the other sacraments make no mention of a reward.
8595 Therefore neither should any mention be made thereof in the form of this sacrament, as in the words: "Since thou wilt have
8596 a share, if faithfully," etc.
8597 </p>
8598 <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p6">
8599 <b>I answer that,</b> This sacrament consists chiefly in the power conferred. Now power is conferred by power, as like proceeds from like; and
8600 again power is made known by its use, since powers are manifested by their acts. Wherefore in the form of order the use of
8601 order is expressed by the act which is commanded; and the conferring of power is expressed by employing the imperative mood.
8602 </p>
8603 <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p7">
8604 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The other sacraments are not ordained chiefly to effects similar to the power whereby the sacraments are dispensed, as this
8605 sacrament is. Hence in this sacrament there is a kind of universal communication. Wherefore in the other sacraments something
8606 is expressed on the part of the divine power to which the effect of the sacrament is likened, but not in this sacrament.
8607 </p>
8608 <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p8">
8609 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> [There is a special reason why this sacrament, rather than the others, is conferred by employing the imperative mood. For]*
8610 although the bishop who is the minister of this sacrament has no authority in respect of the conferring of this sacrament,
8611 nevertheless he has some power with regard to the power of Order, which power he confers, in so far as it is derived, from
8612 his. [*The sentence in brackets is not in the Leonine edition.]
8613 </p>
8614 <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p9">
8615 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The use of power is the effect of power in the genus of efficient cause, and from this point of view it has no reason to
8616 be mentioned in the definition of Order. But it is somewhat a cause in the genus of final cause, and from this point of view
8617 it can be placed in the definition of order.
8618 </p>
8619 <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p10">
8620 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is here a difference between this and the other sacraments. Because by this sacrament an office or the power to do
8621 something is conferred; and so it is fitting that mention be made of the reward to be obtained if it be administered faithfully.
8622 But in the other sacraments no such office or power to act is conferred, and so no mention of reward is made in them. Accordingly
8623 the recipient is somewhat passive in relation to the other sacraments,
8624 because he receives them for the perfecting of his own state only, whereas in relation to this sacrament he holds himself
8625 somewhat actively, since he receives it for the sake of exercising hierarchical duties in the Church. Wherefore although the
8626 other sacraments, from the very fact that they give grace, direct the recipient to salvation, properly speaking they do not
8627 direct him to a reward, in the same way as this sacrament does.
8628 </p>
8629 <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p11"></p>
8630 <p id="XP_Q34_A4-p12"></p>
8631 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A3.html"></a>
8632 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A5.html"></a>
8633 </div>
8634 <div id="XP_Q34_A5" class="div4">
8635 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A4.html"></a>
8636 <a href="summa.XP_Q35.html"></a>
8637 <h4 id="XP_Q34_A5-p0.1">Whether this sacrament has any matter?</h4>
8638 <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p1"></p>
8639 <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p2">
8640 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this sacrament has no matter. Because in every sacrament that has a matter the power that works in the
8641 sacrament is in the matter. But in the material objects which are used here, such as keys, candlesticks, and so forth, there
8642 is not apparently any power of sanctification. Therefore it has no matter.
8643 </p>
8644 <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p3">
8645 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in this sacrament the fulness of sevenfold grace is conferred, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24), just as
8646 in Confirmation. But the matter of Confirmation requires to be consecrated beforehand. Since then the things which appear
8647 to be material in this sacrament are not consecrated beforehand, it would seem that they are not the matter of the sacrament.
8648 </p>
8649 <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p4">
8650 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in any sacrament that has matter there needs to be contact of matter with the recipient of the sacrament. Now, as
8651 some say, it is not essential to this sacrament that there be contact between the aforesaid material objects and the recipient
8652 of the sacrament, but only that they be presented to him. Therefore the aforesaid material objects are not the matter of this
8653 sacrament.
8654 </p>
8655 <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p5">
8656 <b>On the contrary,</b> Every sacrament consists of things and words. Now in any sacrament the thing is the matter. Therefore the things employed
8657 in this sacrament are its matter.
8658 </p>
8659 <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p6"> Further, more is requisite to dispense the sacraments than to receive them. Yet Baptism, wherein the power is given to receive
8660 the sacraments, needs a matter. Therefore order also does, wherein the power is given to dispense them.
8661 </p>
8662 <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p7">
8663 <b>I answer that,</b> The matter employed outwardly in the sacraments signifies that the power which works in the sacraments comes entirely from
8664 without. Wherefore, since the effect proper to this sacrament, namely the character, is not received through any operation
8665 of the one who approaches the sacrament, as was the case in Penance, but comes wholly from without, it is fitting that it
8666 should have a matter, yet otherwise than the other sacraments that have matter; because that
8667 which is bestowed in the other sacraments comes from God alone, and not from the minister who dispenses the sacrament; whereas
8668 that which is conferred in this sacrament, namely the spiritual power, comes also from him who gives the sacrament, as imperfect
8669 from perfect power. Hence the efficacy of the other sacraments resides chiefly in the matter which both signifies and contains
8670 the divine power through the sanctification applied by the minister; whereas the efficacy of this sacrament resides
8671 chiefly with him who dispenses the sacrament. And the matter is employed to show the powers conferred in particular by one
8672 who has it completely, rather than to cause power; and this is clear from the fact that the matter is in keeping with the
8673 use of power. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
8674 </p>
8675 <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p8">
8676 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is necessary for the matter to be consecrated in the other sacraments, on account of the power it contains; but it is
8677 not so in the case in point.
8678 </p>
8679 <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p9">
8680 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If we admit this assertion, the reason for it is clear from what we have said; for since the power of order is received from
8681 the minister and not from the matter, the presenting of the matter is more essential to the sacrament than contact therewith.
8682 However, the words themselves of the form would seem to indicate that contact with the matter is essential to the sacrament,
8683 for it is said: "Receive" this or that.
8684 </p>
8685 <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p10"></p>
8686 <p id="XP_Q34_A5-p11"></p>
8687 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A4.html"></a>
8688 <a href="summa.XP_Q35.html"></a>
8689 </div>
8690 <a href="summa.XP_Q33_A2.html"></a>
8691 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A1.html"></a>
8692 </div>
8693 <div id="XP_Q35" class="div3">
8694 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A5.html"></a>
8695 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A1.html"></a>
8696 <h3 id="XP_Q35-p0.1">OF THE EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
8697 <p id="XP_Q35-p1"></p>
8698 <p id="XP_Q35-p2"> We must next consider me effect of this sacrament. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
8699 <p id="XP_Q35-p3"> (1) Whether sanctifying grace is conferred in the sacrament of Order?</p>
8700 <p id="XP_Q35-p4"> (2) Whether a character is imprinted in connection with all the Orders?</p>
8701 <p id="XP_Q35-p5"> (3) Whether the character of Order presupposes of necessity the character of Baptism?</p>
8702 <p id="XP_Q35-p6"> (4) Whether it presupposes of necessity the character of Confirmation?</p>
8703 <p id="XP_Q35-p7"> (5) Whether the character of one Order presupposes of necessity the character of another Order?</p>
8704 <div id="XP_Q35_A1" class="div4">
8705 <a href="summa.XP_Q35.html"></a>
8706 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A2.html"></a>
8707 <h4 id="XP_Q35_A1-p0.1">Whether sanctifying grace is conferred in the sacrament of Order?</h4>
8708 <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p1"></p>
8709 <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p2">
8710 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sanctifying grace is not conferred in the sacrament of Order. For it is commonly agreed that the sacrament
8711 of Order is directed to counteract the defect of ignorance. Now not sanctifying grace but gratuitous grace is given to counteract
8712 ignorance, for sanctifying grace has more to do with the will. Therefore sanctifying grace is not given in the sacrament of
8713 Order.
8714 </p>
8715 <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p3">
8716 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Order implies distinction. Now the members of the Church are distinguished, not by sanctifying but by gratuitous
8717 grace, of which it is said (
8718 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q35_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:4</a>): "There are diversities of graces." Therefore sanctifying grace is not given in order.
8719 </p>
8720 <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p4">
8721 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no cause presupposes its effect. But grace is presupposed in one who receives orders, so that he may be worthy to
8722 receive them. Therefore this same grace is not given in the conferring of Orders.
8723 </p>
8724 <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p5">
8725 <b>On the contrary,</b> The sacraments of the New Law cause what they signify. Now Order by its sevenfold number signifies the seven gifts of the
8726 Holy Ghost, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are not apart from sanctifying
8727 grace, are given in Orders.
8728 </p>
8729 <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p6"> Further, Order is a sacrament of the New Law. Now the definition of a sacrament of that kind includes the words, "that it
8730 may be a cause of grace." Therefore it causes grace in the recipient.
8731 </p>
8732 <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p7"> I answer that The works of God are perfect (
8733 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q35_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>); and consequently whoever receives power from above receives also those things that render him competent to exercise that
8734 power. This is also the case in natural things, since animals are provided with members, by which their soul's powers are
8735 enabled to proceed to their respective actions unless there be some defect on the part of matter. Now just as sanctifying
8736 grace is necessary in order that man
8737 receive the sacraments worthily, so is it that he may dispense them worthily. Wherefore as in Baptism, whereby a man is adapted
8738 to receive the other sacraments, sanctifying grace is given, so is it in the sacrament of Order whereby man is ordained to
8739 the dispensation of the other sacraments.
8740 </p>
8741 <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p8">
8742 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Order is given as a remedy, not to one person but to the whole Church. Hence, although it is said to be given in order to
8743 counteract ignorance, it does not mean that by receiving Orders a man has his ignorance driven out of him, but that the recipient
8744 of Orders is set in authority to expel ignorance from among the people.
8745 </p>
8746 <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p9">
8747 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the gifts of sanctifying grace are common to all the members of the Church, nevertheless a man cannot be the worthy
8748 recipient of those gifts, in respect of which the members of the Church are distinguished from one another, unless he have
8749 charity, and this cannot be apart from sanctifying grace.
8750 </p>
8751 <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p10">
8752 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The worthy exercise of Orders requires not any kind of goodness but excellent goodness, in order that as they who receive
8753 orders are set above the people in the degree of Order, so may they be above them by the merit of holiness. Hence they are
8754 required to have the grace that suffices to make them worthy members of Christ's people, but when they receive Orders they
8755 are given a yet greater gift of grace, whereby they are rendered apt for greater
8756 things.
8757 </p>
8758 <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p11"></p>
8759 <p id="XP_Q35_A1-p12"></p>
8760 <a href="summa.XP_Q35.html"></a>
8761 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A2.html"></a>
8762 </div>
8763 <div id="XP_Q35_A2" class="div4">
8764 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A1.html"></a>
8765 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A3.html"></a>
8766 <h4 id="XP_Q35_A2-p0.1">Whether in the sacrament of Order a character is imprinted in connection with all the Orders?</h4>
8767 <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p1"></p>
8768 <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p2">
8769 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the sacrament of Order a character is not imprinted in connection with all the Orders. For the character
8770 of Order is a spiritual power. Now some Orders are directed only to certain bodily acts, for instance those of the doorkeeper
8771 or of the acolyte. Therefore a character is not imprinted in these Orders.
8772 </p>
8773 <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p3">
8774 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every character is indelible. Therefore a character places a man in a state whence he cannot withdraw. Now those
8775 who have certain Orders can lawfully return to the laity. Therefore a character is not imprinted in all the Orders.
8776 </p>
8777 <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p4">
8778 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by means of a character a man is appointed to give or to receive some sacred thing. Now a man is sufficiently adapted
8779 to the reception of the sacraments by the character of Baptism, and a man is not appointed to dispense the sacraments except
8780 in the Order of priesthood. Therefore a character is not imprinted in the other Orders.
8781 </p>
8782 <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p5">
8783 <b>On the contrary,</b> Every sacrament in which a character is not imprinted can be repeated. But no Order can be repeated. Therefore a character
8784 is imprinted in each Order.
8785 </p>
8786 <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p6"> Further, a character is a distinctive sign. Now there is something distinct in every Order. Therefore every Order imprints
8787 a character.
8788 </p>
8789 <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p7">
8790 <b>I answer that,</b> There have been three opinions on this point. For some have said that a character is imprinted only in the Order of priesthood;
8791 but this is not true, since none but a deacon can exercise the act of the diaconate, and so it is clear that in the dispensation
8792 of the sacraments, he has a spiritual power which others have not. For this reason others have said that a character is impressed
8793 in the sacred, but not in the minor, Orders. But this again comes to
8794 nothing, since each Order sets a man above the people in some degree of authority directed to the dispensation of the sacraments.
8795 Wherefore since a character is a sign whereby one thing is distinguished from another, it follows that a character is imprinted
8796 in each Order. And this is confirmed by the fact that they remain for ever and are never repeated. This is the third and more
8797 common opinion.
8798 </p>
8799 <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p8">
8800 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Each Order either has an act connected with the sacrament itself, or adapts a man to the dispensation of the sacraments;
8801 thus doorkeepers exercise the act of admitting men to witness the Divine sacraments, and so forth; and consequently a spiritual
8802 power is required in each.
8803 </p>
8804 <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p9">
8805 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> For all that a man may return to the laity, the character always remains in him. This is evident from the fact that if he
8806 return to the clerical state, he does not receive again the order which he had already.
8807 </p>
8808 <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p10"> The Reply to the Third Objection is the same as to the First.</p>
8809 <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p11"></p>
8810 <p id="XP_Q35_A2-p12"></p>
8811 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A1.html"></a>
8812 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A3.html"></a>
8813 </div>
8814 <div id="XP_Q35_A3" class="div4">
8815 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A2.html"></a>
8816 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A4.html"></a>
8817 <h4 id="XP_Q35_A3-p0.1">Whether the character of Order presupposes the baptismal character?</h4>
8818 <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p1"></p>
8819 <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p2">
8820 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the character of Order does not presuppose the character of Baptism. For the character of Order makes
8821 a man a dispenser of the sacraments; while the character of Baptism makes him a recipient of them. Now active power does not
8822 necessarily presuppose passive power, for it can be without it, as in God. Therefore the character of Order does not necessarily
8823 presuppose the character of Baptism.
8824 </p>
8825 <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p3">
8826 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it may happen that a man is not baptized, and yet think with probability that he has been baptized. If therefore
8827 such a person present himself for Orders, he will not receive the character of Order, supposing the character of Order to
8828 presuppose the character of Baptism; and consequently whatever he does by way of consecration or absolution will be invalid,
8829 and the Church will be deceived therein, which is inadmissible.
8830 </p>
8831 <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p4">
8832 <b>On the contrary,</b> Baptism is the door of the sacraments. Therefore since Order is a sacrament, it presupposes Baptism.
8833 </p>
8834 <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p5">
8835 <b>I answer that,</b> No one can receive what he has not the power to receive. Now the character of Baptism gives a man the power to receive the
8836 other sacraments. Wherefore he that has not the baptismal character, can receive no other sacrament; and consequently the
8837 character of Order presupposes the character of Baptism.
8838 </p>
8839 <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p6">
8840 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In one who has active power of himself, the active does not presuppose the passive power; but in one who has active power
8841 from another, passive power, whereby he is enabled to receive the active power, is prerequisite to active power.
8842 </p>
8843 <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p7">
8844 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Such a man if he be ordained to the priesthood is not a priest, and he can neither consecrate, nor absolve in the tribunal
8845 of Penance. Wherefore according to the canons he must be baptized, and reordained (Extra De Presbyt. non Bapt., cap. Si quis;
8846 cap. Veniens). And even though he be raised to the episcopate, those whom he ordains receive not the Order. Yet it may piously
8847 be believed that as regards the ultimate effects of the sacraments, the High
8848 Priest will supply the defect, and that He would not allow this to be so hidden as to endanger the Church.
8849 </p>
8850 <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p8"></p>
8851 <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p9"></p>
8852 <p id="XP_Q35_A3-p10"></p>
8853 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A2.html"></a>
8854 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A4.html"></a>
8855 </div>
8856 <div id="XP_Q35_A4" class="div4">
8857 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A3.html"></a>
8858 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A5.html"></a>
8859 <h4 id="XP_Q35_A4-p0.1">Whether the character of Order necessarily presupposes the character of Confirmation?</h4>
8860 <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p1"></p>
8861 <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p2">
8862 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the character of Order necessarily presupposes the character of Confirmation. For in things subordinate
8863 to one another, as the middle presupposes the first, so does the last presuppose the middle. Now the character of Confirmation
8864 presupposes that of Baptism as being the first. Therefore the character of Order presupposes that of Confirmation as being
8865 in the middle.
8866 </p>
8867 <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p3">
8868 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those who are appointed to confirm should themselves be most firm. Now those who receive the sacrament of Order
8869 are appointed to confirm others. Therefore they especially should have received the sacrament of Confirmation.
8870 </p>
8871 <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p4">
8872 <b>On the contrary,</b> The apostles received the power of order before the Ascension (
8873 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q35_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.22" target="asv">Jn. 20:22</a>), where it is said: "Receive the Holy Ghost." But they were confirmed after the Ascension by the coming of the Holy Ghost.
8874 Therefore order does not presuppose Confirmation.
8875 </p>
8876 <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p5">
8877 <b>I answer that,</b> For the reception of Orders something is prerequisite for the validity of the sacrament, and something as congruous to the
8878 sacrament. For the validity of the sacrament it is required that one who presents himself for Orders should be capable of
8879 receiving them, and this is competent to him through Baptism; wherefore the baptismal character is prerequisite for the validity
8880 of the sacrament, so that the sacrament of Order cannot be conferred without it. On the
8881 other hand, as congruous to the sacrament a man is required to have every perfection whereby he becomes adapted to the exercise
8882 of Orders, and one of these is that he be confirmed. Wherefore the character of Order presupposes the character of Confirmation
8883 as congruous but not as necessary.
8884 </p>
8885 <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p6">
8886 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this case the middle does not stand in the same relation to the last as the first to the middle, because the character
8887 of Baptism enables a man to receive the sacrament of Confirmation, whereas the character of Confirmation does not enable a
8888 man to receive the sacrament of Order. Hence the comparison fails.
8889 </p>
8890 <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p7">
8891 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers aptness by way of congruity.
8892 </p>
8893 <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p8"></p>
8894 <p id="XP_Q35_A4-p9"></p>
8895 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A3.html"></a>
8896 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A5.html"></a>
8897 </div>
8898 <div id="XP_Q35_A5" class="div4">
8899 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A4.html"></a>
8900 <a href="summa.XP_Q36.html"></a>
8901 <h4 id="XP_Q35_A5-p0.1">Whether the character of one Order necessarily presupposes the character of another Order?</h4>
8902 <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p1"></p>
8903 <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p2">
8904 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the character of one Order necessarily presupposes the character of another Order. For there is more in
8905 common between one Order and another, than between Order and another sacrament. But the character of Order presupposes the
8906 character of another sacrament, namely Baptism. Much more therefore does the character of one Order presuppose the character
8907 of another.
8908 </p>
8909 <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p3">
8910 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Orders are degrees of a kind. Now no one can reach a further degree, unless he first mount the previous degree.
8911 Therefore no one can receive the character of a subsequent Order unless he has first received the preceding Order.
8912 </p>
8913 <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p4">
8914 <b>On the contrary,</b> If anything necessary for a sacrament be omitted in that sacrament, the sacrament must be repeated. But if one receive a
8915 subsequent Order, without receiving a preceding Order, he is not reordained, but he receives what was lacking, according to
8916 the canonical statutes (cap. Tuae literae, De clerico per salt. prom.). Therefore the preceding Order is not necessary for
8917 the following.
8918 </p>
8919 <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p5">
8920 <b>I answer that,</b> It is not necessary for the higher Orders that one should have received the minor Orders, because their respective powers
8921 are distinct, and one, considered in its essentials, does not require another in the same subject. Hence even in the early
8922 Church some were ordained priests without having previously received the lower Orders and yet they could do all that the lower
8923 Orders could, because the lower power is comprised in the higher, even as sense in
8924 understanding, and dukedom in kingdom. Afterwards, however, it was decided by the legislation of the Church that no one should
8925 present himself to the higher orders who had not previously humbled himself in the lower offices. And hence it is that according
8926 to the Canons (cap. Tuae literae, De clerico per salt. prom.) those who are ordained without receiving a preceding Order are
8927 not reordained, but receive what was lacking to them of the preceding Order.
8928 </p>
8929 <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p6">
8930 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Orders have more in common with one another as regards specific likeness, than order has with Baptism. But as regards proportion
8931 of power to action, Baptism has more in common with Order, than one Order with another, because Baptism confers on man the
8932 passive power to receive Orders, whereas a lower Order does not give him the passive power to receive higher Orders.
8933 </p>
8934 <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p7">
8935 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Orders are not degrees combining in one action or in one movement, so that it be necessary to reach the last through the
8936 first; but they are like degrees consisting in things of different kinds, such as the degrees between man and angel, and it
8937 is not necessary that one who is an angel be first of all a man. Such also are the degrees between the head and all members
8938 of the body; nor is it necessary that that which is the head should be previously a
8939 foot; and thus it is in the case in point.
8940 </p>
8941 <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p8"></p>
8942 <p id="XP_Q35_A5-p9"></p>
8943 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A4.html"></a>
8944 <a href="summa.XP_Q36.html"></a>
8945 </div>
8946 <a href="summa.XP_Q34_A5.html"></a>
8947 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A1.html"></a>
8948 </div>
8949 <div id="XP_Q36" class="div3">
8950 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A5.html"></a>
8951 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A1.html"></a>
8952 <h3 id="XP_Q36-p0.1">OF THE QUALITIES REQUIRED OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THIS SACRAMENT (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
8953 <p id="XP_Q36-p1"></p>
8954 <p id="XP_Q36-p2"> We must next consider the qualities required of those who receive the sacrament of Order. Under this head there are five
8955 points of inquiry:
8956 </p>
8957 <p id="XP_Q36-p3"> (1) Whether goodness of life is required of those who receive this sacrament?</p>
8958 <p id="XP_Q36-p4"> (2) Whether the knowledge of the whole of Sacred Writ is required?</p>
8959 <p id="XP_Q36-p5"> (3) Whether the degree of Orders is obtained by mere merit of life?</p>
8960 <p id="XP_Q36-p6"> (4) Whether he who raises the unworthy to Orders sins?</p>
8961 <p id="XP_Q36-p7"> (5) Whether one who is in sin can without committing a sin exercise the Order he has received?</p>
8962 <div id="XP_Q36_A1" class="div4">
8963 <a href="summa.XP_Q36.html"></a>
8964 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A2.html"></a>
8965 <h4 id="XP_Q36_A1-p0.1">Whether goodness of life is required of those who receive Orders?</h4>
8966 <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p1"></p>
8967 <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p2">
8968 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that goodness of life is not required of those who receive Orders. For by Orders a man is ordained to the dispensation
8969 of the sacraments. But the sacraments can be administered by good and wicked. Therefore goodness of life is not requisite.
8970 </p>
8971 <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p3">
8972 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the service of God in the sacraments is no greater than service offered to Him in the body. Now our Lord did not
8973 cast aside the sinful and notorious woman from rendering Him a bodily service (
8974 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q36_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.7" target="asv">Lk. 7</a>). Therefore neither should the like be debarred from His service in the sacraments.
8975 </p>
8976 <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p4">
8977 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by every grace a remedy is given against sin. Now those who are in sin should not be refused a remedy that may avail
8978 them. Since then grace is given in the sacrament of order, it would seem that this sacrament ought also to be conferred on
8979 sinners.
8980 </p>
8981 <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p5">
8982 <b>On the contrary,</b> "Whosoever of the seed of Aaron throughout their families hath a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God neither shall
8983 he approach to minister to him [*Vulg.: 'Say to Aaron: Whosoever of thy seed,'etc.]" (
8984 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q36_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.21.17" target="asv">Lev. 21:17,18</a>). Now "blemish signifies all kinds of vice" according to a gloss. Therefore he who is shackled by any vice should not be
8985 admitted to the ministry of Orders.
8986 </p>
8987 <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p6"> Further, Jerome commenting on the words of
8988 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q36_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.2.15" target="asv"> Titus 2:15, </a> "Let no man despise thee," says that "not only should bishops, priests, and deacons take very great care to be examples of
8989 speech and conduct to those over whom they are placed, but also the lower grades, and without exception all who serve the
8990 household of God, since it is most disastrous to the Church if the laity be better than the clergy." Therefore holiness of
8991 life is requisite in all the
8992 Orders.
8993 </p>
8994 <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p7">
8995 <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), "even as the more subtle and clear essences, being filled by the outpouring of the solar
8996 radiance, like the sun enlighten other bodies with their brilliant light, so in all things pertaining to God a man must not
8997 dare to become a leader of others, unless in all his habits he be most deiform and godlike." Wherefore, since in every order
8998 a man is appointed to lead others in Divine things, he who being conscious of mortal
8999 sin presents himself for Orders is guilty of presumption and sins mortally. Consequently holiness of life is requisite for
9000 Orders, as a matter of precept, but not as essential to the sacrament; and if a wicked man be ordained, he receives the Order
9001 none the less, and yet with sin withal.
9002 </p>
9003 <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p8">
9004 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the sinner dispenses sacraments validly, so does he receive validly the sacrament of Orders, and as he dispenses
9005 unworthily, even so he receives unworthily.
9006 </p>
9007 <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p9">
9008 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The service in point consisted only in the exercise of bodily homage, which even sinners can offer lawfully. It is different
9009 with the spiritual service to which the ordained are appointed, because thereby they are made to stand between God and the
9010 people. Wherefore they should shine with a good conscience before God, and with a good name before men.
9011 </p>
9012 <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p10">
9013 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain medicines require a robust constitution, else it is mortally dangerous to take them; others can be given to the weakly.
9014 So too in spiritual things certain sacraments are ordained as remedies for sin, and the like are to be given to sinners, as
9015 Baptism and Penance, while others, which confer the perfection of grace, require a man made strong by grace.
9016 </p>
9017 <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p11"></p>
9018 <p id="XP_Q36_A1-p12"></p>
9019 <a href="summa.XP_Q36.html"></a>
9020 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A2.html"></a>
9021 </div>
9022 <div id="XP_Q36_A2" class="div4">
9023 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A1.html"></a>
9024 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A3.html"></a>
9025 <h4 id="XP_Q36_A2-p0.1">Whether knowledge of all Holy Writ is required?</h4>
9026 <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p1"></p>
9027 <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p2">
9028 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that knowledge of all Holy Writ is required. For one from whose lips we seek the law, should have knowledge
9029 of the law. Now the laity seek the law at the mouth of the priest (
9030 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q36_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.2.7" target="asv">Malachi 2:7</a>). Therefore he should have knowledge of the whole law.
9031 </p>
9032 <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p3">
9033 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "being always ready to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that faith and hope in you [*Vulg.: 'Of that
9034 hope which is in you; St. Thomas apparently took his reading from Bede]." Now to give a reason for things pertaining to faith
9035 and hope belongs to those who have perfect knowledge of Holy Writ. Therefore the like knowledge should be possessed by those
9036 who are placed in Orders, and to whom the aforesaid words are addressed.
9037 </p>
9038 <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p4">
9039 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one is competent to read what he understands not, since to read without intelligence is "negligence,"* as Cato
9040 declares (Rudiment.). [*"Legere et non intelligere est negligere." The play on the words is more evident in Latin.] Now it
9041 belongs to the reader (which is the lower Order) to read the Old Testament, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore
9042 he should understand the whole of the Old Testament; and much more those in the higher
9043 Orders.
9044 </p>
9045 <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p5">
9046 <b>On the contrary,</b> Many are raised to the priesthood even who know nothing at all of these things, even in many religious Orders. Therefore
9047 apparently this knowledge is not required.
9048 </p>
9049 <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p6"> Further, we read in the Lives of the Fathers that some who were monks were raised to the priesthood, being of a most holy
9050 life. Therefore the aforesaid knowledge is not required in those to be ordained.
9051 </p>
9052 <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p7">
9053 <b>I answer that,</b> For any human act to be rightly ordered there must needs be the direction of reason. Wherefore in order that a man exercise
9054 the office of an Order, it is necessary for him to have as much knowledge as suffices for his direction in the act of that
9055 Order. And consequently one who is to be raised to Orders is required to have that knowledge, and to be instructed in Sacred
9056 Scripture, not the whole, but more or less, according as his office is of a greater or
9057 lesser extent---to wit, that those who are placed over others, and receive the care of souls, know things pertaining to the
9058 doctrine of faith and morals, and that others know whatever concerns the exercise of their Order.
9059 </p>
9060 <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p8">
9061 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A priest exercises a twofold action: the one, which is principal, over the true body of Christ; the other, which is secondary,
9062 over the mystical body of Christ. The second act depends on the first, but not conversely. Wherefore some are raised to the
9063 priesthood, to whom the first act alone is deputed, for instance those religious who are not empowered with the care of souls.
9064 The law is not sought at the mouth of these, they are required only for the
9065 celebration of the sacraments; and consequently it is enough for them to have such knowledge as enables them to observe rightly
9066 those things that regard the celebration of the sacrament. Others are raised to exercise the other act which is over the mystical
9067 body of Christ, and it is at the mouth of these that the people seek the law; wherefore they ought to possess knowledge of
9068 the law, not indeed to know all the difficult points of the law (for in these they should have recourse to their
9069 superiors), but to know what the people have to believe and fulfill in the law. To the higher priests, namely the bishops,
9070 it belongs to know even those points of the law which may offer some difficulty, and to know them the more perfectly according
9071 as they are in a higher position.
9072 </p>
9073 <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p9">
9074 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason that we have to give for our faith and hope does not denote one that suffices to prove matters of faith and hope,
9075 since they are both of things invisible; it means that we should be able to give general proofs of the probability of both,
9076 and for this there is not much need of great knowledge.
9077 </p>
9078 <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p10">
9079 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reader has not to explain Holy Writ to the people (for this belongs to the higher orders), but merely to voice the words.
9080 Therefore he is not required to have so much knowledge as to understand Holy Writ, but only to know how to pronounce it correctly.
9081 And since such knowledge is obtained easily and from many persons, it may be supposed with probability that the ordained will
9082 acquire that knowledge even if he have it not already, especially if it
9083 appear that he is on the road to acquire it.
9084 </p>
9085 <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p11"></p>
9086 <p id="XP_Q36_A2-p12"></p>
9087 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A1.html"></a>
9088 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A3.html"></a>
9089 </div>
9090 <div id="XP_Q36_A3" class="div4">
9091 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A2.html"></a>
9092 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A4.html"></a>
9093 <h4 id="XP_Q36_A3-p0.1">Whether a man obtains the degrees of Order by the merit of one's life?</h4>
9094 <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p1"></p>
9095 <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p2">
9096 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man obtains the degrees of order by the mere merit of his life. For, according to Chrysostom [*Hom.
9097 xliii in the Opus Imperfectum, wrongly ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "not every priest is a saint, but every saint is
9098 a priest." Now a man becomes a saint by the merit of his life. Consequently he thereby also becomes a priest, and "a fortiori"
9099 has he the other Orders.
9100 </p>
9101 <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p3">
9102 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in natural things, men obtain a higher degree from the very fact that they are near God, and have a greater share
9103 of His favors, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iv). Now it is by merit of holiness and knowledge that a man approaches nearer
9104 to God and receives more of His favors. Therefore by this alone he is raised to the degree of Orders.
9105 </p>
9106 <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p4">
9107 <b>On the contrary,</b> Holiness once possessed can be lost. But when once a man is ordained he never loses his order. Therefore order does not consist
9108 in the mere merit of holiness.
9109 </p>
9110 <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p5">
9111 <b>I answer that,</b> A cause should be proportionate to its effect. And consequently as in Christ, from Whom grace comes down on all men, there
9112 must needs be fulness of grace; so in the ministers of the Church, to whom it belongs, not to give grace, but to give the
9113 sacraments of grace, the degree of order does not result from their having grace, but from their participating in a sacrament
9114 of grace.
9115 </p>
9116 <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p6">
9117 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chrysostom is speaking of the priest in reference to the reason for which he is so called, the word "sacerdos" signifying
9118 dispenser of holy things [sacra dans]: for in this sense every righteous man, in so far as he assists others by the sacraments,
9119 may be called a priest. But he is not speaking according to the actual meaning of the words; for this word "sacerdos" [priest]
9120 is employed to signify one who gives sacred things by dispensing the
9121 sacraments.
9122 </p>
9123 <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p7">
9124 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Natural things acquire a degree of superiority over others, from the fact that they are able to act on them by virtue of
9125 their form; wherefore from the very fact that they have a higher form, they obtain a higher degree. But the ministers of the
9126 Church are placed over others, not to confer anything on them by virtue of their own holiness (for this belongs to God alone),
9127 but as ministers, and as instruments, so to say, of the outpouring from the Head
9128 to the members. Hence the comparison fails as regards the dignity of Order, although it applies as to congruity.
9129 </p>
9130 <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p8"></p>
9131 <p id="XP_Q36_A3-p9"></p>
9132 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A2.html"></a>
9133 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A4.html"></a>
9134 </div>
9135 <div id="XP_Q36_A4" class="div4">
9136 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A3.html"></a>
9137 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A5.html"></a>
9138 <h4 id="XP_Q36_A4-p0.1">Whether he who raises the unworthy to Orders commits a sin?</h4>
9139 <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p1"></p>
9140 <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p2">
9141 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that he who raises the unworthy to orders commits no sin. For a bishop needs assistants appointed to the lesser
9142 offices. But he would be unable to find them in sufficient number, if he were to require of them such qualifications as the
9143 saints enumerate. Therefore if he raise some who are not qualified, he would seem to be excusable.
9144 </p>
9145 <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p3">
9146 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Church needs not only ministers for the dispensation of things spiritual, but also for the supervision of temporalities.
9147 But sometimes men without knowledge or holiness of life may be useful for the conduct of temporal affairs, either because
9148 of their worldly power, or on account of their natural industry. Therefore seemingly the like can be promoted without sin.
9149 </p>
9150 <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p4">
9151 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everyone is bound to avoid sin, as far as he can. If therefore a bishop sins in promoting the unworthy, he is bound
9152 to take the utmost pains to know whether those who present themselves for Orders be worthy, by making a careful inquiry about
9153 their morals and knowledge, and yet seemingly this is not done anywhere.
9154 </p>
9155 <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p5">
9156 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is worse to raise the wicked to the sacred ministry, than not to correct those who are raised already. But Heli sinned
9157 mortally by not correcting his sons for their wickedness; wherefore "he fell backwards . . . and died" (
9158 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q36_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.4.18" target="asv">1 Kings 4:18</a>). Therefore he who promotes the unworthy does not escape sin.
9159 </p>
9160 <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p6"> Further, spiritual things must be set before temporal things in the Church. Now a man would commit a mortal sin were he knowingly
9161 to endanger the temporalities of the Church. Much more therefore is it a mortal sin to endanger spiritual things. But whoever
9162 promotes the unworthy endangers spiritual things, since according to Gregory (Hom. xii in Evang.) "if a man's life is contemptible,
9163 his preaching is liable to be despised"; and for the same reason all the spiritual things that
9164 he dispenses. Therefore he who promotes the unworthy sins mortally.
9165 </p>
9166 <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p7">
9167 <b>I answer that,</b> Our Lord describes the faithful servant whom He has set "over His household to give them their measure of wheat." Hence he
9168 is guilty of unfaithfulness who gives any man Divine things above his measure: and whoso promotes the unworthy does this.
9169 Wherefore he commits a mortal crime, as being unfaithful to his sovereign Lord, especially since this is detrimental to the
9170 Church and to the Divine honor which is promoted by good ministers. For a man would be
9171 unfaithful to his earthly lord were he to place unworthy subjects in his offices.
9172 </p>
9173 <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p8">
9174 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God never so abandons His Church that apt ministers are not to be found sufficient for the needs of the people, if the worthy
9175 be promoted and the unworthy set aside. And though it were impossible to find as many ministers as there are now, it were
9176 better to have few good ministers than many bad ones, as the blessed Clement declares in his second epistle to James the brother
9177 of the Lord.
9178 </p>
9179 <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p9">
9180 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Temporal things are not to be sought but for the sake of spiritual things. Wherefore all temporal advantage should count
9181 for nothing, and all gain be despised for the advancement of spiritual good.
9182 </p>
9183 <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p10">
9184 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is at least required that the ordainer know that nothing contrary to holiness is in the candidate for ordination. But
9185 besides this he is required to take the greatest care, in proportion to the Order or office to be enjoined, so as to be certain
9186 of the qualifications of those to be promoted, at least from the testification of others. This is the meaning of the Apostle
9187 when he says (
9188 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q36_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.22" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:22</a>): "Impose not hands lightly on any
9189 man."
9190 </p>
9191 <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p11"></p>
9192 <p id="XP_Q36_A4-p12"></p>
9193 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A3.html"></a>
9194 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A5.html"></a>
9195 </div>
9196 <div id="XP_Q36_A5" class="div4">
9197 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A4.html"></a>
9198 <a href="summa.XP_Q37.html"></a>
9199 <h4 id="XP_Q36_A5-p0.1">Whether a man who is in sin can without sin exercise the Order he has received? [*Cf. TP, Q[64], A[6]]</h4>
9200 <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p1"></p>
9201 <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p2">
9202 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one who is in sin can without sin exercise the order he has received. For since, by virtue of his office,
9203 he is bound to exercise his order, he sins if he fails to do so. If therefore he sins by exercising it, he cannot avoid sin:
9204 which is inadmissible.
9205 </p>
9206 <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p3">
9207 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a dispensation is a relaxation of the law. Therefore although by rights it would be unlawful for him to exercise
9208 the order he has received, it would be lawful for him to do so by dispensation.
9209 </p>
9210 <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p4">
9211 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever co-operates with another in a mortal sin, sins mortally. If therefore a sinner sins mortally by exercising
9212 his order, he who receives or demands any Divine thing from him also sins mortally: and this seems absurd.
9213 </p>
9214 <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p5">
9215 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if he sins by exercising his order, it follows that every act of his order that he performs is a mortal sin; and
9216 consequently since many acts concur in the one exercise of his order, it would seem that he commits many mortal sins: which
9217 seems very hard.
9218 </p>
9219 <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p6">
9220 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Ep. ad Demophil.): "It seems presumptuous for such a man, one to wit who is not enlightened, to lay hands
9221 on priestly things; he is not afraid nor ashamed, all unworthy that he is to take part in Divine things, with the thought
9222 that God does not see what he sees in himself; he thinks, by false pretense, to cheat Him Whom he falsely calls his Father;
9223 he dares to utter in the person of Christ, words polluted by his infamy, I will not call
9224 them prayers, over the Divine symbols." Therefore a priest is a blasphemer and a cheat if he exercises his order unworthily,
9225 and thus he sins mortally: and in like manner any other person in orders.
9226 </p>
9227 <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p7"> Further, holiness of life is required in one who receives an order, that he may be qualified to exercise it. Now a man sins
9228 mortally if he present himself for orders in mortal sin. Much more therefore does he sin mortally whenever he exercises his
9229 order.
9230 </p>
9231 <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p8">
9232 <b>I answer that,</b> The law prescribes (
9233 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q36_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.20" target="asv">Dt. 16:20</a>) that "man should follow justly after that which is just." Wherefore whoever fulfills unworthily the duties of his order
9234 follows unjustly after that which is just, and acts contrary to a precept of the law, and thereby sins mortally. Now anyone
9235 who exercises a sacred office in mortal sin, without doubt does so unworthily. Hence it is clear that he sins mortally.
9236 </p>
9237 <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p9">
9238 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He is not perplexed as though he were in the necessity of sinning; for he can renounce his sin, or resign his office whereby
9239 he was bound to the exercise of his order.
9240 </p>
9241 <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p10">
9242 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The natural law allows of no dispensation; and it is of natural law that man handle holy things holily. Therefore no one
9243 can dispense from this.
9244 </p>
9245 <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p11">
9246 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> So long as a minister of the Church who is in mortal sin is recognized by the Church, his subject must receive the sacraments
9247 from him, since this is the purpose for which he is bound to him. Nevertheless, outside the case of necessity, it would not
9248 be safe to induce him to an execution of his Order, as long as he is conscious of being in mortal sin, which conscience, however,
9249 he can lay aside since a man is repaired in an instant by Divine grace.
9250 </p>
9251 <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p12">
9252 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When any man performs an action as a minister of the Church while in a state of mortal sin, he sins mortally, and as often
9253 as he performs that action, since, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. i), "it is wrong for the unclean even to touch the symbols,"
9254 i.e. the sacramental signs. Hence when they touch sacred things in the exercise of their office they sin mortally. It would
9255 be otherwise if they were to touch some sacred thing or perform some sacred duty
9256 in a case of necessity, when it would be allowable even to a layman, for instance if they were to baptize in a case of urgency,
9257 or gather up the Lord's body should it be cast to the ground.
9258 </p>
9259 <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p13"></p>
9260 <p id="XP_Q36_A5-p14"></p>
9261 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A4.html"></a>
9262 <a href="summa.XP_Q37.html"></a>
9263 </div>
9264 <a href="summa.XP_Q35_A5.html"></a>
9265 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A1.html"></a>
9266 </div>
9267 <div id="XP_Q37" class="div3">
9268 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A5.html"></a>
9269 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A1.html"></a>
9270 <h3 id="XP_Q37-p0.1">OF THE DISTINCTION OF ORDERS, OF THEIR ACTS, AND THE IMPRINTING OF THE CHARACTER (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
9271 <p id="XP_Q37-p1"></p>
9272 <p id="XP_Q37-p2"> In the next place we must consider the distinction of the orders and their acts, and the imprinting of the character. Under
9273 this head there are five points of inquiry:
9274 </p>
9275 <p id="XP_Q37-p3"> (1) Whether Order should be divided into several kinds?</p>
9276 <p id="XP_Q37-p4"> (2) How many are there?</p>
9277 <p id="XP_Q37-p5"> (3) Whether they ought to be divided into those that are sacred and those that are not?</p>
9278 <p id="XP_Q37-p6"> (4) Whether the acts of the Orders are rightly assigned in the text?</p>
9279 <p id="XP_Q37-p7"> (5) When are the characters of the Orders imprinted?</p>
9280 <div id="XP_Q37_A1" class="div4">
9281 <a href="summa.XP_Q37.html"></a>
9282 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html"></a>
9283 <h4 id="XP_Q37_A1-p0.1">Whether we ought to distinguish several Orders? </h4>
9284 <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p1"></p>
9285 <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p2">
9286 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not to distinguish several Orders. For the greater a power is, the less is it multiplied. Now
9287 this sacrament ranks above the others in so far as it places its recipients in a degree above other persons. Since then the
9288 other sacraments are not divided into several of which the whole is predicated, neither ought this sacrament to be divided
9289 into several Orders.
9290 </p>
9291 <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p3">
9292 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be divided, the parts of the division are either integral or subjective. But they are not integral, for then
9293 the whole would not be predicated of them. Therefore it is a division into subjective parts. Now subjective parts can have
9294 the remote genus predicated of them in the plural in the same way as the proximate genus; thus man and ass are several animals,
9295 and are several animated bodies. Therefore also priesthood and diaconate, as they are
9296 several Orders, even so are several sacraments, since sacrament is the genus, so to speak, in respect of Orders.
9297 </p>
9298 <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p4">
9299 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10) the form of authority in which one alone governs is a better government
9300 of the common weal than aristocracy, where different persons occupy different offices. But the government of the Church should
9301 be the best of all. Therefore in the Church there should be no distinction of Orders for different acts, but the whole power
9302 should reside in one person; and consequently there ought to be only one Order.
9303 </p>
9304 <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p5">
9305 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Church is Christ's mystical body, like to our natural body, according to the Apostle (
9306 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.5" target="asv">Rom. 12:5</a>;
9307 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:12</a>,
9308 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p5.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.27" target="asv">27</a>;
9309 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p5.4" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.22" target="asv">Eph. 1:22,23</a>;
9310 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p5.5" href="./asv.html#Col.1.24" target="asv"> Col. 1:24</a>). Now in the natural body there are various offices of the members. Therefore in the Church also there should be various
9311 Orders.
9312 </p>
9313 <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p6"> Further, the ministry of the New Testament is superior to that of the Old Testament (
9314 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3" target="asv">2 Cor. 3</a>). Now in the Old Testament not only the priests, but also their ministers, the Levites, were consecrated. Therefore likewise
9315 in the New Testament not only the priests but also their ministers should be consecrated by the sacrament of Order; and consequently
9316 there ought to be several Orders.
9317 </p>
9318 <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p7">
9319 <b>I answer that,</b> Multiplicity of Orders was introduced into the Church for three reasons. First to show forth the wisdom of God, which is
9320 reflected in the orderly distinction of things both natural and spiritual. This is signified in the statement of
9321 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 10:4,5</a> that "when the queen of Saba saw . . . the order of" Solomon's "servants . . . she had no longer any spirit in her," for
9322 she was breathless from admiration of his wisdom. Secondly, in order
9323 to succor human weakness, because it would be impossible for one man, without his being heavily burdened, to fulfill all things
9324 pertaining to the Divine mysteries; and so various orders are severally appointed to the various offices; and this is shown
9325 by the Lord giving Moses seventy ancients to assist him. Thirdly, that men may be given a broader way for advancing (to perfection),
9326 seeing that the various duties are divided among many men, so that all become the co-operators of God; than which
9327 nothing is more God-like, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii).
9328 </p>
9329 <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p8">
9330 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The other sacraments are given that certain effects may be received; but this sacrament is given chiefly that certain acts
9331 may be performed. Hence it behooves the sacrament of Order to be differentiated according to the diversity of acts, even as
9332 powers are differentiated by their acts.
9333 </p>
9334 <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p9">
9335 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The division of Order is not that of an integral whole into its parts, nor of a universal whole, but of a potential whole,
9336 the nature of which is that the notion of the whole is found to be complete in one part, but in the others by some participation
9337 thereof. Thus it is here: for the entire fulness of the sacrament is in one Order, namely the priesthood, while in the other
9338 sacraments there is a participation of Order. And this is signified by the
9339 Lord saying (
9340 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Num.11.17" target="asv">Num. 11:17</a>): "I will take of thy spirit and give to them, that they may bear with thee the burden of the people." Therefore all the
9341 Orders are one sacrament.
9342 </p>
9343 <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p10">
9344 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In a kingdom, although the entire fulness of power resides in the king, this does not exclude the ministers having a power
9345 which is a participation of the kingly power. It is the same in Order. In the aristocratic form of government, on the contrary,
9346 the fulness of power resides in no one, but in all.
9347 </p>
9348 <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p11"></p>
9349 <p id="XP_Q37_A1-p12"></p>
9350 <a href="summa.XP_Q37.html"></a>
9351 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html"></a>
9352 </div>
9353 <div id="XP_Q37_A2" class="div4">
9354 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A1.html"></a>
9355 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A3.html"></a>
9356 <h4 id="XP_Q37_A2-p0.1">Whether there are seven Orders?</h4>
9357 <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p1"></p>
9358 <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p2">
9359 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not seven Orders. For the Orders of the Church are directed to the hierarchical acts. But there
9360 are only three hierarchical acts, namely "to cleanse, to enlighten, and to perfect," for which reason Dionysius distinguishes
9361 three Orders (Eccl. Hier. v). Therefore there are not seven.
9362 </p>
9363 <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p3">
9364 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the sacraments derive their efficacy and authenticity from their institution by Christ, or at least by His apostles.
9365 But no mention except of priests and deacons is made in the teaching of Christ and His apostles. Therefore seemingly there
9366 are no other Orders.
9367 </p>
9368 <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p4">
9369 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the sacrament of Order a man is appointed to dispense the other sacraments. But there are only six other sacraments.
9370 Therefore there should be only six Orders.
9371 </p>
9372 <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p5">
9373 <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, It would seem that there ought to be more. For the higher a power is, the less is it subject to multiplication.
9374 Now the hierarchical power is in the angels in a higher way than in us, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. i). Since then there
9375 are nine Orders in the angelic hierarchy, there should be as many, or more, in the Church.
9376 </p>
9377 <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p6">
9378 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the prophecy of the Psalms is the most noble of all the prophecies. Now there is one Order, namely of readers, for
9379 reading the other prophecies in the Church. Therefore there ought to be another Order for reading the Psalms, especially since
9380 (Decretals, Dist. xxi, cap. Cleros) the "psalmist" is reckoned as the second Order after the doorkeeper.
9381 </p>
9382 <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p7">
9383 <b>I answer that,</b> Some show the sufficiency of the orders from their correspondence with the gratuitous graces which are indicated
9384 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 12</a>. For they say that the "word of wisdom" belongs to the bishop, because he is the ordainer of others, which pertains to wisdom;
9385 the "word of knowledge" to the priest, for he ought to have the key of knowledge; "faith" to the deacon, for he preaches the
9386 Gospel; the "working of miracles" to the subdeacon, who sets himself to do deeds of
9387 perfection by the vow of continency; "interpretation of speeches" to the acolyte, this being signified by the light which
9388 he bears; the "grace of healing" to the exorcist; "diverse kinds of tongues" to the psalmist; "prophecy" to the reader; and
9389 the "discerning of spirits" to the doorkeeper, for he excludes some and admits others. But this is of no account, for the
9390 gratuitous graces are not given, as the Orders are, to one same man. For it is written (
9391 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:4</a>): "There
9392 are distributions [Douay: 'diversities'] of graces." Moreover the episcopate [*Cf.
9393 <a id="XP_Q37_A2-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q40_A5.html"> Q[40], A[5]</a>] and the office of psalmist are included, which are not Orders. Wherefore others account for the Orders by likening them
9394 to the heavenly hierarchy, where the Orders are distinguished in reference to cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting. Thus
9395 they say that the doorkeeper cleanses outwardly, by separating even in the body the good from the wicked; that the acolyte
9396 cleanses
9397 inwardly, because by the light which he bears, he signifies that he dispels inward darkness; and that the exorcist cleanses
9398 both ways, for he casts out the devil who disturbs a man both ways. But enlightening, which is effected by teaching, is done
9399 by readers as regards prophetic doctrine; by subdeacons as to apostolic doctrine; and by deacons as to the gospel doctrine;
9400 while ordinary perfection, such as the perfection of Penance, Baptism, and so forth is the work of the priest; excellent
9401 perfection, such as the consecration of priests and virgins, is the work of the bishop; while the most excellent perfection
9402 is the work of the Sovereign Pontiff in whom resides the fulness of authority. But this again is of no account; both because
9403 the orders of the heavenly hierarchy are not distinguished by the aforesaid hierarchical actions, since each of them is applicable
9404 to every Order; and because, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), perfecting belongs to the bishops alone,
9405 enlightening to the priests, and cleansing to all the ministers. Wherefore others suit the orders to the seven gifts, so that
9406 the priesthood corresponds to the gift of wisdom, which feeds us with the bread of life and understanding, even as the priest
9407 refreshes us with the heavenly bread; fear to the doorkeeper, for he separates us from the wicked; and thus the intermediate
9408 Orders to the intermediate gifts. But this again is of no account, since the sevenfold grace is given in each one of the
9409 Orders. Consequently we must answer differently by saying that the sacrament of Order is directed to the sacrament of the
9410 Eucharist, which is the sacrament of sacraments, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii). For just as temple, altar, vessels,
9411 and vestments need to be consecrated, so do the ministers who are ordained for the Eucharist; and this consecration is the
9412 sacrament of Order. Hence the distinction of Orders is derived from their relation to the Eucharist. For the power of Order
9413 is
9414 directed either to the consecration of the Eucharist itself, or to some ministry in connection with this sacrament of the
9415 Eucharist. If in the former way, then it is the Order of priests; hence when they are ordained, they receive the chalice with
9416 wine, and the paten with the bread, because they are receiving the power to consecrate the body and blood of Christ. The co-operation
9417 of the ministers is directed either to the sacrament itself, or to the recipients. If the former, this happens in
9418 three ways. For in the first place, there is the ministry whereby the minister co-operates with the priest in the sacrament
9419 itself, by dispensing, but not by consecrating, for this is done by the priest alone; and this belongs to the deacon. Hence
9420 in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) it is said that it belongs to the deacon to minister to the priests in whatever is done in Christ's
9421 sacraments, wherefore he dispenses Christ's blood. Secondly, there is the ministry directed to the disposal of the
9422 sacramental matter in the sacred vessels of the sacrament. and this belongs to subdeacons. Wherefore it is stated in the text
9423 (Sent. iv, D, 24) that they carry the vessels of our Lord's body and blood, and place the oblation on the altar; hence, when
9424 they are ordained, they receive the chalice, empty however, from the bishop's hands. Thirdly, there is the ministry directed
9425 to the proffering of the sacramental matter, and this belongs to the acolyte. For he, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D,
9426 24), prepares the cruet with wine and water; wherefore he receives an empty cruet. The ministry directed to the preparation
9427 of the recipients can be exercised only over the unclean, since those who are clean are already apt for receiving the sacraments.
9428 Now the unclean are of three kinds, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii). For some are absolute unbelievers and unwilling
9429 to believe; and these must be altogether debarred from beholding Divine things and from the assembly of the faithful;
9430 this belongs to the doorkeepers. Some, however, are willing to believe, but are not as yet instructed, namely catechumens,
9431 and to the instruction of such persons the Order of readers is directed, who are therefore entrusted with the reading of the
9432 first rudiments of the doctrine of faith, namely the Old Testament. But some are believers and instructed, yet lie under an
9433 impediment through the power of the devil, namely those who are possessed: and to this ministry the order of exorcists is
9434 directed. Thus the reason and number of the degrees of Orders is made clear.
9435 </p>
9436 <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p8">
9437 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius is speaking of the orders not as sacraments, but as directed to hierarchical actions. Wherefore he distinguishes
9438 three Orders corresponding to those actions. The first of these Orders, namely the bishop, has all three actions; the second,
9439 namely the priest, has two; while the third has one, namely to cleanse; this is the deacon who is called a minister: and under
9440 this last all the lower Orders are comprised. But the Orders derive their
9441 sacramental nature from their relation to the greatest of the sacraments, and consequently the number of Orders depends on
9442 this.
9443 </p>
9444 <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p9">
9445 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the early Church, on account of the fewness of ministers, all the lower ministries were entrusted to the deacons, as Dionysius
9446 says (Eccl. Hier. iii), where he says: "Some of the ministers stand at the closed door of the Church, others are otherwise
9447 occupied in the exercise of their own order; others place the sacred bread and the chalice of benediction on the altar and
9448 offer them to the priests." Nevertheless all the power to do all these things
9449 was included in the one power of the deacon, though implicitly. But afterwards the Divine worship developed, and the Church
9450 committed expressly to several persons that which had hitherto been committed implicitly in one Order. This is what the Master
9451 means, when He says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) that the Church instituted other Orders.
9452 </p>
9453 <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p10">
9454 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The orders are directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist chiefly, and to the other sacraments consequently, for even the
9455 other sacraments flow from that which is contained in that sacrament. Hence it does not follow that the orders ought to be
9456 distinguished according to the sacraments.
9457 </p>
9458 <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p11">
9459 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The angels differ specifically [*Cf.
9460 <a id="XP_Q37_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q50_A4.html">FP, Q[50], A[4]</a>]: for this reason it is possible for them to have various modes of receiving Divine things, and hence also they are divided
9461 into various hierarchies. But in men there is only one hierarchy, because they have only one mode of receiving Divine things,
9462 which results from the human species, namely through the images of sensible objects. Consequently the distinction of orders
9463 in
9464 the angels cannot bear any relation to a sacrament as it is with us, but only a relation to the hierarchical actions which
9465 among them each Order exercises on the Orders below. In this respect our Orders correspond to theirs; since in our hierarchy
9466 there are three Orders, distinguished according to the three hierarchical actions, even as in each angelic hierarchy.
9467 </p>
9468 <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p12">
9469 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The office of psalmist is not an Order, but an office annexed to an Order. For the psalmist is also styled precentor because
9470 the psalms are recited with chant. Now precentor is not the name of a special Order, both because it belongs to the whole
9471 choir to sing, and because he has no special relation to the sacrament of the Eucharist. Since, however, it is a particular
9472 office, it is sometimes reckoned among the Orders, taking these in a broad
9473 sense.
9474 </p>
9475 <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p13"></p>
9476 <p id="XP_Q37_A2-p14"></p>
9477 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A1.html"></a>
9478 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A3.html"></a>
9479 </div>
9480 <div id="XP_Q37_A3" class="div4">
9481 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html"></a>
9482 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A4.html"></a>
9483 <h4 id="XP_Q37_A3-p0.1">Whether the Order should be divided into those that are sacred and those that are not?</h4>
9484 <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p1"></p>
9485 <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p2">
9486 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Orders ought not to be divided into those that are sacred and those that are not. For all the Orders
9487 are sacraments, and all the sacraments are sacred. Therefore all the Orders are sacred.
9488 </p>
9489 <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p3">
9490 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by the Orders of the Church a man is not appointed to any other than Divine offices. Now all these are sacred. Therefore
9491 all the Orders also are sacred.
9492 </p>
9493 <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p4">
9494 <b>On the contrary,</b> The sacred Orders are an impediment to the contracting of marriage and annul the marriage that is already contracted. But
9495 the four lower orders neither impede the contracting nor annul the contract. Therefore these are not sacred Orders.
9496 </p>
9497 <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p5">
9498 <b>I answer that,</b> An Order is said to be sacred in two ways. First, in itself, and thus every order is sacred, since it is a sacrament. Secondly,
9499 by reason of the matter about which it exercises an act, and thus an Order is called sacred, if it exercises an act about
9500 some consecrated thing. In this sense there are only three sacred Orders, namely the priesthood and diaconate, which exercise
9501 an act about the consecrated body and blood of Christ, and the subdiaconate, which
9502 exercises an act about the consecrated vessels. Wherefore continency is enjoined them, that they who handle holy things may
9503 themselves be holy and clean.
9504 </p>
9505 <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p6"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
9506 <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p7"></p>
9507 <p id="XP_Q37_A3-p8"></p>
9508 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html"></a>
9509 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A4.html"></a>
9510 </div>
9511 <div id="XP_Q37_A4" class="div4">
9512 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A3.html"></a>
9513 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A5.html"></a>
9514 <h4 id="XP_Q37_A4-p0.1">Whether the acts of the Orders are rightly assigned in the text?</h4>
9515 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p1"></p>
9516 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p2">
9517 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the acts of the Orders are not rightly assigned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Because a person is prepared
9518 by absolution to receive Christ's body. Now the preparation of the recipients of a sacrament belongs to the lower Orders.
9519 Therefore absolution from sins is unfittingly reckoned among the acts of a priest.
9520 </p>
9521 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p3">
9522 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man is made like to God immediately in Baptism, by receiving the character which causes this likeness. But prayer
9523 and the offering of oblations are acts directed immediately to God. Therefore every baptized person can perform these acts,
9524 and not priests alone.
9525 </p>
9526 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p4">
9527 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, different Orders have different acts. But it belongs to the subdeacon to place the oblations on the altar, and to
9528 read the epistle; and subdeacons carry the cross before the Pope. Therefore these acts should not be assigned to the deacon.
9529 </p>
9530 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p5">
9531 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the same truth is contained in the Old and in the New Testament. But it belongs to the readers to read the Old Testament.
9532 Therefore it should belong to them likewise, and not to deacons, to read the New Testament.
9533 </p>
9534 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p6">
9535 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the apostles preached naught else but the gospel of Christ (
9536 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.15" target="asv">Rom. 1:15</a>). But the teaching of the apostles is entrusted to subdeacons to be read by them. Therefore the Gospel teaching should be
9537 also.
9538 </p>
9539 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p7">
9540 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) that which belongs to a higher Order should not be applicable to a lower
9541 Order. But it is an act of subdeacons to minister with the cruets. Therefore it should not be assigned to acolytes.
9542 </p>
9543 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p8">
9544 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, spiritual actions should rank above bodily actions. But the acolyte's act is merely corporeal. Therefore the exorcist
9545 has not the spiritual act of casting out devils, since he is of inferior rank.
9546 </p>
9547 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p9">
9548 <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, things that have most in common should be placed beside one another. Now the reading of the Old Testament must needs
9549 have most in common with the reading of the New Testament, which latter belongs to the higher ministers. Therefore the reading
9550 of the Old Testament should be reckoned the act, not of the reader, but rather of the acolyte; especially since the bodily
9551 light which the acolytes carry signifies the light of spiritual doctrine.
9552 </p>
9553 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p10">
9554 <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, in every act of a special Order, there should be some special power, which the person ordained has to the exclusion
9555 of other persons. But in opening and shutting doors the doorkeeper has no special power that other men have not. Therefore
9556 this should not be reckoned their act.
9557 </p>
9558 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p11">
9559 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the consecration conferred in the sacrament of orders is directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist, as stated above
9560
9561 <a id="XP_Q37_A4-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the principal act of each order is that whereby it is most nearly directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist. In this respect,
9562 too, one order ranks above another, in so far as one act is more nearly directed to that same sacrament. But because many
9563 things are directed to the Eucharist, as being the most
9564 exalted of the sacraments, it follows not unfittingly that one Order has many acts besides its principal act, and all the
9565 more, as it ranks higher, since a power extends to the more things, the higher it is.
9566 </p>
9567 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p12">
9568 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The preparation of the recipients of a sacrament is twofold. One is remote and is effected by the ministers: another is proximate,
9569 whereby they are rendered apt at once for receiving the sacraments. This latter belongs to priests, since even in natural
9570 things matter receives from one and the same agent both the ultimate disposition to the form, and the form itself. And since
9571 a person acquires the proximate disposition to the Eucharist by being
9572 cleansed from sin, it follows that the priest is the proper minister of all those sacraments which are chiefly instituted
9573 for the cleansing of sins, namely Baptism, Penance, and Extreme Unction.
9574 </p>
9575 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p13">
9576 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Acts are directed immediately to God in two ways; in one way on the part of one person only, for instance the prayers of
9577 individuals, vows, and so forth: such acts befit any baptized person. In another way on the part of the whole Church, and
9578 thus the priest alone exercises acts immediately directed to God; because to impersonate the whole Church belongs to him alone
9579 who consecrates the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of the universal Church.
9580 </p>
9581 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p14">
9582 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The offerings made by the people are offered through the priest. Hence a twofold ministry is necessary with regard to offerings.
9583 One on the part of the people: and this belongs to the subdeacon who receives the offerings from the people and places them
9584 on the altar or offers them to the deacon. the other is on the part of the priest, and belongs to the deacon, who hands the
9585 offerings to the priest. This is the principal act of both Orders, and for
9586 this reason the deacon's Order is the higher. But to read the epistle does not belong to a deacon, except as the acts of lower
9587 Orders are ascribed to the higher; and in like manner to carry the cross. Moreover, this depends on the customs of Churches,
9588 because in secondary acts it is not unfitting for customs to vary.
9589 </p>
9590 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p15">
9591 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Doctrine is a remote preparation for the reception of a sacrament; wherefore the announcement of doctrine is entrusted to
9592 the ministers. But the doctrine of the Old Testament is more remote than that of the New Testament, since it contains no instruction
9593 about this sacrament except in figures. Hence announcing of the New Testament is entrusted to the higher ministers, and that
9594 of the Old Testament to the lower ministers. Moreover the doctrine of the
9595 New Testament is more perfect as delivered by our Lord Himself, than as made known by His apostles. Wherefore the Gospel is
9596 committed to deacons and the Epistle to subdeacons.
9597 </p>
9598 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p16"> This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.</p>
9599 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p17">
9600 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Acolytes exercise an act over the cruet alone, and not over the contents of the cruet; whereas the subdeacon exercises an
9601 act over the contents of the cruet, because he handles the water and wine to the end that they be put into the chalice,* and
9602 again he pours the water over the hands of the priest; and the deacon, like the subdeacon, exercises an act over the chalice
9603 only, not over its contents, whereas the priest exercises an act over the contents.
9604 [*The wording of St. Thomas is sufficiently vague to refer either to the Roman rite, where the priest pours the wine and water
9605 into the chalice, or to the Dominican rite, where this is done by the subdeacon.] Wherefore as the subdeacon at his ordination
9606 receives an empty chalice, while the priest receives a full chalice, so the acolyte receives an empty cruet, but the subdeacon
9607 a full one. Thus there is a certain connection among the Orders.
9608 </p>
9609 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p18">
9610 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The bodily acts of the acolyte are more intimately connected with the act of Holy orders than the act of the exorcist, although
9611 the latter is, in a fashion, spiritual. For the acolytes exercise a ministry over the vessels in which the sacramental matter
9612 is contained, as regards the wine, which needs a vessel to hold it on account of its humidity. Hence of all the minor orders
9613 the Order of acolytes is the highest.
9614 </p>
9615 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p19">
9616 <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> The act of the acolyte is more closely connected with the principal acts of the higher ministers, than the acts of the other
9617 minor Orders, as is self-evident; and again as regards the secondary acts whereby they prepare the people by doctrine. For
9618 the acolyte by bearing a light represents the doctrine of the New Testament in a visible manner, while the reader by his recital
9619 represents it differently, wherefore the acolyte is of higher rank. It is the
9620 same with the exorcist, for as the act of the reader is compared with the secondary act of the deacon and subdeacon, so is
9621 the act of the exorcist compared with the secondary act of the priest, namely to bind and to loose, by which man is wholly
9622 freed from the slavery of the devil. This, too, shows the degrees of Order to be most orderly. since only the three higher
9623 Orders co-operate with the priest in his principal act which is to consecrate the body of Christ, while both the higher and
9624 lower
9625 Orders co-operate with him in his secondary act, which is to loose and bind.
9626 </p>
9627 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p20">
9628 <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> Some say that in receiving the Order the doorkeeper is given a Divine power to debar others from entering the Church, even
9629 as Christ had, when He cast out the sellers from the Temple. But this belongs to a gratuitous grace rather than to a sacramental
9630 grace. Wherefore we should reply that he receives the power to do this by virtue of his office, although others may do so,
9631 but not officially. It is the case in all the acts of the minor Orders, that
9632 they can be lawfully exercised by others, even though these have no office to that effect: just as Mass may be said in an
9633 unconsecrated building, although the consecration of a church is directed to the purpose that Mass be said there.
9634 </p>
9635 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p21"></p>
9636 <p id="XP_Q37_A4-p22"></p>
9637 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A3.html"></a>
9638 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A5.html"></a>
9639 </div>
9640 <div id="XP_Q37_A5" class="div4">
9641 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A4.html"></a>
9642 <a href="summa.XP_Q38.html"></a>
9643 <h4 id="XP_Q37_A5-p0.1">Whether the character is imprinted on a priest when the chalice is handed to him?</h4>
9644 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p1"></p>
9645 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p2">
9646 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the character is not imprinted on the priest at the moment when the chalice is handed to him. For the
9647 consecration of a priest is done by anointing as in Confirmation. Now in Confirmation the character is imprinted at the moment
9648 of anointing; and therefore in the priesthood also and not at the handing of the chalice.
9649 </p>
9650 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p3">
9651 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, our Lord gave His disciples the priestly power when He said (
9652 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.22" target="asv">Jn. 20:22,23</a>): "Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins you shall forgive," etc. Now the Holy Ghost is given by the imposition of hands.
9653 Therefore the character of order is given at the moment of the imposition of hands.
9654 </p>
9655 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p4">
9656 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the ministers are consecrated, even so are the ministers' vestments. Now the blessing alone consecrates the vestments.
9657 Therefore the consecration of the priest also is effected by the mere blessing of the bishop.
9658 </p>
9659 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p5">
9660 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as a chalice is handed to the priest, even so is the priestly vestment. Therefore if a character is imprinted at
9661 the giving of the chalice, so likewise is there at the giving of the chasuble, and thus a priest would have two characters:
9662 but this is false.
9663 </p>
9664 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p6">
9665 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the deacon's order is more closely allied to the priest's Order than is the subdeacon's. But if a character is imprinted
9666 on the priest at the moment of the handing of the chalice, the subdeacon would be more closely allied to the priest than the
9667 deacon; because the subdeacon receives the character at the handing of the chalice and not the deacon. Therefore the priestly
9668 character is not imprinted at the handing of the chalice.
9669 </p>
9670 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p7">
9671 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Order of acolytes approaches nearer to the priestly act by exercising an act over the cruet than by exercising
9672 an act over the torch. Yet the character is imprinted on the acolytes when they receive the torch rather than when they receive
9673 the cruet, because the name of acolyte signifies candle-bearer. Therefore the character is not imprinted on the priest when
9674 he receives the chalice.
9675 </p>
9676 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p8">
9677 <b>On the contrary,</b> The principal act of the priest's Order is to consecrate Christ's body. Now he receives the power to this effect at the handing
9678 of the chalice. Therefore the character is imprinted on him then.
9679 </p>
9680 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p9">
9681 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[4], ad 1), to cause the form and to give the matter its proximate preparation for the form belong to the
9682 same agent. Wherefore the bishop in conferring orders does two things; for he prepares the candidates for the reception of
9683 orders, and delivers to them the power of order. He prepares them, both by instructing them in their respective offices and
9684 by doing something to them, so that they may be adapted to receive the power. This
9685 preparation consists of three things, namely blessing, imposition of hands, and anointing. By the blessing they are enlisted
9686 in the Divine service, wherefore the blessing is given to all. By the imposition of hands the fulness of grace is given, whereby
9687 they are qualified for exalted duties, wherefore only deacons and priests receive the imposition of hands, because they are
9688 competent to dispense the sacraments, although the latter as principal dispensers, the former as ministers. But by the
9689 anointing they are consecrated for the purpose of handling the sacrament, wherefore the anointing is done to the priests alone
9690 who touch the body of Christ with their own hands; even as a chalice is anointed because it holds the blood, and the paten
9691 because it holds the body.
9692 </p>
9693 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p10"> The conferring of power is effected by giving them something pertaining to their proper act. And since the principal act
9694 of a priest is to consecrate the body and blood of Christ, the priestly character is imprinted at the very giving of the chalice
9695 under the prescribed form of words.
9696 </p>
9697 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p11">
9698 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In Confirmation there is not given the office of exercising an act on an exterior matter, wherefore the character is not
9699 imprinted in that sacrament at the handing of some particular thing, but at the mere imposition of hands and anointing. But
9700 it is otherwise in the priestly Order, and consequently the comparison fails.
9701 </p>
9702 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p12">
9703 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our Lord gave His disciples the priestly power, as regards the principal act, before His passion at the supper when He said:
9704 "Take ye and eat" (
9705 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A5-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.26" target="asv">Mat. 26:26</a>), wherefore He added: "Do this for a commemoration of Me" (
9706 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q37_A5-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.19" target="asv">Lk. 22:19</a>). After the resurrection, however, He gave them the priestly power, as to its secondary act, which is to bind and loose.
9707 </p>
9708 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p13">
9709 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Vestments require no other consecration except to be set aside for the Divine worship, wherefore the blessing suffices for
9710 their consecration. But it is different with those who are ordained, as explained above.
9711 </p>
9712 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p14">
9713 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The priestly vestment signifies, not the power given to the priest, but the aptitude required of him for exercising the act
9714 of that power. Wherefore a character is imprinted neither on the priest nor on anyone else at the giving of a vestment.
9715 </p>
9716 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p15">
9717 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The deacon's power is midway between the subdeacon's and the priest's. For the priest exercises a power directly on Christ's
9718 body, the subdeacon on the vessels only, and the deacon on Christ's body contained in a vessel. Hence it is not for him to
9719 touch Christ's body, but to carry the body on the paten, and to dispense the blood with the chalice. Consequently his power,
9720 as to the principal act, could not be expressed, either by the giving of the
9721 vessel only, or by the giving of the matter; and his power is expressed as to the secondary act alone, by his receiving the
9722 book of the Gospels, and this power is understood to contain the other; wherefore the character is impressed at the handing
9723 of the book.
9724 </p>
9725 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p16">
9726 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The act of the acolyte whereby he serves with the cruet ranks before his act of carrying the torch; although he takes his
9727 name from the secondary act, because it is better known and more proper to him. Hence the acolyte receives the character when
9728 he is given the cruet, by virtue of the words uttered by the bishop.
9729 </p>
9730 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p17"></p>
9731 <p id="XP_Q37_A5-p18"></p>
9732 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A4.html"></a>
9733 <a href="summa.XP_Q38.html"></a>
9734 </div>
9735 <a href="summa.XP_Q36_A5.html"></a>
9736 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A1.html"></a>
9737 </div>
9738 <div id="XP_Q38" class="div3">
9739 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A5.html"></a>
9740 <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A1.html"></a>
9741 <h3 id="XP_Q38-p0.1">OF THOSE WHO CONFER THIS SACRAMENT (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
9742 <p id="XP_Q38-p1"></p>
9743 <p id="XP_Q38-p2"> We must now consider those who confer this sacrament. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
9744 <p id="XP_Q38-p3"> (1) Whether a bishop alone can confer this sacrament?</p>
9745 <p id="XP_Q38-p4"> (2) Whether a heretic or any other person cut off from the Church can confer this sacrament?</p>
9746 <div id="XP_Q38_A1" class="div4">
9747 <a href="summa.XP_Q38.html"></a>
9748 <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A2.html"></a>
9749 <h4 id="XP_Q38_A1-p0.1">Whether a bishop alone confers the sacrament of Order?</h4>
9750 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p1"></p>
9751 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p2">
9752 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not only a bishop confers the sacrament of Order. For the imposition of hands has something to do with
9753 the consecration. Now not only the bishop but also the assisting priests lay hands on the priests who are being ordained.
9754 Therefore not only a bishop confers the sacrament of Order.
9755 </p>
9756 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p3">
9757 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man receives the power of Order, when that which pertains to the act of his Order is handed to him. Now the cruet
9758 with water, bowl* and towel, are given to the subdeacon by the archdeacon; as also the candlestick with candle, and the empty
9759 cruet to the acolyte. [*"Bacili." The rubric has "aquamanili." Some texts of the Summa have "mantili" ("maniple"), but the
9760 archdeacon does not give the maniple to the subdeacon.] Therefore not only the bishop
9761 confers the sacrament of Order.
9762 </p>
9763 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p4">
9764 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which belongs to an Order cannot be entrusted to one who has not the Order. Now the conferring of minor Orders
9765 is entrusted to certain persons who are not bishops, for instance to Cardinal priests. Therefore the conferring of Orders
9766 does not belong to the episcopal Order.
9767 </p>
9768 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p5">
9769 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever is entrusted with the principal is entrusted with the accessory also. Now the sacrament of Order is directed
9770 to the Eucharist, as accessory to principal. Since then a priest consecrates the Eucharist, he can also confer Orders.
9771 </p>
9772 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p6">
9773 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, there is a greater distinction between a priest and a deacon than between bishop and bishop. But a bishop can consecrate
9774 a bishop. Therefore a priest can ordain a deacon.
9775 </p>
9776 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p7">
9777 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ministers are applied by their Orders to the Divine worship in a more noble way than the sacred vessels. But the consecration
9778 of the vessels belongs to a bishop only. Much more therefore does the consecration of ministers.
9779 </p>
9780 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p8"> Further, the sacrament of Order ranks higher than the sacrament of Confirmation. Now a bishop alone confirms. Much more therefore
9781 does a bishop alone confer the sacrament of Order.
9782 </p>
9783 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p9"> Further, virgins are not placed in a degree of spiritual power by their consecration, as the ordained are. Yet a bishop alone
9784 can consecrate a virgin. Therefore much more can he alone ordain.
9785 </p>
9786 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p10">
9787 <b>I answer that,</b> The episcopal power stands in the same relation to the power of the lower Orders, as political science, which seeks the common
9788 good, to the lower acts and virtues which seek some special good, as appears from what was said above (
9789 <a id="XP_Q38_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q37_A1.html">Q[37], A[1]</a>). Now political science, as stated in Ethic. i, 2, lays down the law to lower sciences, namely what science each one ought
9790 to cultivate, and how far he should pursue it and in what way. Wherefore
9791 it belongs to a bishop to assign others to places in all the Divine services. Hence he alone confirms, because those who are
9792 confirmed receive the office, as it were, of confessing the faith; again he alone blesses virgins who are images of the Church,
9793 Christ's spouse, the care of which is entrusted chiefly to him; and he it is who consecrates the candidates for ordination
9794 to the ministry of Orders, and, by his consecration, appoints the vessels that they are to use; even as secular offices in
9795 various cities are allotted by him who holds the highest power, for instance by the king.
9796 </p>
9797 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p11">
9798 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
9799 <a id="XP_Q38_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q37_A5.html">Q[37], A[5]</a>), at the imposition of hands there is given, not the character of the priestly Order, but grace which makes a man fit to
9800 exercise his Order. And since those who are raised to the priesthood need most copious grace, the priests together with the
9801 bishop lay hands on them, but the bishop alone lays hands on deacons.
9802 </p>
9803 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p12">
9804 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the archdeacon is as it were minister-in-chief, all things pertaining to the ministry are handed by him, for instance
9805 the candle with which the acolyte serves the deacon by carrying it before him at the Gospel, and the cruet with which he serves
9806 the subdeacon; and in like manner he gives the subdeacon the things with which the latter serves the higher Orders. And yet
9807 the principal act of the subdeacon does not consist in these things, but in his
9808 co-operation as regards the matter of the sacrament; wherefore he receives the character through the chalice being handed
9809 to him by the bishop. On the other hand, the acolyte receives the character by virtue of the words of the bishop when the
9810 aforesaid things---the cruet rather than the candlestick---are handed to him by the archdeacon. Hence it does not follow that
9811 the archdeacon ordains.
9812 </p>
9813 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p13">
9814 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Pope, who has the fulness of episcopal power, can entrust one who is not a bishop with things pertaining to the episcopal
9815 dignity, provided they bear no immediate relation to the true body of Christ. Hence by virtue of his commission a simple priest
9816 can confer the minor Orders and confirm; but not one who is not a priest. Nor can a priest confer the higher Orders which
9817 bear an immediate relation to Christ's body, over the consecration of which the
9818 Pope's power is no greater than that of a simple priest.
9819 </p>
9820 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p14">
9821 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the Eucharist is in itself the greatest of the sacraments, it does not place a man in an office as does the sacrament
9822 of Order. Hence the comparison fails.
9823 </p>
9824 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p15">
9825 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In order to bestow what one has on another, it is necessary not only to be near him but also to have fulness of power. And
9826 since a priest has not fulness of power in the hierarchical offices, as a bishop has, it does not follow that he can raise
9827 others to the diaconate, although the latter Order is near to his.
9828 </p>
9829 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p16"></p>
9830 <p id="XP_Q38_A1-p17"></p>
9831 <a href="summa.XP_Q38.html"></a>
9832 <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A2.html"></a>
9833 </div>
9834 <div id="XP_Q38_A2" class="div4">
9835 <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A1.html"></a>
9836 <a href="summa.XP_Q39.html"></a>
9837 <h4 id="XP_Q38_A2-p0.1">Whether heretics and those who are cut off from the Church can confer Orders? [*Cf. TP, Q[64], AA[5],9] </h4>
9838 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p1"></p>
9839 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p2">
9840 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heretics and those who are cut off from the Church cannot confer Orders. For to confer Orders is a greater
9841 thing than to loose or bind anyone. But a heretic cannot loose or bind. Neither therefore can he ordain.
9842 </p>
9843 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p3">
9844 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a priest that is separated from the Church can consecrate, because the character whence he derives this power remains
9845 in him indelibly. But a bishop receives no character when he is raised to the episcopate. Therefore he does not necessarily
9846 retain the episcopal power after his separation from the Church.
9847 </p>
9848 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p4">
9849 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in no community can one who is expelled therefrom dispose of the offices of the community. Now Orders are offices
9850 of the Church. Therefore one who is outside the Church cannot confer Orders.
9851 </p>
9852 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p5">
9853 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the sacraments derive their efficacy from Christ's passion. Now a heretic is not united to Christ's passion; neither
9854 by his own faith, since he is an unbeliever, nor by the faith of the Church, since he is severed from the Church. Therefore
9855 he cannot confer the sacrament of Orders.
9856 </p>
9857 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p6">
9858 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a blessing is necessary in the conferring of Orders. But a heretic cannot bless; in fact his blessing is turned
9859 into a curse, as appears from the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 25). Therefore he cannot ordain.
9860 </p>
9861 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p7">
9862 <b>On the contrary,</b> When a bishop who has fallen into heresy is reconciled he is not reconsecrated. Therefore he did not lose the power which
9863 he had of conferring Orders.
9864 </p>
9865 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p8"> Further, the power to ordain is greater than the power of Orders. But the power of Orders is not forfeited on account of
9866 heresy and the like. Neither therefore is the power to ordain.
9867 </p>
9868 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p9"> Further, as the one who baptizes exercises a merely outward ministry, so does one who ordains, while God works inwardly.
9869 But one who is cut off from the Church by no means loses the power to baptize. Neither therefore does he lose the power to
9870 ordain.
9871 </p>
9872 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p10">
9873 <b>I answer that,</b> on this question four opinions are mentioned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 25). For some said that heretics, so long as they
9874 are tolerated by the Church, retain the power to ordain, but not after they have been cut off from the Church; as neither
9875 do those who have been degraded and the like. This is the first opinion. Yet this is impossible, because, happen what may,
9876 no power that is given with a consecration can be taken away so long as the thing itself
9877 remains, any more than the consecration itself can be annulled, for even an altar or chrism once consecrated remains consecrated
9878 for ever. Wherefore, since the episcopal power is conferred by consecration, it must needs endure for ever, however much a
9879 man may sin or be cut off from the Church. For this reason others said that those who are cut off from the Church after having
9880 episcopal power in the Church, retain the power to ordain and raise others, but that those who are raised by them have
9881 not this power. This is the fourth opinion. But this again is impossible, for if those who were ordained in the Church retain
9882 the power they received, it is clear that by exercising their power they consecrate validly, and therefore they validly confer
9883 whatever power is given with that consecration, and thus those who receive ordination or promotion from them have the same
9884 power as they. Wherefore others said that even those who are cut off from the Church can confer Orders and the other
9885 sacraments, provided they observe the due form and intention, both as to the first effect, which is the conferring of the
9886 sacrament, and as to the ultimate effect which is the conferring of grace. This is the second opinion. But this again is inadmissible,
9887 since by the very fact that a person communicates in the sacraments with a heretic who is cut off from the Church, he sins,
9888 and thus approaches the sacrament insincerely and cannot obtain grace, except perhaps in Baptism in a case of
9889 necessity. Hence others say that they confer the sacraments validly, but do not confer grace with them, not that the sacraments
9890 are lacking in efficacy, but on account of the sins of those who receive the sacraments from such persons despite the prohibition
9891 of the Church. This is the third and the true opinion.
9892 </p>
9893 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p11">
9894 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The effect of absolution is nothing else but the forgiveness of sins which results from grace, and consequently a heretic
9895 cannot absolve, as neither can he confer grace in the sacraments. Moreover in order to give absolution it is necessary to
9896 have jurisdiction, which one who is cut off from the Church has not.
9897 </p>
9898 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p12">
9899 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man is raised to the episcopate he receives a power which he retains for ever. This, however, cannot be called a character,
9900 because a man is not thereby placed in direct relation to God, but to Christ's mystical body. Nevertheless it remains indelibly
9901 even as the character, because it is given by consecration.
9902 </p>
9903 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p13">
9904 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who are ordained by heretics, although they receive an Order, do not receive the exercise thereof, so as to minister
9905 lawfully in their Orders, for the very reason indicated in the Objection.
9906 </p>
9907 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p14">
9908 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> They are united to the passion of Christ by the faith of the Church, for although in themselves they are severed from it,
9909 they are united to it as regards the form of the Church which they observe.
9910 </p>
9911 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p15">
9912 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> This refers to the ultimate effect of the sacraments, as the third opinion maintains.
9913 </p>
9914 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p16"></p>
9915 <p id="XP_Q38_A2-p17"></p>
9916 <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A1.html"></a>
9917 <a href="summa.XP_Q39.html"></a>
9918 </div>
9919 <a href="summa.XP_Q37_A5.html"></a>
9920 <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A1.html"></a>
9921 </div>
9922 <div id="XP_Q39" class="div3">
9923 <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A2.html"></a>
9924 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A1.html"></a>
9925 <h3 id="XP_Q39-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO THIS SACRAMENT (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
9926 <p id="XP_Q39-p1"></p>
9927 <p id="XP_Q39-p2"> We must next consider the impediments to this sacrament. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
9928 <p id="XP_Q39-p3"> (1) Whether the female sex is an impediment to receiving this sacrament?</p>
9929 <p id="XP_Q39-p4"> (2) Whether lack of the use of reason is?</p>
9930 <p id="XP_Q39-p5"> (3) Whether the state of slavery is?</p>
9931 <p id="XP_Q39-p6"> (4) Whether homicide is?</p>
9932 <p id="XP_Q39-p7"> (5) Whether illegitimate birth is?</p>
9933 <p id="XP_Q39-p8"> (6) Whether lack of members is?</p>
9934 <div id="XP_Q39_A1" class="div4">
9935 <a href="summa.XP_Q39.html"></a>
9936 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A2.html"></a>
9937 <h4 id="XP_Q39_A1-p0.1">Whether the female sex is an impediment to receiving Orders?</h4>
9938 <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p1"></p>
9939 <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p2">
9940 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the female sex is no impediment to receiving Orders. For the office of prophet is greater than the office
9941 of priest, since a prophet stands midway between God and priests, just as the priest does between God and people. Now the
9942 office of prophet was sometimes granted to women, as may be gathered from
9943 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 22:14.</a> Therefore the office of priest also may be competent to them.
9944 </p>
9945 <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p3">
9946 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as Order pertains to a kind of pre-eminence, so does a position of authority as well as martyrdom and the religious
9947 state. Now authority is entrusted to women in the New Testament, as in the case of abbesses, and in the Old Testament, as
9948 in the case of Debbora, who judged Israel (
9949 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Judg.2" target="asv">Judges 2</a>). Moreover martyrdom and the religious life are also befitting to them. Therefore the Orders of the Church are also competent
9950 to them.
9951 </p>
9952 <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p4">
9953 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the power of orders is founded in the soul. But sex is not in the soul. Therefore difference in sex makes no difference
9954 to the reception of Orders.
9955 </p>
9956 <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p5">
9957 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
9958 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.12" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:12</a>): "I suffer not a woman to teach (in the Church),* nor to use authority over the man." [*The words in parenthesis are from
9959
9960 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.34" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:34, </a> "Let women keep silence in the churches."]
9961 </p>
9962 <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p6"> Further, the crown is required previous to receiving Orders, albeit not for the validity of the sacrament. But the crown
9963 or tonsure is not befitting to women according to
9964 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 11</a>. Neither therefore is the receiving of Orders.
9965 </p>
9966 <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p7">
9967 <b>I answer that,</b> Certain things are required in the recipient of a sacrament as being requisite for the validity of the sacrament, and if
9968 such things be lacking, one can receive neither the sacrament nor the reality of the sacrament. Other things, however, are
9969 required, not for the validity of the sacrament, but for its lawfulness, as being congruous to the sacrament; and without
9970 these one receives the sacrament, but not the reality of the sacrament. Accordingly we must say
9971 that the male sex is required for receiving Orders not only in the second, but also in the first way. Wherefore even though
9972 a woman were made the object of all that is done in conferring Orders, she would not receive Orders, for since a sacrament
9973 is a sign, not only the thing, but the signification of the thing, is required in all sacramental actions; thus it was stated
9974 above (
9975 <a id="XP_Q39_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q32_A2.html">Q[32], A[2]</a>) that in Extreme Unction it is necessary to have a sick man, in order to signify
9976 the need of healing. Accordingly, since it is not possible in the female sex to signify eminence of degree, for a woman is
9977 in the state of subjection, it follows that she cannot receive the sacrament of Order. Some, however, have asserted that the
9978 male sex is necessary for the lawfulness and not for the validity of the sacrament, because even in the Decretals (cap. Mulieres
9979 dist. 32; cap. Diaconissam, 27, qu. i) mention is made of deaconesses and priestesses. But deaconess there denotes a woman
9980 who shares in some act of a deacon, namely who reads the homilies in the Church; and priestess [presbytera] means a widow,
9981 for the word "presbyter" means elder.
9982 </p>
9983 <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p8">
9984 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prophecy is not a sacrament but a gift of God. Wherefore there it is not the signification, but only the thing which is necessary.
9985 And since in matters pertaining to the soul woman does not differ from man as to the thing (for sometimes a woman is found
9986 to be better than many men as regards the soul), it follows that she can receive the gift of prophecy and the like, but not
9987 the sacrament of Orders.
9988 </p>
9989 <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p9"> And thereby appears the Reply to the Second and Third Objections. However, as to abbesses, it is said that they have not
9990 ordinary authority, but delegated as it were, on account of the danger of men and women living together. But Debbora exercised
9991 authority in temporal, not in priestly matters, even as now woman may have temporal power.
9992 </p>
9993 <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p10"></p>
9994 <p id="XP_Q39_A1-p11"></p>
9995 <a href="summa.XP_Q39.html"></a>
9996 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A2.html"></a>
9997 </div>
9998 <div id="XP_Q39_A2" class="div4">
9999 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A1.html"></a>
10000 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A3.html"></a>
10001 <h4 id="XP_Q39_A2-p0.1">Whether boys and those who lack the use of reason can receive Orders?</h4>
10002 <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p1"></p>
10003 <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p2">
10004 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that boys and those who lack the use of reason cannot receive Orders. For, as stated in the text (Sent. iv,
10005 D, 25), the sacred canons have appointed a certain fixed age in those who receive Orders. But this would not be if boys could
10006 receive the sacrament of Orders. Therefore, etc.
10007 </p>
10008 <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p3">
10009 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sacrament of Orders ranks above the sacrament of matrimony. Now children and those who lack the use of reason
10010 cannot contract matrimony. Neither therefore can they receive Orders.
10011 </p>
10012 <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p4">
10013 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, act and power are in the same subject, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vigil. i). Now the act of Orders
10014 requires the use of reason. Therefore the power of Orders does also.
10015 </p>
10016 <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p5">
10017 <b>On the contrary,</b> one who is raised to Orders before the age of discretion is sometimes allowed to exercise them without being reordained,
10018 as appears from Extra., De Cler. per salt. prom. But this would not be the case if he had not received Orders. Therefore a
10019 boy can receive Orders.
10020 </p>
10021 <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p6"> Further, boys can receive other sacraments in which a character is imprinted, namely Baptism and Confirmation. Therefore
10022 in like manner they can receive Orders.
10023 </p>
10024 <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p7">
10025 <b>I answer that,</b> Boyhood and other defects which remove the use of reason occasion an impediment to act. Wherefore the like are unfit to receive
10026 all those sacraments which require an act on the part of the recipient of the sacrament, such as Penance, Matrimony, and so
10027 forth. But since infused powers like natural powers precede acts---although acquired powers follow acts---and the removal
10028 of that which comes after does not entail the removal of what comes first, it follows
10029 that children and those who lack the use of reason can receive all the sacraments in which an act on the part of the recipient
10030 is not required for the validity of the sacrament, but some spiritual power is conferred from above; with this difference,
10031 however, that in the minor orders the age of discretion is required out of respect for the dignity of the sacrament, but not
10032 for its lawfulness, nor for its validity. Hence some can without sin be raised to the minor orders before the years of
10033 discretion, if there be an urgent reason for it and hope of their proficiency. and they are validly ordained; for although
10034 at the time they are not qualified for the offices entrusted to them, they will become qualified by being habituated thereto.
10035 For the higher Orders, however, the use of reason is required both out of respect for, and for the lawfulness of the sacrament,
10036 not only on account of the vow of continency annexed thereto, but also because the handling of the sacraments is entrusted
10037 to them [*See Acts of the Council of Trent: De Reform., Sess. xxii, cap. 4,11,12]. But for the episcopate whereby a man receives
10038 power also over the mystical body, the act of accepting the pastoral care of souls is required; wherefore the use of reason
10039 is necessary for the validity of episcopal consecration. Some, however, maintain that the use of reason is necessary for the
10040 validity of the sacrament in all the Orders. but this statement is not confirmed either by authority or by reason.
10041 </p>
10042 <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p8">
10043 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in the Article, not all that is necessary for the lawfulness of a sacrament is required for its validity.
10044 </p>
10045 <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p9">
10046 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The cause of matrimony is consent, which cannot be without the use of reason. Whereas in the reception of Orders no act is
10047 required on the part of the recipients since no act on their part is expressed in their consecration. Hence there is no comparison.
10048 </p>
10049 <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p10">
10050 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Act and power are in the same subject; yet sometimes a power, such as the free-will, precedes its act; and thus it is in
10051 the case in point.
10052 </p>
10053 <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p11"></p>
10054 <p id="XP_Q39_A2-p12"></p>
10055 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A1.html"></a>
10056 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A3.html"></a>
10057 </div>
10058 <div id="XP_Q39_A3" class="div4">
10059 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A2.html"></a>
10060 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A4.html"></a>
10061 <h4 id="XP_Q39_A3-p0.1">Whether the state of slavery is an impediment to receiving Orders?</h4>
10062 <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p1"></p>
10063 <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p2">
10064 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the state of slavery is not an impediment to receiving Orders. For corporal subjection is not incompatible
10065 with spiritual authority. But in a slave there is corporal subjection. Therefore he is not hindered from receiving the spiritual
10066 authority which is given in orders.
10067 </p>
10068 <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p3">
10069 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is an occasion for humility should not be an impediment to the reception of a sacrament. Now such is
10070 slavery, for the Apostle counsels a man, if possible, rather to remain in slavery (
10071 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.21" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:21</a>). Therefore it should not hinder him from being raised to Orders.
10072 </p>
10073 <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p4">
10074 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is more disgraceful for a cleric to become a slave than for a slave to be made a cleric. Yet a cleric may lawfully
10075 be sold as a slave; for a bishop of Nola, Paulinus, to wit, sold himself as a slave as related by Gregory (Dial. iii). Much
10076 more therefore can a slave be made a cleric.
10077 </p>
10078 <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p5">
10079 <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, It would seem that it is an impediment to the validity of the sacrament. For a woman, on account of her
10080 subjection, cannot receive the sacrament of Orders. But greater still is the subjection in a slave; since woman was not given
10081 to man as his handmaid (for which reason she was not made from his feet). Therefore neither can a slave receive this sacrament.
10082 </p>
10083 <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p6">
10084 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a man, from the fact that he receives an Order, is bound to minister in that Order. But he cannot at the same time
10085 serve his carnal master and exercise his spiritual ministry. Therefore it would seem that he cannot receive Orders, since
10086 the master must be indemnified.
10087 </p>
10088 <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p7">
10089 <b>I answer that,</b> By receiving Orders a man pledges himself to the Divine offices. And since no man can give what is not his, a slave who has
10090 not the disposal of himself, cannot be raised to Orders. If, however, he be raised, he receives the Order, because freedom
10091 is not required for the validity of the sacrament, although it is requisite for its lawfulness, since it hinders not the power,
10092 but the act only. The same reason applies to all who are under an obligation to others,
10093 such as those who are in debt and like persons.
10094 </p>
10095 <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p8">
10096 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reception of spiritual power involves also an obligation to certain bodily actions, and consequently it is hindered by
10097 bodily subjection.
10098 </p>
10099 <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p9">
10100 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man may take an occasion for humility from many other things which do not prove a hindrance to the exercise of Orders.
10101 </p>
10102 <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p10">
10103 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The blessed Paulinus did this out of the abundance of his charity, being led by the spirit of God; as was proved by the result
10104 of his action, since by his becoming a slave, many of his flock were freed from slavery. Hence we must not draw a conclusion
10105 from this particular instance, since "where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (
10106 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:17</a>).
10107 </p>
10108 <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p11">
10109 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sacramental signs signify by reason of their natural likeness. Now a woman is a subject by her nature, whereas a slave
10110 is not. Hence the comparison fails.
10111 </p>
10112 <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p12">
10113 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> If he be ordained, his master knowing and not dissenting, by this very fact he becomes a freedman. But if his master be in
10114 ignorance, the bishop and he who presented him are bound to pay the master double the slave's value, if they knew him to be
10115 a slave. Otherwise if the slave has possessions of his own, he is bound to buy his freedom, else he would have to return to
10116 the bondage of his master, notwithstanding the impossibility of his exercising his
10117 Order.
10118 </p>
10119 <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p13"></p>
10120 <p id="XP_Q39_A3-p14"></p>
10121 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A2.html"></a>
10122 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A4.html"></a>
10123 </div>
10124 <div id="XP_Q39_A4" class="div4">
10125 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A3.html"></a>
10126 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A5.html"></a>
10127 <h4 id="XP_Q39_A4-p0.1">Whether a man should be debarred from receiving Orders on account of homicide?</h4>
10128 <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p1"></p>
10129 <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p2">
10130 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man ought not to be debarred from receiving Orders on account of homicide. Because our Orders originated
10131 with the office of the Levites, as stated in the previous Distinction (Sent. iv, D, 24). But the Levites consecrated their
10132 hands by shedding the blood of their brethren (
10133 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.29" target="asv">Ex. 32:29</a>). Therefore neither should anyone in the New Testament be debarred from receiving Orders on account of the shedding of blood.
10134 </p>
10135 <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p3">
10136 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one should be debarred from a sacrament on account of an act of virtue. Now blood is sometimes shed for justice'
10137 sake, for instance by a judge; and he who has the office would sin if he did not shed it. Therefore he is not hindered on
10138 that account from receiving Orders.
10139 </p>
10140 <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p4">
10141 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, punishment is not due save for a fault. Now sometimes a person commits homicide without fault, for instance by defending
10142 himself, or again by mishap. Therefore he ought not to incur the punishment of irregularity.
10143 </p>
10144 <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p5">
10145 <b>On the contrary,</b> Against this there are many canonical statutes [*Cap. Miror; cap. Clericum; cap. De his Cler., dist. 1; cap. Continebatur,
10146 De homic. volunt.], as also the custom of the Church.
10147 </p>
10148 <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p6">
10149 <b>I answer that,</b> All the Orders bear a relation to the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of the peace vouchsafed to us by
10150 the shedding of Christ's blood. And since homicide is most opposed to peace, and those who slay are conformed to Christ's
10151 slayers rather than to Christ slain, to whom all the ministers of the aforesaid sacrament ought to be conformed, it follows
10152 that it is unlawful, although not invalid, for homicides to be raised to Orders.
10153 </p>
10154 <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p7">
10155 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Old Law inflicted the punishment of blood, whereas the New Law does not. Hence the comparison fails between the ministers
10156 of the Old Testament and those of the New, which is a sweet yoke and a light burden (
10157 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.30" target="asv">Mat. 11:30</a>).
10158 </p>
10159 <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p8">
10160 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irregularity is incurred not only on account of sin, but chiefly on account of a person being unfit to administer the sacrament
10161 of the Eucharist. Hence the judge and all who take part with him in a cause of blood, are irregular, because the shedding
10162 of blood is unbecoming to the ministers of that sacrament.
10163 </p>
10164 <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p9">
10165 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No one does a thing without being the cause thereof, and in man this is something voluntary. Hence he who by mishap slays
10166 a man without knowing that it is a man, is not called a homicide, nor does he incur irregularity (unless he was occupying
10167 himself in some unlawful manner, or failed to take sufficient care, since in this case the slaying becomes somewhat voluntary).
10168 But this is not because he is not in fault, since irregularity is incurred even
10169 without fault. Wherefore even he who in a particular case slays a man in self-defense without committing a sin, is none the
10170 less irregular [*St. Thomas is speaking according to the canon law of his time. This is no longer the case now.].
10171 </p>
10172 <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p10"></p>
10173 <p id="XP_Q39_A4-p11"></p>
10174 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A3.html"></a>
10175 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A5.html"></a>
10176 </div>
10177 <div id="XP_Q39_A5" class="div4">
10178 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A4.html"></a>
10179 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A6.html"></a>
10180 <h4 id="XP_Q39_A5-p0.1">Whether those of illegitimate birth should be debarred from receiving Orders?</h4>
10181 <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p1"></p>
10182 <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p2">
10183 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those who are of illegitimate birth should not be debarred from receiving Orders. For the son should not
10184 bear the iniquity of the father (
10185 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>); and yet he would if this were an impediment to his receiving Orders. Therefore, etc.
10186 </p>
10187 <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p3">
10188 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one's own fault is a greater impediment than the fault of another. Now unlawful intercourse does not always debar
10189 a man from receiving Orders. Therefore neither should he be debarred by the unlawful intercourse of his father.
10190 </p>
10191 <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p4">
10192 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
10193 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.2" target="asv">Dt. 23:2</a>): "A mamzer, that is to say, one born of a prostitute, shall not enter into the Church of the Lord until the tenth generation."
10194 Much less therefore should he be ordained.
10195 </p>
10196 <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p5">
10197 <b>I answer that,</b> Those who are ordained are placed in a position of dignity over others. Hence by a kind of propriety it is requisite that
10198 they should be without reproach, not for the validity but for the lawfulness of the sacrament, namely that they should be
10199 of good repute, bedecked with a virtuous life, and not publicly penitent. And since a man's good name is bedimmed by a sinful
10200 origin, therefore those also who are born of an unlawful union are debarred from receiving
10201 orders, unless they receive a dispensation; and this is the more difficult to obtain, according as their origin is more discreditable.
10202 </p>
10203 <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p6">
10204 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Irregularity is not a punishment due for sin. Hence it is clear that those who are of illegitimate birth do not bear the
10205 iniquity of their father through being irregular.
10206 </p>
10207 <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p7">
10208 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What a man does by his own act can be removed by repentance and by a contrary act; not so the things which are from nature.
10209 Hence the comparison fails between sinful act and sinful origin.
10210 </p>
10211 <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p8"></p>
10212 <p id="XP_Q39_A5-p9"></p>
10213 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A4.html"></a>
10214 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A6.html"></a>
10215 </div>
10216 <div id="XP_Q39_A6" class="div4">
10217 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A5.html"></a>
10218 <a href="summa.XP_Q40.html"></a>
10219 <h4 id="XP_Q39_A6-p0.1">Whether lack of members should be an impediment?</h4>
10220 <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p1"></p>
10221 <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p2">
10222 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man ought not to be debarred from receiving Orders on account of a lack of members. For one who is afflicted
10223 should not receive additional affliction. Therefore a man ought not to be deprived of the degree of Orders on account of his
10224 suffering a bodily defect.
10225 </p>
10226 <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p3">
10227 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, integrity of discretion is more necessary for the act of orders than integrity of body. But some can be ordained
10228 before the years of discretion. Therefore they can also be ordained though deficient in body.
10229 </p>
10230 <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p4">
10231 <b>On the contrary,</b> The like were debarred from the ministry of the Old Law (
10232 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q39_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.21.18" target="asv">Lev. 21:18, </a> seqq.). Much more therefore should they be debarred in the New Law.
10233 </p>
10234 <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p5"> We shall speak of bigamy in the treatise on Matrimony (
10235 <a id="XP_Q39_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q66.html">Q[66])</a>.
10236 </p>
10237 <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p6">
10238 <b>I answer that,</b> As appears from what we have said above (
10239 <a id="XP_Q39_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q39_A3.html">AA[3]</a>,4,5), a man is disqualified from receiving Orders, either on account of an impediment to the act, or on account of an impediment
10240 affecting his personal comeliness. Hence he who suffers from a lack of members is debarred from receiving Orders, if the defect
10241 be such as to cause a notable blemish, whereby a man's comeliness is bedimmed (for instance if his nose be cut off) or the
10242 exercise
10243 of his Order imperilled; otherwise he is not debarred. This integrity, however, is necessary for the lawfulness and not for
10244 the validity of the sacrament.
10245 </p>
10246 <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p7"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
10247 <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p8"></p>
10248 <p id="XP_Q39_A6-p9"></p>
10249 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A5.html"></a>
10250 <a href="summa.XP_Q40.html"></a>
10251 </div>
10252 <a href="summa.XP_Q38_A2.html"></a>
10253 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A1.html"></a>
10254 </div>
10255 <div id="XP_Q40" class="div3">
10256 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A6.html"></a>
10257 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A1.html"></a>
10258 <h3 id="XP_Q40-p0.1">OF THE THINGS ANNEXED TO THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER (SEVEN ARTICLES)</h3>
10259 <p id="XP_Q40-p1"></p>
10260 <p id="XP_Q40-p2"> We must now consider the things that are annexed to the sacrament of Order. Under this head there are seven points of inquiry:</p>
10261 <p id="XP_Q40-p3"> (1) Whether those who are ordained ought to be shaven and tonsured in the form of a crown?</p>
10262 <p id="XP_Q40-p4"> (2) Whether the tonsure is an Order?</p>
10263 <p id="XP_Q40-p5"> (3) Whether by receiving the tonsure one renounces temporal goods?</p>
10264 <p id="XP_Q40-p6"> (4) Whether above the priestly Order there should be an episcopal power?</p>
10265 <p id="XP_Q40-p7"> (5) Whether the episcopate is an Order?</p>
10266 <p id="XP_Q40-p8"> (6) Whether in the Church there can be any power above the episcopate?</p>
10267 <p id="XP_Q40-p9"> (7) Whether the vestments of the ministers are fittingly instituted by the Church?</p>
10268 <div id="XP_Q40_A1" class="div4">
10269 <a href="summa.XP_Q40.html"></a>
10270 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A2.html"></a>
10271 <h4 id="XP_Q40_A1-p0.1">Whether those who are ordained ought to wear the tonsure?</h4>
10272 <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p1"></p>
10273 <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p2">
10274 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those who are ordained ought not to wear the tonsure in the shape of a crown. For the Lord threatened
10275 captivity and dispersion to those who were shaven in this way: "Of the captivity of the bare head of the enemies" (
10276 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.42" target="asv">Dt. 32:42</a>), and: "I will scatter into every wind them that have their hair cut round" (
10277 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.49.32" target="asv">Jer. 49:32</a>). Now the ministers of Christ should not be captives, but free. Therefore shaving and
10278 tonsure in the shape of a crown does not become them.
10279 </p>
10280 <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p3">
10281 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the truth should correspond to the figure. Now the crown was prefigured in the Old Law by the tonsure of the Nazarenes,
10282 as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore since the Nazarenes were not ordained to the Divine ministry, it would
10283 seem that the ministers of the Church should not receive the tonsure or shave the head in the form of a crown. The same would
10284 seem to follow from the fact that lay brothers, who are not ministers of the Church,
10285 receive a tonsure in the religious Orders.
10286 </p>
10287 <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p4">
10288 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the hair signifies superabundance, because it grows from that which is superabundant. But the ministers of the Church
10289 should cast off all superabundance. Therefore they should shave the head completely and not in the shape of a crown.
10290 </p>
10291 <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p5">
10292 <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Gregory, "to serve God is to reign" (Super
10293 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.101.23" target="asv"> Ps. 101:23</a>). Now a crown is the sign of royalty. Therefore a crown is becoming to those who are devoted to the Divine ministry.
10294 </p>
10295 <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p6"> Further, according to
10296 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:15, </a> hair is given us "for a covering." But the ministers of the altar should have the mind uncovered. Therefore the tonsure is
10297 becoming to them.
10298 </p>
10299 <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p7">
10300 <b>I answer that,</b> It is becoming for those who apply themselves to the Divine ministry to be shaven or tonsured in the form of a crown by reason
10301 of the shape. Because a crown is the sign of royalty; and of perfection, since it is circular; and those who are appointed
10302 to the Divine service acquire a royal dignity and ought to be perfect in virtue. It is also becoming to them as it involves
10303 the hair being taken both from the higher part of the head by shaving, lest their mind
10304 be hindered by temporal occupations from contemplating Divine things, and from the lower part by clipping, lest their senses
10305 be entangled in temporal things.
10306 </p>
10307 <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p8">
10308 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Lord threatens those who did this for the worship of demons.
10309 </p>
10310 <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p9">
10311 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The things that were done in the Old Testament represent imperfectly the things of the New Testament. Hence things pertaining
10312 to the ministers of the New Testament were signified not only by the offices of the Levites, but also by all those persons
10313 who professed some degree of perfection. Now the Nazarenes professed a certain perfection by having their hair cut off, thus
10314 signifying their contempt of temporal things, although they did not have it cut
10315 in the shape of a crown, but cut it off completely, for as yet it was not the time of the royal and perfect priesthood. In
10316 like manner lay brothers have their hair cut because they renounce temporalities. but they do not shave the head, because
10317 they are not occupied in the Divine ministry, so as to have to contemplate Divine things with the mind.
10318 </p>
10319 <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p10">
10320 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not only the renunciation of temporalities, but also the royal dignity has to be signified by the form of a crown; wherefore
10321 the hair should not be cut off entirely. Another reason is that this would be unbecoming.
10322 </p>
10323 <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p11"></p>
10324 <p id="XP_Q40_A1-p12"></p>
10325 <a href="summa.XP_Q40.html"></a>
10326 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A2.html"></a>
10327 </div>
10328 <div id="XP_Q40_A2" class="div4">
10329 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A1.html"></a>
10330 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A3.html"></a>
10331 <h4 id="XP_Q40_A2-p0.1">Whether the tonsure is an Order?</h4>
10332 <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p1"></p>
10333 <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p2">
10334 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the tonsure is an Order. For in the acts of the Church the spiritual corresponds to the corporal. Now
10335 the tonsure is a corporal sign employed by the Church. Therefore seemingly there is some interior signification corresponding
10336 thereto; so that a person receives a character when he receives the tonsure, and consequently the latter is an Order.
10337 </p>
10338 <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p3">
10339 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as Confirmation and the other Orders are given by a bishop alone, so is the tonsure. Now a character is imprinted
10340 in Confirmation, and the other Orders. Therefore one is imprinted likewise in receiving the tonsure. Therefore the same conclusion
10341 follows.
10342 </p>
10343 <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p4">
10344 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Order denotes a degree of dignity. Now a cleric by the very fact of being a cleric is placed on a degree above the
10345 people. Therefore the tonsure by which he is made a cleric is an Order.
10346 </p>
10347 <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p5">
10348 <b>On the contrary,</b> No Order is given except during the celebration of Mass. But the tonsure is given even outside the office of the Mass. Therefore
10349 it is not an Order.
10350 </p>
10351 <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p6"> Further, in the conferring of every Order mention is made of some power granted, but not in the conferring of the tonsure.
10352 Therefore it is not an Order.
10353 </p>
10354 <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p7">
10355 <b>I answer that,</b> The ministers of the Church are severed from the people in order that they may give themselves entirely to the Divine worship.
10356 Now in the Divine worship are certain actions that have to be exercised by virtue of certain definite powers, and for this
10357 purpose the spiritual power of order is given; while other actions are performed by the whole body of ministers in common,
10358 for instance the recital of the Divine praises. For such things it is not necessary to
10359 have the power of Order, but only to be deputed to such an office; and this is done by the tonsure. Consequently it is not
10360 an Order but a preamble to Orders.
10361 </p>
10362 <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p8">
10363 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The tonsure has some spiritual thing inwardly corresponding to it, as signate corresponds to sign; but this is not a spiritual
10364 power. Wherefore a character is not imprinted in the tonsure as in an Order.
10365 </p>
10366 <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p9">
10367 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a man does not receive a character in the tonsure, nevertheless he is appointed to the Divine worship. Hence this
10368 appointment should be made by the supreme minister, namely the bishop, who moreover blesses the vestments and vessels and
10369 whatsoever else is employed in the Divine worship.
10370 </p>
10371 <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p10">
10372 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A man through being a cleric is in a higher state than a layman; but as regards power he has not the higher degree that is
10373 required for Orders.
10374 </p>
10375 <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p11"></p>
10376 <p id="XP_Q40_A2-p12"></p>
10377 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A1.html"></a>
10378 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A3.html"></a>
10379 </div>
10380 <div id="XP_Q40_A3" class="div4">
10381 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A2.html"></a>
10382 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A4.html"></a>
10383 <h4 id="XP_Q40_A3-p0.1">Whether by receiving the tonsure a man renounces temporal goods?</h4>
10384 <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p1"></p>
10385 <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p2">
10386 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men renounce temporal goods by receiving the tonsure, for when they are tonsured they say: "The Lord is
10387 the portion of my inheritance." But as Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot.), "the Lord disdains to be made a portion together with
10388 these temporal things." Therefore he renounces temporalities.
10389 </p>
10390 <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p3">
10391 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the justice of the ministers of the New Testament ought to abound more than that of the ministers of the Old Testament
10392 (
10393 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv">Mat. 5:20</a>). But the ministers of the Old Testament, namely the Levites, did not receive a portion of inheritance with their brethren
10394 (
10395 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.10" target="asv">Dt. 10</a>;
10396 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A3-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.18" target="asv">Dt. 18</a>). Therefore neither should the ministers of the New Testament.
10397 </p>
10398 <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p4">
10399 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Hugh says (De Sacram. ii) that "after a man is made a cleric, he must from thenceforward live on the pay of the
10400 Church." But this would not be so were he to retain his patrimony. Therefore he would seem to renounce it by becoming a cleric.
10401 </p>
10402 <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p5">
10403 <b>On the contrary,</b> Jeremias was of the priestly order (
10404 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.1.1" target="asv">Jer. 1:1</a>). Yet he retained possession of his inheritance (
10405 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.32.8" target="asv">Jer. 32:8</a>). Therefore clerics can retain their patrimony.
10406 </p>
10407 <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p6"> Further, if this were not so there would seem to be no difference between religious and the secular clergy.</p>
10408 <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p7">
10409 <b>I answer that,</b> Clerics by receiving the tonsure, do not renounce their patrimony or other temporalities; since the possession of earthly
10410 things is not contrary to the Divine worship to which clerics are appointed, although excessive care for such things is; for
10411 as Gregory says (Moral. x, 30), "it is not wealth but the love of wealth that is sinful."
10412 </p>
10413 <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p8">
10414 <b>Reply to Objection 11:</b> The Lord disdains to be a portion as being loved equally with other things, so that a man place his end in God and the things
10415 of the world. He does not, however, disdain to be the portion of those who so possess the things of the world as not to be
10416 withdrawn thereby from the Divine worship.
10417 </p>
10418 <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p9">
10419 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the Old Testament the Levites had a right to their paternal inheritance; and the reason why they did not receive a portion
10420 with the other tribes was because they were scattered throughout all the tribes, which would have been impossible if, like
10421 the other tribes, they had received one fixed portion of the soil.
10422 </p>
10423 <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p10">
10424 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Clerics promoted to holy orders, if they be poor, must be provided for by the bishop who ordained them; otherwise he is not
10425 so bound. And they are bound to minister to the Church in the Order they have received. The words of Hugh refer to those who
10426 have no means of livelihood.
10427 </p>
10428 <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p11"></p>
10429 <p id="XP_Q40_A3-p12"></p>
10430 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A2.html"></a>
10431 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A4.html"></a>
10432 </div>
10433 <div id="XP_Q40_A4" class="div4">
10434 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A3.html"></a>
10435 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A5.html"></a>
10436 <h4 id="XP_Q40_A4-p0.1">Whether above the priestly Order there ought to be an episcopal power?</h4>
10437 <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p1"></p>
10438 <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p2">
10439 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there ought not to be an episcopal power above the priestly Order. For as stated in the text (Sent. iv,
10440 D, 24) "the priestly Order originated from Aaron." Now in the Old Law there was no one above Aaron. Therefore neither in the
10441 New Law ought there to be any power above that of the priests.
10442 </p>
10443 <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p3">
10444 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, powers rank according to acts. Now no sacred act can be greater than to consecrate the body of Christ, whereunto
10445 the priestly power is directed. Therefore there should not be an episcopal above the priestly power.
10446 </p>
10447 <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p4">
10448 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the priest, in offering, represents Christ in the Church, Who offered Himself for us to the Father. Now no one is
10449 above Christ in the Church, since He is the Head of the Church. Therefore there should not be an episcopal above the priestly
10450 power.
10451 </p>
10452 <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p5">
10453 <b>On the contrary,</b> A power is so much the higher according as it extends to more things. Now the priestly power, according to Dionysius (Eccl.
10454 Hier. v), extends only to cleansing and enlightening, whereas the episcopal power extends both to this and to perfecting.
10455 Therefore the episcopal should be above the priestly power.
10456 </p>
10457 <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p6"> Further, the Divine ministries should be more orderly than human ministries. Now the order of human ministries requires that
10458 in each office there should be one person to preside, just as a general is placed over soldiers. Therefore there should also
10459 be appointed over priests one who is the chief priest, and this is the bishop. Therefore the episcopal should be above the
10460 priestly power.
10461 </p>
10462 <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p7">
10463 <b>I answer that,</b> A priest has two acts: one is the principal, namely to consecrate the body of Christ. the other is secondary, namely to prepare
10464 God's people for the reception of this sacrament, as stated above (
10465 <a id="XP_Q40_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html">Q[37], AA[2]</a>,4). As regards the first act, the priest's power does not depend on a higher power save God's; but as to the second, it depends
10466 on a higher and that a human power. For every power that cannot exercise its act without certain
10467 ordinances, depends on the power that makes those ordinances. Now a priest cannot loose and bind, except we presuppose him
10468 to have the jurisdiction of authority, whereby those whom he absolves are subject to him. But he can consecrate any matter
10469 determined by Christ, nor is anything else required for the validity of the sacrament; although, on account of a certain congruousness,
10470 the act of the bishop is pre-required in the consecration of the altar, vestments, and so forth. Hence it is clear
10471 that it behooves the episcopal to be above the priestly power, as regards the priest's secondary act, but not as regards his
10472 primary act.
10473 </p>
10474 <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p8">
10475 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aaron was both priest and pontiff, that is chief priest. Accordingly the priestly power originated from him, in so far as
10476 he was a priest offering sacrifices, which was lawful even to the lesser priests; but it does not originate from him as pontiff,
10477 by which power he was able to do certain things; for instance, to enter once a year the Holy of Holies, which it was unlawful
10478 for the other priests to do.
10479 </p>
10480 <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p9">
10481 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is no higher power with regard to this act, but with regard to another, as stated above.
10482 </p>
10483 <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p10">
10484 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the perfections of all natural things pre-exist in God as their exemplar, so was Christ the exemplar of all ecclesiastical
10485 offices. Wherefore each minister of the Church is, in some respect, a copy of Christ, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D,
10486 24). Yet he is the higher who represents Christ according to a greater perfection. Now a priest represents Christ in that
10487 He fulfilled a certain ministry by Himself, whereas a bishop represents Him in
10488 that He instituted other ministers and founded the Church. Hence it belongs to a bishop to dedicate a thing to the Divine
10489 offices, as establishing the Divine worship after the manner of Christ. For this reason also a bishop is especially called
10490 the bridegroom of the Church even as Christ is.
10491 </p>
10492 <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p11"></p>
10493 <p id="XP_Q40_A4-p12"></p>
10494 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A3.html"></a>
10495 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A5.html"></a>
10496 </div>
10497 <div id="XP_Q40_A5" class="div4">
10498 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A4.html"></a>
10499 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A6.html"></a>
10500 <h4 id="XP_Q40_A5-p0.1">Whether the episcopate is an Order?</h4>
10501 <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p1"></p>
10502 <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p2">
10503 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the episcopate is an Order. First of all, because Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) assigns these three orders
10504 to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the bishop, the priest, and the minister. In the text also (Sent. iv, D, 24) it is stated
10505 that the episcopal Order is fourfold.
10506 </p>
10507 <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p3">
10508 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Order is nothing else but a degree of power in the dispensing of spiritual things. Now bishops can dispense certain
10509 sacraments which priests cannot dispense, namely Confirmation and Order. Therefore the episcopate is an Order.
10510 </p>
10511 <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p4">
10512 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the Church there is no spiritual power other than of Order or jurisdiction. But things pertaining to the episcopal
10513 power are not matters of jurisdiction, else they might be committed to one who is not a bishop, which is false. Therefore
10514 they belong to the power of Order. Therefore the bishop has an Order which a simple priest has not; and thus the episcopate
10515 is an Order.
10516 </p>
10517 <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p5">
10518 <b>On the contrary,</b> One Order does not depend on a preceding order as regards the validity of the sacrament. But the episcopal power depends
10519 on the priestly power, since no one can receive the episcopal power unless he have previously the priestly power. Therefore
10520 the episcopate is not an Order.
10521 </p>
10522 <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p6"> Further, the greater Orders are not conferred except on Saturdays [*The four Ember Saturdays]. But the episcopal power is
10523 bestowed on Sundays [*Dist. lxxv, can. Ordinationes]. Therefore it is not an Order.
10524 </p>
10525 <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p7">
10526 <b>I answer that,</b> Order may be understood in two ways. In one way as a sacrament, and thus, as already stated (
10527 <a id="XP_Q40_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html">Q[37], AA[2]</a>,4), every Order is directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist. Wherefore since the bishop has not a higher power than the
10528 priest, in this respect the episcopate is not an Order. In another way Order may be considered as an office in relation to
10529 certain sacred actions: and thus since in hierarchical actions a bishop has in
10530 relation to the mystical body a higher power than the priest, the episcopate is an Order. It is in this sense that the authorities
10531 quoted speak.
10532 </p>
10533 <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p8"> Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.</p>
10534 <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p9">
10535 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Order considered as a sacrament which imprints a character is specially directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist, in which
10536 Christ Himself is contained, because by a character we are made like to Christ Himself [*Cf.
10537 <a id="XP_Q40_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q63_A3.html">TP, Q[63], A[3]</a>]. Hence although at his promotion a bishop receives a spiritual power in respect of certain sacraments, this power nevertheless
10538 has not the nature of a character. For this reason the episcopate is
10539 not an Order, in the sense in which an Order is a sacrament.
10540 </p>
10541 <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p10">
10542 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The episcopal power is one not only of jurisdiction but also of Order, as stated above, taking Order in the sense in which
10543 it is generally understood.
10544 </p>
10545 <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p11"></p>
10546 <p id="XP_Q40_A5-p12"></p>
10547 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A4.html"></a>
10548 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A6.html"></a>
10549 </div>
10550 <div id="XP_Q40_A6" class="div4">
10551 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A5.html"></a>
10552 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A7.html"></a>
10553 <h4 id="XP_Q40_A6-p0.1">Whether in the Church there can be anyone above the bishops?</h4>
10554 <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p1"></p>
10555 <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p2">
10556 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be anyone in the Church higher than the bishops. For all the bishops are the successors of
10557 the apostles. Now the power so given to one of the apostles, namely Peter (
10558 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.16.19" target="asv">Mat. 16:19</a>), was given to all the apostles (
10559 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#John.20.23" target="asv">Jn. 20:23</a>). Therefore all bishops are equal, and one is not above another.
10560 </p>
10561 <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p3">
10562 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the rite of the Church ought to be more conformed to the Jewish rite than to that of the Gentiles. Now the distinction
10563 of the episcopal dignity and the appointment of one over another, were introduced by the Gentiles. as stated in the text (Sent.
10564 iv, D, 24); and there was no such thing in the Old Law. Therefore neither in the Church should one bishop be above another.
10565 </p>
10566 <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p4">
10567 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a higher power cannot be conferred by a lower, nor equal by equal, because "without all contradiction that which
10568 is less is blessed by the greater [Vulg.: 'better']"; hence a priest does not consecrate a bishop or a priest, but a bishop
10569 consecrates a priest. But a bishop can consecrate any bishop, since even the bishop of Ostia consecrates the Pope. Therefore
10570 the episcopal dignity is equal in all matters, and consequently one bishop should not be
10571 subject to another, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24).
10572 </p>
10573 <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p5">
10574 <b>On the contrary,</b> We read in the council of Constantinople: "In accordance with the Scriptures and the statutes and definitions of the canons,
10575 we venerate the most holy bishop of ancient Rome the first and greatest of bishops, and after him the bishop of Constantinople."
10576 Therefore one bishop is above another.
10577 </p>
10578 <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p6"> Further, the blessed Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, says: "That we may remain members of our apostolic head, the throne of
10579 the Roman Pontiffs, of whom it is our duty to seek what we are to believe and what we are to hold, venerating him, beseeching
10580 him above others; for his it is to reprove, to correct, to appoint, to loose, and to bind in place of Him Who set up that
10581 very throne, and Who gave the fulness of His own to no other, but to him alone, to whom by divine right all bow
10582 the head, and the primates of the world are obedient as to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself." Therefore bishops are subject to
10583 someone even by divine right.
10584 </p>
10585 <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p7">
10586 <b>I answer that,</b> Wherever there are several authorities directed to one purpose, there must needs be one universal authority over the particular
10587 authorities, because in all virtues and acts the order is according to the order of their ends (Ethic. i, 1,2). Now the common
10588 good is more Godlike than the particular good. Wherefore above the governing power which aims at a particular good there must
10589 be a universal governing power in respect of the common good, otherwise there
10590 would be no cohesion towards the one object. Hence since the whole Church is one body, it behooves, if this oneness is to
10591 be preserved, that there be a governing power in respect of the whole Church, above the episcopal power whereby each particular
10592 Church is governed, and this is the power of the Pope. Consequently those who deny this power are called schismatics as causing
10593 a division in the unity of the Church. Again, between a simple bishop and the Pope there are other degrees of rank
10594 corresponding to the degrees of union, in respect of which one congregation or community includes another; thus the community
10595 of a province includes the community of a city, and the community of a kingdom includes the community of one province, and
10596 the community of the whole world includes the community of one kingdom.
10597 </p>
10598 <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p8">
10599 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the power of binding and loosing was given to all the apostles in common, nevertheless in order to indicate some
10600 order in this power, it was given first of all to Peter alone, to show that this power must come down from him to the others.
10601 For this reason He said to him in the singular: "Confirm thy brethren" (
10602 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.32" target="asv">Lk. 22:32</a>), and: "Feed My sheep" (
10603 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A6-p8.2" href="./asv.html#John.21.17" target="asv">Jn. 21:17</a>), i.e. according to Chrysostom: "Be thou the
10604 president and head of thy brethren in My stead, that they, putting thee in My place, may preach and confirm thee throughout
10605 the world whilst thou sittest on thy throne."
10606 </p>
10607 <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p9">
10608 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Jewish rite was not spread abroad in various kingdoms and provinces, but was confined to one nation; hence there was
10609 no need to distinguish various pontiffs under the one who had the chief power. But the rite of the Church, like that of the
10610 Gentiles, is spread abroad through various nations; and consequently in this respect it is necessary for the constitution
10611 of the Church to be like the rite of the Gentiles rather than that of the Jews.
10612 </p>
10613 <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p10">
10614 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The priestly power is surpassed by the episcopal power, as by a power of a different kind; but the episcopal is surpassed
10615 by the papal power as by a power of the same kind. Hence a bishop can perform every hierarchical act that the Pope can; whereas
10616 a priest cannot perform every act that a bishop can in conferring the sacraments. Wherefore as regards matters pertaining
10617 to the episcopal Order, all bishops are equal, and for this reason any bishop can
10618 consecrate another bishop.
10619 </p>
10620 <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p11"></p>
10621 <p id="XP_Q40_A6-p12"></p>
10622 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A5.html"></a>
10623 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A7.html"></a>
10624 </div>
10625 <div id="XP_Q40_A7" class="div4">
10626 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A6.html"></a>
10627 <a href="summa.XP_Q41.html"></a>
10628 <h4 id="XP_Q40_A7-p0.1">Whether the vestments of the ministers are fittingly instituted in the Church?</h4>
10629 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p1"></p>
10630 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p2">
10631 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the vestments of the ministers are not fittingly instituted in the Church. For the ministers of the New
10632 Testament are more bound to chastity than were the ministers of the Old Testament. Now among the vestments of the Old Testament
10633 there were the breeches as a sign of chastity. Much more therefore should they have a place among the vestments of the Church's
10634 ministers.
10635 </p>
10636 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p3">
10637 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the priesthood of the New Testament is more worthy than the priesthood of the Old. But the priests of the Old Testament
10638 had mitres, which are a sign of dignity. Therefore the priests of the New Testament should also have them.
10639 </p>
10640 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p4">
10641 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the priest is nearer than the episcopal Order to the Orders of ministers. Now the bishop uses the vestments of the
10642 ministers, namely the dalmatic, which is the deacon's vestment, and the tunic, which is the subdeacon's. Much more therefore
10643 should simple priests use them.
10644 </p>
10645 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p5">
10646 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the Old Law the pontiff wore the ephod [*Superhumerale, i.e. over-the-shoulders], which signified the burden
10647 of the Gospel, as Bede observes (De Tabernac. iii). Now this is especially incumbent on our pontiffs. Therefore they ought
10648 to wear the ephod.
10649 </p>
10650 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p6">
10651 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, "Doctrine and Truth" were inscribed on the "rational" which the pontiffs of the Old Testament wore. Now truth was
10652 made known especially in the New Law. Therefore it is becoming to the pontiffs of the New Law.
10653 </p>
10654 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p7">
10655 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the golden plate on which was written the most admirable name of God, was the most admirable of the adornments of
10656 the Old Law. Therefore it should especially have been transferred to the New Law.
10657 </p>
10658 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p8">
10659 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, the things which the ministers of the Church wear outwardly are signs of inward power. Now the archbishop has no
10660 other kind of power than a bishop, as stated above
10661 <a id="XP_Q40_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q40_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. Therefore he should not have the pallium which other bishops have not.
10662 </p>
10663 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p9">
10664 <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, the fulness of power resides in the Roman Pontiff. But he has not a crozier. Therefore other bishops should not
10665 have one.
10666 </p>
10667 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p10">
10668 <b>I answer that,</b> The vestments of the ministers denote the qualifications required of them for handling Divine things. And since certain things
10669 are required of all, and some are required of the higher, that are not so exacted of the lower ministers, therefore certain
10670 vestments are common to all the ministers, while some pertain to the higher ministers only. Accordingly it is becoming to
10671 all the ministers to wear the "amice" which covers the shoulders, thereby signifying
10672 courage in the exercise of the Divine offices to which they are deputed; and the "alb," which signifies a pure life, and the
10673 "girdle," which signifies restraint of the flesh. But the subdeacon wears in addition the "maniple" on the left arm; this
10674 signifies the wiping away of the least stains, since a maniple is a kind of handkerchief for wiping the face; for they are
10675 the first to be admitted to the handling of sacred things. They also have the "narrow tunic," signifying the doctrine of Christ;
10676 wherefore in the Old Law little bells hung therefrom, and subdeacons are the first admitted to announce the doctrine of the
10677 New Law. The deacon has in addition the "stole" over the left shoulder, as a sign that he is deputed to a ministry in the
10678 sacraments themselves, and the "dalmatic" (which is a full vestment, so called because it first came into use in Dalmatia),
10679 to signify that he is the first to be appointed to dispense the sacraments: for he dispenses the blood, and in dispensing
10680 one
10681 should be generous.
10682 </p>
10683 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p11"> But in the case of the priest the "stole" hangs from both shoulders, to show that he has received full power to dispense
10684 the sacraments, and not as the minister of another man, for which reason the stole reaches right down. He also wears the "chasuble,"
10685 which signifies charity, because he it is who consecrates the sacrament of charity, namely the Eucharist.
10686 </p>
10687 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p12"> Bishops have nine ornaments besides those which the priest has; these are the "stockings, sandals, succinctory, tunic, dalmatic,
10688 mitre, gloves, ring, and crozier," because there are nine things which they can, but priests cannot, do, namely ordain clerics,
10689 bless virgins, consecrate bishops, impose hands, dedicate churches, depose clerics, celebrate synods, consecrate chrism, bless
10690 vestments and vessels.
10691 </p>
10692 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p13"> We may also say that the "stockings" signify his upright walk; the "sandals" which cover the feet, his contempt of earthly
10693 things; the "succinctory" which girds the stole with the alb, his love of probity; the "tunic," perseverance, for Joseph is
10694 said (
10695 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q40_A7-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.37.23" target="asv">Gn. 37:23</a>) to have had a long tunic---"talaric," because it reached down to the ankles [talos], which denote the end of life; the "dalmatic,"
10696 generosity in works of mercy; the "gloves," prudence in action; the
10697 "mitre," knowledge of both Testaments, for which reason it has two crests; the "crozier," his pastoral care, whereby he has
10698 to gather together the wayward (this is denoted by the curve at the head of the crozier), to uphold the weak (this is denoted
10699 by the stem of the crozier), and to spur on the laggards (this is denoted by the point at the foot of the crozier). Hence
10700 the line:
10701 </p>
10702 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p14"> "Gather, uphold, spur on</p>
10703 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p15"> The wayward, the weak, and the laggard."</p>
10704 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p16">The "ring" signifies the sacraments of that faith whereby the Church is espoused to Christ. For bishops are espoused to the
10705 Church in the place of Christ. Furthermore archbishops have the "pallium" in sign of their privileged power, for it signifies
10706 the golden chain which those who fought rightfully were wont to receive.
10707 </p>
10708 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p17">
10709 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The priests of the Old Law were enjoined continency only for the time of their attendance for the purpose of their ministry.
10710 Wherefore as a sign of the chastity which they had then to observe, they wore the breeches while offering sacrifices. But
10711 the ministers of the New Testament are enjoined perpetual continency; and so the comparison fails.
10712 </p>
10713 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p18">
10714 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The mitre was not a sign of dignity, for it was a kind of hat, as Jerome says (Ep. ad Fabiol.). But the diadem which was
10715 a sign of dignity was given to the pontiffs alone, as the mitre is now.
10716 </p>
10717 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p19">
10718 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of the ministers resides in the bishop as their source, but not in the priest, for he does not confer those Orders.
10719 Wherefore the bishop, rather than the priest, wears those vestments.
10720 </p>
10721 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p20">
10722 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Instead of the ephod, they wear the stole, which is intended for the same signification as the ephod.
10723 </p>
10724 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p21">
10725 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The pallium takes the place of the "rational."
10726 </p>
10727 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p22">
10728 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Instead of that plate our pontiff wears the cross, as Innocent III says (De Myst. Miss. i), just as the breeches are replaced
10729 by the sandals, the linen garment by the alb, the belt by the girdle, the long or talaric garment by the tunic, the ephod
10730 by the amice, the "rational" by the pallium, the diadem by the mitre.
10731 </p>
10732 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p23">
10733 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> Although he has not another kind of power he has the same power more fully. and so in order to designate this perfection,
10734 he receives the pallium which surrounds him on all sides.
10735 </p>
10736 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p24">
10737 <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> The Roman Pontiff does not use a pastoral staff because Peter sent his to restore to life a certain disciple who afterwards
10738 became bishop of Treves. Hence in the diocese of Treves the Pope carries a crozier but not elsewhere; or else it is a sign
10739 of his not having a restricted power denoted by the curve of the staff.
10740 </p>
10741 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p25"></p>
10742 <p id="XP_Q40_A7-p26"></p>
10743 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A6.html"></a>
10744 <a href="summa.XP_Q41.html"></a>
10745 </div>
10746 <a href="summa.XP_Q39_A6.html"></a>
10747 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A1.html"></a>
10748 </div>
10749 <div id="XP_Q41" class="div3">
10750 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A7.html"></a>
10751 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html"></a>
10752 <h3 id="XP_Q41-p0.1">MATRIMONY (QQ[41]-67)</h3>
10753 <p id="XP_Q41-p1"></p>
10754 <p id="XP_Q41-p2">OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY AS DIRECTED TO AN OFFICE OF NATURE (FOUR ARTICLES)</p>
10755 <p id="XP_Q41-p3"> In the next place we must consider matrimony. We must treat of it (1) as directed to an office of nature; (2) as a sacrament;
10756 (3) as considered absolutely and in itself. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
10757 </p>
10758 <p id="XP_Q41-p4"> (1) Whether it is of natural law?</p>
10759 <p id="XP_Q41-p5"> (2) Whether it is a matter of precept?</p>
10760 <p id="XP_Q41-p6"> (3) Whether its act is lawful?</p>
10761 <p id="XP_Q41-p7"> (4) Whether its act can be meritorious?</p>
10762 <div id="XP_Q41_A1" class="div4">
10763 <a href="summa.XP_Q41.html"></a>
10764 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A2.html"></a>
10765 <h4 id="XP_Q41_A1-p0.1">Whether matrimony is of natural law?</h4>
10766 <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p1"></p>
10767 <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p2">
10768 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that matrimony is not natural. Because "the natural law is what nature has taught all animals" [*Digest. I,
10769 i, de justitia et jure, 1]. But in other animals the sexes are united without matrimony. Therefore matrimony is not of natural
10770 law.
10771 </p>
10772 <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p3">
10773 <b>Objection 1:</b> Further, that which is of natural law is found in all men with regard to their every state. But matrimony was not in every
10774 state of man, for as Tully says (De Inv. Rhet.), "at the beginning men were savages and then no man knew his own children,
10775 nor was he bound by any marriage tie," wherein matrimony consists. Therefore it is not natural.
10776 </p>
10777 <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p4">
10778 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, natural things are the same among all. But matrimony is not in the same way among all, since its practice varies
10779 according to the various laws. Therefore it is not natural.
10780 </p>
10781 <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p5">
10782 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, those things without which the intention of nature can be maintained would seem not to be natural. But nature intends
10783 the preservation of the species by generation which is possible without matrimony, as in the case of fornicators. Therefore
10784 matrimony is not natural.
10785 </p>
10786 <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p6">
10787 <b>On the contrary,</b> At the commencement of the Digests it is stated: "The union of male and female, which we call matrimony, is of natural law."
10788 </p>
10789 <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p7"> Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) says that "man is an animal more inclined by nature to connubial than political
10790 society." But "man is naturally a political and gregarious animal," as the same author asserts (Polit. i, 2). Therefore he
10791 is naturally inclined to connubial union, and thus the conjugal union or matrimony is natural.
10792 </p>
10793 <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p8">
10794 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, as resulting of necessity from the principles of nature; thus upward movement
10795 is natural to fire. In this way matrimony is not natural, nor are any of those things that come to pass at the intervention
10796 or motion of the free-will. Secondly, that is said to be natural to which nature inclines although it comes to pass through
10797 the intervention of the free-will; thus acts of virtue and the virtues themselves are
10798 called natural; and in this way matrimony is natural, because natural reason inclines thereto in two ways. First, in relation
10799 to the principal end of matrimony, namely the good of the offspring. For nature intends not only the begetting of offspring,
10800 but also its education and development until it reach the perfect state of man as man, and that is the state of virtue. Hence,
10801 according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12), we derive three things from our parents, namely "existence,"
10802 "nourishment," and "education." Now a child cannot be brought up and instructed unless it have certain and definite parents,
10803 and this would not be the case unless there were a tie between the man and a definite woman and it is in this that matrimony
10804 consists. Secondly, in relation to the secondary end of matrimony, which is the mutual services which married persons render
10805 one another in household matters. For just as natural reason dictates that men should live together, since one is not
10806 self-sufficient in all things concerning life, for which reason man is described as being naturally inclined to political
10807 society, so too among those works that are necessary for human life some are becoming to men, others to women. Wherefore nature
10808 inculcates that society of man and woman which consists in matrimony. These two reasons are given by the Philosopher (Ethic.
10809 viii, 11,12).
10810 </p>
10811 <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p9">
10812 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man's nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way, because that thing is becoming to the generic nature, and this
10813 is common to all animals; in another way because it is becoming to the nature of the difference, whereby the human species
10814 in so far as it is rational overflows the genus; such is an act of prudence or temperance. And just as the generic nature,
10815 though one in all animals, yet is not in all in the same way, so neither does it incline
10816 in the same way in all, but in a way befitting each one. Accordingly man's nature inclines to matrimony on the part of the
10817 difference, as regards the second reason given above; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12; Polit. i) gives this
10818 reason in men over other animals; but as regards the first reason it inclines on the part of the genus; wherefore he says
10819 that the begetting of offspring is common to all animals. Yet nature does not incline thereto in the same way in all animals;
10820 since
10821 there are animals whose offspring are able to seek food immediately after birth, or are sufficiently fed by their mother;
10822 and in these there is no tie between male and female; whereas in those whose offspring needs the support of both parents,
10823 although for a short time, there is a certain tie, as may be seen in certain birds. In man, however, since the child needs
10824 the parents' care for a long time, there is a very great tie between male and female, to which tie even the generic nature
10825 inclines.
10826 </p>
10827 <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p10">
10828 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The assertion of Tully may be true of some particular nation, provided we understand it as referring to the proximate beginning
10829 of that nation when it became a nation distinct from others; for that to which natural reason inclines is not realized in
10830 all things, and this statement is not universally true, since Holy Writ states that there has been matrimony from the beginning
10831 of the human race.
10832 </p>
10833 <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p11">
10834 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii) "human nature is not unchangeable as the Divine nature is." Hence things that are
10835 of natural law vary according to the various states and conditions of men; although those which naturally pertain to things
10836 Divine nowise vary.
10837 </p>
10838 <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p12">
10839 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nature intends not only being in the offspring, but also perfect being, for which matrimony is necessary, as shown above.
10840 </p>
10841 <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p13"></p>
10842 <p id="XP_Q41_A1-p14"></p>
10843 <a href="summa.XP_Q41.html"></a>
10844 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A2.html"></a>
10845 </div>
10846 <div id="XP_Q41_A2" class="div4">
10847 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html"></a>
10848 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A3.html"></a>
10849 <h4 id="XP_Q41_A2-p0.1">Whether matrimony still comes under a precept?</h4>
10850 <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p1"></p>
10851 <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p2">
10852 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that matrimony still comes under a precept. For a precept is binding so long as it is not recalled. But the
10853 primary institution of matrimony came under a precept, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26); nor do we read anywhere that
10854 this precept was recalled, but rather that it was confirmed (
10855 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.6" target="asv">Mat. 19:6</a>): "What . . . God hath joined together let no man put asunder." Therefore matrimony still comes under a precept.
10856 </p>
10857 <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p3">
10858 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the precepts of natural law are binding in respect of all time. Now matrimony is of natural law, as stated above
10859
10860 <a id="XP_Q41_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore, etc.
10861 </p>
10862 <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p4">
10863 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good of the species is better than the good of the individual, "for the good of the State is more Godlike than
10864 the good of one man" (Ethic. i, 2). Now the precept given to the first man concerning the preservation of the good of the
10865 individual by the act of the nutritive power is still in force. Much more therefore does the precept concerning matrimony
10866 still hold, since it refers to the preservation of the species.
10867 </p>
10868 <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p5">
10869 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where the reason of an obligation remains the same, the obligation must remain the same. Now the reason why men
10870 were bound to marry in olden times was lest the human race should cease to multiply. Since then the result would be the same,
10871 if each one were free to abstain from marriage, it would seem that matrimony comes under a precept.
10872 </p>
10873 <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p6">
10874 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
10875 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.38" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:38</a>): "He that giveth not his virgin in marriage doth better [*Vulg.: 'He that giveth his virgin in marriage doth well, and he
10876 that giveth her not doth better']," namely than he that giveth her in marriage. Therefore the contract of marriage is not
10877 now a matter of precept.
10878 </p>
10879 <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p7"> Further, no one deserves a reward for breaking a precept. Now a special reward, namely the aureole, is due to virgins [*Cf.
10880 <a id="XP_Q41_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q96_A5.html"> Q[96], A[5]</a>]. Therefore matrimony does not come under a precept.
10881 </p>
10882 <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p8">
10883 <b>I answer that,</b> Nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way as to that which is necessary for the perfection of the individual, and
10884 such an obligation is binding on each one, since natural perfections are common to all. In another way it inclines to that
10885 which is necessary for the perfection of the community; and since there are many things of this kind, one of which hinders
10886 another, such an inclination does not bind each man by way of precept; else each man would be
10887 bound to husbandry and building and to such offices as are necessary to the human community; but the inclination of nature
10888 is satisfied by the accomplishment of those various offices by various individuals. Accordingly, since the perfection of the
10889 human community requires that some should devote themselves to the contemplative life to which marriage is a very great obstacle,
10890 the natural inclination to marriage is not binding by way of precept even according to the philosophers. Hence
10891 Theophrastus proves that it is not advisable for a wise man to marry, as Jerome relates (Contra Jovin. i).
10892 </p>
10893 <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p9">
10894 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This precept has not been recalled, and yet it is not binding on each individual, for the reason given above, except at that
10895 time when the paucity of men required each one to betake himself to the begetting of children.
10896 </p>
10897 <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p10"> The Replies to objections 2 and 3 are clear from what has been said.</p>
10898 <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p11">
10899 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Human nature has a general inclination to various offices and acts, as already stated. But since it is variously in various
10900 subjects, as individualized in this or that one, it inclines one subject more to one of those offices, and another subject
10901 more to another, according to the difference of temperament of various individuals. And it is owing to this difference, as
10902 well as to Divine providence which governs all, that one person chooses one office
10903 such as husbandry, and another person another. And so it is too that some choose the married life and some the contemplative.
10904 Wherefore no danger threatens.
10905 </p>
10906 <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p12"></p>
10907 <p id="XP_Q41_A2-p13"></p>
10908 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html"></a>
10909 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A3.html"></a>
10910 </div>
10911 <div id="XP_Q41_A3" class="div4">
10912 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A2.html"></a>
10913 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A4.html"></a>
10914 <h4 id="XP_Q41_A3-p0.1">Whether the marriage act is always sinful?</h4>
10915 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p1"></p>
10916 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p2">
10917 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the marriage act is always sinful. For it is written (
10918 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.29" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:29</a>): "That they . . . who have wives, be as if they had none." But those who are not married do not perform the marriage act.
10919 Therefore even those who are married sin in that act.
10920 </p>
10921 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p3">
10922 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Now the marriage act divides man from God wherefore the
10923 people who were to see God (
10924 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.19.11" target="asv">Ex. 19:11</a>) were commanded not to go near their wives (
10925 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.19.20" target="asv">Ex. 19:20</a>); and Jerome says (Ep. ad Ageruch.: Contra Jovini, 18) that in the marriage act "the Holy Ghost touches not the hearts of
10926 the prophets." Therefore it is sinful.
10927 </p>
10928 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p4">
10929 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is shameful in itself can by no means be well done. Now the marriage act is always connected with concupiscence,
10930 which is always shameful. Therefore it is always sinful.
10931 </p>
10932 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p5">
10933 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing is the object of excuse save sin. Now the marriage act needs to be excused by the marriage blessings, as
10934 the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 26). Therefore it is a sin.
10935 </p>
10936 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p6">
10937 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, things alike in species are judged alike. But marriage intercourse is of the same species as the act of adultery,
10938 since its end is the same, namely the human species. Therefore since the act of adultery is a sin, the marriage act is likewise.
10939 </p>
10940 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p7">
10941 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, excess in the passions corrupts virtue. Now there is always excess of pleasure in the marriage act, so much so that
10942 it absorbs the reason which is man's principal good, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "in that act it
10943 is impossible to understand anything." Therefore the marriage act is always a sin.
10944 </p>
10945 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p8">
10946 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
10947 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:28</a>): "If a virgin marry she hath not sinned," and (
10948 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:14</a>): "I will . . . that the younger should marry," and "bear children." But there can be no bearing of children without carnal
10949 union. Therefore the marriage act is not a sin; else the Apostle would not have approved of it.
10950 </p>
10951 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p9"> Further, no sin is a matter of precept. But the marriage act is a matter of precept (
10952 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:3</a>): "Let the husband render the debt to his life." Therefore it is not a sin.
10953 </p>
10954 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p10">
10955 <b>I answer that,</b> If we suppose the corporeal nature to be created by the good God we cannot hold that those things which pertain to the preservation
10956 of the corporeal nature and to which nature inclines, are altogether evil; wherefore, since the inclination to beget an offspring
10957 whereby the specific nature is preserved is from nature, it is impossible to maintain that the act of begetting children is
10958 altogether unlawful, so that it be impossible to find the mean of virtue
10959 therein; unless we suppose, as some are mad enough to assert, that corruptible things were created by an evil god, whence
10960 perhaps the opinion mentioned in the text is derived (Sent. iv, D, 26); wherefore this is a most wicked heresy.
10961 </p>
10962 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p11">
10963 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By these words the Apostle did not forbid the marriage act, as neither did he forbid the possession of things when he said
10964 (
10965 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:31</a>): "They that use this world" (let them be) "as if they used it not." In each case he forbade enjoyment [*"Fruitionem," i.e.
10966 enjoyment of a thing sought as one's last end]; which is clear from the way in which he expresses himself; for he did not
10967 say "let them not use it," or "let them not have them," but let them be
10968 "as if they used it not" and "as if they had none."
10969 </p>
10970 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p12">
10971 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We are united to God by the habit of grace and by the act of contemplation and love. Therefore whatever severs the former
10972 of these unions is always a sin, but not always that which severs the latter, since a lawful occupation about lower things
10973 distracts the mind so that it is not fit for actual union with God; and this is especially the case in carnal intercourse
10974 wherein the mind is withheld by the intensity of pleasure. For this reason those who
10975 have to contemplate Divine things or handle sacred things are enjoined not to have to do with their wives for that particular
10976 time; and it is in this sense that the Holy Ghost, as regards the actual revelation of hidden things, did not touch the hearts
10977 of the prophets at the time of the marriage act.
10978 </p>
10979 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p13">
10980 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The shamefulness of concupiscence that always accompanies the marriage act is a shamefulness not of guilt, but of punishment
10981 inflicted for the first sin, inasmuch as the lower powers and the members do not obey reason. Hence the argument does not
10982 prove.
10983 </p>
10984 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p14">
10985 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Properly speaking, a thing is said to be excused when it has some appearance of evil, and yet is not evil, or not as evil
10986 as it seems, because some things excuse wholly, others in part. And since the marriage act, by reason of the corruption of
10987 concupiscence, has the appearance of an inordinate act, it is wholly excused by the marriage blessing, so as not to be a sin.
10988 </p>
10989 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p15">
10990 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Although they are the same as to their natural species, they differ as to their moral species, which differs in respect of
10991 one circumstance, namely intercourse with one's wife and with another than one's wife; just as to kill a man by assault or
10992 by justice differentiates the moral species, although the natural species is the same; and yet the one is lawful and the other
10993 unlawful.
10994 </p>
10995 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p16">
10996 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The excess of passions that corrupts virtue not only hinders the act of reason, but also destroys the order of reason. The
10997 intensity of pleasure in the marriage act does not do this, since, although for the moment man is not being directed, he was
10998 previously directed by his reason.
10999 </p>
11000 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p17"></p>
11001 <p id="XP_Q41_A3-p18"></p>
11002 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A2.html"></a>
11003 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A4.html"></a>
11004 </div>
11005 <div id="XP_Q41_A4" class="div4">
11006 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A3.html"></a>
11007 <a href="summa.XP_Q42.html"></a>
11008 <h4 id="XP_Q41_A4-p0.1">Whether the marriage act is meritorious?</h4>
11009 <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p1"></p>
11010 <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p2">
11011 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the marriage act is not meritorious. For Chrysostom [*Hom. i in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed
11012 to St. John Chrysostom] says in his commentary on Matthew: "Although marriage brings no punishment to those who use it, it
11013 affords them no meed." Now merit bears a relation to meed. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.
11014 </p>
11015 <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p3">
11016 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to refrain from what is meritorious deserves not praise. Yet virginity whereby one refrains from marriage is praiseworthy.
11017 Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.
11018 </p>
11019 <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p4">
11020 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he who avails himself of an indulgence granted him, avails himself of a favor received. But a man does not merit
11021 by receiving a favor. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.
11022 </p>
11023 <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p5">
11024 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, merit like virtue, consists in difficulty. But the marriage act affords not difficulty but pleasure. Therefore it
11025 is not meritorious.
11026 </p>
11027 <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p6">
11028 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, that which cannot be done without venial sin is never meritorious, for a man cannot both merit and demerit at the
11029 same time. Now there is always a venial sin in the marriage act, since even the first movement in such like pleasures is a
11030 venial sin. Therefore the aforesaid act cannot be meritorious.
11031 </p>
11032 <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p7">
11033 <b>On the contrary,</b> Every act whereby a precept is fulfilled is meritorious if it be done from charity. Now such is the marriage act, for it
11034 is said (
11035 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q41_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:3</a>): "Let the husband render the debt to his wife." Therefore, etc.
11036 </p>
11037 <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p8"> Further, every act of virtue is meritorious. Now the aforesaid act is an act of justice, for it is called the rendering of
11038 a debt. Therefore it is meritorious.
11039 </p>
11040 <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p9">
11041 <b>I answer that,</b> Since no act proceeding from a deliberate will is indifferent, as stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 40, Q[1], A[3];
11042
11043 <a id="XP_Q41_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A9.html">FS, Q[18], A[9]</a>), the marriage act is always either sinful or meritorious in one who is in a state of grace. For if the motive for the marriage
11044 act be a virtue, whether of justice that they may render the debt, or of religion, that they may beget children for the worship
11045 of God, it is meritorious. But if the
11046 motive be lust, yet not excluding the marriage blessings, namely that he would by no means be willing to go to another woman,
11047 it is a venial sin; while if he exclude the marriage blessings, so as to be disposed to act in like manner with any woman,
11048 it is a mortal sin. And nature cannot move without being either directed by reason, and thus it will be an act of virtue,
11049 or not so directed, and then it will be an act of lust.
11050 </p>
11051 <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p10">
11052 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The root of merit, as regards the essential reward, is charity itself; but as regards an accidental reward, the reason for
11053 merit consists in the difficulty of an act; and thus the marriage act is not meritorious except in the first way.
11054 </p>
11055 <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p11">
11056 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The difficulty required for merit of the accidental reward is a difficulty of labor, but the difficulty required for the
11057 essential reward is the difficulty of observing the mean, and this is the difficulty in the marriage act.
11058 </p>
11059 <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p12">
11060 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> First movements in so far as they are venial sins are movements of the appetite to some inordinate object of pleasure. This
11061 is not the case in the marriage act, and consequently the argument does not prove.
11062 </p>
11063 <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p13"></p>
11064 <p id="XP_Q41_A4-p14"></p>
11065 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A3.html"></a>
11066 <a href="summa.XP_Q42.html"></a>
11067 </div>
11068 <a href="summa.XP_Q40_A7.html"></a>
11069 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html"></a>
11070 </div>
11071 <div id="XP_Q42" class="div3">
11072 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A4.html"></a>
11073 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A1.html"></a>
11074 <h3 id="XP_Q42-p0.1">OF MATRIMONY AS A SACRAMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
11075 <p id="XP_Q42-p1"></p>
11076 <p id="XP_Q42-p2"> We must next consider matrimony as a sacrament. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
11077 <p id="XP_Q42-p3"> (1) Whether matrimony is a sacrament?</p>
11078 <p id="XP_Q42-p4"> (2) Whether it ought to have been instituted before sin was committed?</p>
11079 <p id="XP_Q42-p5"> (3) Whether it confers grace?</p>
11080 <p id="XP_Q42-p6"> (4) Whether carnal intercourse belongs to the integrity of matrimony?</p>
11081 <div id="XP_Q42_A1" class="div4">
11082 <a href="summa.XP_Q42.html"></a>
11083 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A2.html"></a>
11084 <h4 id="XP_Q42_A1-p0.1">Whether matrimony is a sacrament?</h4>
11085 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p1"></p>
11086 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p2">
11087 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that matrimony is not a sacrament. For every sacrament of the New Law has a form that is essential to the sacrament.
11088 But the blessing given by the priest at a wedding is not essential to matrimony. Therefore it is not a sacrament.
11089 </p>
11090 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p3">
11091 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a sacrament according to Hugh (De Sacram. i) is "a material element." But matrimony has not a material element for
11092 its matter. Therefore it is not a sacrament.
11093 </p>
11094 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p4">
11095 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sacraments derive their efficacy from Christ's Passion. But matrimony, since it has pleasure annexed to it,
11096 does not conform man to Christ's Passion, which was painful. Therefore it is not a sacrament.
11097 </p>
11098 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p5">
11099 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every sacrament of the New Law causes that which it signifies. Yet matrimony does not cause the union of Christ
11100 with the Church, which union it signifies. Therefore matrimony is not a sacrament.
11101 </p>
11102 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p6">
11103 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, in the other sacraments there is something which is reality and sacrament. But this is not to be found in matrimony,
11104 since it does not imprint a character, else it would not be repeated. Therefore it is not a sacrament.
11105 </p>
11106 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p7">
11107 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
11108 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q42_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.32" target="asv">Eph. 5:32</a>): "This is a great sacrament." Therefore, etc.
11109 </p>
11110 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p8"> Further, a sacrament is the sign of a sacred thing. But such is Matrimony. Therefore, etc.</p>
11111 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p9">
11112 <b>I answer that,</b> A sacrament denotes a sanctifying remedy against sin offered to man under sensible signs [*Cf.
11113 <a id="XP_Q42_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q61_A1.html">TP, Q[61], A[1]</a>;
11114 <a id="XP_Q42_A1-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q65_A1.html">TP, Q[65], A[1]</a>]. Wherefore since this is the case in matrimony, it is reckoned among the sacraments.
11115 </p>
11116 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p10">
11117 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words whereby the marriage consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament, and not the priest's blessing, which
11118 is a sacramental.
11119 </p>
11120 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p11">
11121 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sacrament of Matrimony, like that of Penance, is perfected by the act of the recipient. Wherefore just as Penance has
11122 no other matter than the sensible acts themselves, which take the place of the material element, so it is in Matrimony.
11123 </p>
11124 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p12">
11125 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although Matrimony is not conformed to Christ's Passion as regards pain, it is as regards charity, whereby He suffered for
11126 the Church who was to be united to Him as His spouse.
11127 </p>
11128 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p13">
11129 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The union of Christ with the Church is not the reality contained in this sacrament, but is the reality signified and not
11130 contained---and no sacrament causes a reality of that kind---but it has another both contained and signified which it causes,
11131 as we shall state further on (ad 5). The Master, however (Sent. iv, D, 26), asserts that it is a non-contained reality, because
11132 he was of opinion that Matrimony has no reality contained therein.
11133 </p>
11134 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p14">
11135 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In this sacrament also those three things [*Cf.
11136 <a id="XP_Q42_A1-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q66_A1.html">TP, Q[66], A[1]</a>] are to be found, for the acts externally apparent are the sacrament only; the bond between husband and wife resulting from
11137 those acts is reality and sacrament; and the ultimate reality contained is the effect of this sacrament, while the non-contained
11138 reality is that which the Master assigns (Sent. iv, D, 26).
11139 </p>
11140 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p15"></p>
11141 <p id="XP_Q42_A1-p16"></p>
11142 <a href="summa.XP_Q42.html"></a>
11143 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A2.html"></a>
11144 </div>
11145 <div id="XP_Q42_A2" class="div4">
11146 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A1.html"></a>
11147 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A3.html"></a>
11148 <h4 id="XP_Q42_A2-p0.1">Whether this sacrament ought to have been instituted before sin was committed?</h4>
11149 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p1"></p>
11150 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p2">
11151 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Matrimony ought not to have been instituted before sin. Because that which is of natural law needs not
11152 to be instituted. Now such is Matrimony, as stated above (
11153 <a id="XP_Q42_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html">Q[41], A[1]</a>). Therefore it ought not to have been instituted.
11154 </p>
11155 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p3">
11156 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sacraments are medicines against the disease of sin. But a medicine is not made ready except for an actual disease.
11157 Therefore it should not have been instituted before sin.
11158 </p>
11159 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p4">
11160 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one institution suffices for one thing. Now Matrimony was instituted also after sin, as stated in the text (Sent.
11161 iv, D, 26). Therefore it was not instituted before sin.
11162 </p>
11163 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p5">
11164 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the institution of a sacrament must come from God. Now before sin, the words relating to Matrimony were not definitely
11165 said by God but by Adam; the words which God uttered (
11166 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q42_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.22" target="asv">Gn. 1:22</a>), "Increase and multiply," were addressed also to the brute creation where there is no marriage. Therefore Matrimony was
11167 not instituted before sin.
11168 </p>
11169 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p6">
11170 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Matrimony is a sacrament of the New Law. But the sacraments of the New Law took their origin from Christ. Therefore
11171 it ought not to have been instituted before sin.
11172 </p>
11173 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p7">
11174 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
11175 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q42_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.4" target="asv">Mat. 19:4</a>): "Have ye not read that He Who made man from the beginning 'made them male and female'"?
11176 </p>
11177 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p8"> Further, Matrimony was instituted for the begetting of children. But the begetting of children was necessary to man before
11178 sin. Therefore it behooved Matrimony to be instituted before sin.
11179 </p>
11180 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p9">
11181 <b>I answer that,</b> Nature inclines to marriage with a certain good in view, which good varies according to the different states of man, wherefore
11182 it was necessary for matrimony to be variously instituted in the various states of man in reference to that good. Consequently
11183 matrimony as directed to the begetting of children, which was necessary even when there was no sin, was instituted before
11184 sin; according as it affords a remedy for the wound of sin, it was instituted after
11185 sin at the time of the natural law; its institution belongs to the Mosaic Law as regards personal disqualifications; and it
11186 was instituted in the New Law in so far as it represents the mystery of Christ's union with the Church, and in this respect
11187 it is a sacrament of the New Law. As regards other advantages resulting from matrimony, such as the friendship and mutual
11188 services which husband and wife render one another, its institution belongs to the civil law. Since, however, a sacrament
11189 is
11190 essentially a sign and a remedy, it follows that the nature of sacrament applies to matrimony as regards the intermediate
11191 institution; that it is fittingly intended to fulfill an office of nature as regards the first institution; and. as regards
11192 the last-mentioned institution, that it is directed to fulfill an office of society.
11193 </p>
11194 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p10">
11195 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things which are of natural law in a general way, need to be instituted as regards their determination which is subject to
11196 variation according to various states; just as it is of natural law that evil-doers be punished, but that such and such a
11197 punishment be appointed for such and such a crime is determined by positive law.
11198 </p>
11199 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p11">
11200 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Matrimony is not only for a remedy against sin, but is chiefly for an office of nature; and thus it was instituted before
11201 sin, not as intended for a remedy.
11202 </p>
11203 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p12">
11204 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no reason why matrimony should not have had several institutions corresponding to the various things that had to
11205 be determined in connection with marriage. Hence these various institutions are not of the same thing in the same respect.
11206 </p>
11207 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p13">
11208 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Before sin matrimony was instituted by God, when He fashioned a helpmate for man out of his rib, and said to them: "Increase
11209 and multiply." And although this was said also to the other animals, it was not to be fulfilled by them in the same way as
11210 by men. As to Adam's words, he uttered them inspired by God to understand that the institution of marriage was from God.
11211 </p>
11212 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p14">
11213 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As was clearly stated, matrimony was not instituted before Christ as a sacrament of the New Law.
11214 </p>
11215 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p15"></p>
11216 <p id="XP_Q42_A2-p16"></p>
11217 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A1.html"></a>
11218 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A3.html"></a>
11219 </div>
11220 <div id="XP_Q42_A3" class="div4">
11221 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A2.html"></a>
11222 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A4.html"></a>
11223 <h4 id="XP_Q42_A3-p0.1">Whether matrimony confers grace?</h4>
11224 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p1"></p>
11225 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p2">
11226 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that matrimony does not confer grace. For, according to Hugh (De Sacram. i) "the sacraments, by virtue of their
11227 sanctification, confer an invisible grace." But matrimony has no sanctification essential to it. Therefore grace is not conferred
11228 therein.
11229 </p>
11230 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p3">
11231 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sacrament that confers grace confers it by virtue of its matter and form. Now the acts which are the matter
11232 in this sacrament are not the cause of grace (for it would be the heresy of Pelagius to assert that our acts cause grace);
11233 and the words expressive of consent are not the cause of grace, since no sanctification results from them. Therefore grace
11234 is by no means given in matrimony.
11235 </p>
11236 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p4">
11237 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the grace that is directed against the wound of sin is necessary to all who have that wound. Now the wound of concupiscence
11238 is to be found in all. Therefore if grace were given in matrimony against the wound of concupiscence, all men ought to contract
11239 marriage, and it would be very stupid to refrain from matrimony.
11240 </p>
11241 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p5">
11242 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sickness does not seek a remedy where it finds aggravation. Now concupiscence is aggravated by concupiscence, because,
11243 according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12), "the desire of concupiscence is insatiable, and is increased by congenial actions."
11244 Therefore it would seem that grace is not conferred in matrimony, as a remedy for concupiscence.
11245 </p>
11246 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p6">
11247 <b>On the contrary,</b> Definition and thing defined should be convertible. Now causality of grace is included in the definition of a sacrament.
11248 Since, then, matrimony is a sacrament, it is a cause of grace.
11249 </p>
11250 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p7"> Further, Augustine says (De Bono Viduit. viii; Gen. ad lit. ix, 7) that "matrimony affords a remedy to the sick." But it
11251 is not a remedy except in so far as it has some efficacy. Therefore it has some efficacy for the repression of concupiscence.
11252 Now concupiscence is not repressed except by grace. Therefore grace is conferred therein.
11253 </p>
11254 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p8">
11255 <b>I answer that,</b> There have been three opinions on this point. For some [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iv, D, 2] said that matrimony is nowise the
11256 cause of grace, but only a sign thereof. But this cannot be maintained, for in that case it would in no respect surpass the
11257 sacraments of the Old Law. Wherefore there would be no reason for reckoning it among the sacraments of the New Law; since
11258 even in the Old Law by the very nature of the act it was able to afford a remedy to
11259 concupiscence lest the latter run riot when held in too strict restraint.
11260 </p>
11261 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p9"> Hence others [*St. Albert Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 26] said that grace is conferred therein as regards the withdrawal from evil,
11262 because the act is excused from sin, for it would be a sin apart from matrimony. But this would be too little, since it had
11263 this also in the Old Law. And so they say that it makes man withdraw from evil, by restraining the concupiscence lest it tend
11264 to something outside the marriage blessings, but that this grace does not enable a man to do good works. But
11265 this cannot be maintained, since the same grace hinders sin and inclines to good, just as the same heat expels cold and gives
11266 heat.
11267 </p>
11268 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p10"> Hence others [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. iv, D, 26] say that matrimony, inasmuch as it is contracted in the faith of Christ,
11269 is able to confer the grace which enables us to do those works which are required in matrimony. and this is more probable,
11270 since wherever God gives the faculty to do a thing, He gives also the helps whereby man is enabled to make becoming use of
11271 that faculty; thus it is clear that to all the soul's powers there correspond bodily members by which they can
11272 proceed to act. Therefore, since in matrimony man receives by Divine institution the faculty to use his wife for the begetting
11273 of children, he also receives the grace without which he cannot becomingly do so; just as we have said of the sacrament of
11274 orders (
11275 <a id="XP_Q42_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q35_A1.html">Q[35], A[1]</a>). And thus this grace which is given is the last thing contained in this sacrament.
11276 </p>
11277 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p11">
11278 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the baptismal water by virtue of its contact with Christ's body [*Cf.
11279 <a id="XP_Q42_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q66_A3.html">TP, Q[66], A[3]</a>, ad 4] is able to "touch the body and cleanse the heart" [*St. Augustine, Tract. lxxx in Joan.], so is matrimony able to
11280 do so through Christ having represented it by His Passion, and not principally through any blessing of the priest.
11281 </p>
11282 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p12">
11283 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the water of Baptism together with the form of words results immediately not in the infusion of grace, but in the
11284 imprinting of the character, so the outward acts and the words expressive of consent directly effect a certain tie which is
11285 the sacrament of matrimony; and this tie by virtue of its Divine institution works dispositively [*Cf.
11286 <a id="XP_Q42_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q18_A1.html"> Q[18], A[1]</a>, where St. Thomas uses the same expression; and Editor's notes at the
11287 beginning of the Supplement and on that Article] to the infusion of grace.
11288 </p>
11289 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p13">
11290 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would hold if no more efficacious remedy could be employed against the disease of concupiscence; but a yet
11291 more powerful remedy is found in spiritual works and mortification of the flesh by those who make no use of matrimony.
11292 </p>
11293 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p14">
11294 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A remedy can be employed against concupiscence in two ways. First, on the part of concupiscence by repressing it in its root,
11295 and thus matrimony affords a remedy by the grace given therein. Secondly, on the part of its act, and this in two ways: first,
11296 by depriving the act to which concupiscence inclines of its outward shamefulness, and this is done by the marriage blessings
11297 which justify carnal concupiscence; secondly, by hindering the shameful act,
11298 which is done by the very nature of the act. because concupiscence, being satisfied by the conjugal act, does not incline
11299 so much to other wickedness. For this reason the Apostle says (
11300 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q42_A3-p14.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:9</a>): "It is better to marry than to burn." For though the works congenial to concupiscence are in themselves of a nature to
11301 increase concupiscence, yet in so far as they are directed according to reason they repress concupiscence, because like acts
11302 result in like dispositions and
11303 habits.
11304 </p>
11305 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p15"></p>
11306 <p id="XP_Q42_A3-p16"></p>
11307 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A2.html"></a>
11308 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A4.html"></a>
11309 </div>
11310 <div id="XP_Q42_A4" class="div4">
11311 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A3.html"></a>
11312 <a href="summa.XP_Q43.html"></a>
11313 <h4 id="XP_Q42_A4-p0.1">Whether carnal intercourse is an integral part of this sacrament?</h4>
11314 <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p1"></p>
11315 <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p2">
11316 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that carnal intercourse is an integral part of marriage. For at the very institution of marriage it was declared
11317 (
11318 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q42_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.24" target="asv">Gn. 2:24</a>): "They shall be two in one flesh." Now this is not brought about save by carnal intercourse. Therefore it is an integral
11319 part of marriage.
11320 </p>
11321 <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p3">
11322 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which belongs to the signification of a sacrament is necessary for the sacrament, as we have stated above
11323 <a id="XP_Q42_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q42_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[9], A[1] ). Now carnal intercourse belongs to the signification of matrimony, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26).
11324 Therefore it is an integral part of the sacrament.
11325 </p>
11326 <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p4">
11327 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this sacrament is directed to the preservation of the species. But the species cannot be preserved without carnal
11328 intercourse. Therefore it is an integral part of the sacrament.
11329 </p>
11330 <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p5">
11331 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Matrimony is a sacrament inasmuch as it affords a remedy against concupiscence; according to the Apostle's saying
11332 (
11333 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q42_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:9</a>): "It is better to marry than to burn." But it does not afford this remedy to those who have no carnal intercourse. Therefore
11334 the same conclusion follows as before.
11335 </p>
11336 <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p6">
11337 <b>On the contrary,</b> There was matrimony in Paradise, and yet there was no carnal intercourse. Therefore carnal intercourse is not an integral
11338 part of matrimony.
11339 </p>
11340 <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p7"> Further, a sacrament by its very name denotes a sanctification. But matrimony is holier without carnal intercourse, according
11341 to the text (Sent. D, 26). Therefore carnal intercourse is not necessary for the sacrament.
11342 </p>
11343 <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p8">
11344 <b>I answer that,</b> Integrity is twofold. One regards the primal perfection consisting in the very essence of a thing; the other regards the
11345 secondary perfection consisting in operation. Since then carnal intercourse is an operation or use of marriage which gives
11346 the faculty for that intercourse, it follows, that carnal intercourse belongs to the latter, and not to the former integrity
11347 of marriage [*Cf.
11348 <a id="XP_Q42_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q29_A2.html">TP, Q[29], A[2]</a> ].
11349 </p>
11350 <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p9">
11351 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adam expressed the integrity of marriage in regard to both perfections, because a thing is known by its operation.
11352 </p>
11353 <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p10">
11354 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Signification of the thing contained is necessary for the sacrament. Carnal intercourse belongs not to this signification,
11355 but to the thing not contained, as appears from what was said above (A[1], ad 4,5).
11356 </p>
11357 <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p11">
11358 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A thing does not reach its end except by its own act. Wherefore, from the fact that the end of matrimony is not attained
11359 without carnal intercourse, it follows that it belongs to the second and not to the first integrity.
11360 </p>
11361 <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p12">
11362 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Before carnal intercourse marriage is a remedy by virtue of the grace given therein, although not by virtue of the act, which
11363 belongs to the second integrity.
11364 </p>
11365 <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p13"></p>
11366 <p id="XP_Q42_A4-p14"></p>
11367 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A3.html"></a>
11368 <a href="summa.XP_Q43.html"></a>
11369 </div>
11370 <a href="summa.XP_Q41_A4.html"></a>
11371 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A1.html"></a>
11372 </div>
11373 <div id="XP_Q43" class="div3">
11374 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A4.html"></a>
11375 <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A1.html"></a>
11376 <h3 id="XP_Q43-p0.1">OF MATRIMONY WITH REGARD TO THE BETROTHAL (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
11377 <p id="XP_Q43-p1"></p>
11378 <p id="XP_Q43-p2"> In the next place we must consider matrimony absolutely; and here we must treat (1) of the betrothal; (2) of the nature of
11379 matrimony; (3) of its efficient cause, namely the consent; (4) of its blessings; (5) of the impediments thereto; (6) of second
11380 marriages; (7) of certain things annexed to marriage.
11381 </p>
11382 <p id="XP_Q43-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
11383 <p id="XP_Q43-p4"> (1) What is the betrothal?</p>
11384 <p id="XP_Q43-p5"> (2) Who can contract a betrothal?</p>
11385 <p id="XP_Q43-p6"> (3) Whether a betrothal can be canceled?</p>
11386 <div id="XP_Q43_A1" class="div4">
11387 <a href="summa.XP_Q43.html"></a>
11388 <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A2.html"></a>
11389 <h4 id="XP_Q43_A1-p0.1">Whether a betrothal is a promise of future marriage?</h4>
11390 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p1"></p>
11391 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p2">
11392 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a betrothal is not rightly defined "a promise of future marriage," as expressed in the words of Pope Nicholas
11393 I (Resp. ad Consul. Bulgar., iii). For as Isidore says (Etym. iv), "a man is betrothed not by a mere promise, but by giving
11394 his troth [spondet] and providing sureties [sponsores]". Now a person is said to be betrothed by reason of his betrothal.
11395 Therefore it is wrongly described as a promise.
11396 </p>
11397 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p3">
11398 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever promises a thing must be compelled to fulfill his promise. But those who have contracted a betrothal are
11399 not compelled by the Church to fulfill the marriage. Therefore a betrothal is not a promise.
11400 </p>
11401 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p4">
11402 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sometimes a betrothal does not consist of a mere promise, but an oath is added, as also certain pledges. Therefore
11403 seemingly it should not be defined as a mere promise.
11404 </p>
11405 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p5">
11406 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, marriage should be free and absolute. But a betrothal is sometimes expressed under a condition even of money to
11407 be received. Therefore it is not fittingly described as a promise of marriage.
11408 </p>
11409 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p6">
11410 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, promising about the future is blamed in
11411 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q43_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.13" target="asv"> James 4:13, </a> seqq. But there should be nothing blameworthy about the sacraments. Therefore one ought not to make a promise of future marriage.
11412 </p>
11413 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p7">
11414 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, no man is called a spouse except on account of his espousals. But a man is said to be a spouse on account of actual
11415 marriage, according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 27). Therefore espousals are not always a promise of future marriage.
11416 </p>
11417 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p8">
11418 <b>I answer that,</b> Consent to conjugal union if expressed in words of the future does not make a marriage, but a promise of marriage; and this
11419 promise is called "a betrothal from plighting one's troth," as Isidore says (Etym. iv). For before the use of writing-tablets,
11420 they used to give pledges of marriage, by which they plighted their mutual consent under the marriage code, and they provided
11421 guarantors. This promise is made in two ways, namely absolutely, or conditionally.
11422 Absolutely, in four ways: firstly, a mere promise, by saying: "I will take thee for my wife," and conversely; secondly, by
11423 giving betrothal pledges, such as money and the like; thirdly, by giving an engagement ring; fourthly, by the addition of
11424 an oath. If, however, this promise be made conditionally, we must draw a distinction; for it is either an honorable condition,
11425 for instance if we say: "I will take thee, if thy parents consent," and then the promise holds if the condition is fulfilled,
11426 and does not hold if the condition is not fulfilled; or else the condition is dishonorable, and this in two ways: for either
11427 it is contrary to the marriage blessings, as if we were to say: "I will take thee if thou promise means of sterility," and
11428 then no betrothal is contracted; or else it is not contrary to the marriage blessings, as were one to say: "I will take thee
11429 if thou consent to my thefts," and then the promise holds, but the condition should be removed.
11430 </p>
11431 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p9">
11432 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The betrothal itself and giving of sureties are a ratification of the promise, wherefore it is denominated from these as
11433 from that which is more perfect.
11434 </p>
11435 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p10">
11436 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By this promise one party is bound to the other in respect of contracting marriage; and he who fulfills not his promise sins
11437 mortally, unless a lawful impediment arise; and the Church uses compulsion in the sense that she enjoins a penance for the
11438 sin. But he is not compelled by sentence of the court, because compulsory marriages are wont to have evil results; unless
11439 the parties be bound by oath, for then he ought to be compelled, in the opinion of
11440 some, although others think differently on account of the reason given above, especially if there be fear of one taking the
11441 other's life.
11442 </p>
11443 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p11">
11444 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such things are added only in confirmation of the promise, and consequently they are not distinct from it.
11445 </p>
11446 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p12">
11447 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The condition that is appended does not destroy the liberty of marriage; for if it be unlawful, it should be renounced; and
11448 if it be lawful, it is either about things that are good simply, as were one to say, "I will take thee, if thy parents consent,"
11449 and such a condition does not destroy the liberty of the betrothal, but gives it an increase of rectitude. or else it is about
11450 things that are useful, as were one to say: "I will marry thee if thou pay
11451 me a hundred pounds," and then this condition is appended, not as asking a price for the consent of marriage, but as referring
11452 to the promise of a dowry; so that the marriage does not lose its liberty. Sometimes, however, the condition appended is the
11453 payment of a sum of money by way of penalty, and then, since marriage should be free, such a condition does not hold, nor
11454 can such a penalty be exacted from a person who is unwilling to fulfill the promise of marriage.
11455 </p>
11456 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p13">
11457 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> James does not intend to forbid altogether the making of promises about the future, but the making of promises as though
11458 one were certain of one's life; hence he teaches that we ought to add the condition. "If the Lord will," which, though it
11459 be not expressed in words, ought nevertheless to be impressed on the heart.
11460 </p>
11461 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p14">
11462 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> In marriage we may consider both the marriage union and the marriage act; and on account of his promise of the first as future
11463 a man is called a "spouse" from his having contracted his espousals by words expressive of the future; but from the promise
11464 of the second a man is called a "spouse," even when the marriage has been contracted by words expressive of the present, because
11465 by this very fact he promises [spondet] the marriage act. However, properly
11466 speaking, espousals are so called from the promise [sponsione] in the first sense, because espousals are a kind of sacramental
11467 annexed to matrimony, as exorcism to baptism.
11468 </p>
11469 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p15"></p>
11470 <p id="XP_Q43_A1-p16"></p>
11471 <a href="summa.XP_Q43.html"></a>
11472 <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A2.html"></a>
11473 </div>
11474 <div id="XP_Q43_A2" class="div4">
11475 <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A1.html"></a>
11476 <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A3.html"></a>
11477 <h4 id="XP_Q43_A2-p0.1">Whether seven years is fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal?</h4>
11478 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p1"></p>
11479 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p2">
11480 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that seven years is not fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal. For a contract that can be formed by others
11481 does not require discretion in those whom it concerns. Now a betrothal can be arranged by the parents without the knowledge
11482 of either of the persons betrothed. Therefore a betrothal can be arranged before the age of seven years as well as after.
11483 </p>
11484 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p3">
11485 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as some use of reason is necessary for the contract of betrothal, so is there for the consent to mortal sin.
11486 Now, as Gregory says (Dial. iv), a boy of five years of age was carried off by the devil on account of the sin of blasphemy.
11487 Therefore a betrothal can take place before the age of seven years.
11488 </p>
11489 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p4">
11490 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a betrothal is directed to marriage. But for marriage the same age is not assigned to boy and girl.
11491 </p>
11492 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p5">
11493 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, one can become betrothed as soon as future marriage can be agreeable to one. Now signs of this agreeableness are
11494 often apparent in boys before the age of seven. Therefore they can become betrothed before that age.
11495 </p>
11496 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p6">
11497 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if persons become betrothed before they are seven years old, and subsequently after the age of seven and before
11498 the age of maturity renew their promise in words expressive of the present, they are reckoned to be betrothed. Now this is
11499 not by virtue of the second contract, since they intend to contract not betrothal but marriage. Therefore it is by the virtue
11500 of the first; and thus espousals can be contracted before the age of seven.
11501 </p>
11502 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p7">
11503 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, when a thing is done by many persons in common, if one fails he is supplied by another, as in the case of those
11504 who row a boat. Now the contract of betrothal is an action common to the contracting parties. Therefore if one be of mature
11505 age, he can contract a betrothal with a girl who is not seven years old, since the lack of age in one is more than counterbalanced
11506 in the other.
11507 </p>
11508 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p8">
11509 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, those who at about the age of puberty, but before it, enter into the marriage contract by words expressive of the
11510 present are reputed to be married. Therefore in like manner if they contract marriage by words expressive of the future, before
11511 yet close on the age of puberty, they are to be reputed as betrothed.
11512 </p>
11513 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p9">
11514 <b>I answer that,</b> The age of seven years is fixed reasonably enough by law for the contracting of betrothals, for since a betrothal is a promise
11515 of the future, as already stated
11516 <a id="XP_Q43_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q43_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it follows that they are within the competency of those who can make a promise in some way, and this is only for those who
11517 can have some foresight of the future, and this requires the use of reason, of which three degrees are to be observed, according
11518 to the
11519 Philosopher (Ethic. i, 4). The first is when a person neither understands by himself nor is able to learn from another; the
11520 second stage is when a man can learn from another but is incapable by himself of consideration and understanding; the third
11521 degree is when a man is both able to learn from another and to consider by himself. And since reason develops in man by little
11522 and little, in proportion as the movement and fluctuation of the humors is calmed, man reaches the first stage of reason
11523 before his seventh year; and consequently during that period he is unfit for any contract, and therefore for betrothal. But
11524 he begins to reach the second stage at the end of his first seven years, wherefore children at that age are sent to school.
11525 But man begins to reach the third stage at the end of his second seven years, as regards things concerning his person, when
11526 his natural reason develops; but as regards things outside his person, at the end of his third seven years. Hence before his
11527 first seven years a man is not fit to make any contract, but at the end of that period he begins to be fit to make certain
11528 promises for the future, especially about those things to which natural reason inclines us more, though he is not fit to bind
11529 himself by a perpetual obligation, because as yet he has not a firm will. Hence at that age betrothals can be contracted.
11530 But at the end of the second seven years he can already bind himself in matters concerning his person, either to religion
11531 or to
11532 wedlock. And after the third seven years he can bind himself in other matters also; and according to the laws he is given
11533 the power of disposing of his property after his twenty-second year.
11534 </p>
11535 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p10">
11536 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the parties are betrothed by another person before they reach the age of puberty, either of them or both can demur; wherefore
11537 in that case the betrothal does not take effect, so that neither does any affinity result therefrom. Hence a betrothal made
11538 between certain persons by some other takes effect, in so far as those between whom the betrothal is arranged do not demur
11539 when they reach the proper age, whence they are understood to consent to what
11540 others have done.
11541 </p>
11542 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p11">
11543 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that the boy of whom Gregory tells this story was not lost, and that he did not sin mortally; and that this vision
11544 was for the purpose of making the father sorrowful, for he had sinned in the boy through failing to correct him. But this
11545 is contrary to the express intention of Gregory, who says (Dial. iv) that "the boy's father having neglected the soul of his
11546 little son, fostered no little sinner for the flames of hell." Consequently it must
11547 be said that for a mortal sin it is sufficient to give consent to something present, whereas in a betrothal the consent is
11548 to something future; and greater discretion of reason is required for looking to the future than for consenting to one present
11549 act. Wherefore a man can sin mortally before he can bind himself to a future obligation.
11550 </p>
11551 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p12">
11552 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Regarding the age for the marriage contract a disposition is required not only on the part of the use of reason, but also
11553 on the part of the body, in that it is necessary to be of an age adapted to procreation. And since a girl becomes apt for
11554 the act of procreation in her twelfth year, and a boy at the end of his second seven years, as the Philosopher says (De Hist.
11555 Anim. vii), whereas the age is the same in both for attaining the use of reason which
11556 is the sole condition for betrothal, hence it is that the one age is assigned for both as regards betrothal, but not as regards
11557 marriage.
11558 </p>
11559 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p13">
11560 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This agreeableness in regard to boys under the age of seven does not result from the perfect use of reason, since they are
11561 not as yet possessed of complete self-control; it results rather from the movement of nature than from any process of reason.
11562 Consequently, this agreeableness does not suffice for contracting a betrothal.
11563 </p>
11564 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p14">
11565 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In this case, although the second contract does not amount to marriage, nevertheless the parties show that they ratify their
11566 former promise; wherefore the first contract is confirmed by the second.
11567 </p>
11568 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p15">
11569 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Those who row a boat act by way of one cause, and consequently what is lacking in one can be supplied by another. But those
11570 who make a contract of betrothal act as distinct persons, since a betrothal can only be between two parties; wherefore it
11571 is necessary for each to be qualified to contract, and thus the defect of one is an obstacle to their betrothal, nor can it
11572 be supplied by the other.
11573 </p>
11574 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p16">
11575 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> It is true that in the matter of betrothal if the contracting parties are close upon the age of seven, the contract of betrothal
11576 is valid, since, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 56), "when little is lacking it seems as though nothing were lacking."
11577 Some fix the margin at six months. but it is better to determine it according to the condition of the contracting parties,
11578 since the use of reason comes sooner to some than to others.
11579 </p>
11580 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p17"></p>
11581 <p id="XP_Q43_A2-p18"></p>
11582 <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A1.html"></a>
11583 <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A3.html"></a>
11584 </div>
11585 <div id="XP_Q43_A3" class="div4">
11586 <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A2.html"></a>
11587 <a href="summa.XP_Q44.html"></a>
11588 <h4 id="XP_Q43_A3-p0.1">Whether a betrothal can be dissolved?</h4>
11589 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p1"></p>
11590 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p2">
11591 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a betrothal cannot be dissolved if one of the parties enter religion. For if I have promised a thing to
11592 someone I cannot lawfully pledge it to someone else. Now he who betroths himself promises his body to the woman. Therefore
11593 he cannot make a further offering of himself to God in religion.
11594 </p>
11595 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p3">
11596 <b>Objection 2:</b> Again, seemingly it should not be dissolved when one of the parties leaves for a distant country, because in doubtful matters
11597 one should always choose the safer course. Now the safer course would be to wait for him. Therefore she is bound to wait for
11598 him.
11599 </p>
11600 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p4">
11601 <b>Objection 3:</b> Again, neither seemingly is it dissolved by sickness contracted after betrothal, for no man should be punished for being
11602 under a penalty. Now the man who contracts an infirmity would be punished if he were to lose his right to the woman betrothed
11603 to him. Therefore a betrothal should not be dissolved on account of a bodily infirmity.
11604 </p>
11605 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p5">
11606 <b>Objection 4:</b> Again, neither seemingly should a betrothal be dissolved on account of a supervening affinity, for instance if the spouse
11607 were to commit fornication with a kinswoman of his betrothed; for in that case the affianced bride would be penalized for
11608 the sin of her affianced spouse, which is unreasonable.
11609 </p>
11610 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p6">
11611 <b>Objection 5:</b> Again, seemingly they cannot set one another free; for it would be a proof of greatest fickleness if they contracted together
11612 and then set one another free; and such conduct ought not to be tolerated by the Church. Therefore, etc.
11613 </p>
11614 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p7">
11615 <b>Objection 6:</b> Again, neither seemingly ought a betrothal to be dissolved on account of the fornication of one of the parties. For a betrothal
11616 does not yet give the one power over the body of the other; wherefore it would seem that they nowise sin against one another
11617 if meanwhile they commit fornication. Consequently a betrothal should not be dissolved on that account.
11618 </p>
11619 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p8">
11620 <b>Objection 7:</b> Again, neither seemingly on account of his contracting with another woman by words expressive of the present. For a subsequent
11621 sale does not void a previous sale. Therefore neither should a second contract void a previous one.
11622 </p>
11623 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p9">
11624 <b>Objection 8:</b> Again, neither seemingly should it be dissolved on account of deficient age; since what is not cannot be dissolved. Now a
11625 betrothal is null before the requisite age. Therefore it cannot be dissolved.
11626 </p>
11627 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p10">
11628 <b>I answer that,</b> In all the cases mentioned above the betrothal that has been contracted is dissolved, but in different ways. For in two of
11629 them---namely when a party enters religion, and when either of the affianced spouses contracts with another party by words
11630 expressive of the present---the betrothal is dissolved by law, whereas in the other cases it has to be dissolved according
11631 to the judgment of the Church.
11632 </p>
11633 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p11">
11634 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The like promise is dissolved by spiritual death, for that promise is purely spiritual, as we shall state further on (
11635 <a id="XP_Q43_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q61_A2.html">Q[61], A[2]</a>).
11636 </p>
11637 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p12">
11638 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This doubt is solved by either party not putting in an appearance at the time fixed for completing the marriage. Wherefore
11639 if it was no fault of that party that the marriage was not completed, he or she can lawfully marry without any sin. But if
11640 he or she was responsible for the non-completion of the marriage, this responsibility involves the obligation of doing penance
11641 for the broken promise---or oath if the promise was confirmed by oath---and he or
11642 she can contract with another if they wish it, subject to the judgment of the Church.
11643 </p>
11644 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p13">
11645 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If either of the betrothed parties incur an infirmity which notably weakens the subject (as epilepsy or paralysis), or causes
11646 a deformity (as loss of the nose or eyes, and the like), or is contrary to the good of the offspring (as leprosy, which is
11647 wont to be transmitted to the children), the betrothal can be dissolved, lest the betrothed be displeasing to one another,
11648 and the marriage thus contracted have an evil result. Nor is one punished for being
11649 under a penalty, although one incurs a loss from one's penalty, and this is not unreasonable.
11650 </p>
11651 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p14">
11652 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If the affianced bridegroom has carnal knowledge of a kinswoman of his spouse, or "vice versa," the betrothal must be dissolved;
11653 and for proof it is sufficient that the fact be the common talk, in order to avoid scandal; for causes whose effects mature
11654 in the future are voided of their effects, not only by what actually is, but also by what happens subsequently. Hence just
11655 as affinity, had it existed at the time of the betrothal, would have prevented
11656 that contract, so, if it supervene before marriage, which is an effect of the betrothal, the previous contract is voided of
11657 its effect. Nor does the other party suffer in consequence, indeed he or she gains, being set free from one who has become
11658 hateful to God by committing fornication.
11659 </p>
11660 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p15">
11661 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Some do not admit this case. Yet they have against them the Decretal (cap. Praeterea, De spons. et matr.) which says expressly:
11662 "Just as those who enter into a contract of fellowship by pledging their faith to one another and afterwards give it back,
11663 so it may be patiently tolerated that those who are betrothed to one another should set one another free." Yet to this they
11664 say that the Church allows this lest worse happen rather than because it is
11665 according to strict law. But this does not seem to agree with the example quoted by the Decretal.
11666 </p>
11667 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p16"> Accordingly we must reply that it is not always a proof of fickleness to rescind an agreement, since "our counsels are uncertain"
11668 (
11669 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q43_A3-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>).
11670 </p>
11671 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p17">
11672 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Although when they become betrothed they have not yet given one another power over one another's body, yet if this [*Referring
11673 to the contention of the Objection] were to happen it would make them suspicious of one another's fidelity; and so one can
11674 ensure himself against the other by breaking off the engagement.
11675 </p>
11676 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p18">
11677 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> This argument would hold if each contract were of the same kind; whereas the second contract of marriage has greater force
11678 than the first, and consequently dissolves it.
11679 </p>
11680 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p19">
11681 <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Although it was not a true betrothal, there was a betrothal of a kind; and consequently, lest approval should seem to be
11682 given when they come to the lawful age, they should seek a dissolution of the betrothal by the judgment of the Church, for
11683 the sake of a good example.
11684 </p>
11685 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p20"></p>
11686 <p id="XP_Q43_A3-p21"></p>
11687 <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A2.html"></a>
11688 <a href="summa.XP_Q44.html"></a>
11689 </div>
11690 <a href="summa.XP_Q42_A4.html"></a>
11691 <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A1.html"></a>
11692 </div>
11693 <div id="XP_Q44" class="div3">
11694 <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A3.html"></a>
11695 <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html"></a>
11696 <h3 id="XP_Q44-p0.1">OF THE DEFINITION OF MATRIMONY (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
11697 <p id="XP_Q44-p1"></p>
11698 <p id="XP_Q44-p2"> We must now consider the nature of matrimony. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
11699 <p id="XP_Q44-p3"> (1) Whether matrimony is a kind of joining?</p>
11700 <p id="XP_Q44-p4"> (2) Whether it is fittingly named?</p>
11701 <p id="XP_Q44-p5"> (3) Whether it is fittingly defined?</p>
11702 <div id="XP_Q44_A1" class="div4">
11703 <a href="summa.XP_Q44.html"></a>
11704 <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A2.html"></a>
11705 <h4 id="XP_Q44_A1-p0.1">Whether matrimony is a kind of joining?</h4>
11706 <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p1"></p>
11707 <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p2">
11708 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that matrimony is not a kind of joining. Because the bond whereby things are tied together differs from their
11709 joining, as cause from effect. Now matrimony is the bond whereby those who are joined in matrimony are tied together. Therefore
11710 it is not a kind of joining.
11711 </p>
11712 <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p3">
11713 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sacrament is a sensible sign. But no relation is a sensible accident. Therefore since matrimony is a sacrament,
11714 it is not a kind of relation, and consequently neither is it a kind of joining.
11715 </p>
11716 <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p4">
11717 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a joining is a relation of equiparance as well as of equality. Now according to Avicenna the relation of equality
11718 is not identically the same in each extreme. Neither therefore is there an identically same joining; and consequently if matrimony
11719 is a kind of joining, there is not only one matrimony between man and wife.
11720 </p>
11721 <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p5">
11722 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is by relation that things are related to one another. Now by matrimony certain things are related to one another; for
11723 the husband is the wife's husband, and the wife is the husband's wife. Therefore matrimony is a kind of relation, nor is it
11724 other than a joining.
11725 </p>
11726 <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p6"> Further, the union of two things into one can result only from their being joined. Now such is the effect of matrimony (
11727 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q44_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.24" target="asv">Gn. 2:24</a>): "They shall be two in one flesh." Therefore matrimony is a kind of joining.
11728 </p>
11729 <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p7">
11730 <b>I answer that,</b> A joining denotes a kind of uniting, and so wherever things are united there must be a joining. Now things directed to one
11731 purpose are said to be united in their direction thereto, thus many men are united in following one military calling or in
11732 pursuing one business, in relation to which they are called fellow-soldiers or business partners. Hence, since by marriage
11733 certain persons are directed to one begetting and upbringing of children, and again to one
11734 family life, it is clear that in matrimony there is a joining in respect of which we speak of husband and wife; and this joining,
11735 through being directed to some one thing, is matrimony; while the joining together of bodies and minds is a result of matrimony.
11736 </p>
11737 <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p8">
11738 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Matrimony is the bond by which they are tied formally, not effectively, and so it need not be distinct from the joining.
11739 </p>
11740 <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p9">
11741 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although relation is not itself a sensible accident, its causes may be sensible. Nor is it necessary in a sacrament for that
11742 which is both reality and sacrament [*Cf.
11743 <a id="XP_Q44_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q66_A1.html">TP, Q[66], A[1]</a>] to be sensible (for such is the relation of the aforesaid joining to this sacrament), whereas the words expressive of consent,
11744 which are sacrament only and are the cause of that same joining, are sensible.
11745 </p>
11746 <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p10">
11747 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A relation is founded on something as its cause---for instance likeness is founded on quality---and on something as its subject---for
11748 instance in the things themselves that are like; and on either hand we may find unity and diversity of relation. Since then
11749 it is not the same identical quality that conduces to likeness, but the same specific quality in each of the like subjects,
11750 and since, moreover, the subjects of likeness are two in number, and the
11751 same applies to equality, it follows that both equality and likeness are in every way numerically distinct in either of the
11752 like or equal subjects. But the relations of matrimony, on the one hand, have unity in both extremes, namely on the part of
11753 the cause, since it is directed to the one identical begetting; whereas on the part of the subject there is numerical diversity.
11754 The fact of this relation having a diversity of subjects is signified by the terms "husband" and "wife," while its unity
11755 is denoted by its being called matrimony.
11756 </p>
11757 <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p11"></p>
11758 <p id="XP_Q44_A1-p12"></p>
11759 <a href="summa.XP_Q44.html"></a>
11760 <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A2.html"></a>
11761 </div>
11762 <div id="XP_Q44_A2" class="div4">
11763 <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html"></a>
11764 <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A3.html"></a>
11765 <h4 id="XP_Q44_A2-p0.1">Whether matrimony is fittingly named?</h4>
11766 <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p1"></p>
11767 <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p2">
11768 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that matrimony is unfittingly named. Because a thing should be named after that which ranks higher. But the
11769 father ranks above the mother. Therefore the union of father and mother should rather be named after the father.
11770 </p>
11771 <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p3">
11772 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing should be named from that which is essential to it, since a "definition expresses the nature signified by
11773 a name" (Metaph. iv, 28). Now nuptials are not essential to matrimony. Therefore matrimony should not be called nuptials.
11774 </p>
11775 <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p4">
11776 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a species cannot take its proper name from that which belongs to the genus. Now a joining [conjunctio] is the genus
11777 of matrimony. Therefore it should not be called a conjugal union.
11778 </p>
11779 <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p5">
11780 <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the common use of speech.
11781 </p>
11782 <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p6">
11783 <b>I answer that,</b> Three things may be considered in matrimony. First, its essence, which is a joining together, and in reference to this it
11784 is called the "conjugal union"; secondly, its cause, which is the wedding, and in reference to this it is called the "nuptial
11785 union" from "nubo" [*The original meaning of 'nubo' is 'to veil'], because at the wedding ceremony, whereby the marriage is
11786 completed, the heads of those who are wedded are covered with a veil [*This is still done
11787 in some countries]; thirdly, the effect, which is the offspring, and in reference to this it is called "matrimony," as Augustine
11788 says (Contra Faust. xix, 26), because "a woman's sole purpose in marrying should be motherhood." Matrimony may also be resolved
11789 into "matris munium" [*i.e. munus], i.e. a mother's duty, since the duty of bringing up the children chiefly devolves on the
11790 women; or into "matrem muniens," because it provides the mother with a protector and support in the person of her
11791 husband; or into "matrem monens," as admonishing her not to leave her husband and take up with another man; or into "materia
11792 unius," because it is a joining together for the purpose of providing the matter of one offspring as though it were derived
11793 from {monos} and "materia"; or into "matre" and "nato," as Isidore says (Etym. ix), because it makes a woman the mother of
11794 a child.
11795 </p>
11796 <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p7">
11797 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the father ranks above the mother, the mother has more to do with the offspring than the father has. or we may say
11798 that woman was made chiefly in order to be man's helpmate in relation to the offspring, whereas the man was not made for this
11799 purpose. Wherefore the mother has a closer relation to the nature of marriage than the father has.
11800 </p>
11801 <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p8">
11802 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sometimes essentials are known by accidentals, wherefore some things can be named even after their accidentals, since a name
11803 is given to a thing for the purpose that it may become known.
11804 </p>
11805 <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p9">
11806 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes a species is named after something pertaining to the genus on account of an imperfection in the species, when namely
11807 it has the generic nature completely, yet adds nothing pertaining to dignity; thus the accidental property retains the name
11808 of property, which is common to it and to the definition. Sometimes, however, it is on account of a perfection, when we find
11809 the generic nature completely in one species and not in another; thus animal is
11810 named from soul [anima], and this belongs to an animate body, which is the genus of animal; yet animation is not found perfectly
11811 in those animate beings that are not animals. It is thus with the case in point. for the joining of husband and wife by matrimony
11812 is the greatest of all joinings, since it is a joining of soul and body, wherefore it is called a "conjugal" union.
11813 </p>
11814 <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p10"></p>
11815 <p id="XP_Q44_A2-p11"></p>
11816 <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html"></a>
11817 <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A3.html"></a>
11818 </div>
11819 <div id="XP_Q44_A3" class="div4">
11820 <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A2.html"></a>
11821 <a href="summa.XP_Q45.html"></a>
11822 <h4 id="XP_Q44_A3-p0.1">Whether matrimony is fittingly defined in the text?</h4>
11823 <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p1"></p>
11824 <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p2">
11825 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that matrimony is unfittingly defined in the text* (Sent. iv, D, 27). [*The definition alluded to is as follows:
11826 "Marriage is the marital union of man and woman involving living together in undivided partnership."] For it is necessary
11827 to mention matrimony in defining a husband, since it is the husband who is joined to the woman in matrimony. Now "marital
11828 union" is put in the definition of matrimony. Therefore in these definitions there would seem
11829 to be a vicious circle.
11830 </p>
11831 <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p3">
11832 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, matrimony makes the woman the man's wife no less than it makes the man the woman's husband. Therefore it should
11833 not be described as a "marital union" rather than an uxorial union.
11834 </p>
11835 <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p4">
11836 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habit [consuetudo] pertains to morals. Yet it often happens that married persons differ very much in habit. Therefore
11837 the words "involving their living together [consuetudinem] in undivided partnership" should have no place in the definition
11838 of matrimony.
11839 </p>
11840 <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p5">
11841 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we find other definitions given of matrimony, for according to Hugh (Sum. Sent. vii, 6), "matrimony is the lawful
11842 consent of two apt persons to be joined together." Also, according to some, "matrimony is the fellowship of a common life
11843 and a community regulated by Divine and human law"; and we ask how these definitions differ.
11844 </p>
11845 <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p6">
11846 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
11847 <a id="XP_Q44_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, three things are to be considered in matrimony, namely its cause, its essence, and its effect; and accordingly we find three
11848 definitions given of matrimony. For the definition of Hugh indicates the cause, namely the consent, and this definition is
11849 self-evident. The definition given in the text indicates the essence of matrimony, namely the "union," and adds determinate
11850 subjects by the words "between lawful
11851 persons." It also points to the difference of the contracting parties in reference to the species, by the word "marital,"
11852 for since matrimony is a joining together for the purpose of some one thing, this joining together is specified by the purpose
11853 to which it is directed, and this is what pertains to the husband [maritum]. It also indicates the force of this joining---for
11854 it is indissoluble---by the words "involving," etc.
11855 </p>
11856 <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p7"> The remaining definition indicates the effect to which matrimony is directed, namely the common life in family matters. And
11857 since every community is regulated by some law, the code according to which this community is directed, namely Divine and
11858 human law, finds a place in this definition. while other communities, such as those of traders or soldiers, are established
11859 by human law alone.
11860 </p>
11861 <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p8">
11862 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes the prior things from which a definition ought to be given are not known to us, and consequently certain things
11863 are defined from things that are posterior simply, but prior to us; thus in the definition of quality the Philosopher employs
11864 the word "such" [quale] when he says (Cap. De Qualitate) that "quality is that whereby we are said to be such." Thus, too,
11865 in defining matrimony we say that it is a "marital union," by which we mean that
11866 matrimony is a union for the purpose of those things required by the marital office, all of which could not be expressed in
11867 one word.
11868 </p>
11869 <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p9">
11870 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated
11871 <a id="XP_Q44_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, this difference indicates the end of the union. And since, according to the Apostle (
11872 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q44_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:9</a>), the "man is not [Vulg.: 'was not created'] for the woman, but the woman for the man," it follows that this difference should
11873 be indicated in reference to the man rather than the woman.
11874 </p>
11875 <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p10">
11876 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the civic life denotes not the individual act of this or that one, but the things that concern the common action
11877 of the citizens, so the conjugal life is nothing else than a particular kind of companionship pertaining to that common action.
11878 wherefore as regards this same life the partnership of married persons is always indivisible, although it is divisible as
11879 regards the act belonging to each party.
11880 </p>
11881 <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p11"> The Reply to the Fourth Objection is clear from what has been said above.</p>
11882 <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p12"></p>
11883 <p id="XP_Q44_A3-p13"></p>
11884 <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A2.html"></a>
11885 <a href="summa.XP_Q45.html"></a>
11886 </div>
11887 <a href="summa.XP_Q43_A3.html"></a>
11888 <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html"></a>
11889 </div>
11890 <div id="XP_Q45" class="div3">
11891 <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A3.html"></a>
11892 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A1.html"></a>
11893 <h3 id="XP_Q45-p0.1">OF THE MARRIAGE CONSENT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
11894 <p id="XP_Q45-p1"></p>
11895 <p id="XP_Q45-p2"> In the next place we have to consider the consent; and the first point to discuss is the consent considered in itself; the
11896 second is the consent confirmed by oath or by carnal intercourse; the third is compulsory consent and conditional consent;
11897 and the fourth is the object of the consent.
11898 </p>
11899 <p id="XP_Q45-p3"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
11900 <p id="XP_Q45-p4"> (1) Whether the consent is the efficient cause of matrimony?</p>
11901 <p id="XP_Q45-p5"> (2) Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words?</p>
11902 <p id="XP_Q45-p6"> (3) Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage?</p>
11903 <p id="XP_Q45-p7"> (4) Whether consent given in words expressive of the present, without inward consent, makes a true marriage outwardly?</p>
11904 <p id="XP_Q45-p8"> (5) Whether consent given secretly in words expressive of the present makes a marriage?</p>
11905 <div id="XP_Q45_A1" class="div4">
11906 <a href="summa.XP_Q45.html"></a>
11907 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A2.html"></a>
11908 <h4 id="XP_Q45_A1-p0.1">Whether consent is the efficient cause of matrimony?</h4>
11909 <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p1"></p>
11910 <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p2">
11911 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent is not the efficient cause of matrimony. For the sacraments depend not on the human will but on
11912 the Divine institution, as shown above (Sent. iv, D, 2;
11913 <a id="XP_Q45_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q64_A2.html">TP, Q[64], A[2]</a>). But consent belongs to the human will. Therefore it is no more the cause of matrimony than of the other sacraments.
11914 </p>
11915 <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p3">
11916 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is its own cause. But seemingly matrimony is nothing else than the consent, since it is the consent which
11917 signifies the union of Christ with the Church.
11918 </p>
11919 <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p4">
11920 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, of one thing there should be one cause. Now there is one marriage between two persons, as stated above (
11921 <a id="XP_Q45_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>); whereas the consents of the two parties are distinct, for they are given by different persons and to different things,
11922 since on the one hand there is consent to take a husband, and on the other hand consent to take a wife. Therefore mutual consent
11923 is not the cause of matrimony.
11924 </p>
11925 <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p5">
11926 <b>On the contrary,</b> Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "It is not coition but consent
11927 that makes a marriage."
11928 </p>
11929 <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p6"> Further, one person does not receive power over that which is at the free disposal of another, without the latter's consent.
11930 Now by marriage each of the married parties receives power over the other's body (
11931 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q45_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:4</a>), whereas hitherto each had free power over his own body. Therefore consent makes a marriage.
11932 </p>
11933 <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p7">
11934 <b>I answer that,</b> In every sacrament there is a spiritual operation by means of a material operation which signifies it; thus in Baptism the
11935 inward spiritual cleansing is effected by a bodily cleansing. Wherefore, since in matrimony there is a kind of spiritual joining
11936 together, in so far as matrimony is a sacrament, and a certain material joining together, in so far as it is directed to an
11937 office of nature and of civil life, it follows that the spiritual joining is the
11938 effect of the Divine power by means of the material joining. Therefore seeing that the joinings of material contracts are
11939 effected by mutual consent, it follows that the joining together of marriage is effected in the same way.
11940 </p>
11941 <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p8">
11942 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first cause of the sacraments is the Divine power which works in them the welfare of the soul; but the second or instrumental
11943 causes are material operations deriving their efficacy from the Divine institution, and thus consent is the cause in matrimony.
11944 </p>
11945 <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p9">
11946 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Matrimony is not the consent itself, but the union of persons directed to one purpose, as stated above (
11947 <a id="XP_Q45_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>), and this union is the effect of the consent. Moreover, the consent, properly speaking, signifies not the union of Christ
11948 with the Church, but His will whereby His union with the Church was brought about.
11949 </p>
11950 <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p10">
11951 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as marriage is one on the part of the object to which the union is directed, whereas it is more than one on the part
11952 of the persons united, so too the consent is one on the part of the thing consented to, namely the aforesaid union, whereas
11953 it is more than one on the part of the persons consenting. Nor is the direct object of consent a husband but union with a
11954 husband on the part of the wife, even as it is union with a wife on the part of the
11955 husband.
11956 </p>
11957 <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p11"></p>
11958 <p id="XP_Q45_A1-p12"></p>
11959 <a href="summa.XP_Q45.html"></a>
11960 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A2.html"></a>
11961 </div>
11962 <div id="XP_Q45_A2" class="div4">
11963 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A1.html"></a>
11964 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A3.html"></a>
11965 <h4 id="XP_Q45_A2-p0.1">Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words?</h4>
11966 <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p1"></p>
11967 <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p2">
11968 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no need for the consent to be expressed in words. For a man is brought under another's power
11969 by a vow just as he is by matrimony. Now a vow is binding in God's sight, even though it be not expressed in words. Therefore
11970 consent also makes a marriage binding even without being expressed in words.
11971 </p>
11972 <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p3">
11973 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there can be marriage between persons who are unable to express their mutual consent in words, through being dumb
11974 or of different languages. Therefore expression of the consent by words is not required for matrimony.
11975 </p>
11976 <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p4">
11977 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if that which is essential to a sacrament be omitted for any reason whatever, there is no sacrament. Now there is
11978 a case of marriage without the expression of words if the maid is silent through bashfulness when her parents give her away
11979 to the bridegroom. Therefore the expression of words is not essential to matrimony.
11980 </p>
11981 <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p5">
11982 <b>On the contrary,</b> Matrimony is a sacrament. Now a sensible sign is required in every sacrament. Therefore it is also required in matrimony,
11983 and consequently there must needs be at least words by which the consent is made perceptible to the senses.
11984 </p>
11985 <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p6"> Further, in matrimony there is a contract between husband and wife. Now in every contract there must be expression of the
11986 words by which men bind themselves mutually to one another. Therefore in matrimony also the consent must be expressed in words.
11987 </p>
11988 <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p7">
11989 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
11990 <a id="XP_Q45_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q45_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the marriage union is effected in the same way as the bond in material contracts. And since material contracts are not feasible
11991 unless the contracting parties express their will to one another in words, it follows that the consent which makes a marriage
11992 must also be expressed in words, so that the expression of words is to marriage what the outward washing is to Baptism.
11993 </p>
11994 <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p8">
11995 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In a vow there is not a sacramental but only a spiritual bond, wherefore there is no need for it to be done in the same way
11996 as material contracts, in order that it be binding, as in the case of matrimony.
11997 </p>
11998 <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p9">
11999 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the like cannot plight themselves to one another in words, they can do so by signs, and such signs count for words.
12000 </p>
12001 <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p10">
12002 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Hugh of S. Victor (Tract. vii, Sum. Sent.), persons who are being married should give their consent by accepting
12003 one another freely. and this is judged to be the case if they show no dissent when they are being wedded. Wherefore in such
12004 a case the words of the parents are taken as being the maid's, for the fact that she does not contradict them is a sign that
12005 they are her words.
12006 </p>
12007 <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p11"></p>
12008 <p id="XP_Q45_A2-p12"></p>
12009 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A1.html"></a>
12010 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A3.html"></a>
12011 </div>
12012 <div id="XP_Q45_A3" class="div4">
12013 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A2.html"></a>
12014 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A4.html"></a>
12015 <h4 id="XP_Q45_A3-p0.1">Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage?</h4>
12016 <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p1"></p>
12017 <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p2">
12018 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage. For as present is to present, so is
12019 future to future. But consent given in words expressive of the present makes a marriage in the present. Therefore consent
12020 given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage in the future.
12021 </p>
12022 <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p3">
12023 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in other civil contracts, just as in matrimony, a certain obligation results from the words expressing consent.
12024 Now in other contracts it matters not whether the obligation is effected by words of the present or of the future tense. Therefore
12025 neither does it make any difference in matrimony.
12026 </p>
12027 <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p4">
12028 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the religious vow man contracts a spiritual marriage with God. Now the religious vow is expressed in words of
12029 the future tense, and is binding. Therefore carnal marriage also can be effected by words of the future tense.
12030 </p>
12031 <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p5">
12032 <b>On the contrary,</b> A man who consents in words of the future tense to take a particular woman as his wife, and after, by words of the present
12033 tense, consents to take another, according to law must take the second for his wife (cap. Sicut ex Litteris, De spons. et
12034 matr.). But this would not be the case if consent given in words of the future tense made a marriage, since from the very
12035 fact that his marriage with the one is valid, he cannot, as long as she lives, marry another.
12036 Therefore consent given in words of the future tense does not make a marriage.
12037 </p>
12038 <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p6"> Further, he who promises to do a certain thing does it not yet. Now he who consents in words of the future tense, promises
12039 to marry a certain woman. Therefore he does not marry her yet.
12040 </p>
12041 <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p7">
12042 <b>I answer that,</b> The sacramental causes produce their effect by signifying it; hence they effect what they signify. Since therefore when a
12043 man expresses his consent by words of the future tense, he does not signify that he is marrying, but promises that he will
12044 marry, it follows that a consent expressed in this manner does not make a marriage, but a promise [sponsionem] of marriage,
12045 and this promise is known as a betrothal [sponsalia].
12046 </p>
12047 <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p8">
12048 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When consent is expressed in words of the present tense, not only are the words actually present, but consent is directed
12049 to the present, so that they coincide in point of time; but when consent is given in words of the future tense, although the
12050 words are actually present, the consent is directed to a future time, and hence they do not coincide in point of time. For
12051 this reason the comparison fails.
12052 </p>
12053 <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p9">
12054 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even in other contracts, a man who uses words referring to the future, does not transfer the power over his property to another
12055 person---for instance if he were to say "I will give thee"---but only when he uses words indicative of the present.
12056 </p>
12057 <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p10">
12058 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the vow of religious profession it is not the spiritual marriage itself that is expressed in words which refer to the
12059 future, but an act of the spiritual marriage, namely obedience or observance of the rule. If, however, a man vow spiritual
12060 marriage in the future, it is not a spiritual marriage, for a man does not become a monk by taking such a vow, but promises
12061 to become one.
12062 </p>
12063 <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p11"></p>
12064 <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p12"></p>
12065 <p id="XP_Q45_A3-p13"></p>
12066 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A2.html"></a>
12067 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A4.html"></a>
12068 </div>
12069 <div id="XP_Q45_A4" class="div4">
12070 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A3.html"></a>
12071 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A5.html"></a>
12072 <h4 id="XP_Q45_A4-p0.1">Whether, in the absence of inward consent, a marriage is made by consent given in words of the present?</h4>
12073 <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p1"></p>
12074 <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p2">
12075 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that even in the absence of inward consent a marriage is made by consent expressed in words of the present.
12076 For "fraud and deceit should benefit no man," according to the law (cap. Ex Tenore, De Rescrip., cap. Si Vir, De cognat. spir.).
12077 Now he who gives consent in words without consenting in heart commits a fraud. Therefore he should not benefit by it, through
12078 being released of the bond of marriage.
12079 </p>
12080 <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p3">
12081 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mental consent of one person cannot be known to another, except in so far as it is expressed in words. If then
12082 the expression of the words is not enough, and inward consent is required in both parties, neither of them will be able to
12083 know that he is truly married to the other; and consequently whenever he uses marriage he will commit fornication.
12084 </p>
12085 <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p4">
12086 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a man is proved to have consented to take a certain woman to wife in words of the present tense, he is compelled
12087 under pain of excommunication to take her as his wife, even though he should say that he was wanting in mental consent, notwithstanding
12088 that afterwards he may have contracted marriage with another woman by words expressive of consent in the present. But this
12089 would not be the case if mental consent were requisite for marriage. Therefore
12090 it is not required.
12091 </p>
12092 <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p5">
12093 <b>On the contrary,</b> Innocent III says in a Decretal (cap. Tua Nos, De Spons. et matr.) in reference to this case: "Other things cannot complete
12094 the marriage bond in the absence of consent."
12095 </p>
12096 <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p6"> Further, intention is necessary in all the sacraments. Now he who consents not in his heart has no intention of contracting
12097 marriage; and therefore he does not contract a marriage.
12098 </p>
12099 <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p7">
12100 <b>I answer that,</b> The outward cleansing stands in the same relation to baptism as the expression of words to this sacrament, as stated above
12101
12102 <a id="XP_Q45_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q45_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Wherefore just as were a person to receive the outward cleansing, with the intention, not of receiving the sacrament, but
12103 of acting in jest or deceit, he would not be baptized; so, too, expression of words without inward consent makes no marriage.
12104 </p>
12105 <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p8">
12106 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are two things here, namely the lack of consent---which benefits him in the tribunal of his conscience so that he is
12107 not bound by the marriage tie, albeit not in the tribunal of the Church where judgment is pronounced according to the evidence---and
12108 the deceit in the words, which does not benefit him, neither in the tribunal of his conscience nor in the tribunal of the
12109 Church, since in both he is punished for this.
12110 </p>
12111 <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p9">
12112 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If mental consent is lacking in one of the parties, on neither side is there marriage, since marriage consists in a mutual
12113 joining together, as stated above (
12114 <a id="XP_Q45_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>). However one may believe that in all probability there is no fraud unless there be evident signs thereof; because we must
12115 presume good of everyone, unless there be proof of the contrary. Consequently the party in whom there is no fraud is excused
12116 from sin on
12117 account of ignorance.
12118 </p>
12119 <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p10">
12120 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In such a case the Church compels him to hold to his first wife, because the Church judges according to outward appearances;
12121 nor is she deceived in justice or right, although she is deceived in the facts of the case. Yet such a man ought to bear the
12122 excommunication rather than return to his first wife; or else he should go far away into another country.
12123 </p>
12124 <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p11"></p>
12125 <p id="XP_Q45_A4-p12"></p>
12126 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A3.html"></a>
12127 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A5.html"></a>
12128 </div>
12129 <div id="XP_Q45_A5" class="div4">
12130 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A4.html"></a>
12131 <a href="summa.XP_Q46.html"></a>
12132 <h4 id="XP_Q45_A5-p0.1">Whether consent given secretly in words of the present makes a marriage?</h4>
12133 <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p1"></p>
12134 <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p2">
12135 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent given secretly in words of the present does not make a marriage. For a thing that is in one person's
12136 power is not transferred to the power of another without the consent of the person in whose power it was. Now the maid is
12137 in her father's power. Therefore she cannot by marriage be transferred to a husband's power without her father's consent.
12138 Wherefore if consent be given secretly, even though it should be expressed in words of the
12139 present, there will be no marriage.
12140 </p>
12141 <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p3">
12142 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in penance, just as in matrimony, our act is as it were essential to the sacrament. But the sacrament of penance
12143 is not made complete except by means of the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments. Therefore neither
12144 can marriage be perfected without the priest's blessing.
12145 </p>
12146 <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p4">
12147 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Church does not forbid baptism to be given secretly, since one may baptize either privately or publicly. But
12148 the Church does forbid the celebration of clandestine marriages (cap. Cum inhibitio, De clandest. despons.). Therefore they
12149 cannot be done secretly.
12150 </p>
12151 <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p5">
12152 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, marriage cannot be contracted by those who are related in the second degree, because the Church has forbidden it.
12153 But the Church has also forbidden clandestine marriages. Therefore they cannot be valid marriages.
12154 </p>
12155 <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p6">
12156 <b>On the contrary,</b> Given the cause the effect follows. Now the sufficient cause of matrimony is consent expressed in words of the present. Therefore
12157 whether this be done in public or in private the result is a marriage.
12158 </p>
12159 <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p7"> Further, wherever there is the due matter and the due form of a sacrament there is the sacrament. Now in a secret marriage
12160 there is the due matter, since there are persons who are able lawfully to contract---and the due form, since there are the
12161 words of the present expressive of consent. Therefore there is a true marriage.
12162 </p>
12163 <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p8">
12164 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as in the other sacraments certain things are essential to the sacrament, and if they are omitted there is no sacrament,
12165 while certain things belong to the solemnization of the sacrament, and if these be omitted the sacrament is nevertheless validly
12166 performed, although it is a sin to omit them; so, too, consent expressed in words of the present between persons lawfully
12167 qualified to contract makes a marriage, because these two conditions are essential to
12168 the sacrament; while all else belongs to the solemnization of the sacrament, as being done in order that the marriage may
12169 be more fittingly performed. Hence if these be omitted it is a true marriage, although the contracting parties sin, unless
12170 they have a lawful motive for being excused. [*Clandestine marriages have since been declared invalid by the Council of Trent
12171 (sess. xxiv). It must be borne in mind that throughout the treatise on marriage St. Thomas gives the Canon Law of his time.]
12172 </p>
12173 <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p9">
12174 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The maid is in her father's power, not as a female slave without power over her own body, but as a daughter, for the purpose
12175 of education. Hence, in so far as she is free, she can give herself into another's power without her father's consent, even
12176 as a son or daughter, since they are free, may enter religion without their parent's consent.
12177 </p>
12178 <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p10">
12179 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In penance our act, although essential to the sacrament, does not suffice for producing the proximate effect of the sacrament,
12180 namely forgiveness of sins, and consequently it is necessary that the act of the priest intervene in order that the sacrament
12181 be perfected. But in matrimony our acts are the sufficient cause for the production of the proximate effect, which is the
12182 marriage bond, because whoever has the right to dispose of himself can bind
12183 himself to another. Consequently the priest's blessing is not required for matrimony as being essential to the sacrament.
12184 </p>
12185 <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p11">
12186 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is also forbidden to receive baptism otherwise than from a priest, except in a case of necessity. But matrimony is not
12187 a necessary sacrament: and consequently the comparison fails. However, clandestine marriages are forbidden on account of the
12188 evil results to which they are liable, since it often happens that one of the parties is guilty of fraud in such marriages;
12189 frequently, too, they have recourse to other nuptials when they repent of having
12190 married in haste; and many other evils result therefrom, besides which there is something disgraceful about them.
12191 </p>
12192 <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p12">
12193 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Clandestine marriages are not forbidden as though they were contrary to the essentials of marriage, in the same way as the
12194 marriages of unlawful persons, who are undue matter for this sacrament; and hence there is no comparison.
12195 </p>
12196 <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p13"></p>
12197 <p id="XP_Q45_A5-p14"></p>
12198 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A4.html"></a>
12199 <a href="summa.XP_Q46.html"></a>
12200 </div>
12201 <a href="summa.XP_Q44_A3.html"></a>
12202 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A1.html"></a>
12203 </div>
12204 <div id="XP_Q46" class="div3">
12205 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A5.html"></a>
12206 <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A1.html"></a>
12207 <h3 id="XP_Q46-p0.1">OF THE CONSENT TO WHICH AN OATH OR CARNAL INTERCOURSE IS APPENDED (TWO ARTICLES) </h3>
12208 <p id="XP_Q46-p1"></p>
12209 <p id="XP_Q46-p2"> We must now consider the consent to which an oath or carnal intercourse is appended. Under this head there are two points
12210 of inquiry:
12211 </p>
12212 <p id="XP_Q46-p3"> (1) Whether an oath added to the consent that is expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage?</p>
12213 <p id="XP_Q46-p4"> (2) Whether carnal intercourse supervening to such a consent makes a marriage?</p>
12214 <div id="XP_Q46_A1" class="div4">
12215 <a href="summa.XP_Q46.html"></a>
12216 <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A2.html"></a>
12217 <h4 id="XP_Q46_A1-p0.1">Whether an oath added to the consent that is expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage?</h4>
12218 <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p1"></p>
12219 <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p2">
12220 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that if an oath be added to a consent that is expressed in words of the future tense it makes a marriage. For
12221 no one can bind himself to act against the Divine Law. But the fulfilling of an oath is of Divine law according to
12222 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q46_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.33" target="asv"> Mat. 5:33, </a> "Thou shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord." Consequently no subsequent obligation can relieve a man of the obligation to
12223 keep an oath previously taken. If, therefore, after consenting to marry a
12224 woman by words expressive of the future and confirming that consent with an oath, a man binds himself to another woman by
12225 words expressive of the present, it would seem that none the less he is bound to keep his former oath. But this would not
12226 be the case unless that oath made the marriage complete. Therefore an oath affixed to a consent expressed in words of the
12227 future tense makes a marriage.
12228 </p>
12229 <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p3">
12230 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Divine truth is stronger than human truth. Now an oath confirms a thing with the Divine truth. Since then words
12231 expressive of consent in the present in which there is mere human truth complete a marriage, it would seem that much more
12232 is this the case with words of the future confirmed by an oath.
12233 </p>
12234 <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p4">
12235 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Apostle (
12236 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q46_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.16" target="asv">Heb. 6:16</a>), "An oath for confirmation is the end of all . . . controversy"; wherefore in a court of justice at any rate one must stand
12237 by an oath rather than by a mere affirmation. Therefore if a man consent to marry a woman by a simple affirmation expressed
12238 in words of the present, after having consented to marry another in words of the future confirmed by oath, it would seem that
12239 in the judgment of the
12240 Church he should be compelled to take the first and not the second as his wife.
12241 </p>
12242 <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p5">
12243 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the simple uttering of words relating to the future makes a betrothal. But the addition of an oath must have some
12244 effect. Therefore it makes something more than a betrothal. Now beyond a betrothal there is nothing but marriage. Therefore
12245 it makes a marriage.
12246 </p>
12247 <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p6">
12248 <b>On the contrary,</b> What is future is not yet. Now the addition of an oath does not make words of the future tense signify anything else than
12249 consent to something future. Therefore it is not a marriage yet.
12250 </p>
12251 <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p7"> Further, after a marriage is complete, no further consent is required for the marriage. But after the oath there is yet another
12252 consent which makes the marriage, else it would be useless to swear to a future marriage. Therefore it does not make a marriage.
12253 </p>
12254 <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p8">
12255 <b>I answer that,</b> An oath is employed in confirmation of one's words; wherefore it confirms that only which is signified by the words, nor
12256 does it change their signification. Consequently, since it belongs to words of the future tense, by their very signification,
12257 not to make a marriage, since what is promised in the future is not done yet, even though an oath be added to the promise,
12258 the marriage is not made yet, as the Master says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 28).
12259 </p>
12260 <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p9">
12261 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The fulfilling of a lawful oath is of Divine law, but not the fulfilling of an unlawful oath. Wherefore if a subsequent obligation
12262 makes that oath unlawful, whereas it was lawful before, he who does not keep the oath he took previously does not disobey
12263 the Divine law. And so it is in the case in point; since he swears unlawfully who promises unlawfully; and a promise about
12264 another's property is unlawful. Consequently the subsequent consent by words of
12265 the present, whereby a man transfers the power over his body to another woman, makes the previous oath unlawful which was
12266 lawful before.
12267 </p>
12268 <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p10">
12269 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Divine truth is most efficacious in confirming that to which it is applied. Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is
12270 clear.
12271 </p>
12272 <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p11">
12273 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The oath has some effect, not by causing a new obligation, but confirming that which is already made, and thus he who violates
12274 it sins more grievously.
12275 </p>
12276 <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p12"></p>
12277 <p id="XP_Q46_A1-p13"></p>
12278 <a href="summa.XP_Q46.html"></a>
12279 <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A2.html"></a>
12280 </div>
12281 <div id="XP_Q46_A2" class="div4">
12282 <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A1.html"></a>
12283 <a href="summa.XP_Q47.html"></a>
12284 <h4 id="XP_Q46_A2-p0.1">Whether carnal intercourse after consent expressed in words of the future makes a marriage?</h4>
12285 <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p1"></p>
12286 <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p2">
12287 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that carnal intercourse after consent expressed in words of the future makes a marriage. For consent by deed
12288 is greater than consent by word. But he who has carnal intercourse consents by deed to the promise he has previously made.
12289 Therefore it would seem that much more does this make a marriage than if he were to consent to mere words referring to the
12290 present.
12291 </p>
12292 <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p3">
12293 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, not only explicit but also interpretive consent makes a marriage. Now there can be no better interpretation of consent
12294 than carnal intercourse. Therefore marriage is completed thereby.
12295 </p>
12296 <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p4">
12297 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all carnal union outside marriage is a sin. But the woman, seemingly, does not sin by admitting her betrothed to
12298 carnal intercourse. Therefore it makes a marriage.
12299 </p>
12300 <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p5">
12301 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "Sin is not forgiven unless restitution be made," as Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.). Now a man cannot reinstate
12302 a woman whom he has violated under the pretense of marriage unless he marry her. Therefore it would seem that even if, after
12303 his carnal intercourse, he happen to contract with another by words of the present tense, he is bound to return to the first;
12304 and this would not be the case unless he were married to her. Therefore carnal
12305 intercourse after consent referring to the future makes a marriage.
12306 </p>
12307 <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p6">
12308 <b>On the contrary,</b> Pope Nicholas I says (Resp. ad Consult. Bulg. iii; Cap. Tuas dudum, De clandest. despons.), "Without the consent to marriage,
12309 other things, including coition, are of no effect."
12310 </p>
12311 <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p7"> Further, that which follows a thing does not make it. But carnal intercourse follows the actual marriage, as effect follows
12312 cause. Therefore it cannot make a marriage.
12313 </p>
12314 <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p8">
12315 <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of marriage in two ways. First, in reference to the tribunal of conscience, and thus in very truth carnal intercourse
12316 cannot complete a marriage the promise of which has previously been made in words expressive of the future, if inward consent
12317 is lacking, since words, even though expressive of the present, would not make a marriage in the absence of mental consent,
12318 as stated above (
12319 <a id="XP_Q46_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q45_A4.html">Q[45], A[4]</a>). Secondly, in reference to
12320 the judgment of the Church; and since in the external tribunal judgment is given in accordance with external evidence, and
12321 since nothing is more expressly significant of consent than carnal intercourse, it follows that in the judgment of the Church
12322 carnal intercourse following on betrothal is declared to make a marriage, unless there appear clear signs of deceit or fraud
12323 [*According to the pre-Tridentine legislation] (De sponsal. et matrim., cap. Is qui fidem).
12324 </p>
12325 <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p9">
12326 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In reality he who has carnal intercourse consents by deed to the act of sexual union, and does not merely for this reason
12327 consent to marriage except according to the interpretation of the law.
12328 </p>
12329 <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p10">
12330 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This interpretation does not alter the truth of the matter, but changes the judgment which is about external things.
12331 </p>
12332 <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p11">
12333 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the woman admit her betrothed, thinking that he wishes to consummate the marriage, she is excused from the sin, unless
12334 there be clear signs of fraud; for instance if they differ considerably in birth or fortune, or some other evident sign appear.
12335 Nevertheless the affianced husband is guilty of fornication, and should be punished for this fraud he has committed.
12336 </p>
12337 <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p12">
12338 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In a case of this kind the affianced husband, before his marriage with the other woman, is bound to marry the one to whom
12339 he was betrothed, if she be his equal or superior in rank. But if he has married another woman, he is no longer able to fulfill
12340 his obligation, wherefore it suffices if he provide for her marriage. Nor is he bound even to do this, according to some,
12341 if her affianced husband is of much higher rank than she, or if there be some
12342 evident sign of fraud, because it may be presumed that in all probability she was not deceived but pretended to be.
12343 </p>
12344 <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p13"></p>
12345 <p id="XP_Q46_A2-p14"></p>
12346 <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A1.html"></a>
12347 <a href="summa.XP_Q47.html"></a>
12348 </div>
12349 <a href="summa.XP_Q45_A5.html"></a>
12350 <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A1.html"></a>
12351 </div>
12352 <div id="XP_Q47" class="div3">
12353 <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A2.html"></a>
12354 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A1.html"></a>
12355 <h3 id="XP_Q47-p0.1">OF COMPULSORY AND CONDITIONAL CONSENT (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
12356 <p id="XP_Q47-p1"></p>
12357 <p id="XP_Q47-p2"> We must now consider compulsory and conditional consent. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
12358 <p id="XP_Q47-p3"> (1) Whether compulsory consent is possible?</p>
12359 <p id="XP_Q47-p4"> (2) Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear?</p>
12360 <p id="XP_Q47-p5"> (3) Whether compulsory consent invalidates marriage?</p>
12361 <p id="XP_Q47-p6"> (4) Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party using compulsion?</p>
12362 <p id="XP_Q47-p7"> (5) Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?</p>
12363 <p id="XP_Q47-p8"> (6) Whether one can be compelled by one's father to marry?</p>
12364 <div id="XP_Q47_A1" class="div4">
12365 <a href="summa.XP_Q47.html"></a>
12366 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A2.html"></a>
12367 <h4 id="XP_Q47_A1-p0.1">Whether a compulsory consent is possible?</h4>
12368 <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p1"></p>
12369 <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p2">
12370 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no consent can be compulsory. For, as stated above (Sent. ii, D, 25 [*
12371 <a id="XP_Q47_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A4.html">FS, Q[6], A[4]</a>]) the free-will cannot be compelled. Now consent is an act of the free-will. Therefore it cannot be compulsory.
12372 </p>
12373 <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p3">
12374 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, violent is the same as compulsory. Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), "a violent action is one the
12375 principle of which is without, the patient concurring not at all." But the principle of consent is always within. Therefore
12376 no consent can be compulsory.
12377 </p>
12378 <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p4">
12379 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is perfected by consent. But that which perfects a sin cannot be compulsory, for, according to Augustine
12380 (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18), "no one sins in what he cannot avoid." Since then violence is defined by jurists (i, ff. de eo quod
12381 vi metusve) as the "force of a stronger being that cannot be repulsed," it would seem that consent cannot be compulsory or
12382 violent.
12383 </p>
12384 <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p5">
12385 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, power is opposed to liberty. But compulsion is allied to power, as appears from a definition of Tully's in which
12386 he says that "compulsion is the force of one who exercises his power to detain a thing outside its proper bounds." Therefore
12387 the free-will cannot be compelled, and consequently neither can consent which is an act thereof.
12388 </p>
12389 <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p6">
12390 <b>On the contrary,</b> That which cannot be, cannot be an impediment. But compulsory consent is an impediment to matrimony, as stated in the text
12391 (Sent. iv, D, 29). Therefore consent can be compelled.
12392 </p>
12393 <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p7"> Further, in marriage there is a contract. Now the will can be compelled in the matter of contracts; for which reason the
12394 law adjudges that restitution should be made of the whole, for it does not ratify "that which was done under compulsion or
12395 fear" (Sent. iv, D[29]). Therefore in marriage also it is possible for the consent to be compulsory.
12396 </p>
12397 <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p8">
12398 <b>I answer that,</b> Compulsion or violence is twofold. One is the cause of absolute necessity, and violence of this kind the Philosopher calls
12399 (Ethic. iii, 1) "violent simply," as when by bodily strength one forces a person to move; the other causes conditional necessity,
12400 and the Philosopher calls this a "mixed violence," as when a person throws his merchandise overboard in order to save himself.
12401 In the latter kind of violence, although the thing done is not voluntary in
12402 itself, yet taking into consideration the circumstances of place and time it is voluntary. And since actions are about particulars,
12403 it follows that it is voluntary simply, and involuntary in a certain respect (Cf.
12404 <a id="XP_Q47_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A6.html">FS, Q[6], A[6]</a>). Wherefore this latter violence or compulsion is consistent with consent, but not the former. And since this compulsion
12405 results from one's fear of a threatening danger, it follows that this violence coincides with fear which, in a manner,
12406 compels the will, whereas the former violence has to do with bodily actions. Moreover, since the law considers not merely
12407 internal actions, but rather external actions, consequently it takes violence to mean absolute compulsion, for which reason
12408 it draws a distinction between violence and fear. Here, however, it is a question of internal consent which cannot be influenced
12409 by compulsion or violence as distinct from fear. Therefore as to the question at issue compulsion and fear are the same.
12410 Now, according to lawyers fear is "the agitation of the mind occasioned by danger imminent or future" (Ethic. iii, 1).
12411 </p>
12412 <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for the first set of arguments consider the first kind of compulsion, and
12413 the second set of arguments consider the second.
12414 </p>
12415 <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p10"></p>
12416 <p id="XP_Q47_A1-p11"></p>
12417 <a href="summa.XP_Q47.html"></a>
12418 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A2.html"></a>
12419 </div>
12420 <div id="XP_Q47_A2" class="div4">
12421 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A1.html"></a>
12422 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A3.html"></a>
12423 <h4 id="XP_Q47_A2-p0.1">Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear?</h4>
12424 <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p1"></p>
12425 <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p2">
12426 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "a constant man" [*Cap. Ad audientiam, De his quae vi.] cannot be compelled by fear. Because the nature
12427 of a constant man is not to be agitated in the midst of dangers. Since then fear is "agitation of the mind occasioned by imminent
12428 danger," it would seem that he is not compelled by fear.
12429 </p>
12430 <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p3">
12431 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Of all fearsome things death is the limit," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), as though it were the
12432 most perfect of all things that inspire fear. But the constant man is not compelled by death, since the brave face even mortal
12433 dangers. Therefore no fear influences a constant man.
12434 </p>
12435 <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p4">
12436 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, of all dangers a good man fears most that which affects his good name. But the fear of disgrace is not reckoned
12437 to influence a constant man, because, according to the law (vii, ff, de eo quod metus, etc.), "fear of disgrace is not included
12438 under the ordinance, 'That which is done through fear'" [*Dig. iv, 2, Quod metus causa]. Therefore neither does any other
12439 kind of fear influence a constant man.
12440 </p>
12441 <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p5">
12442 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in him who is compelled by fear, fear leaves a sin, for it makes him promise what he is unwilling to fulfill, and
12443 thus it makes him lie. But a constant man does not commit a sin, not even a very slight one, for fear. Therefore no fear influences
12444 a constant man.
12445 </p>
12446 <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p6">
12447 <b>On the contrary,</b> Abraham and Isaac were constant. Yet they were influenced by fear, since on account of fear each said that his wife was his
12448 sister (
12449 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q47_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.12.12" target="asv">Gn. 12:12</a>; 26:7).
12450 </p>
12451 <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p7"> Further, wherever there is mixed violence, it is fear that compels. But however constant a man may be he may suffer violence
12452 of that kind, for if he be on the sea, he will throw his merchandise overboard if menaced with shipwreck. Therefore fear can
12453 influence a constant man.
12454 </p>
12455 <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p8">
12456 <b>I answer that,</b> By fear influencing a man we mean his being compelled by fear. A man is compelled by fear when he does that which otherwise
12457 he would not wish to do, in order to avoid that which he fears. Now the constant differs from the inconstant man in two respects.
12458 First, in respect of the quality of the danger feared, because the constant man follows right reason, whereby he knows whether
12459 to omit this rather than that, and whether to do this rather than that. Now the
12460 lesser evil or the greater good is always to be chosen in preference; and therefore the constant man is compelled to bear
12461 with the lesser evil through fear of the greater evil, but he is not compelled to bear with the greater evil in order to avoid
12462 the lesser. But the inconstant man is compelled to bear with the greater evil through fear of a lesser evil, namely to commit
12463 sin through fear of bodily suffering; whereas on the contrary the obstinate man cannot be compelled even to permit or to do
12464 a lesser evil, in order to avoid a greater. Hence the constant man is a mean between the inconstant and the obstinate. Secondly,
12465 they differ as to their estimate of the threatening evil, for a constant man is not compelled unless for grave and probable
12466 reasons, while the inconstant man is compelled by trifling motives: "The wicked man seeth when no man pursueth" (
12467 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q47_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.28.1" target="asv">Prov. 28:1</a>).
12468 </p>
12469 <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p9">
12470 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The constant man, like the brave man, is fearless, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 4), not that he is altogether without
12471 fear, but because he fears not what he ought not to fear, or where, or when he ought not to fear.
12472 </p>
12473 <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p10">
12474 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin is the greatest of evils, and consequently a constant man can nowise be compelled to sin; indeed a man should die rather
12475 than suffer the like, as again the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6,9). Yet certain bodily injuries are less grievous than
12476 certain others; and chief among them are those which relate to the person, such as death, blows, the stain resulting from
12477 rape, and slavery. Wherefore the like compel a constant man to suffer other bodily
12478 injuries. They are contained in the verse: "Rape, status, blows, and death." Nor does it matter whether they refer to his
12479 own person, or to the person of his wife or children, or the like.
12480 </p>
12481 <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p11">
12482 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although disgrace is a greater injury it is easy to remedy it. Hence fear of disgrace is not reckoned to influence a constant
12483 man according to law.
12484 </p>
12485 <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p12">
12486 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The constant man is not compelled to lie, because at the time he wishes to give; yet afterwards he wishes to ask for restitution,
12487 or at least to appeal to the judge, if he promised not to ask for restitution. But he cannot promise not to appeal, for since
12488 this is contrary to the good of justice, he cannot be compelled thereto, namely to act against justice.
12489 </p>
12490 <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p13"></p>
12491 <p id="XP_Q47_A2-p14"></p>
12492 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A1.html"></a>
12493 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A3.html"></a>
12494 </div>
12495 <div id="XP_Q47_A3" class="div4">
12496 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A2.html"></a>
12497 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A4.html"></a>
12498 <h4 id="XP_Q47_A3-p0.1">Whether compulsory consent invalidates a marriage?</h4>
12499 <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p1"></p>
12500 <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p2">
12501 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that compulsory consent does not invalidate a marriage. For just as consent is necessary for matrimony, so
12502 is intention necessary for Baptism. Now one who is compelled by fear to receive Baptism, receives the sacrament. Therefore
12503 one who is compelled by fear to consent is bound by his marriage.
12504 </p>
12505 <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p3">
12506 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), that which is done on account of mixed violence is more voluntary
12507 than involuntary. Now consent cannot be compelled except by mixed violence. Therefore it is not entirely involuntary, and
12508 consequently the marriage is valid.
12509 </p>
12510 <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p4">
12511 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seemingly he who has consented to marriage under compulsion ought to be counseled to stand to that marriage; because
12512 to promise and not to fulfill has an "appearance of evil," and the Apostle wishes us to refrain from all such things (
12513 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q47_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.5.22" target="asv">1 Thess 5:22</a>). But that would not be the case if compulsory consent invalidated a marriage altogether. Therefore, etc.
12514 </p>
12515 <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p5">
12516 <b>On the contrary,</b> A Decretal says (cap. Cum locum, De sponsal. et matrim.): "Since there is no room for consent where fear or compulsion enters
12517 in, it follows that where a person's consent is required, every pretext for compulsion must be set aside." Now mutual contract
12518 is necessary in marriage. Therefore, etc.
12519 </p>
12520 <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p6"> Further, Matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church, which union is according to the liberty of love. Therefore
12521 it cannot be the result of compulsory consent.
12522 </p>
12523 <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p7">
12524 <b>I answer that,</b> The marriage bond is everlasting. Hence whatever is inconsistent with its perpetuity invalidates marriage. Now the fear which
12525 compels a constant man deprives the contract of its perpetuity, since its complete rescission can be demanded. Wherefore this
12526 compulsion by fear which influences a constant man, invalidates marriage, but not the other compulsion. Now a constant man
12527 is reckoned a virtuous man who, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4), is a
12528 measure in all human actions.
12529 </p>
12530 <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p8"> However, some say that if there be consent although compulsory, the marriage is valid in conscience and in God's sight, but
12531 not in the eyes of the Church, who presumes that there was no inward consent on account of the fear. But this is of no account,
12532 because the Church should not presume a person to sin until it be proved; and he sinned if he said that he consented whereas
12533 he did not consent. Wherefore the Church presumes that he did consent, but judges this compulsory consent
12534 to be insufficient for a valid marriage.
12535 </p>
12536 <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p9">
12537 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intention is not the efficient cause of the sacrament in baptism, it is merely the cause that elicits the action of the
12538 agent; whereas the consent is the efficient cause in matrimony. Hence the comparison fails.
12539 </p>
12540 <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p10">
12541 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not any kind of voluntariness suffices for marriage: it must be completely voluntary, because it has to be perpetual; and
12542 consequently it is invalidated by violence of a mixed nature.
12543 </p>
12544 <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p11">
12545 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He ought not always to be advised to stand to that marriage, but only when evil results are feared from its dissolution.
12546 Nor does he sin if he does otherwise, because there is no appearance of evil in not fulfilling a promise that one has made
12547 unwillingly.
12548 </p>
12549 <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p12"></p>
12550 <p id="XP_Q47_A3-p13"></p>
12551 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A2.html"></a>
12552 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A4.html"></a>
12553 </div>
12554 <div id="XP_Q47_A4" class="div4">
12555 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A3.html"></a>
12556 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A5.html"></a>
12557 <h4 id="XP_Q47_A4-p0.1">Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party who uses compulsion?</h4>
12558 <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p1"></p>
12559 <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p2">
12560 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that compulsory consent makes a marriage, at least as regards the party who uses compulsion. For matrimony
12561 is a sign of a spiritual union. But spiritual union which is by charity may be with one who has not charity. Therefore marriage
12562 is possible with one who wills it not.
12563 </p>
12564 <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p3">
12565 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if she who was compelled consents afterwards, it will be a true marriage. But he who compelled her before is not
12566 bound by her consent. Therefore he was married to her by virtue of the consent he gave before.
12567 </p>
12568 <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p4">
12569 <b>On the contrary,</b> Matrimony is an equiparant relation. Now a relation of that kind is equally in both terms. Therefore if there is an impediment
12570 on the part of one, there will be no marriage on the part of the other.
12571 </p>
12572 <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p5">
12573 <b>I answer that,</b> Since marriage is a kind of relation, and a relation cannot arise in one of the terms without arising in the other, it follows
12574 that whatever is an impediment to matrimony in the one, is an impediment to matrimony in the other; since it is impossible
12575 for a man to be the husband of one who is not his wife, or for a woman to be a wife without a husband, just as it is impossible
12576 to be a mother without having a child. Hence it is a common saying that "marriage is
12577 not lame."
12578 </p>
12579 <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p6">
12580 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the act of the lover can be directed to one who loves not, there can be no union between them, unless love be mutual.
12581 Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) that friendship which consists in a kind of union requires a return of love.
12582 </p>
12583 <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p7">
12584 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Marriage does not result from the consent of her who was compelled before, except in so far as the other party's previous
12585 consent remains in force; wherefore if he were to withdraw his consent there would be no marriage.
12586 </p>
12587 <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p8"></p>
12588 <p id="XP_Q47_A4-p9"></p>
12589 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A3.html"></a>
12590 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A5.html"></a>
12591 </div>
12592 <div id="XP_Q47_A5" class="div4">
12593 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A4.html"></a>
12594 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A6.html"></a>
12595 <h4 id="XP_Q47_A5-p0.1">Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?</h4>
12596 <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p1"></p>
12597 <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p2">
12598 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not even a conditional consent makes a marriage, because a statement is not made simply if it is made
12599 subject to a condition. But in marriage the words expressive of consent must be uttered simply. Therefore a conditional consent
12600 makes no marriage.
12601 </p>
12602 <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p3">
12603 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, marriage should be certain. But where a statement is made under a condition it is rendered doubtful. Therefore a
12604 like consent makes no marriage.
12605 </p>
12606 <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p4">
12607 <b>On the contrary,</b> In other contracts an obligation is undertaken conditionally, and holds so long as the condition holds. Therefore since marriage
12608 is a contract, it would seem that it can be made by a conditional consent.
12609 </p>
12610 <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p5">
12611 <b>I answer that,</b> The condition made is either of the present or of the future. If it is of the present and is not contrary to marriage, whether
12612 it be moral or immoral, the marriage holds if the condition is verified, and is invalid if the condition is not verified.
12613 If, however, it be contrary to the marriage blessings, the marriage is invalid, as we have also said in reference to betrothals
12614 (
12615 <a id="XP_Q47_A5-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q43_A1.html">Q[43], A[1]</a>). But if the condition refer to the future, it
12616 is either necessary, as that the sun will rise tomorrow---and then the marriage is valid, because such future things are present
12617 in their causes---or else it is contingent, as the payment of a sum of money, or the consent of the parents, and then the
12618 judgment about a consent of this kind is the same as about a consent expressed in words of the future tense; wherefore it
12619 makes no marriage.
12620 </p>
12621 <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p6"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
12622 <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p7"></p>
12623 <p id="XP_Q47_A5-p8"></p>
12624 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A4.html"></a>
12625 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A6.html"></a>
12626 </div>
12627 <div id="XP_Q47_A6" class="div4">
12628 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A5.html"></a>
12629 <a href="summa.XP_Q48.html"></a>
12630 <h4 id="XP_Q47_A6-p0.1">Whether one can be compelled by one's father's command to marry?</h4>
12631 <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p1"></p>
12632 <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p2">
12633 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one can be compelled by one's father's command to marry. For it is written (
12634 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q47_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.20" target="asv">Col. 3:20</a>): "Children, obey your parents in all things." Therefore they are bound to obey them in this also.
12635 </p>
12636 <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p3">
12637 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaac charged Jacob (
12638 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q47_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.28.1" target="asv">Gn. 28:1</a>) not to take a wife from the daughters of Chanaan. But he would not have charged him thus unless he had the right to command
12639 it. Therefore a son is bound to obey his father in this.
12640 </p>
12641 <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p4">
12642 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one should promise, especially with an oath, for one whom he cannot compel to keep the promise. Now parents promise
12643 future marriages for their children, and even confirm their promise by oath. Therefore they can compel their children to keep
12644 that promise.
12645 </p>
12646 <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p5">
12647 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, our spiritual father, the Pope to wit, can by his command compel a man to a spiritual marriage, namely to accept
12648 a bishopric. Therefore a carnal father can compel his son to marriage.
12649 </p>
12650 <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p6">
12651 <b>On the contrary,</b> A son may lawfully enter religion though his father command him to marry. Therefore he is not bound to obey him in this.
12652 </p>
12653 <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p7"> Further, if he were bound to obey, a betrothal contracted by the parents would hold good without their children's consent.
12654 But this is against the law (cap. Ex litteris, De despon. impub.). Therefore, etc.
12655 </p>
12656 <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p8">
12657 <b>I answer that,</b> Since in marriage there is a kind of perpetual service, as it were, a father cannot by his command compel his son to marry,
12658 since the latter is of free condition: but he may induce him for a reasonable cause; and thus the son will be affected by
12659 his father's command in the same way as he is affected by that cause, so that if the cause be compelling as indicating either
12660 obligation or fitness, his father's command will compel him in the same measure: otherwise
12661 he may not compel him.
12662 </p>
12663 <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p9">
12664 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle do not refer to those matters in which a man is his own master as the father is. Such is marriage
12665 by which the son also becomes a father.
12666 </p>
12667 <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p10">
12668 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There were other motives why Jacob was bound to do what Isaac commanded him, both on account of the wickedness of those women,
12669 and because the seed of Chanaan was to be cast forth from the land which was promised to the seed of the patriarchs. Hence
12670 Isaac could command this.
12671 </p>
12672 <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p11">
12673 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> They do not swear except with the implied condition "if it please them"; and they are bound to induce them in good faith.
12674 </p>
12675 <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p12">
12676 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some say that the Pope cannot command a man to accept a bishopric, because consent should be free. But if this be granted
12677 there would be an end of ecclesiastical order, for unless a man can be compelled to accept the government of a church, the
12678 Church could not be preserved, since sometimes those who are qualified for the purpose are unwilling to accept unless they
12679 be compelled. Therefore we must reply that the two cases are not parallel; for there is
12680 no bodily service in a spiritual marriage as there is in the bodily marriage; because the spiritual marriage is a kind of
12681 office for dispensing the public weal: "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the
12682 mysteries of God" (
12683 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q47_A6-p12.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:1</a>).
12684 </p>
12685 <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p13"></p>
12686 <p id="XP_Q47_A6-p14"></p>
12687 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A5.html"></a>
12688 <a href="summa.XP_Q48.html"></a>
12689 </div>
12690 <a href="summa.XP_Q46_A2.html"></a>
12691 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A1.html"></a>
12692 </div>
12693 <div id="XP_Q48" class="div3">
12694 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A6.html"></a>
12695 <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A1.html"></a>
12696 <h3 id="XP_Q48-p0.1">OF THE OBJECT OF THE CONSENT (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
12697 <p id="XP_Q48-p1"></p>
12698 <p id="XP_Q48-p2"> We must now consider the object of the consent. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
12699 <p id="XP_Q48-p3"> (1) Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse?</p>
12700 <p id="XP_Q48-p4"> (2) Whether consent to marry a person for an immoral motive makes a marriage?</p>
12701 <div id="XP_Q48_A1" class="div4">
12702 <a href="summa.XP_Q48.html"></a>
12703 <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A2.html"></a>
12704 <h4 id="XP_Q48_A1-p0.1">Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse?</h4>
12705 <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p1"></p>
12706 <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p2">
12707 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the consent which makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse. For Jerome [*The words quoted are
12708 found implicitly in St. Augustine (De Bono Viduit ix)] says that "for those who have vowed virginity it is wicked, not only
12709 to marry, but even to wish to marry." But it would not be wicked unless it were contrary to virginity, and marriage is not
12710 contrary to virginity except by reason of carnal intercourse. Therefore the will's consent in
12711 marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse.
12712 </p>
12713 <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p3">
12714 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever there is in marriage between husband and wife is lawful between brother and sister except carnal intercourse.
12715 But there cannot lawfully be a consent to marriage between them. Therefore the marriage consent is a consent to carnal intercourse.
12716 </p>
12717 <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p4">
12718 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the woman say to the man: "I consent to take thee provided however that you know me not," it is not a marriage
12719 consent, because it contains something against the essence of that consent. Yet this would not be the case unless the marriage
12720 consent were a consent to carnal intercourse. Therefore, etc.
12721 </p>
12722 <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p5">
12723 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in everything the beginning corresponds to the consummation. Now marriage is consummated by carnal intercourse.
12724 Therefore, since it begins by the consent, it would seem that the consent is to carnal intercourse.
12725 </p>
12726 <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p6">
12727 <b>On the contrary,</b> No one that consents to carnal intercourse is a virgin in mind and body. Yet Blessed John the evangelist after consenting
12728 to marriage was a virgin both in mind and body. Therefore he did not consent to carnal intercourse.
12729 </p>
12730 <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p7"> Further, the effect corresponds to its cause. Now consent is the cause of marriage. Since then carnal intercourse is not
12731 essential to marriage, seemingly neither is the consent which causes marriage a consent to carnal intercourse.
12732 </p>
12733 <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p8">
12734 <b>I answer that,</b> The consent that makes a marriage is a consent to marriage, because the proper effect of the will is the thing willed. Wherefore,
12735 according as carnal intercourse stands in relation to marriage, so far is the consent that causes marriage a consent to carnal
12736 intercourse. Now, as stated above (
12737 <a id="XP_Q48_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>;
12738 <a id="XP_Q48_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q45_A1.html"> Q[45], AA[1]</a>,2), marriage is not essentially the carnal union itself, but a certain joining together of
12739 husband and wife ordained to carnal intercourse, and a further consequent union between husband and wife, in so far as they
12740 each receive power over the other in reference to carnal intercourse, which joining together is called the nuptial bond. Hence
12741 it is evident that they said well who asserted that to consent to marriage is to consent to carnal intercourse implicitly
12742 and not explicitly. For carnal intercourse is not to be understood, except as an effect is implicitly contained in its cause,
12743 for the power to have carnal intercourse, which power is the object of the consent, is the cause of carnal intercourse, just
12744 as the power to use one's own property is the cause of the use.
12745 </p>
12746 <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p9">
12747 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why consent to marriage after taking the vow of virginity is sinful, is because that consent gives a power to
12748 do what is unlawful: even so would a man sin if he gave another man the power to receive that which he has in deposit, and
12749 not only by actually delivering it to him. With regard to the consent of the Blessed Virgin, we have spoken about it above
12750 (Sent. iv, D, 3;
12751 <a id="XP_Q48_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q29_A2.html">TP, Q[29], A[2]</a>).
12752 </p>
12753 <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p10">
12754 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Between brother and sister there can be no power of one over the other in relation to carnal intercourse, even as neither
12755 can there be lawfully carnal intercourse itself. Consequently the argument does not prove.
12756 </p>
12757 <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p11">
12758 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such an explicit condition is contrary not only to the act but also to the power of carnal intercourse, and therefore it
12759 is contrary to marriage.
12760 </p>
12761 <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p12">
12762 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Marriage begun corresponds to marriage consummated, as habit or power corresponds to the act which is operation.
12763 </p>
12764 <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p13"> The arguments on the contrary side show that consent is not given explicitly to carnal intercourse; and this is true.</p>
12765 <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p14"></p>
12766 <p id="XP_Q48_A1-p15"></p>
12767 <a href="summa.XP_Q48.html"></a>
12768 <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A2.html"></a>
12769 </div>
12770 <div id="XP_Q48_A2" class="div4">
12771 <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A1.html"></a>
12772 <a href="summa.XP_Q49.html"></a>
12773 <h4 id="XP_Q48_A2-p0.1">Whether marriage can result from one person's consent to take another for a base motive?</h4>
12774 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p1"></p>
12775 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p2">
12776 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that marriage cannot result from one person's consent to take another for a base motive. For there is but one
12777 reason for one thing. Now marriage is one sacrament. Therefore it cannot result from the intention of any other end than that
12778 for which it was instituted by God; namely the begetting of children.
12779 </p>
12780 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p3">
12781 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the marriage union is from God, according to
12782 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q48_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.6" target="asv"> Mat. 19:6, </a> "What . . . God hath joined together let no man put asunder." But a union that is made for immoral motives is not from God.
12783 Therefore it is not a marriage.
12784 </p>
12785 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p4">
12786 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the other sacraments, if the intention of the Church be not observed, the sacrament is invalid. Now the intention
12787 of the Church in the sacrament of matrimony is not directed to a base purpose. Therefore, if a marriage be contracted for
12788 a base purpose, it will not be a valid marriage.
12789 </p>
12790 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p5">
12791 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Boethius (De Diff., Topic. ii) "a thing is good if its end be good." But matrimony is always good.
12792 Therefore it is not matrimony if it is done for an evil end.
12793 </p>
12794 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p6">
12795 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church; and in this there can be nothing base. Neither therefore
12796 can marriage be contracted for a base motive.
12797 </p>
12798 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p7">
12799 <b>On the contrary,</b> He who baptizes another for the sake of gain baptizes validly. Therefore if a man marries a woman for the purpose of gain
12800 it is a valid marriage.
12801 </p>
12802 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p8"> Further, the same conclusion is proved by the examples and authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 30).</p>
12803 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p9">
12804 <b>I answer that,</b> The final cause of marriage may be taken as twofold, namely essential and accidental. The essential cause of marriage is
12805 the end to which it is by its very nature ordained, and this is always good, namely the begetting of children and the avoiding
12806 of fornication. But the accidental final cause thereof is that which the contracting parties intend as the result of marriage.
12807 And since that which is intended as the result of marriage is consequent upon marriage,
12808 and since that which comes first is not altered by what comes after, but conversely; marriage does not become good or evil
12809 by reason of that cause, but the contracting parties to whom this cause is the essential end. And since accidental causes
12810 are infinite in number, it follows that there can be an infinite number of such causes in matrimony, some of which are good
12811 and some bad.
12812 </p>
12813 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p10">
12814 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This is true of the essential and principal cause; but that which has one essential and principal end may have several secondary
12815 essential ends, and an infinite number of accidental ends.
12816 </p>
12817 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p11">
12818 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The joining together can be taken for the relation itself which is marriage, and that is always from God, and is good, whatever
12819 be its cause; or for the act of those who are being joined together, and thus it is sometimes evil and is not from God simply.
12820 Nor is it unreasonable that an effect be from God, the cause of which is evil, such as a child born of adultery; for it is
12821 not from that cause as evil, but as having some good in so far as it is from
12822 God, although it is not from God simply.
12823 </p>
12824 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p12">
12825 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intention of the Church whereby she intends to confer a sacrament is essential to each sacrament, so that if it be not
12826 observed, all sacraments are null. But the intention of the Church whereby she intends an advantage resulting from the sacrament
12827 belongs to the well-being and not to the essence of a sacrament; wherefore, if it be not observed, the sacrament is none the
12828 less valid. Yet he who omits this intention sins; for instance if in baptism
12829 one intend not the healing of the mind which the Church intends. In like manner he who intends to marry, although he fail
12830 to direct it to the end which the Church intends, nevertheless contracts a valid marriage.
12831 </p>
12832 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p13">
12833 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This evil which is intended is the end not of marriage, but of the contracting parties.
12834 </p>
12835 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p14">
12836 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The union itself, and not the action of those who are united, is the sign of the union of Christ with the Church: wherefore
12837 the conclusion does not follow.
12838 </p>
12839 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p15"></p>
12840 <p id="XP_Q48_A2-p16"></p>
12841 <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A1.html"></a>
12842 <a href="summa.XP_Q49.html"></a>
12843 </div>
12844 <a href="summa.XP_Q47_A6.html"></a>
12845 <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A1.html"></a>
12846 </div>
12847 <div id="XP_Q49" class="div3">
12848 <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A2.html"></a>
12849 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A1.html"></a>
12850 <h3 id="XP_Q49-p0.1">OF THE MARRIAGE GOODS* (SIX ARTICLES) [*"Bona matrimonii," variously rendered marriage goods, marriage blessings, and advantages
12851 of marriage.]
12852 </h3>
12853 <p id="XP_Q49-p1"></p>
12854 <p id="XP_Q49-p2"> In the next place we must consider the marriage goods. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
12855 <p id="XP_Q49-p3"> (1) Whether certain goods are necessary in order to excuse marriage?</p>
12856 <p id="XP_Q49-p4"> (2) Whether those assigned are sufficient?</p>
12857 <p id="XP_Q49-p5"> (3) Whether the sacrament is the principal among the goods?</p>
12858 <p id="XP_Q49-p6"> (4) Whether the marriage act is excused from sin by the aforesaid goods?</p>
12859 <p id="XP_Q49-p7"> (5) Whether it can ever be excused from sin without them?</p>
12860 <p id="XP_Q49-p8"> (6) Whether in their absence it is always a mortal sin?</p>
12861 <div id="XP_Q49_A1" class="div4">
12862 <a href="summa.XP_Q49.html"></a>
12863 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A2.html"></a>
12864 <h4 id="XP_Q49_A1-p0.1">Whether certain blessings are necessary in order to excuse marriage?</h4>
12865 <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p1"></p>
12866 <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p2">
12867 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that certain blessings are not necessary in order to excuse marriage. For just as the preservation of the individual
12868 which is effected by the nutritive power is intended by nature, so too is the preservation of the species which is effected
12869 by marriage; and indeed so much the more as the good of the species is better and more exalted than the good of the individual.
12870 But no goods are necessary to excuse the act of the nutritive power. Neither
12871 therefore are they necessary to excuse marriage.
12872 </p>
12873 <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p3">
12874 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) the friendship between husband and wife is natural, and includes
12875 the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But that which is virtuous in itself needs no excuse. Therefore neither should
12876 any goods be assigned for the excuse of matrimony.
12877 </p>
12878 <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p4">
12879 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, matrimony was instituted as a remedy and as an office, as stated above (
12880 <a id="XP_Q49_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q42_A2.html">Q[42], A[2]</a>). Now it needs no excuse in so far as it is instituted as an office, since then it would also have needed an excuse in paradise,
12881 which is false, for there, as Augustine says, "marriage would have been without reproach and the marriage-bed without stain"
12882 (Gen. ad lit. ix). In like manner neither does it need an excuse in so far as it is intended
12883 as a remedy, any more than the other sacraments which were instituted as remedies for sin. Therefore matrimony does not need
12884 these excuses.
12885 </p>
12886 <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p5">
12887 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the virtues are directed to whatever can be done aright. If then marriage can be righted by certain goods, it needs
12888 nothing else to right it besides the virtues of the soul; and consequently there is no need to assign to matrimony any goods
12889 whereby it is righted, any more than to other things in which the virtues direct us.
12890 </p>
12891 <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p6">
12892 <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever there is indulgence, there must needs be some reason for excuse. Now marriage is allowed in the state of infirmity
12893 "by indulgence" (
12894 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q49_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:6</a>). Therefore it needs to be excused by certain goods.
12895 </p>
12896 <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p7"> Further, the intercourse of fornication and that of marriage are of the same species as regards the species of nature. But
12897 the intercourse of fornication is wrong in itself. Therefore, in order that the marriage intercourse be not wrong, something
12898 must be added to it to make it right, and draw it to another moral species.
12899 </p>
12900 <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p8">
12901 <b>I answer that,</b> No wise man should allow himself to lose a thing except for some compensation in the shape of an equal or better good. Wherefore
12902 for a thing that has a loss attached to it to be eligible, it needs to have some good connected with it, which by compensating
12903 for that loss makes that thing ordinate and right. Now there is a loss of reason incidental to the union of man and woman,
12904 both because the reason is carried away entirely on account of the vehemence of the
12905 pleasure, so that it is unable to understand anything at the same time, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11); and again
12906 because of the tribulation of the flesh which such persons have to suffer from solicitude for temporal things (
12907 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q49_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:28</a>). Consequently the choice of this union cannot be made ordinate except by certain compensations whereby that same union is
12908 righted. and these are the goods which excuse marriage and make it right.
12909 </p>
12910 <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p9">
12911 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the act of eating there is not such an intense pleasure overpowering the reason as in the aforesaid action, both because
12912 the generative power, whereby original sin is transmitted, is infected and corrupt, whereas the nutritive power, by which
12913 original sin is not transmitted, is neither corrupt nor infected; and again because each one feels in himself a defect of
12914 the individual more than a defect of the species. Hence, in order to entice a man to
12915 take food which supplies a defect of the individual, it is enough that he feel this defect; but in order to entice him to
12916 the act whereby a defect of the species is remedied, Divine providence attached pleasure to that act, which moves even irrational
12917 animals in which there is not the stain of original sin. Hence the comparison fails.
12918 </p>
12919 <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p10">
12920 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These goods which justify marriage belong to the nature of marriage, which consequently needs them, not as extrinsic causes
12921 of its rectitude, but as causing in it that rectitude which belongs to it by nature.
12922 </p>
12923 <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p11">
12924 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the very fact that marriage is intended as an office or as a remedy it has the aspect of something useful and right;
12925 nevertheless both aspects belong to it from the fact that it has these goods by which it fulfills the office and affords a
12926 remedy to concupiscence.
12927 </p>
12928 <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p12">
12929 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An act of virtue may derive its rectitude both from the virtue as its elicitive principle, and from its circumstances as
12930 its formal principles; and the goods of marriage are related to marriage as circumstances to an act of virtue which owes it
12931 to those circumstances that it can be an act of virtue.
12932 </p>
12933 <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p13"></p>
12934 <p id="XP_Q49_A1-p14"></p>
12935 <a href="summa.XP_Q49.html"></a>
12936 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A2.html"></a>
12937 </div>
12938 <div id="XP_Q49_A2" class="div4">
12939 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A1.html"></a>
12940 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A3.html"></a>
12941 <h4 id="XP_Q49_A2-p0.1">Whether the goods of marriage are sufficiently enumerated?</h4>
12942 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p1"></p>
12943 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p2">
12944 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goods of marriage are insufficiently enumerated by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 31), namely "faith, offspring,
12945 and sacrament." For the object of marriage among men is not only the begetting and feeding of children, but also the partnership
12946 of a common life, whereby each one contributes his share of work to the common stock, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12. Therefore
12947 as the offspring is reckoned a good of matrimony, so also should the
12948 communication of works.
12949 </p>
12950 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p3">
12951 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the union of Christ with the Church, signified by matrimony, is the effect of charity. Therefore charity rather
12952 than faith should be reckoned among the goods of matrimony.
12953 </p>
12954 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p4">
12955 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in matrimony, just as it is required that neither party have intercourse with another, so is it required that the
12956 one pay the marriage debt to the other. Now the former pertains to faith according to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 31). Therefore
12957 justice should also be reckoned among the goods of marriage on account of the payment of the debt.
12958 </p>
12959 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p5">
12960 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in matrimony as signifying the union of Christ with the Church, just as indivisibility is required, so also is unity,
12961 whereby one man has one wife. But the sacrament which is reckoned among the three marriage goods pertains to indivisibility.
12962 Therefore there should be something else pertaining to unity.
12963 </p>
12964 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p6">
12965 <b>Objection 5:</b> On the other hand, it would seem that they are too many. For one virtue suffices to make one act right. Now faith is one
12966 virtue. Therefore it was not necessary to add two other goods to make marriage right.
12967 </p>
12968 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p7">
12969 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the same cause does not make a thing both useful and virtuous, since the useful and the virtuous are opposite divisions
12970 of the good. Now marriage derives its character of useful from the offspring. Therefore the offspring should not be reckoned
12971 among the goods that make marriage virtuous.
12972 </p>
12973 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p8">
12974 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, nothing should be reckoned as a property or condition of itself. Now these goods are reckoned to be conditions of
12975 marriage. Therefore since matrimony is a sacrament, the sacrament should not be reckoned a condition of matrimony.
12976 </p>
12977 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p9">
12978 <b>I answer that,</b> Matrimony is instituted both as an office of nature and as a sacrament of the Church. As an office of nature it is directed
12979 by two things, like every other virtuous act. one of these is required on the part of the agent and is the intention of the
12980 due end, and thus the "offspring" is accounted a good of matrimony; the other is required on the part of the act, which is
12981 good generically through being about a due matter; and thus we have "faith," whereby a man
12982 has intercourse with his wife and with no other woman. Besides this it has a certain goodness as a sacrament, and this is
12983 signified by the very word "sacrament."
12984 </p>
12985 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p10">
12986 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Offspring signifies not only the begetting of children, but also their education, to which as its end is directed the entire
12987 communion of works that exists between man and wife as united in marriage, since parents naturally "lay up" for their "children"
12988 (
12989 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q49_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:14</a>); so that the offspring like a principal end includes another, as it were, secondary end.
12990 </p>
12991 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p11">
12992 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith is not taken here as a theological virtue, but as part of justice, in so far as faith [fides] signifies the suiting
12993 of deed to word [fiant dicta] by keeping one's promises; for since marriage is a contract it contains a promise whereby this
12994 man is assigned to this woman.
12995 </p>
12996 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p12">
12997 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the marriage promise means that neither party is to have intercourse with a third party, so does it require that
12998 they should mutually pay the marriage debt. The latter is indeed the chief of the two, since it follows from the power which
12999 each receives over the other. Consequently both these things pertain to faith, although the Book of Sentences mentions that
13000 which is the less manifest.
13001 </p>
13002 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p13">
13003 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> By sacrament we are to understand not only indivisibility, but all those things that result from marriage being a sign of
13004 Christ's union with the Church. We may also reply that the unity to which the objection refers pertains to faith, just as
13005 indivisibility belongs to the sacrament.
13006 </p>
13007 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p14">
13008 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Faith here does not denote a virtue, but that condition of virtue which is a part of justice and is called by the name of
13009 faith.
13010 </p>
13011 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p15">
13012 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Just as the right use of a useful good derives its rectitude not from the useful but from the reason which causes the right
13013 use, so too direction to a useful good may cause the goodness of rectitude by virtue of the reason causing the right direction;
13014 and in this way marriage, through being directed to the offspring, is useful, and nevertheless righteous, inasmuch as it is
13015 directed aright.
13016 </p>
13017 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p16">
13018 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> As the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 31), sacrament here does not mean matrimony itself, but its indissolubility, which is a
13019 sign of the same thing as matrimony is.
13020 </p>
13021 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p17"> We may also reply that although marriage is a sacrament, marriage as marriage is not the same as marriage as a sacrament,
13022 since it was instituted not only as a sign of a sacred thing, but also as an office of nature. Hence the sacramental aspect
13023 is a condition added to marriage considered in itself, whence also it derives its rectitude. Hence its sacramentality, if
13024 I may use the term, is reckoned among the goods which justify marriage; and accordingly this third good of
13025 marriage, the sacrament to wit, denotes not only its indissolubility, but also whatever pertains to its signification.
13026 </p>
13027 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p18"></p>
13028 <p id="XP_Q49_A2-p19"></p>
13029 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A1.html"></a>
13030 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A3.html"></a>
13031 </div>
13032 <div id="XP_Q49_A3" class="div4">
13033 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A2.html"></a>
13034 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A4.html"></a>
13035 <h4 id="XP_Q49_A3-p0.1">Whether the sacrament is the chief of the marriage goods?</h4>
13036 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p1"></p>
13037 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p2">
13038 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the "sacrament" is not the chief of the marriage goods. For the end is principal in everything. Now the
13039 end of marriage is the offspring. Therefore the offspring is the chief marriage good.
13040 </p>
13041 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p3">
13042 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the specific nature the difference is more important than the genus, even as the form is more important than
13043 matter in the composition of a natural thing. Now "sacrament" refers to marriage on the part of its genus, while "offspring"
13044 and "faith" refer thereto on the part of the difference whereby it is a special kind of sacrament. Therefore these other two
13045 are more important than sacrament in reference to marriage.
13046 </p>
13047 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p4">
13048 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as we find marriage without "offspring" and without "faith," so do we find it without indissolubility, as in
13049 the case where one of the parties enters religion before the marriage is consummated. Therefore neither from this point of
13050 view is "sacrament" the most important marriage good.
13051 </p>
13052 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p5">
13053 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, an effect cannot be more important than its cause. Now consent, which is the cause of matrimony, is often changed.
13054 Therefore the marriage also can be dissolved and consequently inseparability is not always a condition of marriage.
13055 </p>
13056 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p6">
13057 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the sacraments which produce an everlasting effect imprint a character. But no character is imprinted in matrimony.
13058 Therefore it is not conditioned by a lasting inseparability. Consequently just as there is marriage without "offspring" so
13059 is there marriage without "sacrament," and thus the same conclusion follows as above.
13060 </p>
13061 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p7">
13062 <b>On the contrary,</b> That which has a place in the definition of a thing is most essential thereto. Now inseparability, which pertains to sacrament,
13063 is placed in the definition of marriage (
13064 <a id="XP_Q49_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A3.html">Q[44], A[3]</a>), while offspring and faith are not. Therefore among the other goods sacrament is the most essential to matrimony.
13065 </p>
13066 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p8"> Further, the Divine power which works in the sacraments is more efficacious than human power. But "offspring" and "faith"
13067 pertain to matrimony as directed to an office of human nature, whereas "sacrament" pertains to it as instituted by God. Therefore
13068 sacrament takes a more important part in marriage than the other two.
13069 </p>
13070 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p9">
13071 <b>I answer that,</b> This or that may be more important to a thing in two ways, either because it is more essential or because it is more excellent.
13072 If the reason is because it is more excellent, then "sacrament" is in every way the most important of the three marriage goods,
13073 since it belongs to marriage considered as a sacrament of grace; while the other two belong to it as an office of nature;
13074 and a perfection of grace is more excellent than a perfection of nature. If,
13075 however, it is said to be more important because it is more essential, we must draw a distinction; for "faith" and "offspring"
13076 can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, and thus they regard the use of matrimony in begetting children and observing
13077 the marriage compact; while inseparability, which is denoted by "sacrament," regards the very sacrament considered in itself,
13078 since from the very fact that by the marriage compact man and wife give to one another power the one over the other
13079 in perpetuity, it follows that they cannot be put asunder. Hence there is no matrimony without inseparability, whereas there
13080 is matrimony without "faith" and "offspring," because the existence of a thing does not depend on its use; and in this sense
13081 "sacrament" is more essential to matrimony than "faith" and "offspring." Secondly, "faith" and "offspring" may be considered
13082 as in their principles, so that "offspring" denote the intention of having children, and "faith" the duty of remaining
13083 faithful, and there can be no matrimony without these also, since they are caused in matrimony by the marriage compact itself,
13084 so that if anything contrary to these were expressed in the consent which makes a marriage, the marriage would be invalid.
13085 Taking "faith" and "offspring" in this sense, it is clear that "offspring" is the most essential thing in marriage, secondly
13086 "faith," and thirdly "sacrament"; even as to man it is more essential to be in nature than to be in grace, although it is
13087 more excellent to be in grace.
13088 </p>
13089 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p10">
13090 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The end as regards the intention stands first in a thing, but as regards the attainment it stands last. It is the same with
13091 "offspring" among the marriage goods; wherefore in a way it is the most important and in another way it is not.
13092 </p>
13093 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p11">
13094 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sacrament, even as holding the third place among the marriage goods, belongs to matrimony by reason of its difference; for
13095 it is called "sacrament" from its signification of that particular sacred thing which matrimony signifies.
13096 </p>
13097 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p12">
13098 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. ix), marriage is a good of mortals, wherefore in the resurrection "they shall neither
13099 marry nor be married" (
13100 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q49_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>). Hence the marriage bond does not last after the life wherein it is contracted, and consequently it is said to be inseparable,
13101 because it cannot be sundered in this life, but either by bodily death after carnal union, or by spiritual death after a merely
13102 spiritual
13103 union.
13104 </p>
13105 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p13">
13106 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the consent which makes a marriage is not everlasting materially, i.e. in regard to the substance of the act, since
13107 that act ceases and a contrary act may succeed it, nevertheless formally speaking it is everlasting, because it is a consent
13108 to an ever lasting bond, else it would not make a marriage, for a consent to take a woman for a time makes no marriage. Hence
13109 it is everlasting formally, inasmuch as an act takes its species from its
13110 object; and thus it is that matrimony derives its inseparability from the consent.
13111 </p>
13112 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p14">
13113 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In those sacraments wherein a character is imprinted, power is given to perform spiritual actions; but in matrimony, to perform
13114 bodily actions. Wherefore matrimony by reason of the power which man and wife receive over one another agrees with the sacraments
13115 in which a character is imprinted, and from this it derives its inseparability, as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 31); yet
13116 it differs from them in so far as that power regards bodily acts; hence it
13117 does not confer a spiritual character.
13118 </p>
13119 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p15"></p>
13120 <p id="XP_Q49_A3-p16"></p>
13121 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A2.html"></a>
13122 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A4.html"></a>
13123 </div>
13124 <div id="XP_Q49_A4" class="div4">
13125 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A3.html"></a>
13126 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A5.html"></a>
13127 <h4 id="XP_Q49_A4-p0.1">Whether the marriage act is excused by the aforesaid goods?</h4>
13128 <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p1"></p>
13129 <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p2">
13130 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the marriage act cannot be altogether excused from sin by the aforesaid goods. For whoever allows himself
13131 to lose a greater good for the sake of a lesser good sins because he allows it inordinately. Now the good of reason which
13132 is prejudiced in the marriage act is greater than these three marriage goods. Therefore the aforesaid goods do not suffice
13133 to excuse marriage intercourse.
13134 </p>
13135 <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p3">
13136 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a moral good be added to a moral evil the sum total is evil and not good, since one evil circumstance makes an
13137 action evil, whereas one good circumstance does not make it good. Now the marriage act is evil in itself, else it would need
13138 no excuse. Therefore the addition of the marriage goods cannot make the act good.
13139 </p>
13140 <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p4">
13141 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wherever there is immoderate passion there is moral vice. Now the marriage goods cannot prevent the pleasure in
13142 that act from being immoderate. Therefore they cannot excuse it from being a sin.
13143 </p>
13144 <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p5">
13145 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15), shame is only caused by a disgraceful deed. Now the marriage goods
13146 do not deprive that deed of its shame. Therefore they cannot excuse it from sin.
13147 </p>
13148 <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p6">
13149 <b>On the contrary,</b> The marriage act differs not from fornication except by the marriage goods. If therefore these were not sufficient to excuse
13150 it marriage would be always unlawful; and this is contrary to what was stated above (
13151 <a id="XP_Q49_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q41_A3.html">Q[41], A[3]</a>).
13152 </p>
13153 <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p7"> Further, the marriage goods are related to its act as its due circumstances, as stated above (A[1], ad 4). Now the like circumstances
13154 are sufficient to prevent an action from being evil. Therefore these goods can excuse marriage so that it is nowise a sin.
13155 </p>
13156 <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p8">
13157 <b>I answer that,</b> An act is said to be excused in two ways. First, on the part of the agent, so that although it be evil it is not imputed
13158 as sin to the agent, or at least not as so grave a sin. thus ignorance is said to excuse a sin wholly or partly. Secondly,
13159 an act is said to be excused on its part, so that, namely, it is not evil; and it is thus that the aforesaid goods are said
13160 to excuse the marriage act. Now it is from the same cause that an act is not morally evil, and
13161 that it is good, since there is no such thing as an indifferent act, as was stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 40;
13162 <a id="XP_Q49_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A9.html">FS, Q[18], A[9]</a>). Now a human act is said to be good in two ways. In one way by goodness of virtue, and thus an act derives its goodness
13163 from those things which place it in the mean. This is what "faith" and "offspring" do in the marriage act, as stated above
13164
13165 <a id="XP_Q49_A4-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q49_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. In another way, by goodness of the "sacrament," in which way
13166 an act is said to be not only good, but also holy, and the marriage act derives this goodness from the indissolubility of
13167 the union, in respect of which it signifies the union of Christ with the Church. Thus it is clear that the aforesaid goods
13168 sufficiently excuse the marriage act.
13169 </p>
13170 <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p9">
13171 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the marriage act man does not incur harm to his reason as to habit, but only as to act. Nor is it unfitting that a certain
13172 act which is generically better be sometimes interrupted for some less good act; for it is possible to do this without sin,
13173 as in the case of one who ceases from the act of contemplation in order meanwhile to devote himself to action.
13174 </p>
13175 <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p10">
13176 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would avail if the evil that is inseparable from carnal intercourse were an evil of sin. But in this case it
13177 is an evil not of sin but of punishment alone, consisting in the rebellion of concupiscence against reason; and consequently
13178 the conclusion does not follow.
13179 </p>
13180 <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p11">
13181 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The excess of passion that amounts to a sin does not refer to the passion's quantitative intensity, but to its proportion
13182 to reason; wherefore it is only when a passion goes beyond the bounds of reason that it is reckoned to be immoderate. Now
13183 the pleasure attaching to the marriage act, while it is most intense in point of quantity, does not go beyond the bounds previously
13184 appointed by reason before the commencement of the act, although reason is
13185 unable to regulate them during the pleasure itself.
13186 </p>
13187 <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p12">
13188 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The turpitude that always accompanies the marriage act and always causes shame is the turpitude of punishment, not of sin,
13189 for man is naturally ashamed of any defect.
13190 </p>
13191 <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p13"></p>
13192 <p id="XP_Q49_A4-p14"></p>
13193 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A3.html"></a>
13194 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A5.html"></a>
13195 </div>
13196 <div id="XP_Q49_A5" class="div4">
13197 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A4.html"></a>
13198 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A6.html"></a>
13199 <h4 id="XP_Q49_A5-p0.1">Whether the marriage act can be excused without the marriage goods?</h4>
13200 <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p1"></p>
13201 <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p2">
13202 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage goods. For he who is moved by nature alone to
13203 the marriage act, apparently does not intend any of the marriage goods, since the marriage goods pertain to grace or virtue.
13204 Yet when a person is moved to the aforesaid act by the natural appetite alone, seemingly he commits no sin, for nothing natural
13205 is an evil, since "evil is contrary to nature and order," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
13206 iv). Therefore the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage goods.
13207 </p>
13208 <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p3">
13209 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who has intercourse with his wife in order to avoid fornication, does not seemingly intend any of the marriage
13210 goods. Yet he does not sin apparently, because marriage was granted to human weakness for the very purpose of avoiding fornication
13211 (
13212 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q49_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:2</a>,
13213 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q49_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.6" target="asv">6</a>). Therefore the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage goods.
13214 </p>
13215 <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p4">
13216 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he who uses as he will that which is his own does not act against justice, and thus seemingly does not sin. Now
13217 marriage makes the wife the husband's own, and "vice versa." Therefore, if they use one another at will through the instigation
13218 of lust, it would seem that it is no sin; and thus the same conclusion follows.
13219 </p>
13220 <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p5">
13221 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which is good generically does not become evil unless it be done with an evil intention. Now the marriage act
13222 whereby a husband knows his wife is generically good. Therefore it cannot be evil unless it be done with an evil intention.
13223 Now it can be done with a good intention, even without intending any marriage good, for instance by intending to keep or acquire
13224 bodily health. Therefore it seems that this act can be excused even without the
13225 marriage goods.
13226 </p>
13227 <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p6">
13228 <b>On the contrary,</b> If the cause be removed the effect is removed. Now the marriage goods are the cause of rectitude in the marriage act. Therefore
13229 the marriage act cannot be excused without them.
13230 </p>
13231 <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p7"> Further, the aforesaid act does not differ from the act of fornication except in the aforesaid goods. But the act of fornication
13232 is always evil. Therefore the marriage act also will always be evil unless it be excused by the aforesaid goods.
13233 </p>
13234 <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p8">
13235 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as the marriage goods, in so far as they consist in a habit, make a marriage honest and holy, so too, in so far as they
13236 are in the actual intention, they make the marriage act honest, as regards those two marriage goods which relate to the marriage
13237 act. Hence when married persons come together for the purpose of begetting children, or of paying the debt to one another
13238 (which pertains to "faith") they are wholly excused from sin. But the third good does
13239 not relate to the use of marriage, but to its excuse, as stated above
13240 <a id="XP_Q49_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q49_A3.html">(A[3])</a>; wherefore it makes marriage itself honest, but not its act, as though its act were wholly excused from sin, through being
13241 done on account of some signification. Consequently there are only two ways in which married persons can come together without
13242 any sin at all, namely in order to have offspring, and in order to pay the debt. otherwise it is always at least a venial
13243 sin.
13244 </p>
13245 <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p9">
13246 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The offspring considered as a marriage good includes something besides the offspring as a good intended by nature. For nature
13247 intends offspring as safeguarding the good of the species, whereas the offspring as a good of the sacrament of marriage includes
13248 besides this the directing of the child to God. Wherefore the intention of nature which intends the offspring must needs be
13249 referred either actually or habitually to the intention of having an
13250 offspring, as a good of the sacrament: otherwise the intention would go no further than a creature; and this is always a sin.
13251 Consequently whenever nature alone moves a person to the marriage act, he is not wholly excused from sin, except in so far
13252 as the movement of nature is further directed actually or habitually to the offspring as a good of the sacrament. Nor does
13253 it follow that the instigation of nature is evil, but that it is imperfect unless it be further directed to some marriage
13254 good.
13255 </p>
13256 <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p10">
13257 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If a man intends by the marriage act to prevent fornication in his wife, it is no sin, because this is a kind of payment
13258 of the debt that comes under the good of "faith." But if he intends to avoid fornication in himself, then there is a certain
13259 superfluity, and accordingly there is a venial sin, nor was the sacrament instituted for that purpose, except by indulgence,
13260 which regards venial sins.
13261 </p>
13262 <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p11">
13263 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One due circumstance does not suffice to make a good act, and consequently it does not follow that, no matter how one use
13264 one's own property, the use is good, but when one uses it as one ought according to all the circumstances.
13265 </p>
13266 <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p12">
13267 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although it is not evil in itself to intend to keep oneself in good health, this intention becomes evil, if one intend health
13268 by means of something that is not naturally ordained for that purpose; for instance if one sought only bodily health by the
13269 sacrament of baptism, and the same applies to the marriage act in the question at issue.
13270 </p>
13271 <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p13"></p>
13272 <p id="XP_Q49_A5-p14"></p>
13273 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A4.html"></a>
13274 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A6.html"></a>
13275 </div>
13276 <div id="XP_Q49_A6" class="div4">
13277 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A5.html"></a>
13278 <a href="summa.XP_Q50.html"></a>
13279 <h4 id="XP_Q49_A6-p0.1">Whether it is a mortal sin for a man to have knowledge of his wife, with the intention not of a marriage good but merely of
13280 pleasure?
13281 </h4>
13282 <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p1"></p>
13283 <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p2">
13284 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that whenever a man has knowledge of his wife, with the intention not of a marriage good but merely of pleasure,
13285 he commits a mortal sin. For according to Jerome (Comment. in
13286 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q49_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.25" target="asv"> Eph. 5:25</a>), as quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 31), "the pleasure taken in the embraces of a wanton is damnable in a husband." Now
13287 nothing but mortal sin is said to be damnable. Therefore it is always a mortal sin to have knowledge of one's wife for
13288 mere pleasure.
13289 </p>
13290 <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p3">
13291 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, consent to pleasure is a mortal sin, as stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 24). Now whoever knows his wife
13292 for the sake of pleasure consents to the pleasure. Therefore he sins mortally.
13293 </p>
13294 <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p4">
13295 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever fails to refer the use of a creature to God enjoys a creature, and this is a mortal sin. But whoever uses
13296 his wife for mere pleasure does not refer that use to God. Therefore he sins mortally.
13297 </p>
13298 <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p5">
13299 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no one should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. Now according to the text (Sent. ii, D, 24) a man who knows
13300 his wife for mere pleasure is debarred from entering the Church, as though he were excommunicate. Therefore every such man
13301 sins mortally.
13302 </p>
13303 <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p6">
13304 <b>On the contrary,</b> As stated in the text (Sent. ii, D, 24), according to Augustine (Contra Jul. ii, 10; De Decem Chord. xi; Serm. xli, de Sanct.),
13305 carnal intercourse of this kind is one of the daily sins, for which we say the "Our Father." Now these are not mortal sins.
13306 Therefore, etc.
13307 </p>
13308 <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p7"> Further, it is no mortal sin to take food for mere pleasure. Therefore in like manner it is not a mortal sin for a man to
13309 use his wife merely to satisfy his desire.
13310 </p>
13311 <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p8">
13312 <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that whenever pleasure is the chief motive for the marriage act it is a mortal sin; that when it is an indirect
13313 motive it is a venial sin; and that when it spurns the pleasure altogether and is displeasing, it is wholly void of venial
13314 sin; so that it would be a mortal sin to seek pleasure in this act, a venial sin to take the pleasure when offered, but that
13315 perfection requires one to detest it. But this is impossible, since according to the
13316 Philosopher (Ethic. x, 3,4) the same judgment applies to pleasure as to action, because pleasure in a good action is good,
13317 and in an evil action, evil; wherefore, as the marriage act is not evil in itself, neither will it be always a mortal sin
13318 to seek pleasure therein. Consequently the right answer to this question is that if pleasure be sought in such a way as to
13319 exclude the honesty of marriage, so that, to wit, it is not as a wife but as a woman that a man treats his wife, and that
13320 he is
13321 ready to use her in the same way if she were not his wife, it is a mortal sin; wherefore such a man is said to be too ardent
13322 a lover of his wife, because his ardor carries him away from the goods of marriage. If, however, he seek pleasure within the
13323 bounds of marriage, so that it would not be sought in another than his wife, it is a venial sin.
13324 </p>
13325 <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p9">
13326 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man seeks wanton pleasure in his wife when he sees no more in her that he would in a wanton.
13327 </p>
13328 <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p10">
13329 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Consent to the pleasure of the intercourse that is a mortal sin is itself a mortal sin; but such is not the consent to the
13330 marriage act.
13331 </p>
13332 <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p11">
13333 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although he does not actually refer the pleasure to God, he does not place his will's last end therein; otherwise he would
13334 seek it anywhere indifferently. Hence it does not follow that he enjoys a creature; but he uses a creature actually for his
13335 own sake, and himself habitually, though not actually, for God's sake.
13336 </p>
13337 <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p12">
13338 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The reason for this statement is not that man deserves to be excommunicated for this sin, but because he renders himself
13339 unfit for spiritual things, since in that act, he becomes flesh and nothing more.
13340 </p>
13341 <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p13"></p>
13342 <p id="XP_Q49_A6-p14"></p>
13343 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A5.html"></a>
13344 <a href="summa.XP_Q50.html"></a>
13345 </div>
13346 <a href="summa.XP_Q48_A2.html"></a>
13347 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A1.html"></a>
13348 </div>
13349 <div id="XP_Q50" class="div3">
13350 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A6.html"></a>
13351 <a href="summa.XP_Q50_A1.html"></a>
13352 <h3 id="XP_Q50-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF MARRIAGE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)</h3>
13353 <p id="XP_Q50-p1"></p>
13354 <p id="XP_Q50-p2"> In the next place we must consider the impediments of marriage: (1) In general; (2) In particular.</p>
13355 <div id="XP_Q50_A1" class="div4">
13356 <a href="summa.XP_Q50.html"></a>
13357 <a href="summa.XP_Q51.html"></a>
13358 <h4 id="XP_Q50_A1-p0.1">Whether it is fitting that impediments should be assigned to marriage?</h4>
13359 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p1"></p>
13360 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p2">
13361 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unfitting for impediments to be assigned to marriage. For marriage is a sacrament condivided with the others.
13362 But no impediments are assigned to the others. Neither therefore should they be assigned to marriage.
13363 </p>
13364 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p3">
13365 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the less perfect a thing is the fewer its obstacles. Now matrimony is the least perfect of the sacraments. Therefore
13366 it should have either no impediments or very few.
13367 </p>
13368 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p4">
13369 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wherever there is disease, it is necessary to have a remedy for the disease. Now concupiscence, a remedy for which
13370 is permitted in matrimony (
13371 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q50_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:6</a>), is in all. Therefore there should not be any impediment making it altogether unlawful for a particular person to marry.
13372 </p>
13373 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p5">
13374 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, unlawful means against the law. Now these impediments that are assigned to matrimony are not against the natural
13375 law, because they are not found to be the same in each state of the human race, since more degrees of kindred come under prohibition
13376 at one time than at another. Nor, seemingly, can human law set impediments against marriage, since marriage, like the other
13377 sacraments, is not of human but of Divine institution. Therefore impediments should
13378 not be assigned to marriage, making it unlawful for a person to marry.
13379 </p>
13380 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p6">
13381 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, lawful and unlawful differ as that which is against the law from that which is not, and between these there is no
13382 middle term, since they are opposed according to affirmation and negation. Therefore there cannot be impediments to marriage,
13383 placing a person in a middle position between those who are lawful and those who are unlawful subjects of marriage.
13384 </p>
13385 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p7">
13386 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, union of man and woman is unlawful save in marriage. Now every unlawful union should be dissolved. Therefore if
13387 anything prevent a marriage being contracted, it will "de facto" dissolve it after it has been contracted; and thus impediments
13388 should not be assigned to marriage, which hinder it from being contracted, and dissolve it after it has been contracted.
13389 </p>
13390 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p8">
13391 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, no impediment can remove from a thing that which is part of its definition. Now indissolubility is part of the definition
13392 of marriage. Therefore there cannot be any impediments which annul a marriage already contracted.
13393 </p>
13394 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p9">
13395 <b>Objection 8:</b> On the other hand, it would seem that there should be an infinite number of impediments to marriage. For marriage is a good.
13396 Now good may be lacking in an infinite number of ways, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii). Therefore there is an infinite number
13397 of impediments to marriage.
13398 </p>
13399 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p10">
13400 <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, the impediments to marriage arise from the conditions of individuals. But such like conditions are infinite in number.
13401 Therefore the impediments to marriage are also infinite.
13402 </p>
13403 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p11">
13404 <b>I answer that,</b> In marriage, as in other sacraments, there are certain things essential to marriage, and others that belong to its solemnization.
13405 And since even without the things that pertain to its solemnization it is still a true sacrament, as also in the case of the
13406 other sacraments, it follows that the impediments to those things that pertain to the solemnization of this sacrament do not
13407 derogate from the validity of the marriage. These impediments are said to hinder
13408 the contracting of marriage, but they do not dissolve the marriage once contracted; such are the veto of the Church, or the
13409 holy seasons. Hence the verse:
13410 </p>
13411 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p12"> "The veto of the Church and holy tide</p>
13412 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p13"> Forbid the knot, but loose it not if tied."</p>
13413 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p14"> On the other hand, those impediments which regard the essentials of marriage make a marriage invalid, wherefore they are
13414 said not only to hinder the contracting of marriage, but to dissolve it if contracted; and they are contained in the following
13415 verse:
13416 </p>
13417 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p15"> "Error, station, vow, kinship, crime,</p>
13418 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p16"> Difference of worship, force, holy orders,</p>
13419 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p17"> Marriage bond, honesty, affinity, impotence,</p>
13420 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p18"> All these forbid marriage, and annul it though</p>
13421 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p19"> contracted."</p>
13422 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p20"> The reason for this number may be explained as follows: Marriage may be hindered either on the part of the contract or in
13423 regard to the contracting parties. If in the first way, since the marriage contract is made by voluntary consent, and this
13424 is incompatible with either ignorance or violence, there will be two impediments to marriage, namely "force," i.e. compulsion,
13425 and "error" in reference to ignorance. Wherefore the Master pronounced on these two impediments when treating
13426 of the cause of matrimony (Sent. iv, DD 29,30). Here, however, he is treating of the impediments as arising from the contracting
13427 parties, and these may be differentiated as follows. A person may be hindered from contracting marriage either simply, or
13428 with some particular person. If simply, so that he be unable to contract marriage with any woman, this can only be because
13429 he is hindered from performing the marriage act. This happens in two ways. First, because he cannot "de facto," either
13430 through being altogether unable---and thus we have the impediment of "impotence"---or through being unable to do so freely,
13431 and thus we have the impediment of the "condition of slavery." Secondly, because he cannot do it lawfully, and this because
13432 he is bound to continence, which happens in two ways, either through his being bound on account of the office he has undertaken
13433 to fulfill---and thus we have the impediment of "Order"---or on account of his having taken a vow---and thus "Vow" is an
13434 impediment.
13435 </p>
13436 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p21"> If, however, a person is hindered from marrying, not simply but in reference to a particular person, this is either because
13437 he is bound to another person, and thus he who is married to one cannot marry another, which constitutes the impediment of
13438 the "bond of marriage"---or through lack of proportion to the other party, and this for three reasons. First, on account of
13439 too great a distance separating them, and thus we have "difference of worship"; secondly, on account of their
13440 being too closely related, and thus we have three impediments, namely "kinship," then "affinity," which denotes the close
13441 relationship between two persons, in reference to a third united to one of them by marriage, and the "justice of public honesty,"
13442 where we have a close relationship between two persons arising out of the betrothal of one of them to a third person; thirdly,
13443 on account of a previous undue union between him and the woman, and thus the "crime of adultery" previously committed
13444 with her is an impediment.
13445 </p>
13446 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p22">
13447 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There may be impediments to the other sacraments also in the omission either of that which is essential, or of that which
13448 pertains to the solemnization of the sacrament, as stated above. However, impediments are assigned to matrimony rather than
13449 to the other sacraments for three reasons. First, because matrimony consists of two persons, and consequently can be impeded
13450 in more ways than the other sacraments which refer to one person taken individually;
13451 secondly, because matrimony has its cause in us and in God, while some of the other sacraments have their cause in God alone.
13452 Wherefore penance which in a manner has a cause in us, is assigned certain impediments by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 16), such
13453 as hypocrisy, the public games, and so forth; thirdly, because other sacraments are objects of command or counsel, as being
13454 more perfect goods, whereas marriage is a matter of indulgence, as being a less perfect good (
13455 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q50_A1-p22.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.6" target="asv">1 Cor.
13456 7:6
13457 </a>). Wherefore, in order to afford an opportunity of proficiency towards a greater good, more impediments are assigned to matrimony
13458 than to the other sacraments.
13459 </p>
13460 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p23">
13461 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The more perfect things can be hindered in more ways, in so far as more conditions are required for them. And if an imperfect
13462 thing requires more conditions, there will be more impediments to it; and thus it is in matrimony.
13463 </p>
13464 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p24">
13465 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would hold, were there no other and more efficacious remedies for the disease of concupiscence; which is false.
13466 </p>
13467 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p25">
13468 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Persons are said to be unlawful subjects for marriage through being contrary to the law whereby marriage is established.
13469 Now marriage as fulfilling an office of nature is established by the natural law; as a sacrament, by the Divine law; as fulfilling
13470 an office of society, by the civil law. Consequently a person may be rendered an unlawful subject of marriage by any of the
13471 aforesaid laws. Nor does the comparison with the other sacraments hold, for
13472 they are sacraments only. And since the natural law is particularized in various ways according to the various states of mankind,
13473 and since positive law, too, varies according to the various conditions of men, the Master (Sent. iv, D, 34) asserts that
13474 at various times various persons have been unlawful subjects of marriage.
13475 </p>
13476 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p26">
13477 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The law may forbid a thing either altogether, or in part and in certain cases. Hence between that which is altogether according
13478 to the law and that which is altogether against the law (which are opposed by contrariety and not according to affirmation
13479 and negation), that which is somewhat according to the law and somewhat against the law is a middle term. For this reason
13480 certain persons hold a middle place between those who are simply lawful subjects
13481 and those who are simply unlawful.
13482 </p>
13483 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p27">
13484 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Those impediments which do not annul a marriage already contracted sometimes hinder a marriage from being contracted, by
13485 rendering it not invalid but unlawful. And if it be contracted it is a true marriage although the contracting parties sin;
13486 just as by consecrating after breaking one's fast one would sin by disobeying the Church's ordinance, and yet it would be
13487 a valid sacrament because it is not essential to the sacrament that the consecrator be
13488 fasting.
13489 </p>
13490 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p28">
13491 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> When we say that the aforesaid impediments annul marriage already contracted, we do not mean that they dissolve a marriage
13492 contracted in due form, but that they dissolve a marriage contracted "de facto" and not "de jure." Wherefore if an impediment
13493 supervene after a marriage has been contracted in due form, it cannot dissolve the marriage.
13494 </p>
13495 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p29">
13496 <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> The impediments that hinder a good accidentally are infinite in number, like all accidental causes. But the causes which
13497 of their own nature corrupt a certain good are directed to that effect, and determinate, even as are the causes which produce
13498 that good; for the causes by which a thing is destroyed and those by which it is made are either contrary to one another,
13499 or the same but taken in a contrary way.
13500 </p>
13501 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p30">
13502 <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> The conditions of particular persons taken individually are infinite in number, but taken in general, they may be reduced
13503 to a certain number; as instanced in medicine and all operative arts, which consider the conditions of particular persons
13504 in whom acts are.
13505 </p>
13506 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p31"></p>
13507 <p id="XP_Q50_A1-p32"></p>
13508 <a href="summa.XP_Q50.html"></a>
13509 <a href="summa.XP_Q51.html"></a>
13510 </div>
13511 <a href="summa.XP_Q49_A6.html"></a>
13512 <a href="summa.XP_Q50_A1.html"></a>
13513 </div>
13514 <div id="XP_Q51" class="div3">
13515 <a href="summa.XP_Q50_A1.html"></a>
13516 <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A1.html"></a>
13517 <h3 id="XP_Q51-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF ERROR (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
13518 <p id="XP_Q51-p1"></p>
13519 <p id="XP_Q51-p2"> We must now consider the impediments to matrimony in particular, and in the first place the impediment of error. Under this
13520 head there are two points of inquiry:
13521 </p>
13522 <p id="XP_Q51-p3"> (1) Whether error of its very nature is an impediment to matrimony?</p>
13523 <p id="XP_Q51-p4"> (2) What kind of error?</p>
13524 <div id="XP_Q51_A1" class="div4">
13525 <a href="summa.XP_Q51.html"></a>
13526 <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A2.html"></a>
13527 <h4 id="XP_Q51_A1-p0.1">Whether it is right to reckon error as an impediment to marriage?</h4>
13528 <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p1"></p>
13529 <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p2">
13530 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that error should not be reckoned in itself an impediment to marriage. For consent, which is the efficient
13531 cause of marriage, is hindered in the same way as the voluntary. Now the voluntary, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
13532 1), may be hindered by ignorance. But ignorance is not the same as error, because ignorance excludes knowledge altogether,
13533 whereas error does not, since "error is to approve the false as though it were true,"
13534 according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 11). Therefore ignorance rather than error should have been reckoned here as an impediment
13535 to marriage.
13536 </p>
13537 <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p3">
13538 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which of its very nature can be an impediment to marriage is in opposition to the good of marriage. But error
13539 is not a thing of this kind. Therefore error is not by its very nature an impediment to marriage.
13540 </p>
13541 <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p4">
13542 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as consent is required for marriage, so is intention required for baptism. Now if one were to baptize John,
13543 thinking to baptize Peter, John would be baptized none the less. Therefore error does not annul matrimony.
13544 </p>
13545 <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p5">
13546 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there was true marriage between Lia and Jacob, and yet, in this case, there was error. Therefore error does not
13547 annul a marriage.
13548 </p>
13549 <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p6">
13550 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the Digests (Si per errorem, ff. De jurisdic. omn. judic.): "What is more opposed to consent than error?" Now
13551 consent is required for marriage. Therefore error is an impediment to matrimony.
13552 </p>
13553 <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p7"> Further, consent denotes something voluntary. Now error is an obstacle to the voluntary, since "the voluntary," according
13554 to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (De Nat. Hom. xxxii),
13555 "is that which has its principle in one who has knowledge of singulars which are the matter of actions." But this does not
13556 apply to one who is in error. Therefore error is an impediment to matrimony.
13557 </p>
13558 <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p8">
13559 <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever hinders a cause, of its very nature hinders the effect likewise. Now consent is the cause of matrimony, as stated
13560 above (
13561 <a id="XP_Q51_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q45_A1.html">Q[45], A[1]</a>). Hence whatever voids the consent, voids marriage. Now consent is an act of the will, presupposing an act of the intellect;
13562 and if the first be lacking, the second must needs be lacking also. Hence, when error hinders knowledge, there follows a defect
13563 in the consent also, and consequently in
13564 the marriage. Therefore it is possible according to the natural law for error to void marriage.
13565 </p>
13566 <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p9">
13567 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Speaking simply, ignorance differs from error, because ignorance does not of its very nature imply an act of knowledge, while
13568 error supposes a wrong judgment of reason about something. However, as regards being an impediment to the voluntary, it differs
13569 not whether we call it ignorance or error, since no ignorance can be an impediment to the voluntary, unless it have error
13570 in conjunction with it, because the will's act presupposes an estimate or
13571 judgment about something which is the object of the will. Wherefore if there be ignorance there must needs be error; and for
13572 this reason error is set down as being the proximate cause.
13573 </p>
13574 <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p10">
13575 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although error is not of itself contrary to matrimony, it is contrary thereto as regards the cause of marriage.
13576 </p>
13577 <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p11">
13578 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The character of baptism is not caused directly by the intention of the baptizer, but by the material element applied outwardly;
13579 and the intention is effective only as directing the material element to its effect; whereas the marriage tie is caused by
13580 the consent directly. Hence the comparison fails.
13581 </p>
13582 <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p12">
13583 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 30) the marriage between Lia and Jacob was effected not by their coming together, which
13584 happened through an error, but by their consent, which followed afterwards. Yet both are clearly to be excused from sin (Sent.
13585 iv, D, 30).
13586 </p>
13587 <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p13"></p>
13588 <p id="XP_Q51_A1-p14"></p>
13589 <a href="summa.XP_Q51.html"></a>
13590 <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A2.html"></a>
13591 </div>
13592 <div id="XP_Q51_A2" class="div4">
13593 <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A1.html"></a>
13594 <a href="summa.XP_Q52.html"></a>
13595 <h4 id="XP_Q51_A2-p0.1">Whether every error is an impediment to matrimony?</h4>
13596 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p1"></p>
13597 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p2">
13598 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every error is an impediment to matrimony, and not, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 30), only error
13599 about the condition or the person. For that which applies to a thing as such applies to it in all its bearings. Now error
13600 is of its very nature an impediment to matrimony, as stated above
13601 <a id="XP_Q51_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q51_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore every error is an impediment to matrimony.
13602 </p>
13603 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p3">
13604 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if error, as such, is an impediment to matrimony, the greater the error the greater the impediment. Now the error
13605 concerning faith in a heretic who disbelieves in this sacrament is greater than an error concerning the person. Therefore
13606 it should be a greater impediment than error about the person.
13607 </p>
13608 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p4">
13609 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, error does not void marriage except as removing voluntariness. Now ignorance about any circumstance takes away voluntariness
13610 (Ethic. iii, 1). Therefore it is not only error about condition or person that is an impediment to matrimony.
13611 </p>
13612 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p5">
13613 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as the condition of slavery is an accident affecting the person, so are bodily or mental qualities. But error
13614 regarding the condition is an impediment to matrimony. Therefore error concerning quality or fortune is equally an impediment.
13615 </p>
13616 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p6">
13617 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, just as slavery or freedom pertains to the condition of person, so do high and low rank, or dignity of position
13618 and the lack thereof. Now error regarding the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony. Therefore error about the
13619 other matters mentioned is also an impediment.
13620 </p>
13621 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p7">
13622 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, just as the condition of slavery is an impediment, so are difference of worship and impotence, as we shall say further
13623 on (
13624 <a id="XP_Q51_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q52_A2.html">Q[52], A[2]</a>;
13625 <a id="XP_Q51_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q58_A1.html"> Q[58], A[1]</a>;
13626 <a id="XP_Q51_A2-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A1.html"> Q[59], A[1]</a>). Therefore just as error regarding the condition is an impediment, so also should error about those other matters be reckoned
13627 an impediment.
13628 </p>
13629 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p8">
13630 <b>Objection 7:</b> On the other hand, it would seem that not even error about the person is an impediment to marriage. For marriage is a contract
13631 even as a sale is. Now in buying and selling the sale is not voided if one coin be given instead of another of equal value.
13632 Therefore a marriage is not voided if one woman be taken instead of another.
13633 </p>
13634 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p9">
13635 <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, it is possible for them to remain in this error for many years and to beget between them sons and daughters. But
13636 it would be a grave assertion to maintain that they ought to be separated then. Therefore their previous error did not void
13637 their marriage.
13638 </p>
13639 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p10">
13640 <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, it might happen that the woman is betrothed to the brother of the man whom she thinks that she is consenting to
13641 marry, and that she has had carnal intercourse with him; in which case, seemingly, she cannot go back to the man to whom she
13642 thought to give her consent, but should hold on to his brother. Thus error regarding the person is not an impediment to marriage.
13643 </p>
13644 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p11">
13645 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as error, through causing involuntariness, is an excuse from sin, so on the same count is it an impediment to marriage.
13646 Now error does not excuse from sin unless it refer to a circumstance the presence or absence of which makes an action lawful
13647 or unlawful. For if a man were to strike his father with an iron rod thinking it to be of wood, he is not excused from sin
13648 wholly, although perhaps in part; but if a man were to strike his father, thinking to
13649 strike his son to correct him, he is wholly excused provided he take due care. Wherefore error, in order to void marriage,
13650 must needs be about the essentials of marriage. Now marriage includes two things, namely the two persons who are joined together,
13651 and the mutual power over one another wherein marriage consists. The first of these is removed by error concerning the person,
13652 the second by error regarding the condition, since a slave cannot freely give power over his body to another, without
13653 his master's consent. For this reason these two errors, and no others, are an impediment to matrimony.
13654 </p>
13655 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p12">
13656 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not from its generic nature that error is an impediment to marriage, but from the nature of the difference added thereto;
13657 namely from its being error about one of the essentials to marriage.
13658 </p>
13659 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p13">
13660 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An error of faith about matrimony is about things consequent upon matrimony, for instance on the question of its being a
13661 sacrament, or of its being lawful. Wherefore such error as these is no impediment to marriage, as neither does an error about
13662 baptism hinder a man from receiving the character, provided he intend to receive what the Church gives, although he believe
13663 it to be nothing.
13664 </p>
13665 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p14">
13666 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not any ignorance of a circumstance that causes the involuntariness which is an excuse from sin, as stated above; wherefore
13667 the argument does not prove.
13668 </p>
13669 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p15">
13670 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Difference of fortune or of quality does not make a difference in the essentials to matrimony, as the condition of slavery
13671 does. Hence the argument does not prove.
13672 </p>
13673 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p16">
13674 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Error about a person's rank, as such, does not void a marriage, for the same reason as neither does error about a personal
13675 quality. If, however, the error about a person's rank or position amounts to an error about the person, it is an impediment
13676 to matrimony. Hence, if the woman consent directly to this particular person, her error about his rank does not void the marriage;
13677 but if she intend directly to consent to marry the king's son, whoever he may
13678 be, then, if another man than the king's son be brought to her, there is error about the person, and the marriage will be
13679 void.
13680 </p>
13681 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p17">
13682 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Error is an impediment to matrimony, although it be about other impediments to marriage if it concern those things which
13683 render a person an unlawful subject of marriage. But (the Master) does not mention error about such things, because they are
13684 an impediment to marriage whether there be error about them or not; so that if a woman contract with a subdeacon, whether
13685 she know this or not, there is no marriage; whereas the condition of slavery is no
13686 impediment if the slavery be known. Hence the comparison fails.
13687 </p>
13688 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p18">
13689 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> In contracts money is regarded as the measure of other things (Ethic. v, 5), and not as being sought for its own sake. Hence
13690 if the coin paid is not what it is thought to be but another of equal value, this does not void the contract. But if there
13691 be error about a thing sought for its own sake, the contract is voided, for instance if one were to sell a donkey for a horse;
13692 and thus it is in the case in point.
13693 </p>
13694 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p19">
13695 <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> No matter how long they have cohabited, unless she be willing to consent again, there is no marriage.
13696 </p>
13697 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p20">
13698 <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> If she did not consent previously to marry his brother, she may hold to the one whom she took in error. Nor can she return
13699 to his brother, especially if there has been carnal intercourse between her and the man she took to husband. If, however,
13700 she had previously consented to take the first one in words of the present, she cannot have the second while the first lives.
13701 But she may either leave the second or return to the first; and ignorance of the
13702 fact excuses her from sin, just as she would be excused if after the consummation of the marriage a kinsman of her husband
13703 were to know her by fraud since she is not to be blamed for the other's deceit.
13704 </p>
13705 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p21"></p>
13706 <p id="XP_Q51_A2-p22"></p>
13707 <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A1.html"></a>
13708 <a href="summa.XP_Q52.html"></a>
13709 </div>
13710 <a href="summa.XP_Q50_A1.html"></a>
13711 <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A1.html"></a>
13712 </div>
13713 <div id="XP_Q52" class="div3">
13714 <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A2.html"></a>
13715 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A1.html"></a>
13716 <h3 id="XP_Q52-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF THE CONDITION OF SLAVERY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
13717 <p id="XP_Q52-p1"></p>
13718 <p id="XP_Q52-p2"> We must now consider the impediment of the condition of slavery. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
13719 <p id="XP_Q52-p3"> (1) Whether the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony?</p>
13720 <p id="XP_Q52-p4"> (2) Whether a slave can marry without his master's consent?</p>
13721 <p id="XP_Q52-p5"> (3) Whether a man who is already married can make himself a slave without his wife's consent?</p>
13722 <p id="XP_Q52-p6"> (4) Whether the children should follow the condition of their father or of their mother?</p>
13723 <div id="XP_Q52_A1" class="div4">
13724 <a href="summa.XP_Q52.html"></a>
13725 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A2.html"></a>
13726 <h4 id="XP_Q52_A1-p0.1">Whether the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony?</h4>
13727 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p1"></p>
13728 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p2">
13729 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the condition of slavery is no impediment to matrimony. For nothing is an impediment to marriage except
13730 what is in some way opposed to it. But slavery is in no way opposed to marriage, else there could be no marriage among slaves.
13731 Therefore slavery is no impediment to marriage.
13732 </p>
13733 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p3">
13734 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is contrary to nature cannot be an impediment to that which is according to nature. Now slavery is contrary
13735 to nature, for as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 6), "it is contrary to nature for man to wish to lord it over another man"; and
13736 this is also evident from the fact that it was said of man (
13737 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q52_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>) that he should "have dominion over the fishes of the sea," but not that he should have dominion over man. Therefore it
13738 cannot be an impediment to marriage, which is a natural thing.
13739 </p>
13740 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p4">
13741 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it is an impediment, this is either of natural law or of positive law. But it is not of natural law, since according
13742 to natural law all men are equal, as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 6), while it is stated at the beginning of the Digests (Manumissiones,
13743 ff. de just. et jure.) that slavery is not of natural law; and positive law springs from the natural law, as Tully says (De
13744 Invent. ii). Therefore, according to law, slavery is not an impediment to any
13745 marriage.
13746 </p>
13747 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p5">
13748 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which is an impediment to marriage is equally an impediment whether it be known or not, as in the case of consanguinity.
13749 Now the slavery of one party, if it be known to the other, is no impediment to their marriage. Therefore slavery, considered
13750 in itself, is unable to void a marriage; and consequently it should not be reckoned by itself as a distinct impediment to
13751 marriage.
13752 </p>
13753 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p6">
13754 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, just as one may be in error about slavery, so as to deem a person free who is a slave, so may one be in error about
13755 freedom, so as to deem a person a slave whereas he is free. But freedom is not accounted an impediment to matrimony. Therefore
13756 neither should slavery be so accounted.
13757 </p>
13758 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p7">
13759 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, leprosy is a greater burden to the fellowship of marriage and is a greater obstacle to the good of the offspring
13760 than slavery is. Yet leprosy is not reckoned an impediment to marriage. Therefore neither should slavery be so reckoned.
13761 </p>
13762 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p8">
13763 <b>On the contrary,</b> A Decretal says (De conjug. servorum, cap. Ad nostram) that "error regarding the condition hinders a marriage from being
13764 contracted and voids that which is already contracted."
13765 </p>
13766 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p9"> Further, marriage is one of the goods that are sought for their own sake, because it is qualified by honesty; whereas slavery
13767 is one of the things to be avoided for their own sake. Therefore marriage and slavery are contrary to one another; and consequently
13768 slavery is an impediment to matrimony.
13769 </p>
13770 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p10">
13771 <b>I answer that,</b> In the marriage contract one party is bound to the other in the matter of paying the debt; wherefore if one who thus binds
13772 himself is unable to pay the debt, ignorance of this inability, on the side of the party to whom he binds himself, voids the
13773 contract. Now just as impotence in respect of coition makes a person unable to pay the debt, so that he is altogether disabled,
13774 so slavery makes him unable to pay it freely. Therefore, just as ignorance or
13775 impotence in respect of coition is an impediment if not known but not if known, as we shall state further on (
13776 <a id="XP_Q52_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q58.html">Q[58])</a>, so the condition of slavery is an impediment if not known, but not if it be known.
13777 </p>
13778 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p11">
13779 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Slavery is contrary to marriage as regards the act to which marriage binds one party in relation to the other, because it
13780 prevents the free execution of that act; and again as regards the good of the offspring who become subject to the same condition
13781 by reason of the parent's slavery. Since, however, it is free to everyone to suffer detriment in that which is his due, if
13782 one of the parties knows the other to be a slave, the marriage is none the less
13783 valid. Likewise since in marriage there is an equal obligation on either side to pay the debt, neither party can exact of
13784 the other a greater obligation than that under which he lies; so that if a slave marry a bondswoman, thinking her to be free,
13785 the marriage is not thereby rendered invalid. It is therefore evident that slavery is no impediment to marriage except when
13786 it is unknown to the other party, even though the latter be in a condition of freedom; and so nothing prevents marriage between
13787 slaves, or even between a freeman and a bondswoman.
13788 </p>
13789 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p12">
13790 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing prevents a thing being against nature as to the first intention of nature, and yet not against nature as to its second
13791 intention. Thus, as stated in De Coelo, ii, all corruption, defect, and old age are contrary to nature, because nature intends
13792 being and perfection, and yet they are not contrary to the second intention of nature, because nature, through being unable
13793 to preserve being in one thing, preserves it in another which is engendered
13794 of the other's corruption. And when nature is unable to bring a thing to a greater perfection it brings it to a lesser; thus
13795 when it cannot produce a male it produces a female which is "a misbegotten male" (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3). I say then in
13796 like manner that slavery is contrary to the first intention of nature. Yet it is not contrary to the second, because natural
13797 reason has this inclination, and nature has this desire---that everyone should be good; but from the fact that a person sins,
13798 nature has an inclination that he should be punished for his sin, and thus slavery was brought in as a punishment of sin.
13799 Nor is it unreasonable for a natural thing to be hindered by that which is unnatural in this way; for thus is marriage hindered
13800 by impotence of coition, which impotence is contrary to nature in the way mentioned.
13801 </p>
13802 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p13">
13803 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural law requires punishment to be inflicted for guilt, and that no one should be punished who is not guilty; but
13804 the appointing of the punishment according to the circumstances of person and guilt belongs to positive law. Hence slavery
13805 which is a definite punishment is of positive law, and arises out of natural law, as the determinate from that which is indeterminate.
13806 And it arises from the determination of the same positive law that slavery
13807 if unknown is an impediment to matrimony, lest one who is not guilty be punished; for it is a punishment to the wife to have
13808 a slave for husband, and "vice versa."
13809 </p>
13810 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p14">
13811 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Certain impediments render a marriage unlawful; and since it is not our will that makes a thing lawful or unlawful, but the
13812 law to which our will ought to be subject, it follows that the validity or invalidity of a marriage is not affected either
13813 by ignorance (such as destroys voluntariness) of the impediment or by knowledge thereof; and such an impediment is affinity
13814 or a vow, and others of the same kind. other impediments, however, render a marriage
13815 ineffectual as to the payment of the debt; and since it is within the competency of our will to remit a debt that is due to
13816 us, it follows that such impediments, if known, do not invalidate a marriage, but only when ignorance of them destroys voluntariness.
13817 Such impediments are slavery and impotence of coition. And, because they have of themselves the nature of an impediment, they
13818 are reckoned as special impediments besides error; whereas a change of person is not reckoned a special impediment
13819 besides error, because the substitution of another person has not the nature of an impediment except by reason of the intention
13820 of one of the contracting parties.
13821 </p>
13822 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p15">
13823 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Freedom does not hinder the marriage act, wherefore ignorance of freedom is no impediment to matrimony.
13824 </p>
13825 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p16">
13826 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Leprosy does not hinder marriage as to its first act, since lepers can pay the debt freely; although they lay a burden upon
13827 marriage as to its secondary effects; wherefore it is not an impediment to marriage as slavery is.
13828 </p>
13829 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p17"></p>
13830 <p id="XP_Q52_A1-p18"></p>
13831 <a href="summa.XP_Q52.html"></a>
13832 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A2.html"></a>
13833 </div>
13834 <div id="XP_Q52_A2" class="div4">
13835 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A1.html"></a>
13836 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A3.html"></a>
13837 <h4 id="XP_Q52_A2-p0.1">Whether a slave can marry without his master's consent?</h4>
13838 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p1"></p>
13839 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p2">
13840 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a slave cannot marry without his master's consent. For no one can give a person that which is another's
13841 without the latter's consent. Now a slave is his master's chattel. Therefore he cannot give his wife power over his body by
13842 marrying without his master's consent.
13843 </p>
13844 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p3">
13845 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a slave is bound to obey his master. But his master may command him not to consent to marry. Therefore he cannot
13846 marry without his consent.
13847 </p>
13848 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p4">
13849 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, after marriage, a slave is bound even by a precept of the Divine law to pay the debt to his wife. But at the time
13850 that his wife asks for the debt his master may demand of him a service which he will be unable to perform if he wish to occupy
13851 himself in carnal intercourse. Therefore if a slave can marry without his master's consent, the latter would be deprived of
13852 a service due to him without any fault of his; and this ought not to be.
13853 </p>
13854 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p5">
13855 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a master may sell his slave into a foreign country, where the latter's wife is unable to follow him, through either
13856 bodily weakness, or imminent danger to her faith; for instance if he be sold to unbelievers, or if her master be unwilling,
13857 supposing her to be a bondswoman; and thus the marriage will be dissolved, which is unfitting. Therefore a slave cannot marry
13858 without his master's consent.
13859 </p>
13860 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p6">
13861 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the burden under which a man binds himself to the Divine service is more advantageous than that whereby a man subjects
13862 himself to his wife. But a slave cannot enter religion or receive orders without his master's consent. Much less therefore
13863 can he be married without his consent.
13864 </p>
13865 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p7">
13866 <b>On the contrary,</b> "In Christ Jesus . . . there is neither bond nor free" (
13867 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q52_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.26" target="asv">Gal. 3:26</a>,
13868 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q52_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.28" target="asv">28</a>). Therefore both freeman and bondsman enjoy the same liberty to marry in the faith of Christ Jesus.
13869 </p>
13870 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p8"> Further, slavery is of positive law; whereas marriage is of natural and Divine law. Since then positive law is not prejudicial
13871 to the natural or the Divine law, it would seem that a slave can marry without his master's consent.
13872 </p>
13873 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p9">
13874 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 3), the positive law arises out of the natural law, and consequently slavery, which is of positive
13875 law, cannot be prejudicious to those things that are of natural law. Now just as nature seeks the preservation of the individual,
13876 so does it seek the preservation of the species by means of procreation; wherefore even as a slave is not so subject to his
13877 master as not to be at liberty to eat, sleep, and do such things as pertain to the
13878 needs of his body, and without which nature cannot be preserved, so he is not subject to him to the extent of being unable
13879 to marry freely, even without his master's knowledge or consent.
13880 </p>
13881 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p10">
13882 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A slave is his master's chattel in matters superadded to nature, but in natural things all are equal. Wherefore, in things
13883 pertaining to natural acts, a slave can by marrying give another person power over his body without his master's consent.
13884 </p>
13885 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p11">
13886 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A slave is bound to obey his master in those things which his master can command lawfully; and just as his master cannot
13887 lawfully command him not to eat or sleep, so neither can he lawfully command him to refrain from marrying. For it is the concern
13888 of the lawgiver how each one uses his own, and consequently if the master command his slave not to marry, the slave is not
13889 bound to obey his master.
13890 </p>
13891 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p12">
13892 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If a slave has married with his master's consent, he should omit the service commanded by his master and pay the debt to
13893 his wife; because the master, by consenting to his slave's marriage, implicitly consented to all that marriage requires. If,
13894 however, the marriage was contracted without the master's knowledge or consent, he is not bound to pay the debt, but in preference
13895 to obey his master, if the two things are incompatible. Nevertheless in such
13896 matters there are many particulars to be considered, as in all human acts, namely the danger to which his wife's chastity
13897 is exposed, and the obstacle which the payment of the debt places in the way of the service commanded, and other like considerations,
13898 all of which being duly weighed it will be possible to judge which of the two in preference the slave is bound to obey, his
13899 master or his wife.
13900 </p>
13901 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p13">
13902 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In such a case it is said that the master should be compelled not to sell the slave in such a way as to increase the weight
13903 of the marriage burden, especially since he is able to obtain anywhere a just price for his slave.
13904 </p>
13905 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p14">
13906 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> By entering religion or receiving orders a man is bound to the Divine service for all time; whereas a husband is bound to
13907 pay the debt to his wife not always, but at a fitting time; hence the comparison fails. Moreover, he who enters religion or
13908 receives orders binds himself to works that are superadded to natural works, and in which his master has power over him, but
13909 not in natural works to which a man binds himself by marriage. Hence he cannot vow
13910 continence without his master's consent.
13911 </p>
13912 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p15"></p>
13913 <p id="XP_Q52_A2-p16"></p>
13914 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A1.html"></a>
13915 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A3.html"></a>
13916 </div>
13917 <div id="XP_Q52_A3" class="div4">
13918 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A2.html"></a>
13919 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A4.html"></a>
13920 <h4 id="XP_Q52_A3-p0.1">Whether slavery can supervene to marriage?</h4>
13921 <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p1"></p>
13922 <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p2">
13923 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that slavery cannot supervene to marriage, by the husband selling himself to another as slave. Because what
13924 is done by fraud and to another's detriment should not hold. But a husband who sells himself for a slave, does so sometimes
13925 to cheat marriage, and at least to the detriment of his wife. Therefore such a sale should not hold as to the effect of slavery.
13926 </p>
13927 <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p3">
13928 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, two favorable things outweigh one that is not favorable. Now marriage and freedom are favorable things and are contrary
13929 to slavery, which in law is not a favorable thing. Therefore such a slavery ought to be entirely annulled in marriage.
13930 </p>
13931 <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p4">
13932 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in marriage husband and wife are on a par with one another. Now the wife cannot surrender herself to be a slave
13933 without her husband's consent. Therefore neither can the husband without his wife's consent.
13934 </p>
13935 <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p5">
13936 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in natural things that which hinders a thing being generated destroys it after it has been generated. Now bondage
13937 of the husband, if unknown to the wife, is an impediment to the act of marriage before it is performed. Therefore if it could
13938 supervene to marriage it would dissolve it; which is unreasonable.
13939 </p>
13940 <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p6">
13941 <b>On the contrary,</b> Everyone can give another that which is his own. Now the husband is his own master since he is free. Therefore he can surrender
13942 his right to another.
13943 </p>
13944 <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p7"> Further, a slave can marry without his master's consent, as stated above
13945 <a id="XP_Q52_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q52_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore a husband can in like manner subject himself to a master, without his wife's consent.
13946 </p>
13947 <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p8">
13948 <b>I answer that,</b> A husband is subject to his wife in those things which pertain to the act of nature; in these things they are equal, and
13949 the subjection of slavery does not extend thereto. Wherefore the husband, without his wife's knowledge, can surrender himself
13950 to be another's slave. Nor does this result in a dissolution of the marriage, since no impediment supervening to marriage
13951 can dissolve it, as stated above (
13952 <a id="XP_Q52_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q50_A1.html">Q[50], A[1]</a>, ad 7).
13953 </p>
13954 <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p9">
13955 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The fraud can indeed hurt the person who has acted fraudulently, but it cannot be prejudicial to another person: wherefore
13956 if the husband, to cheat his wife, surrender himself to be another's slave, It will be to his own prejudice, through his losing
13957 the inestimable good of freedom; whereas this can nowise be prejudicial to the wife, and he is bound to pay her the debt when
13958 she asks, and to do all that marriage requires of him for he cannot be taken
13959 away from these obligations by his master's command.
13960 </p>
13961 <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p10">
13962 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In so far as slavery is opposed to marriage, marriage is prejudicial to slavery, since the slave is bound then to pay the
13963 debt to his wife, though his master be unwilling.
13964 </p>
13965 <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p11">
13966 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although husband and wife are considered to be on a par in the marriage act and in things relating to nature, to which the
13967 condition of slavery does not extend, nevertheless as regards the management of the household, and other such additional matters
13968 the husband is the head of the wife and should correct her, and not "vice versa." Hence the wife cannot surrender herself
13969 to be a slave without her husband's consent.
13970 </p>
13971 <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p12">
13972 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This argument considers corruptible things; and yet even in these there are many obstacles to generation that are not capable
13973 of destroying what is already generated. But in things which have stability it is possible to have an impediment which prevents
13974 a certain thing from beginning to be, yet does not cause it to cease to be; as instanced by the rational soul. It is the same
13975 with marriage, which is a lasting tie so long as this life lasts.
13976 </p>
13977 <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p13"></p>
13978 <p id="XP_Q52_A3-p14"></p>
13979 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A2.html"></a>
13980 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A4.html"></a>
13981 </div>
13982 <div id="XP_Q52_A4" class="div4">
13983 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A3.html"></a>
13984 <a href="summa.XP_Q53.html"></a>
13985 <h4 id="XP_Q52_A4-p0.1">Whether children should follow the condition of their father?</h4>
13986 <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p1"></p>
13987 <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p2">
13988 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that children should follow the condition of their father. Because dominion belongs to those of higher rank.
13989 Now in generating the father ranks above the mother. Therefore, etc.
13990 </p>
13991 <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p3">
13992 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the being of a thing depends on the form more than on the matter. Now in generation the father gives the form, and
13993 the mother the matter (De Gener. Animal. ii, 4). Therefore the child should follow the condition of the father rather than
13994 of the mother.
13995 </p>
13996 <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p4">
13997 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing should follow that chiefly to which it is most like. Now the son is more like the father than the mother,
13998 even as the daughter is more like the mother. Therefore at least the son should follow the father in preference, and the daughter
13999 the mother.
14000 </p>
14001 <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p5">
14002 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in Holy Writ genealogies are not traced through the women but through the men. Therefore the children follow the
14003 father rather than the mother.
14004 </p>
14005 <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p6">
14006 <b>On the contrary,</b> If a man sows on another's land, the produce belongs to the owner of the land. Now the woman's womb in relation to the seed
14007 of man is like the land in relation to the sower. Therefore, etc.
14008 </p>
14009 <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p7"> Further, we observe that in animals born from different species the offspring follows the mother rather that the father,
14010 wherefore mules born of a mare and an ass are more like mares than those born of a she-ass and a horse. Therefore it should
14011 be the same with men.
14012 </p>
14013 <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p8">
14014 <b>I answer that,</b> According to civil law (XIX, ff. De statu hom. vii, cap. De rei vendit.) the offspring follows the womb: and this is reasonable
14015 since the offspring derives its formal complement from the father, but the substance of the body from the mother. Now slavery
14016 is a condition of the body, since a slave is to the master a kind of instrument in working; wherefore children follow the
14017 mother in freedom and bondage; whereas in matters pertaining to dignity as proceeding
14018 from a thing's form, they follow the father, for instance in honors, franchise, inheritance and so forth. The canons are in
14019 agreement with this (cap. Liberi, 32, qu. iv, in gloss.: cap. Inducens, De natis ex libero ventre) as also the law of Moses
14020 (
14021 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q52_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21" target="asv">Ex. 21</a>).
14022 </p>
14023 <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p9"> In some countries, however, where the civil law does not hold, the offspring follows the inferior condition, so that if the
14024 father be a slave the children will be slaves although the mother be free; but not if the father gave himself up as a slave
14025 after his marriage and without his wife's consent; and the same applies if the case be reversed. And if both be of servile
14026 condition and belong to different masters, the children, if several, are divided among the latter, or if one
14027 only, the one master will compensate the other in value and will take the child thus born for his slave. However it is incredible
14028 that this custom have as much reason in its favor as the decision of the time-honored deliberations of many wise men. Moreover
14029 in natural things it is the rule that what is received is in the recipient according to the mode of the recipient and not
14030 according to the mode of the giver; wherefore it is reasonable that the seed received by the mother should be drawn to
14031 her condition.
14032 </p>
14033 <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p10">
14034 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the father is a more noble principle than the mother, nevertheless the mother provides the substance of the body,
14035 and it is to this that the condition of slavery attaches.
14036 </p>
14037 <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p11">
14038 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As regards things pertaining to the specific nature the son is like the father rather than the mother, but in material conditions
14039 should be like the mother rather than the father, since a thing has its specific being from its form, but material conditions
14040 from matter.
14041 </p>
14042 <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p12">
14043 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The son is like the father in respect of the form which is his, and also the father's, complement. Hence the argument is
14044 not to the point.
14045 </p>
14046 <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p13">
14047 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is because the son derives honor from his father rather than from his mother that in the genealogies of Scripture, and
14048 according to common custom, children are named after their father rather than from their mother. But in matters relating to
14049 slavery they follow the mother by preference.
14050 </p>
14051 <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p14"></p>
14052 <p id="XP_Q52_A4-p15"></p>
14053 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A3.html"></a>
14054 <a href="summa.XP_Q53.html"></a>
14055 </div>
14056 <a href="summa.XP_Q51_A2.html"></a>
14057 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A1.html"></a>
14058 </div>
14059 <div id="XP_Q53" class="div3">
14060 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A4.html"></a>
14061 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A1.html"></a>
14062 <h3 id="XP_Q53-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF VOWS AND ORDERS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
14063 <p id="XP_Q53-p1"></p>
14064 <p id="XP_Q53-p2"> We must now consider the impediment of vows and orders. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
14065 <p id="XP_Q53-p3"> (1) Whether a simple vow is a diriment impediment to matrimony?</p>
14066 <p id="XP_Q53-p4"> (2) Whether a solemn vow is a diriment impediment?</p>
14067 <p id="XP_Q53-p5"> (3) Whether order is an impediment to matrimony?</p>
14068 <p id="XP_Q53-p6"> (4) Whether a man can receive a sacred order after being married?</p>
14069 <div id="XP_Q53_A1" class="div4">
14070 <a href="summa.XP_Q53.html"></a>
14071 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A2.html"></a>
14072 <h4 id="XP_Q53_A1-p0.1">Whether marriage already contracted should be annulled by the obligation of a simple vow?</h4>
14073 <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p1"></p>
14074 <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p2">
14075 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a marriage already contracted ought to be annulled by the obligation of a simple vow. For the stronger
14076 tie takes precedence of the weaker. Now a vow is a stronger tie than marriage, since the latter binds man to man, but the
14077 former binds man to God. Therefore the obligation of a vow takes precedence of the marriage tie.
14078 </p>
14079 <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p3">
14080 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God's commandment is no less binding than the commandment of the Church. Now the commandment of the Church is so
14081 binding that a marriage is void if contracted in despite thereof; as instanced in the case of those who marry within the degrees
14082 of kindred forbidden by the Church. Therefore, since it is a Divine commandment to keep a vow, it would seem that if a person
14083 marry in despite of a vow his marriage should be annulled for that reason.
14084 </p>
14085 <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p4">
14086 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in marriage a man may have carnal intercourse without sin. Yet he who has taken a simple vow of chastity can never
14087 have carnal intercourse with his wife without sin. Therefore a simple vow annuls marriage. The minor is proved as follows.
14088 It is clear that it is a mortal sin to marry after taking a simple vow of continence, since according to Jerome [*Cf. St.
14089 Augustine, De Bono Viduit, ix] "for those who vow virginity it is damnable not only to marry,
14090 but even to wish to marry." Now the marriage contract is not contrary to the vow of continence, except by reason of carnal
14091 intercourse: and therefore he sins mortally the first time he has intercourse with his wife, and for the same reason every
14092 other time, because a sin committed in the first instance cannot be an excuse for a subsequent sin.
14093 </p>
14094 <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p5">
14095 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, husband and wife should be equal in marriage, especially as regards carnal intercourse. But he who has taken a simple
14096 vow of continence can never ask for the debt without a sin, for this is clearly against his vow of continence, since he is
14097 bound to continence by vow. Therefore neither can he pay the debt without sin.
14098 </p>
14099 <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p6">
14100 <b>On the contrary,</b> Pope Clement [*Alexander III] says (cap. Consuluit, De his qui cler. vel vovent.) that a "simple vow is an impediment to
14101 the contract of marriage, but does not annul it after it is contracted."
14102 </p>
14103 <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p7">
14104 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing ceases to be in one man's power from the fact that it passes into the power of another. Now the promise of a thing
14105 does not transfer it into the power of the person to whom it is promised, wherefore a thing does not cease to be in a person's
14106 power for the reason that he has promised it. Since then a simple vow contains merely a simple promise of one's body to the
14107 effect of keeping continence for God's sake, a man still retains power over his own body
14108 after a simple vow, and consequently can surrender it to another, namely his wife; and in this surrender consists the sacrament
14109 of matrimony, which is indissoluble. Therefore although a simple vow is an impediment to the contracting of a marriage, since
14110 it is a sin to marry after taking a simple vow of continence, yet since the contract is valid, the marriage cannot be annulled
14111 on that account.
14112 </p>
14113 <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p8">
14114 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A vow is a stronger tie than matrimony, as regards that to which man is tied, and the obligation under which he lies. because
14115 by marriage a man is tied to his wife, with the obligation of paying the debt, whereas by a vow a man is tied to God, with
14116 the obligation of remaining continent. But as to the manner in which he is tied marriage is a stronger tie than a simple vow,
14117 since by marriage a man surrenders himself actually to the power of his wife,
14118 but not by a simple vow as explained above: and the possessor is always in the stronger position. In this respect a simple
14119 vow binds in the same way as a betrothal; wherefore a betrothal must be annulled on account of a simple vow.
14120 </p>
14121 <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p9">
14122 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The contracting of a marriage between blood relations is annulled by the commandment forbidding such marriages, not precisely
14123 because it is a commandment of God or of the Church, but because it makes it impossible for the body of a kinswoman to be
14124 transferred into the power of her kinsman: whereas the commandment forbidding marriage after a simple vow has not this effect,
14125 as already stated. Hence the argument is void for it assigns as a cause that
14126 which is not cause.
14127 </p>
14128 <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p10">
14129 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If after taking a simple vow a man contract marriage by words of the present, he cannot know his wife without mortal sin,
14130 because until the marriage is consummated he is still in a position to fulfill the vow of continence. But after the marriage
14131 has been consummated, thenceforth through his fault it is unlawful for him not to pay the debt when his wife asks: wherefore
14132 this is not covered by his obligation to his vow, as explained above (ad 1).
14133 Nevertheless he should atone for not keeping continence, by his tears of repentance.
14134 </p>
14135 <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p11">
14136 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> After contracting marriage he is still bound to keep his vow of continence in those matters wherein he is not rendered unable
14137 to do so. Hence if his wife die he is bound to continence altogether. And since the marriage tie does not bind him to ask
14138 for the debt, he cannot ask for it without sin, although he can pay the debt without sin on being asked, when once he has
14139 incurred this obligation through the carnal intercourse that has already occurred.
14140 And this holds whether the wife ask expressly or interpretively, as when she is ashamed and her husband feels that she desires
14141 him to pay the debt, for then he may pay it without sin. This is especially the case if he fears to endanger her chastity:
14142 nor does it matter that they are equal in the marriage act, since everyone may renounce what is his own. Some say, however,
14143 that he may both ask and pay lest the marriage become too burdensome to the wife who has always to ask; but if this be looked
14144 into aright, it is the same as asking interpretively.
14145 </p>
14146 <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p12"></p>
14147 <p id="XP_Q53_A1-p13"></p>
14148 <a href="summa.XP_Q53.html"></a>
14149 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A2.html"></a>
14150 </div>
14151 <div id="XP_Q53_A2" class="div4">
14152 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A1.html"></a>
14153 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A3.html"></a>
14154 <h4 id="XP_Q53_A2-p0.1">Whether a solemn vow dissolves a marriage already contracted?</h4>
14155 <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p1"></p>
14156 <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p2">
14157 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not even a solemn vow dissolves a marriage already contracted. For according to a Decretal (cap. Rursus,
14158 De his qui cler. vel vovent.) "in God's sight a simple vow is no less binding than a solemn one." Now marriage stands or falls
14159 by virtue of the Divine acceptance. Therefore since a simple vow does not dissolve marriage, neither will a solemn vow dissolve
14160 it.
14161 </p>
14162 <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p3">
14163 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a solemn vow does not add the same force to a simple vow as an oath does. Now a simple vow, even though an oath
14164 be added thereto, does not dissolve a marriage already contracted. Neither therefore does a solemn vow.
14165 </p>
14166 <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p4">
14167 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a solemn vow has nothing that a simple vow cannot have. For a simple vow may give rise to scandal since it may be
14168 public, even as a solemn vow. Again the Church could and should ordain that a simple vow dissolves a marriage already contracted,
14169 so that many sins may be avoided. Therefore for the same reason that a simple vow does not dissolve a marriage already contracted,
14170 neither should a solemn vow dissolve it.
14171 </p>
14172 <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p5">
14173 <b>On the contrary,</b> He who takes a solemn vow contracts a spiritual marriage with God, which is much more excellent than a material marriage.
14174 Now a material marriage already contracted annuls a marriage contracted afterwards. Therefore a solemn vow does also.
14175 </p>
14176 <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p6"> Further, the same conclusion may be proved by many authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 28).</p>
14177 <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p7">
14178 <b>I answer that,</b> All agree that as a solemn vow is an impediment to the contracting of marriage, so it invalidates the contract. Some assign
14179 scandal as the reason. But this is futile, because even a simple vow sometimes leads to scandal since it is at times somewhat
14180 public. Moreover the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the truth of life [*Cf.
14181 <a id="XP_Q53_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html">FP, Q[16], A[4]</a>, ad 3;
14182 <a id="XP_Q53_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html">FP, Q[21], A[2]</a>, ad 2;
14183 <a id="XP_Q53_A2-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q109_A3.html">SS,
14184 Q[109], A[3]
14185 </a>, ad 3], which truth is not to be set aside on account of scandal. Wherefore others say that it is on account of the ordinance
14186 of the Church. But this again is insufficient, since in that case the Church might decide the contrary, which is seemingly
14187 untrue. Wherefore we must say with others that a solemn vow of its very nature dissolves the marriage contract, inasmuch namely
14188 as thereby a man has lost the power over his own body, through surrendering it to God for the purpose of
14189 perpetual continence. Wherefore he is unable to surrender it to the power of a wife by contracting marriage. And since the
14190 marriage that follows such a vow is void, a vow of this kind is said to annul the marriage contracted.
14191 </p>
14192 <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p8">
14193 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A simple vow is said to be no less binding in God's sight than a solemn vow, in matters pertaining to God, for instance the
14194 separation from God by mortal sin, because he who breaks a simple vow commits a mortal sin just as one who breaks a solemn
14195 vow, although it is more grievous to break a solemn vow, so that the comparison be understood as to the genus and not as to
14196 the definite degree of guilt. But as regards marriage, whereby one man is under an
14197 obligation to another, there is no need for it to be of equal obligation even in general, since a solemn vow binds to certain
14198 things to which a simple vow does not bind.
14199 </p>
14200 <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p9">
14201 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An oath is more binding than a vow on the part of the cause of the obligation: but a solemn vow is more binding as to the
14202 manner in which it binds, in so far as it is an actual surrender of that which is promised; while an oath does not do this
14203 actually. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
14204 </p>
14205 <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p10">
14206 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A solemn vow implies the actual surrender of one's body, whereas a simple vow does not, as stated above
14207 <a id="XP_Q53_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q53_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Hence the argument does not suffice to prove the conclusion.
14208 </p>
14209 <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p11"></p>
14210 <p id="XP_Q53_A2-p12"></p>
14211 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A1.html"></a>
14212 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A3.html"></a>
14213 </div>
14214 <div id="XP_Q53_A3" class="div4">
14215 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A2.html"></a>
14216 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A4.html"></a>
14217 <h4 id="XP_Q53_A3-p0.1">Whether order is an impediment to matrimony?</h4>
14218 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p1"></p>
14219 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p2">
14220 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that order is not an impediment to matrimony. For nothing is an impediment to a thing except its contrary.
14221 But order is not contrary to matrimony. Therefore it is not an impediment thereto.
14222 </p>
14223 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p3">
14224 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, orders are the same with us as with the Eastern Church. But they are not an impediment to matrimony in the Eastern
14225 Church. Therefore, etc.
14226 </p>
14227 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p4">
14228 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church. Now this is most fittingly signified in those who are Christ's
14229 ministers, those namely who are ordained. Therefore order is not an impediment to matrimony.
14230 </p>
14231 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p5">
14232 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all the orders are directed to spiritual things. Now order cannot be an impediment to matrimony except by reason
14233 of its spirituality. Therefore if order is an impediment to matrimony, every order will be an impediment, and this is untrue.
14234 </p>
14235 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p6">
14236 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, every ordained person can have ecclesiastical benefices, and can enjoy equally the privilege of clergy. If, therefore,
14237 orders are an impediment to marriage, because married persons cannot have an ecclesiastical benefice, nor enjoy the privilege
14238 of clergy, as jurists assert (cap. Joannes et seqq., De cler. conjug.), then every order ought to be an impediment. Yet this
14239 is false, as shown by the Decretal of Alexander III (De cler. conjug., cap. Si Quis):
14240 and consequently it would seem that no order is an impediment to marriage.
14241 </p>
14242 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p7">
14243 <b>On the contrary,</b> the Decretal says (De cler. conjug., cap. Si Quis): "any person whom you shall find to have taken a wife after receiving
14244 the subdiaconate or the higher orders, you shall compel to put his wife away." But this would not be so if the marriage were
14245 valid.
14246 </p>
14247 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p8"> Further, no person who has vowed continence can contract marriage. Now some orders have a vow of continence connected with
14248 them, as appears from the text (Sent. iv, D, 37). Therefore in that case order is an impediment to matrimony.
14249 </p>
14250 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p9">
14251 <b>I answer that,</b> By a certain fittingness the very nature of holy order requires that it should be an impediment to marriage: because those
14252 who are in holy orders handle the sacred vessels and the sacraments: wherefore it is becoming that they keep their bodies
14253 clean by continence [*Cf.
14254 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q53_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.52.11" target="asv"> Is. 52:11</a>]. But it is owing to the Church's ordinance that it is actually an impediment to marriage. However it is not the same with
14255 the Latins as with the Greeks; since
14256 with the Greeks it is an impediment to the contracting of marriage, solely by virtue of order; whereas with the Latins it
14257 is an impediment by virtue of order, and besides by virtue of the vow of continence which is annexed to the sacred orders;
14258 for although this vow is not expressed in words, nevertheless a person is understood to have taken it by the very fact of
14259 his being ordained. Hence among the Greeks and other Eastern peoples a sacred order is an impediment to the contracting of
14260 matrimony
14261 but it does not forbid the use of marriage already contracted: for they can use marriage contracted previously, although they
14262 cannot be married again. But in the Western Church it is an impediment both to marriage and to the use of marriage, unless
14263 perhaps the husband should receive a sacred order without the knowledge or consent of his wife, because this cannot be prejudicial
14264 to her.
14265 </p>
14266 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p10"> Of the distinction between sacred and non-sacred orders now and in the early Church we have spoken above (
14267 <a id="XP_Q53_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q37_A3.html">Q[37], A[3]</a>).
14268 </p>
14269 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p11">
14270 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although a sacred order is not contrary to matrimony as a sacrament, it has a certain incompatibility with marriage in respect
14271 of the latter's act which is an obstacle to spiritual acts.
14272 </p>
14273 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p12">
14274 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The objection is based on a false statement: since order is everywhere an impediment to the contracting of marriage, although
14275 it has not everywhere a vow annexed to it.
14276 </p>
14277 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p13">
14278 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who are in sacred orders signify Christ by more sublime actions, as appears from what has been said in the treatise
14279 on orders (
14280 <a id="XP_Q53_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q37_A2.html">Q[37], AA[2]</a>,4), than those who are married. Consequently the conclusion does not follow.
14281 </p>
14282 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p14">
14283 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those who are in minor orders are not forbidden to marry by virtue of their order; for although those orders are entrusted
14284 with certain spiritualities, they are not admitted to the immediate handling of sacred things, as those are who are in sacred
14285 orders. But according to the laws of the Western Church, the use of marriage is an impediment to the exercise of a non-sacred
14286 order, for the sake of maintaining a greater honesty in the offices of the
14287 Church. And since the holding of an ecclesiastical benefice binds a man to the exercise of his order, and since for this very
14288 reason he enjoys the privilege of clergy, it follows that in the Latin Church this privilege is forfeit to a married cleric.
14289 </p>
14290 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p15"> This suffices for the Reply to the last Objection.</p>
14291 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p16"></p>
14292 <p id="XP_Q53_A3-p17"></p>
14293 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A2.html"></a>
14294 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A4.html"></a>
14295 </div>
14296 <div id="XP_Q53_A4" class="div4">
14297 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A3.html"></a>
14298 <a href="summa.XP_Q54.html"></a>
14299 <h4 id="XP_Q53_A4-p0.1">Whether a sacred order cannot supervene to matrimony?</h4>
14300 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p1"></p>
14301 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p2">
14302 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sacred order cannot supervene to matrimony. For the stronger prejudices the weaker. Now a spiritual
14303 obligation is stronger than a bodily tie. Therefore if a married man be ordained, this will prejudice the wife, so that she
14304 will be unable to demand the debt, since order is a spiritual, and marriage a bodily bond. Hence it would seem that a man
14305 cannot receive a sacred order after consummating marriage.
14306 </p>
14307 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p3">
14308 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, after consummating the marriage, one of the parties cannot vow continence without the other's consent [*Cf.
14309 <a id="XP_Q53_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q61_A1.html"> Q[61], A[1]</a>]. Now a sacred order has a vow of continence annexed to it. Therefore if the husband be ordained without his wife's consent,
14310 she will be bound to remain continent against her will, since she cannot marry another man during her husband's lifetime.
14311 </p>
14312 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p4">
14313 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a husband may not even for a time devote himself to prayer without his wife's consent (
14314 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q53_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:5</a>). But in the Eastern Church those who are in sacred orders are bound to continence for the time when they exercise their
14315 office. Therefore neither may they be ordained without their wife's consent, and much less may the Latins.
14316 </p>
14317 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p5">
14318 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, husband and wife are on a par with one another. Now a Greek priest cannot marry again after his wife's death. Therefore
14319 neither can his wife after her husband's death. But she cannot be deprived by her husband's act of the right to marry after
14320 his death. Therefore her husband cannot receive orders after marriage.
14321 </p>
14322 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p6">
14323 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, order is as much opposed to marriage as marriage to order. Now a previous order is an impediment to a subsequent
14324 marriage. Therefore, etc.
14325 </p>
14326 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p7">
14327 <b>On the contrary,</b> Religious are bound to continence like those who are in sacred orders. But a man may enter religion after marriage, if his
14328 wife die, or if she consent. Therefore he can also receive orders.
14329 </p>
14330 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p8"> Further, a man may become a man's bondsman after marriage. Therefore he can become a bondsman of God by receiving orders.</p>
14331 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p9">
14332 <b>I answer that,</b> Marriage is not an impediment to the receiving of sacred orders, since if a married man receive sacred orders, even though
14333 his wife be unwilling, he receives the character of order: but he lacks the exercise of his order. If, however, his wife consent,
14334 or if she be dead, he receives both the order and the exercise.
14335 </p>
14336 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p10">
14337 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The bond of orders dissolves the bond of marriage as regards the payment of the debt, in respect of which it is incompatible
14338 with marriage, on the part of the person ordained, since he cannot demand the debt, nor is the wife bound to pay it. But it
14339 does not dissolve the bond in respect of the other party, since the husband is bound to pay the debt to the wife if he cannot
14340 persuade her to observe continence.
14341 </p>
14342 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p11">
14343 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the husband receive sacred orders with the knowledge and consent of his wife, she is bound to vow perpetual continence,
14344 but she is not bound to enter religion, if she has no fear of her chastity being endangered through her husband having taken
14345 a solemn vow: it would have been different, however, if he had taken a simple vow. On the other hand, if he be ordained without
14346 her consent, she is not bound in this way, because the result is not
14347 prejudicial to her in any way.
14348 </p>
14349 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p12">
14350 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It would seem more probable, although some say the contrary, that even a Greek ought not to receive sacred orders without
14351 his wife's consent, since at least at the time of his ministry she would be deprived of the payment of the debt, of which
14352 she cannot be deprived according to law if the husband should have been ordained without her consent or knowledge.
14353 </p>
14354 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p13">
14355 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated, among the Greeks the wife, by the very fact of consenting to her husband's receiving a sacred order, binds herself
14356 never to marry another man, because the signification of marriage would not be safeguarded, and this is especially required
14357 in the marriage of a priest. If, however, he be ordained without her consent, seemingly she would not be under that obligation.
14358 </p>
14359 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p14">
14360 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Marriage has for its cause our consent: not so order, which has a sacramental cause appointed by God. Hence matrimony may
14361 be impeded by a previous order; so as not to be true marriage: whereas order cannot be impeded by marriage, so as not to be
14362 true order, because the power of the sacraments is unchangeable, whereas human acts can be impeded.
14363 </p>
14364 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p15"></p>
14365 <p id="XP_Q53_A4-p16"></p>
14366 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A3.html"></a>
14367 <a href="summa.XP_Q54.html"></a>
14368 </div>
14369 <a href="summa.XP_Q52_A4.html"></a>
14370 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A1.html"></a>
14371 </div>
14372 <div id="XP_Q54" class="div3">
14373 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A4.html"></a>
14374 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A1.html"></a>
14375 <h3 id="XP_Q54-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF CONSANGUINITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
14376 <p id="XP_Q54-p1"></p>
14377 <p id="XP_Q54-p2"> We must next consider the impediment of consanguinity. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
14378 <p id="XP_Q54-p3"> (1) Whether consanguinity is rightly defined by some?</p>
14379 <p id="XP_Q54-p4"> (2) Whether it is fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines?</p>
14380 <p id="XP_Q54-p5"> (3) Whether certain degrees are by natural law an impediment to marriage?</p>
14381 <p id="XP_Q54-p6"> (4) Whether the impediment degrees can be fixed by the ordinance of the Church?</p>
14382 <div id="XP_Q54_A1" class="div4">
14383 <a href="summa.XP_Q54.html"></a>
14384 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A2.html"></a>
14385 <h4 id="XP_Q54_A1-p0.1">Whether consanguinity is rightly defined?</h4>
14386 <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p1"></p>
14387 <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p2">
14388 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consanguinity is unsuitably defined by some as follows: "Consanguinity is the tie contracted between persons
14389 descending from the same common ancestor by carnal procreation." For all men descend from the same common ancestor, namely
14390 Adam, by carnal procreation. Therefore if the above definition of consanguinity is right, all men would be related by consanguinity:
14391 which is false.
14392 </p>
14393 <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p3">
14394 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a tie is only between things in accord with one another, since a tie unites. Now there is not greater accordance
14395 between persons descended from a common ancestor than there is between other men, since they accord in species but differ
14396 in number, just as other men do. Therefore consanguinity is not a tie.
14397 </p>
14398 <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p4">
14399 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, carnal procreation, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. ii, 19), is effected from the surplus food [*Cf.
14400
14401 <a id="XP_Q54_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q119_A2.html">FP, Q[119], A[2]</a>]. Now this surplus has more in common with that which is eaten, since it agrees with it in substance, than with him who eats.
14402 Since then no tie of consanguinity arises between the person born of semen and that which he eats, neither will there be any
14403 tie of kindred between him and the person of
14404 whom he is born by carnal procreation.
14405 </p>
14406 <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p5">
14407 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Laban said to Jacob (
14408 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q54_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.29.14" target="asv">Gn. 29:14</a>): "Thou art my bone and my flesh," on account of the relationship between them. Therefore such a kinship should be called
14409 flesh-relationship rather than blood-relationship [consanguinitas].
14410 </p>
14411 <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p6">
14412 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, carnal procreation is common to men and animals. But no tie of consanguinity is contracted among animals from carnal
14413 procreation. Therefore neither is there among men.
14414 </p>
14415 <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p7">
14416 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11, 12) "all friendship is based on some kind of fellowship." And since friendship
14417 is a knot or union, it follows that the fellowship which is the cause of friendship is called "a tie." Wherefore in respect
14418 of any kind of a fellowship certain persons are denominated as though they were tied together: thus we speak of fellow-citizens
14419 who are connected by a common political life, of fellow-soldiers who are connected by
14420 the common business of soldiering, and in the same way those who are connected by the fellowship of nature are said to be
14421 tied by blood [consanguinei]. Hence in the above definition "tie" is included as being the genus of consanguinity; the "persons
14422 descending from the same common ancestor," who are thus tied together are the subject of this tie. while "carnal procreation"
14423 is mentioned as being its origin.
14424 </p>
14425 <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p8">
14426 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An active force is not received into an instrument in the same degree of perfection as it has in the principal agent. And
14427 since every moved mover is an instrument, it follows that the power of the first mover in a particular genus when drawn out
14428 through many mediate movers fails at length, and reaches something that is moved and not a mover. But the power of a begetter
14429 moves not only as to that which belongs to the species, but also as to that which
14430 belongs to the individual, by reason of which the child is like the parent even in accidentals and not only in the specific
14431 nature. And yet this individual power of the father is not so perfect in the son as it was in the father, and still less so
14432 in the grandson, and thus it goes on failing: so that at length it ceases and can go no further. Since then consanguinity
14433 results from this power being communicated to many through being conveyed to them from one person by procreation, it destroys
14434 itself by little and little, as Isidore says (Etym. ix). Consequently in defining consanguinity we must not take a remote
14435 common ancestor but the nearest, whose power still remains in those who are descended from him.
14436 </p>
14437 <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p9">
14438 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is clear from what has been said that blood relations agree not only in the specific nature but also in that power peculiar
14439 to the individual which is conveyed from one to many: the result being that sometimes the child is not only like his father,
14440 but also his grandfather or his remote ancestors (De Gener. Anim. iv, 3).
14441 </p>
14442 <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p10">
14443 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Likeness depends more on form whereby a thing is actually, than on matter whereby a thing is potentially: for instance, charcoal
14444 has more in common with fire than with the tree from which the wood was cut. In like manner food already transformed by the
14445 nutritive power into the substance of the person fed has more in common with the subject nourished than with that from which
14446 the nourishment was taken. The argument however would hold according to the
14447 opinion of those who asserted that the whole nature of a thing is from its matter and that all forms are accidents: which
14448 is false.
14449 </p>
14450 <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p11">
14451 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is the blood that is proximately changed into the semen, as proved in De Gener. Anim. i, 18. Hence the tie contracted
14452 by carnal procreation is more fittingly called blood-relationship than flesh-relationship. That sometimes one relation is
14453 called the flesh of another, is because the blood which is transformed into the man's seed or into the menstrual fluid is
14454 potentially flesh and bone.
14455 </p>
14456 <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p12">
14457 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Some say that the reason why the tie of consanguinity is contracted among men through carnal procreation, and not among other
14458 animals, is because whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in all men was in our first parent: which does not apply
14459 to other animals. But according to this, matrimonial consanguinity would never come to an end. However the above theory was
14460 disproved in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30:
14461 <a id="XP_Q54_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q119_A1.html">FP, Q[119],
14462 A[1]
14463 </a>). Wherefore we must reply that the reason for this is that animals are not united together in the union of friendship through
14464 the begetting of many from one proximate parent, as is the case with men, as stated above.
14465 </p>
14466 <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p13"></p>
14467 <p id="XP_Q54_A1-p14"></p>
14468 <a href="summa.XP_Q54.html"></a>
14469 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A2.html"></a>
14470 </div>
14471 <div id="XP_Q54_A2" class="div4">
14472 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A1.html"></a>
14473 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A3.html"></a>
14474 <h4 id="XP_Q54_A2-p0.1">Whether consanguinity is fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines?</h4>
14475 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p1"></p>
14476 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p2">
14477 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consanguinity is unfittingly distinguished by degrees and lines. For a line of consanguinity is described
14478 as "the ordered series of persons related by blood, and descending from a common ancestor in various degrees." Now consanguinity
14479 is nothing else but a series of such persons. Therefore a line of consanguinity is the same as consanguinity. Now a thing
14480 ought not to be distinguished by itself. Therefore consanguinity is not fittingly
14481 distinguished into lines.
14482 </p>
14483 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p3">
14484 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that by which a common thing is divided should not be placed in the definition of that common thing. Now descent
14485 is placed in the above definition of consanguinity. Therefore consanguinity cannot be divided into ascending, descending and
14486 collateral lines.
14487 </p>
14488 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p4">
14489 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a line is defined as being between two points. But two points make but one degree. Therefore one line has but one
14490 degree, and for this reason it would seem that consanguinity should not be divided into lines and degrees.
14491 </p>
14492 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p5">
14493 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a degree is defined as "the relation between distant persons, whereby is known the distance between them." Now since
14494 consanguinity is a kind of propinquity, distance between persons is opposed to consanguinity rather than a part thereof.
14495 </p>
14496 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p6">
14497 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if consanguinity is distinguished and known by its degrees, those who are in the same degree ought to be equally
14498 related. But this is false since a man's great-uncle and great-nephew are in the same degree, and yet they are not equally
14499 related according to a Decretal (cap. Porro; cap. Parenteloe, 35, qu. v). Therefore consanguinity is not rightly divided into
14500 degrees.
14501 </p>
14502 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p7">
14503 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in ordinary things a different degree results from the addition of one thing to another, even as every additional
14504 unity makes a different species of number. Yet the addition of one person to another does not always make a different degree
14505 of consanguinity, since father and uncle are in the same degree of consanguinity, for they are side by side. Therefore consanguinity
14506 is not rightly divided into degrees.
14507 </p>
14508 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p8">
14509 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, if two persons be akin to one another there is always the same measure of kinship between them, since the distance
14510 from one extreme to the other is the same either way. Yet the degrees of consanguinity are not always the same on either side,
14511 since sometimes one relative is in the third and the other in the fourth degree. Therefore the measure of consanguinity cannot
14512 be sufficiently known by its degrees.
14513 </p>
14514 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p9">
14515 <b>I answer that,</b> Consanguinity as stated
14516 <a id="XP_Q54_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q54_A1.html">(A[1])</a> is a certain propinquity based on the natural communication by the act of procreation whereby nature is propagated. Wherefore
14517 according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) this communication is threefold. one corresponds to the relationship between
14518 cause and effect, and this is the consanguinity of father to son, wherefore he says that "parents love their children as being
14519 a part of themselves."
14520 Another corresponds to the relation of effect to cause, and this is the consanguinity of son to father, wherefore he says
14521 that "children love their parents as being themselves something which owes its existence to them." The third corresponds to
14522 the mutual relation between things that come from the same cause, as brothers, "who are born of the same parents," as he again
14523 says (Ethic. viii, 12). And since the movement of a point makes a line, and since a father by procreation may be said to
14524 descend to his son, hence it is that corresponding to these three relationships there are three lines of consanguinity, namely
14525 the "descending" line corresponding to the first relationship, the "ascending" line corresponding to the second, and the "collateral"
14526 line corresponding to the third. Since however the movement of propagation does not rest in one term but continues beyond,
14527 the result is that one can point to the father's father and to the son's son, and so on, and according to the
14528 various steps we take we find various degrees in one line. And seeing that the degrees of a thing are parts of that thing,
14529 there cannot be degrees of propinquity where there is no propinquity. Consequently identity and too great a distance do away
14530 with degrees of consanguinity; since no man is kin to himself any more than he is like himself: for which reason there is
14531 no degree of consanguinity where there is but one person, but only when one person is compared to another.
14532 </p>
14533 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p10"> Nevertheless there are different ways of counting the degrees in various lines. For the degree of consanguinity in the ascending
14534 and descending line is contracted from the fact that one of the parties whose consanguinity is in question, is descended from
14535 the other. Wherefore according to the canonical as well as the legal reckoning, the person who occupies the first place, whether
14536 in the ascending or in the descending line, is distant from a certain one, say Peter, in the first
14537 degree---for instance father and son; while the one who occupies the second place in either direction is distant in the second
14538 degree, for instance grandfather, grandson and so on. But the consanguinity that exists between persons who are in collateral
14539 lines is contracted not through one being descended from the other, but through both being descended from one: wherefore the
14540 degrees of consanguinity in this line must be reckoned in relation to the one principle whence it arises. Here, however,
14541 the canonical and legal reckonings differ: for the legal reckoning takes into account the descent from the common stock on
14542 both sides, whereas the canonical reckoning takes into account only one, that namely on which the greater number of degrees
14543 are found. Hence according to the legal reckoning brother and sister, or two brothers, are related in the second degree, because
14544 each is separated from the common stock by one degree; and in like manner the children of two brothers are distant from one
14545 another in the fourth degree. But according to the canonical reckoning, two brothers are related in the first degree, since
14546 neither is distant more than one degree from the common stock: but the children of one brother are distant in the second degree
14547 from the other brother, because they are at that distance from the common stock. Hence, according to the canonical reckoning,
14548 by whatever degree a person is distant from some higher degree, by so much and never by less is he distant from each
14549 person descending from that degree, because "the cause of a thing being so is yet more so." Wherefore although the other descendants
14550 from the common stock be related to some person on account of his being descended from the common stock, these descendants
14551 of the other branch cannot be more nearly related to him than he is to the common stock. Sometimes, however, a person is more
14552 distantly related to a descendant from the common stock, than he himself is to the common stock, because this other
14553 person may be more distantly related to the common stock than he is: and consanguinity must be reckoned according to the more
14554 distant degree.
14555 </p>
14556 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p11">
14557 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection is based on a false premise: for consanguinity is not the series but a mutual relationship existing between
14558 certain persons, the series of whom forms a line of consanguinity.
14559 </p>
14560 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p12">
14561 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Descent taken in a general sense attaches to every line of consanguinity, because carnal procreation whence the tie of consanguinity
14562 arises is a kind of descent: but it is a particular kind of descent, namely from the person whose consanguinity is in question,
14563 that makes the descending line.
14564 </p>
14565 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p13">
14566 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A line may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken properly for the dimension itself that is the first species of continuous
14567 quantity: and thus a straight line contains actually but two points which terminate it, but infinite points potentially, any
14568 one of which being actually designated, the line is divided, and becomes two lines. But sometimes a line designates things
14569 which are arranged in a line, and thus we have line and figure in numbers, in
14570 so far as unity added to unity involves number. Thus every unity added makes a degree in a particular line: and it is the
14571 same with the line of consanguinity: wherefore one line contains several degrees.
14572 </p>
14573 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p14">
14574 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even as there cannot be likeness without a difference, so there is no propinquity without distance. Hence not every distance
14575 is opposed to consanguinity, but such as excludes the propinquity of blood-relationship.
14576 </p>
14577 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p15">
14578 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Even as whiteness is said to be greater in two ways, in one way through intensity of the quality itself, in another way through
14579 the quantity of the surface, so consanguinity is said to be greater or lesser in two ways. First, intensively by reason of
14580 the very nature of consanguinity: secondly, extensively as it were, and thus the degree of consanguinity is measured by the
14581 persons between whom there is the propagation of a common blood, and in this way
14582 the degrees of consanguinity are distinguished. Wherefore it happens that of two persons related to one person in the same
14583 degree of consanguinity, one is more akin to him than the other, if we consider the quantity of consanguinity in the first
14584 way: thus a man's father and brother are related to him in the first degree of consanguinity, because in neither case does
14585 any person come in between; and yet from the point of view of intensity a man's father is more closely related to him than
14586 his
14587 brother, since his brother is related to him only because he is of the same father. Hence the nearer a person is to the common
14588 ancestor from whom the consanguinity descends, the greater is his consanguinity although he be not in a nearer degree. In
14589 this way a man's great-uncle is more closely related to him than his great-nephew, although they are in the same degree.
14590 </p>
14591 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p16">
14592 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Although a man's father and uncle are in the same degree in respect of the root of consanguinity, since both are separated
14593 by one degree from the grandfather, nevertheless in respect of the person whose consanguinity is in question, they are not
14594 in the same degree, since the father is in the first degree, whereas the uncle cannot be nearer than the second degree, wherein
14595 the grandfather stands.
14596 </p>
14597 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p17">
14598 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> Two persons are always related in the same degree to one another, although they are not always distant in the same number
14599 of degrees from the common ancestor, as explained above.
14600 </p>
14601 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p18"></p>
14602 <p id="XP_Q54_A2-p19"></p>
14603 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A1.html"></a>
14604 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A3.html"></a>
14605 </div>
14606 <div id="XP_Q54_A3" class="div4">
14607 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A2.html"></a>
14608 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A4.html"></a>
14609 <h4 id="XP_Q54_A3-p0.1">Whether consanguinity is an impediment to marriage by virtue of the natural law?</h4>
14610 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p1"></p>
14611 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p2">
14612 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consanguinity is not by natural law an impediment to marriage. For no woman can be more akin to a man
14613 than Eve was to Adam, since of her did he say (
14614 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q54_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.23" target="asv">Gn. 2:23</a>): "This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh." Yet Eve was joined in marriage to Adam. Therefore as regards the
14615 natural law no consanguinity is an impediment to marriage.
14616 </p>
14617 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p3">
14618 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the natural law is the same for all. Now among the uncivilized nations no person is debarred from marriage by reason
14619 of consanguinity. Therefore, as regards the law of nature, consanguinity is no impediment to marriage.
14620 </p>
14621 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p4">
14622 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the natural law is what "nature has taught all animals," as stated at the beginning of the Digests (i, ff. De just.
14623 et jure). Now brute animals copulate even with their mother. Therefore it is not of natural law that certain persons are debarred
14624 from marriage on account of consanguinity.
14625 </p>
14626 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p5">
14627 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing that is not contrary to one of the goods of matrimony is an impediment to marriage. But consanguinity is
14628 not contrary to any of the goods of marriage. Therefore it is not an impediment thereto.
14629 </p>
14630 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p6">
14631 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, things which are more akin and more similar to one another are better and more firmly united together. Now matrimony
14632 is a kind of union. Since then consanguinity is a kind of kinship, it does not hinder marriage but rather strengthens the
14633 union.
14634 </p>
14635 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p7">
14636 <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the natural law whatever is an obstacle to the good of the offspring is an impediment to marriage. Now consanguinity
14637 hinders the good of the offspring, because in the words of Gregory (Regist., epis. xxxi) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D,
14638 40): "We have learnt by experience that the children of such a union cannot thrive." Therefore according to the law of nature
14639 consanguinity is an impediment to matrimony.
14640 </p>
14641 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p8"> Further, that which belongs to human nature when it was first created is of natural law. Now it belonged to human nature
14642 from when it was first created that one should be debarred from marrying one's father or mother: in proof of which it was
14643 said (
14644 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q54_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.24" target="asv">Gn. 2:24</a>): "Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother": which cannot be understood of cohabitation, and consequently must refer
14645 to the union of marriage. Therefore consanguinity is an impediment to marriage
14646 according to the natural law.
14647 </p>
14648 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p9">
14649 <b>I answer that,</b> In relation to marriage a thing is said to be contrary to the natural law if it prevents marriage from reaching the end for
14650 which it was instituted. Now the essential and primary end of marriage is the good of the offspring. and this is hindered
14651 by a certain consanguinity, namely that which is between father and daughter, or son and mother. It is not that the good of
14652 the offspring is utterly destroyed, since a daughter can have a child of her father's semen
14653 and with the father rear and teach that child in which things the good of the offspring consists, but that it is not effected
14654 in a becoming way. For it is out of order that a daughter be mated to her father in marriage for the purpose of begetting
14655 and rearing children, since in all things she ought to be subject to her father as proceeding from him. Hence by natural law
14656 a father and mother are debarred from marrying their children; and the mother still more than the father, since it is more
14657 derogatory to the reverence due to parents if the son marry his mother than if the father marry his daughter; since the wife
14658 should be to a certain extent subject to her husband. The secondary essential end of marriage is the curbing of concupiscence;
14659 and this end would be forfeit if a man could marry any blood-relation, since a wide scope would be afforded to concupiscence
14660 if those who have to live together in the same house were not forbidden to be mated in the flesh. Wherefore the Divine law
14661 debars from marriage not only father and mother, but also other kinsfolk who have to live in close intimacy with one another
14662 and ought to safeguard one another's modesty. The Divine law assigns this reason (
14663 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q54_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.10" target="asv">Lev. 18:10</a>): "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness" of such and such a one, "because it is thy own nakedness."
14664 </p>
14665 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p10"> But the accidental end of marriage is the binding together of mankind and the extension of friendship: for a husband regards
14666 his wife's kindred as his own. Hence it would be prejudicial to this extension of friendship if a man could take a woman of
14667 his kindred to wife since no new friendship would accrue to anyone from such a marriage. Wherefore, according to human law
14668 and the ordinances of the Church, several degrees of consanguinity are debarred from marriage.
14669 </p>
14670 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p11"> Accordingly it is clear from what has been said that consanguinity is by natural law an impediment to marriage in regard
14671 to certain persons, by Divine law in respect of some, and by human law in respect of others.
14672 </p>
14673 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p12">
14674 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although Eve was formed from Adam she was not Adam's daughter, because she was not formed from him after the manner in which
14675 it is natural for a man to beget his like in species, but by the Divine operation, since from Adam's rib a horse might have
14676 been formed in the same way as Eve was. Hence the natural connection between Eve and Adam was not so great as between daughter
14677 and father, nor was Adam the natural principle of Eve as a father is of his
14678 daughter.
14679 </p>
14680 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p13">
14681 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That certain barbarians are united carnally to their parents does not come from the natural law but from the passion of concupiscence
14682 which has clouded the natural law in them.
14683 </p>
14684 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p14">
14685 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Union of male and female is said to be of natural law, because nature has taught this to animals: yet she has taught this
14686 union to various animals in various ways according to their various conditions. But carnal copulation with parents is derogatory
14687 to the reverence due to them. For just as nature has instilled into parents solicitude in providing for their offspring, so
14688 has it instilled into the offspring reverence towards their parents: yet to no
14689 kind of animal save man has she instilled a lasting solicitude for his children or reverence for parents; but to other animals
14690 more or less, according as the offspring is more or less necessary to its parents, or the parents to their offspring. Hence
14691 as the Philosopher attests (De Animal. ix, 47) concerning the camel and the horse, among certain animals the son abhors copulation
14692 with its mother as long as he retains knowledge of her and a certain reverence for her. And since all honest customs
14693 of animals are united together in man naturally, and more perfectly than in other animals, it follows that man naturally abhors
14694 carnal knowledge not only of his mother, but also of his daughter, which is, however, less against nature, as stated above.
14695 </p>
14696 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p15"> Moreover consanguinity does not result from carnal procreation in other animals as in man, as stated above (A[1], ad 5).
14697 Hence the comparison fails.
14698 </p>
14699 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p16">
14700 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It has been shown how consanguinity between married persons is contrary to the goods of marriage. Hence the Objection proceeds
14701 from false premises.
14702 </p>
14703 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p17">
14704 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> It is not unreasonable for one of two unions to be hindered by the other, even as where there is identity there is not likeness.
14705 In like manner the tie of consanguinity may hinder the union of marriage.
14706 </p>
14707 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p18"></p>
14708 <p id="XP_Q54_A3-p19"></p>
14709 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A2.html"></a>
14710 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A4.html"></a>
14711 </div>
14712 <div id="XP_Q54_A4" class="div4">
14713 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A3.html"></a>
14714 <a href="summa.XP_Q55.html"></a>
14715 <h4 id="XP_Q54_A4-p0.1">Whether the degrees of consanguinity that are an impediment to marriage could be fixed by the Church?</h4>
14716 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p1"></p>
14717 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p2">
14718 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the degrees of consanguinity that are an impediment to marriage could not be fixed by the Church so as
14719 to reach to the fourth degree. For it is written (
14720 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q54_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.6" target="asv">Mat. 19:6</a>): "What God hath joined together let no man put asunder." But God joined those together who are married within the fourth
14721 degree of consanguinity, since their union is not forbidden by the Divine law. Therefore they should not be put asunder by
14722 a human law.
14723 </p>
14724 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p3">
14725 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, matrimony is a sacrament as also is baptism. Now no ordinance of the Church could prevent one who is baptized from
14726 receiving the baptismal character, if he be capable of receiving it according to the Divine law. Therefore neither can an
14727 ordinance of the Church forbid marriage between those who are not forbidden to marry by the Divine law.
14728 </p>
14729 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p4">
14730 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, positive law can neither void nor extend those things which are natural. Now consanguinity is a natural tie which
14731 is in itself of a nature to impede marriage. Therefore the Church cannot by its ordinance permit or forbid certain people
14732 to marry, any more than she can make them to be kin or not kin.
14733 </p>
14734 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p5">
14735 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, an ordinance of positive law should have some reasonable cause, since it is for this reasonable cause that it proceeds
14736 from the natural law. But the causes that are assigned for the number of degrees seem altogether unreasonable, since they
14737 bear no relation to their effect; for instance, that consanguinity be an impediment as far as the fourth degree on account
14738 of the four elements as far as the sixth degree on account of the six ages of the world, as
14739 far as the seventh degree on account of the seven days of which all time is comprised. Therefore seemingly this prohibition
14740 is of no force.
14741 </p>
14742 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p6">
14743 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, where the cause is the same there should be the same effect. Now the causes for which consanguinity is an impediment
14744 to marriage are the good of the offspring, the curbing of concupiscence, and the extension of friendship, as stated above
14745
14746 <a id="XP_Q54_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q54_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, which are equally necessary for all time. Therefore the degrees of consanguinity should have equally impeded marriage at
14747 all times: yet this is not true since consanguinity is now an
14748 impediment to marriage as far as the fourth degree, whereas formerly it was an impediment as far as the seventh.
14749 </p>
14750 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p7">
14751 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, one and the same union cannot be a kind of sacrament and a kind of incest. But this would be the case if the Church
14752 had the power of fixing a different number in the degrees which are an impediment to marriage. Thus if certain parties related
14753 in the fifth degree were married when that degree was an impediment, their union would be incestuous, and yet this same union
14754 would be a marriage afterwards when the Church withdrew her prohibition. And the
14755 reverse might happen if certain degrees which were not an impediment were subsequently to be forbidden by the Church. Therefore
14756 seemingly the power of the Church does not extend to this.
14757 </p>
14758 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p8">
14759 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, human law should copy the Divine law. Now according to the Divine law which is contained in the Old Law, the prohibition
14760 of degrees does not apply equally in the ascending and descending lines: since in the Old Law a man was forbidden to marry
14761 his father's sister but not his brother's daughter. Therefore neither should there remain now a prohibition in respect of
14762 nephews and uncles.
14763 </p>
14764 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p9">
14765 <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said to His disciples (
14766 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q54_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.16" target="asv">Lk. 10:16</a>): "He that heareth you heareth Me." Therefore a commandment of the Church has the same force as a commandment of God. Now
14767 the Church sometimes has forbidden and sometimes allowed certain degrees which the Old Law did not forbid. Therefore those
14768 degrees are an impediment to marriage.
14769 </p>
14770 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p10"> Further, even as of old the marriages of pagans were controlled by the civil law, so now is marriage controlled by the laws
14771 of the Church. Now formerly the civil law decided which degrees of consanguinity impede marriage, and which do not. Therefore
14772 this can be done now by a commandment of the Church.
14773 </p>
14774 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p11">
14775 <b>I answer that,</b> The degrees within which consanguinity has been an impediment to marriage have varied according to various times. For at
14776 the beginning of the human race father and mother alone were debarred from marrying their children, because then mankind were
14777 few in number, and then it was necessary for the propagation of the human race to be ensured with very great care, and consequently
14778 only such persons were to be debarred as were unfitted for marriage even in respect
14779 of its principal end which is the good of the offspring, as stated above
14780 <a id="XP_Q54_A4-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q54_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Afterwards however, the human race having multiplied, more persons were excluded by the law of Moses, for they already began
14781 to curb concupiscence. Wherefore as Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) all those persons were debarred from marrying one
14782 another who are wont to live together in one household, because if a lawful carnal intercourse were possible between them,
14783 this would prove a
14784 very great incentive to lust. Yet the Old Law permitted other degrees of consanguinity, in fact to a certain extent it commanded
14785 them; to wit that each man should take a wife from his kindred, in order to avoid confusion of inheritances: because at that
14786 time the Divine worship was handed down as the inheritance of the race. But afterwards more degrees were forbidden by the
14787 New Law which is the law of the spirit and of love, because the worship of God is no longer handed down and spread abroad
14788 by a carnal birth but by a spiritual grace: wherefore it was necessary that men should be yet more withdrawn from carnal things
14789 by devoting themselves to things spiritual, and that love should have a yet wider play. Hence in olden times marriage was
14790 forbidden even within the more remote degrees of consanguinity, in order that consanguinity and affinity might be the sources
14791 of a wider natural friendship; and this was reasonably extended to the seventh degree, both because beyond this it was
14792 difficult to have any recollection of the common stock, and because this was in keeping with the sevenfold grace of the Holy
14793 Ghost. Afterwards, however, towards these latter times the prohibition of the Church has been restricted to the fourth degree,
14794 because it became useless and dangerous to extend the prohibition to more remote degrees of consanguinity. Useless, because
14795 charity waxed cold in many hearts so that they had scarcely a greater bond of friendship with their more remote kindred
14796 than with strangers: and it was dangerous because through the prevalence of concupiscence and neglect men took no account
14797 of so numerous a kindred, and thus the prohibition of the more remote degrees became for many a snare leading to damnation.
14798 Moreover there is a certain fittingness in the restriction of the above prohibition to the fourth degree. First because men
14799 are wont to live until the fourth generation, so that consanguinity cannot lapse into oblivion, wherefore God threatened
14800 (
14801 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q54_A4-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv">Ex. 20:5</a>) to visit the parent's sins on their children to the third and fourth generation. Secondly, because in each generation the
14802 blood, the identity of which causes consanguinity, receives a further addition of new blood, and the more another blood is
14803 added the less there is of the old. And because there are four elements, each of which is the more easily mixed with another,
14804 according as it is more rarefied it follows that at the first admixture the identity of blood
14805 disappears as regards the first element which is most subtle; at the second admixture, as regards the second element; at the
14806 third, as to the third element; at the fourth, as to the fourth element. Thus after the fourth generation it is fitting for
14807 the carnal union to be repeated.
14808 </p>
14809 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p12">
14810 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as God does not join together those who are joined together against the Divine command, so does He not join together
14811 those who are joined together against the commandment of the Church, which has the same binding force as a commandment of
14812 God.
14813 </p>
14814 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p13">
14815 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Matrimony is not only a sacrament but also fulfills an office; wherefore it is more subject to the control of the Church's
14816 ministers than baptism which is a sacrament only: because just as human contracts and offices are controlled by human laws,
14817 so are spiritual contracts and offices controlled by the law of the Church.
14818 </p>
14819 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p14">
14820 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the tie of consanguinity is natural, it is not natural that consanguinity forbid carnal intercourse, except as regards
14821 certain degrees, as stated above
14822 <a id="XP_Q54_A4-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q54_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Wherefore the Church's commandment does not cause certain people to be kin or not kin, because they remain equally kin at
14823 all times: but it makes carnal intercourse to be lawful or unlawful at different times for different degrees of consanguinity.
14824 </p>
14825 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p15">
14826 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The reasons assigned are given as indicating aptness and congruousness rather than causality and necessity.
14827 </p>
14828 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p16">
14829 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The reason for the impediment of consanguinity is not the same at different times: wherefore that which it was useful to
14830 allow at one time, it was beneficial to forbid at another.
14831 </p>
14832 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p17">
14833 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> A commandment does not affect the past but the future. Wherefore if the fifth degree which is now allowed were to be forbidden
14834 at any time, those in the fifth degree who are married would not have to separate, because no impediment supervening to marriage
14835 can annul it; and consequently a union which was a marriage from the first would not be made incestuous by a commandment of
14836 the Church. In like manner, if a degree which is now forbidden were to be
14837 allowed, such a union would not become a marriage on account of the Church's commandment by reason of the former contract,
14838 because they could separate if they wished. Nevertheless, they could contract anew, and this would be a new union.
14839 </p>
14840 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p18">
14841 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> In prohibiting the degrees of consanguinity the Church considers chiefly the point of view of affection. And since the reason
14842 for affection towards one's brother's son is not less but even greater than the reasons for affection towards one's father's
14843 brother, inasmuch as the son is more akin to the father than the father to the son (Ethic. viii, 12), therefore did the Church
14844 equally prohibit the degrees of consanguinity in uncles and nephews. On the
14845 other hand the Old Law in debarring certain persons looked chiefly to the danger of concupiscence arising from cohabitation;
14846 and debarred those persons who were in closer intimacy with one another on account of their living together. Now it is more
14847 usual for a niece to live with her uncle than an aunt with her nephew: because a daughter is more identified with her father,
14848 being part of him, whereas a sister is not in this way identified with her brother, for she is not part of him but is born
14849 of the same parent. Hence there was not the same reason for debarring a niece and an aunt.
14850 </p>
14851 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p19"></p>
14852 <p id="XP_Q54_A4-p20"></p>
14853 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A3.html"></a>
14854 <a href="summa.XP_Q55.html"></a>
14855 </div>
14856 <a href="summa.XP_Q53_A4.html"></a>
14857 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A1.html"></a>
14858 </div>
14859 <div id="XP_Q55" class="div3">
14860 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A4.html"></a>
14861 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A1.html"></a>
14862 <h3 id="XP_Q55-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF AFFINITY (ELEVEN ARTICLES)</h3>
14863 <p id="XP_Q55-p1"></p>
14864 <p id="XP_Q55-p2"> We must consider next the impediment of affinity. Under this head there are eleven points of inquiry:</p>
14865 <p id="XP_Q55-p3"> (1) Whether affinity results from matrimony?</p>
14866 <p id="XP_Q55-p4"> (2) Whether it remains after the death of husband or wife?</p>
14867 <p id="XP_Q55-p5"> (3) Whether it is caused through unlawful intercourse?</p>
14868 <p id="XP_Q55-p6"> (4) Whether it arises from a betrothal?</p>
14869 <p id="XP_Q55-p7"> (5) Whether affinity is caused through affinity?</p>
14870 <p id="XP_Q55-p8"> (6) Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage?</p>
14871 <p id="XP_Q55-p9"> (7) Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees?</p>
14872 <p id="XP_Q55-p10"> (8) Whether its degrees extend as far as the degrees of consanguinity?</p>
14873 <p id="XP_Q55-p11"> (9) Whether marriages of persons related to one another by consanguinity or affinity should always be dissolved by divorce?</p>
14874 <p id="XP_Q55-p12"> (10) Whether the process for the dissolution of like marriages should always be by way of accusation?</p>
14875 <p id="XP_Q55-p13"> (11) Whether witnesses should be called in such a case?</p>
14876 <div id="XP_Q55_A1" class="div4">
14877 <a href="summa.XP_Q55.html"></a>
14878 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A2.html"></a>
14879 <h4 id="XP_Q55_A1-p0.1">Whether a person contracts affinity through the marriage of a blood-relation?</h4>
14880 <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p1"></p>
14881 <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p2">
14882 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a person does not contract affinity through the marriage of a blood-relation. For "the cause of a thing
14883 being so is yet more so." Now the wife is not connected with her husband's kindred except by reason of the husband. Since
14884 then she does not contract affinity with her husband, neither does she contract it with her husband's kindred.
14885 </p>
14886 <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p3">
14887 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if certain things be separate from one another and something be connected with one of them, it does not follow that
14888 it is connected with the other. Now a person's blood relations are separate from one another. Therefore it does not follow,
14889 if a certain woman be married to a certain man, that she is therefore connected with all his kindred.
14890 </p>
14891 <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p4">
14892 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, relations result from certain things being united together. Now the kindred of the husband do not become united
14893 together by the fact of his taking a wife. Therefore they do not acquire any relationship of affinity.
14894 </p>
14895 <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p5">
14896 <b>On the contrary,</b> Husband and wife are made one flesh. Therefore if the husband is related in the flesh to all his kindred, for the same reason
14897 his wife will be related to them all.
14898 </p>
14899 <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p6"> Further, this is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41).</p>
14900 <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p7">
14901 <b>I answer that,</b> A certain natural friendship is founded on natural fellowship. Now natural fellowship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
14902 viii, 12), arises in two ways; first, from carnal procreation; secondly, from connection with orderly carnal procreation,
14903 wherefore he says (Ethic. viii, 12) that the friendship of a husband towards his wife is natural. Consequently even as a person
14904 through being connected with another by carnal procreation is bound to him by a tie of
14905 natural friendship, so does one person become connected with another through carnal intercourse. But there is a difference
14906 in this, that one who is connected with another through carnal procreation, as a son with his father, shares in the same common
14907 stock and blood, so that a son is connected with his father's kindred by the same kind of tie as the father was, the tie,
14908 namely of consanguinity, albeit in a different degree on account of his being more distant from the stock: whereas one who
14909 is
14910 connected with another through carnal intercourse does not share in the same stock, but is as it were an extraneous addition
14911 thereto: whence arises another kind of tie known by the name of "affinity." This is expressed in the verse:
14912 </p>
14913 <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p8"> Marriage makes a new kind of connection,</p>
14914 <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p9"> While birth makes a new degree,</p>
14915 <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p10">because, to wit, the person begotten is in the same kind of relationship, but in a different degree, whereas through carnal
14916 intercourse he enters into a new kind of relationship.
14917 </p>
14918 <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p11">
14919 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although a cause is more potent than its effect, it does not always follow that the same name is applicable to the cause
14920 as to the effect, because sometimes that which is in the effect, is found in the cause not in the same but in a higher way;
14921 wherefore it is not applicable to both cause and effect under the same name or under the same aspect, as is the case with
14922 all equivocal effective causes. Thus, then, the union of husband and wife is stronger
14923 than the union of the wife with her husband's kindred, and yet it ought not to be named affinity, but matrimony which is a
14924 kind of unity; even as a man is identical with himself, but not with his kinsman.
14925 </p>
14926 <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p12">
14927 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Blood-relations are in a way separate, and in a way connected: and it happens in respect of their connection that a person
14928 who is connected with one of them is in some way connected with all of them. But on account of their separation and distance
14929 from one another it happens that a person who is connected with one of them in one way is connected with another in another
14930 way, either as to the kind of connection or as to the degree.
14931 </p>
14932 <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p13">
14933 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Further, a relation results sometimes from a movement in each extreme, for instance fatherhood and sonship, and a relation
14934 of this kind is really in both extremes. Sometimes it results from the movement of one only, and this happens in two ways.
14935 In one way when a relation results from the movement of one extreme without any movement previous or concomitant of the other
14936 extreme; as in the Creator and the creature, the sensible and the sense, knowledge
14937 and the knowable object: and then the relation is in one extreme really and in the other logically only. In another way when
14938 the relation results from the movement of one extreme without any concomitant movement, but not without a previous movement
14939 of the other; thus there results equality between two men by the increase of one, without the other either increasing or decreasing
14940 then, although previously he reached his actual quantity by some movement or change, so that this relation is founded
14941 really in both extremes. It is the same with consanguinity and affinity, because the relation of brotherhood which results
14942 in a grown child on the birth of a boy, is caused without any movement of the former's at the time, but by virtue of that
14943 previous movement of his wherein he was begotten; wherefore at the time it happens that there results in him the aforesaid
14944 relation through the movement of another. Likewise because this man descends through his own birth from the same stock as
14945 the
14946 husband, there results in him affinity with the latter's wife, without any new change in him.
14947 </p>
14948 <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p14"></p>
14949 <p id="XP_Q55_A1-p15"></p>
14950 <a href="summa.XP_Q55.html"></a>
14951 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A2.html"></a>
14952 </div>
14953 <div id="XP_Q55_A2" class="div4">
14954 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A1.html"></a>
14955 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A3.html"></a>
14956 <h4 id="XP_Q55_A2-p0.1">Whether affinity remains after the death of husband or wife?</h4>
14957 <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p1"></p>
14958 <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p2">
14959 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that affinity does not remain after the death of husband or wife, between the blood-relations of husband and
14960 wife or "vice versa." Because if the cause cease the effect ceases. Now the cause of affinity was the marriage, which ceases
14961 after the husband's death, since then "the woman . . . is loosed from the law of the husband" (
14962 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q55_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.2" target="asv">Rom. 7:2</a>). Therefore the aforesaid affinity ceases also.
14963 </p>
14964 <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p3">
14965 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, consanguinity is the cause of affinity. Now the consanguinity of the husband with his blood-relations ceases at
14966 his death. Therefore, the wife's affinity with them ceases also.
14967 </p>
14968 <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p4">
14969 <b>On the contrary,</b> Affinity is caused by consanguinity. Now consanguinity binds persons together for all time as long as they live. Therefore
14970 affinity does so also: and consequently affinity (between two persons) is not dissolved through the dissolution of the marriage
14971 by the death of a third person.
14972 </p>
14973 <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p5">
14974 <b>I answer that,</b> A relation ceases in two ways: in one way through the corruption of its subject, in another way by the removal of its cause;
14975 thus likeness ceases when one of the like subjects dies, or when the quality that caused the likeness is removed. Now there
14976 are certain relations which have for their cause an action, or a passion or movement (Metaph. v, 20): and some of these are
14977 caused by movement, through something being moved actually; such is the relation between
14978 mover and moved: some of them are caused through something being adapted to movement, for instance the relations between the
14979 motive power and the movable, or between master and servant; and some of them result from something, having been moved previously,
14980 such as the relation between father and son, for the relation between them is caused not by (the con) being begotten now,
14981 but by his having been begotten. Now aptitude for movement and for being moved is transitory; whereas the fact of having
14982 been moved is everlasting, since what has been never ceases having been. Consequently fatherhood and sonship are never dissolved
14983 through the removal of the cause, but only through the corruption of the subject, that is of one of the subjects. The same
14984 applies to affinity, for this is caused by certain persons having been joined together not by their being actually joined.
14985 Wherefore it is not done away, as long as the persons between whom affinity has been contracted survive, although the person
14986 die through whom it was contracted.
14987 </p>
14988 <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p6">
14989 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The marriage tie causes affinity not only by reason of actual union, but also by reason of the union having been effected
14990 in the past.
14991 </p>
14992 <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p7">
14993 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Consanguinity is not the chief cause of affinity, but union with a blood-relation, not only because that union is now, but
14994 because it has been. Hence the argument does not prove.
14995 </p>
14996 <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p8"></p>
14997 <p id="XP_Q55_A2-p9"></p>
14998 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A1.html"></a>
14999 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A3.html"></a>
15000 </div>
15001 <div id="XP_Q55_A3" class="div4">
15002 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A2.html"></a>
15003 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A4.html"></a>
15004 <h4 id="XP_Q55_A3-p0.1">Whether unlawful intercourse causes affinity?</h4>
15005 <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p1"></p>
15006 <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p2">
15007 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that unlawful intercourse does not cause affinity. For affinity is an honorable thing. Now honorable things
15008 do not result from that which is dishonorable. Therefore affinity cannot be caused by a dishonorable intercourse.
15009 </p>
15010 <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p3">
15011 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, where there is consanguinity there cannot be affinity; since affinity is a relationship between persons that results
15012 from carnal intercourse and is altogether void of blood-relationship. Now if unlawful intercourse were a cause of affinity,
15013 it would sometimes happen that a man would contract affinity with his blood-relations and with himself: for instance when
15014 a man is guilty of incest with a blood-relation. Therefore affinity is not caused by
15015 unlawful intercourse.
15016 </p>
15017 <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p4">
15018 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, unlawful intercourse is according to nature or against nature. Now affinity is not caused by unnatural unlawful
15019 intercourse as decided by law (can. Extraordinaria, xxxv, qu. 2,3). Therefore it is not caused only by unlawful intercourse
15020 according to nature.
15021 </p>
15022 <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p5">
15023 <b>On the contrary,</b> He who is joined to a harlot is made one body (
15024 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q55_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.16" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:16</a>). Now this is the reason why marriage caused affinity. Therefore unlawful intercourse does so for the same reason.
15025 </p>
15026 <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p6"> Further, carnal intercourse is the cause of affinity, as shown by the definition of affinity, which definition is as follows:
15027 Affinity is the relationship of persons which results from carnal intercourse and is altogether void of blood-relationship.
15028 But there is carnal copulation even in unlawful intercourse. Therefore unlawful intercourse causes affinity.
15029 </p>
15030 <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p7">
15031 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) the union of husband and wife is said to be natural chiefly on account of
15032 the procreation of offspring, and secondly on account of the community of works: the former of which belongs to marriage by
15033 reason of carnal copulation, and the latter, in so far as marriage is a partnership directed to a common life. Now the former
15034 is to be found in every carnal union where there is a mingling of seeds, since such a union
15035 may be productive of offspring, but the latter may be wanting. Consequently since marriage caused affinity, in so far as it
15036 was a carnal mingling, it follows that also an unlawful intercourse causes affinity in so far as it has something of natural
15037 copulation.
15038 </p>
15039 <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p8">
15040 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In an unlawful intercourse there is something natural which is common to fornication and marriage, and in this respect it
15041 causes affinity. There is also something which is inordinate whereby it differs from marriage, and in this respect it does
15042 not cause affinity. Hence affinity remains honorable, although its cause is in a way dishonorable.
15043 </p>
15044 <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p9">
15045 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is no reason why diverse relations should not be in the same subject by reason of different things. Consequently there
15046 can be affinity and consanguinity between two persons, not only on account of unlawful but also on account of lawful intercourse:
15047 for instance if a blood-relation of mine on my father's side marries a blood-relation of mine on my mother's side. Hence in
15048 the above definition the words "which is altogether void of
15049 blood-relationship" apply to affinity as such. Nor does it follow that a man by having intercourse with his blood-relation
15050 contracts affinity with himself, since affinity, like consanguinity, requires diversity of subjects, as likeness does.
15051 </p>
15052 <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p10">
15053 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In unnatural copulation there is no mingling of seeds that makes generation possible: wherefore a like intercourse does not
15054 cause affinity.
15055 </p>
15056 <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p11"></p>
15057 <p id="XP_Q55_A3-p12"></p>
15058 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A2.html"></a>
15059 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A4.html"></a>
15060 </div>
15061 <div id="XP_Q55_A4" class="div4">
15062 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A3.html"></a>
15063 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A5.html"></a>
15064 <h4 id="XP_Q55_A4-p0.1">Whether affinity is caused by betrothal?</h4>
15065 <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p1"></p>
15066 <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p2">
15067 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that affinity cannot be caused by betrothal. For affinity is a lasting tie: whereas a betrothal is sometimes
15068 broken off. Therefore it cannot cause affinity.
15069 </p>
15070 <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p3">
15071 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further if the hymen be penetrated without the deed being consummated, affinity is not contracted. Yet this is much more
15072 akin to carnal intercourse than a betrothal. Therefore betrothal does not cause affinity.
15073 </p>
15074 <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p4">
15075 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, betrothal is nothing but a promise of future marriage. Now sometimes there is a promise of future marriage without
15076 affinity being contracted, for instance if it take place before the age of seven years; or if a man having a perpetual impediment
15077 of impotence promise a woman future marriage; or if a like promise be made between persons to whom marriage is rendered unlawful
15078 by a vow; or in any other way whatever. Therefore betrothal cannot cause
15079 affinity.
15080 </p>
15081 <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p5">
15082 <b>On the contrary,</b> Pope Alexander (cap. Ad audiendem, De spons. et matrim.) forbade a certain woman to marry a certain man, because she had
15083 been betrothed to his brother. Now this would not be the case unless affinity were contracted by betrothal. Therefore, etc.
15084 </p>
15085 <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p6">
15086 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as a betrothal has not the conditions of a perfect marriage, but is a preparation for marriage, so betrothal causes
15087 not affinity as marriage does, but something like affinity. This is called "the justice of public honesty," which is an impediment
15088 to marriage even as affinity and consanguinity are, and according to the same degrees, and is defined thus: "The justice of
15089 public honesty is a relationship arising out of betrothal, and derives its force from
15090 ecclesiastical institution by reason of its honesty." This indicates the reason of its name as well as its cause, namely that
15091 this relationship was instituted by the Church on account of its honesty.
15092 </p>
15093 <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p7">
15094 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Betrothal, by reason not of itself but of the end to which it is directed, causes this kind of affinity known as "the justice
15095 of public honesty": wherefore just as marriage is a lasting tie, so is the aforesaid kind of affinity.
15096 </p>
15097 <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p8">
15098 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In carnal intercourse man and woman become one flesh by the mingling of seeds. Wherefore it is not every invasion or penetration
15099 of the hymen that causes affinity to be contracted, but only such as is followed by a mingling of seeds. But marriage causes
15100 affinity not only on account of carnal intercourse, but also by reason of the conjugal fellowship, in respect of which also
15101 marriage is according to nature. Consequently affinity results from the
15102 marriage contract itself expressed in words of the present and before its consummation, and in like manner there results from
15103 betrothal, which is a promise of conjugal fellowship, something akin to affinity, namely the justice of public honesty.
15104 </p>
15105 <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p9">
15106 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All those impediments which void a betrothal prevent affinity being contracted through a promise of marriage. Hence whether
15107 he who actually promises marriage be lacking in age, or be under a solemn vow of continence or any like impediment, no affinity
15108 nor anything akin to it results because the betrothal is void. If however, a minor, laboring under insensibility or malefice,
15109 having a perpetual impediment, is betrothed before the age of puberty and
15110 after the age of seven years, with a woman who is of age, from such a contract there results the impediment called "justice
15111 of public honesty," because at the time the impediment was not actual, since at that age the boy who is insensible is equally
15112 impotent in respect of the act in question.
15113 </p>
15114 <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p10"></p>
15115 <p id="XP_Q55_A4-p11"></p>
15116 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A3.html"></a>
15117 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A5.html"></a>
15118 </div>
15119 <div id="XP_Q55_A5" class="div4">
15120 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A4.html"></a>
15121 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A6.html"></a>
15122 <h4 id="XP_Q55_A5-p0.1">Whether affinity is a cause of affinity?</h4>
15123 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p1"></p>
15124 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p2">
15125 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that affinity also is a cause of affinity. For Pope Julius I says (cap. Contradicimus 35, qu. iii): "No man
15126 may marry his wife's surviving blood-relation": and it is said in the next chapter (cap. Porro duorum) that "the wives of
15127 two cousins are forbidden to marry, one after the other, the same husband." But this is only on account of affinity being
15128 contracted through union with a person related by affinity. Therefore affinity is a cause of
15129 affinity.
15130 </p>
15131 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p3">
15132 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, carnal intercourse makes persons akin even as carnal procreation, since the degrees of affinity and consanguinity
15133 are reckoned equally. But consanguinity causes affinity. Therefore affinity does also.
15134 </p>
15135 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p4">
15136 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things that are the same with one and the same are the same with one another. But the wife contracts the same relations
15137 with all her husband's kindred. Therefore all her husband's kindred are made one with all who are related by affinity to the
15138 wife, and thus affinity is the cause of affinity.
15139 </p>
15140 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p5">
15141 <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, If affinity is caused by affinity a man who has connection with two women can marry neither of them, because
15142 then the one would be related to the other by affinity. But this is false. Therefore affinity does not cause affinity.
15143 </p>
15144 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p6">
15145 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if affinity arose out of affinity a man by marrying another man's widow would contract affinity with all her first
15146 husband's kindred, since she is related to them by affinity. But this cannot be the case because he would become especially
15147 related by affinity to her deceased husband. Therefore, etc.
15148 </p>
15149 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p7">
15150 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, consanguinity is a stronger tie than affinity. But the blood-relations of the wife do not become blood-relations
15151 of the husband. Much less, therefore, does affinity to the wife cause affinity to her blood-relations, and thus the same conclusion
15152 follows.
15153 </p>
15154 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p8">
15155 <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which one thing proceeds from another: in one way a thing proceeds from another in likeness of species,
15156 as a man is begotten of a man: in another way one thing proceeds from another, not in likeness of species; and this process
15157 is always towards a lower species, as instanced in all equivocal agents. The first kind of procession, however often it be
15158 repeated, the same species always remains: thus if one man be begotten of another by an
15159 act of the generative power, of this man also another man will be begotten, and so on. But the second kind of procession,
15160 just as in the first instance it produces another species, so it makes another species as often as it is repeated. Thus by
15161 movement from a point there proceeds a line and not a point, because a point by being moved makes a line; and from a line
15162 moved lineally, there proceeds not a line but a surface, and from a surface a body, and in this way the procession can go
15163 no
15164 further. Now in the procession of kinship we find two kinds whereby this tie is caused: one is by carnal procreation, and
15165 this always produces the same species of relationship; the other is by the marriage union, and this produces a different kind
15166 of relationship from the beginning: thus it is clear that a married woman is related to her husband's blood-relations not
15167 by blood but by affinity. Wherefore if this kind of process be repeated, the result will be not affinity but another kind
15168 of
15169 relationship; and consequently a married party contracts with the affines of the other party a relation not of affinity but
15170 of some other kind which is called affinity of the second kind. And again if a person through marriage contracts relationship
15171 with an affine of the second kind, it will not be affinity of the second kind, but of a third kind, as indicated in the verse
15172 quoted above
15173 <a id="XP_Q55_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q55_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Formerly these two kinds were included in the prohibition, under the head of
15174 the justice of public honesty rather than under the head of affinity, because they fall short of true affinity, in the same
15175 way as the relationship arising out of betrothal. Now however they have ceased to be included in the prohibition, which now
15176 refers only to the first kind of affinity in which true affinity consists.
15177 </p>
15178 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p9">
15179 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A husband contracts affinity of the first kind with his wife's male blood-relation, and affinity of the second kind with
15180 the latter's wife: wherefore if the latter man dies the former cannot marry his widow on account of the second kind of affinity.
15181 Again if a man A marry a widow B, C, a relation of her former husband being connected with B by the first kind of affinity,
15182 contracts affinity of the second kind with her husband A; and D, the wife of this
15183 relation C being connected, by affinity of the second kind, with B, this man's wife contracts affinity of the third kind with
15184 her husband A. And since the third kind of affinity was included in the prohibition on account of a certain honesty more than
15185 by reason of affinity, the canon (cap. Porro duorum 35, qu. iii) says: "The justice of public honesty forbids the wives of
15186 two cousins to be married to the same man, the one after the other." But this prohibition is done away with.
15187 </p>
15188 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p10">
15189 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although carnal intercourse is a cause of people being connected with one another, it is not the same kind of connection.
15190 </p>
15191 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p11">
15192 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The wife contracts the same connection with her husband's relatives as to the degree but not as to the kind of connection.
15193 </p>
15194 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p12"> Since however the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show that no tie is caused by affinity, we must reply to
15195 them lest the time-honored prohibition of the Church seem unreasonable.
15196 </p>
15197 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p13">
15198 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above, a woman does not contract affinity of the first kind with the man to whom she is united in the flesh, wherefore
15199 she does not contract affinity of the second kind with a woman known by the same man; and consequently if a man marry one
15200 of these women, the other does not contract affinity of the third kind with him. And so the laws of bygone times did not forbid
15201 the same man to marry successively two women known by one man.
15202 </p>
15203 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p14">
15204 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As a man is not connected with his wife by affinity of the first kind, so he does not contract affinity of the second kind
15205 with the second husband of the same wife. Wherefore the argument does not prove.
15206 </p>
15207 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p15">
15208 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> One person is not connected with me through another, except they be connected together. Hence through a woman who is affine
15209 to me, no person becomes connected with me, except such as is connected with her. Now this cannot be except through carnal
15210 procreation from her, or through connection with her by marriage: and according to the olden legislation, I contracted some
15211 kind of connection through her in both ways: because her son even by another husband
15212 becomes affine to me in the same kind and in a different degree of affinity, as appears from the rule given above: and again
15213 her second husband becomes affine to me in the second kind of affinity. But her other blood-relations are not connected with
15214 him, but she is connected with them, either as with father or mother, inasmuch as she descends from them, or, as with her
15215 brothers, as proceeding from the same principle; wherefore the brother or father of my affine does not become affine to me
15216 in
15217 any kind of affinity.
15218 </p>
15219 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p16"></p>
15220 <p id="XP_Q55_A5-p17"></p>
15221 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A4.html"></a>
15222 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A6.html"></a>
15223 </div>
15224 <div id="XP_Q55_A6" class="div4">
15225 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A5.html"></a>
15226 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A7.html"></a>
15227 <h4 id="XP_Q55_A6-p0.1">Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage?</h4>
15228 <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p1"></p>
15229 <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p2">
15230 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that affinity is not an impediment to marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage except what is contrary
15231 thereto. But affinity is not contrary to marriage since it is caused by it. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.
15232 </p>
15233 <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p3">
15234 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by marriage the wife becomes a possession of the husband. Now the husband's kindred inherit his possessions after
15235 his death. Therefore they can succeed to his wife, although she is affine to them, as shown above
15236 <a id="XP_Q55_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q55_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Therefore affinity is not an impediment to marriage.
15237 </p>
15238 <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p4">
15239 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
15240 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q55_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.8" target="asv">Lev. 18:8</a>): "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy father's wife." Now she is only affine. Therefore affinity is an impediment
15241 to marriage.
15242 </p>
15243 <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p5">
15244 <b>I answer that,</b> Affinity that precedes marriage hinders marriage being contracted and voids the contract, for the same reason as consanguinity.
15245 For just as there is a certain need for blood-relations to live together, so is there for those who are connected by affinity:
15246 and just as there is a tie of friendship between blood-relations, so is there between those who are affine to one another.
15247 If, however, affinity supervene to matrimony, it cannot void the marriage, as stated
15248 above (
15249 <a id="XP_Q55_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q50_A7.html">Q[50], A[7]</a>).
15250 </p>
15251 <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p6">
15252 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Affinity is not contrary to the marriage which causes it, but to a marriage being contracted with an affine, in so far as
15253 the latter would hinder the extension of friendship and the curbing of concupiscence, which are sought in marriage.
15254 </p>
15255 <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p7">
15256 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The husband's possessions do not become one with him as the wife is made one flesh with him. Wherefore just as consanguinity
15257 is an impediment to marriage or union with the husband according to the flesh, so is one forbidden to marry the husband's
15258 wife.
15259 </p>
15260 <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p8"></p>
15261 <p id="XP_Q55_A6-p9"></p>
15262 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A5.html"></a>
15263 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A7.html"></a>
15264 </div>
15265 <div id="XP_Q55_A7" class="div4">
15266 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A6.html"></a>
15267 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A8.html"></a>
15268 <h4 id="XP_Q55_A7-p0.1">Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees?</h4>
15269 <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p1"></p>
15270 <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p2">
15271 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that affinity in itself admits of degrees. For any kind of propinquity can itself be the subject of degrees.
15272 Now affinity is a kind of propinquity. Therefore it has degrees in itself apart from the degrees of consanguinity by which
15273 it is caused.
15274 </p>
15275 <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p3">
15276 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41) that the child of a second marriage could not take a consort from within
15277 the degrees of affinity of the first husband. But this would not be the case unless the son of an affine were also affine.
15278 Therefore affinity like consanguinity admits itself of degrees.
15279 </p>
15280 <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p4">
15281 <b>On the contrary,</b> Affinity is caused by consanguinity. Therefore all the degrees of affinity are caused by the degrees of consanguinity: and
15282 so it has no degrees of itself.
15283 </p>
15284 <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p5">
15285 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing does not of itself admit of being divided except in reference to something belonging to it by reason of its genus:
15286 thus animal is divided into rational and irrational and not into white and black. Now carnal procreation has a direct relation
15287 to consanguinity, because the tie of consanguinity is immediately contracted through it; whereas it has no relation to affinity
15288 except through consanguinity which is the latter's cause. Wherefore since the
15289 degrees of relationship are distinguished in reference to carnal procreation, the distinction of degrees is directly and immediately
15290 referable to consanguinity, and to affinity through consanguinity. Hence the general rule in seeking the degrees of affinity
15291 is that in whatever degree of consanguinity I am related to the husband, in that same degree of affinity I am related to the
15292 wife.
15293 </p>
15294 <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p6">
15295 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The degrees in propinquity of relationship can only be taken in reference to ascent and descent of propagation, to which
15296 affinity is compared only through consanguinity. Wherefore affinity has no direct degrees, but derives them according to the
15297 degrees of consanguinity.
15298 </p>
15299 <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p7">
15300 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Formerly it used to be said that the son of my affine by a second marriage was affine to me, not directly but accidentally
15301 as it were: wherefore he was forbidden to marry on account of the justice of public honesty rather than affinity. And for
15302 this reason this prohibition is now revoked.
15303 </p>
15304 <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p8"></p>
15305 <p id="XP_Q55_A7-p9"></p>
15306 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A6.html"></a>
15307 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A8.html"></a>
15308 </div>
15309 <div id="XP_Q55_A8" class="div4">
15310 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A7.html"></a>
15311 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A9.html"></a>
15312 <h4 id="XP_Q55_A8-p0.1">Whether the degrees of affinity extend in the same way as the degrees of consanguinity?</h4>
15313 <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p1"></p>
15314 <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p2">
15315 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the degrees of affinity do not extend in the same way as the degrees of consanguinity. For the tie of
15316 affinity is less strong than the tie of consanguinity, since affinity arises from consanguinity in diversity of species, as
15317 from an equivocal cause. Now the stronger the tie the longer it lasts. Therefore the tie of affinity does not last to the
15318 same number of degrees as consanguinity.
15319 </p>
15320 <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p3">
15321 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human law should imitate Divine law. Now according to the Divine law certain degrees of consanguinity were forbidden,
15322 in which degrees affinity was not an impediment to marriage: as instanced in a brother's wife whom a man could marry although
15323 he could not marry her sister. Therefore now too the prohibition of affinity and consanguinity should not extend to the same
15324 degrees.
15325 </p>
15326 <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p4">
15327 <b>On the contrary,</b> A woman is connected with me by affinity from the very fact that she is married to a blood-relation of mine. Therefore in
15328 whatever degree her husband is related to me by blood she is related to me in that same degree by affinity: and so the degrees
15329 of affinity should be reckoned in the same number as the degrees of consanguinity.
15330 </p>
15331 <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p5">
15332 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the degrees of affinity are reckoned according to the degrees of consanguinity, the degrees of affinity must needs
15333 be the same in number as those of consanguinity. Nevertheless, affinity being a lesser tie than consanguinity, both formerly
15334 and now, a dispensation is more easily granted in the more remote degrees of affinity than in the remote degrees of consanguinity.
15335 </p>
15336 <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p6">
15337 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The fact that the tie of affinity is less than the tie of consanguinity causes a difference in the kind of relationship but
15338 not in the degrees. Hence this argument is not to the point.
15339 </p>
15340 <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p7">
15341 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man could not take his deceased brother's wife except, in the case when the latter died without issue, in order to raise
15342 up seed to his brother. This was requisite at a time when religious worship was propagated by means of the propagation of
15343 the flesh, which is not the case now. Hence it is clear that he did not marry her in his own person as it were, but as supplying
15344 the place of his brother.
15345 </p>
15346 <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p8"></p>
15347 <p id="XP_Q55_A8-p9"></p>
15348 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A7.html"></a>
15349 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A9.html"></a>
15350 </div>
15351 <div id="XP_Q55_A9" class="div4">
15352 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A8.html"></a>
15353 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A10.html"></a>
15354 <h4 id="XP_Q55_A9-p0.1">Whether a marriage contracted by persons with the degrees of affinity or consanguinity should always be annulled?</h4>
15355 <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p1"></p>
15356 <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p2">
15357 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a marriage contracted by persons within the degrees of affinity or consanguinity ought not always to be
15358 annulled by divorce. For "what God hath joined together let no man put asunder" (
15359 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q55_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.6" target="asv">Mat. 19:6</a>). Since then it is understood that what the Church does God does, and since the Church sometimes through ignorance joins
15360 such persons together, it would seem that if subsequently this came to knowledge they ought not to be separated.
15361 </p>
15362 <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p3">
15363 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the tie of marriage is less onerous than the tie of ownership. Now after a long time a man may acquire by prescription
15364 the ownership of a thing of which he was not the owner. Therefore by length of time a marriage becomes good in law, although
15365 it was not so before.
15366 </p>
15367 <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p4">
15368 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, of like things we judge alike. Now if a marriage ought to be annulled on account of consanguinity, in the case when
15369 two brothers marry two sisters, if one be separated on account of consanguinity, the other ought to be separated for the same
15370 reason. and yet this is not seemly. Therefore a marriage ought not to be annulled on account of affinity or consanguinity.
15371 </p>
15372 <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p5">
15373 <b>On the contrary,</b> Consanguinity and affinity forbid the contracting of a marriage and void the contract. Therefore if affinity or consanguinity
15374 be proved, the parties should be separated even though they have actually contracted marriage.
15375 </p>
15376 <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p6">
15377 <b>I answer that,</b> Since all copulation apart from lawful marriage is a mortal sin, which the Church uses all her endeavors to prevent, it belongs
15378 to her to separate those between whom there cannot be valid marriage, especially those related by blood or by affinity, who
15379 cannot without incest be united in the flesh.
15380 </p>
15381 <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p7">
15382 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the Church is upheld by God's gift and authority, yet in so far as she is an assembly of men there results in her
15383 acts something of human frailty which is not Divine. Therefore a union effected in the presence of the Church who is ignorant
15384 of an impediment is not indissoluble by Divine authority, but is brought about contrary to Divine authority through man's
15385 error, which being an error of fact excuses from sin, as long as it remains. Hence
15386 when the impediment comes to the knowledge of the Church, she ought to sever the aforesaid union.
15387 </p>
15388 <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p8">
15389 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which cannot be done without sin is not ratified by any prescription, for as Innocent III says (Conc. Later. iv, can.
15390 50: cap. Non debent, De consang. et affinit.), "length of time does not diminish sin but increases it": nor can it in any
15391 way legitimize a marriage which could not take place between unlawful persons.
15392 </p>
15393 <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p9">
15394 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In contentious suits between two persons the verdict does not prejudice a third party, wherefore although the one brother's
15395 marriage with the one sister is annulled on account of consanguinity, the Church does not therefore annul the other marriage
15396 against which no action is taken. Yet in the tribunal of the conscience the other brother ought not on this account always
15397 to be bound to put away his wife, because such accusations frequently proceed from
15398 ill-will, and are proved by false witnesses. Hence he is not bound to form his conscience on what has been done about the
15399 other marriage: but seemingly one ought to draw a distinction, because either he has certain knowledge of the impediment of
15400 his marriage, or he has an opinion about it, or he has neither. In the first case, he can neither seek nor pay the debt, in
15401 the second, he must pay, but not ask, in the third he can both pay and ask.
15402 </p>
15403 <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p10"></p>
15404 <p id="XP_Q55_A9-p11"></p>
15405 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A8.html"></a>
15406 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A10.html"></a>
15407 </div>
15408 <div id="XP_Q55_A10" class="div4">
15409 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A9.html"></a>
15410 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A11.html"></a>
15411 <h4 id="XP_Q55_A10-p0.1">Whether it is necessary to proceed by way of accusation for the annulment of a marriage contracted by persons related to each
15412 other by affinity or consanguinity?
15413 </h4>
15414 <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p1"></p>
15415 <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p2">
15416 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one ought not to proceed by way of accusation in order to sever a marriage contracted between persons
15417 related by affinity or consanguinity. Because accusation is preceded by inscription* whereby a man binds himself to suffer
15418 the punishment of retaliation, if he fail to prove his accusation. [*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere)
15419 the writ of accusation; Cf.
15420 <a id="XP_Q55_A10-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A7.html">SS, Q[33], A[7]</a>]. But this is not
15421 required when a matrimonial separation is at issue. Therefore accusation has no place then.
15422 </p>
15423 <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p3">
15424 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in a matrimonial lawsuit only the relatives are heard, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41). But in accusations
15425 even strangers are heard. Therefore in a suit for matrimonial separation the process is not by way of accusation.
15426 </p>
15427 <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p4">
15428 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a marriage ought to be denounced this should be done especially where it is least difficult to sever the tie.
15429 Now this is when only the betrothal has been contracted, and then it is not the marriage that is denounced. Therefore accusation
15430 should never take place at any other time.
15431 </p>
15432 <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p5">
15433 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a man is not prevented from accusing by the fact that he does not accuse at once. But this happens in marriage,
15434 for if he was silent at first when the marriage was being contracted, he cannot denounce the marriage afterwards without laying
15435 himself open to suspicion. Therefore, etc.
15436 </p>
15437 <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p6">
15438 <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is unlawful can be denounced. But the marriage of relatives by affinity and consanguinity is unlawful. Therefore
15439 it can be denounced.
15440 </p>
15441 <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p7">
15442 <b>I answer that,</b> Accusation is instituted lest the guilty be tolerated as though they were innocent. Now just as it happens through ignorance
15443 of fact that a guilty man is reputed innocent, so it happens through ignorance of a circumstance that a certain fact is deemed
15444 lawful whereas it is unlawful. Wherefore just as a man is sometimes accused, so is a fact sometimes an object of accusation.
15445 It is in this way that a marriage is denounced, when through ignorance of an
15446 impediment it is deemed lawful, whereas it is unlawful.
15447 </p>
15448 <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p8">
15449 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The punishment of retaliation takes place when a person is accused of a crime, because then action is taken that he may be
15450 punished. But when it is a deed that is accused, action is taken not for the punishment of the doer, but in order to prevent
15451 what is unlawful. Hence in a matrimonial suit the accuser does not bind himself to a punishment. Moreover, the accusation
15452 may be made either in words or in writing, provided the person who denounces the
15453 marriage denounced, and the impediment for which it is denounced, be expressed.
15454 </p>
15455 <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p9">
15456 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Strangers cannot know of the consanguinity except from the relatives, since these know with greater probability. Hence when
15457 these are silent, a stranger is liable to be suspected of acting from ill-will unless he wish the relatives to prove his assertion.
15458 Wherefore a stranger is debarred from accusing when there are relatives who are silent, and by whom he cannot prove his accusation.
15459 On the other hand the relatives, however nearly related they be,
15460 are not debarred from accusing, when the marriage is denounced on account of a perpetual impediment, which prevents the contracting
15461 of the marriage and voids the contract. When, however, the accusation is based on a denial of the contract having taken place,
15462 the parents should be debarred from witnessing as being liable to suspicion, except those of the party that is inferior in
15463 rank and wealth, for they, one is inclined to think, would be willing for the marriage to stand.
15464 </p>
15465 <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p10">
15466 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the marriage is not yet contracted and there is only a betrothal, there can be no accusation, for what is not, cannot
15467 be accused. But the impediment can be denounced lest the marriage be contracted.
15468 </p>
15469 <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p11">
15470 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> He who is silent at first is sometimes heard afterwards if he wish to denounce the marriage, and sometimes he is repulsed.
15471 This is made clear by the Decretal (cap. Cum in tua, De his qui matrim. accus. possunt.) which runs as follows: "If an accuser
15472 present himself after the marriage has been contracted, since he did not declare himself when according to custom, the banns
15473 were published in church, we may rightly ask whether he should be allowed to
15474 voice his accusation. In this matter we deem that a distinction should be made, so that if he who lodges information against
15475 persons already married was absent from the diocese at the time of the aforesaid publication, or if for some other reason
15476 this could not come to his knowledge, for instance if through exceeding stress of weakness and fever he was not in possession
15477 of his faculties, or was of so tender years as to be too young to understand such matters, or if he were hindered by some
15478 other lawful cause, his accusation should be heard. otherwise without doubt he should be repulsed as open to suspicion, unless
15479 he swear that the information lodged by him came to his knowledge subsequently and that he is not moved by ill-will to make
15480 his accusation."
15481 </p>
15482 <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p12"></p>
15483 <p id="XP_Q55_A10-p13"></p>
15484 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A9.html"></a>
15485 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A11.html"></a>
15486 </div>
15487 <div id="XP_Q55_A11" class="div4">
15488 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A10.html"></a>
15489 <a href="summa.XP_Q56.html"></a>
15490 <h4 id="XP_Q55_A11-p0.1">Whether in a suit of this kind one should proceed by hearing witnesses in the same way as in other suits?</h4>
15491 <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p1"></p>
15492 <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p2">
15493 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in such a suit one ought not to proceed by hearing witnesses, in the same way as in other suits where
15494 any witnesses may be called provided they be unexceptionable. But here strangers are not admitted, although they be unexceptionable.
15495 Therefore, etc.
15496 </p>
15497 <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p3">
15498 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, witnesses who are suspected of private hatred or love are debarred from giving evidence. Now relatives are especially
15499 open to suspicion of love for one party, and hatred for the other. Therefore their evidence should not be taken.
15500 </p>
15501 <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p4">
15502 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, marriage is a more favorable suit than those others in which purely corporeal questions are at stake. Now in these
15503 the same person cannot be both accuser and witness. Neither therefore can this be in a matrimonial suit; and so it would appear
15504 that it is not right to proceed by hearing witnesses in a suit of this kind.
15505 </p>
15506 <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p5">
15507 <b>On the contrary,</b> Witnesses are called in a suit in order to give the judge evidence concerning matters of doubt. Now evidence should be afforded
15508 the judge in this suit as in other suits, since he must not pronounce a hasty judgment on what is not proven. Therefore here
15509 as in other lawsuits witnesses should be called.
15510 </p>
15511 <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p6">
15512 <b>I answer that,</b> In this kind of lawsuit as in others, truth must be unveiled by witnesses: yet, as the lawyers say, there are many things
15513 peculiar to this suit; namely that "the same person can be accuser and witness; that evidence is not taken 'on oath of calumny,'
15514 since it is a quasi-spiritual lawsuit; that relatives are allowed as witnesses; that the juridical order is not perfectly
15515 observed, since if the denunciation has been made, and the suit is uncontested, the
15516 defendant may be excommunicated if contumacious; that hearsay evidence is admitted; and that witnesses may be called after
15517 the publication of the names of the witnesses." All this is in order to prevent the sin that may occur in such a union (cap.
15518 Quoties aliqui; cap. Super eo, De test. et attest.; cap. Literas, De juram. calumn.).
15519 </p>
15520 <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p7"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
15521 <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p8"></p>
15522 <p id="XP_Q55_A11-p9"></p>
15523 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A10.html"></a>
15524 <a href="summa.XP_Q56.html"></a>
15525 </div>
15526 <a href="summa.XP_Q54_A4.html"></a>
15527 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A1.html"></a>
15528 </div>
15529 <div id="XP_Q56" class="div3">
15530 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A11.html"></a>
15531 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A1.html"></a>
15532 <h3 id="XP_Q56-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
15533 <p id="XP_Q56-p1"></p>
15534 <p id="XP_Q56-p2"> We must now consider the impediment of spiritual relationship: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
15535 <p id="XP_Q56-p3"> (1) Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?</p>
15536 <p id="XP_Q56-p4"> (2) From what cause is it contracted?</p>
15537 <p id="XP_Q56-p5"> (3) Between whom?</p>
15538 <p id="XP_Q56-p6"> (4) Whether it passes from husband to wife?</p>
15539 <p id="XP_Q56-p7"> (5) Whether it passes to the father's carnal children?</p>
15540 <div id="XP_Q56_A1" class="div4">
15541 <a href="summa.XP_Q56.html"></a>
15542 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A2.html"></a>
15543 <h4 id="XP_Q56_A1-p0.1">Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?</h4>
15544 <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p1"></p>
15545 <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p2">
15546 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual relationship is not an impediment to marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage save
15547 what is contrary to a marriage good. Now spiritual relationship is not contrary to a marriage good. Therefore it is not an
15548 impediment to marriage.
15549 </p>
15550 <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p3">
15551 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a perpetual impediment to marriage cannot stand together with marriage. But spiritual relationship sometimes stands
15552 together with marriage, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42), as when a man in a case of necessity baptizes his own child,
15553 for then he contracts a spiritual relationship with his wife, and yet the marriage is not dissolved. Therefore spiritual relationship
15554 is not an impediment to marriage.
15555 </p>
15556 <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p4">
15557 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, union of the spirit does not pass to the flesh. But marriage is a union of the flesh. Therefore since spiritual
15558 relationship is a union of the spirit, it cannot become an impediment to marriage.
15559 </p>
15560 <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p5">
15561 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, contraries have not the same effects. Now spiritual relationship is apparently contrary to disparity of worship,
15562 since spiritual relationship is a kinship resulting from the giving of a sacrament or the intention of so doing [*See next
15563 Article, ad 3]: whereas disparity of worship consists in the lack of a sacrament, as stated above (
15564 <a id="XP_Q56_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q50_A1.html">Q[50], A[1]</a>). Since then disparity of worship is an impediment to matrimony, it would seem that
15565 spiritual relationship has not this effect.
15566 </p>
15567 <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p6">
15568 <b>On the contrary,</b> The holier the bond, the more is it to be safeguarded. Now a spiritual bond is holier than a bodily tie: and since the tie
15569 of bodily kinship is an impediment to marriage, it follows that spiritual relationship should also be an impediment.
15570 </p>
15571 <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p7"> Further, in marriage the union of souls ranks higher than union of bodies, for it precedes it. Therefore with much more reason
15572 can a spiritual relationship hinder marriage than bodily relationship does.
15573 </p>
15574 <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p8">
15575 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as by carnal procreation man receives natural being, so by the sacraments he receives the spiritual being of grace.
15576 Wherefore just as the tie that is contracted by carnal procreation is natural to man, inasmuch as he is a natural being, so
15577 the tie that is contracted from the reception of the sacraments is after a fashion natural to man, inasmuch as he is a member
15578 of the Church. Therefore as carnal relationship hinders marriage, even so does spiritual
15579 relationship by command of the Church. We must however draw a distinction in reference to spiritual relationship, since either
15580 it precedes or follows marriage. If it precedes, it hinders the contracting of marriage and voids the contract. If it follows,
15581 it does not dissolve the marriage bond: but we must draw a further distinction in reference to the marriage act. For either
15582 the spiritual relationship is contracted in a case of necessity, as when a father baptizes his child who is at the point
15583 of death---and then it is not an obstacle to the marriage act on either side---or it is contracted without any necessity and
15584 through ignorance, in which case if the person whose action has occasioned the relationship acted with due caution, it is
15585 the same with him as in the former case---or it is contracted purposely and without any necessity, and then the person whose
15586 action has occasioned the relationship, loses the right to ask for the debt; but is bound to pay if asked, because the fault
15587 of
15588 the one party should not be prejudicial to the other.
15589 </p>
15590 <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p9">
15591 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although spiritual relationship does not hinder any of the chief marriage goods, it hinders one of the secondary goods, namely
15592 the extension of friendship, because spiritual relationship is by itself a sufficient reason for friendship: wherefore intimacy
15593 and friendship with other persons need to be sought by means of marriage.
15594 </p>
15595 <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p10">
15596 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Marriage is a lasting bond, wherefore no supervening impediment can sever it. Hence it happens sometimes that marriage and
15597 an impediment to marriage stand together, but not if the impediment precedes.
15598 </p>
15599 <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p11">
15600 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In marriage there is not only a bodily but also a spiritual union: and consequently kinship of spirit proves an impediment
15601 thereto, without spiritual kinship having to pass into a bodily relationship.
15602 </p>
15603 <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p12">
15604 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is nothing unreasonable in two things that are contrary to one another being contrary to the same thing, as great and
15605 small are contrary to equal. Thus disparity of worship and spiritual relationship are opposed to marriage, because in one
15606 the distance is greater, and in the other less, than required by marriage. Hence there is an impediment to marriage in either
15607 case.
15608 </p>
15609 <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p13"></p>
15610 <p id="XP_Q56_A1-p14"></p>
15611 <a href="summa.XP_Q56.html"></a>
15612 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A2.html"></a>
15613 </div>
15614 <div id="XP_Q56_A2" class="div4">
15615 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A1.html"></a>
15616 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A3.html"></a>
15617 <h4 id="XP_Q56_A2-p0.1">Whether spiritual relationship is contracted by baptism only?</h4>
15618 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p1"></p>
15619 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p2">
15620 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual relationship is contracted by Baptism only. For as bodily kinship is to bodily birth, so is
15621 spiritual kinship to spiritual birth. Now Baptism alone is called spiritual birth. Therefore spiritual kinship is contracted
15622 by Baptism only, even as only by carnal birth is carnal kinship contracted.
15623 </p>
15624 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p3">
15625 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a character is imprinted in order as in Confirmation. But spiritual relationship does not result from receiving
15626 orders. Therefore it does not result from Confirmation but only from Baptism.
15627 </p>
15628 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p4">
15629 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sacraments are more excellent than sacramentals. Now spiritual relationship does not result from certain sacraments,
15630 for instance from Extreme Unction. Much less therefore does it result from catechizing, as some maintain.
15631 </p>
15632 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p5">
15633 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, many other sacramentals are attached to Baptism besides catechizing. Therefore spiritual relationship is not contracted
15634 from catechism any more than from the others.
15635 </p>
15636 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p6">
15637 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, prayer is no less efficacious than instruction of catechism for advancement in good. But spiritual relationship
15638 does not result from prayer. Therefore it does not result from catechism.
15639 </p>
15640 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p7">
15641 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the instruction given to the baptized by preaching to them avails no less than preaching to those who are not yet
15642 baptized. But no spiritual relationship results from preaching. Neither therefore does it result from catechism.
15643 </p>
15644 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p8">
15645 <b>Objection 7:</b> On the other hand, It is written (
15646 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q56_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:15</a>): "In Christ Jesus by the gospel I have begotten you." Now spiritual birth causes spiritual relationship. Therefore spiritual
15647 relationship results from the preaching of the gospel and instruction, and not only from Baptism.
15648 </p>
15649 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p9">
15650 <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, as original sin is taken away by Baptism, so is actual sin taken away by Penance. Therefore just as Baptism causes
15651 spiritual relationship, so also does Penance.
15652 </p>
15653 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p10">
15654 <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, "father" denotes relationship. Now a man is called another's spiritual father in respect of Penance, teaching, pastoral
15655 care and many other like things. Therefore spiritual relationship is contracted from many other sources besides Baptism and
15656 Confirmation.
15657 </p>
15658 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p11">
15659 <b>I answer that,</b> There are three opinions on this question. Some say that as spiritual regeneration is bestowed by the sevenfold grace of
15660 the Holy Ghost, it is caused by means of seven things, beginning with the first taste of blessed salt and ending with Confirmation
15661 given by the bishop: and they say that spiritual relationship is contracted by each of these seven things. But this does not
15662 seem reasonable, for carnal relationship is not contracted except by a perfect act of
15663 generation. Wherefore affinity is not contracted except there be mingling of seeds, from which it is possible for carnal generation
15664 to follow. Now spiritual generation is not perfected except by a sacrament: wherefore it does not seem fitting for spiritual
15665 relationship to be contracted otherwise than through a sacrament. Hence others say that spiritual relationship is only contracted
15666 through three sacraments, namely catechism, Baptism and Confirmation, but these do not apparently know the
15667 meaning of what they say, since catechism is not a sacrament but a sacramental. Wherefore others say that it is contracted
15668 through two sacraments only, namely Confirmation and Baptism, and this is the more common opinion. Some however of these say
15669 that catechism is a weak impediment, since it hinders the contracting of marriage but does not void the contract.
15670 </p>
15671 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p12">
15672 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Carnal birth is twofold. The first is in the womb, wherein that which is born is a weakling and cannot come forth without
15673 danger: and to this birth regeneration by Baptism is likened; wherein a man is regenerated as though yet needing to be fostered
15674 in the womb of the Church. The second is birth from out of the womb, when that which was born in the womb is so far strengthened
15675 that it can without danger face the outer world which has a natural
15676 corruptive tendency. To this is likened Confirmation, whereby man being strengthened goes forth abroad to confess the name
15677 of Christ. Hence spiritual relationship is fittingly contracted through both these sacraments.
15678 </p>
15679 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p13">
15680 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The effect of the sacrament of order is not regeneration but the bestowal of power, for which reason it is not conferred
15681 on women, and consequently no impediment to marriage can arise therefrom. Hence this kind of relationship does not count.
15682 </p>
15683 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p14">
15684 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In catechism one makes a profession of future Baptism, just as in betrothal one enters an engagement of future marriage.
15685 Wherefore just as in betrothal a certain kind of propinquity is contracted, so is there in catechism, whereby marriage is
15686 rendered at least unlawful, as some say; but not in the other sacraments.
15687 </p>
15688 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p15">
15689 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is not made a profession of faith in the other sacramentals of Baptism, as in catechism: wherefore the comparison fails.
15690 </p>
15691 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p16"> The same answer applies to the Fifth and Sixth Objections.</p>
15692 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p17">
15693 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The Apostle had instructed them in the faith by a kind of catechism; and consequently his instruction was directed to their
15694 spiritual birth.
15695 </p>
15696 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p18">
15697 <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Properly speaking a spiritual relationship is not contracted through the sacrament of Penance. Wherefore a priest's son can
15698 marry a woman whose confession the priest has heard, else in the whole parish he could not find a woman whom he could marry.
15699 Nor does it matter that by Penance actual sin is taken away, for this is not a kind of birth, but a kind of healing. Nevertheless
15700 Penance occasions a kind of bond between the woman penitent and the priest,
15701 that has a resemblance to spiritual relationship, so that if he have carnal intercourse with her, he sins as grievously as
15702 if she were his spiritual daughter. The reason of this is that the relations between priest and penitent are most intimate,
15703 and consequently in order to remove the occasion of sin this prohibition [*Can. Omnes quos, and seqq., Caus. xxx] was made.
15704 </p>
15705 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p19">
15706 <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> A spiritual father is so called from his likeness to a carnal father. Now as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) a carnal
15707 father gives his child three things, being nourishment and instruction: and consequently a person's spiritual father is so
15708 called from one of these three things. Nevertheless he has not, through being his spiritual father, a spiritual relationship
15709 with him, unless he is like a (carnal) father as to generation which is the way to
15710 being. This solution may also be applied to the foregoing Eighth Objection.
15711 </p>
15712 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p20"></p>
15713 <p id="XP_Q56_A2-p21"></p>
15714 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A1.html"></a>
15715 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A3.html"></a>
15716 </div>
15717 <div id="XP_Q56_A3" class="div4">
15718 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A2.html"></a>
15719 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A4.html"></a>
15720 <h4 id="XP_Q56_A3-p0.1">Whether spiritual relationship is contracted between the person baptized and the person who raises him from the sacred font?</h4>
15721 <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p1"></p>
15722 <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p2">
15723 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual relationship is not contracted between the person baptized and the person who raises him from
15724 the sacred font. For in carnal generation carnal relationship is contracted only on the part of the person of whose seed the
15725 child is born; and not on the part of the person who receives the child after birth. Therefore neither is spiritual relationship
15726 contracted between the receiver and the received at the sacred font.
15727 </p>
15728 <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p3">
15729 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who raises a person from the sacred font is called {anadochos} by Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii): and it is part
15730 of his office to instruct the child. But instruction is not a sufficient cause of spiritual relationship, as stated above
15731
15732 <a id="XP_Q56_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q56_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore no relationship is contracted between him and the person whom he raises from the sacred font.
15733 </p>
15734 <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p4">
15735 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it may happen that someone raises a person from the sacred font before he himself is baptized. Now spiritual relationship
15736 is not contracted in such a case, since one who is not baptized is not capable of spirituality. Therefore raising a person
15737 from the sacred font is not sufficient to contract a spiritual relationship.
15738 </p>
15739 <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p5">
15740 <b>On the contrary,</b> There is the definition of spiritual relationship quoted above
15741 <a id="XP_Q56_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q56_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, as also the authorities mentioned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).
15742 </p>
15743 <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p6">
15744 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as in carnal generation a person is born of a father and mother, so in spiritual generation a person is born again a
15745 son of God as Father, and of the Church as Mother. Now while he who confers the sacrament stands in the place of God, whose
15746 instrument and minister he is, he who raises a baptized person from the sacred font, or holds the candidate for Confirmation,
15747 stands in the place of the Church. Therefore spiritual relationship is contracted with
15748 both.
15749 </p>
15750 <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p7">
15751 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not only the father, of whose seed the child is born, is related carnally to the child, but also the mother who provides
15752 the matter, and in whose womb the child is begotten. So too the godparent who in place of the Church offers and raises the
15753 candidate for Baptism and holds the candidate for Confirmation contracts spiritual relationship.
15754 </p>
15755 <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p8">
15756 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He contracts spiritual relationship not by reason of the instruction it is his duty to give, but on account of the spiritual
15757 birth in which he co-operates.
15758 </p>
15759 <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p9">
15760 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A person who is not baptized cannot raise anyone from the sacred font, since he is not a member of the Church whom the godparent
15761 in Baptism represents: although he can baptize, because he is a creature of God Whom the baptizer represents. And yet he cannot
15762 contract a spiritual relationship, since he is void of spiritual life to which man is first born by receiving Baptism.
15763 </p>
15764 <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p10"></p>
15765 <p id="XP_Q56_A3-p11"></p>
15766 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A2.html"></a>
15767 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A4.html"></a>
15768 </div>
15769 <div id="XP_Q56_A4" class="div4">
15770 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A3.html"></a>
15771 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A5.html"></a>
15772 <h4 id="XP_Q56_A4-p0.1">Whether spiritual relationship passes from husband to wife?</h4>
15773 <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p1"></p>
15774 <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p2">
15775 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass from husband to wife. For spiritual and bodily union are disparate
15776 and differ generically. Therefore carnal union which is between husband and wife cannot be the means of contracting a spiritual
15777 relationship.
15778 </p>
15779 <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p3">
15780 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the godfather and godmother have more in common in the spiritual birth that is the cause of spiritual relationship,
15781 than a husband, who is godfather, has with his wife. Now godfather and godmother do not hereby contract spiritual relationship.
15782 Therefore neither does a wife contract a spiritual relationship through her husband being godfather to someone.
15783 </p>
15784 <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p4">
15785 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it may happen that the husband is baptized, and his wife not, for instance when he is converted from unbelief without
15786 his wife being converted. Now spiritual relationship cannot be contracted by one who is not baptized. Therefore it does not
15787 always pass from husband to wife.
15788 </p>
15789 <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p5">
15790 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, husband and wife together can raise a person from the sacred font, since no law forbids it. If therefore spiritual
15791 relationship passed from husband to wife, it would follow that each of them is twice godfather or godmother of the same individual:
15792 which is absurd.
15793 </p>
15794 <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p6">
15795 <b>On the contrary,</b> Spiritual goods are more communicable than bodily goods. But the bodily consanguinity of the husband passes to his wife by
15796 affinity. Much more therefore does spiritual relationship.
15797 </p>
15798 <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p7">
15799 <b>I answer that,</b> A may become co-parent with B in two ways. First, by the act of another (B), who baptizes A's child, or raises him in Baptism.
15800 In this way spiritual relationship does not pass from husband to wife, unless perchance it be his wife's child, for then she
15801 contracts spiritual relationship directly, even as her husband. Secondly, by his own act, for instance when he raises B's
15802 child from the sacred font, and thus spiritual relationship passes to the wife if he has
15803 already had carnal knowledge of her, but not if the marriage be not yet consummated, since they are not as yet made one flesh:
15804 and this is by way of a kind of affinity; wherefore it would seem on the same grounds to pass to a woman of whom he has carnal
15805 knowledge, though she be not his wife. Hence the verse: "I may not marry my own child's godmother, nor the mother of my godchild:
15806 but I may marry the godmother of my wife's child."
15807 </p>
15808 <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p8">
15809 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that corporal and spiritual union differ generically we may conclude that the one is not the other, but not
15810 that the one cannot cause the other, since things of different genera sometimes cause one another either directly or indirectly.
15811 </p>
15812 <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p9">
15813 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The godfather and godmother of the same person are not united in that person's spiritual birth save accidentally, since one
15814 of them would be self-sufficient for the purpose. Hence it does not follow from this that any spiritual relationship results
15815 between them whereby they are hindered from marrying one another. Hence the verse:
15816 </p>
15817 <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p10"> "Of two co-parents one is always spiritual, the other carnal: this rule is infallible."</p>
15818 <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p11"> On the other hand, marriage by itself makes husband and wife one flesh: wherefore the comparison fails.</p>
15819 <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p12">
15820 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the wife be not baptized, the spiritual relationship will not reach her, because she is not a fit subject, and not because
15821 spiritual relationship cannot pass from husband to wife through marriage.
15822 </p>
15823 <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p13">
15824 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since no spiritual relationship results between godfather and godmother, nothing prevents husband and wife from raising together
15825 someone from the sacred font. Nor is it absurd that the wife become twice godmother of the same person from different causes,
15826 just as it is possible for her to be connected in carnal relationship both by affinity and consanguinity to the same person.
15827 </p>
15828 <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p14"></p>
15829 <p id="XP_Q56_A4-p15"></p>
15830 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A3.html"></a>
15831 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A5.html"></a>
15832 </div>
15833 <div id="XP_Q56_A5" class="div4">
15834 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A4.html"></a>
15835 <a href="summa.XP_Q57.html"></a>
15836 <h4 id="XP_Q56_A5-p0.1">Whether spiritual relationship passes to the godfather's carnal children?</h4>
15837 <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p1"></p>
15838 <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p2">
15839 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass to the godfather's carnal children. For no degrees are assigned to
15840 spiritual relationship. Yet there would be degrees if it passed from father to son, since the person begotten involves a change
15841 of degree, as stated above (
15842 <a id="XP_Q56_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q55_A5.html">Q[55], A[5]</a>). Therefore it does not pass to the godfather's carnal sons.
15843 </p>
15844 <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p3">
15845 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, father and son are related in the same degree as brother and brother. If therefore spiritual relationship passes
15846 from father to son, it will equally pass from brother to brother: and this is false.
15847 </p>
15848 <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p4">
15849 <b>On the contrary,</b> This is proved by authority quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).
15850 </p>
15851 <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p5">
15852 <b>I answer that,</b> A son is something of his father and not conversely (Ethic. viii, 12): wherefore spiritual relationship passes from father
15853 to his carnal son and not conversely. Thus it is clear that there are three spiritual relationships: one called spiritual
15854 fatherhood between godfather and godchild; another called co-paternity between the godparent and carnal parent of the same
15855 person; and the third is called spiritual brotherhood, between godchild and the carnal
15856 children of the same parent. Each of these hinders the contracting of marriage and voids the contract.
15857 </p>
15858 <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p6">
15859 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The addition of a person by carnal generation entails a degree with regard to a person connected by the same kind of relationship,
15860 but not with regard to one connected by another kind of relationship. Thus a son is connected with his father's wife in the
15861 same degree as his father, but by another kind of relationship. Now spiritual relationship differs in kind from carnal. Wherefore
15862 a godson is not related to his godfather's carnal son in the same
15863 degree as the latter's father is related to him, through whom the spiritual relationship is contracted. Consequently it does
15864 not follow that spiritual relationship admits of degrees.
15865 </p>
15866 <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p7">
15867 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man is not part of his brother as a son is of his father. But a wife is part of her husband, since she is made one with
15868 him in body. Consequently the relationship does not pass from brother to brother, whether the brother be born before or after
15869 spiritual brotherhood.
15870 </p>
15871 <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p8"></p>
15872 <p id="XP_Q56_A5-p9"></p>
15873 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A4.html"></a>
15874 <a href="summa.XP_Q57.html"></a>
15875 </div>
15876 <a href="summa.XP_Q55_A11.html"></a>
15877 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A1.html"></a>
15878 </div>
15879 <div id="XP_Q57" class="div3">
15880 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A5.html"></a>
15881 <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A1.html"></a>
15882 <h3 id="XP_Q57-p0.1">OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS BY ADOPTION (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
15883 <p id="XP_Q57-p1"></p>
15884 <p id="XP_Q57-p2"> We must now consider legal relationship which is by adoption. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
15885 <p id="XP_Q57-p3"> (1) What is adoption?</p>
15886 <p id="XP_Q57-p4"> (2) Whether one contracts through it a tie that is an impediment to marriage?</p>
15887 <p id="XP_Q57-p5"> (3) Between which persons is this tie contracted.</p>
15888 <div id="XP_Q57_A1" class="div4">
15889 <a href="summa.XP_Q57.html"></a>
15890 <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A2.html"></a>
15891 <h4 id="XP_Q57_A1-p0.1">Whether adoption is rightly defined?</h4>
15892 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p1"></p>
15893 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p2">
15894 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that adoption is not rightly defined: "Adoption is the act by which a person lawfully takes for his child or
15895 grandchild and so on one who does not belong to him." For the child should be subject to its father. Now, sometimes the person
15896 adopted does not come under the power of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not always the taking of someone as a child.
15897 </p>
15898 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p3">
15899 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Parents should lay up for their children" (
15900 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q57_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:14</a>). But the adoptive father does not always necessarily lay up for his adopted child, since sometimes the adopted does not
15901 inherit the goods of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not the taking of someone as a child.
15902 </p>
15903 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p4">
15904 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, adoption, whereby someone is taken as a child, is likened to natural procreation whereby a child is begotten naturally.
15905 Therefore whoever is competent to beget a child naturally is competent to adopt. But this is untrue, since neither one who
15906 is not his own master, nor one who is not twenty-five years of age, nor a woman can adopt, and yet they can beget a child
15907 naturally. Therefore, properly speaking, adoption is not the taking of someone as a
15908 child.
15909 </p>
15910 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p5">
15911 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, to take as one's child one who is not one's own seems necessary in order to supply the lack of children begotten
15912 naturally. Now one who is unable to beget, through being a eunuch or impotent, suffers especially from the absence of children
15913 of his own begetting. Therefore he is especially competent to adopt someone as his child. But he is not competent to adopt.
15914 Therefore adoption is not the taking of someone as one's child.
15915 </p>
15916 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p6">
15917 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, in spiritual relationship, where someone is taken as a child without carnal procreation, it is of no consequence
15918 whether an older person become the father of a younger, or "vice versa," since a youth can baptize an old man and "vice versa."
15919 Therefore, if by adoption a person is taken as a child without being carnally begotten, it would make no difference whether
15920 an older person adopted a younger, or a younger an older person; which is not true.
15921 Therefore the same conclusion follows.
15922 </p>
15923 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p7">
15924 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, there is no difference of degree between adopted and adopter. Therefore whoever is adopted, is adopted as a child;
15925 and consequently it is not right to say that one may be adopted as a grandchild.
15926 </p>
15927 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p8">
15928 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, adoption is a result of love, wherefore God is said to have adopted us as children through charity. Now we should
15929 have greater charity towards those who are connected with us than towards strangers. Therefore adoption should be not of a
15930 stranger but of someone connected with us.
15931 </p>
15932 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p9">
15933 <b>I answer that,</b> Art imitates nature and supplies the defect of nature where nature is deficient. Hence just as a man begets by natural procreation,
15934 so by positive law which is the art of what is good and just, one person can take to himself another as a child in likeness
15935 to one that is his child by nature, in order to take the place of the children he has lost, this being the chief reason why
15936 adoption was introduced. And since taking implies a term "wherefrom," for which
15937 reason the taker is not the thing taken, it follows that the person taken as a child must be a stranger. Accordingly, just
15938 as natural procreation has a term "whereto," namely the form which is the end of generation, and a term "wherefrom," namely
15939 the contrary form, so legal generation has a term "whereto," namely a child or grandchild, and a term "wherefrom," namely,
15940 a stranger. Consequently the above definition includes the genus of adoption, for it is described as a "lawful taking," and
15941 the
15942 term "wherefrom," since it is said to be the taking of "a stranger," and the term "whereto," because it says, "as a child
15943 or grandchild ."
15944 </p>
15945 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p10">
15946 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sonship of adoption is an imitation of natural sonship. Wherefore there are two species of adoption, one which imitates
15947 natural sonship perfectly, and this is called "arrogatio," whereby the person adopted is placed under the power of the adopter;
15948 and one who is thus adopted inherits from his adopted father if the latter die intestate, nor can his father legally deprive
15949 him of a fourth part of his inheritance. But no one can adopt in this way
15950 except one who is his own master, one namely who has no father or, if he has, is of age. There can be no adoption of this
15951 kind without the authority of the sovereign. The other kind of adoption imitates natural sonship imperfectly, and is called
15952 "simple adoption," and by this the adopted does not come under the power of the adopter: so that it is a disposition to perfect
15953 adoption, rather than perfect adoption itself. In this way even one who is not his own master can adopt, without the consent
15954 of the sovereign and with the authority of a magistrate: and one who is thus adopted does not inherit the estate of the adopter,
15955 nor is the latter bound to bequeath to him any of his goods in his will, unless he will.
15956 </p>
15957 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p11"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
15958 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p12">
15959 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural procreation is directed to the production of the species; wherefore anyone in whom the specific nature is not hindered
15960 is competent to be able to beget naturally. But adoption is directed to hereditary succession, wherefore those alone are competent
15961 to adopt who have the power to dispose of their estate. Consequently one who is not his own master, or who is less than twenty-five
15962 years of age, or a woman, cannot adopt anyone, except by special
15963 permission of the sovereign.
15964 </p>
15965 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p13">
15966 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An inheritance cannot pass to posterity through one who has a perpetual impediment from begetting: hence for this very reason
15967 it ought to pass to those who ought to succeed to him by right of relationship; and consequently he cannot adopt, as neither
15968 can he beget. Moreover greater is sorrow for children lost than for children one has never had. Wherefore those who are impeded
15969 from begetting need no solace for their lack of children as those who have
15970 had and have lost them, or could have had them but have them not by reason of some accidental impediment.
15971 </p>
15972 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p14">
15973 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Spiritual relationship is contracted through a sacrament whereby the faithful are born again in Christ, in Whom there is
15974 no difference between male and female, bondman and free, youth and old age (
15975 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q57_A1-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.28" target="asv">Gal. 3:28</a>;
15976 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q57_A1-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Col.3.11" target="asv"> Col. 3:11</a>). Wherefore anyone can indifferently become another's godfather. But adoption aims at hereditary succession and a certain
15977 subjection of the adopted to the adopter: and it is not fitting that
15978 older persons should be subjected to younger in the care of the household. Consequently a younger person cannot adopt an older;
15979 but according to law the adopted person must be so much younger than the adopter, that he might have been the child of his
15980 natural begetting.
15981 </p>
15982 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p15">
15983 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> One may lose one's grandchildren and so forth even as one may lose one's children. Wherefore since adoption was introduced
15984 as a solace for children lost, just as someone may be adopted in place of a child, so may someone be adopted in place of a
15985 grandchild and so on.
15986 </p>
15987 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p16">
15988 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> A relative ought to succeed by right of relationship; and therefore such a person is not competent to be chosen to succeed
15989 by adoption. And if a relative, who is not competent to inherit the estate, be adopted, he is adopted not as a relative, but
15990 as a stranger lacking the right of succeeding to the adopter's goods.
15991 </p>
15992 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p17"></p>
15993 <p id="XP_Q57_A1-p18"></p>
15994 <a href="summa.XP_Q57.html"></a>
15995 <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A2.html"></a>
15996 </div>
15997 <div id="XP_Q57_A2" class="div4">
15998 <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A1.html"></a>
15999 <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A3.html"></a>
16000 <h4 id="XP_Q57_A2-p0.1">Whether a tie that is an impediment to marriage is contracted through adoption?</h4>
16001 <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p1"></p>
16002 <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p2">
16003 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not contracted through adoption a tie that is an impediment to marriage. For spiritual care is
16004 more excellent than corporeal care. But no tie of relationship is contracted through one's being subjected to another's spiritual
16005 care: else all those who dwell in the parish would be related to the parish priest and would be unable to marry his son. Neither
16006 therefore can this result from adoption which places the adopted under the care of
16007 the adopter.
16008 </p>
16009 <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p3">
16010 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no tie of relationship results from persons conferring a benefit on another. But adoption is nothing but the conferring
16011 of a benefit. Therefore no tie of relationship results from adoption.
16012 </p>
16013 <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p4">
16014 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a natural father provides for his child chiefly in three things, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11,12),
16015 namely by giving him being, nourishment and education; and hereditary succession is subsequent to these. Now no tie of relationship
16016 is contracted by one's providing for a person's nourishment and education, else a person would be related to his nourishers,
16017 tutors and masters, which is false. Therefore neither is any relationship contracted
16018 through adoption by which one inherits another's estate.
16019 </p>
16020 <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p5">
16021 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the sacraments of the Church are not subject to human laws. Now marriage is a sacrament of the Church. Since then
16022 adoption was introduced by human law, it would seem that a tie contracted from adoption cannot be an impediment to marriage.
16023 </p>
16024 <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p6">
16025 <b>On the contrary,</b> Relationship is an impediment to marriage. Now a kind of relationship results from adoption, namely legal relationship, as
16026 evidenced by its definition, for "legal relationship is a connection arising out of adoption." Therefore adoption results
16027 in a tie which is an impediment to marriage.
16028 </p>
16029 <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p7"> Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).</p>
16030 <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p8">
16031 <b>I answer that,</b> The Divine law especially forbids marriage between those persons who have to live together lest, as Rabbi Moses observes
16032 (Doc. Perp. iii, 49), if it were lawful for them to have carnal intercourse, there should be more room for concupiscence to
16033 the repression of which marriage is directed. And since the adopted child dwells in the house of his adopted father like one
16034 that is begotten naturally human laws forbid the contracting of marriage between the like,
16035 and this prohibition is approved by the Church. Hence it is that legal adoption is an impediment to marriage. This suffices
16036 for the Replies to the first three Objections, because none of those things entails such a cohabitation as might be an incentive
16037 to concupiscence. Therefore they do not cause a relationship that is an impediment to marriage.
16038 </p>
16039 <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p9">
16040 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The prohibition of a human law would not suffice to make an impediment to marriage, unless the authority of the Church intervenes
16041 by issuing the same prohibition.
16042 </p>
16043 <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p10"></p>
16044 <p id="XP_Q57_A2-p11"></p>
16045 <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A1.html"></a>
16046 <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A3.html"></a>
16047 </div>
16048 <div id="XP_Q57_A3" class="div4">
16049 <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A2.html"></a>
16050 <a href="summa.XP_Q58.html"></a>
16051 <h4 id="XP_Q57_A3-p0.1">Whether legal relationship is contracted only between the adopting father and the adopted child?</h4>
16052 <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p1"></p>
16053 <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p2">
16054 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a relationship of this kind is contracted only between the adopting father and the adopted child. For
16055 it would seem that it ought above all to be contracted between the adopting father and the natural mother of the adopted,
16056 as happens in spiritual relationship. Yet there is no legal relationship between them. Therefore it is not contracted between
16057 any other persons besides the adopter and adopted.
16058 </p>
16059 <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p3">
16060 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relationship that impedes marriage is a perpetual impediment. But there is not a perpetual impediment between
16061 the adopted son and the naturally begotten daughter of the adopted; because when the adoption terminates at the death of the
16062 adopter, or when the adopted comes of age, the latter can marry her. Therefore he was not related to her in such a way as
16063 to prevent him from marrying her.
16064 </p>
16065 <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p4">
16066 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, spiritual relationship passes to no person incapable of being a god-parent; wherefore it does not pass to one who
16067 is not baptized. Now a woman cannot adopt, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore legal relationship does not pass from husband
16068 to wife.
16069 </p>
16070 <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p5">
16071 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, spiritual relationship is stronger than legal. But spiritual relationship does not pass to a grandchild. Neither,
16072 therefore, does legal relationship.
16073 </p>
16074 <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p6">
16075 <b>On the contrary,</b> Legal relationship is more in agreement with carnal union or procreation than spiritual relationship is. But spiritual relationship
16076 passes to another person. Therefore legal relationship does so also.
16077 </p>
16078 <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p7"> Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).</p>
16079 <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p8">
16080 <b>I answer that,</b> Legal relationship is of three kinds. The first is in the descending order as it were, and is contracted between the adoptive
16081 father and the adopted child, the latter's child grandchild and so on; the second is between the adopted child and the naturally
16082 begotten child; the third is like a kind of affinity, and is between the adoptive father and the wife of the adopted son,
16083 or contrariwise between the adopted son and the wife of the adoptive father.
16084 Accordingly the first and third relationships are perpetual impediments to marriage: but the second is not, but only so long
16085 as the adopted person remains under the power of the adoptive father, wherefore when the father dies or when the child comes
16086 of age, they can be married.
16087 </p>
16088 <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p9">
16089 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By spiritual generation the son is not withdrawn from the father's power, as in the case of adoption, so that the godson
16090 remains the son of both at the same time, whereas the adopted son does not. Hence no relationship is contracted between the
16091 adoptive father and the natural mother or father, as was the case in spiritual relationship.
16092 </p>
16093 <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p10">
16094 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Legal relationship is an impediment to marriage on account of the parties dwelling together: hence when the need for dwelling
16095 together ceases, it is not unreasonable that the aforesaid tie cease, for instance when he ceases to be under the power of
16096 the same father. But the adoptive father and his wife always retain a certain authority over their adopted son and his wife,
16097 wherefore the tie between them remains.
16098 </p>
16099 <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p11">
16100 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even a woman can adopt by permission of the sovereign, wherefore legal relationship passes also to her. Moreover the reason
16101 why spiritual relationship does not pass to a non-baptized person is not because such a person cannot be a god-parent but
16102 because he is not a fit subject of spirituality.
16103 </p>
16104 <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p12">
16105 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> By spiritual relationship the son is not placed under the power and care of the godfather, as in legal relationship: because
16106 it is necessary that whatever is in the son's power pass under the power of the adoptive father. Wherefore if a father be
16107 adopted the children and grandchildren who are in the power of the person adopted are adopted also.
16108 </p>
16109 <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p13"></p>
16110 <p id="XP_Q57_A3-p14"></p>
16111 <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A2.html"></a>
16112 <a href="summa.XP_Q58.html"></a>
16113 </div>
16114 <a href="summa.XP_Q56_A5.html"></a>
16115 <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A1.html"></a>
16116 </div>
16117 <div id="XP_Q58" class="div3">
16118 <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A3.html"></a>
16119 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A1.html"></a>
16120 <h3 id="XP_Q58-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF IMPOTENCE, SPELL, FRENZY OR MADNESS, INCEST AND DEFECTIVE AGE (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
16121 <p id="XP_Q58-p1"></p>
16122 <p id="XP_Q58-p2"> We must now consider five impediments to marriage, namely the impediments of impotence, spell, frenzy or madness, incest,
16123 and defective age. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
16124 </p>
16125 <p id="XP_Q58-p3"> (1) Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?</p>
16126 <p id="XP_Q58-p4"> (2) Whether a spell is?</p>
16127 <p id="XP_Q58-p5"> (3) Whether frenzy or madness is?</p>
16128 <p id="XP_Q58-p6"> (4) Whether incest is?</p>
16129 <p id="XP_Q58-p7"> (5) Whether defective age is?</p>
16130 <div id="XP_Q58_A1" class="div4">
16131 <a href="summa.XP_Q58.html"></a>
16132 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A2.html"></a>
16133 <h4 id="XP_Q58_A1-p0.1">Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?</h4>
16134 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p1"></p>
16135 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p2">
16136 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that impotence is not an impediment to marriage. For carnal copulation is not essential to marriage, since
16137 marriage is more perfect when both parties observe continency by vow. But impotence deprives marriage of nothing save carnal
16138 copulation. Therefore it is not a diriment impediment to the marriage contract.
16139 </p>
16140 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p3">
16141 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as impotence prevents carnal copulation so does frigidity. But frigidity is not reckoned an impediment to marriage.
16142 Therefore neither should impotence be reckoned as such.
16143 </p>
16144 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p4">
16145 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all old people are frigid. Yet old people can marry. Therefore, etc.
16146 </p>
16147 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p5">
16148 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the woman knows the man to be frigid when she marries him, the marriage is valid. Therefore frigidity, considered
16149 in itself, is not an impediment to marriage.
16150 </p>
16151 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p6">
16152 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, calidity may prove a sufficient incentive to carnal copulation with one who is not a virgin, but not with one who
16153 is, because it happens to be so weak as to pass away quickly, and is therefore insufficient for the deflowering of a virgin.
16154 Or again it may move a man sufficiently in regard to a beautiful woman, but insufficiently in regard to an uncomely one. Therefore
16155 it would seem that frigidity, although it be an impediment in regard to one, is not
16156 an impediment absolutely.
16157 </p>
16158 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p7">
16159 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, generally speaking woman is more frigid than man. But women are not debarred from marriage. Neither therefore should
16160 men be debarred on account of frigidity.
16161 </p>
16162 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p8">
16163 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated (Extra, De Frigidis et Malefic., cap. Quod Sedem): "Just as a boy who is incapable of marital intercourse is
16164 unfit to marry, so also those who are impotent are deemed most unfit for the marriage contract." Now persons affected with
16165 frigidity are the like. Therefore, etc.
16166 </p>
16167 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p9"> Further, no one can bind himself to the impossible. Now in marriage man binds himself to carnal copulation; because it is
16168 for this purpose that he gives the other party power over his body. Therefore a frigid person, being incapable of carnal copulation,
16169 cannot marry.
16170 </p>
16171 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p10">
16172 <b>I answer that,</b> In marriage there is a contract whereby one is bound to pay the other the marital debt: wherefore just as in other contracts,
16173 the bond is unfitting if a person bind himself to what he cannot give or do, so the marriage contract is unfitting, if it
16174 be made by one who cannot pay the marital debt. This impediment is called by the general name of impotence as regards coition,
16175 and can arise either from an intrinsic and natural cause, or from an extrinsic and
16176 accidental cause, for instance spell, of which we shall speak later
16177 <a id="XP_Q58_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q58_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. If it be due to a natural cause, this may happen in two ways. For either it is temporary, and can be remedied by medicine,
16178 or by the course of time, and then it does not void a marriage: or it is perpetual and then it voids marriage, so that the
16179 party who labors under this impediment remains for ever without hope of marriage, while the other may "marry to whom she will
16180 . . . in the Lord"
16181 (
16182 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q58_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.39" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:39</a>). In order to ascertain whether the impediment be perpetual or not, the Church has appointed a fixed time, namely three years,
16183 for putting the matter to a practical proof: and if after three years, during which both parties have honestly endeavored
16184 to fulfil their marital intercourse, the marriage remain unconsummated, the Church adjudges the marriage to be dissolved.
16185 And yet the Church is sometimes mistaken in this, because three years are sometimes
16186 insufficient to prove impotence to be perpetual. Wherefore if the Church find that she has been mistaken, seeing that the
16187 subject of the impediment has completed carnal copulation with another or with the same person, she reinstates the former
16188 marriage and dissolves the subsequent one, although the latter has been contracted with her permission. [*"Nowadays it is
16189 seldom necessary to examine too closely into this matter, as all cases arising from it are treated as far as possible under
16190 the form
16191 of dispensations of non-consummated marriages." Cf. Catholic Encyclopedia, article Canonical Impediments.]
16192 </p>
16193 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p11">
16194 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the act of carnal copulation is not essential to marriage, ability to fulfill the act is essential, because marriage
16195 gives each of the married parties power over the other's body in relation to marital intercourse.
16196 </p>
16197 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p12">
16198 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Excessive calidity can scarcely be a perpetual impediment. If, however, it were to prove an impediment to marital intercourse
16199 for three years it would be adjudged to be perpetual. Nevertheless, since frigidity is a greater and more frequent impediment
16200 (for it not only hinders the mingling of seeds but also weakens the members which co-operate in the union of bodies), it is
16201 accounted an impediment rather than calidity, since all natural defects are
16202 reduced to frigidity.
16203 </p>
16204 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p13">
16205 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although old people have not sufficient calidity to procreate, they have sufficient to copulate. Wherefore they are allowed
16206 to marry, in so far as marriage is intended as a remedy, although it does not befit them as fulfilling an office of nature.
16207 </p>
16208 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p14">
16209 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In all contracts it is agreed on all hands that anyone who is unable to satisfy an obligation is unfit to make a contract
16210 which requires the fulfilling of that obligation. Now this inability is of two kinds. First, because a person is unable to
16211 fulfill the obligation "de jure," and such inability renders the contract altogether void, whether the party with whom he
16212 contracts knows of this or not. Secondly, because he is unable to fulfill "de facto";
16213 and then if the party with whom he contracts knows of this and, notwithstanding, enters the contract, this shows that the
16214 latter seeks some other end from the contract, and the contract stands. But if he does not know of it the contract is void.
16215 Consequently frigidity which causes such an impotence that a man cannot "de facto" pay the marriage debt, as also the condition
16216 of slavery, whereby a man cannot "de facto" give his service freely, are impediments to marriage, when the one married party
16217 does not know that the other is unable to pay the marriage debt. But an impediment whereby a person cannot pay the marriage
16218 debt "de jure," for instance consanguinity, voids the marriage contract, whether the other party knows of it or not. For this
16219 reason the Master holds (Sent. iv, D, 34) that these two impediments, frigidity and slavery, make it not altogether unlawful
16220 for their subjects to marry.
16221 </p>
16222 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p15">
16223 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A man cannot have a perpetual natural impediment in regard to one person and not in regard to another. But if he cannot fulfill
16224 the carnal act with a virgin, while he can with one who is not a virgin, the hymeneal membrane may be broken by a medical
16225 instrument, and thus he may have connection with her. Nor would this be contrary to nature, for it would be done not for pleasure
16226 but for a remedy. Dislike for a woman is not a natural cause, but an
16227 accidental extrinsic cause: and therefore we must form the same judgment in its regard as about spells, of which we shall
16228 speak further on
16229 <a id="XP_Q58_A1-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q58_A2.html">(A[2])</a>.
16230 </p>
16231 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p16">
16232 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The male is the agent in procreation, and the female is the patient, wherefore greater calidity is required in the male than
16233 in the female for the act of procreation. Hence the frigidity which renders the man impotent would not disable the woman.
16234 Yet there may be a natural impediment from another cause, namely stricture, and then we must judge of stricture in the woman
16235 in the same way as of frigidity in the man.
16236 </p>
16237 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p17"></p>
16238 <p id="XP_Q58_A1-p18"></p>
16239 <a href="summa.XP_Q58.html"></a>
16240 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A2.html"></a>
16241 </div>
16242 <div id="XP_Q58_A2" class="div4">
16243 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A1.html"></a>
16244 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A3.html"></a>
16245 <h4 id="XP_Q58_A2-p0.1">Whether a spell can be an impediment to marriage?</h4>
16246 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p1"></p>
16247 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p2">
16248 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a spell cannot be an impediment to marriage. For the spells in question are caused by the operation of
16249 demons. But the demons have no more power to prevent the marriage act than other bodily actions; and these they cannot prevent,
16250 for thus they would upset the whole world if they hindered eating and walking and the like. Therefore they cannot hinder marriage
16251 by spells.
16252 </p>
16253 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p3">
16254 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God's work is stronger than the devil's. But a spell is the work of the devil. Therefore it cannot hinder marriage
16255 which is the work of God.
16256 </p>
16257 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p4">
16258 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no impediment, unless it be perpetual, voids the marriage contract. But a spell cannot be a perpetual impediment,
16259 for since the devil has no power over others than sinners, the spell will be removed if the sin be cast out, or by another
16260 spell, or by the exorcisms of the Church which are employed for the repression of the demon's power. Therefore a spell cannot
16261 be an impediment to marriage.
16262 </p>
16263 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p5">
16264 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, carnal copulation cannot be hindered, unless there be an impediment to the generative power which is its principle.
16265 But the generative power of one man is equally related to all women. Therefore a spell cannot be an impediment in respect
16266 of one woman without being so also in respect of all.
16267 </p>
16268 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p6">
16269 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in the Decretals (XXXIII, qu. 1, cap. iv): "If by sorcerers or witches . . . ," and further on, "if they be
16270 incurable, they must be separated."
16271 </p>
16272 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p7"> Further, the demons' power is greater than man's: "There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him who was made
16273 to fear no one" (
16274 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q58_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.41.24" target="asv">Job 41:24</a>). Now through the action of man, a person may be rendered incapable of carnal copulation by some power or by castration;
16275 and this is an impediment to marriage. Therefore much more can this be done by the power of a demon.
16276 </p>
16277 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p8">
16278 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have asserted that witchcraft is nothing in the world but an imagining of men who ascribed to spells those natural effects
16279 the causes of which are hidden. But this is contrary to the authority of holy men who state that the demons have power over
16280 men's bodies and imaginations, when God allows them: wherefore by their means wizards can work certain signs. Now this opinion
16281 grows from the root of unbelief or incredulity, because they do not believe that
16282 demons exist save only in the imagination of the common people, who ascribe to the demon the terrors which a man conjures
16283 from his thoughts, and because, owing to a vivid imagination, certain shapes such as he has in his thoughts become apparent
16284 to the senses, and then he believes that he sees the demons. But such assertions are rejected by the true faith whereby we
16285 believe that angels fell from heaven, and that the demons exist, and that by reason of their subtle nature they are able to
16286 do
16287 many things which we cannot; and those who induce them to do such things are called wizards.
16288 </p>
16289 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p9"> Wherefore others have maintained that witchcraft can set up an impediment to carnal copulation, but that no such impediment
16290 is perpetual: hence it does not void the marriage contract, and they say that the laws asserting this have been revoked. But
16291 this is contrary to actual facts and to the new legislation which agrees with the old.
16292 </p>
16293 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p10"> We must therefore draw a distinction: for the inability to copulate caused by witchcraft is either perpetual and then it
16294 voids marriage, or it is not perpetual and then it does not void marriage. And in order to put this to practical proof the
16295 Church has fixed the space of three years in the same way as we have stated with regard to frigidity
16296 <a id="XP_Q58_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q58_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. There is, however this difference between a spell and frigidity, that a person who is impotent through
16297 frigidity is equally impotent in relation to one as to another, and consequently when the marriage is dissolved, he is not
16298 permitted to marry another woman. whereas through witchcraft a man may be rendered impotent in relation to one woman and not
16299 to another, and consequently when the Church adjudges the marriage to be dissolved, each party is permitted to seek another
16300 partner in marriage.
16301 </p>
16302 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p11">
16303 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first corruption of sin whereby man became the slave of the devil was transmitted to us by the act of the generative
16304 power, and for this reason God allows the devil to exercise his power of witchcraft in this act more than in others. Even
16305 so the power of witchcraft is made manifest in serpents more than in other animals according to
16306 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q58_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3" target="asv">Gn. 3</a>, since the devil tempted the woman through a serpent.
16307 </p>
16308 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p12">
16309 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's work may be hindered by the devil's work with God's permission; not that the devil is stronger than God so as to destroy
16310 His works by violence.
16311 </p>
16312 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p13">
16313 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some spells are so perpetual that they can have no human remedy, although God might afford a remedy by coercing the demon,
16314 or the demon by desisting. For, as wizards themselves admit, it does not always follow that what was done by one kind of witchcraft
16315 can be destroyed by another kind, and even though it were possible to use witchcraft as a remedy, it would nevertheless be
16316 reckoned to be perpetual, since nowise ought one to invoke the demon's help
16317 by witchcraft. Again, if the devil has been given power over a person on account of sin, it does not follow that his power
16318 ceases with the sin, because the punishment sometimes continues after the fault has been removed. And again, the exorcisms
16319 of the Church do not always avail to repress the demons in all their molestations of the body, if God will it so, but they
16320 always avail against those assaults of the demons against which they are chiefly instituted.
16321 </p>
16322 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p14">
16323 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Witchcraft sometimes causes an impediment in relation to all, sometimes in relation to one only: because the devil is a voluntary
16324 cause not acting from natural necessity. Moreover, the impediment resulting from witchcraft may result from an impression
16325 made by the demon on a man's imagination, whereby he is deprived of the concupiscence that moves him in regard to a particular
16326 woman and not to another.
16327 </p>
16328 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p15"></p>
16329 <p id="XP_Q58_A2-p16"></p>
16330 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A1.html"></a>
16331 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A3.html"></a>
16332 </div>
16333 <div id="XP_Q58_A3" class="div4">
16334 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A2.html"></a>
16335 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A4.html"></a>
16336 <h4 id="XP_Q58_A3-p0.1">Whether madness is an impediment to marriage?</h4>
16337 <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p1"></p>
16338 <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p2">
16339 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that madness is not an impediment to marriage. For spiritual marriage which is contracted in Baptism is more
16340 excellent than carnal marriage. But mad persons can be baptized. Therefore they can also marry.
16341 </p>
16342 <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p3">
16343 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, frigidity is an impediment to marriage because it impedes carnal copulation, which is not impeded by madness. Therefore
16344 neither is marriage impeded thereby.
16345 </p>
16346 <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p4">
16347 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, marriage is not voided save by a perpetual impediment. But one cannot tell whether madness is a perpetual impediment.
16348 Therefore it does not void marriage.
16349 </p>
16350 <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p5">
16351 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the impediments that hinder marriage are sufficiently contained in the verses given above (
16352 <a id="XP_Q58_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q50.html">Q[50])</a>. But they contain no mention of madness. Therefore, etc.
16353 </p>
16354 <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p6">
16355 <b>On the contrary,</b> Madness removes the use of reason more than error does. But error is an impediment to marriage. Therefore madness is also.
16356 </p>
16357 <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p7"> Further, mad persons are not fit for making contracts. But marriage is a contract. Therefore, etc.</p>
16358 <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p8">
16359 <b>I answer that,</b> The madness is either previous or subsequent to marriage. If subsequent, it nowise voids the marriage, but if it be previous,
16360 then the mad person either has lucid intervals, or not. If he has, then although it is not safe for him to marry during that
16361 interval, since he would not know how to educate his children, yet if he marries, the marriage is valid. But if he has no
16362 lucid intervals, or marries outside a lucid interval, then, since there can be no consent
16363 without use of reason, the marriage will be invalid.
16364 </p>
16365 <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p9">
16366 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The use of reason is not necessary for Baptism as its cause, in which way it is necessary for matrimony. Hence the comparison
16367 fails. We have, however, spoken of the Baptism of mad persons (
16368 <a id="XP_Q58_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q68_A12.html">TP, Q[68], A[12]</a>).
16369 </p>
16370 <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p10">
16371 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Madness impedes marriage on the part of the latter's cause which is the consent, although not on the part of the act as frigidity
16372 does. Yet the Master treats of it together with frigidity, because both are defects of nature (Sent. iv, D, 34).
16373 </p>
16374 <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p11">
16375 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A passing impediment which hinders the cause of marriage, namely the consent, voids marriage altogether. But an impediment
16376 that hinders the act must needs be perpetual in order to void the marriage.
16377 </p>
16378 <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p12">
16379 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This impediment is reducible to error, since in either case there is lack of consent on the part of the reason.
16380 </p>
16381 <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p13"></p>
16382 <p id="XP_Q58_A3-p14"></p>
16383 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A2.html"></a>
16384 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A4.html"></a>
16385 </div>
16386 <div id="XP_Q58_A4" class="div4">
16387 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A3.html"></a>
16388 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A5.html"></a>
16389 <h4 id="XP_Q58_A4-p0.1">Whether marriage is annulled by the husband committing incest with his wife's sister?</h4>
16390 <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p1"></p>
16391 <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p2">
16392 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that marriage is not annulled by the husband committing incest with his wife's sister. For the wife should
16393 not be punished for her husband's sin. Yet she would be punished if the marriage were annulled. Therefore, etc.
16394 </p>
16395 <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p3">
16396 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is a greater sin to know one's own relative, than to know the relative of one's wife. But the former sin is not
16397 an impediment to marriage. Therefore neither is the second.
16398 </p>
16399 <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p4">
16400 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if this is inflicted as a punishment of the sin, it would seem, if the incestuous husband marry even after his wife's
16401 death, that they ought to be separated: which is not true.
16402 </p>
16403 <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p5">
16404 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, this impediment is not mentioned among those enumerated above (
16405 <a id="XP_Q58_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q50.html">Q[50])</a>. Therefore it does not void the marriage contract.
16406 </p>
16407 <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p6">
16408 <b>On the contrary,</b> By knowing his wife's sister he contracts affinity, with his wife. But affinity voids the marriage contract. Therefore the
16409 aforesaid incest does also.
16410 </p>
16411 <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p7"> Further, by whatsoever a man sinneth, by the same also is he punished. Now such a man sins against marriage. Therefore he
16412 ought to be punished by being deprived of marriage.
16413 </p>
16414 <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p8">
16415 <b>I answer that,</b> If a man has connection with the sister or other relative of his wife before contracting marriage, even after his betrothal,
16416 the marriage should be broken off on account of the resultant affinity. If, however, the connection take place after the marriage
16417 has been contracted and consummated, the marriage must not be altogether dissolved: but the husband loses his right to marital
16418 intercourse, nor can he demand it without sin. And yet he must grant it if
16419 asked, because the wife should not be punished for her husband's sin. But after the death of his wife he ought to remain without
16420 any hope of marriage, unless he receive a dispensation on account of his frailty, through fear of unlawful intercourse. If,
16421 however, he marry without a dispensation, he sins by contravening the law of the Church, but his marriage is not for this
16422 reason to be annulled. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, for incest is accounted an impediment to marriage
16423 not so much for its being a sin as on account of the affinity which it causes. For this reason it is not mentioned with the
16424 other impediments, but is included in the impediment of affinity.
16425 </p>
16426 <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p9"></p>
16427 <p id="XP_Q58_A4-p10"></p>
16428 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A3.html"></a>
16429 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A5.html"></a>
16430 </div>
16431 <div id="XP_Q58_A5" class="div4">
16432 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A4.html"></a>
16433 <a href="summa.XP_Q59.html"></a>
16434 <h4 id="XP_Q58_A5-p0.1">Whether defective age is an impediment to marriage?</h4>
16435 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p1"></p>
16436 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p2">
16437 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that deficient age is not an impediment to marriage. For according to the laws children are under the care
16438 of a guardian until their twenty-fifth year. Therefore it would seem that before that age their reason is not sufficiently
16439 mature to give consent, and consequently that ought seemingly to be the age fixed for marrying. Yet marriage can be contracted
16440 before that age. Therefore lack of the appointed age is not an impediment to marriage.
16441 </p>
16442 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p3">
16443 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the tie of religion is perpetual so is the marriage tie. Now according to the new legislation (cap. Non
16444 Solum, De regular. et transeunt.) no one can be professed before the fourteenth year of age. Therefore neither could a person
16445 marry if defective age were an impediment.
16446 </p>
16447 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p4">
16448 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as consent is necessary for marriage on the part of the man, so is it on the part of the woman. Now a woman
16449 can marry before the age of fourteen. Therefore a man can also.
16450 </p>
16451 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p5">
16452 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, inability to copulate, unless it be perpetual and not known, is not an impediment to marriage. But lack of age is
16453 neither perpetual nor unknown. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.
16454 </p>
16455 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p6">
16456 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is not included under any of the aforesaid impediments (
16457 <a id="XP_Q58_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q50.html">Q[50])</a>, and consequently would seem not to be an impediment to marriage.
16458 </p>
16459 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p7">
16460 <b>On the contrary,</b> A Decretal (cap. Quod Sedem, De frigid et malefic.) says that "a boy who is incapable of marriage intercourse is unfit to
16461 marry." But in the majority of cases he cannot pay the marriage debt before the age of fourteen (De Animal. vii). Therefore,
16462 etc.
16463 </p>
16464 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p8"> Further, "There is a fixed limit of size and growth for all things in nature" according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
16465 4): and consequently it would seem that, since marriage is natural, it must have a fixed age by defect of which it is impeded.
16466 </p>
16467 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p9">
16468 <b>I answer that,</b> Since marriage is effected by way of a contract, it comes under the ordinance of positive law like other contracts. Consequently
16469 according to law (cap. Tua, De sponsal. impub.) it is determined that marriage may not be contracted before the age of discretion
16470 when each party is capable of sufficient deliberation about marriage, and of mutual fulfilment of the marriage debt, and that
16471 marriages otherwise contracted are void. Now for the most part this age is
16472 the fourteenth year in males and the twelfth year in women: but since the ordinances of positive law are consequent upon what
16473 happens in the majority of cases, if anyone reach the required perfection before the aforesaid age, so that nature and reason
16474 are sufficiently developed to supply the lack of age, the marriage is not annulled. Wherefore if the parties who marry before
16475 the age of puberty have marital intercourse before the aforesaid age, their marriage is none the less perpetually
16476 indissoluble.
16477 </p>
16478 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p10">
16479 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In matters to which nature inclines there is not required such a development of reason in order to deliberate, as in other
16480 matters: and therefore it is possible after deliberation to consent to marriage before one is able to manage one's own affairs
16481 in other matters without a guardian.
16482 </p>
16483 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p11">
16484 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same answer applies, since the religious vow is about matters outside the inclination of nature, and which offer greater
16485 difficulty than marriage.
16486 </p>
16487 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p12">
16488 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is said that woman comes to the age of puberty sooner than man does (De Animal. ix); hence there is no parallel between
16489 the two.
16490 </p>
16491 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p13">
16492 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In this case there is an impediment not only as to inability to copulate, but also on account of the defect of the reason,
16493 which is not yet qualified to give rightly that consent which is to endure in perpetuity.
16494 </p>
16495 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p14">
16496 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The impediment arising from defective age, like that which arises from madness, is reducible to the impediment of error;
16497 because a man has not yet the full use of his free-will.
16498 </p>
16499 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p15"></p>
16500 <p id="XP_Q58_A5-p16"></p>
16501 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A4.html"></a>
16502 <a href="summa.XP_Q59.html"></a>
16503 </div>
16504 <a href="summa.XP_Q57_A3.html"></a>
16505 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A1.html"></a>
16506 </div>
16507 <div id="XP_Q59" class="div3">
16508 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A5.html"></a>
16509 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A1.html"></a>
16510 <h3 id="XP_Q59-p0.1">OF DISPARITY OF WORSHIP AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
16511 <p id="XP_Q59-p1"></p>
16512 <p id="XP_Q59-p2"> We must now consider disparity of worship as an impediment to marriage. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
16513 <p id="XP_Q59-p3"> (1) Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever?</p>
16514 <p id="XP_Q59-p4"> (2) Whether there is marriage between unbelievers?</p>
16515 <p id="XP_Q59-p5"> (3) Whether a husband being converted to the faith can remain with his wife if she be unwilling to be converted?</p>
16516 <p id="XP_Q59-p6"> (4) Whether he may leave his unbelieving wife?</p>
16517 <p id="XP_Q59-p7"> (5) Whether after putting her away he may take another wife?</p>
16518 <p id="XP_Q59-p8"> (6) Whether a husband may put aside his wife on account of other sins as he may for unbelief?</p>
16519 <div id="XP_Q59_A1" class="div4">
16520 <a href="summa.XP_Q59.html"></a>
16521 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A2.html"></a>
16522 <h4 id="XP_Q59_A1-p0.1">Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever?</h4>
16523 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p1"></p>
16524 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p2">
16525 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a believer can marry an unbeliever. For Joseph married an Egyptian woman, and Esther married Assuerus:
16526 and in both marriages there was disparity of worship, since one was an unbeliever and the other a believer. Therefore disparity
16527 of worship previous to marriage is not an impediment thereto.
16528 </p>
16529 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p3">
16530 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Old Law teaches the same faith as the New. But according to the Old Law there could be marriage between a believer
16531 and an unbeliever, as evidenced by
16532 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.10" target="asv"> Dt. 21:10 </a>seqq.: "If thou go out to the fight . . . and seest in the number of the captives a beautiful woman and lovest her, and wilt
16533 have her to wife . . . thou shalt go in unto her, and shalt sleep with her, and she shall be thy wife." Therefore it is lawful
16534 also under the New
16535 Law.
16536 </p>
16537 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p4">
16538 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, betrothal is directed to marriage. Now there can be a betrothal between a believer and an unbeliever in the case
16539 where a condition is made of the latter's future conversion. Therefore under the same condition there can be marriage between
16540 them.
16541 </p>
16542 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p5">
16543 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every impediment to marriage is in some way contrary to marriage. But unbelief is not contrary to marriage, since
16544 marriage fulfills an office of nature whose dictate faith surpasses. Therefore disparity of worship is not an impediment to
16545 marriage.
16546 </p>
16547 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p6">
16548 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, there is sometime disparity of worship even between two persons who are baptized, for instance when, after Baptism,
16549 a person falls into heresy. Yet if such a person marry a believer, it is nevertheless a valid marriage. Therefore disparity
16550 of worship is not an impediment to marriage.
16551 </p>
16552 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p7">
16553 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
16554 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:14</a>): "What concord hath light with darkness? [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ
16555 with Belial?']" Now there is the greatest concord between husband and wife. Therefore one who is in the light of faith cannot
16556 marry one who is in the darkness of unbelief.
16557 </p>
16558 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p8"> Further, it is written (
16559 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.2.11" target="asv">Malachi 2:11</a>): "Juda hath profaned the holiness of the Lord, which he loved, and hath married the daughter of a strange god." But such
16560 had not been the case if they could have married validly. Therefore disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage.
16561 </p>
16562 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p9">
16563 <b>I answer that,</b> The chief good of marriage is the offspring to be brought up to the worship of God. Now since education is the work of father
16564 and mother in common, each of them intends to bring up the child to the worship of God according to their own faith. Consequently
16565 if they be of different faith, the intention of the one will be contrary to the intention of the other, and therefore there
16566 cannot be a fitting marriage between them. For this reason disparity of faith
16567 previous to marriage is an impediment to the marriage contract.
16568 </p>
16569 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p10">
16570 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the Old Law it was allowable to marry with certain unbelievers, and forbidden with others. It was however especially forbidden
16571 with regard to inhabitants of the land of Canaan, both because the Lord had commanded them to be slain on account of their
16572 obstinacy, and because it was fraught with a greater danger, lest to wit they should pervert to idolatry those whom they married
16573 or their children, since the Israelites were more liable to adopt their
16574 rites and customs through dwelling among them. But it was permitted in regard to other unbelievers, especially when there
16575 could be no fear of their being drawn into idolatry. And thus Joseph, Moses, and Esther married unbelievers. But under the
16576 New Law which is spread throughout the whole world the prohibition extends with equal reason to all unbelievers. Hence disparity
16577 of worship previous to marriage is an impediment to its being contracted and voids the contract.
16578 </p>
16579 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p11">
16580 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This law either refers to other nations with whom they could lawfully marry, or to the case when the captive woman was willing
16581 to be converted to the faith and worship of God.
16582 </p>
16583 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p12">
16584 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Present is related to present in the same way as future to future. Wherefore just as when marriage is contracted in the present,
16585 unity of worship is required in both contracting parties, so in the case of a betrothal, which is a promise of future marriage,
16586 it suffices to add the condition of future unity of worship.
16587 </p>
16588 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p13">
16589 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It has been made clear that disparity of worship is contrary to marriage in respect of its chief good, which is the good
16590 of the offspring.
16591 </p>
16592 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p14">
16593 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Matrimony is a sacrament: and therefore so far as the sacramental essentials are concerned, it requires purity with regard
16594 to the sacrament of faith, namely Baptism, rather than with regard to interior faith. For which reason also this impediment
16595 is not called disparity of faith, but disparity of worship which concerns outward service, as stated above (Sent. iii, D,
16596 9
16597 <a id="XP_Q59_A1-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q1_A1.html">, Q[1], A[1]</a>, qu. 1). Consequently if a believer marry a
16598 baptized heretic, the marriage is valid, although he sins by marrying her if he knows her to be a heretic: even so he would
16599 sin were he to marry an excommunicate woman, and yet the marriage would not be void: whereas on the other hand if a catechumen
16600 having right faith but not having been baptized were to marry a baptized believer, the marriage would not be valid.
16601 </p>
16602 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p15"></p>
16603 <p id="XP_Q59_A1-p16"></p>
16604 <a href="summa.XP_Q59.html"></a>
16605 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A2.html"></a>
16606 </div>
16607 <div id="XP_Q59_A2" class="div4">
16608 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A1.html"></a>
16609 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A3.html"></a>
16610 <h4 id="XP_Q59_A2-p0.1">Whether there can be marriage between unbelievers?</h4>
16611 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p1"></p>
16612 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p2">
16613 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be no marriage between unbelievers. For matrimony is a sacrament of the Church. Now Baptism
16614 is the door of the sacraments. Therefore unbelievers, since they are not baptized, cannot marry any more than they can receive
16615 other sacraments.
16616 </p>
16617 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p3">
16618 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, two evils are a greater impediment to good than one. But the unbelief of only one party is an impediment to marriage.
16619 Much more, therefore, is the unbelief of both, and consequently there can be no marriage between unbelievers.
16620 </p>
16621 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p4">
16622 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as there is disparity of worship between believer and unbeliever, so can there be between two unbelievers,
16623 for instance if one be a heathen and the other a Jew. Now disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage, as stated above
16624
16625 <a id="XP_Q59_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore there can be no valid marriage at least between unbelievers of different worship.
16626 </p>
16627 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p5">
16628 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in marriage there is real chastity. But according to Augustine (De Adult. Conjug. i, 18) there is no real chastity
16629 between an unbeliever and his wife, and these words are quoted in the Decretals (XXVIII, qu. i, can. Sic enim.). Neither therefore
16630 is there a true marriage.
16631 </p>
16632 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p6">
16633 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, true marriage excuses carnal intercourse from sin. But marriage contracted between unbelievers cannot do this, since
16634 "the whole life of unbelievers is a sin," as a gloss observes on
16635 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv"> Rom. 14:23, </a> "All that is not of faith is sin." Therefore there is no true marriage between unbelievers.
16636 </p>
16637 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p7">
16638 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
16639 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:12</a>): "If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she consent to dwell with him, let him not put her away." But she is
16640 not called his wife except by reason of marriage. Therefore marriage between unbelievers is a true marriage.
16641 </p>
16642 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p8"> Further, the removal of what comes after does not imply the removal of what comes first. Now marriage belongs to an office
16643 of nature, which precedes the state of grace, the principle of which is faith. Therefore unbelief does not prevent the existence
16644 of marriage between unbelievers.
16645 </p>
16646 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p9">
16647 <b>I answer that,</b> Marriage was instituted chiefly for the good of the offspring, not only as to its begetting---since this can be effected
16648 even without marriage---but also as to its advancement to a perfect state, because everything intends naturally to bring its
16649 effect to perfection. Now a twofold perfection is to be considered in the offspring. one is the perfection of nature, not
16650 only as regards the body but also as regards the soul, by those means which are of the natural
16651 law. The other is the perfection of grace: and the former perfection is material and imperfect in relation to the latter.
16652 Consequently, since those things which are for the sake of the end are proportionate to the end, the marriage that tends to
16653 the first perfection is imperfect and material in comparison with that which tends to the second perfection. And since the
16654 first perfection can be common to unbelievers and believers, while the second belongs only to believers, it follows that between
16655 unbelievers there is marriage indeed, but not perfected by its ultimate perfection as there is between believers.
16656 </p>
16657 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p10">
16658 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Marriage was instituted not only as a sacrament, but also as an office of nature. And therefore, although marriage is not
16659 competent to unbelievers, as a sacrament dependent on the dispensation of the Church's ministers, it is nevertheless competent
16660 to them as fulfilling an office of nature. And yet even a marriage of this kind is a sacrament after the manner of a habit,
16661 although it is not actually since they do not marry actually in the faith of the
16662 Church.
16663 </p>
16664 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p11">
16665 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage, not by reason of unbelief, but on account of the difference of faith.
16666 For disparity of worship hinders not only the second perfection of the offspring, but also the first, since the parents endeavor
16667 to draw their children in different directions, which is not the case when both are unbelievers.
16668 </p>
16669 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p12">
16670 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As already stated (ad 1) there is marriage between unbelievers, in so far as marriage fulfills an office of nature. Now those
16671 things that pertain to the natural law are determinable by positive law: and therefore if any law among unbelievers forbid
16672 the contracting of marriage with unbelievers of a different rite, the disparity of worship will be an impediment to their
16673 intermarrying. They are not, however, forbidden by Divine law, because before God,
16674 however much one may stray from the faith, this makes no difference to one's being removed from grace: nor is it forbidden
16675 by any law of the Church who has not to judge of those who are without.
16676 </p>
16677 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p13">
16678 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The chastity and other virtues of unbelievers are said not to be real, because they cannot attain the end of real virtue,
16679 which is real happiness. Thus we say it is not a real wine if it has not the effect of wine.
16680 </p>
16681 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p14">
16682 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> An unbeliever does not sin in having intercourse with his wife, if he pays her the marriage debt, for the good of the offspring,
16683 or for the troth whereby he is bound to her: since this is an act of justice and of temperance which observes the due circumstance
16684 in pleasure of touch; even as neither does he sin in performing acts of other civic virtues. Again, the reason why the whole
16685 life of unbelievers is said to be a sin is not that they sin in every
16686 act, but because they cannot be delivered from the bondage of sin by that which they do.
16687 </p>
16688 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p15"></p>
16689 <p id="XP_Q59_A2-p16"></p>
16690 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A1.html"></a>
16691 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A3.html"></a>
16692 </div>
16693 <div id="XP_Q59_A3" class="div4">
16694 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A2.html"></a>
16695 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A4.html"></a>
16696 <h4 id="XP_Q59_A3-p0.1">Whether the husband, being converted to the faith, may remain with his wife is she be unwilling to be converted?</h4>
16697 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p1"></p>
16698 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p2">
16699 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that when a husband is converted to the faith he cannot remain with his wife who is an unbeliever and is unwilling
16700 to be converted, and whom he had married while he was yet an unbeliever. For where the danger is the same one should take
16701 the same precautions. Now a believer is forbidden to marry an unbeliever for fear of being turned away from the faith. Since
16702 then if the believer remain with the unbeliever whom he had married previously, the
16703 danger is the same, in fact greater, for neophytes are more easily perverted than those who have been brought up in the faith,
16704 it would seem that a believer, after being converted, cannot remain with an unbeliever.
16705 </p>
16706 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p3">
16707 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "An unbeliever cannot remain united to her who has been received into the Christian faith" (Decretals, XXVIII, qu.
16708 1, can. Judaei). Therefore a believer is bound to put away a wife who does not believe.
16709 </p>
16710 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p4">
16711 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a marriage contracted between believers is more perfect than one contracted between unbelievers. Now, if believers
16712 marry within the degrees forbidden by the Church, their marriage is void. Therefore the same applies to unbelievers, and thus
16713 a believing husband cannot remain with an unbelieving wife, at any rate, if as an unbeliever he married her within the forbidden
16714 degrees.
16715 </p>
16716 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p5">
16717 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sometimes an unbeliever has several wives recognized by his law. If, then, he can remain with those whom he married
16718 while yet an unbeliever, it would seem that even after his conversion he can retain several wives.
16719 </p>
16720 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p6">
16721 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it may happen that after divorcing his first wife he has married a second, and that he is converted during this
16722 latter marriage. It would seem therefore that at least in this case he cannot remain with this second wife.
16723 </p>
16724 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p7">
16725 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle counsels him to remain (
16726 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:12</a>).
16727 </p>
16728 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p8"> Further, no impediment that supervenes upon a true marriage dissolves it. Now it was a true marriage when they were both
16729 unbelievers. Therefore when one of them is converted, the marriage is not annulled on that account; and thus it would seem
16730 that they may lawfully remain together.
16731 </p>
16732 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p9">
16733 <b>I answer that,</b> The faith of a married person does not dissolve but perfects the marriage. Wherefore, since there is true marriage between
16734 unbelievers, as stated above (A[2], ad 1), the marriage tie is not broken by the fact that one of them is converted to the
16735 faith, but sometimes while the marriage tie remains, the marriage is dissolved as to cohabitation and marital intercourse,
16736 wherein unbelief and adultery are on a par, since both are against the good of the offspring.
16737 Consequently, the husband has the same power to put away an unbelieving wife or to remain with her, as he has to put away
16738 an adulterous wife or to remain with her. For an innocent husband is free to remain with an adulterous wife in the hope of
16739 her amendment, but not if she be obstinate in her sin of adultery, lest he seem to approve of her disgrace; although even
16740 if there be hope of her amendment he is free to put her away. In like manner the believer after his conversion may remain
16741 with the
16742 unbeliever in the hope of her conversion, if he see that she is not obstinate in her unbelief, and he does well in remaining
16743 with her, though not bound to do so: and this is what the Apostle counsels (
16744 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:12</a>).
16745 </p>
16746 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p10">
16747 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is easier to prevent a thing being done than to undo what is rightly done. Hence there are many things that impede the
16748 contracting of marriage if they precede it, which nevertheless cannot dissolve it if they follow it. Such is the case with
16749 affinity (
16750 <a id="XP_Q59_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q55_A6.html">Q[55], A[6]</a>): and it is the same with disparity of worship.
16751 </p>
16752 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p11">
16753 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the early Church at the time of the apostles, both Jews and Gentiles were everywhere converted to the faith: and consequently
16754 the believing husband could then have a reasonable hope for his wife's conversion, even though she did not promise to be converted.
16755 Afterwards, however, as time went on the Jews became more obstinate than the Gentiles, because the Gentiles still continued
16756 to come to the faith, for instance, at the time of the martyrs, and at
16757 the time of Constantine and thereabouts. Wherefore it was not safe then for a believer to cohabit with an unbelieving Jewish
16758 wife, nor was there hope for her conversion as for that of a Gentile wife. Consequently, then, the believer could, after his
16759 conversion, cohabit with his wife if she were a Gentile, but not if she were a Jewess, unless she promised to be converted.
16760 This is the sense of that decree. Now, however, they are on a par, namely Gentiles and Jews, because both are obstinate; and
16761 therefore unless the unbelieving wife be willing to be converted, he is not allowed to cohabit with her, be she Gentile or
16762 Jew.
16763 </p>
16764 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p12">
16765 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Non-baptized unbelievers are not bound by the laws of the Church, but they are bound by the ordinances of the Divine law.
16766 Hence unbelievers who have married within the degrees forbidden by the Divine law, whether both or one of them be converted
16767 to the faith, cannot continue in a like marriage. But if they have married within the degrees forbidden by a commandment of
16768 the Church, they can remain together if both be converted, or if one be converted and
16769 there be hope of the other's conversion.
16770 </p>
16771 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p13">
16772 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To have several wives is contrary to the natural law by which even unbelievers are bound. Wherefore an unbeliever is not
16773 truly married save to her whom he married first. Consequently if he be converted with all his wives, he may remain with the
16774 first, and must put the others away. If, however, the first refuse to be converted, and one of the others be converted, he
16775 has the same right to marry her again as he would have to marry another. We shall treat
16776 of this matter further on
16777 <a id="XP_Q59_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A5.html">(A[5])</a>.
16778 </p>
16779 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p14">
16780 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> To divorce a wife is contrary to the law of nature, wherefore it is not lawful for an unbeliever to divorce his wife. Hence
16781 if he be converted after divorcing one and marrying another, the same judgment is to be pronounced in this case as in the
16782 case of a man who had several wives, because if he wish to be converted he is bound to take the first whom he had divorced
16783 and to put the other away.
16784 </p>
16785 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p15"></p>
16786 <p id="XP_Q59_A3-p16"></p>
16787 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A2.html"></a>
16788 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A4.html"></a>
16789 </div>
16790 <div id="XP_Q59_A4" class="div4">
16791 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A3.html"></a>
16792 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A5.html"></a>
16793 <h4 id="XP_Q59_A4-p0.1">Whether a believer can, after his conversion, put away his unbelieving wife if she be willing to cohabit with him without
16794 insult to the Creator?
16795 </h4>
16796 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p1"></p>
16797 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p2">
16798 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a believer, after his conversion, cannot put away his unbelieving wife if she be willing to cohabit with
16799 him without insult to the Creator. For the husband is more bound to his wife than a slave to his master. But a converted slave
16800 is not freed from the bond of slavery, as appears from
16801 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.21" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:21</a>;
16802 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.1" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:1.</a> Therefore neither can a believing husband put away his unbelieving wife.
16803 </p>
16804 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p3">
16805 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one may act to another's prejudice without the latter's consent. Now the unbelieving wife had a right in the
16806 body of her unbelieving husband. If, then, her husband's conversion to the faith could be prejudicial to the wife, so that
16807 he would be free to put her away, the husband could not be converted to the faith without his wife's consent, even as he cannot
16808 receive orders or vow continence without her consent.
16809 </p>
16810 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p4">
16811 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a man, whether slave or free, knowingly marry a bondwoman, he cannot put her away on account of her different
16812 condition. Since, then, the husband, when he married an unbeliever, knew that she was an unbeliever, it would seem that in
16813 like manner he cannot put her away on account of her unbelief.
16814 </p>
16815 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p5">
16816 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a father is in duty bound to work for the salvation of his children. But if he were to leave his unbelieving wife,
16817 the children of their union would remain with the mother, because "the offspring follows the womb," and thus their salvation
16818 would be imperiled. Therefore he cannot lawfully put away his unbelieving wife.
16819 </p>
16820 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p6">
16821 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, an adulterous husband cannot put away an adulterous wife, even after he has done penance for his adultery. Therefore
16822 if an adulterous and an unbelieving husband are to be judged alike, neither can the believer put aside the unbeliever, even
16823 after his conversion to the faith.
16824 </p>
16825 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p7">
16826 <b>On the contrary,</b> are the words of the Apostle (
16827 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:15,16</a>).
16828 </p>
16829 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p8"> Further, spiritual adultery is more grievous than carnal. But a man can put his wife away, as to cohabitation, on account
16830 of carnal adultery. Much more, therefore, can he do so on account of unbelief, which is spiritual adultery.
16831 </p>
16832 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p9">
16833 <b>I answer that,</b> Different things are competent and expedient to man according as his life is of one kind or of another. Wherefore he who
16834 dies to his former life is not bound to those things to which he was bound in his former life. Hence it is that he who vowed
16835 certain things while living in the world is not bound to fulfill them when he dies to the world by adopting the religious
16836 life. Now he who is baptized is regenerated in Christ and dies to his former life, since the
16837 generation of one thing is the corruption of another, and consequently he is freed from the obligation whereby he was bound
16838 to pay his wife the marriage debt, and is not bound to cohabit with her when she is unwilling to be converted, although in
16839 a certain case he is free to do so, as stated above
16840 <a id="XP_Q59_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, just as a religious is free to fulfill the vows he took in the world, if they be not contrary to his religious profession,
16841 although he is not bound to do so.
16842 </p>
16843 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p10">
16844 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Bondage is not inconsistent with the perfection of the Christian religion, which makes a very special profession of humility.
16845 But the obligation to a wife, or the conjugal bond, is somewhat derogatory to the perfection of Christian life, the highest
16846 state of which is in the possession of the continent: hence the comparison fails. Moreover one married party is not bound
16847 to the other as the latter's possession, as a slave to his master, but by way of a
16848 kind of partnership, which is unfitting between unbeliever and believer as appears from
16849 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.15" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:15</a>; hence there is no comparison between a slave and a married person.
16850 </p>
16851 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p11">
16852 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The wife had a right in the body of her husband only as long as he remained in the life wherein he had married, since also
16853 when the husband dies the wife "is delivered from the law of her husband" (
16854 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.3" target="asv">Rom. 7:3</a>). Wherefore if the husband leave her after he has changed his life by dying to his former life, this is nowise prejudicial
16855 to her. Now he who goes over to the religious life dies but a spiritual death and not a bodily death. Wherefore if the
16856 marriage be consummated, the husband cannot enter religion without his wife's consent, whereas he can before carnal connection
16857 when there is only a spiritual connection. On the other hand, he who is baptized is even corporeally buried together with
16858 Christ unto death; and therefore he is freed from paying the marriage debt even after the marriage has been consummated.
16859 </p>
16860 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p12"> We may also reply that it is through her own fault in refusing to be converted that the wife suffers prejudice.</p>
16861 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p13">
16862 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Disparity of worship makes a person simply unfit for lawful marriage, whereas the condition of bondage does not, but only
16863 where it is unknown. Hence there is no comparison between an unbeliever and a bondswoman.
16864 </p>
16865 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p14">
16866 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Either the child has reached a perfect age, and then it is free to follow either the believing father or the unbelieving
16867 mother, or else it is under age, and then it should be given to the believer notwithstanding that it needs the mother's care
16868 for its education.
16869 </p>
16870 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p15">
16871 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> By doing penance the adulterer does not enter another life as an unbeliever by being baptized. Hence the comparison fails.
16872 </p>
16873 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p16"></p>
16874 <p id="XP_Q59_A4-p17"></p>
16875 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A3.html"></a>
16876 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A5.html"></a>
16877 </div>
16878 <div id="XP_Q59_A5" class="div4">
16879 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A4.html"></a>
16880 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A6.html"></a>
16881 <h4 id="XP_Q59_A5-p0.1">Whether the believer who leaves his unbelieving wife can take another wife?</h4>
16882 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p1"></p>
16883 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p2">
16884 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the believer who leaves his unbelieving wife cannot take another wife. For indissolubility is of the nature
16885 of marriage, since it is contrary to the natural law to divorce one's wife. Now there was true marriage between them as unbelievers.
16886 Therefore their marriage can nowise be dissolved. But as long as a man is bound by marriage to one woman he cannot marry another.
16887 Therefore a believer who leaves his unbelieving wife cannot take another
16888 wife.
16889 </p>
16890 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p3">
16891 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a crime subsequent to marriage does not dissolve the marriage. Now, if the wife be willing to cohabit without insult
16892 to the Creator, the marriage tie is not dissolved, since the husband cannot marry another. Therefore the sin of the wife who
16893 refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator does not dissolve the marriage so that her husband be free to take another
16894 wife.
16895 </p>
16896 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p4">
16897 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, husband and wife are equal in the marriage tie. Since, then, it is unlawful for the unbelieving wife to marry again
16898 while her husband lives, it would seem that neither can the believing husband do so.
16899 </p>
16900 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p5">
16901 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the vow of continence is more favorable than the marriage contract. Now seemingly it is not lawful for the believing
16902 husband to take a vow of continence without the consent of his unbelieving wife, since then the latter would be deprived of
16903 marriage if she were afterwards converted. Much less therefore is it lawful for him to take another wife.
16904 </p>
16905 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p6">
16906 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the son who persists in unbelief after his father's conversion loses the right to inherit from his father: and yet
16907 if he be afterwards converted, the inheritance is restored to him even though another should have entered into possession
16908 thereof. Therefore it would seem that in like manner, if the unbelieving wife be converted, her husband ought to be restored
16909 to her even though he should have married another wife: yet this would be impossible if the
16910 second marriage were valid. Therefore he cannot take another wife.
16911 </p>
16912 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p7">
16913 <b>On the contrary,</b> Matrimony is not ratified without the sacrament of Baptism. Now what is not ratified can be annulled. Therefore marriage
16914 contracted in unbelief can be annulled, and consequently, the marriage tie being dissolved, it is lawful for the husband to
16915 take another wife.
16916 </p>
16917 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p8"> Further, a husband ought not to cohabit with an unbelieving wife who refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator. If
16918 therefore it were unlawful for him to take another wife he would be forced to remain continent, which would seem unreasonable,
16919 since then he would be at a disadvantage through his conversion.
16920 </p>
16921 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p9">
16922 <b>I answer that,</b> When either husband or wife is converted to the faith the other remaining in unbelief, a distinction must be made. For if
16923 the unbeliever be willing to cohabit without insult to the Creator---that is without drawing the other to unbelief---the believer
16924 is free to part from the other, but by parting is not permitted to marry again. But if the unbeliever refuse to cohabit without
16925 insult to the Creator, by making use of blasphemous words and refusing to hear
16926 Christ's name, then if she strive to draw him to unbelief, the believing husband after parting from her may be united to another
16927 in marriage.
16928 </p>
16929 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p10">
16930 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above
16931 <a id="XP_Q59_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the marriage of unbelievers is imperfect, whereas the marriage of believers is perfect and consequently binds more firmly.
16932 Now the firmer tie always looses the weaker if it is contrary to it, and therefore the subsequent marriage contracted in the
16933 faith of Christ dissolves the marriage previously contracted in unbelief. Therefore the marriage of unbelievers is not altogether
16934 firm and ratified, but is
16935 ratified afterwards by Christ's faith.
16936 </p>
16937 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p11">
16938 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sin of the wife who refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator frees the husband from the tie whereby he was bound
16939 to his wife so as to be unable to marry again during her lifetime. It does not however dissolve the marriage at once, since
16940 if she were converted from her blasphemy before he married again, her husband would be restored to her. But the marriage is
16941 dissolved by the second marriage which the believing husband would be unable to
16942 accomplish unless he were freed from his obligation to his wife by her own fault.
16943 </p>
16944 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p12">
16945 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> After the believer has married, the marriage tie is dissolved on either side, because the marriage is not imperfect as to
16946 the bond, although it is sometimes imperfect as to its effect. Hence it is in punishment of the unbelieving wife rather than
16947 by virtue of the previous marriage that she is forbidden to marry again. If however she be afterwards converted, she may be
16948 allowed by dispensation to take another husband, should her husband have taken
16949 another wife.
16950 </p>
16951 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p13">
16952 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The husband ought not to take a vow of continence nor enter into a second marriage, if after his conversion there be a reasonable
16953 hope of the conversion of his wife, because the wife's conversion would be more difficult if she knew she was deprived of
16954 her husband. If however there be no hope of her conversion, he can take Holy orders or enter religion, having first besought
16955 his wife to be converted. And then if the wife be converted after her husband
16956 has received Holy orders, her husband must not be restored to her, but she must take it as a punishment of her tardy conversion
16957 that she is deprived of her husband.
16958 </p>
16959 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p14">
16960 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The bond of fatherhood is not dissolved by disparity of worship, as the marriage bond is: wherefore there is no comparison
16961 between an inheritance and a wife.
16962 </p>
16963 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p15"></p>
16964 <p id="XP_Q59_A5-p16"></p>
16965 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A4.html"></a>
16966 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A6.html"></a>
16967 </div>
16968 <div id="XP_Q59_A6" class="div4">
16969 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A5.html"></a>
16970 <a href="summa.XP_Q60.html"></a>
16971 <h4 id="XP_Q59_A6-p0.1">Whether other sins dissolve marriage?</h4>
16972 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p1"></p>
16973 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p2">
16974 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that other sins besides unbelief dissolve marriage. For adultery is seemingly more directly opposed to marriage
16975 than unbelief is. But unbelief dissolves marriage in a certain case so that it is lawful to marry again. Therefore adultery
16976 has the same effect.
16977 </p>
16978 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p3">
16979 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as unbelief is spiritual fornication, so is any kind of sin. If, then unbelief dissolves marriage because it
16980 is spiritual fornication, for the same reason any kind of sin will dissolve marriage.
16981 </p>
16982 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p4">
16983 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said (
16984 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.30" target="asv">Mat. 5:30</a>): "If thy right hand scandalize thee, pluck it off and cast it from thee," and a gloss of Jerome says that "by the hand and
16985 the right eye we may understand our brother, wife, relatives and children." Now these become obstacles to us by any kind of
16986 sin. Therefore marriage can be dissolved on account of any kind of sin.
16987 </p>
16988 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p5">
16989 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, covetousness is idolatry according to
16990 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.5" target="asv">Eph. 5:5</a>. Now a wife may be put away on account of idolatry. Therefore in like manner she can be put away on account of covetousness,
16991 as also on account of other sins graver than covetousness.
16992 </p>
16993 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p6">
16994 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Master says this expressly (Sent. iv, D, 30).
16995 </p>
16996 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p7">
16997 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
16998 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.32" target="asv">Mat. 5:32</a>): "Whosoever shall put away his wife, excepting for the cause of fornication, maketh her to commit adultery."
16999 </p>
17000 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p8"> Further, if this were true, divorces would be made all day long, since it is rare to find a marriage wherein one of the parties
17001 does not fall into sin.
17002 </p>
17003 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p9">
17004 <b>I answer that,</b> Bodily fornication and unbelief have a special contrariety to the goods of marriage, as stated above
17005 <a id="XP_Q59_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Hence they are specially effective in dissolving marriages. Nevertheless it must be observed that marriage is dissolved
17006 in two ways. In one way as to the marriage tie, and thus marriage cannot be dissolved after it is ratified, neither by unbelief
17007 nor by adultery. But if it be not ratified, the tie is dissolved, if the one
17008 party remain in unbelief, and the other being converted to the faith has married again. On the other hand the aforesaid tie
17009 is not dissolved by adultery, else the unbeliever would be free to give a bill of divorce to his adulterous wife, and having
17010 put her away, could take another wife, which is false. In another way marriage is dissolved as to the act, and thus it can
17011 be dissolved on account of either unbelief or fornication. But marriage cannot be dissolved even as to the act on account
17012 of
17013 other sins, unless perchance the husband wish to cease from intercourse with his wife in order to punish her by depriving
17014 her of the comfort of his presence.
17015 </p>
17016 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p10">
17017 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although adultery is opposed to marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, more directly than unbelief, it is the other
17018 way about if we consider marriage as a sacrament of the Church, from which source it derives perfect stability, inasmuch as
17019 it signifies the indissoluble union of Christ with the Church. Wherefore the marriage that is not ratified can be dissolved
17020 as to the marriage tie on account of unbelief rather than on account of adultery.
17021 </p>
17022 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p11">
17023 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The primal union of the soul to God is by faith, and consequently the soul is thereby espoused to God as it were, according
17024 to
17025 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q59_A6-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.2.20" target="asv"> Osee 2:20, </a> "I will espouse thee to Me in faith." Hence in Holy Writ idolatry and unbelief are specially designated by the name of fornication:
17026 whereas other sins are called spiritual fornications by a more remote signification.
17027 </p>
17028 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p12">
17029 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This applies to the case when the wife proves a notable occasion of sin to her husband, so that he has reason to fear his
17030 being in danger: for then the husband can withdraw from living with her, as stated above
17031 <a id="XP_Q59_A6-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q59_A5.html">(A[5])</a>.
17032 </p>
17033 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p13">
17034 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Covetousness is said to be idolatry on account of a certain likeness of bondage, because both the covetous and the idolater
17035 serve the creature rather than the Creator; but not on account of likeness of unbelief, since unbelief corrupts the intellect
17036 whereas covetousness corrupts the affections.
17037 </p>
17038 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p14">
17039 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The words of the Master refer to betrothal, because a betrothal can be rescinded on account of a subsequent crime. Or, if
17040 he is speaking of marriage, they must be referred to the severing of mutual companionship for a time, as stated above, or
17041 to the case when the wife is unwilling to cohabit except on the condition of sinning, for instance, if she were to say: "I
17042 will not remain your wife unless you amass wealth for me by theft," for then he ought to
17043 leave her rather than thieve.
17044 </p>
17045 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p15"></p>
17046 <p id="XP_Q59_A6-p16"></p>
17047 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A5.html"></a>
17048 <a href="summa.XP_Q60.html"></a>
17049 </div>
17050 <a href="summa.XP_Q58_A5.html"></a>
17051 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A1.html"></a>
17052 </div>
17053 <div id="XP_Q60" class="div3">
17054 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A6.html"></a>
17055 <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A1.html"></a>
17056 <h3 id="XP_Q60-p0.1">OF WIFE-MURDER (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
17057 <p id="XP_Q60-p1"></p>
17058 <p id="XP_Q60-p2"> We must now consider wife-murder, under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
17059 <p id="XP_Q60-p3"> (1) Whether in a certain case it is lawful to kill one's wife?</p>
17060 <p id="XP_Q60-p4"> (2) Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?</p>
17061 <div id="XP_Q60_A1" class="div4">
17062 <a href="summa.XP_Q60.html"></a>
17063 <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A2.html"></a>
17064 <h4 id="XP_Q60_A1-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery?</h4>
17065 <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p1"></p>
17066 <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p2">
17067 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery. For the Divine law commanded
17068 adulterous wives to be stoned. Now it is not a sin to fulfill the Divine law. Neither therefore is it a sin to kill one's
17069 own wife if she be an adulteress.
17070 </p>
17071 <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p3">
17072 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which the law can rightly do, can be rightly done by one whom the law has commissioned to do it. But the law
17073 can rightly kill an adulterous wife or any other person deserving of death. Since then the law has commissioned the husband
17074 to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery, it would seem that he can rightly do so.
17075 </p>
17076 <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p4">
17077 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the husband has greater power over his adulterous wife than over the man who committed adultery with her. Now if
17078 the husband strike a cleric whom he found with his wife he is not excommunicated. Therefore it would seem lawful for him even
17079 to kill his own wife if she be discovered in adultery.
17080 </p>
17081 <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p5">
17082 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the husband is bound to correct his wife. But correction is given by inflicting a just punishment. Since then the
17083 just punishment of adultery is death, because it is a capital sin, it would seem lawful for a husband to kill his adulterous
17084 wife.
17085 </p>
17086 <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p6">
17087 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 37) that "the Church of God is never bound by the laws of this world, for she has
17088 none but a spiritual sword." Therefore it would seem that he who wishes to belong to the Church cannot rightly take advantage
17089 of the law which permits a man to kill his wife.
17090 </p>
17091 <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p7"> Further, husband and wife are judged on a par. But it is not lawful for a wife to kill her husband if he be discovered in
17092 adultery. Neither therefore may a husband kill his wife.
17093 </p>
17094 <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p8">
17095 <b>I answer that,</b> It happens in two ways that a husband kills his wife. First, by a civil judgment; and thus there is no doubt that a husband,
17096 moved by zeal for justice and not by vindictive anger or hatred can, without sin, bring a criminal accusation of adultery
17097 upon his wife before a secular court, and demand that she receive capital punishment as appointed by the law; just as it is
17098 lawful to accuse a person of murder or any other crime. Such an accusation however cannot
17099 be made in an ecclesiastical court, because, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 37), the Church does not wield a material
17100 sword. Secondly, a husband can kill his wife himself without her being convicted in court, and thus to kill her outside of
17101 the act of adultery is not lawful, neither according to civil law nor according to the law of conscience, whatever evidence
17102 he may have of her adultery. The civil law however considers it, as though it were lawful, that he should kill her in the
17103 very
17104 act, not by commanding him to do so, but by not inflicting on him the punishment for murder, on account of the very great
17105 provocation which the husband receives by such a deed to kill his wife. But the Church is not bound in this matter by human
17106 laws, neither does she acquit him of the debt of eternal punishment, nor of such punishment as may be awarded him by an ecclesiastical
17107 tribunal for the reason that he is quit of any punishment to be inflicted by a secular court. Therefore in no case is
17108 it lawful for a husband to kill his wife on his own authority.
17109 </p>
17110 <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p9">
17111 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The law has committed the infliction of this punishment not to private individuals, but to public persons, who are deputed
17112 to this by their office. Now the husband is not his wife's judge: wherefore he may not kill her, but may accuse her in the
17113 judge's presence.
17114 </p>
17115 <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p10">
17116 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The civil law has not commissioned the husband to kill his wife by commanding him to do so, for thus he would not sin, just
17117 as the judge's deputy does not sin by killing the thief condemned to death: but it has permitted this by not punishing it.
17118 For which reason it has raised certain obstacles to prevent the husband from killing his wife.
17119 </p>
17120 <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p11">
17121 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This does not prove that it is lawful simply, but that it is lawful as regards immunity from a particular kind of punishment,
17122 since excommunication is also a kind of punishment.
17123 </p>
17124 <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p12">
17125 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There are two kinds of community: the household, such as a family; and the civil community, such as a city or kingdom. Accordingly,
17126 he who presides over the latter kind of community, a king for instance, can punish an individual both by correcting and by
17127 exterminating him, for the betterment of the community with whose care he is charged. But he who presides over a community
17128 of the first kind, can inflict only corrective punishment, which does not
17129 extend beyond the limits of amendment, and these are exceeded by the punishment of death. Wherefore the husband who exercises
17130 this kind of control over his wife may not kill her, but he may accuse or chastise her in some other way.
17131 </p>
17132 <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p13"></p>
17133 <p id="XP_Q60_A1-p14"></p>
17134 <a href="summa.XP_Q60.html"></a>
17135 <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A2.html"></a>
17136 </div>
17137 <div id="XP_Q60_A2" class="div4">
17138 <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A1.html"></a>
17139 <a href="summa.XP_Q61.html"></a>
17140 <h4 id="XP_Q60_A2-p0.1">Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?</h4>
17141 <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p1"></p>
17142 <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p2">
17143 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wife-murder is not an impediment to marriage. For adultery is more directly opposed to marriage than murder
17144 is. Now adultery is not an impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is wife-murder.
17145 </p>
17146 <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p3">
17147 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is a more grievous sin to kill one's mother than one's wife, for it is never lawful to strike one's mother, whereas
17148 it is sometimes lawful to strike one's wife. But matricide is not an impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is wife-murder.
17149 </p>
17150 <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p4">
17151 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is a greater sin for a man to kill another man's wife on account of adultery than to kill his own wife, inasmuch
17152 as he has less motive and is less concerned with her correction. But he who kills another man's wife is not hindered from
17153 marrying. Neither therefore is he who kills his own wife.
17154 </p>
17155 <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p5">
17156 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. But the sin of murder can be removed by repentance. Therefore the
17157 consequent impediment to marriage can be removed also: and consequently it would seem that after he has done penance he is
17158 not forbidden to marry.
17159 </p>
17160 <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p6">
17161 <b>On the contrary,</b> A canon (caus. xxxiii, qu. ii, can. Interfectores) says: "The slayers of their own wives must be brought back to penance,
17162 and they are absolutely forbidden to marry." Further, in whatsoever a man sins, in that same must he be punished. But he who
17163 kills his wife sins against marriage. Therefore he must be punished by being deprived of marriage.
17164 </p>
17165 <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p7">
17166 <b>I answer that,</b> By the Church's decree wife-murder is an impediment to marriage. Sometimes however it forbids the contracting of marriage
17167 without voiding the contract, when to wit the husband kills his wife on account of adultery or even through hatred; nevertheless
17168 if there be fear lest he should prove incontinent, he may be dispensed by the Church so as to marry lawfully. Sometimes it
17169 also voids the contract, as when a man kills his wife in order to marry her with whom he
17170 has committed adultery, for then the law declares him simply unfit to marry her, so that if he actually marry her his marriage
17171 is void. He is not however hereby rendered simply unfit by law in relation to other women: wherefore if he should have married
17172 another, although he sin by disobeying the Church's ordinance, the marriage is nevertheless not voided for this reason.
17173 </p>
17174 <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p8">
17175 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Murder and adultery in certain cases forbid the contracting of marriage and void the contract, as we say here in regard to
17176 wife-murder, and shall say further on (Sent. iv
17177 <a id="XP_Q60_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q62_A2.html">, Q[62], A[2]</a>) in regard to adultery. We may also reply that wife-murder is contrary to the substance of wedlock, whereas adultery is contrary
17178 to the good of fidelity due to marriage. Hence adultery is not more opposed to marriage than wife-murder, and the
17179 argument is based on a false premiss.
17180 </p>
17181 <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p9">
17182 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Simply speaking it is a more grievous sin to kill one's mother than one's wife, as also more opposed to nature, since a man
17183 reveres his mother naturally. Consequently he is less inclined to matricide and more prone to wife-murder; and it is to repress
17184 this proneness that the Church has forbidden marriage to the man who has murdered his wife.
17185 </p>
17186 <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p10">
17187 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such a man does not sin against marriage as he does who kills his own wife; wherefore the comparison fails.
17188 </p>
17189 <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p11">
17190 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It does not follow that because guilt has been remitted therefore the entire punishment is remitted, as evidenced by irregularity.
17191 For repentance does not restore a man to his former dignity, although it can restore him to his former state of grace, as
17192 stated above (
17193 <a id="XP_Q60_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q38_A1.html">Q[38], A[1]</a>, ad 3).
17194 </p>
17195 <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p12"></p>
17196 <p id="XP_Q60_A2-p13"></p>
17197 <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A1.html"></a>
17198 <a href="summa.XP_Q61.html"></a>
17199 </div>
17200 <a href="summa.XP_Q59_A6.html"></a>
17201 <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A1.html"></a>
17202 </div>
17203 <div id="XP_Q61" class="div3">
17204 <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A2.html"></a>
17205 <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A1.html"></a>
17206 <h3 id="XP_Q61-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE, ARISING FROM A SOLEMN VOW (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
17207 <p id="XP_Q61-p1"></p>
17208 <p id="XP_Q61-p2"> We must next consider the impediments which supervene to marriage. We shall consider (1) the impediment which affects an
17209 unconsummated marriage, namely a solemn vow: (2) the impediment which affects a consummated marriage, namely fornication.
17210 Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
17211 </p>
17212 <p id="XP_Q61-p3"> (1) Whether either party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion without the other's consent?</p>
17213 <p id="XP_Q61-p4"> (2) Whether they can enter religion before the consummation of the marriage?</p>
17214 <p id="XP_Q61-p5"> (3) Whether the wife can take another husband if her former husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?</p>
17215 <div id="XP_Q61_A1" class="div4">
17216 <a href="summa.XP_Q61.html"></a>
17217 <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A2.html"></a>
17218 <h4 id="XP_Q61_A1-p0.1">Whether one party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion without the other's consent?</h4>
17219 <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p1"></p>
17220 <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p2">
17221 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that even after the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter religion without the other's consent.
17222 For the Divine law ought to be more favorable to spiritual things than human law. Now human law has allowed this. Therefore
17223 much more should the Divine law permit it.
17224 </p>
17225 <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p3">
17226 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lesser good does not hinder the greater. But the married state is a lesser good than the religious state, according
17227 to
17228 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q61_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.38" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:38.</a> Therefore marriage ought not to hinder a man from being able to enter religion.
17229 </p>
17230 <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p4">
17231 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in every form of religious life there is a kind of spiritual marriage. Now it is lawful to pass from a less strict
17232 religious order to one that is stricter. Therefore it is also allowable to pass from a less strict---namely a carnal---marriage
17233 to a stricter marriage, namely that of the religious life, even without the wife's consent.
17234 </p>
17235 <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p5">
17236 <b>On the contrary,</b> Married persons are forbidden (
17237 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q61_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:5</a>) to abstain from the use of marriage even for a time without one another's consent, in order to have time for prayer.
17238 </p>
17239 <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p6"> Further, no one can lawfully do that which is prejudicial to another without the latter's consent. Now the religious vow
17240 taken by one consort is prejudicial to the other, since the one has power over the other's body. Therefore one of them cannot
17241 take a religious vow without the other's consent.
17242 </p>
17243 <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p7">
17244 <b>I answer that,</b> No one can make an offering to God of what belongs to another. Wherefore since by a consummated marriage the husband's body
17245 already belongs to his wife, he cannot by a vow of continence offer it to God without her consent.
17246 </p>
17247 <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p8">
17248 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Human law considers marriage merely as fulfilling an office of nature: whereas the Divine law considers it as a sacrament,
17249 by reason of which it is altogether indissoluble. Hence the comparison fails.
17250 </p>
17251 <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p9">
17252 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not unreasonable that a greater good be hindered by a lesser which is contrary to it, just as good is hindered by evil.
17253 </p>
17254 <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p10">
17255 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In every form of religious life marriage is contracted with one person, namely Christ; to Whom, however, a person contracts
17256 more obligations in one religious order than in another. But in carnal marriage and religious marriage the contract is not
17257 with the same person: wherefore that comparison fails.
17258 </p>
17259 <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p11"></p>
17260 <p id="XP_Q61_A1-p12"></p>
17261 <a href="summa.XP_Q61.html"></a>
17262 <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A2.html"></a>
17263 </div>
17264 <div id="XP_Q61_A2" class="div4">
17265 <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A1.html"></a>
17266 <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A3.html"></a>
17267 <h4 id="XP_Q61_A2-p0.1">Whether before the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter religion without the other's consent?</h4>
17268 <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p1"></p>
17269 <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p2">
17270 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that even before the marriage has been consummated one consort cannot enter religion without the other's consent.
17271 For the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the sacrament of matrimony, inasmuch, namely, as it signifies the union of
17272 Christ with the Church. Now marriage is a true sacrament before its consummation, and after consent has been expressed in
17273 words of the present. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by one of them entering religion.
17274 </p>
17275 <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p3">
17276 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by virtue of the consent expressed in words of the present, the one consort has given power over his body to the
17277 other. Therefore the one can forthwith ask for the marriage debt, and the other is bound to pay: and so the one cannot enter
17278 religion without the other's consent.
17279 </p>
17280 <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p4">
17281 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said (
17282 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q61_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.6" target="asv">Mat. 19:6</a>): "What God hath joined together let no man put asunder." But the union which precedes marital intercourse was made by God.
17283 Therefore it cannot be dissolved by the will of man.
17284 </p>
17285 <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p5">
17286 <b>On the contrary,</b> According to Jerome [*Prolog. in Joan.] our Lord called John from his wedding.
17287 </p>
17288 <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p6">
17289 <b>I answer that,</b> Before marital intercourse there is only a spiritual bond between husband and wife, but afterwards there is a carnal bond
17290 between them. Wherefore, just as after marital intercourse marriage is dissolved by carnal death, so by entering religion
17291 the bond which exists before the consummation of the marriage is dissolved, because religious life is a kind of spiritual
17292 death, whereby a man dies to the world and lives to God.
17293 </p>
17294 <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p7">
17295 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Before consummation marriage signifies the union of Christ with the soul by grace, which is dissolved by a contrary spiritual
17296 disposition, namely mortal sin. But after consummation it signifies the union of Christ with the Church, as regards the assumption
17297 of human nature into the unity of person, which union is altogether indissoluble.
17298 </p>
17299 <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p8">
17300 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Before consummation the body of one consort is not absolutely delivered into the power of the other, but conditionally, provided
17301 neither consort meanwhile seek the fruit of a better life. But by marital intercourse the aforesaid delivery is completed,
17302 because then each of them enters into bodily possession of the power transferred to him. Wherefore also before consummation
17303 they are not bound to pay the marriage debt forthwith after contracting
17304 marriage by words of the present, but a space of two months is allowed them for three reasons. First that they may deliberate
17305 meanwhile about entering religion; secondly, to prepare what is necessary for the solemnization of the wedding. thirdly, lest
17306 the husband think little of a gift he has not longed to possess (cap. Institutum, caus. xxvi, qu. ii).
17307 </p>
17308 <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p9">
17309 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The marriage union, before consummation, is indeed perfect as to its primary being, but is not finally perfect as to its
17310 second act which is operation. It is like bodily possession and consequently is not altogether indissoluble.
17311 </p>
17312 <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p10"></p>
17313 <p id="XP_Q61_A2-p11"></p>
17314 <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A1.html"></a>
17315 <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A3.html"></a>
17316 </div>
17317 <div id="XP_Q61_A3" class="div4">
17318 <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A2.html"></a>
17319 <a href="summa.XP_Q62.html"></a>
17320 <h4 id="XP_Q61_A3-p0.1">Whether the wife may take another husband if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?</h4>
17321 <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p1"></p>
17322 <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p2">
17323 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the wife may not take another husband, if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of
17324 the marriage. For that which is consistent with marriage does not dissolve the marriage tie. Now the marriage tie still remains
17325 between those who equally take religious vows. Therefore by the fact that one enters religion, the other is not freed from
17326 the marriage tie. But as long as she remains tied to one by marriage, she cannot marry
17327 another. Therefore, etc.
17328 </p>
17329 <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p3">
17330 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, after entering religion and before making his profession the husband can return to the world. If then the wife can
17331 marry again when her husband enters religion, he also can marry again when he returns to the world: which is absurd.
17332 </p>
17333 <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p4">
17334 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by a new decree (cap. Non solum, de regular. et transeunt.) a profession, if made before the expiry of a year, is
17335 accounted void. Therefore if he return to his wife after making such a profession, she is bound to receive him. Therefore
17336 neither by her husband's entry into religion, nor by his taking a vow, does the wife receive the power to marry again.
17337 </p>
17338 <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p5">
17339 <b>On the contrary,</b> No one can bind another to those things which belong to perfection. Now continence is of those things that belong to perfection.
17340 Therefore a wife is not bound to continence on account of her husband entering religion, and consequently she can marry.
17341 </p>
17342 <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p6">
17343 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as bodily death of the husband dissolves the marriage tie in such a way that the wife may marry whom she will, according
17344 to the statement of the Apostle (
17345 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q61_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.39" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:39</a>); so too after the husband's spiritual death by entering religion, she can marry whom she will.
17346 </p>
17347 <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p7">
17348 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When both consorts take a like vow of continence, neither renounces the marriage tie, wherefore it still remains: but when
17349 only one takes the vow, then for his own part he renounces the marriage tie, wherefore the other is freed therefrom.
17350 </p>
17351 <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p8">
17352 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A person is not accounted dead to the world by entering religion until he makes his profession, and consequently his wife
17353 is bound to wait for him until that time.
17354 </p>
17355 <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p9">
17356 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We must judge of a profession thus made before the time fixed by law, as of a simple vow. Wherefore just as when the husband
17357 has taken a simple vow his wife is not bound to pay him the marriage debt, and yet has not the power to marry again, so is
17358 it in this case.
17359 </p>
17360 <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p10"></p>
17361 <p id="XP_Q61_A3-p11"></p>
17362 <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A2.html"></a>
17363 <a href="summa.XP_Q62.html"></a>
17364 </div>
17365 <a href="summa.XP_Q60_A2.html"></a>
17366 <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A1.html"></a>
17367 </div>
17368 <div id="XP_Q62" class="div3">
17369 <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A3.html"></a>
17370 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A1.html"></a>
17371 <h3 id="XP_Q62-p0.1">OF THE IMPEDIMENT THAT SUPERVENES TO MARRIAGE AFTER ITS CONSUMMATION, NAMELY FORNICATION (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
17372 <p id="XP_Q62-p1"></p>
17373 <p id="XP_Q62-p2"> We must now consider the impediment that supervenes upon marriage after its consummation, namely fornication, which is an
17374 impediment to a previous marriage as regards the act, although the marriage tie remains. Under this head there are six points
17375 of inquiry:
17376 </p>
17377 <p id="XP_Q62-p3"> (1) Whether it is lawful for a husband to put his wife away on account of fornication?</p>
17378 <p id="XP_Q62-p4"> (2) Whether he is bound to do so?</p>
17379 <p id="XP_Q62-p5"> (3) Whether he may put her away at his own judgment?</p>
17380 <p id="XP_Q62-p6"> (4) Whether in this matter husband and wife are of equal condition?</p>
17381 <p id="XP_Q62-p7"> (5) Whether, after being divorced, they must remain unmarried?</p>
17382 <p id="XP_Q62-p8"> (6) Whether they can be reconciled after being divorced?</p>
17383 <div id="XP_Q62_A1" class="div4">
17384 <a href="summa.XP_Q62.html"></a>
17385 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A2.html"></a>
17386 <h4 id="XP_Q62_A1-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for a husband to put away his wife on account of fornication?</h4>
17387 <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p1"></p>
17388 <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p2">
17389 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful for a husband to put away his wife on account of fornication. For we must not return evil for evil.
17390 But the husband, by putting away his wife on account of fornication, seemingly returns evil for evil. Therefore this is not
17391 lawful.
17392 </p>
17393 <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p3">
17394 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sin is greater if both commit fornication, than if one only commits it. But if both commit fornication, they
17395 cannot be divorced on that account. Neither therefore can they be, if only one commits fornication.
17396 </p>
17397 <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p4">
17398 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, spiritual fornication and certain other sins are more grievous than carnal fornication. But separation from bed
17399 cannot be motived by those sins. Neither therefore can it be done on account of fornication.
17400 </p>
17401 <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p5">
17402 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the unnatural vice is further removed from the marriage goods than fornication is, the manner of which is natural.
17403 Therefore it ought to have been a cause of separation rather than fornication.
17404 </p>
17405 <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p6">
17406 <b>On the contrary,</b> are the words of
17407 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.32" target="asv"> Mat. 5:32.</a>
17408 </p>
17409 <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p7"> Further, one is not bound to keep faith with one who breaks his faith. But a spouse by fornication breaks the faith due to
17410 the other spouse. Therefore one can put the other away on account of fornication.
17411 </p>
17412 <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p8">
17413 <b>I answer that,</b> Our Lord permitted a man to put away his wife on account of fornication, in punishment of the unfaithful party and in favor
17414 of the faithful party, so that the latter is not bound to marital intercourse with the unfaithful one. There are however seven
17415 cases to be excepted in which it is not lawful to put away a wife who has committed fornication, when either the wife is not
17416 to be blamed, or both parties are equally blameworthy. The first is if the husband
17417 also has committed fornication; the second is if he has prostituted his wife; the third is if the wife, believing her husband
17418 dead on account of his long absence, has married again; the fourth is if another man has fraudulently impersonated her husband
17419 in the marriage-bed; the fifth is if she be overcome by force; the sixth is if he has been reconciled to her by having carnal
17420 intercourse with her after she has committed adultery; the seventh is if both having been married in the state of
17421 unbelief, the husband has given his wife a bill of divorce and she has married again; for then if both be converted the husband
17422 is bound to receive her back again.
17423 </p>
17424 <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p9">
17425 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A husband sins if through vindictive anger he puts away his wife who has committed fornication, but he does not sin if he
17426 does so in order to avoid losing his good name, lest he seem to share in her guilt, or in order to correct his wife's sin,
17427 or in order to avoid the uncertainty of her offspring.
17428 </p>
17429 <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p10">
17430 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Divorce on account of fornication is effected by the one accusing the other. And since no one can accuse who is guilty of
17431 the same crime, a divorce cannot be pronounced when both have committed fornication, although marriage is more sinned against
17432 when both are guilty of fornication that when only one is.
17433 </p>
17434 <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p11">
17435 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fornication is directly opposed to the good of marriage, since by it the certainty of offspring is destroyed, faith is broken,
17436 and marriage ceases to have its signification when the body of one spouse is given to several others. Wherefore other sins,
17437 though perhaps they be more grievous than fornication, are not motives for a divorce. Since, however, unbelief which is called
17438 spiritual fornication, is also opposed to the good of marriage consisting in
17439 the rearing of the offspring to the worship of God, it is also a motive for divorce, yet not in the same way as bodily fornication.
17440 Because one may take steps for procuring a divorce on account of one act of carnal fornication, not, however, on account of
17441 one act of unbelief, but on account of inveterate unbelief which is a proof of obstinacy wherein unbelief is perfected.
17442 </p>
17443 <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p12">
17444 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Steps may be taken to procure a divorce on account also of the unnatural vice: but this is not mentioned in the same way,
17445 both because it is an unmentionable passion, and because it does not so affect the certainty of offspring.
17446 </p>
17447 <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p13"></p>
17448 <p id="XP_Q62_A1-p14"></p>
17449 <a href="summa.XP_Q62.html"></a>
17450 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A2.html"></a>
17451 </div>
17452 <div id="XP_Q62_A2" class="div4">
17453 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A1.html"></a>
17454 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A3.html"></a>
17455 <h4 id="XP_Q62_A2-p0.1">Whether the husband is bound by precept to put away his wife when she is guilty of fornication?</h4>
17456 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p1"></p>
17457 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p2">
17458 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the husband is bound by precept to put away his wife who is guilty of fornication. For since the husband
17459 is the head of his wife, he is bound to correct his wife. Now separation from bed is prescribed as a correction of the wife
17460 who is guilty of fornication. Therefore he is bound to separate from her.
17461 </p>
17462 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p3">
17463 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who consents with one who sins mortally, is also guilty of mortal sin. Now the husband who retains a wife guilty
17464 of fornication would seem to consent with her, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 35). Therefore he sins unless he puts her
17465 away.
17466 </p>
17467 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p4">
17468 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
17469 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.16" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:16</a>): "He who is joined to a harlot is made one body." Now a man cannot at once be a member of a harlot and a member of Christ
17470 (
17471 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:15</a>). Therefore the husband who is joined to a wife guilty of fornication ceases to be a member of Christ, and therefore sins
17472 mortally.
17473 </p>
17474 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p5">
17475 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as relationship voids the marriage tie, so does fornication dissolve the marriage-bed. Now after the husband
17476 becomes cognizant of his consanguinity with his wife, he sins mortally if he has carnal intercourse with her. Therefore he
17477 also sins mortally if he does so after knowing her to be guilty of fornication.
17478 </p>
17479 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p6">
17480 <b>Objection 5:</b> On the contrary, A gloss on
17481 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:11, </a> "Let not the husband put away his wife" says that "Our Lord permitted a wife to be put away on account of fornication." Therefore
17482 it is not a matter of precept.
17483 </p>
17484 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p7">
17485 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, one can always pardon the sin that another has committed against oneself. Now the wife, by committing fornication,
17486 sinned against her husband. Therefore the husband may spare her by not putting her away.
17487 </p>
17488 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p8">
17489 <b>I answer that,</b> The putting away of a wife guilty of fornication was prescribed in order that the wife might be corrected by means of that
17490 punishment. Now a corrective punishment is not required when amendment has already taken place. Wherefore, if the wife repent
17491 of her sin, her husband is not bound to put her away: whereas if she repent not, he is bound to do so, lest he seem to consent
17492 to her sin, by not having recourse to her due correction.
17493 </p>
17494 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p9">
17495 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The wife can be corrected for her sin of fornication not only by this punishment but also by words and blows; wherefore if
17496 she be ready to be corrected otherwise, her husband is not bound to have recourse to the aforesaid punishment in order to
17497 correct her.
17498 </p>
17499 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p10">
17500 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The husband seems to consent with her when he retains her, notwithstanding that she persists in her past sin: if, however,
17501 she has mended her ways, he does not consent with her.
17502 </p>
17503 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p11">
17504 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> She can no longer be called a harlot since she has repented of her sin. Wherefore her husband, by being joined to her, does
17505 not become a member of a harlot. We might also reply that he is joined to her not as a harlot but as his wife.
17506 </p>
17507 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p12">
17508 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is no parallel, because the effect of consanguinity is that there is no marriage tie between them, so that carnal intercourse
17509 between them becomes unlawful. Whereas fornication does not remove the said tie, so that the act remains, in itself, lawful,
17510 unless it become accidentally unlawful, in so far as the husband seems to consent to his wife's lewdness.
17511 </p>
17512 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p13">
17513 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> This permission is to be understood as an absence of prohibition: and thus it is not in contradistinction with a precept,
17514 for that which is a matter of precept is also not forbidden.
17515 </p>
17516 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p14">
17517 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The wife sins not only against her husband, but also against herself and against God, wherefore her husband cannot entirely
17518 remit the punishment, unless amendment has followed.
17519 </p>
17520 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p15"></p>
17521 <p id="XP_Q62_A2-p16"></p>
17522 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A1.html"></a>
17523 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A3.html"></a>
17524 </div>
17525 <div id="XP_Q62_A3" class="div4">
17526 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A2.html"></a>
17527 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A4.html"></a>
17528 <h4 id="XP_Q62_A3-p0.1">Whether the husband can on his own judgment put away his wife on account of fornication?</h4>
17529 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p1"></p>
17530 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p2">
17531 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the husband can on his own judgment put away his wife on account of fornication. For when sentence has
17532 been pronounced by the judge, it is lawful to carry it out without any further judgment. But God, the just Judge, has pronounced
17533 this judgment, that a husband may put his wife away on account of fornication. Therefore no further judgment is required for
17534 this.
17535 </p>
17536 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p3">
17537 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated (
17538 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.19" target="asv">Mat. 1:19</a>) that Joseph . . . being a just man . . . "was minded to put" Mary "away privately." Therefore it would seem that a husband
17539 may privately pronounce a divorce without the judgment of the Church.
17540 </p>
17541 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p4">
17542 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if after becoming cognizant of his wife's fornication a husband has marital intercourse with his wife, he forfeits
17543 the action which he had against the adulteress. Therefore the refusal of the marriage debt, which pertains to a divorce, ought
17544 to precede the judgment of the Church.
17545 </p>
17546 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p5">
17547 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which cannot be proved ought not to be submitted to the judgment of the Church. Now the crime of fornication
17548 cannot be proved, since "the eye of the adulterer observeth darkness" (
17549 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.24.15" target="asv">Job 24:15</a>). Therefore the divorce in question ought not to be made on the judgment of the Church.
17550 </p>
17551 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p6">
17552 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, accusation should be preceded by inscription [*Cf.
17553 <a id="XP_Q62_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A7.html">SS, Q[33], A[7]</a>], whereby a person binds himself under the pain of retaliation, if he fails to bring proof. But this is impossible in this
17554 matter, because then, in every event the husband would obtain his end, whether he put his wife away, or his wife put him away.
17555 Therefore she ought not to be summoned by accusation to receive the judgment of the Church.
17556 </p>
17557 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p7">
17558 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, a man is more bound to his wife than to a stranger. Now a man ought not to refer to the Church the crime of another,
17559 even though he be a stranger, without previously admonishing him privately (
17560 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.15" target="asv">Mat. 18:15</a>). Much less therefore may the husband bring his wife's crime before the Church, unless he has previously rebuked her in private.
17561 </p>
17562 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p8">
17563 <b>On the contrary,</b> No one should avenge himself. But if a husband were by his own judgment to put away his wife on account of fornication, he
17564 would avenge himself. Therefore this should not be done.
17565 </p>
17566 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p9"> Further, no man is prosecutor and judge in the same cause. But the husband is the prosecutor by suing his wife for the offense
17567 she has committed against him. Therefore he cannot be the judge, and consequently he cannot put her away on his own judgment.
17568 </p>
17569 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p10">
17570 <b>I answer that,</b> A husband can put away his wife in two ways. First as to bed only, and thus he may put her away on his own judgment, as soon
17571 as he has evidence of her fornication: nor is he bound to pay her the marriage debt at her demand, unless he be compelled
17572 by the Church, and by paying it thus he nowise prejudices his own case. Secondly, as to bed and board, and in this way she
17573 cannot be put away except at the judgment of the Church; and if she has been put away
17574 otherwise, he must be compelled to cohabit with her unless the husband can at once prove the wife's fornication. Now this
17575 putting away is called a divorce: and consequently it must be admitted that a divorce cannot be pronounced except at the judgment
17576 of the Church.
17577 </p>
17578 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p11">
17579 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sentence is an application of the general law to a particular fact. Wherefore God gave out the law according to which
17580 the sentence of the court has to be pronounced.
17581 </p>
17582 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p12">
17583 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Joseph was minded to put away the Blessed Virgin not as suspected of fornication, but because in reverence for her sanctity,
17584 he feared to cohabit with her. Moreover there is no parallel, because then the sentence at law was not only divorce but also
17585 stoning, but not now when the case is brought to the Church for judgment. The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what
17586 has been said.
17587 </p>
17588 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p13">
17589 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes when the husband suspects his wife of adultery he watches her secretly that together with witnesses he may discover
17590 her in the sin of fornication, and so proceed to accusation. Moreover, if he has no evidence of the fact, there may be strong
17591 suspicions of fornication, which suspicions being proved the fornication seems to be proved: for instance if they be found
17592 together alone, at a time and place which are open to suspicion, or "nudas cum
17593 nuda."
17594 </p>
17595 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p14">
17596 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A husband may accuse his wife of adultery in two ways. First, he may seek a separation from bed before a spiritual judge,
17597 and then there is no need for an inscription to be made under the pain of retaliation, since thus the husband would gain his
17598 end, as the objection proves. Secondly, he may seek for the crime to be punished in a secular court, and then it is necessary
17599 for inscription to precede, whereby he binds himself under pain of retaliation if
17600 he fail to prove his case.
17601 </p>
17602 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p15">
17603 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> According to a Decretal (Extra, De Simonia, cap. Licet), "there are three modes of procedure in criminal cases. First, by
17604 inquisition, which should be preceded by notoriety; secondly, by accusation, which should be preceded by inscription; [*Cf.
17605
17606 <a id="XP_Q62_A3-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q33_A7.html">SS, Q[33], A[7]</a>] thirdly, by denunciation, which should be preceded by fraternal correction." Accordingly the saying of our Lord refers to
17607 the case where the process is by way of
17608 denunciation, and not by accusation, because then the end in view is not only the correction of the guilty party, but also
17609 his punishment, for the safeguarding of the common good, which would be destroyed if justice were lacking.
17610 </p>
17611 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p16"></p>
17612 <p id="XP_Q62_A3-p17"></p>
17613 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A2.html"></a>
17614 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A4.html"></a>
17615 </div>
17616 <div id="XP_Q62_A4" class="div4">
17617 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A3.html"></a>
17618 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A5.html"></a>
17619 <h4 id="XP_Q62_A4-p0.1">Whether in a case of divorce husband and wife should be judged on a par with each other?</h4>
17620 <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p1"></p>
17621 <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p2">
17622 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that, in a case of divorce, husband and wife ought not to be judged on a par with each other. For divorce under
17623 the New Law takes the place of the divorce [repudium] recognized by the Old Law (
17624 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.31" target="asv">Mat. 5:31,32</a>). Now in the "repudium" husband and wife were not judged on a par with each other, since the husband could put away his wife,
17625 but not "vice versa." Therefore neither in divorce ought they to be judged on a par with each other.
17626 </p>
17627 <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p3">
17628 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is more opposed to the natural law that a wife have several husbands than that a husband have several wives:
17629 wherefore the latter has been sometimes lawful, but the former never. Therefore the wife sins more grievously in adultery
17630 than the husband, and consequently they ought not to be judged on a par with each other.
17631 </p>
17632 <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p4">
17633 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where there is greater injury to one's neighbor, there is a greater sin. Now the adulterous wife does a greater
17634 injury to her husband, than does the adulterous husband to his wife, since a wife's adultery involves uncertainty of the offspring,
17635 whereas the husband's adultery does not. Therefore the wife's sin is the greater, and so they ought not to be judged on a
17636 par with each other.
17637 </p>
17638 <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p5">
17639 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, divorce is prescribed in order to punish the crime of adultery. Now it belongs to the husband who is the head of
17640 the wife (
17641 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:3</a>) to correct his wife, rather than "vice versa." Therefore they should not be judged on a par with each other for the purpose
17642 of divorce, but the husband ought to have the preference.
17643 </p>
17644 <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p6">
17645 <b>Objection 5:</b> On the contrary, It would seem in this matter the wife ought to have the preference. For the more frail the sinner the more
17646 is his sin deserving of pardon. Now there is greater frailty in women than in men, for which reason Chrysostom [*Hom. xl in
17647 the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that "lust is a passion proper to women," and the Philosopher
17648 says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "properly speaking women are not said to be continent on
17649 account of their being easily inclined to concupiscence," for neither can dumb animals be continent, because they have nothing
17650 to stand in the way of their desires. Therefore women are rather to be spared in the punishment of divorce.
17651 </p>
17652 <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p7">
17653 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the husband is placed as the head of the woman in order to correct her. Therefore his sin is greater than the woman's
17654 and so he should be punished the more.
17655 </p>
17656 <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p8">
17657 <b>I answer that,</b> In a case of divorce husband and wife are judged on a par with each other, in the sense that the same things are lawful or
17658 unlawful to the one as to the other: but they are not judged on a par with each other in reference to those things, since
17659 the reason for divorce is greater in one spouse than in the other, although there is sufficient reason for divorce in both.
17660 For divorce is a punishment of adultery, in so far as it is opposed to the marriage goods.
17661 Now as regards the good of fidelity to which husband and wife are equally bound towards each other, the adultery of one is
17662 as great a sin against marriage as the adultery of the other, and this is in either of them a sufficient reason for divorce.
17663 But as regards the good of the offspring the wife's adultery is a greater sin against marriage than the husband's wherefore
17664 it is a greater reason for divorce in the wife than in the husband: and thus they are under an equal obligation, but not for
17665 equal reasons. Nor is this unjust for on either hand there is sufficient reason for the punishment in question, just as there
17666 is in two persons condemned to the punishment of death, although one of them may have sinned more grievously than the other.
17667 </p>
17668 <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p9">
17669 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The only reason why divorce was permitted, was to avoid murder. And since there was more danger of this in men than in women,
17670 the husband was allowed to put away his wife by a bill of divorce, but not "vice versa."
17671 </p>
17672 <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p10"> Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These arguments are based on the fact that in comparison with the good of the offspring there is more
17673 reason for divorce in an adulterous wife than in an adulterous husband. It does not follow, however, that they are not judged
17674 on a par with each other.
17675 </p>
17676 <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p11">
17677 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the husband is the head of the wife, he is her pilot as it were, and is no more her judge than she is his. Consequently
17678 in matters that have to be submitted to a judge, the husband has no more power over his wife, than she over him.
17679 </p>
17680 <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p12">
17681 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In adultery there is the same sinful character as in simple fornication, and something more which aggravates it, namely the
17682 lesion to marriage. Accordingly if we consider that which is common to adultery and fornication, the sin of the husband and
17683 that of the wife are compared the one to the other as that which exceeds to that which is exceeded, for in women the humors
17684 are more abundant, wherefore they are more inclined to be led by their
17685 concupiscences, whereas in man there is abundance of heat which excites concupiscence. Simply speaking, however, other things
17686 being equal, a man sins more grievously in simple fornication than a woman, because he has more of the good of reason, which
17687 prevails over all movements of bodily passions. But as regards the lesion to marriage which adultery adds to fornication and
17688 for which reason it is an occasion for divorce, the woman sins more grievously than the man, as appears from what we have
17689 said above. And since it is more grievous than simple fornication, it follows that, simply speaking, the adulterous wife sins
17690 more grievously than the adulterous husband, other things being equal.
17691 </p>
17692 <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p13">
17693 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Although the control which the husband receives over his wife is an aggravating circumstance, nevertheless the sin is yet
17694 more aggravated by this circumstance which draws the sin to another species, namely by the lesion to marriage, which lesion
17695 becomes a kind of injustice, through the fraudulent substitution of another's child.
17696 </p>
17697 <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p14"></p>
17698 <p id="XP_Q62_A4-p15"></p>
17699 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A3.html"></a>
17700 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A5.html"></a>
17701 </div>
17702 <div id="XP_Q62_A5" class="div4">
17703 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A4.html"></a>
17704 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A6.html"></a>
17705 <h4 id="XP_Q62_A5-p0.1">Whether a husband can marry again after having a divorce?</h4>
17706 <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p1"></p>
17707 <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p2">
17708 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a husband can marry again after having a divorce. For no one is bound to perpetual continence. Now in
17709 some cases the husband is bound to put away his wife forever on account of fornication, as stated above
17710 <a id="XP_Q62_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q62_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore seemingly at least in this case he can marry again.
17711 </p>
17712 <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p3">
17713 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a sinner should not be given a greater occasion of sin. But if she who is put away on account of the sin of fornication
17714 is not allowed to seek another marriage, she is given a greater occasion of sin: for it is improbable that one who was not
17715 continent during marriage will be able to be continent afterwards. Therefore it would seem lawful for her to marry again.
17716 </p>
17717 <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p4">
17718 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the wife is not bound to the husband save as regards the payment of the marriage debt and cohabitation. But she
17719 is freed from both obligations by divorce. Therefore "she is loosed from the law of her husband" [*
17720 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.2" target="asv">Rom. 7:2</a>]. Therefore she can marry again; and the same applies to her husband.
17721 </p>
17722 <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p5">
17723 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is said (
17724 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.9" target="asv">Mat. 19:9</a>): "Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another committeth adultery." Therefore
17725 seemingly he does not commit adultery if he marry again after putting away his wife on account of fornication, and consequently
17726 this will be a true marriage.
17727 </p>
17728 <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p6">
17729 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
17730 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:10,11</a>): "Not I, but the Lord, commandeth that the wife depart not from her husband. and, if she depart, that she remain unmarried."
17731 </p>
17732 <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p7"> Further, no one should gain advantage from sin. But the adulteress would if she were allowed to contract another and more
17733 desired marriage; and an occasion of adultery would be afforded those who wish to marry again. Therefore it is unlawful both
17734 to the wife and to the husband to contract a second marriage.
17735 </p>
17736 <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p8">
17737 <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing supervenient to marriage can dissolve it: wherefore adultery does not make a marriage cease to be valid. For, according
17738 to Augustine (De Nup. et Concup. i, 10), "as long as they live they are bound by the marriage tie, which neither divorce nor
17739 union with another can destroy." Therefore it is unlawful for one, while the other lives, to marry again.
17740 </p>
17741 <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p9">
17742 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although no one is absolutely bound to continence, he may be bound accidentally; for instance, if his wife contract an incurable
17743 disease that is incompatible with carnal intercourse. And it is the same if she labor under a spiritual disease, namely fornication,
17744 so as to be incorrigible.
17745 </p>
17746 <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p10">
17747 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The very shame of having been divorced ought to keep her from sin: and if it cannot keep her from sin, it is a lesser evil
17748 that she alone sin than that her husband take part in her sin.
17749 </p>
17750 <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p11">
17751 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although after divorce the wife is not bound to her husband as regards paying him the marriage debt and cohabiting with him,
17752 the marriage tie, whereby she was bound to this, remains, and consequently she cannot marry again during her husband's lifetime.
17753 She can, however, take a vow of continence, against her husband's will, unless it seem that the Church has been deceived by
17754 false witnesses in pronouncing the divorce; for in that case, even if she has
17755 made her vow of profession she ought to be restored to her husband, and would be bound to pay the marriage debt, but it would
17756 be unlawful for her to demand it.
17757 </p>
17758 <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p12">
17759 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The exception expressed in our Lord's words refers to the putting away of the wife. Hence the objection is based on a false
17760 interpretation.
17761 </p>
17762 <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p13"></p>
17763 <p id="XP_Q62_A5-p14"></p>
17764 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A4.html"></a>
17765 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A6.html"></a>
17766 </div>
17767 <div id="XP_Q62_A6" class="div4">
17768 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A5.html"></a>
17769 <a href="summa.XP_Q63.html"></a>
17770 <h4 id="XP_Q62_A6-p0.1">Whether husband and wife may be reconciled after being divorced?</h4>
17771 <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p1"></p>
17772 <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p2">
17773 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that husband and wife may not be reconciled after being divorced. For the law contains the rule (Can. Quod
17774 bene semel, Caus. vi, qu. iv): "That which has been once well decided must not be subsequently withdrawn." Now it has been
17775 decided by the judgment of the Church that they ought to be separated. Therefore they cannot subsequently be reconciled.
17776 </p>
17777 <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p3">
17778 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it were allowable for them to be reconciled, the husband would seem bound to receive his wife, especially after
17779 she has repented. But he is not bound, for the wife, in defending herself before the judge, cannot allege her repentance against
17780 her husband's accusation of fornication. Therefore in no way is reconciliation allowable.
17781 </p>
17782 <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p4">
17783 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if reconciliation were allowable, it would seem that the adulterous wife is bound to return to her husband if her
17784 husband asks her. But she is not bound, since they are separated by the Church. Therefore, etc.
17785 </p>
17786 <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p5">
17787 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if it were lawful to be reconciled to an adulterous wife, this would especially be the case when the husband is
17788 found to have committed adultery after the divorce. But in this case the wife cannot compel him to be reconciled, since the
17789 divorce has been justly pronounced. Therefore she may nowise be reconciled.
17790 </p>
17791 <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p6">
17792 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if a husband whose adultery is unknown put away his wife, who is convicted of adultery by the sentence of the Church,
17793 the divorce would seem to have been pronounced unjustly. And yet the husband is not bound to be reconciled to his wife, because
17794 she is unable to prove his adultery in court. Much less, therefore, is reconciliation allowable when the divorce has been
17795 granted justly.
17796 </p>
17797 <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p7">
17798 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
17799 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q62_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:11</a>): "And if she depart, that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband."
17800 </p>
17801 <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p8"> Further, it is allowable for the husband not to put her away after fornication. Therefore, for the same reason, he can be
17802 reconciled to her after divorce.
17803 </p>
17804 <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p9">
17805 <b>I answer that,</b> If the wife has mended her ways by repenting of her sin after the divorce, her husband may become reconciled to her; but
17806 if she remain incorrigible in her sin, he must not take her back, for the same reason which forbade him to retain her while
17807 she refused to desist from sin.
17808 </p>
17809 <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p10">
17810 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sentence of the Church in pronouncing the divorce did not bind them to separate, but allowed them to do so. Therefore
17811 reconciliation may be effected or ensue without any withdrawal of the previous sentence.
17812 </p>
17813 <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p11">
17814 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The wife's repentance should induce the husband not to accuse or put away the wife who is guilty of fornication. He cannot,
17815 however, be compelled to this course of action, nor can his wife oppose her repentance to his accusation, because although
17816 she is no longer guilty, neither in act nor in the stain of sin, there still remains something of the debt of punishment,
17817 and though this has been taken away in the sight of God, there still remains the debt
17818 of punishment to be inflicted by the judgment of man, because man sees not the heart as God does.
17819 </p>
17820 <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p12">
17821 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which is done in a person's favor does him no prejudice. Wherefore since the divorce has been granted in favor of the
17822 husband, it does not deprive him of the right of asking for the marriage debt, or of asking his wife to return to him. Hence
17823 his wife is bound to pay the debt, and to return to him, if he ask her, unless with his consent she has taken a vow of continence.
17824 </p>
17825 <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p13">
17826 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to strict law, a husband who was previously innocent should not be compelled to receive an adulterous wife on account
17827 of his having committed adultery after the divorce. But according to equity, the judge is bound by virtue of his office first
17828 of all to admonish him to beware of imperiling his own soul and of scandalizing others; although the wife may not herself
17829 seek reconciliation.
17830 </p>
17831 <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p14"></p>
17832 <p id="XP_Q62_A6-p15"></p>
17833 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A5.html"></a>
17834 <a href="summa.XP_Q63.html"></a>
17835 </div>
17836 <a href="summa.XP_Q61_A3.html"></a>
17837 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A1.html"></a>
17838 </div>
17839 <div id="XP_Q63" class="div3">
17840 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A6.html"></a>
17841 <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A1.html"></a>
17842 <h3 id="XP_Q63-p0.1">OF SECOND MARRIAGES (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
17843 <p id="XP_Q63-p1"></p>
17844 <p id="XP_Q63-p2"> In the next place we must consider second marriage. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
17845 <p id="XP_Q63-p3"> (1) Whether it is lawful?</p>
17846 <p id="XP_Q63-p4"> (2) Whether it is a sacrament?</p>
17847 <div id="XP_Q63_A1" class="div4">
17848 <a href="summa.XP_Q63.html"></a>
17849 <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A2.html"></a>
17850 <h4 id="XP_Q63_A1-p0.1">Whether a second marriage is lawful?</h4>
17851 <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p1"></p>
17852 <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p2">
17853 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a second marriage is unlawful. Because we should judge of things according to truth. Now Chrysostom [*Hom.
17854 xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that "to take a second husband is in truth fornication,"
17855 which is unlawful. Therefore neither is a second marriage lawful.
17856 </p>
17857 <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p3">
17858 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is not good is unlawful. Now Ambrose [*On
17859 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q63_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.40" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:40 </a>and De Viduis] says that a second marriage is not good. Therefore it is unlawful.
17860 </p>
17861 <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p4">
17862 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one should be debarred from being present at such things as are becoming and lawful. Yet priests are debarred
17863 from being present at second marriages, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42). Therefore they are unlawful.
17864 </p>
17865 <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p5">
17866 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no one incurs a penalty save for sin. Now a person incurs the penalty of irregularity on account of being married
17867 twice. Therefore a second marriage is unlawful.
17868 </p>
17869 <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p6">
17870 <b>On the contrary,</b> We read of Abraham having contracted a second marriage (
17871 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q63_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.25.1" target="asv">Gn. 25:1</a>).
17872 </p>
17873 <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p7"> Further, the Apostle says (
17874 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q63_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.5.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 5:14</a>): "I will . . . that the younger," namely widows, "should marry, bear children." Therefore second marriages are lawful.
17875 </p>
17876 <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p8">
17877 <b>I answer that,</b> The marriage tie lasts only until death (
17878 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q63_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.2" target="asv">Rom. 7:2</a>), wherefore at the death of either spouse the marriage tie ceases: and consequently when one dies the other is not hindered
17879 from marrying a second time on account of the previous marriage. Therefore not only second marriages are lawful, but even
17880 third and so on.
17881 </p>
17882 <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p9">
17883 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chrysostom is speaking in reference to the cause which is wont at times to incite a person to a second marriage, namely concupiscence
17884 which incites also to fornication.
17885 </p>
17886 <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p10">
17887 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A second marriage is stated not to be good, not that it is unlawful, but because it lacks the honor of the signification
17888 which is in a first marriage, where one husband has one wife, as in the case of Christ and the Church.
17889 </p>
17890 <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p11">
17891 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Men who are consecrated to Divine things are debarred not only from unlawful things, but even from things which have any
17892 appearance of turpitude; and consequently they are debarred from second marriages, which lack the decorum which was in a first
17893 marriage.
17894 </p>
17895 <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p12">
17896 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Irregularity is not always incurred on account of a sin, and may be incurred through a defect in a sacrament [*"Defectus
17897 sacramenti," i.e. defect of signification; Cf. A[2], OBJ[3]]. Hence the argument is not to the point.
17898 </p>
17899 <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p13"></p>
17900 <p id="XP_Q63_A1-p14"></p>
17901 <a href="summa.XP_Q63.html"></a>
17902 <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A2.html"></a>
17903 </div>
17904 <div id="XP_Q63_A2" class="div4">
17905 <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A1.html"></a>
17906 <a href="summa.XP_Q64.html"></a>
17907 <h4 id="XP_Q63_A2-p0.1">Whether a second marriage is a sacrament?</h4>
17908 <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p1"></p>
17909 <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p2">
17910 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a second marriage is not a sacrament. For he who repeats a sacrament injures the sacrament. But no sacrament
17911 should be done an injury. Therefore if a second marriage were a sacrament, marriage ought nowise to be repeated.
17912 </p>
17913 <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p3">
17914 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every sacrament some kind of blessing is given. But no blessing is given in a second marriage, as stated in the
17915 text (Sent. iv, D, 42). Therefore no sacrament is conferred therein.
17916 </p>
17917 <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p4">
17918 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, signification is essential to a sacrament. But the signification of marriage is not preserved in a second marriage,
17919 because there is not a union of only one woman with only one man, as in the case of Christ and the Church. Therefore it is
17920 not a sacrament.
17921 </p>
17922 <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p5">
17923 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, one sacrament is not an impediment to receiving another. But a second marriage is an impediment to receiving orders.
17924 Therefore it is not a sacrament.
17925 </p>
17926 <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p6">
17927 <b>On the contrary,</b> Marital intercourse is excused from sin in a second marriage even as in a first marriage. Now marital intercourse is excused
17928 [*Cf.
17929 <a id="XP_Q63_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q69_A1.html"> Q[69], A[1]</a>] by the marriage goods which are fidelity, offspring, and sacrament. Therefore a second marriage is a sacrament.
17930 </p>
17931 <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p7"> Further, irregularity is not contracted through a second and non-sacramental union, such as fornication. Yet irregularity
17932 is contracted through a second marriage. Therefore it is a sacramental union.
17933 </p>
17934 <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p8">
17935 <b>I answer that,</b> Wherever we find the essentials of a sacrament, there is a true sacrament. Wherefore, since in a second marriage we find
17936 all the essentials of the sacrament of marriage (namely the due matter---which results from the parties having the conditions
17937 prescribed by law---and the due form, which is the expression of the inward consent by words of the present), it is clear
17938 that a second marriage is a sacrament even as a first.
17939 </p>
17940 <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p9">
17941 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This is true of a sacrament which causes an everlasting effect: for then, if the sacrament be repeated, it is implied that
17942 the first was not effective, and thus an injury is done to the first, as is clear in all those sacraments which imprint a
17943 character. But those sacraments which have not an everlasting effect can be repeated without injury to the sacrament, as in
17944 the case of Penance. And, since the marriage tie ceases with death, no injury is done
17945 to the sacrament if a woman marry again after her husband's death.
17946 </p>
17947 <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p10">
17948 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the second marriage, considered in itself, is a perfect sacrament, yet if we consider it in relation to the first
17949 marriage, it is somewhat a defective sacrament, because it has not its full signification, since there is not a union of only
17950 one woman with only one man as in the marriage of Christ with the Church. And on account of this defect the blessing is omitted
17951 in a second marriage. This, however, refers to the case when it is a second
17952 marriage on the part of both man and woman, or on the part of the woman only. For if a virgin marry a man who has had another
17953 wife, the marriage is blessed nevertheless. Because the signification is preserved to a certain extent even in relation to
17954 the former marriage, since though Christ has but one Church for His spouse, there are many persons espoused to Him in the
17955 one Church. But the soul cannot be espoused to another besides Christ, else it commits fornication with the devil. Nor is
17956 there
17957 a spiritual marriage. For this reason when a woman marries a second time the marriage is not blessed on account of the defect
17958 in the sacrament.
17959 </p>
17960 <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p11">
17961 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfect signification is found in a second marriage considered in itself, not however if it be considered in relation
17962 to the previous marriage, and it is thus that it is a defective sacrament.
17963 </p>
17964 <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p12">
17965 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A second marriage in so far as there is a defect in the sacrament, but not as a sacrament, is an impediment to the sacrament
17966 of Order.
17967 </p>
17968 <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p13"></p>
17969 <p id="XP_Q63_A2-p14"></p>
17970 <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A1.html"></a>
17971 <a href="summa.XP_Q64.html"></a>
17972 </div>
17973 <a href="summa.XP_Q62_A6.html"></a>
17974 <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A1.html"></a>
17975 </div>
17976 <div id="XP_Q64" class="div3">
17977 <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A2.html"></a>
17978 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A1.html"></a>
17979 <h3 id="XP_Q64-p0.1">OF THE THINGS ANNEXED TO MARRIAGE, AND FIRST OF THE PAYMENT OF THE MARRIAGE DEBT (TEN ARTICLES)</h3>
17980 <p id="XP_Q64-p1"></p>
17981 <p id="XP_Q64-p2"> In the next place we must consider those things which are annexed to marriage: (1) the payment of the marriage debt; (2)
17982 plurality of wives; (3) bigamy; (4) the bill of divorce; (5) illegitimate children.
17983 </p>
17984 <p id="XP_Q64-p3"> Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:</p>
17985 <p id="XP_Q64-p4"> (1) Whether one spouse is bound to pay the marriage debt to the other?</p>
17986 <p id="XP_Q64-p5"> (2) Whether one is sometimes bound to pay without being asked?</p>
17987 <p id="XP_Q64-p6"> (3) Whether a wife may demand the debt during the menses?</p>
17988 <p id="XP_Q64-p7"> (4) Whether she is bound to pay it at that time?</p>
17989 <p id="XP_Q64-p8"> (5) Whether husband and wife are equal in this matter?</p>
17990 <p id="XP_Q64-p9"> (6) Whether the one without the other's consent may take a vow that prohibits the payment of the debt?</p>
17991 <p id="XP_Q64-p10"> (7) Whether it is forbidden to ask for the debt at any particular time?</p>
17992 <p id="XP_Q64-p11"> (8) Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for it at a holy time?</p>
17993 <p id="XP_Q64-p12"> (9) Whether it is an obligation to pay it at the time of a festival?</p>
17994 <p id="XP_Q64-p13"> (10) Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times?</p>
17995 <div id="XP_Q64_A1" class="div4">
17996 <a href="summa.XP_Q64.html"></a>
17997 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A2.html"></a>
17998 <h4 id="XP_Q64_A1-p0.1">Whether husband and wife are mutually bound to the payment of the marriage debt?</h4>
17999 <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p1"></p>
18000 <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p2">
18001 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that husband and wife are not mutually bound, under the obligation of a precept, to the payment of the marriage
18002 debt. For no one is forbidden to receive the Eucharist on account of fulfilling a precept. Yet he who has had intercourse
18003 with his wife cannot partake of the flesh of the Lamb according to Jerome [*Serm. de Esu Agni viii] quoted in the text (Sent.
18004 iv, D, 32). Therefore the payment of the debt does not come under the obligation of a
18005 precept.
18006 </p>
18007 <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p3">
18008 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is lawful to everyone to abstain from what is hurtful to his person. But it is sometimes harmful to a person
18009 to pay the debt when asked, whether on account of sickness, or because they have already paid it. Therefore it would seem
18010 allowable to refuse the one who asks.
18011 </p>
18012 <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p4">
18013 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is a sin to render oneself unfit to fulfill an obligation of precept. If, therefore, the payment of the debt
18014 comes under the obligation of a precept, it would seem sinful to render oneself unfit for paying the debt, by fasting or otherwise
18015 weakening the body: but apparently this is untrue.
18016 </p>
18017 <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p5">
18018 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12), marriage is directed to the begetting and rearing of children, as
18019 well as to the community of life. Now leprosy is opposed to both these ends of marriage, for since it is a contagious disease,
18020 the wife is not bound to cohabit with a leprous husband; and besides this disease is often transmitted to the offspring. Therefore
18021 it would seem that a wife is not bound to pay the debt to a leprous husband.
18022 </p>
18023 <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p6">
18024 <b>On the contrary,</b> As the slave is in the power of his master, so is one spouse in the power of the other (
18025 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:4</a>). But a slave is bound by an obligation of precept to pay his master the debt of his service according to
18026 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.7" target="asv"> Rom. 13:7, </a> "Render . . . to all men their dues, tribute to whom tribute is due," etc. Therefore husband and wife are mutually bound
18027 to the payment of the marriage debt.
18028 </p>
18029 <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p7"> Further, marriage is directed to the avoiding of fornication (
18030 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:2</a>). But this could not be the effect of marriage, if the one were not bound to pay the debt to the other when the latter is
18031 troubled with concupiscence. Therefore the payment of the debt is an obligation of precept.
18032 </p>
18033 <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p8">
18034 <b>I answer that,</b> Marriage was instituted especially as fulfilling an office of nature. Wherefore in its act the movement of nature must be
18035 observed according to which the nutritive power administers to the generative power that alone which is in excess of what
18036 is required for the preservation of the individual: for the natural order requires that a thing should be first perfected
18037 in itself, and that afterwards it should communicate of its perfection to others: and this is
18038 also the order of charity which perfects nature. And therefore, since the wife has power over her husband only in relation
18039 to the generative power and not in relation to things directed to the preservation of the individual, the husband is bound
18040 to pay the debt to his wife, in matters pertaining to the begetting of children, with due regard however to his own welfare.
18041 </p>
18042 <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p9">
18043 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is possible through fulfilling a precept to render oneself unfit for the exercise of a sacred duty: thus a judge becomes
18044 irregular by sentencing a man to death. In like manner he who pays the marriage debt, in fulfillment of the precept, becomes
18045 unfit for the exercise of divine offices, not because the act in question is sinful, but on account of its carnal nature.
18046 And so, according to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 32), Jerome is speaking only of the
18047 ministers of the Church, and not of others who should be left to use their own discretion, because without sin they may either
18048 abstain out of reverence or receive Christ's body out of devotion.
18049 </p>
18050 <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p10">
18051 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The wife has no power over her husband's body, except as is consistent with the welfare of his person, as stated above. Wherefore
18052 if she go beyond this in her demands, it is not a request for the debt, but an unjust exaction; and for this reason the husband
18053 is not bound to satisfy her.
18054 </p>
18055 <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p11">
18056 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the husband be rendered incapable of paying the debt through a cause consequent upon marriage, for instance through having
18057 already paid the debt and being unable to pay it, the wife has no right to ask again, and in doing so she behaves as a harlot
18058 rather than as a wife. But if he be rendered incapable through some other cause, then if this be a lawful cause, he is not
18059 bound, and she cannot ask, but if it be an unlawful cause, then he sins, and his
18060 wife's sin, should she fall into fornication on this account, is somewhat imputable to him. Hence he should endeavor to do
18061 his best that his wife may remain continent.
18062 </p>
18063 <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p12">
18064 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Leprosy voids a betrothal but not a marriage. Wherefore a wife is bound to pay the debt even to a leprous husband. But she
18065 is not bound to cohabit with him, because she is not so liable to infection from marital intercourse as from continual cohabitation.
18066 And though the child begotten of them be diseased, it is better to be thus than not at all.
18067 </p>
18068 <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p13"></p>
18069 <p id="XP_Q64_A1-p14"></p>
18070 <a href="summa.XP_Q64.html"></a>
18071 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A2.html"></a>
18072 </div>
18073 <div id="XP_Q64_A2" class="div4">
18074 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A1.html"></a>
18075 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A3.html"></a>
18076 <h4 id="XP_Q64_A2-p0.1">Whether a husband is bound to pay the debt if his wife does not ask for it?</h4>
18077 <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p1"></p>
18078 <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p2">
18079 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the husband is not bound to pay the marriage debt if his wife does not ask for it. For an affirmative
18080 precept is binding only at a certain time. But the time fixed for the payment of the debt can only be when it is asked for.
18081 Therefore he is not bound to payment otherwise.
18082 </p>
18083 <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p3">
18084 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we ought to presume the better things of everyone. Now even for married people it is better to be continent than
18085 to make use of marriage. Therefore unless she ask expressly for the debt, the husband should presume that it pleases her to
18086 be continent, and so he is not bound to pay her the debt.
18087 </p>
18088 <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p4">
18089 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the wife has power over her husband, so has a master over his slave. Now a slave is not bound to serve his master
18090 save when the latter commands him. Therefore neither is a husband bound to pay the debt to his wife except when she demands
18091 it.
18092 </p>
18093 <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p5">
18094 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the husband can sometimes request his wife not to exact the debt when she asks for it. Much more therefore may he
18095 not pay it when he is not asked.
18096 </p>
18097 <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p6">
18098 <b>On the contrary,</b> By the payment of the debt a remedy is afforded against the wife's concupiscence. Now a physician who has the care of a sick
18099 person is bound to remedy the disease without being asked. Therefore the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife although
18100 she ask not for it. Further, a superior is bound to apply a remedy for the sins of his subjects even though they rebel against
18101 it. But the payment of the debt on the husband's part is directed against the
18102 sins of his wife. Therefore sometimes the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife even though she ask it not of him.
18103 </p>
18104 <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p7">
18105 <b>I answer that,</b> The debt may be demanded in two ways. First, explicitly, as when they ask one another by words; secondly, implicitly, when
18106 namely the husband knows by certain signs that the wife would wish him to pay the debt, but is silent through shame. And so
18107 even though she does not ask for the debt explicitly in words, the husband is bound to pay it, whenever his wife shows signs
18108 of wishing him to do so.
18109 </p>
18110 <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p8">
18111 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The appointed time is not only when it is demanded but also when on account of certain signs there is fear of danger (to
18112 avoid which is the purpose of the payment of the debt) unless it be paid then.
18113 </p>
18114 <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p9">
18115 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The husband may presume this of his wife when he perceives in her no signs of the contrary; but it would be foolish of him
18116 to admit this presumption if he does see such signs.
18117 </p>
18118 <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p10">
18119 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The master is not ashamed to demand of his slave the duty of his service, as a wife is to ask the marriage debt of her husband.
18120 Yet if the master were not to demand it, either through ignorance or some other cause, the slave would nevertheless be bound
18121 to fulfill his duty, if some danger were threatening. For this is what is meant by "not serving to the eye" (
18122 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.6" target="asv">Eph. 6:6</a>;
18123 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Col.3.22" target="asv">Col. 3:22</a>) which is the Apostle's command to servants.
18124 </p>
18125 <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p11">
18126 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A husband should not dissuade his wife from asking for the debt, except for a reasonable cause; and even then he should not
18127 be too insistent, on account of the besetting danger.
18128 </p>
18129 <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p12"></p>
18130 <p id="XP_Q64_A2-p13"></p>
18131 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A1.html"></a>
18132 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A3.html"></a>
18133 </div>
18134 <div id="XP_Q64_A3" class="div4">
18135 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A2.html"></a>
18136 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A4.html"></a>
18137 <h4 id="XP_Q64_A3-p0.1">Whether it is allowable for a menstruous wife to ask for the marriage debt? [*This and the Fourth Article are omitted in the
18138 Leonine edition.]
18139 </h4>
18140 <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p1"></p>
18141 <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p2">
18142 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem lawful for a menstruous wife to ask for the marriage debt. For in the Law a man who had an issue of seed was
18143 unclean, even as a menstruous woman. Yet a man who has an issue of seed may ask for the debt. Therefore a menstruous wife
18144 may also.
18145 </p>
18146 <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p3">
18147 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, leprosy is a worse complaint than suffering from monthly periods, and would seem to cause a greater corruption in
18148 the offspring. Yet a leper can ask for the debt. Therefore, etc.
18149 </p>
18150 <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p4">
18151 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a menstruous wife is not allowed to ask for the debt, this can only be because it is feared this may be detrimental
18152 to the offspring. Yet if the wife be unfruitful there is no such fear. Therefore, seemingly, at least an unfruitful wife may
18153 ask for the debt during her menses.
18154 </p>
18155 <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p5">
18156 <b>On the contrary,</b> "Thou shalt not approach to a woman having her flowers" (
18157 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.19" target="asv">Lev. 18:19</a>) where Augustine observes: "Although he has already sufficiently forbidden this he repeats the prohibition here lest he seem
18158 to have spoken figuratively."
18159 </p>
18160 <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p6"> Further, "All our justices" are become "as the rag of a menstruous woman" (
18161 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.64.6" target="asv">Is. 64:6</a>) where Jerome observes: "Men ought then to keep away from their wives because thus is a deformed blind lame leprous offspring
18162 conceived: so that those parents who are not ashamed to come together in sexual intercourse have their sin made obvious to
18163 all": and thus the same conclusion follows.
18164 </p>
18165 <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p7">
18166 <b>I answer that,</b> It was forbidden in the Law to approach to a menstruous woman, for two reasons both on account of her uncleanness, and on
18167 account of the harm that frequently resulted to the offspring from such intercourse. With regard to the first reason, it was
18168 a ceremonial precept, but with regard to the second it was a moral precept. For since marriage is chiefly directed to the
18169 good of the offspring, all use of marriage which is intended for the good of the offspring is
18170 in order. Consequently this precept is binding even in the New Law on account of the second reason, although not on account
18171 of the first. Now, the menstrual issue may be natural or unnatural. The natural issue is that to which women are subject at
18172 stated periods when they are in good health; and it is unnatural when they suffer from an issue of blood through some disorder
18173 resulting from sickness. Accordingly if the menstrual flow be unnatural it is not forbidden in the New Law to approach to
18174 a
18175 menstruous woman both on account of her infirmity since a woman in that state cannot conceive, and because an issue of this
18176 kind is lasting and continuous, so that the husband would have to abstain for always. When however the woman is subject to
18177 a natural issue of the menstruum, she can conceive; moreover, the said issue lasts only a short time, wherefore it is forbidden
18178 to approach to her. In like manner a woman is forbidden to ask for the debt during the period of that issue.
18179 </p>
18180 <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p8">
18181 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The issue of seed in a man is the result of infirmity, nor is the seed in this case apt for generation. Moreover a complaint
18182 of this kind is continual or lasting like leprosy: wherefore the comparison falls.
18183 </p>
18184 <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p9"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
18185 <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p10">
18186 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As long as a woman is subject to the menses it cannot be certain that she is sterile. For some are sterile in youth, and
18187 in course of time become fruitful, and "vice versa," as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Anim. xvi).
18188 </p>
18189 <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p11"></p>
18190 <p id="XP_Q64_A3-p12"></p>
18191 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A2.html"></a>
18192 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A4.html"></a>
18193 </div>
18194 <div id="XP_Q64_A4" class="div4">
18195 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A3.html"></a>
18196 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A5.html"></a>
18197 <h4 id="XP_Q64_A4-p0.1">Whether a menstruous woman should or may lawfully pay the marriage debt to her husband if he ask for it? [*This and the previous
18198 article are omitted in the Leonine edition.]
18199 </h4>
18200 <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p1"></p>
18201 <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p2">
18202 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a menstruous wife may not pay the marriage debt to her husband at his asking. For it is written (
18203 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.20.18" target="asv">Lev. 20:18</a>) that if any man approach to a menstruous woman both shall be put to death. Therefore it would seem that both he who asks
18204 and she who grants are guilty of mortal sin.
18205 </p>
18206 <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p3">
18207 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Not only they that do them but they also that consent to them are worthy of death" (
18208 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.32" target="asv">Rom. 1:32</a>). Now he who knowingly asks for the debt from a menstruous woman sins mortally. Therefore she also sins mortally by consenting
18209 to pay the debt.
18210 </p>
18211 <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p4">
18212 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a madman must not be given back his sword lest he kill himself or another. Therefore in like manner neither should
18213 a wife give her body to her husband during her menses, lest he be guilty of spiritual murder.
18214 </p>
18215 <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p5">
18216 <b>On the contrary,</b> "The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband" (
18217 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:4</a>). Therefore at his asking his wife must pay the debt even during her menses.
18218 </p>
18219 <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p6"> Further, the menstruous wife should not be an occasion of sin to her husband. But she would give her husband an occasion
18220 of sin, if she paid him not the debt at his asking; since he might commit fornication. Therefore, etc.
18221 </p>
18222 <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p7">
18223 <b>I answer that,</b> In this regard some have asserted that a menstruous woman may not pay the debt even as she may not ask for it. For just as
18224 she would not be bound to pay it if she had some personal ailment so as to make it dangerous for herself, so is she not bound
18225 to pay for fear of danger to the offspring. But this opinion would seem to derogate from marriage, by which the husband is
18226 given entire power of his wife's body with regard to the marriage act. Nor is there any
18227 parallel between bodily affliction of the offspring and the danger to her own body: since, if the wife be ailing, it is quite
18228 certain that she would be endangered by the carnal act, whereas this is by no means so certain with regard to the offspring
18229 which perhaps would not be forthcoming.
18230 </p>
18231 <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p8"> Wherefore others say that a menstruous woman is never allowed to ask for the debt; and that if her husband ask, he does so
18232 either knowingly or in ignorance. If knowingly, she ought to dissuade him by her prayers and admonitions; yet not so insistently
18233 as possibly to afford him an occasion of falling into other, and those sinful, practices, if he be deemed that way inclined.
18234 If however, he ask in ignorance, the wife may put forward some motive, or allege sickness as a reason for
18235 not paying the debt, unless there be fear of danger to her husband. If, however, the husband ultimately persists in his request,
18236 she must yield to his demand. But it would not be safe for her to make known [*"Indicare," as in the commentary on the Sentences;
18237 the Leonine edition reads "judicare."] her disaffection, lest this make her husband entertain a repulsion towards her, unless
18238 his prudence may be taken for granted.
18239 </p>
18240 <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p9">
18241 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This refers to the case when both willingly consent, but not when the woman pays the debt by force as it were.
18242 </p>
18243 <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p10">
18244 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since there is no consent without the concurrence of the will, the woman is not deemed to consent in her husband's sin unless
18245 she pay the debt willingly. For when she is unwilling she is passive rather than consenting.
18246 </p>
18247 <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p11">
18248 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A madman should be given back his sword if a greater danger were feared from its not being returned to him: and thus it is
18249 in the case in point.
18250 </p>
18251 <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p12"></p>
18252 <p id="XP_Q64_A4-p13"></p>
18253 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A3.html"></a>
18254 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A5.html"></a>
18255 </div>
18256 <div id="XP_Q64_A5" class="div4">
18257 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A4.html"></a>
18258 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A6.html"></a>
18259 <h4 id="XP_Q64_A5-p0.1">Whether husband and wife are equal in the marriage act?</h4>
18260 <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p1"></p>
18261 <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p2">
18262 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that husband and wife are not equal in the marriage act. For according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) the
18263 agent is more noble than the patient. But in the marriage act the husband is as agent and the wife as patient. Therefore they
18264 are not equal in that act.
18265 </p>
18266 <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p3">
18267 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the wife is not bound to pay her husband the debt without being asked; whereas he is so bound, as stated above (
18268 <a id="XP_Q64_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q64_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore they are not equal in the marriage act.
18269 </p>
18270 <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p4">
18271 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the woman was made on the man's account in reference to marriage according to
18272 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.18" target="asv"> Gn. 2:18, </a> "Let us make him a help like unto himself." But that on account of which another thing is, is always the principal. Therefore,
18273 etc.
18274 </p>
18275 <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p5">
18276 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the marriage act. But in marriage "the husband is the head of the wife" (
18277 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.23" target="asv">Eph. 5:23</a>). Therefore they are not equal in the aforesaid act.
18278 </p>
18279 <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p6">
18280 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
18281 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:4</a>): "The husband . . . hath not power of his own body," and the same is said of the wife. Therefore they are equal in the marriage
18282 act.
18283 </p>
18284 <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p7"> Further, Marriage is a relation of equiparence, since it is a kind of union, as stated above (
18285 <a id="XP_Q64_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,3). Therefore husband and wife are equal in the marriage act.
18286 </p>
18287 <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p8">
18288 <b>I answer that,</b> Equality is twofold, of quantity and of proportion. Equality of quantity is that which is observed between two quantities
18289 of the same measure, for instance a thing two cubits long and another two cubits in length. But equality of proportion is
18290 that which is observed between two proportions of the same kind as double to double. Accordingly, speaking of the first equality,
18291 husband and wife are not equal in marriage; neither as regards the marriage act, wherein
18292 the more noble part is due to the husband, nor as regards the household management, wherein the wife is ruled and the husband
18293 rules. But with reference to the second kind of equality, they are equal in both matters, because just as in both the marriage
18294 act and in the management of the household the husband is bound to the wife in all things pertaining to the husband, so is
18295 the wife bound to the husband in all things pertaining to the wife. It is in this sense that it is stated in the text
18296 (Sent. iv, D, 32) that they are equal in paying and demanding the debt.
18297 </p>
18298 <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p9">
18299 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is more noble to be active than passive, there is the same proportion between patient and passivity as between
18300 agent and activity; and accordingly there is equality of proportion between them.
18301 </p>
18302 <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p10">
18303 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This is accidental. For the husband having the more noble part in the marriage act, it is natural that he should be less
18304 ashamed than the wife to ask for the debt. Hence it is that the wife is not bound to pay the debt to her husband without being
18305 asked, whereas the husband is bound to pay it to the wife.
18306 </p>
18307 <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p11">
18308 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This proves that they are not equal absolutely, but not that they are not equal in proportion.
18309 </p>
18310 <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p12">
18311 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the head is the principal member, yet just as the members are bound to the head in their own respective capacities,
18312 so is the head in its own capacity bound to the members: and thus there is equality of proportion between them.
18313 </p>
18314 <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p13"></p>
18315 <p id="XP_Q64_A5-p14"></p>
18316 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A4.html"></a>
18317 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A6.html"></a>
18318 </div>
18319 <div id="XP_Q64_A6" class="div4">
18320 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A5.html"></a>
18321 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A7.html"></a>
18322 <h4 id="XP_Q64_A6-p0.1">Whether husband and wife can take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent?</h4>
18323 <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p1"></p>
18324 <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p2">
18325 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that husband and wife may take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent. For husband
18326 and wife are equally bound to pay the debt, as stated above
18327 <a id="XP_Q64_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q64_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Now it is lawful for the husband, even if his wife be unwilling, to take the cross in defense of the Holy Land: and consequently
18328 this is also lawful to the wife. Therefore, since this prevents the payment of the debt, either husband or wife may
18329 without the other's consent take the aforesaid vow.
18330 </p>
18331 <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p3">
18332 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in taking a vow one should not await the consent of another who cannot dissent without sin. Now the husband or wife
18333 cannot, without sin, refuse their consent to the other's taking a vow of continence whether absolutely or for a time; because
18334 to prevent a person's spiritual progress is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore the one can take a vow of continence either
18335 absolutely or for a time, without the other's consent.
18336 </p>
18337 <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p4">
18338 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the marriage act, the debt has to be demanded just as it has to be paid. Now the one can, without the other's
18339 consent, vow not to demand the debt, since in this he is within his own rights. Therefore he can equally take a vow not to
18340 pay the debt.
18341 </p>
18342 <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p5">
18343 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no one can be bound by the command of a superior to do what he cannot lawfully vow or do simply, since one must
18344 not obey in what is unlawful. Now the superior authority might command the husband not to pay the debt to his wife for a time,
18345 by occupying him in some service. Therefore he might, of his own accord, do or vow that which would hinder him from paying
18346 the debt.
18347 </p>
18348 <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p6">
18349 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
18350 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:5</a>): "Defraud not one another, except . . . by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer."
18351 </p>
18352 <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p7"> Further, no one can vow that which belongs to another. Now "the husband . . . hath not power of his own body, but the wife"
18353 (
18354 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:4</a>). Therefore, without her consent, the husband cannot take a vow of continence whether absolutely or for a time.
18355 </p>
18356 <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p8">
18357 <b>I answer that,</b> A vow is a voluntary act, as its very name implies: and consequently a vow can only be about those goods which are subject
18358 to our will, and those in which one person is bound to another do not come under this head. Therefore in matters of this kind
18359 one person cannot take a vow without the consent of the one to whom he is bound. Consequently, since husband and wife are
18360 mutually bound as regards the payment of the debt which is an obstacle to continence, the
18361 one cannot vow continence without the other's consent; and if he take the vow he sins, and must not keep the vow, but must
18362 do penance for an ill-taken vow [*Cf.
18363 <a id="XP_Q64_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q53_A1.html"> Q[53], AA[1]</a>,4;
18364 <a id="XP_Q64_A6-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q61_A1.html"> Q[61], A[1]</a>].
18365 </p>
18366 <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p9">
18367 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is sufficiently probable that the wife ought to be willing to remain continent for a time, in order to succor the need
18368 of the universal Church. Hence in favor of the business for which the cross is given to him, it is laid down that the husband
18369 may take the cross without his wife's consent, even as he might go fighting without the consent of his landlord whose land
18370 he has leased. And yet the wife is not entirely deprived of her right, since she can
18371 follow him. Nor is there a parallel between wife and husband: because, since the husband has to rule the wife and not "vice
18372 versa," the wife is bound to follow her husband rather than the husband the wife. Moreover there would be more danger to the
18373 wife's chastity as a result of wandering from country to country, than to the husband's, and less profit to the Church. Wherefore
18374 the wife cannot take this vow without her husband's consent.
18375 </p>
18376 <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p10">
18377 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The one spouse, by refusing to consent to the other's vow of continence, does not sin, because the object of his dissent
18378 is to hinder not the other's good, but the harm to himself.
18379 </p>
18380 <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p11">
18381 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two opinions on this point. For some say that one can without the other's consent vow not to demand the debt, not
18382 however not to pay it, because in the former case they are both within their own rights, but not in the second. Seeing, however,
18383 that if one were never to ask for the debt, marriage would become too burdensome to the other who would always have to undergo
18384 the shame of asking for the debt, others assert with greater probability
18385 that neither vow can be lawfully taken by one spouse without the other's consent.
18386 </p>
18387 <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p12">
18388 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Just as the wife receives power over her husband's body, without prejudice to the husband's duty to his own body, so also
18389 is it without prejudice to his duty to his master. Hence just as a wife cannot ask her husband for the debt to the detriment
18390 of his bodily health, so neither can she do this so as to hinder him in his duty to his master. And yet the master cannot
18391 for this reason prevent her from paying the debt.
18392 </p>
18393 <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p13"></p>
18394 <p id="XP_Q64_A6-p14"></p>
18395 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A5.html"></a>
18396 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A7.html"></a>
18397 </div>
18398 <div id="XP_Q64_A7" class="div4">
18399 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A6.html"></a>
18400 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A8.html"></a>
18401 <h4 id="XP_Q64_A7-p0.1">Whether it is forbidden to demand the debt on holy days?</h4>
18402 <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p1"></p>
18403 <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p2">
18404 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a person ought not to be forbidden to ask for the debt on holy days. For the remedy should be applied
18405 when the disease gains strength. Now concupiscence may possibly gain strength on a feast day. Therefore the remedy should
18406 be applied then by asking for the debt.
18407 </p>
18408 <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p3">
18409 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the only reason why the debt should not be demanded on feast days is because they are devoted to prayer. Yet on
18410 those days certain hours are appointed for prayer. Therefore one may ask for the debt at some other time.
18411 </p>
18412 <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p4">
18413 <b>On the contrary,</b> Just as certain places are holy because they are devoted to holy things, so are certain times holy for the same reason. But
18414 it is not lawful to demand the debt in a holy place. Therefore neither is it lawful at a holy time.
18415 </p>
18416 <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p5">
18417 <b>I answer that,</b> Although the marriage act is void of sin, nevertheless since it oppresses the reason on account of the carnal pleasure, it
18418 renders man unfit for spiritual things. Therefore, on those days when one ought especially to give one's time to spiritual
18419 things, it is not lawful to ask for the debt.
18420 </p>
18421 <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p6">
18422 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> At such a time other means may be employed for the repression of concupiscence; for instance, prayer and many similar things,
18423 to which even those who observe perpetual continence have recourse.
18424 </p>
18425 <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p7">
18426 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although one is not bound to pray at all hours, one is bound throughout the day to keep oneself fit for prayer.
18427 </p>
18428 <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p8"></p>
18429 <p id="XP_Q64_A7-p9"></p>
18430 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A6.html"></a>
18431 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A8.html"></a>
18432 </div>
18433 <div id="XP_Q64_A8" class="div4">
18434 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A7.html"></a>
18435 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A9.html"></a>
18436 <h4 id="XP_Q64_A8-p0.1">Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time?</h4>
18437 <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p1"></p>
18438 <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p2">
18439 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time. For Gregory says (Dial. i) that the devil took
18440 possession of a woman who had intercourse with her husband at night and came in the morning to the procession. But this would
18441 not have happened had she not sinned mortally. Therefore, etc.
18442 </p>
18443 <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p3">
18444 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever disobeys a Divine command commits a mortal sin. Now the Lord commanded (
18445 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.19.15" target="asv">Ex. 19:15</a>): "Come not near your wives," when namely they were about to receive the Law. Much more therefore do husbands sin mortally
18446 if they have intercourse with their wives at a time when they should be intent on the sacred observances of the New Law.
18447 </p>
18448 <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p4">
18449 <b>On the contrary,</b> No circumstance aggravates infinitely. But undue time is a circumstance. Therefore it does not aggravate a sin infinitely,
18450 so as to make mortal what was otherwise venial.
18451 </p>
18452 <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p5">
18453 <b>I answer that,</b> To ask for the debt on a feast day is not a circumstance drawing a sin into another species; wherefore it cannot aggravate
18454 infinitely. Consequently a wife or husband does not sin mortally by asking for the debt on a feast day. It is however a more
18455 grievous sin to ask for the sake of mere pleasure, than through fear of the weakness of the flesh.
18456 </p>
18457 <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p6">
18458 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This woman was punished not because she paid the debt, but because afterwards she rashly intruded into the divine service
18459 against her conscience.
18460 </p>
18461 <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p7">
18462 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The authority quoted shows not that it is a mortal sin but that it is unbecoming. For under the Old Law which was given to
18463 a carnal people many things were required under an obligation of precept, for the sake of bodily cleanness, which are not
18464 required in the New Law which is the law of the spirit.
18465 </p>
18466 <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p8"></p>
18467 <p id="XP_Q64_A8-p9"></p>
18468 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A7.html"></a>
18469 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A9.html"></a>
18470 </div>
18471 <div id="XP_Q64_A9" class="div4">
18472 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A8.html"></a>
18473 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A10.html"></a>
18474 <h4 id="XP_Q64_A9-p0.1">Whether one spouse is bound to pay the debt to the other at a festal time?</h4>
18475 <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p1"></p>
18476 <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p2">
18477 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that neither are they bound to pay the debt at a festal time. For those who commit a sin as well as those who
18478 consent thereto are equally punished (
18479 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.32" target="asv">Rom. 1:32</a>). But the one who pays the debt consents with the one that asks, who sins. Therefore he sins also.
18480 </p>
18481 <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p3">
18482 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is an affirmative precept that binds us to pray, and therefore we are bound to do so at a fixed time. Therefore
18483 one ought not to pay the debt at a time when one is bound to pray, as neither ought one at a time when one is bound to fulfill
18484 a special duty towards a temporal master.
18485 </p>
18486 <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p4">
18487 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
18488 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A9-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:5</a>): "Defraud not one another, except by consent, for a time," etc. Therefore when one spouse asks the other must pay.
18489 </p>
18490 <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p5">
18491 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the wife has power of her husband's body, and "vice versa," with regard to the act of procreation, the one is bound
18492 to pay the debt to the other, at any season or hour, with due regard to the decorum required in such matters, for this must
18493 not be done at once openly.
18494 </p>
18495 <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p6">
18496 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As far as he is concerned he does not consent, but grants unwillingly and with grief that which is exacted of him; and consequently
18497 he does not sin. For it is ordained by God, on account of the weakness of the flesh, that the debt must always be paid to
18498 the one who asks lest he be afforded an occasion of sin.
18499 </p>
18500 <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p7">
18501 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No hour is fixed for praying, but that compensation can be made at some other hour; wherefore the argument is not cogent.
18502 </p>
18503 <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p8"></p>
18504 <p id="XP_Q64_A9-p9"></p>
18505 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A8.html"></a>
18506 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A10.html"></a>
18507 </div>
18508 <div id="XP_Q64_A10" class="div4">
18509 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A9.html"></a>
18510 <a href="summa.XP_Q65.html"></a>
18511 <h4 id="XP_Q64_A10-p0.1">Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times? [*This article is omitted in the Leonine edition.]</h4>
18512 <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p1"></p>
18513 <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p2">
18514 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that weddings ought not to be forbidden at certain times. For marriage is a sacrament: and the celebration
18515 of the others sacraments is not forbidden at those times. Therefore neither should the celebration of marriage be forbidden
18516 then.
18517 </p>
18518 <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p3">
18519 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, asking for the marriage debt is more unbecoming on feast days than the celebration of marriage. Yet the debt may
18520 be asked for on those days. Therefore also marriages may be solemnized.
18521 </p>
18522 <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p4">
18523 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, marriages that are contracted in despite of the law of the Church ought to be dissolved. Yet marriages are not dissolved
18524 if they be contracted at those times. Therefore it should not be forbidden by a commandment of the Church.
18525 </p>
18526 <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p5">
18527 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
18528 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q64_A10-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.5" target="asv">Eccles. 3:5</a>): "A time to embrace, and a time to be far from embraces."
18529 </p>
18530 <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p6">
18531 <b>I answer that,</b> When the newly married spouse is given to her husband, the minds of husband and wife are taken up with carnal preoccupations
18532 by reason of the very newness of things, wherefore weddings are wont to be signalized by much unrestrained rejoicing. On this
18533 account it is forbidden to celebrate marriages at those times when men ought especially to arise to spiritual things. Those
18534 times are from Advent until the Epiphany because of the Communion which, according to
18535 the ancient Canons, is wont to be made at Christmas (as was observed in its proper place,
18536 <a id="XP_Q64_A10-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.TP_Q30.html">TP, Q[30])</a>, from Septuagesima until the octave day of Easter, on account of the Easter Communion, and from the three days before the
18537 Ascension until the octave day of Pentecost, on account of the preparation for Communion to be received at that time.
18538 </p>
18539 <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p7">
18540 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The celebration of marriage has a certain worldly and carnal rejoicing connected with it, which does not apply to the other
18541 sacraments. Hence the comparison fails.
18542 </p>
18543 <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p8">
18544 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is not such a distraction of minds caused by the payment of a request for the debt as by the celebration of a marriage;
18545 and consequently the comparison fails.
18546 </p>
18547 <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p9">
18548 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since time is not essential to a marriage contracted within the forbidden seasons, the marriage is nevertheless a true sacrament.
18549 Nor is the marriage dissolved absolutely, but for a time, that they may do penance for having disobeyed the commandment of
18550 the Church. It is thus that we are to understand the statement of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 33), namely that should a marriage
18551 have been contracted or a wedding celebrated at the aforesaid times, those
18552 who have done so "ought to be separated." Nor does he say this on his own authority, but in reference to some canonical ordinance,
18553 such as that of the Council of Lerida, which decision is quoted by the Decretals.
18554 </p>
18555 <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p10"></p>
18556 <p id="XP_Q64_A10-p11"></p>
18557 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A9.html"></a>
18558 <a href="summa.XP_Q65.html"></a>
18559 </div>
18560 <a href="summa.XP_Q63_A2.html"></a>
18561 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A1.html"></a>
18562 </div>
18563 <div id="XP_Q65" class="div3">
18564 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A10.html"></a>
18565 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html"></a>
18566 <h3 id="XP_Q65-p0.1">OF PLURALITY OF WIVES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
18567 <p id="XP_Q65-p1"></p>
18568 <p id="XP_Q65-p2"> We must now consider the plurality of wives. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p>
18569 <p id="XP_Q65-p3"> (1) Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?</p>
18570 <p id="XP_Q65-p4"> (2) Whether this was ever lawful?</p>
18571 <p id="XP_Q65-p5"> (3) Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?</p>
18572 <p id="XP_Q65-p6"> (4) Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?</p>
18573 <p id="XP_Q65-p7"> (5) Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?</p>
18574 <div id="XP_Q65_A1" class="div4">
18575 <a href="summa.XP_Q65.html"></a>
18576 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A2.html"></a>
18577 <h4 id="XP_Q65_A1-p0.1">Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?</h4>
18578 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p1"></p>
18579 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p2">
18580 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not against the natural law to have several wives. For custom does not prejudice the law of nature.
18581 But "it was not a sin" to have several wives "when this was the custom," according to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xv) as quoted
18582 in the text (Sent. iv, D, 33). Therefore it is not contrary to the natural law to have several wives.
18583 </p>
18584 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p3">
18585 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever acts in opposition to the natural law, disobeys a commandment, for the law of nature has its commandments
18586 even as the written law has. Now Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xv; De Civ. Dei xv, 38) that "it was not contrary to a commandment"
18587 to have several wives, "because by no law was it forbidden." Therefore it is not against the natural law to have several wives.
18588 </p>
18589 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p4">
18590 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the begetting of offspring. But one man may get children of several women, by causing
18591 them to be pregnant. Therefore It is not against the natural law to have several wives.
18592 </p>
18593 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p5">
18594 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "Natural right is that which nature has taught all animals," as stated at the beginning of the Digests (1, i, ff.
18595 De just. et jure). Now nature has not taught all animals that one male should be united to but one female, since with many
18596 animals the one male is united to several females. Therefore it is not against the natural law to have several wives.
18597 </p>
18598 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p6">
18599 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i, 20), in the begetting of offspring the male is to the female
18600 as agent to patient, and as the craftsman is to his material. But it is not against the order of nature for one agent to act
18601 on several patients, or for one craftsman to work in several materials. Therefore neither is it contrary to the law of nature
18602 for one husband to have many wives.
18603 </p>
18604 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p7">
18605 <b>Objection 6:</b> On the contrary, That which was instilled into man at the formation of human nature would seem especially to belong to the
18606 natural law. Now it was instilled into him at the very formation of human nature that one man should have one wife, according
18607 to
18608 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.24" target="asv"> Gn. 2:24, </a> "They shall be two in one flesh." Therefore it is of natural law.
18609 </p>
18610 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p8">
18611 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, it is contrary to the law of nature that man should bind himself to the impossible, and that what is given to one
18612 should be given to another. Now when a man contracts with a wife, he gives her the power of his body, so that he is bound
18613 to pay her the debt when she asks. Therefore it is against the law of nature that he should afterwards give the power of his
18614 body to another, because it would be impossible for him to pay both were both to ask at the
18615 same time.
18616 </p>
18617 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p9">
18618 <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, "Do not to another what thou wouldst not were done to thyself" [*Cf.
18619 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.4.16" target="asv"> Tob. 4:16</a>] is a precept of the natural law. But a husband would by no means be willing for his wife to have another husband. Therefore
18620 he would be acting against the law of nature, were he to have another wife in addition.
18621 </p>
18622 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p10">
18623 <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, whatever is against the natural desire is contrary to the natural law. Now a husband's jealousy of his wife and
18624 the wife's jealousy of her husband are natural, for they are found in all. Therefore, since jealousy is "love impatient of
18625 sharing the beloved," it would seem to be contrary to the natural law that several wives should share one husband.
18626 </p>
18627 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p11">
18628 <b>I answer that,</b> All natural things are imbued with certain principles whereby they are enabled not only to exercise their proper actions,
18629 but also to render those actions proportionate to their end, whether such actions belong to a thing by virtue of its generic
18630 nature, or by virtue of its specific nature: thus it belongs to a magnet to be borne downwards by virtue of its generic nature,
18631 and to attract iron by virtue of its specific nature. Now just as in those things which
18632 act from natural necessity the principle of action is the form itself, whence their proper actions proceed proportionately
18633 to their end, so in things which are endowed with knowledge the principles of action are knowledge and appetite. Hence in
18634 the cognitive power there needs to be a natural concept, and in the appetitive power a natural inclination, whereby the action
18635 befitting the genus or species is rendered proportionate to the end. Now since man, of all animals, knows the aspect of the
18636 end, and the proportion of the action to the end, it follows that he is imbued with a natural concept, whereby he is directed
18637 to act in a befitting manner, and this is called "the natural law" or "the natural right," but in other animals "the natural
18638 instinct." For brutes are rather impelled by the force of nature to do befitting actions, than guided to act on their own
18639 judgment. Therefore the natural law is nothing else than a concept naturally instilled into man, whereby he is guided to act
18640 in a befitting manner in his proper actions, whether they are competent to him by virtue of his generic nature, as, for instance,
18641 to beget, to eat, and so on, or belong to him by virtue of his specific nature, as, for instance, to reason and so forth.
18642 Now whatever renders an action improportionate to the end which nature intends to obtain by a certain work is said to be contrary
18643 to the natural law. But an action may be improportionate either to the principal or to the secondary end, and in
18644 either case this happens in two ways. First, on account of something which wholly hinders the end; for instance a very great
18645 excess or a very great deficiency in eating hinders both the health of the body, which is the principal end of food, and aptitude
18646 for conducting business, which is its secondary end. Secondly, on account of something that renders the attainment of the
18647 principal or secondary end difficult, or less satisfactory, for instance eating inordinately in respect of undue time.
18648 Accordingly if an action be improportionate to the end, through altogether hindering the principal end directly, it is forbidden
18649 by the first precepts of the natural law, which hold the same place in practical matters, as the general concepts of the mind
18650 in speculative matters. If, however, it be in any way improportionate to the secondary end, or again to the principal end,
18651 as rendering its attainment difficult or less satisfactory, it is forbidden, not indeed by the first precepts of the
18652 natural law, but by the second which are derived from the first even as conclusions in speculative matters receive our assent
18653 by virtue of self-known principles: and thus the act in question is said to be against the law of nature.
18654 </p>
18655 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p12"> Now marriage has for its principal end the begetting and rearing of children, and this end is competent to man according
18656 to his generic nature, wherefore it is common to other animals (Ethic. viii, 12), and thus it is that the "offspring" is assigned
18657 as a marriage good. But for its secondary end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), it has, among men alone, the community
18658 of works that are a necessity of life, as stated above (
18659 <a id="XP_Q65_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html">Q[41], A[1]</a>). And in
18660 reference to this they owe one another "fidelity" which is one of the goods of marriage. Furthermore it has another end, as
18661 regards marriage between believers, namely the signification of Christ and the Church: and thus the "sacrament" is said to
18662 be a marriage good. Wherefore the first end corresponds to the marriage of man inasmuch as he is an animal: the second, inasmuch
18663 as he is a man; the third, inasmuch as he is a believer. Accordingly plurality of wives neither wholly destroys nor in any
18664 way hinders the first end of marriage, since one man is sufficient to get children of several wives, and to rear the children
18665 born of them. But though it does not wholly destroy the second end, it hinders it considerably for there cannot easily be
18666 peace in a family where several wives are joined to one husband, since one husband cannot suffice to satisfy the requisitions
18667 of several wives, and again because the sharing of several in one occupation is a cause of strife: thus "potters quarrel with
18668 one another" [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 4], and in like manner the several wives of one husband. The third end, it removes altogether,
18669 because as Christ is one, so also is the Church one. It is therefore evident from what has been said that plurality of wives
18670 is in a way against the law of nature, and in a way not against it.
18671 </p>
18672 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p13">
18673 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Custom does not prejudice the law of nature as regards the first precepts of the latter, which are like the general concepts
18674 of the mind in speculative matters. But those which are drawn like conclusions from these custom enforces, as Tully declares
18675 (De Inv. Rhet. ii), or weakens. Such is the precept of nature in the matter of having one wife.
18676 </p>
18677 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p14">
18678 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii), "fear of the law and religion have sanctioned those things that come from nature and are
18679 approved by custom." Wherefore it is evident that those dictates of the natural law, which are derived from the first principles
18680 as it were of the natural law, have not the binding force of an absolute commandment, except when they have been sanctioned
18681 by Divine or human law. This is what Augustine means by saying that "they did
18682 not disobey the commandments of the law, since it was not forbidden by any law."
18683 </p>
18684 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p15"> The Reply to the Third Objection follows from what has been said.</p>
18685 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p16">
18686 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Natural right has several significations. First a right is said to be natural by its principle, because it is instilled by
18687 nature: and thus Tully defines it (De Inv. Rhet. ii) when he says: "Natural right is not the result of opinion but the product
18688 of an innate force." And since even in natural things certain movements are called natural, not that they be from an intrinsic
18689 principle, but because they are from a higher moving principle---thus the
18690 movements that are caused in the elements by the impress of heavenly bodies are said to be natural, as the Commentator states
18691 (De Coelo et Mundo iii, 28), therefore those things that are of Divine right are said to be of natural right, because they
18692 are caused by the impress and influence of a higher principle, namely God. Isidore takes it in this sense, when he says (Etym.
18693 v) that "the natural right is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." Thirdly, right is said to be natural not
18694 only from its principle but also from its matter, because it is about natural things. And since nature is contradistinguished
18695 with reason, whereby man is a man, it follows that if we take natural right in its strictest sense, those things which are
18696 dictated by natural reason and pertain to man alone are not said to be of natural right, but only those which are dictated
18697 by natural reason and are common to man and other animals. Thus we have the aforesaid definition, namely: "Natural right is
18698 what nature has taught all animals." Accordingly plurality of wives, though not contrary to natural right taken in the third
18699 sense, is nevertheless against natural right taken in the second sense, because it is forbidden by the Divine law. It is also
18700 against natural right taken in the first sense, as appears from what has been said, for such is nature's dictate to every
18701 animal according to the mode befitting its nature. Wherefore also certain animals, the rearing of whose offspring demands
18702 the
18703 care of both, namely the male and female, by natural instinct cling to the union of one with one, for instance the turtle-dove,
18704 the dove, and so forth.
18705 </p>
18706 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p17"> The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what has been said.</p>
18707 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p18"> Since, however, the arguments adduced "on the contrary side" would seem to show that plurality of wives is against the first
18708 principles of the natural law, we must reply to them.
18709 </p>
18710 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p19"> Accordingly we reply to the Sixth Objection that human nature was founded without any defect, and consequently it is endowed
18711 not only with those things without which the principal end of marriage is impossible of attainment, but also with those without
18712 which the secondary end of marriage could not be obtained without difficulty: and in this way it sufficed man when he was
18713 first formed to have one wife, as stated above.
18714 </p>
18715 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p20">
18716 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> In marriage the husband gives his wife power of his body, not in all respects, but only in those things that are required
18717 by marriage. Now marriage does not require the husband to pay the debt every time his wife asks for it, if we consider the
18718 principal end for which marriage was instituted, namely the good of the offspring, but only as far as is necessary for impregnation.
18719 But in so far as it is instituted as a remedy (which is its secondary end),
18720 marriage does require the debt to be paid at all times on being asked for. Hence it is evident that by taking several wives
18721 a man does not bind himself to the impossible, considering the principal end of marriage; and therefore plurality of wives
18722 is not against the first principles of the natural law.
18723 </p>
18724 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p21">
18725 <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> This precept of the natural law, "Do not to another what thou wouldst not were done to thyself," should be understood with
18726 the proviso that there be equal proportion. For if a superior is unwilling to be withstood by his subject, he is not therefore
18727 bound not to withstand his subject. Hence it does not follow in virtue of this precept that as a husband is unwilling for
18728 his wife to have another husband, he must not have another wife: because for one
18729 man to have several wives is not contrary to the first principles of the natural law, as stated above: whereas for one wife
18730 to have several husbands is contrary to the first principles of the natural law, since thereby the good of the offspring which
18731 is the principal end of marriage is, in one respect, entirely destroyed, and in another respect hindered. For the good of
18732 the offspring means not only begetting, but also rearing. Now the begetting of offspring, though not wholly voided (since
18733 a
18734 woman may be impregnated a second time after impregnation has already taken place, as stated in De Gener. Animal. vii. 4),
18735 is nevertheless considerably hindered, because this can scarcely happen without injury either to both fetus or to one of them.
18736 But the rearing of the offspring is altogether done away, because as a result of one woman having several husbands there follows
18737 uncertainty of the offspring in relation to its father, whose care is necessary for its education. Wherefore the
18738 marriage of one wife with several husbands has not been sanctioned by any law or custom, whereas the converse has been.
18739 </p>
18740 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p22">
18741 <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> The natural inclination in the appetitive power follows the natural concept in the cognitive power. And since it is not so
18742 much opposed to the natural concept for a man to have several wives as for a wife to have several husbands, it follows that
18743 a wife's love is not so averse to another sharing the same husband with her, as a husband's love is to another sharing the
18744 same wife with him. Consequently both in man and in other animals the male is more
18745 jealous of the female than "vice versa."
18746 </p>
18747 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p23"></p>
18748 <p id="XP_Q65_A1-p24"></p>
18749 <a href="summa.XP_Q65.html"></a>
18750 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A2.html"></a>
18751 </div>
18752 <div id="XP_Q65_A2" class="div4">
18753 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html"></a>
18754 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A3.html"></a>
18755 <h4 id="XP_Q65_A2-p0.1">Whether it was ever lawful to have several wives?</h4>
18756 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p1"></p>
18757 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p2">
18758 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it can never have been lawful to have several wives. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7),
18759 "The natural law has the same power at all times and places." Now plurality of wives is forbidden by the natural law, as stated
18760 above
18761 <a id="XP_Q65_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore as it is unlawful now, it was unlawful at all times.
18762 </p>
18763 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p3">
18764 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it was ever lawful, this could only be because it was lawful either in itself, or by dispensation. If the former,
18765 it would also be lawful now; if the latter, this is impossible, for according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3), "as God
18766 is the founder of nature, He does nothing contrary to the principles which He has planted in nature." Since then God has planted
18767 in our nature the principle that one man should be united to one wife, it would seem
18768 that He has never dispensed man from this.
18769 </p>
18770 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p4">
18771 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a thing be lawful by dispensation, it is only lawful for those who receive the dispensation. Now we do not read
18772 in the Law of a general dispensation having been granted to all. Since then in the Old Testament all who wished to do so,
18773 without any distinction, took to themselves several wives, nor were reproached on that account, either by the law or by the
18774 prophets, it would seem that it was not made lawful by dispensation.
18775 </p>
18776 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p5">
18777 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where there is the same reason for dispensation, the same dispensation should be given. Now we cannot assign any
18778 other reason for dispensation than the multiplying of the offspring for the worship of God, and this is necessary also now.
18779 Therefore this dispensation would be still in force, especially as we read nowhere of its having been recalled.
18780 </p>
18781 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p6">
18782 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, in granting a dispensation the greater good should not be overlooked for the sake of a lesser good. Now fidelity
18783 and the sacrament, which it would seem impossible to safeguard in a marriage where one man is joined to several wives, are
18784 greater goods than the multiplication of the offspring. Therefore this dispensation ought not to have been granted with a
18785 view to this multiplication.
18786 </p>
18787 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p7">
18788 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated (
18789 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.19" target="asv">Gal. 3:19</a>) that the Law "was set because of transgressors [Vulg.: 'transgressions']," namely in order to prohibit them. Now the Old
18790 Law mentions plurality of wives without any prohibition thereof, as appears from
18791 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.15" target="asv"> Dt. 21:15, </a> "If a man have two wives," etc. Therefore they were not transgressors through having two wives; and so it was lawful.
18792 </p>
18793 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p8"> Further, this is confirmed by the example of the holy patriarchs, who are stated to have had several wives, and yet were
18794 most pleasing to God, for instance Jacob, David, and several others. Therefore at one time it was lawful.
18795 </p>
18796 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p9">
18797 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8), plurality of wives is said to be against the natural law, not as regards its first precepts,
18798 but as regards the secondary precepts, which like conclusions are drawn from its first precepts. Since, however, human acts
18799 must needs vary according to the various conditions of persons, times, and other circumstances, the aforesaid conclusions
18800 do not proceed from the first precepts of the natural law, so as to be binding in all
18801 cases, but only in the majority. for such is the entire matter of Ethics according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3,7). Hence,
18802 when they cease to be binding, it is lawful to disregard them. But because it is not easy to determine the above variations,
18803 it belongs exclusively to him from whose authority he derives its binding force to permit the non-observance of the law in
18804 those cases to which the force of the law ought not to extend, and this permission is called a dispensation. Now the law
18805 prescribing the one wife was framed not by man but by God, nor was it ever given by word or in writing, but was imprinted
18806 on the heart, like other things belonging in any way to the natural law. Consequently a dispensation in this matter could
18807 be granted by God alone through an inward inspiration, vouchsafed originally to the holy patriarchs, and by their example
18808 continued to others, at a time when it behooved the aforesaid precept not to be observed, in order to ensure the multiplication
18809 of
18810 the offspring to be brought up in the worship of God. For the principal end is ever to be borne in mind before the secondary
18811 end. Wherefore, since the good of the offspring is the principal end of marriage, it behooved to disregard for a time the
18812 impediment that might arise to the secondary ends, when it was necessary for the offspring to be multiplied; because it was
18813 for the removal of this impediment that the precept forbidding a plurality of wives was framed, as stated above
18814
18815 <a id="XP_Q65_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html">(A[1])</a>.
18816 </p>
18817 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p10">
18818 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The natural law, considered in itself, has the same force at all times and places; but accidentally on account of some impediment
18819 it may vary at certain times and places, as the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3,7) instances in the case of other natural things.
18820 For at all times and places the right hand is better than the left according to nature, but it may happen accidentally that
18821 a person is ambidextrous, because our nature is variable; and the same applies
18822 to the natural, just as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 3,7).
18823 </p>
18824 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p11">
18825 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In a Decretal (De divortiis, cap. Gaudemus) it is asserted that is was never lawful to have several wives without having
18826 a dispensation received through Divine inspiration. Nor is the dispensation thus granted a contradiction to the principles
18827 which God has implanted in nature, but an exception to them, because those principles are not intended to apply to all cases
18828 but to the majority, as stated. Even so it is not contrary to nature when certain
18829 occurrences take place in natural things miraculously, by way of exception to more frequent occurrences.
18830 </p>
18831 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p12">
18832 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Dispensation from a law should follow the quality of the law. Wherefore, since the law of nature is imprinted on the heart,
18833 it was not necessary for a dispensation from things pertaining to the natural law to be given under the form of a written
18834 law but by internal inspiration.
18835 </p>
18836 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p13">
18837 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When Christ came it was the time of the fulness of the grace of Christ, whereby the worship of God was spread abroad among
18838 all nations by a spiritual propagation. Hence there is not the same reason for a dispensation as before Christ's coming, when
18839 the worship of God was spread and safeguarded by a carnal propagation.
18840 </p>
18841 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p14">
18842 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The offspring, considered as one of the marriage goods, includes the keeping of faith with God, because the reason why it
18843 is reckoned a marriage good is because it is awaited with a view to its being brought up in the worship of God. Now the faith
18844 to be kept with God is of greater import than the faith to be kept with a wife, which is reckoned a marriage good, and than
18845 the signification which pertains to the sacrament, since the signification is
18846 subordinate to the knowledge of faith. Hence it is not unfitting if something is taken from the two other goods for the sake
18847 of the good of the offspring. Nor are they entirely done away, since there remains faith towards several wives; and the sacrament
18848 remains after a fashion, for though it did not signify the union of Christ with the Church as one, nevertheless the plurality
18849 of wives signified the distinction of degrees in the Church, which distinction is not only in the Church militant but
18850 also in the Church triumphant. Consequently their marriages signified somewhat the union of Christ not only with the Church
18851 militant, as some say, but also with the Church triumphant where there are "many mansions" [*
18852 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A2-p14.1" href="./asv.html#John.19.2" target="asv">Jn. 19:2</a>].
18853 </p>
18854 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p15"></p>
18855 <p id="XP_Q65_A2-p16"></p>
18856 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html"></a>
18857 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A3.html"></a>
18858 </div>
18859 <div id="XP_Q65_A3" class="div4">
18860 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A2.html"></a>
18861 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A4.html"></a>
18862 <h4 id="XP_Q65_A3-p0.1">Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?</h4>
18863 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p1"></p>
18864 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p2">
18865 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to have a concubine is not against the natural law. For the ceremonies of the Law are not of the natural
18866 law. But fornication is forbidden (
18867 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.29" target="asv">Acts 15:29</a>) in conjunction with ceremonies of the law which for the time were being imposed on those who were brought to the faith from
18868 among the heathens. Therefore simple fornication which is intercourse with a concubine is not against the natural law.
18869 </p>
18870 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p3">
18871 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, positive law is an outcome of the natural law, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Now fornication was not forbidden
18872 by positive law; indeed according to the ancient laws women used to be sentenced to be taken to brothels. Therefore it is
18873 not against the natural law to have a concubine.
18874 </p>
18875 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p4">
18876 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the natural law does not forbid that which is given simply, to be given for a time or under certain restrictions.
18877 Now one unmarried woman may give the power of her body for ever to an unmarried man, so that he may use her when he will.
18878 Therefore it is not against the law of nature, if she give him power of her body for a time.
18879 </p>
18880 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p5">
18881 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever uses his own property as he will, injures no one. But a bondswoman is her master's property. Therefore if
18882 her master use her as he will, he injures no one: and consequently it is not against the natural law to have a concubine.
18883 </p>
18884 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p6">
18885 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, everyone may give his own property to another. Now the wife has power of her husband's body (
18886 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:4</a>). Therefore if his wife be willing, the husband can have intercourse with another woman without sin.
18887 </p>
18888 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p7">
18889 <b>On the contrary,</b> According to all laws the children born of a concubine are children of shame. But this would not be so unless the union of
18890 which they are born were naturally shameful.
18891 </p>
18892 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p8"> Further, as stated above (
18893 <a id="XP_Q65_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q41_A1.html">Q[41], A[1]</a>), marriage is natural. But this would not be so if without prejudice to the natural law a man could be united to a woman
18894 otherwise than by marriage. Therefore it is against the natural law to have a concubine.
18895 </p>
18896 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p9">
18897 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
18898 <a id="XP_Q65_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, an action is said to be against the natural law, if it is not in keeping with the due end intended by nature, whether through
18899 not being directed thereto by the action of the agent, or through being directed thereto by the action of the agent, or through
18900 being in itself improportionate to that end. Now the end which nature intends in sexual union is the begetting and rearing
18901 of the offspring. and that this good
18902 might be sought after, it attached pleasure to the union; as Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 8). Accordingly to make
18903 use of sexual intercourse on account of its inherent pleasure, without reference to the end for which nature intended it,
18904 is to act against nature, as also is it if the intercourse be not such as may fittingly be directed to that end. And since,
18905 for the most part, things are denominated from their end, as being that which is of most consequence to them, just as the
18906 marriage
18907 union took its name from the good of the offspring [*Cf. Q[44], A[2]], which is the end chiefly sought after in marriage,
18908 so the name of concubine is expressive of that union where sexual intercourse is sought after for its own sake. Moreover even
18909 though sometimes a man may seek to have offspring of such an intercourse, this is not befitting to the good of the offspring,
18910 which signifies not only the begetting of children from which they take their being, but also their rearing and instruction,
18911 by which means they receive nourishment and learning from their parents, in respect of which three things the parents are
18912 bound to their children, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12). Now since the rearing and teaching of the children
18913 remain a duty of the parents during a long period of time, the law of nature requires the father and mother to dwell together
18914 for a long time, in order that together they may be of assistance to their children. Hence birds that unite together in
18915 rearing their young do not sever their mutual fellowship from the time when they first come together until the young are fully
18916 fledged. Now this obligation which binds the female and her mate to remain together constitutes matrimony. Consequently it
18917 is evident that it is contrary to the natural law for a man to have intercourse with a woman who is not married to him, which
18918 is the signification of a concubine.
18919 </p>
18920 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p10">
18921 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Among the Gentiles the natural law was obscured in many points: and consequently they did not think it wrong to have intercourse
18922 with a concubine, and in many cases practiced fornication as though it were lawful, as also other things contrary to the ceremonial
18923 laws of the Jews, though not contrary to the law of nature. Wherefore the apostles inserted the prohibition of fornication
18924 among that of other ceremonial observances, because in both cases there
18925 was a difference of opinion between Jews and Gentiles.
18926 </p>
18927 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p11">
18928 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This law was the result of the darkness just mentioned, into which the Gentiles had fallen, by not giving due honor to God
18929 as stated in
18930 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.21" target="asv"> Rom. 1:21, </a> and did not proceed from the instinct of the natural law. Hence, when the Christian religion prevailed, this law was abolished.
18931 </p>
18932 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p12">
18933 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In certain cases no evil results ensue if a person surrenders his right to a thing whether absolutely or for a time, so that
18934 in neither case is the surrender against the natural law. But that does not apply to the case in point, wherefore the argument
18935 does not prove.
18936 </p>
18937 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p13">
18938 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Injury is opposed to justice. Now the natural law forbids not only injustice, but also whatever is opposed to any of the
18939 virtues: for instance it is contrary to the natural law to eat immoderately, although by doing so a man uses his own property
18940 without injury to anyone. Moreover although a bondswoman is her master's property that she may serve him, she is not his that
18941 she may be his concubine. And again it depends how a person makes use of his
18942 property. For such a man does an injury to the offspring he begets, since such a union is not directed to its good, as stated
18943 above.
18944 </p>
18945 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p14">
18946 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The wife has power of her husband's body, not simply and in all respects, but only in relation to marriage, and consequently
18947 she cannot transfer her husband's body to another to the detriment of the good of marriage.
18948 </p>
18949 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p15"></p>
18950 <p id="XP_Q65_A3-p16"></p>
18951 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A2.html"></a>
18952 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A4.html"></a>
18953 </div>
18954 <div id="XP_Q65_A4" class="div4">
18955 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A3.html"></a>
18956 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A5.html"></a>
18957 <h4 id="XP_Q65_A4-p0.1">Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?</h4>
18958 <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p1"></p>
18959 <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p2">
18960 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine. For a lie is a greater sin than simple fornication:
18961 and a proof of this is that Juda, who did not abhor to commit fornication with Thamar, recoiled from telling a lie, saying
18962 (
18963 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.38.23" target="asv">Gn. 38:23</a>): "Surely she cannot charge us with a lie." But a lie is not always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is simple fornication.
18964 </p>
18965 <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p3">
18966 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a deadly sin should be punished with death. But the Old Law did not punish with death intercourse with a concubine,
18967 save in a certain case (
18968 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.25" target="asv">Dt. 22:25</a>). Therefore it is not a deadly sin.
18969 </p>
18970 <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p4">
18971 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), the sins of the flesh are less blameworthy than spiritual sins. Now pride
18972 and covetousness, which are spiritual sins, are not always mortal sins. Therefore fornication, which is a sin of the flesh,
18973 is not always a mortal sin.
18974 </p>
18975 <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p5">
18976 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where the incentive is greater the sin is less grievous, because he sins more who is overcome by a lighter temptation.
18977 But concupiscence is the greatest incentive to lust. Therefore since lustful actions are not always mortal sins, neither is
18978 simple fornication a mortal sin.
18979 </p>
18980 <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p6">
18981 <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but mortal sin excludes from the kingdom of God. But fornicators are excluded from the kingdom of God (
18982 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:9,10</a>). Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.
18983 </p>
18984 <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p7"> Further, mortal sins alone are called crimes. Now all fornication is a crime according to
18985 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.4.13" target="asv"> Tob. 4:13, </a> "Take heed to keep thyself . . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know crime." Therefore, etc.
18986 </p>
18987 <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p8">
18988 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have already stated (Sent. ii, D, 42
18989 <a id="XP_Q65_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q1_A4.html">, Q[1], A[4]</a>), those sins are mortal in their genus which violate the bond of friendship between man and God, and between man and man;
18990 for such sins are against the two precepts of charity which is the life of the soul. Wherefore since the intercourse of fornication
18991 destroys the due relations of the parent with the offspring that is nature's aim in sexual intercourse, there can be no doubt
18992 that simple fornication by its very nature is a mortal sin even though there were no written law.
18993 </p>
18994 <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p9">
18995 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It often happens that a man who does not avoid a mortal sin, avoids a venial sin to which he has not so great an incentive.
18996 Thus, too, Juda avoided a lie while he avoided not fornication. Nevertheless that would have been a pernicious lie, for it
18997 would have involved an injury if he had not kept his promise.
18998 </p>
18999 <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p10">
19000 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A sin is called deadly, not because it is punished with temporal, but because it is punished with eternal death. Hence also
19001 theft, which is a mortal sin, and many other sins are sometimes not punished with temporal death by the law. The same applies
19002 to fornication.
19003 </p>
19004 <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p11">
19005 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as not every movement of pride is a mortal sin, so neither is every movement of lust, because the first movements of
19006 lust and the like are venial sins, even sometimes marriage intercourse. Nevertheless some acts of lust are mortal sins, while
19007 some movements of pride are venial: since the words quoted from Gregory are to be understood as comparing vices in their genus
19008 and not in their particular acts.
19009 </p>
19010 <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p12">
19011 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A circumstance is the more effective in aggravating a sin according as it comes nearer to the nature of sin. Hence although
19012 fornication is less grave on account of the greatness of its incentive, yet on account of the matter about which it is, it
19013 has a greater gravity than immoderate eating, because it is about those things which tighten the bond of human fellowship,
19014 as stated above. Hence the argument does not prove.
19015 </p>
19016 <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p13"></p>
19017 <p id="XP_Q65_A4-p14"></p>
19018 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A3.html"></a>
19019 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A5.html"></a>
19020 </div>
19021 <div id="XP_Q65_A5" class="div4">
19022 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A4.html"></a>
19023 <a href="summa.XP_Q66.html"></a>
19024 <h4 id="XP_Q65_A5-p0.1">Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?</h4>
19025 <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p1"></p>
19026 <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p2">
19027 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it has been sometimes lawful to have a concubine. For just as the natural law requires a man to have but
19028 one wife, so does it forbid him to have a concubine. Yet at times it has been lawful to have several wives. Therefore it has
19029 also been lawful to have a concubine.
19030 </p>
19031 <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p3">
19032 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a woman cannot be at the same time a slave and a wife; wherefore according to the Law (
19033 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.11" target="asv">Dt. 21:11, </a> seqq.) a bondswoman gained her freedom by the very fact of being taken in marriage. Now we read that certain men who were
19034 most beloved of God, for instance Abraham and Jacob, had intercourse with their bondswomen. Therefore these were not wives,
19035 and consequently it was sometime lawful to have a concubine.
19036 </p>
19037 <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p4">
19038 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a woman who is taken in marriage cannot be cast out, and her son should have a share in the inheritance. Yet Abraham
19039 sent Agar away, and her son was not his heir (
19040 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.21.14" target="asv">Gn. 21:14</a>). Therefore she was not Abraham's wife.
19041 </p>
19042 <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p5">
19043 <b>On the contrary,</b> Things opposed to the precepts of the decalogue were never lawful. Now to have a concubine is against a precept of the decalogue,
19044 namely, "Thou shalt not commit adultery." Therefore it was never lawful.
19045 </p>
19046 <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p6"> Further, Ambrose says in his book on the patriarchs (De Abraham i, 4): "What is unlawful to a wife is unlawful to a husband."
19047 But it is never lawful for a wife to put aside her own husband and have intercourse with another man. Therefore it was never
19048 lawful for a husband to have a concubine.
19049 </p>
19050 <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p7">
19051 <b>I answer that,</b> Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) that before the time of the Law fornication was not a sin; and he proved his assertion
19052 from the fact that Juda had intercourse with Thamar. But this argument is not conclusive. For there is no need to excuse Jacob's
19053 sons from mortal sin, since they were accused to their father of a most wicked crime (
19054 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.37.2" target="asv">Gn. 37:2</a>), and consented kill Joseph and to sell him. Wherefore we must say that since it is against the natural law to
19055 have a concubine outside wedlock, as stated above
19056 <a id="XP_Q65_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, it was never lawful either in itself or by dispensation. For as we have shown (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) intercourse with a woman
19057 outside wedlock is an action improportionate to the good of the offspring which is the principal end of marriage: and consequently
19058 it is against the first precepts of the natural law which admit of no dispensation. Hence wherever in the Old Testament we
19059 read of concubines being taken by such
19060 men as we ought to excuse from mortal sin, we must needs understand them to have been taken in marriage, and yet to have been
19061 called concubines, because they had something of the character of a wife and something of the character of a concubine. In
19062 so far as marriage is directed to its principal end, which is the good of the offspring, the union of wife and husband is
19063 indissoluble or at least of a lasting nature, as shown above
19064 <a id="XP_Q65_A5-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, and in regard to this there is no
19065 dispensation. But in regard to the secondary end, which is the management of the household and community of works, the wife
19066 is united to the husband as his mate: and this was lacking in those who were known as concubines. For in this respect a dispensation
19067 was possible, since it is the secondary end of marriage. And from this point of view they bore some resemblance to concubines,
19068 and for this reason they were known as such.
19069 </p>
19070 <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p8">
19071 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8) to have several wives is not against the first precepts of the natural law, as it is to have
19072 a concubine; wherefore the argument does not prove.
19073 </p>
19074 <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p9">
19075 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The patriarchs of old by virtue of the dispensation which allowed them several wives, approached their bondswomen with the
19076 disposition of a husband towards his wife. For these women were wives as to the principal and first end of marriage, but not
19077 as to the other union which regards the secondary end, to which bondage is opposed since a woman cannot be at once mate and
19078 slave.
19079 </p>
19080 <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p10">
19081 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As in the Mosaic law it was allowable by dispensation to grant a bill of divorce in order to avoid wife-murder (as we shall
19082 state further on
19083 <a id="XP_Q65_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q67_A6.html">, Q[67], A[6]</a>), so by the same dispensation Abraham was allowed to send Agar away, in order to signify the mystery which the Apostle explains
19084 (
19085 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.22" target="asv">Gal. 4:22, </a> seqq.). Again, that this son did not inherit belongs to the mystery, as explained in the same place. Even so Esau,
19086 the son of a free woman, did not inherit (
19087 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q65_A5-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.13" target="asv">Rom. 9:13, </a> seqq.). In like manner on account of the mystery it came about that the sons of Jacob born of bond and free women inherited,
19088 as Augustine says (Tract. xi in Joan.) because "sons and heirs are born to Christ both of good ministers denoted by the free
19089 woman and of evil ministers denoted by the bondswoman."
19090 </p>
19091 <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p11"></p>
19092 <p id="XP_Q65_A5-p12"></p>
19093 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A4.html"></a>
19094 <a href="summa.XP_Q66.html"></a>
19095 </div>
19096 <a href="summa.XP_Q64_A10.html"></a>
19097 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html"></a>
19098 </div>
19099 <div id="XP_Q66" class="div3">
19100 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A5.html"></a>
19101 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A1.html"></a>
19102 <h3 id="XP_Q66-p0.1">OF BIGAMY AND OF THE IRREGULARITY CONTRACTED THEREBY (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
19103 <p id="XP_Q66-p1"></p>
19104 <p id="XP_Q66-p2"> In the next place we must consider bigamy and the irregularity contracted thereby. Under this head there are five points
19105 of inquiry:
19106 </p>
19107 <p id="XP_Q66-p3"> (1) Whether irregularity attaches to the bigamy that consists in having two successive wives?</p>
19108 <p id="XP_Q66-p4"> (2) Whether irregularity is contracted by one who has two wives at once?</p>
19109 <p id="XP_Q66-p5"> (3) Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin?</p>
19110 <p id="XP_Q66-p6"> (4) Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?</p>
19111 <p id="XP_Q66-p7"> (5) Whether a dispensation can be granted to a bigamous person?</p>
19112 <div id="XP_Q66_A1" class="div4">
19113 <a href="summa.XP_Q66.html"></a>
19114 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A2.html"></a>
19115 <h4 id="XP_Q66_A1-p0.1">Whether irregularity attaches to bigamy?</h4>
19116 <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p1"></p>
19117 <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p2">
19118 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that irregularity is not attached to the bigamy that consists in having two wives successively. For multitude
19119 and unity are consequent upon being. Since then non-being does not cause plurality, a man who has two wives successively,
19120 the one in being, the other in non-being, does not thereby become the husband of more than one wife, so as to be debarred,
19121 according to the Apostle (
19122 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.3.2" target="asv">1 Tim. 3:2</a>;
19123 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Titus.1.6" target="asv"> Titus 1:6</a>),
19124 from the episcopate.
19125 </p>
19126 <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p3">
19127 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man who commits fornication with several women gives more evidence of incontinence than one who has several wives
19128 successively. Yet in the first case a man does not become irregular. Therefore neither in the second should he become irregular.
19129 </p>
19130 <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p4">
19131 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if bigamy causes irregularity, this is either because of the sacrament, or because of the carnal intercourse. Now
19132 it is not on account of the former, for if a man had contracted marriage by words of the present and, his wife dying before
19133 the consummation of the marriage, he were to marry another, he would become irregular, which is against the decree of Innocent
19134 III (cap. Dubium, De bigamia). Nor again is it on account of the second, for then a man
19135 who had committed fornication with several women would become irregular: which is false. Therefore bigamy nowise causes irregularity.
19136 </p>
19137 <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p5">
19138 <b>I answer that,</b> By the sacrament of order a man is appointed to the ministry of the sacraments; and he who has to administer the sacraments
19139 to others must suffer from no defect in the sacraments. Now there is a defect in a sacrament when the entire signification
19140 of the sacrament is not found therein. And the sacrament of marriage signifies the union of Christ with the Church, which
19141 is the union of one with one. Therefore the perfect signification of the sacrament requires
19142 the husband to have only one wife, and the wife to have but one husband; and consequently bigamy, which does away with this,
19143 causes irregularity. And there are four kinds of bigamy: the first is when a man has several lawful wives successively; the
19144 second is when a man has several wives at once, one in law, the other in fact; the third, when he has several successively,
19145 one in law, the other in fact; the fourth, when a man marries a widow. Accordingly irregularity attaches to all of these.
19146 </p>
19147 <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p6"> There is another consequent reason assigned, since those who receive the sacrament of order should be signalized by the greatest
19148 spirituality, both because they administer spiritual things, namely the sacraments, and because they teach spiritual things,
19149 and should be occupied in spiritual matters. Wherefore since concupiscence is most incompatible with spirituality, inasmuch
19150 as it makes a man to be wholly carnal, they should give no sign of persistent concupiscence, which does
19151 indeed show itself in bigamous persons, seeing that they were unwilling to be content with one wife. The first reason however
19152 is the better.
19153 </p>
19154 <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p7">
19155 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multitude of several wives at the same time is a multitude simply, wherefore a multitude of this kind is wholly inconsistent
19156 with the signification of the sacrament, so that the sacrament is voided on that account. But the multitude of several successive
19157 wives is a multitude relatively, wherefore it does not entirely destroy the signification of the sacrament, nor does it void
19158 the sacrament in its essence but in its perfection, which is required
19159 of those who are the dispensers of sacraments.
19160 </p>
19161 <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p8">
19162 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although those who are guilty of fornication give proof of greater concupiscence, theirs is not a so persistent concupiscence,
19163 since by fornication one party is not bound to the other for ever; and consequently no defect attaches to the sacrament.
19164 </p>
19165 <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p9">
19166 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above, bigamy causes irregularity, because it destroys the perfect signification of the sacrament: which signification
19167 is seated both in the union of minds, as expressed by the consent, and in the union of bodies. Wherefore bigamy must affect
19168 both of these at the same time in order to cause irregularity. Hence the decree of Innocent III disposes of the statement
19169 of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 27), namely that consent alone by words of the
19170 present is sufficient to cause irregularity.
19171 </p>
19172 <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p10"></p>
19173 <p id="XP_Q66_A1-p11"></p>
19174 <a href="summa.XP_Q66.html"></a>
19175 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A2.html"></a>
19176 </div>
19177 <div id="XP_Q66_A2" class="div4">
19178 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A1.html"></a>
19179 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A3.html"></a>
19180 <h4 id="XP_Q66_A2-p0.1">Whether irregularity results from bigamy, when one husband has two wives, one in law, the other in fact?</h4>
19181 <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p1"></p>
19182 <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p2">
19183 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that irregularity does not result from bigamy when one husband has two wives at the same time, one in law and
19184 one in fact. For when the sacrament is void there can be no defect in the sacrament. Now when a man marries a woman in fact
19185 but not in law there is no sacrament, since such a union does not signify the union of Christ with the Church. Therefore since
19186 irregularity does not result from bigamy except on account of a defect in the sacrament,
19187 it would seem that no irregularity attaches to bigamy of this kind.
19188 </p>
19189 <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p3">
19190 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if a man has intercourse with a woman whom he has married in fact and not in law, he commits fornication if he has
19191 not a lawful wife, or adultery if he has. But a man does not become irregular by dividing his flesh among several women by
19192 fornication or adultery. Therefore neither does he by the aforesaid kind of bigamy.
19193 </p>
19194 <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p4">
19195 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it may happen that a man, before knowing carnally the woman he has married in law, marries another in fact and not
19196 in law, and knows her carnally, whether the former woman be living or dead. Now this man has contracted marriage with several
19197 women either in law or in fact, and yet he is not irregular, since he has not divided his flesh among several women. Therefore
19198 irregularity is not contracted by reason of the aforesaid kind of bigamy.
19199 </p>
19200 <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p5">
19201 <b>I answer that,</b> Irregularity is contracted in the two second kinds of bigamy, for although in the one there is no sacrament, there is a certain
19202 likeness to a sacrament. Wherefore these two kinds are secondary, and the first is the principal kind in causing irregularity.
19203 </p>
19204 <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p6">
19205 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although there is no sacrament in this case there is a certain likeness to a sacrament, whereas there is no such likeness
19206 in fornication or adultery. Hence the comparison fails.
19207 </p>
19208 <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p>
19209 <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p8">
19210 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In this case the man is not reckoned a bigamist, because the first marriage lacked its perfect signification. Nevertheless
19211 if, by the judgment of the Church, he be compelled to return to his first wife and carnally to know her, he becomes irregular
19212 forthwith, because the irregularity is the result not of the sin but of imperfect signification.
19213 </p>
19214 <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p9"></p>
19215 <p id="XP_Q66_A2-p10"></p>
19216 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A1.html"></a>
19217 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A3.html"></a>
19218 </div>
19219 <div id="XP_Q66_A3" class="div4">
19220 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A2.html"></a>
19221 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A4.html"></a>
19222 <h4 id="XP_Q66_A3-p0.1">Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin?</h4>
19223 <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p1"></p>
19224 <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p2">
19225 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that irregularity is not contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin. For a man's own defect is a greater
19226 impediment to him than the defect of another. But if the man himself who marries is not a virgin he does not become irregular.
19227 Therefore much less does he if his wife is not a virgin.
19228 </p>
19229 <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p3">
19230 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it may happen that a man marries a woman after corrupting her. Now, seemingly, such a man does not become irregular,
19231 since he has not divided his flesh among several, nor has his wife done so, and yet he marries a woman who is not a virgin.
19232 Therefore this kind of bigamy does not cause irregularity.
19233 </p>
19234 <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p4">
19235 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no man can become irregular except voluntarily. But sometimes a man marries involuntarily one who is not a virgin,
19236 for instance when he thinks her a virgin and afterwards, by knowing her carnally, finds that she is not. Therefore this kind
19237 does not always cause irregularity.
19238 </p>
19239 <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p5">
19240 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, unlawful intercourse after marriage is more guilty than before marriage. Now if a wife, after the marriage has been
19241 consummated, has intercourse with another man, her husband does not become irregular, otherwise he would be punished for his
19242 wife's sin. Moreover, it might happen that, after knowing of this, he pays her the debt at her asking, before she is accused
19243 and convicted of adultery. Therefore it would seem that this kind of bigamy does not
19244 cause irregularity.
19245 </p>
19246 <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p6">
19247 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Regist. ii, ep. 37): "We command thee never to make unlawful ordinations, nor to admit to holy orders a bigamist,
19248 or one who has married a woman that is not a virgin, or one who is unlettered, or one who is deformed in his limbs, or bound
19249 to do penance or to perform some civil duty, or who is in any state of subjection."
19250 </p>
19251 <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p7">
19252 <b>I answer that,</b> In the union of Christ with the Church unity is found on either side. Consequently whether we find division of the flesh
19253 on the part of the husband, or on the part of the wife, there is a defect of sacrament. There is, however, a difference, because
19254 on the part of the husband it is required that he should not have married another wife, but not that he should be a virgin,
19255 whereas on the part of the wife it is also required that she be a virgin. The reason
19256 assigned by those versed in the Decretals is because the bridegroom signifies the Church militant which is entrusted to the
19257 care of a bishop, and in which there are many corruptions, while the spouse signifies Christ Who was a virgin: wherefore virginity
19258 on the part of the spouse, but not on the part of the bridegroom, is required in order that a man be made a bishop. This reason,
19259 however, is expressly contrary to the words of the Apostle (
19260 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.25" target="asv">Eph. 5:25</a>): "Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also
19261 loved the Church," which show that the bride signifies the Church, and the bridegroom Christ; and again he says (
19262 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.23" target="asv">Eph. 5:23</a>): "Because the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church." Wherefore others say that Christ is
19263 signified by the bridegroom, and that the bride signifies the Church triumphant in which there is no stain. Also that the
19264 synagogue was first united to Christ as a concubine; so that the sacrament loses nothing of its signification
19265 if the bridegroom previously had a concubine. But this is most absurd, since just as the faith of ancients and of moderns
19266 is one, so is the Church one. Wherefore those who served God at the time of the synagogue belonged to the unity of the Church
19267 in which we serve God. Moreover this is expressly contrary to
19268 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A3-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Jer.3.14" target="asv"> Jer. 3:14, </a>
19269 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A3-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Ezek.16.8" target="asv">Ezech. 16:8, </a>
19270 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A3-p7.5" href="./asv.html#Hos.2.16" target="asv">Osee 2:16, </a> where the espousals of the synagogue are mentioned explicitly: so that she was not as a
19271 concubine but as a wife. Again, according to this, fornication would be the sacred sign [sacramentum] of that union, which
19272 is absurd. Wherefore heathendom, before being espoused to Christ in the faith of the Church, was corrupted by the devil through
19273 idolatry. Hence we must say otherwise that irregularity is caused by a defect in the sacrament itself. Now when corruption
19274 of the flesh occurs outside wedlock on account of a preceding marriage, it causes no defect in the sacrament on the part of
19275 the person corrupted, but it causes a defect in the other person, because the act of one who contracts marriage terminates
19276 not in himself, but in the other party, wherefore it takes its species from its term, which, moreover, in regard to that act,
19277 is the matter as it were of the sacrament. Consequently if a woman were able to receive orders, just as her husband becomes
19278 irregular through marrying one who is not a virgin, but not through his not being a virgin when he marries, so also would
19279 a
19280 woman become irregular if she were to marry a man who is not a virgin, but not if she were no longer a virgin when she married
19281 ---unless she had been corrupted by reason of a previous marriage.
19282 </p>
19283 <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p>
19284 <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p9">
19285 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In this case opinions differ. It is, however, more probable that he is not irregular, because he has not divided his flesh
19286 among several women.
19287 </p>
19288 <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p10">
19289 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Irregularity is not the infliction of a punishment, but the defect of a sacrament. Consequently it is not always necessary
19290 for bigamy to be voluntary in order to cause irregularity. Hence a man who marries a woman, thinking her to be a virgin, whereas
19291 she is not, becomes irregular by knowing her carnally.
19292 </p>
19293 <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p11">
19294 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If a woman commits fornication after being married, her husband does not become irregular on that account, unless he again
19295 knows her carnally after she has been corrupted by adultery, since otherwise the corruption of the wife nowise affects the
19296 marriage act of the husband. But though he be compelled by law to pay her the debt, or if he do so at her request, being compelled
19297 by his own conscience, even before she is convicted of adultery, he becomes
19298 irregular, albeit opinions differ on this point. However, what we have said is more probable, since here it is not a question
19299 of sin, but of signification only.
19300 </p>
19301 <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p12"></p>
19302 <p id="XP_Q66_A3-p13"></p>
19303 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A2.html"></a>
19304 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A4.html"></a>
19305 </div>
19306 <div id="XP_Q66_A4" class="div4">
19307 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A3.html"></a>
19308 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A5.html"></a>
19309 <h4 id="XP_Q66_A4-p0.1">Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?</h4>
19310 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p1"></p>
19311 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p2">
19312 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that bigamy is removed by Baptism. For Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to Titus (1:6, "the husband
19313 of one wife") that if a man has had several wives before receiving Baptism, or one before and another after Baptism, he is
19314 not a bigamist. Therefore bigamy is removed by Baptism.
19315 </p>
19316 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p3">
19317 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who does what is more, does what is less. Now Baptism removes all sin, and sin is a greater thing than irregularity.
19318 Therefore it removes irregularity.
19319 </p>
19320 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p4">
19321 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Baptism takes away all punishment resulting from an act. Now such is the irregularity of bigamy. Therefore, etc.
19322 </p>
19323 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p5">
19324 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a bigamist is irregular because he is deficient in the representation of Christ. Now by Baptism we are fully conformed
19325 to Christ. Therefore this irregularity is removed.
19326 </p>
19327 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p6">
19328 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the sacraments of the New Law are more efficacious than the sacraments of the Old Law. But the sacraments of the
19329 Old Law removed irregularities according to the Master's statement (Sent. iv,). Therefore Baptism also, being the most efficacious
19330 of the sacraments of the New Law, removes the irregularity consequent upon bigamy.
19331 </p>
19332 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p7">
19333 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii): "Those understand the question more correctly who maintain that a man who has married
19334 a second wife, though he was a catechumen or even a pagan at the time, cannot be ordained, because it is a question of a sacrament,
19335 not of a sin."
19336 </p>
19337 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p8"> Further, according to the same authority (De Bono Conjug. xviii) "a woman who has been corrupted while a catechumen or a
19338 pagan cannot after Baptism be consecrated among God's virgins." Therefore in like manner one who was a bigamist before Baptism
19339 cannot be ordained.
19340 </p>
19341 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p9">
19342 <b>I answer that,</b> Baptism removes sin, but does not dissolve marriage. Wherefore since irregularity results from marriage, it cannot be removed
19343 by Baptism, as Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii).
19344 </p>
19345 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p10">
19346 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this case Jerome's opinion is not followed: unless perhaps he wished to explain that he means that a dispensation should
19347 be more easily granted.
19348 </p>
19349 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p11">
19350 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It does not follow that what does a greater thing, does a lesser, unless it be directed to the latter. This is not so in
19351 the case in point, because Baptism is not directed to the removal of an irregularity.
19352 </p>
19353 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p12">
19354 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This must be understood of punishments consequent upon actual sin, which are, or have yet to be, inflicted: for one does
19355 not recover virginity by Baptism, nor again undivision of the flesh.
19356 </p>
19357 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p13">
19358 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Baptism conforms a man to Christ as regards the virtue of the mind, but not as to the condition of the body, which is effected
19359 by virginity or division of the flesh.
19360 </p>
19361 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p14">
19362 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Those irregularities were contracted through slight and temporary causes, and consequently they could be removed by those
19363 sacraments. Moreover the latter were ordained for that purpose, whereas Baptism is not.
19364 </p>
19365 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p15"></p>
19366 <p id="XP_Q66_A4-p16"></p>
19367 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A3.html"></a>
19368 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A5.html"></a>
19369 </div>
19370 <div id="XP_Q66_A5" class="div4">
19371 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A4.html"></a>
19372 <a href="summa.XP_Q67.html"></a>
19373 <h4 id="XP_Q66_A5-p0.1">Whether it is lawful for a bigamist to receive a dispensation?</h4>
19374 <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p1"></p>
19375 <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p2">
19376 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unlawful for a bigamist to be granted a dispensation. For it is said (Extra, De bigamis, cap. Nuper): "It is
19377 not lawful to grant a dispensation to clerics who, as far as they could do so, have taken to themselves a second wife."
19378 </p>
19379 <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p3">
19380 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is not lawful to grant a dispensation from the Divine law. Now whatever is in the canonical writings belongs
19381 to the Divine law. Since then in canonical Scripture the Apostle says (
19382 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q66_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.3.2" target="asv">1 Tim. 3:2</a>): "It behooveth . . . a bishop to be . . . the husband of one wife," it would seem that a dispensation cannot be granted
19383 in this matter.
19384 </p>
19385 <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p4">
19386 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one can receive a dispensation in what is essential to a sacrament. But it is essential to the sacrament of order
19387 that the recipient be not irregular, since the signification which is essential to a sacrament is lacking in one who is irregular.
19388 Therefore he cannot be granted a dispensation in this.
19389 </p>
19390 <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p5">
19391 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is reasonably done cannot be reasonably undone. If, therefore, a bigamist can lawfully receive a dispensation,
19392 it was unreasonable that he should be irregular: which is inadmissible.
19393 </p>
19394 <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p6">
19395 <b>On the contrary,</b> Pope Lucius granted a dispensation to the bishop of Palermo who was a bigamist, as stated in the gloss on can. Lector, dist.
19396 34.
19397 </p>
19398 <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p7"> Further, Pope Martin [*Martinus Bracarensis: cap. xliii] says: "If a Reader marry a widow, let him remain a Reader, or if
19399 there be need for it, he may receive the Subdiaconate, but no higher order: and the same applies if he should be a bigamist."
19400 Therefore he may at least receive a dispensation as far as the Subdiaconate.
19401 </p>
19402 <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p8">
19403 <b>I answer that,</b> Irregularity attaches to bigamy not by natural, but by positive law; nor again is it one of the essentials of order that
19404 a man be not a bigamist, which is evident from the fact that if a bigamist present himself for orders, he receives the character.
19405 Wherefore the Pope can dispense altogether from such an irregularity; but a bishop, only as regards the minor orders, though
19406 some say that in order to prevent religious wandering abroad he can dispense therefrom
19407 as regards the major orders in those who wish to serve God in religion.
19408 </p>
19409 <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p9">
19410 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This Decretal shows that there is the same difficulty against granting a dispensation in those who have married several wives
19411 in fact, as if they had married them in law; but it does not prove that the Pope has no power to grant a dispensation in such
19412 cases.
19413 </p>
19414 <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p10">
19415 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This is true as regards things belonging to the natural law, and those which are essential to the sacraments, and to faith.
19416 But in those which owe their institution to the apostles, since the Church has the same power now as then of setting up and
19417 of putting down, she can grant a dispensation through him who holds the primacy.
19418 </p>
19419 <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p11">
19420 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not every signification is essential to a sacrament, but that alone which belongs to the sacramental effect,* and this is
19421 not removed by irregularity. [*Leonine edition reads "officium," some read "effectum"; the meaning is the same, and is best
19422 rendered as above.]
19423 </p>
19424 <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p12">
19425 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In particular cases there is no ratio that applies to all equally, on account of their variety. Hence what is reasonably
19426 established for all, in consideration of what happens in the majority of cases, can be with equal reason done away in a certain
19427 definite case.
19428 </p>
19429 <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p13"></p>
19430 <p id="XP_Q66_A5-p14"></p>
19431 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A4.html"></a>
19432 <a href="summa.XP_Q67.html"></a>
19433 </div>
19434 <a href="summa.XP_Q65_A5.html"></a>
19435 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A1.html"></a>
19436 </div>
19437 <div id="XP_Q67" class="div3">
19438 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A5.html"></a>
19439 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A1.html"></a>
19440 <h3 id="XP_Q67-p0.1">OF THE BILL OF DIVORCE (SEVEN ARTICLES)</h3>
19441 <p id="XP_Q67-p1"></p>
19442 <p id="XP_Q67-p2"> We must now consider the bill of divorce, under which head there are seven points of inquiry:</p>
19443 <p id="XP_Q67-p3"> (1) Whether the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law?</p>
19444 <p id="XP_Q67-p4"> (2) Whether by dispensation it may become lawful to put away a wife?</p>
19445 <p id="XP_Q67-p5"> (3) Whether it was lawful under the Mosaic law?</p>
19446 <p id="XP_Q67-p6"> (4) Whether a wife who has been divorced may take another husband?</p>
19447 <p id="XP_Q67-p7"> (5) Whether the husband can marry again the wife whom he has divorced?</p>
19448 <p id="XP_Q67-p8"> (6) Whether the cause of divorce was hatred of the wife?</p>
19449 <p id="XP_Q67-p9"> (7) Whether the reasons for divorce had to be written on the bill?</p>
19450 <div id="XP_Q67_A1" class="div4">
19451 <a href="summa.XP_Q67.html"></a>
19452 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A2.html"></a>
19453 <h4 id="XP_Q67_A1-p0.1">Whether inseparableness of the wife is of natural law?</h4>
19454 <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p1"></p>
19455 <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p2">
19456 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that inseparableness of the wife is not of natural law. For the natural law is the same for all. But no law
19457 save Christ's has forbidden the divorcing of a wife. Therefore inseparableness of a wife is not of natural law.
19458 </p>
19459 <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p3">
19460 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sacraments are not of the natural law. But the indissolubility of marriage is one of the marriage goods. Therefore
19461 it is not of the natural law.
19462 </p>
19463 <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p4">
19464 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the union of man and woman in marriage is chiefly directed to the begetting, rearing, and instruction of the offspring.
19465 But all things are complete by a certain time. Therefore after that time it is lawful to put away a wife without prejudice
19466 to the natural law.
19467 </p>
19468 <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p5">
19469 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the good of the offspring is the principal end of marriage. But the indissolubility of marriage is opposed to the
19470 good of the offspring, because, according to philosophers, a certain man cannot beget offspring of a certain woman, and yet
19471 he might beget of another, even though she may have had intercourse with another man. Therefore the indissolubility of marriage
19472 is against rather than according to the natural law.
19473 </p>
19474 <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p6">
19475 <b>On the contrary,</b> Those things which were assigned to nature when it was well established in its beginning belong especially to the law of
19476 nature. Now the indissolubility of marriage is one of these things according to
19477 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.4" target="asv"> Mat. 19:4,6.</a> Therefore it is of natural law.
19478 </p>
19479 <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p7"> Further, it is of natural law that man should not oppose himself to God. Yet man would, in a way, oppose himself to God if
19480 he were to sunder "what God hath joined together." Since then the indissolubility of marriage is gathered from this passage
19481 (
19482 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.6" target="asv">Mat. 19:6</a>) it would seem that it is of natural law.
19483 </p>
19484 <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p8">
19485 <b>I answer that,</b> By the intention of nature marriage is directed to the rearing of the offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its
19486 whole life. Hence it is of natural law that parents should lay up for their children, and that children should be their parents'
19487 heirs (
19488 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:14</a>). Therefore, since the offspring is the common good of husband and wife, the dictate of the natural law requires the latter
19489 to live together for ever inseparably: and so the indissolubility
19490 of marriage is of natural law.
19491 </p>
19492 <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p9">
19493 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Christ's law alone brought mankind "to perfection" [*Cf.
19494 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.19" target="asv"> Heb. 7:19</a>] by bringing man back to the state of the newness of nature. Wherefore neither Mosaic nor human laws could remove all that
19495 was contrary to the law of nature, for this was reserved exclusively to "the law of the spirit of life" [*Cf.
19496 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.2" target="asv"> Rom. 8:2</a>].
19497 </p>
19498 <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p10">
19499 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Indissolubility belongs to marriage in so far as the latter is a sign of the perpetual union of Christ with the Church, and
19500 in so far as it fulfills an office of nature that is directed to the good of the offspring, as stated above. But since divorce
19501 is more directly incompatible with the signification of the sacrament than with the good of the offspring, with which it is
19502 incompatible consequently, as stated above (
19503 <a id="XP_Q67_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A2.html">Q[65],
19504 A[2]
19505 </a>, ad 5), the indissolubility of marriage is implied in the good of the sacrament rather than in the good of the offspring,
19506 although it may be connected with both. And in so far as it is connected with the good of the offspring, it is of the natural
19507 law, but not as connected with the good of the sacrament.
19508 </p>
19509 <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p11"> The Reply to the Third Objection may be gathered from what has been said.</p>
19510 <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p12">
19511 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Marriage is chiefly directed to the common good in respect of its principal end, which is the good of the offspring; although
19512 in respect of its secondary end it is directed to the good of the contracting party, in so far as it is by its very nature
19513 a remedy for concupiscence. Hence marriage laws consider what is expedient for all rather than what may be suitable for one.
19514 Therefore although the indissolubility of marriage hinder the good of the
19515 offspring with regard to some individual, it is proportionate with the good of the offspring absolutely speaking: and for
19516 this reason the argument does not prove.
19517 </p>
19518 <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p13"></p>
19519 <p id="XP_Q67_A1-p14"></p>
19520 <a href="summa.XP_Q67.html"></a>
19521 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A2.html"></a>
19522 </div>
19523 <div id="XP_Q67_A2" class="div4">
19524 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A1.html"></a>
19525 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A3.html"></a>
19526 <h4 id="XP_Q67_A2-p0.1">Whether it may have been lawful by dispensation to put away a wife?</h4>
19527 <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p1"></p>
19528 <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p2">
19529 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it could not be lawful by dispensation to put away a wife. For in marriage anything that is opposed to the
19530 good of the offspring is against the first precepts of the natural law, which admit of no dispensation. Now such is the putting
19531 away of a wife, as stated above
19532 <a id="XP_Q67_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q67_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore, etc.
19533 </p>
19534 <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p3">
19535 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a concubine differs from a wife especially in the fact that she is not inseparably united. But by no dispensation
19536 could a man have a concubine. Therefore by no dispensation could he put his wife away.
19537 </p>
19538 <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p4">
19539 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, men are as fit to receive a dispensation now as of old. But now a man cannot receive a dispensation to divorce his
19540 wife. Neither, therefore, could he in olden times.
19541 </p>
19542 <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p5">
19543 <b>On the contrary,</b> Abraham carnally knew Agar with the disposition of a husband towards his wife, as stated above (
19544 <a id="XP_Q67_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A5.html">Q[65], A[5]</a>, ad 2,3). Now by Divine command he sent her away, and yet sinned not. Therefore it could be lawful by dispensation for a
19545 man to put away his wife.
19546 </p>
19547 <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p6">
19548 <b>I answer that,</b> In the commandments, especially those which in some way are of natural law, a dispensation is like a change in the natural
19549 course of things: and this course is subject to a twofold change. First, by some natural cause whereby another natural cause
19550 is hindered from following its course: it is thus in all things that happen by chance less frequently in nature. In this way,
19551 however, there is no variation in the course of those natural things which happen
19552 always, but only in the course of those which happen frequently. Secondly, by a cause altogether supernatural, as in the case
19553 of miracles: and in this way there can be a variation in the course of nature, not only in the course which is appointed for
19554 the majority of cases, but also in the course which is appointed for all cases, as instanced by the sun standing still at
19555 the time of Josue, and by its turning back at the time of Ezechias, and by the miraculous eclipse at the time of Christ's
19556 Passion [*
19557 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Josh.10.14" target="asv">Jos. 10:14</a>;
19558 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 20:10</a>;
19559 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.8" target="asv"> Is. 38:8</a>;
19560 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A2-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.27.15" target="asv"> Mat. 27:15</a>]. In like manner the reason for a dispensation from a precept of the law of nature is sometimes found in the lower causes,
19561 and in this way a dispensation may bear upon the secondary precepts of the natural law, but not on the first precepts because
19562 these are always existent as it were, as stated above (
19563 <a id="XP_Q67_A2-p6.5" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q65_A1.html">Q[65], A[1]</a>) in reference to
19564 the plurality of wives and so forth. But sometimes this reason is found in the higher causes, and then a dispensation may
19565 be given by God even from the first precepts of the natural law, for the sake of signifying or showing some Divine mystery,
19566 as instanced in the dispensation vouchsafed to Abraham in the slaying of his innocent son. Such dispensations, however, are
19567 not granted to all generally, but to certain individual persons, as also happens in regard to miracles. Accordingly, if the
19568 indissolubility of marriage is contained among the first precepts of the natural law, it could only be a matter of dispensation
19569 in this second way; but, if it be one of the second precepts of the natural law, it could be a matter of dispensation even
19570 in the first way. Now it would seem to belong rather to the secondary precepts of the natural law. For the indissolubility
19571 of marriage is not directed to the good of the offspring, which is the principal end of marriage, except in so far as parents
19572 have to provide for their children for their whole life, by due preparation of those things that are necessary in life. Now
19573 this preparation does not pertain to the first intention of nature, in respect of which all things are common. And therefore
19574 it would seem that to put away one's wife is not contrary to the first intention of nature, and consequently that it is contrary
19575 not to the first but to the second precepts of the natural law. Therefore, seemingly, it can be a matter of dispensation
19576 even in the first way.
19577 </p>
19578 <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p7">
19579 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good of the offspring, in so far as it belongs to the first intention of nature, includes procreation, nourishment, and
19580 instruction, until the offspring comes to perfect age. But that provision be made for the children by bequeathing to them
19581 the inheritance or other goods belongs seemingly to the second intention of the natural law.
19582 </p>
19583 <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p8">
19584 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To have a concubine is contrary to the good of the offspring, in respect of nature's first intention in that good, namely
19585 the rearing and instruction of the child, for which purpose it is necessary that the parents remain together permanently;
19586 which is not the case with a concubine, since she is taken for a time. Hence the comparison fails. But in respect of nature's
19587 second intention, even the having of a concubine may be a matter of dispensation as
19588 evidenced by
19589 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.1" target="asv">Osee 1</a>.
19590 </p>
19591 <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p9">
19592 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although indissolubility belongs to the second intention of marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, it belongs to its
19593 first intention as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, from the moment it was made a sacrament of the Church, as long as it
19594 remains such it cannot be a matter of dispensation, except perhaps by the second kind of dispensation.
19595 </p>
19596 <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p10"></p>
19597 <p id="XP_Q67_A2-p11"></p>
19598 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A1.html"></a>
19599 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A3.html"></a>
19600 </div>
19601 <div id="XP_Q67_A3" class="div4">
19602 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A2.html"></a>
19603 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A4.html"></a>
19604 <h4 id="XP_Q67_A3-p0.1">Whether it was lawful to divorce a wife under the Mosaic law?</h4>
19605 <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p1"></p>
19606 <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p2">
19607 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it was lawful to divorce a wife under the Mosaic law. For one way of giving consent is to refrain from
19608 prohibiting when one can prohibit. It is also unlawful to consent to what is unlawful. Since then the Mosaic law did not forbid
19609 the putting away of a wife and did no wrong by not forbidding it, for "the law . . . is holy" (
19610 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.12" target="asv">Rom. 7:12</a>), it would seem that divorce was at one time lawful.
19611 </p>
19612 <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p3">
19613 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the prophets spoke inspired by the Holy Ghost, according to
19614 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.21" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:21.</a> Now it is written (
19615 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Mal.2.16" target="asv">Malachi 2:16</a>): "When thou shalt hate her, put her away." Since then that which the Holy Ghost inspires is not unlawful, it would seem
19616 that it was not always unlawful to divorce a wife.
19617 </p>
19618 <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p4">
19619 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that even as the apostles
19620 permitted second marriages, so Moses allowed the bill of divorce. But second marriages are not sinful. Therefore neither was
19621 it sinful under the Mosaic law to divorce a wife.
19622 </p>
19623 <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p5">
19624 <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, our Lord said (
19625 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.8" target="asv">Mat. 19:8</a>) that Moses granted the Jews the bill of divorce by reason of the hardness of their heart. But their hardness of heart did
19626 not excuse them from sin. Neither therefore did the law about the bill of divorce.
19627 </p>
19628 <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p6">
19629 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Chrysostom says [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "Moses, by granting
19630 the bill of divorce, did not indicate the justice of God, but deprived their sin of its guilt, for while the Jews acted as
19631 though they were keeping the law, their sin seemed to be no sin."
19632 </p>
19633 <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p7">
19634 <b>I answer that,</b> on this point there are two opinions. For some say that under the Law those who put away their wives, after giving them a
19635 bill of divorce, were not excused from sin, although they were excused from the punishment which they should have suffered
19636 according to the Law: and that for this reason Moses is stated to have permitted the bill of divorce. Accordingly they reckon
19637 four kinds of permission: one by absence of precept, so that when a greater good is not
19638 prescribed, a lesser good is said to be permitted: thus the Apostle by not prescribing virginity, permitted marriage (
19639 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 7</a>). The second is by absence of prohibition: thus venial sins are said to be permitted because they are not forbidden. The
19640 third is by absence of prevention, and thus all sins are said to be permitted by God, in so far as He does not prevent them
19641 whereas He can. The fourth is by omission of punishment, and in this way the bill of divorce was permitted in the Law, not
19642 indeed for the sake of obtaining a greater good, as was the dispensation to have several wives, but for the sake of preventing
19643 a greater evil, namely wife-murder to which the Jews were prone on account of the corruption of their irascible appetite.
19644 Even so they were allowed to lend money for usury to strangers, on account of corruption in their concupiscible appetite,
19645 lest they should exact usury of their brethren; and again on account of the corruption of suspicion in the reason they were
19646 allowed the sacrifice of jealousy, lest mere suspicion should corrupt their judgment. But because the Old Law, though it did
19647 not confer grace, was given that it might indicate sin, as the saints are agreed in saying, others are of opinion that if
19648 it had been a sin for a man to put away his wife, this ought to have been indicated to him, at least by the law or the prophets:
19649 "Show My people their wicked doings" (
19650 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.58.1" target="asv">Is. 58:1</a>): else they would seem to have been neglected, if those
19651 things which are necessary for salvation and which they knew not were never made known to them: and this cannot be admitted,
19652 because the righteousness of the Law observed at the time of the Law would merit eternal life. For this reason they say that
19653 although to put away one's wife is wrong in itself, it nevertheless became lawful by God's permitting it, and they confirm
19654 this by the authority of Chrysostom, who says [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]
19655 that "the Lawgiver by permitting divorce removed the guilt from the sin." Although this opinion has some probability the former
19656 is more generally held: wherefore we must reply to the arguments on both sides [*Cf.
19657 <a id="XP_Q67_A3-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q105_A4.html">FS, Q[105], A[4]</a>, ad 8;
19658 <a id="XP_Q67_A3-p7.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q108_A3.html">FS, Q[108], A[3]</a>, ad 2; Contra Gentes iii, cap. 123].
19659 </p>
19660 <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p8">
19661 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who can forbid, sins not by omitting to forbid if he has no hope of correcting, but fears by forbidding to furnish the
19662 occasion of a greater evil. Thus it happened to Moses: wherefore acting on Divine authority he did not forbid the bill of
19663 divorce.
19664 </p>
19665 <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p9">
19666 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The prophets, inspired by the Holy Ghost, said that a wife ought to be put away, not as though this were a command of the
19667 Holy Ghost, but as being permitted lest greater evils should be perpetrated.
19668 </p>
19669 <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p10">
19670 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This likeness of permission must not be applied to every detail, but only to the cause which was the same in both cases,
19671 since both permissions were granted in order to avoid some form of wickedness.
19672 </p>
19673 <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p11">
19674 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although their hardness of heart excused them not from sin, the permission given on account of that hardness excused them.
19675 For certain things are forbidden those who are healthy in body, which are not forbidden the sick, and yet the sick sin not
19676 by availing themselves of the permission granted to them.
19677 </p>
19678 <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p12">
19679 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A good may be omitted in two ways. First, in order to obtain a greater good, and then the omission of that good becomes virtuous
19680 by being directed to a greater good; thus Jacob rightly omitted to have only one wife, on account of the good of the offspring.
19681 In another way a good is omitted in order to avoid a greater evil, and then if this is done with the authority of one who
19682 can grant a dispensation, the omission of that good is not sinful, and yet
19683 it does not also become virtuous. In this way the indissolubility of marriage was suspended in the law of Moses in order to
19684 avoid a greater evil, namely wife-murder. Hence Chrysostom says that "he removed the guilt from the sin." For though divorce
19685 remained inordinate, for which reason it is called a sin, it did not incur the debt of punishment, either temporal or eternal,
19686 in so far as it was done by Divine permission: and thus its guilt was taken away from it. And therefore he says again
19687 [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "divorce was permitted, an evil indeed,
19688 yet lawful." Those who hold the first opinion understand by this only that divorce incurred the debt of temporal punishment.
19689 </p>
19690 <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p13"></p>
19691 <p id="XP_Q67_A3-p14"></p>
19692 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A2.html"></a>
19693 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A4.html"></a>
19694 </div>
19695 <div id="XP_Q67_A4" class="div4">
19696 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A3.html"></a>
19697 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A5.html"></a>
19698 <h4 id="XP_Q67_A4-p0.1">Whether it was lawful for a divorced wife to have another husband?</h4>
19699 <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p1"></p>
19700 <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p2">
19701 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it was lawful for a divorced wife to have another husband. For in divorce the husband did a greater wrong
19702 by divorcing his wife than the wife by being divorced. But the husband could, without sin, marry another wife. Therefore the
19703 wife could without sin, marry another husband.
19704 </p>
19705 <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p3">
19706 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine, speaking about bigamy, says (De Bono Conjug. xv, xviii) that "when it was the manner it was no sin."
19707 Now at the time of the Old Law it was the custom for a wife after divorce to marry another husband: "When she is departed
19708 and marrieth another husband," etc. Therefore the wife sinned not by marrying another husband.
19709 </p>
19710 <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p4">
19711 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our Lord showed that the justice of the New Testament is superabundant in comparison with the justice of the Old
19712 Testament (
19713 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Mat. 5</a>). Now He said that it belongs to the superabundant justice of the New Testament that the divorced wife marry not another
19714 husband (
19715 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.32" target="asv">Mat. 5:32</a>). Therefore it was lawful in the Old Law.
19716 </p>
19717 <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p5">
19718 <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, are the words of
19719 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.32" target="asv"> Mat. 5:32, </a> "He that shall marry her that is put away committeth adultery." Now adultery was never permitted in the Old Law. Therefore
19720 it was not lawful for the divorced wife to have another husband.
19721 </p>
19722 <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p6">
19723 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is written (
19724 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.3" target="asv">Dt. 24:3</a>) that a divorced woman who marries another husband "is defiled, and is become abominable before the Lord." Therefore she
19725 sinned by marrying another husband.
19726 </p>
19727 <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p7">
19728 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the first above mentioned opinion
19729 <a id="XP_Q67_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q67_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, she sinned by marrying another husband after being divorced, because her first marriage still held good. For "the woman
19730 . . . whilst her husband liveth, is bound to the law of her husband" (
19731 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.2" target="asv">Rom. 7:2</a>): and she could not have several husbands at one time. But according to the second opinion, just as it was lawful by virtue
19732 of the Divine dispensation for a
19733 husband to divorce his wife, so could the wife marry another husband, because the indissolubility of marriage was removed
19734 by reason of the divine dispensation: and as long as that indissolubility remains the saying of the Apostle holds.
19735 </p>
19736 <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p8"> Accordingly to reply to the arguments on either side:</p>
19737 <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p9">
19738 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It was lawful for a husband to have several wives at one time by virtue of the divine dispensation: wherefore having put
19739 one away he could marry another even though the former marriage were not dissolved. But it was never lawful for a wife to
19740 have several husbands. Wherefore the comparison fails.
19741 </p>
19742 <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p10">
19743 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In this saying of Augustine manner [mos] does not signify custom but good manners; in the same sense a person is said to
19744 have manners [morigeratus] because he has good manners; and "moral" philosophy takes its name from the same source.
19745 </p>
19746 <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p11">
19747 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our Lord shows the superabundance of the New Law over the Old in respect of the counsels, not only as regards those things
19748 which the Old Law permitted, but also as regards those things which were forbidden in the Old Law, and yet were thought by
19749 many to be permitted on account of the precepts being incorrectly explained---for instance that of the hatred towards our
19750 enemies. and so is it in the matter of divorce.
19751 </p>
19752 <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p12">
19753 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The saying of our Lord refers to the time of the New Law, when the aforesaid permission was recalled. In the same way we
19754 are to understand the statement of Chrysostom [*Hom. xii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom],
19755 who says that "a man who divorces his wife according to the law is guilty of four crimes: for in God's sight he is a murderer,"
19756 in so far as he has the purpose of killing his wife unless he divorce her; "and
19757 because he divorces her without her having committed fornication," in which case alone the law of the Gospel allows a man
19758 to put away his wife; "and again, because he makes her an adulteress, and the man whom she marries an adulterer."
19759 </p>
19760 <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p13">
19761 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A gloss observes here: "She is defiled and abominable, namely in the judgment of him who first put her away as being defiled,"
19762 and consequently it does not follow that she is defiled absolutely speaking; or she is said to be defiled just as a person
19763 who had touched a dead or leprous body was said to be unclean with the uncleanness, not of sin, but of a certain legal irregularity.
19764 Wherefore a priest could not marry a widow or a divorced woman.
19765 </p>
19766 <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p14"></p>
19767 <p id="XP_Q67_A4-p15"></p>
19768 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A3.html"></a>
19769 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A5.html"></a>
19770 </div>
19771 <div id="XP_Q67_A5" class="div4">
19772 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A4.html"></a>
19773 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A6.html"></a>
19774 <h4 id="XP_Q67_A5-p0.1">Whether a husband could lawfully take back the wife he had divorced?</h4>
19775 <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p1"></p>
19776 <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p2">
19777 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a husband could lawfully take back the wife he had divorced. For it is lawful to undo what was ill done.
19778 But for the husband to divorce his wife was ill done. Therefore it was lawful for him to undo it, by taking back his wife.
19779 </p>
19780 <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p3">
19781 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it has always been lawful to be indulgent to the sinner, because this is a moral precept, which obtains in every
19782 law. Now the husband by taking back the wife he had divorced was indulgent to one who had sinned. Therefore this also was
19783 lawful.
19784 </p>
19785 <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p4">
19786 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the reason given (
19787 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.4" target="asv">Dt. 24:4</a>) for its being unlawful to take back a divorced wife was "because she is defiled." But the divorced wife is not defiled except
19788 by marrying another husband. Therefore at least it was lawful to take back a divorced wife before she married again.
19789 </p>
19790 <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p5">
19791 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
19792 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.4" target="asv">Dt. 24:4</a>) that "the former husband cannot take her again," etc.
19793 </p>
19794 <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p6">
19795 <b>I answer that,</b> In the law concerning the bill of divorce two things were permitted, namely for the husband to put away the wife, and for
19796 the divorced wife to take another husband; and two things were commanded, namely that the bill of divorce should be written,
19797 and secondly that the husband who divorced his wife could not take her back. According to those who hold the first opinion
19798
19799 <a id="XP_Q67_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.XP_Q67_A3.html">(A[3])</a> this was done in punishment of the woman who married again,
19800 and that it was by this sin that she was defiled: but according to the others it was done that a husband might not be too
19801 ready to divorce his wife if he could nowise take her back afterwards.
19802 </p>
19803 <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p7">
19804 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In order to prevent the evil committed by a man in divorcing his wife, it was ordered that the husband could not take back
19805 his divorced wife, as stated above: and for this reason it was ordered by God.
19806 </p>
19807 <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p8">
19808 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It was always lawful to be indulgent to the sinner as regards the unkindly feelings of the heart, but not as regards the
19809 punishment appointed by God.
19810 </p>
19811 <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p9">
19812 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two opinions on this point. For some say that it was lawful for a divorced wife to be reconciled to her husband,
19813 unless she were joined in marriage to another husband. For then, on account of the adultery to which she had voluntarily yielded,
19814 it was assigned to her in punishment that she should not return to her former husband. Since, however, the law makes no distinction
19815 in its prohibition, others say that from the moment that she was put
19816 away she could not be taken back, even before marrying again, because the defilement must be understood not in reference to
19817 sin, but as explained above (A[4], ad 3).
19818 </p>
19819 <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p10"></p>
19820 <p id="XP_Q67_A5-p11"></p>
19821 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A4.html"></a>
19822 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A6.html"></a>
19823 </div>
19824 <div id="XP_Q67_A6" class="div4">
19825 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A5.html"></a>
19826 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A7.html"></a>
19827 <h4 id="XP_Q67_A6-p0.1">Whether the reason for divorce was hatred for the wife?</h4>
19828 <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p1"></p>
19829 <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p2">
19830 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason for divorce was hatred for the wife. For it is written (
19831 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.2.16" target="asv">Malachi 2:16</a>): "When thou shalt hate her put her away." Therefore, etc.
19832 </p>
19833 <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p3">
19834 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
19835 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.1" target="asv">Dt. 24:1</a>): "If . . . she find not favor in his eyes, for some uncleanness," etc. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.
19836 </p>
19837 <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p4">
19838 <b>Objection 3:</b> On the contrary, Barrenness and fornication are more opposed to marriage than hatred. Therefore they ought to have been reasons
19839 for divorce rather than hatred.
19840 </p>
19841 <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p5">
19842 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, hatred may be caused by the virtue of the person hated. Therefore, if hatred is a sufficient reason, a woman could
19843 be divorced on account of her virtue, which is absurd.
19844 </p>
19845 <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p6">
19846 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, "If a man marry a wife and afterwards hate her, and seek occasions to put her away"* alleging that she was not a
19847 virgin when he married her, should he fail to prove this, he shall be beaten, and shall be condemned in a hundred sicles of
19848 silver, and he shall be unable to put her away all the days of his life (
19849 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.13" target="asv">Dt. 22:13-19</a>). [*The rest of the passage is apparently quoted from memory.] Therefore hatred is not a sufficient reason for
19850 divorce.
19851 </p>
19852 <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p7">
19853 <b>I answer that,</b> It is the general opinion of holy men that the reason for permission being given to divorce a wife was the avoidance of wife-murder.
19854 Now the proximate cause of murder is hatred: wherefore the proximate cause of divorce was hatred. But hatred proceeds, like
19855 love, from a cause. Wherefore we must assign to divorce certain remote causes which were a cause of hatred. For Augustine
19856 says in his gloss (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 14): "In the Law there were many
19857 causes for divorcing a wife: Christ admitted none but fornication: and He commands other grievances to be borne for conjugal
19858 fidelity and chastity." Such causes are imperfections either of body, as sickness or some notable deformity, or in soul as
19859 fornication or the like which amounts to moral depravity. Some, however, restrict these causes within narrower limits, saying
19860 with sufficient probability that it was not lawful to divorce a wife except for some cause subsequent to the marriage; and
19861 that not even then could it be done for any such cause, but only for such as could hinder the good of the offspring, whether
19862 in body as barrenness, or leprosy and the like, or in soul, for instance if she were a woman of wicked habits which her children
19863 through continual contact with her would imitate. There is however a gloss on
19864 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.1" target="asv"> Dt. 24:1, </a> "If . . . she find not favor in his eyes," which would seem to restrict them yet more, namely to sin, by saying that there
19865 "uncleanness"
19866 denotes sin: but "sin" in the gloss refers not only to the morality of the soul but also to the condition of the body. Accordingly
19867 we grant the first two objections.
19868 </p>
19869 <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p8">
19870 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Barrenness and other like things are causes of hatred, and so they are remote causes of divorce.
19871 </p>
19872 <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p9">
19873 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No one is hateful on account of virtue as such, because goodness is the cause of love. Wherefore the argument does not hold.
19874 </p>
19875 <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p10">
19876 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The husband was punished in that case by being unable to put away his wife for ever, just as in the case when he had corrupted
19877 a maid (
19878 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q67_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.28" target="asv">Dt. 22:28-30</a>).
19879 </p>
19880 <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p11"></p>
19881 <p id="XP_Q67_A6-p12"></p>
19882 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A5.html"></a>
19883 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A7.html"></a>
19884 </div>
19885 <div id="XP_Q67_A7" class="div4">
19886 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A6.html"></a>
19887 <a href="summa.XP_Q68.html"></a>
19888 <h4 id="XP_Q67_A7-p0.1">Whether the causes of divorce had to be written in the bill?</h4>
19889 <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p1"></p>
19890 <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p2">
19891 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the causes of divorce had to be written in the bill: because the husband was absolved from the punishment
19892 of the law by the written bill of divorce. But this would seem altogether unjust, unless sufficient causes were alleged for
19893 a divorce. Therefore it was necessary for them to be written in the bill.
19894 </p>
19895 <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p3">
19896 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, seemingly this document was of no use except to show the causes for divorce. Therefore, if they were not written
19897 down, the bill was delivered for no purpose.
19898 </p>
19899 <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p4">
19900 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Master says that it was so in the text (Sent. iv, D, 33).
19901 </p>
19902 <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p5">
19903 <b>On the contrary,</b> The causes for divorce were either sufficient or not. If they were sufficient, the wife was debarred from a second marriage,
19904 though this was allowed her by the Law. If they were insufficient, the divorce was proved to be unjust, and therefore could
19905 not be effected. Therefore the causes for divorce were by no means particularized in the bill.
19906 </p>
19907 <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p6">
19908 <b>I answer that,</b> The causes for divorce were not particularized in the bill, but were indicated in a general way, so as to prove the justice
19909 of the divorce. According to Josephus (Antiq. iv, 6) this was in order that the woman, having the written bill of divorce,
19910 might take another husband, else she would not have been believed. Wherefore according to him it was written in this wise:
19911 "I promise never to have thee with me again." But according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xix,
19912 26) the bill was put into writing in order to cause a delay, and that the husband might be dissuaded by the counsel of the
19913 notaries to refrain from his purpose of divorce.
19914 </p>
19915 <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p7"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
19916 <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p8"></p>
19917 <p id="XP_Q67_A7-p9"></p>
19918 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A6.html"></a>
19919 <a href="summa.XP_Q68.html"></a>
19920 </div>
19921 <a href="summa.XP_Q66_A5.html"></a>
19922 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A1.html"></a>
19923 </div>
19924 <div id="XP_Q68" class="div3">
19925 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A7.html"></a>
19926 <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A1.html"></a>
19927 <h3 id="XP_Q68-p0.1">OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
19928 <p id="XP_Q68-p1"></p>
19929 <p id="XP_Q68-p2"> We must now consider children of illegitimate birth. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
19930 <p id="XP_Q68-p3"> (1) Whether those born out of true marriage are illegitimate?</p>
19931 <p id="XP_Q68-p4"> (2) Whether children should suffer any loss through being illegitimate?</p>
19932 <p id="XP_Q68-p5"> (3) Whether they can be legitimized?</p>
19933 <div id="XP_Q68_A1" class="div4">
19934 <a href="summa.XP_Q68.html"></a>
19935 <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A2.html"></a>
19936 <h4 id="XP_Q68_A1-p0.1">Whether children born out of true marriage are illegitimate?</h4>
19937 <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p1"></p>
19938 <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p2">
19939 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that children born out of true marriage are legitimate. For he that is born according to law is called a legitimate
19940 son. Now everyone is born according to law, at least the law of nature, which has more force than any other. Therefore every
19941 child is to be called legitimate.
19942 </p>
19943 <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p3">
19944 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is the common saying that a legitimate child is one born of a legitimate marriage, or of a marriage that is deemed
19945 legitimate in the eyes of the Church. Now it happens sometimes that a marriage is deemed legitimate in the eyes of the Church,
19946 whereas there is some impediment affecting its validity; which impediment may be known to the parties who marry in the presence
19947 of the Church: or they may marry in secret and be ignorant of the impediment, in
19948 which case their marriage would seem legitimate in the eyes of the Church, for the very reason that it is not prevented by
19949 the Church. Therefore children born out of true marriage are not illegitimate.
19950 </p>
19951 <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p4">
19952 <b>On the contrary,</b> Illegitimate is that which is against the law. Now those who are born out of wedlock are born contrary to the law. Therefore
19953 they are illegitimate.
19954 </p>
19955 <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p5">
19956 <b>I answer that,</b> Children are of four conditions. Some are natural and legitimate, for instance those who are born of a true and lawful marriage;
19957 some are natural and illegitimate, as those who are born of fornication; some are legitimate and not natural, as adopted children;
19958 some are neither legitimate nor natural; such are those born of adultery or incest, for these are born not only against the
19959 positive law, but against the express natural law. Hence we must grant that
19960 some children are illegitimate.
19961 </p>
19962 <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p6">
19963 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although those who are born of an unlawful intercourse are born according to the nature common to man and all animals, they
19964 are born contrary to the law of nature which is proper to man: since fornication, adultery, and the like are contrary to the
19965 law of nature. Hence the like are not legitimate by any law.
19966 </p>
19967 <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p7">
19968 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Ignorance, unless it be affected, excuses unlawful intercourse from sin. Wherefore those who contract together in good faith
19969 in the presence of the Church, although there be an impediment, of which however they are ignorant, sin not, nor are their
19970 children illegitimate. If, however, they know of the impediment, although the Church upholds their marriage because she knows
19971 not of the impediment, they are not excused from sin, nor do their children avoid
19972 being illegitimate. Neither are they excused if they know not of the impediment and marry secretly, because such ignorance
19973 would appear to be affected.
19974 </p>
19975 <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p8"></p>
19976 <p id="XP_Q68_A1-p9"></p>
19977 <a href="summa.XP_Q68.html"></a>
19978 <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A2.html"></a>
19979 </div>
19980 <div id="XP_Q68_A2" class="div4">
19981 <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A1.html"></a>
19982 <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A3.html"></a>
19983 <h4 id="XP_Q68_A2-p0.1">Whether children should suffer any loss through being illegitimate?</h4>
19984 <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p1"></p>
19985 <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p2">
19986 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that children ought not to suffer any loss through being illegitimate. For a child should not be punished on
19987 account of his father's sin, according to the Lord's saying (
19988 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q68_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>). But it is not his own but his father's fault that he is born of an unlawful union. Therefore he should not incur a loss
19989 on this account.
19990 </p>
19991 <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p3">
19992 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human justice is copied from Divine. Now God confers natural goods equally on legitimate and illegitimate children.
19993 Therefore illegitimate should be equalled to legitimate children according to human laws.
19994 </p>
19995 <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p4">
19996 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated (
19997 <a class="scripRef" id="XP_Q68_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.25.5" target="asv">Gn. 25:5,6</a>) that "Abraham gave all his possessions to Isaac, and that to the children of the concubines he gave gifts": and yet the
19998 latter were not born of an unlawful intercourse. Much more, therefore, ought those born of an unlawful intercourse to incur
19999 loss by not inheriting their father's property.
20000 </p>
20001 <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p5">
20002 <b>I answer that,</b> A person is said to incur a loss for some cause in two ways: First, because he is deprived of his due, and thus an illegitimate
20003 child incurs no loss. Secondly, because something is not due to him, which might have been due otherwise, and thus an illegitimate
20004 son incurs a twofold loss. First because he is excluded from legitimate acts such as offices and dignities, which require
20005 a certain respectability in those who perform them. Secondly, he incurs a loss by
20006 not succeeding to his father's inheritance. Nevertheless natural sons can inherit a sixth only, whereas spurious children
20007 cannot inherit any portion, although by natural law their parents are bound to provide for their needs. Hence it is part of
20008 a bishop's care to compel both parents to provide for them.
20009 </p>
20010 <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p6">
20011 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To incur a loss in this second way is not a punishment. Hence we do not say that a person is punished by not succeeding to
20012 the throne through not being the king's son. In like manner it is no punishment to an illegitimate child that he has no right
20013 to that which belongs to the legitimate children.
20014 </p>
20015 <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p7">
20016 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Illegitimate intercourse is contrary to the law, not as an act of the generative power, but as proceeding from a wicked will.
20017 Hence an illegitimate son incurs a loss, not in those things which come to him by his natural origin, but in those things
20018 which are dependent on the will for being done or possessed.
20019 </p>
20020 <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p8"></p>
20021 <p id="XP_Q68_A2-p9"></p>
20022 <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A1.html"></a>
20023 <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A3.html"></a>
20024 </div>
20025 <div id="XP_Q68_A3" class="div4">
20026 <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A2.html"></a>
20027 <a href="summa.XP.iii.html"></a>
20028 <h4 id="XP_Q68_A3-p0.1">Whether an illegitimate son can be legitimized?</h4>
20029 <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p1"></p>
20030 <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p2">
20031 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an illegitimate son cannot be legitimized. For the legitimate child is as far removed from the illegitimate
20032 as the illegitimate from the legitimate. But a legitimate child is never made illegitimate. Neither, therefore, is an illegitimate
20033 child ever made legitimate.
20034 </p>
20035 <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p3">
20036 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, illegitimate intercourse begets an illegitimate child. But illegitimate intercourse never becomes legitimate. Neither,
20037 therefore, can an illegitimate son become legitimate.
20038 </p>
20039 <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p4">
20040 <b>On the contrary,</b> What is done by the law can be undone by the law. Now the illegitimacy of children is an effect of positive law. Therefore
20041 an illegitimate child can be legitimized by one who has legal authority.
20042 </p>
20043 <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p5">
20044 <b>I answer that,</b> An illegitimate child can be legitimized, not so that he be born of a legitimate intercourse, because this intercourse is
20045 a thing of the past and can never be legitimized from the moment that it was once illegitimate. But the child is said to be
20046 legitimized, in so far as the losses which an illegitimate child ought to incur are withdrawn by the authority of the law.
20047 </p>
20048 <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p6"> There are six ways of becoming legitimate: two according to the canons (Cap. Conquestus; Cap. Tanta), namely when a man marries
20049 the woman of whom he has an unlawful child (if it were not a case of adultery), and by special indulgence and dispensation
20050 of the lord Pope. The other four ways are according to the laws: (1) If the father offer his natural son to the emperor's
20051 court, for by this very fact the son is legitimate on account of the reputation of the court; (2) if the
20052 father designate him in his will as his legitimate heir, and the son afterwards offer the will to the emperor; (3) if there
20053 be no legitimate son and the son himself offer himself to the emperor; (4) if the father designate him as legitimate in a
20054 public document or in a document signed by three witnesses, without calling him natural.
20055 </p>
20056 <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p7">
20057 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A favor may be bestowed on a person without injustice, but a person cannot be damnified except for a fault. Hence an illegitimate
20058 child can be legitimized rather than "vice versa"; for although a legitimate son is sometimes deprived of his inheritance
20059 on account of his fault, he is not said to be illegitimate, because he was legitimately begotten.
20060 </p>
20061 <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p8">
20062 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Illegitimate intercourse has an inherent inseparable defect whereby it is opposed to the law: and consequently it cannot
20063 be legitimized. Nor is there any comparison with an illegitimate child who has no such defect.
20064 </p>
20065 <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p9"></p>
20066 <p id="XP_Q68_A3-p10"></p>
20067 <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A2.html"></a>
20068 <a href="summa.XP.iii.html"></a>
20069 </div>
20070 <a href="summa.XP_Q67_A7.html"></a>
20071 <a href="summa.XP_Q68_A1.html"></a>
20072 </div>
20073 <a href="summa.XP.i.html"></a>
20074 <a href="summa.XP_Q1.html"></a>
20075 `
20076 </div>